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1. Principal Vectors of Russian Diplomacy in the Post-Soviet Space

Author:
O. Lebedeva
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
ThE DISINTEGRATION of the Soviet Union has led to a new geopolit- ical zone appearing on the world map – the so-called post-Soviet space where Russia plays a dominant role even though post-Soviet countries have different development paths, political regimes and economies. Amid the escalating relations between Russia and the West, the pressing prob- lem for Russia right now is to build relations with its immediate neigh- bors. Therefore, maintaining diplomatic relations with post-Soviet coun- tries is an important geopolitical goal for Russia, since this is a zone of strategic economic and political interests. however, not only Russia is interested in establishing strong diplomatic ties but also former Soviet countries. This is largely because Russia is at the center of the post-Soviet space, with many countries, including EaEU member states, pursuing trade and economic relations via Russia.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Conflict, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Asia, and Post-Soviet Europe

2. Russia and the Post-Soviet Space: Partners or Rivals?

Author:
Grigory Karasin
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
This interview discusses Russia's relationships with its neighbours.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Moldavia

3. U.S. Complicity in the 2014 Coup in Kiev as a Violation of International Law

Author:
A. Vyleghanin and K. Kritsky
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
FIVE YEARS AGO, a coup d’état took place in Kiev. Following demon- strations and arson attacks, a mob seized several government institutions, including the administration building and residence of the constitutional- ly elected president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich. Some members of the Ukrainian president’s security detail who were protecting his residence from illegal seizure were wounded and killed.1 Alexander Turchinov, one of the coup leaders, began serving as the president of Ukraine even though no Ukrainian presidential election had been held. The coup in Kiev led primarily to the U.S. assuming a leading role in Ukraine’s governance – something it had neither during the period of the Russian Empire nor the Soviet era. The February 2014 overthrow of the president in Kiev that took place without elections and in violation of the Ukrainian Constitution de facto divided the country into regions that recognized the new authorities in Kiev and those that opposed the coup (primarily the southern and eastern regions of Ukraine). This occurred not only because the Ukrainian presi- dent was unconstitutionally removed from power but primarily because the “installation” of the putschist government was accompanied by vio- lence, and ethnic and linguistic persecution. In March 2014, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea left the new, “post-coup” Ukraine in accordance with the provision of the UN Charter on the right of peoples to self-determination. Subsequently, following a referendum in Crimea, a treaty on Crimea’s reunification with Russia was signed. A confrontation between the new regime in Kiev* and residents of Donetsk and Lugansk Regions turned into a protracted armed conflict. The forcible replacement in Kiev of a constitutionally elected head of state (Yanukovich) with an unconstitutional leader (Turchinov) directly impacted Russia’s national interests. Russians and Ukrainians lived together within a single state, the Russian Empire, from the 17th century until 1917. During the Soviet period, the border between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic did not have international legal significance. It was an administrative bor- der. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the independent UN member states (Russia and Ukraine) that replaced them continued to maintain close economic and other ties. Their continued integration, including through joint participation in the Customs Union, objectively met the strategic interests of Ukraine and Russia. A friendly Ukraine is also important to Russia from a national securi- ty standpoint, considering NATO’s expansion toward Russia’s borders that began in the early 1990s – i.e., NATO’s absorption of all former member states of the Warsaw Pact, including Poland and even the former Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Russia’s leadership has repeatedly stressed the inadmissibility of dragging Ukraine into NATO. Words about “fraternal” relations between the peoples of Russia and Ukraine are no exaggeration: Millions of family members (both Russians and Ukrainians) live on opposite sides of the Russian-Ukrainian border,2 and at least one-third of Ukraine’s population speaks Russian as a native language. In this context, it is not surprising that Moscow considered the U.S.- orchestrated seizure of power from the head of state in Kiev an event affecting its vital interests. Something else is remarkable: The U.S. administration said that the events in Ukraine, far away from the American mainland, “constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.”4 Westerners promulgated a very different assessment of the forced ouster of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich in 2014. The U.S. called it a “people’s rev- olution” and said that the mob action organized in part by the U.S. ambas- sador in Kiev (including the killing of Berkut fighters, the state guard of the Ukrainian president) was a legitimate way of expressing the will of the “Ukrainian people.”
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Law, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, South America, Syria, Venezuela, North America, and United States of America

4. Russia’s Position on Territorial Conflicts in East Asia

Author:
Dmitry Streltsov
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
ruSSiA’S poSition on territorial and border conflicts in east Asia arouses great interest. Most of these conflicts have deep roots in and are consequences of the cold War, primarily stemming from legal gaps in the system of interstate borders that is based on the San Francisco peace treaty. these conflicts include disputes over the South Kuril islands (“northern territories”), the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands, and the tokto (takeshima) islands. in addition, there are numerous conflicts in the South china Sea (disputes over territories including the paracel and Spratly islands) that have more complicated histories and go further back into the past, including the colonial era. russia is involved in only one of east Asia’s territorial disputes, one with Japan, and is just an observer in the rest of them. russia’s line on those conflicts is very important from the point of view of its political and economic interests, which are determined by its trade and investment relations with the countries that are parties to those disputes. Many of the most acute conflicts are sovereignty disputes over islands and sea borders. essentially, they are disputes over economic con- trol of vast water areas in the east china Sea and South china Sea, which are rich in mineral and biological resources and are part of key interna- tional maritime communication lines. For russia, however, those com- munications are not as important as they are, for example, for Japan or South Korea, or even for china. russia is more reliant on the transit facilities of its eastern ports. the latter are used in shipping along the northern Sea route and in trans- portation to and from china more than they are in handling cargo transportation between east Asia and europe along the southern route passing through the Strait of Malacca. it was no accident that russia focused on that southern route in setting the agenda for the Asia- pacific economic cooperation (Apec) summit in vladivostok in 2012. As an outside observer in east Asian territorial conflicts with none of its geographical or economic interests affected by them, russia takes a more neutral position on them than countries to which such conflicts pose a direct threat of armed confrontation. the russian position is also determined by the economic develop- ment priorities of Siberia and the russian Far east as set by its “eastward turn” doctrine. Strategically speaking, russia needs good and stable eco- nomic, and hence political, relations with all key countries involved in east Asian processes of integration, processes that encompass all east Asian countries except north Korea. however, practically all east Asian countries with which russia is determined to maintain trade and investment partnership, including china, Japan, South Korea, and key Southeast Asian states such as vietnam, are embroiled in territorial or border conflicts. obviously, by siding with one of the parties to any of these conflicts, russia would jeop- ardize its relations with the other. russia cannot afford to make friends with one country by estranging another. it needs, showing the utmost discretion and delicacy, to achieve a subtle balance in its relations with various actors and to seek at least a fragile regional status quo. neither can russia ignore the fact that, by joining ad hoc blocs or coalitions formed to deal with territorial conflicts, it would risk being drawn into a conflict that might grow into war any moment.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Territorial Disputes, Military Affairs, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia