Publishing Institution: Council on Foreign Relations / Publication Year: within 10 Years / Journal:

1. China's Belt and Road: Implications for the United States

Author:: Jennifer A. Hillman and David Sacks
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy undertaking and the world’s largest infrastructure program, poses a significant challenge to U.S. economic, political, climate change, security, and global health interests. Since BRI’s launch in 2013, Chinese banks and companies have financed and built everything from power plants, railways, highways, and ports to telecommunications infrastructure, fiber-optic cables, and smart cities around the world. If implemented sustainably and responsibly, BRI has the potential to meet long-standing developing country needs and spur global economic growth. To date, however, the risks for both the United States and recipient countries raised by BRI’s implementation considerably outweigh its benefits. BRI was initially designed to connect China’s modern coastal cities to its underdeveloped interior and to its Southeast, Central, and South Asian neighbors, cementing China’s position at the center of a more connected world. The initiative has since outgrown its original regional corridors, expanding to all corners of the globe. Its scope now includes a Digital Silk Road intended to improve recipients’ telecommunications networks, artificial intelligence capabilities, cloud computing, e-commerce and mobile payment systems, surveillance technology, and other high-tech areas, along with a Health Silk Road designed to operationalize China’s vision of global health governance.1 Hundreds of projects around the world now fall under the BRI umbrella.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, Conflict, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Regionalism
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. Improving Pandemic Preparedness: Lessons From COVID-19

Author:: Thomas J. Bollyky and Stewart M. Patrick
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The United States and the world were caught unprepared by the COVID-19 pandemic despite decades of warnings of the threat of global pandemics and years of international planning. The failure to adequately fund and execute these plans has exacted a heavy human and economic price. Hundreds of thousands of lives have already been lost, and the global economy is in the midst of a painful contraction. The crisis—the greatest international public health emergency in more than a century—is not over. It is not too early, however, to begin distilling lessons from this painful experience so that the United States and the world are better positioned to cope with potential future waves of the current pandemic and to avoid disaster when the next one strikes, which it surely will. This CFR-sponsored Independent Task Force report seeks to do just that, framing pandemic disease as a stark threat to global and national security that neither the United States nor the world can afford to ignore again. It argues that future pandemic threats are inevitable and possibly imminent; policymakers should prepare for them and identify what has gone wrong in the U.S. and multilateral response. One of the most important lessons of this pandemic is that preparation and early execution are essential for detecting, containing, and rapidly responding to and mitigating the spread of potentially dangerous emerging infectious diseases. As harmful as this coronavirus has been, a novel influenza could be even worse, transmitting even more easily, killing millions more people, and doing even more damage to societies and economies alike. This Task Force proposes a robust strategy consisting of critical institutional reforms and policy innovations to help the United States and the world perform better. Although there is no substitute for effective political leadership, The recommendations proposed here would if implemented place the nation and the world on a firmer footing to confront humanity’s next microbial foe. The Task Force presents its findings grouped into three sections: the inevitability of pandemics and the logic of preparedness; an assessment of the global response to COVID-19, including the performance of the World Health Organization (WHO), multilateral forums, and the main international legal agreement governing pandemic disease; and the performance of the United States, while also drawing lessons from other countries, including several whose outcomes contrast favorably with the U.S. experience.
Topic:: International Cooperation, World Health Organization, Pandemic, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Global Health
Political Geography:: Global Focus

3. Innovation and National Security: Keeping Our Edge

Author:: Adam Segal
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The United States leads the world in innovation, research, and technology development. Since World War II, the new markets, industries, companies, and military capabilities that emerged from the country’s science and technology commitment have combined to make the United States the most secure and economically prosperous nation on earth. This seventy-year strength arose from the expansion of economic opportunities at home through substantial investments in education and infrastructure, unmatched innovation and talent ecosystems, and the opportunities and competition created by the opening of new markets and the global expansion of trade. It was also forged in the fire of threat: It was formed and tested in military conflicts from the Cold War to the war in Afghanistan, in technological leadership lost and regained during competition with Japan in the 1980s, and in the internal cultural conflicts over the role of scientists in aiding the Pentagon during the Vietnam War. Confronted with a threat to national security or economic competitiveness, the United States responded. So must it once again. This time there is no Sputnik satellite circling the earth to catalyze a response, but the United States faces a convergence of forces that equally threaten its economic and national security. First, the pace of innovation globally has accelerated, and it is more disruptive and transformative to industries, economies, and societies. Second, many advanced technologies necessary for national security are developed in the private sector by firms that design and build them via complex supply chains that span the globe; these technologies are then deployed in global markets. The capacities and vulnerabilities of the manufacturing base are far more complex than in previous eras, and the ability of the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to control manufacturing-base activity using traditional policy means has been greatly reduced. Third, China, now the world’s second-largest economy, is both a U.S. economic partner and a strategic competitor, and it constitutes a different type of challenger.1 Tightly interconnected with the United States, China is launching government-led investments, increasing its numbers of science and engineering graduates, and mobilizing large pools of data and global technology companies in pursuit of ambitious economic and strategic goals. The United States has had a time-tested playbook for technological competition. It invests in basic research and development (R&D), making discoveries that radically change understanding of existing scientific concepts and serve as springs for later-stage development activities in private industry and government. It trains and nurtures science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) talent at home, and it attracts and retains the world’s best students and practitioners. It wins new markets abroad and links emerging technology ecosystems to domestic innovations through trade relationships and alliances. And it converts new technological advances into military capabilities faster than its potential adversaries Erosion in the country’s leadership in any of these steps that drive and diffuse technological advances would warrant a powerful reply. However, the United States faces a critical inflection point in all of them. There is a great deal of talk among policymakers, especially in the Defense Department, about the importance of innovation, but the rhetoric does not translate fast enough into changes that matter. The Task Force believes that the government and the private sector must undertake a comprehensive and urgent response to this challenge over the next five years. Failure to do so will mean a future in which other countries reap the lion’s share of the benefits of technological development, rivals strengthen their militaries and threaten U.S. security interests, and new innovation centers replace the United States as the source of original ideas and inspiration for the world.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Military Strategy, Innovation, and Trade
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

4. Women and Terrorism

Author:: Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Extremist groups rely upon women to gain strategic advantage, recruiting them as facilitators and martyrs while also benefiting from their subjugation. Yet U.S. policymakers overlook the roles that women play in violent extremism—including as perpetrators, mitigators, and victims—and rarely enlist their participation in efforts to combat radicalization. This omission puts the United States at a disadvantage in its efforts to prevent terrorism globally and within its borders. Women fuel extremists’ continued influence by advancing their ideology online and by indoctrinating their families. New technology allows for more sophisticated outreach, directly targeting messages to radicalize and recruit women. It also provides a platform on which female extremists thrive by expanding their recruitment reach and taking on greater operational roles in the virtual sphere. The failure of counterterrorist efforts to understand the ways in which women radicalize, support, and perpetrate violence cedes the benefit of their involvement to extremist groups.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Women
Political Geography:: Global Focus

5. The Work Ahead: Machines, Skills, and U.S. Leadership in the Twenty-First Century

Author:: Edward Alden and Laura Taylor-Kale
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The challenge facing the United States today is to rebuild the links among work, opportunity, and economic security for all Americans in the face of accelerating technological change.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Labor Issues, Employment, Innovation, Emerging Technology, and Machine Learning
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

6. Domestic Constraints on South Korean Foreign Policy

Author:: Scott A. Snyder, Geun Lee, You Young Kim, and Jiyoon Kim
Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Despite becoming influential on the world scene, South Korea remains a relatively weak country surrounded by larger, more powerful neigh- bors. This contrast between its global rank as a top-twenty economy and its regional status as the weakest country in Northeast Asia (with the exception of North Korea) poses a paradox for South Korean for- eign policy strategists. Despite successes addressing nontraditional security challenges in areas such as international development, global health, and UN peacekeeping, South Korea is limited in its capacity to act on regional security threats. South Korea has historically been a victim of geopolitical rivalries among contenders for regional hegemony in East Asia. But the coun- try’s rise in influence provides a glimmer of hope that it can break from its historical role by using its expanded capabilities as leverage to shape its strategic environment. The pressing dilemma for South Korean strategic thinkers is how to do so. As the regional security environment becomes more tense, South Korea’s strategic options are characterized by constraint, given potentially conflicting great-power rivalries and Pyongyang’s efforts to pursue asymmetric nuclear or cyber capabilities at Seoul’s expense. South Korea’s relative weakness puts a premium on its ability to achieve the internal political unity necessary to maximize its influence in foreign policy. Students of Korean history will recall that domestic factionalism among political elites was a chronic factor that hamstrung Korea’s dynastic leadership and contributed to its weakness in dealing with outside forces.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

7. Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy

Author:: Nuala O'Conner
Publication Date:: 01-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Half of all Americans believe their personal information is less secure now than it was five years ago, and a sobering study from the Pew Research Center reveals how little faith the public has in organizations, whether governmental or private-sector, to protect their data—and with good reason. In 2017, there was a disastrous breach at Equifax, Yahoo’s admission that billions of its email accounts were compromised, Deep Root Analytics’ accidental leak of personal details of nearly two hundred million U.S. voters, and Uber’s attempt to conceal a breach that affected fifty-seven million accounts. Individuals are left stymied about what action they can take, if any, to protect their digital assets and identity. Nuala O’Connor Yet record-shattering data breaches and inadequate data-protection practices have produced only piecemeal legislative responses at the federal level, competing state laws, and a myriad of enforcement regimes. Most Western countries have already adopted comprehensive legal protections for personal data, but the United States—home to some of the most advanced, and largest, technology and data companies in the world—continues to lumber forward with a patchwork of sector-specific laws and regulations that fail to adequately protect data. U.S. citizens and companies suffer from this uneven approach—citizens because their data is not adequately protected, and companies because they are saddled with contradictory and sometimes competing requirements. It is past time for Congress to create a single legislative data-protection mandate to protect individuals’ privacy and reconcile the differences between state and federal requirements.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Privacy, Data, and Digitization
Political Geography:: United States and North America

8. Adapting International Trade Institutions to New Realities

Author:: Felix Pena
Publication Date:: 02-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The institutional order governing world trade is going through a critical period. Debate over its future form and design will be a dominant theme on the global agenda for the coming years. The Donald J. Trump administration has questioned the benefits of the multilateral trading order and is pulling the United States back from its traditional leadership role. In December 2017, the Eleventh Ministerial Conference (MC11) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) ended in disappointment with no substantive multilateral achievements. The shift in economic power from the West to the East and the growth of nonstate actors further complicate the search for consensus on international trade rules, leading to a so-called multiplex world. In a multiplex world, actors with different cultural values and relative power inequalities—such as nation-states, international and regional institutions, corporations, and nongovernmental organizations—compete against each other. To ensure a resilient trading system, multilateral trading rules and institutions need to be adapted to these new realities of trade, investment, and the distribution of global power. Unlike the international system as it functioned after World War II, today’s trading system does not reflect the interests of a single power or an alliance of powers with sufficient clout to impose their will on others in a sustained way. This is not a Group of Twenty (G20) or Group of Seven–led world: it is a G-Zero world, with no established lineup of who should be invited to the table where decisions are made. In this vacuum of global leadership it is increasingly difficult to identify who will create the new rules of international competition. Actors pursue their own self-interest, which results in less certainty for the international trade system.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Multilateralism, Trade Wars, and WTO
Political Geography:: Global Focus

9. Increasing International Cooperation in Cybersecurity and Adapting Cyber Norms

Author:: Elena Chernenko, Oleg Demidov, and Fyodor Lukyanov
Publication Date:: 02-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: nformation and communications technology (ICT) presents one of the most critical modern challenges to global security. Threat assessments predict that the next major international crisis could be due to a state or terrorist group weaponizing ICTs to devastate critical infrastructure or military logistics networks. The proliferation of asymmetric warfare (i.e., conflicts between nations or groups that have disparate military capabilities) has increased states’ use of ICTs, which necessitates the development of an international code of cyber conduct. There is an urgent need for cooperation among states to mitigate threats such as cybercrime, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, electronic espionage, bulk data interception, and offensive operations intended to project power by the application of force in and through cyberspace. Emerging cyber threats could precipitate massive economic and societal damage, and international efforts need to be recalibrated to account for this new reality. A common misperception is that the principal cybersecurity threats demanding urgent international collaboration are massive, state sponsored attacks that target critical infrastructure such as power plants or electrical grids, causing massive devastation and human casualties. In fact, cyber threats are more diverse and complex, often targeting private enterprises and endangering the technical integrity of the digital world. The near-total digitalization of business models makes the global economy more vulnerable to cyberattacks, not only from states but also from criminal organizations and other nonstate actors.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Infrastructure, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: Global Focus

10. Cybersecurity and the New Era of Space Activities

Author:: David P. Fidler
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The tasks of securing outer space and cyberspace are converging. The internet increasingly depends on space-enabled communication and information services. Likewise, the operation of satellites and other space assets relies on internet-based networks, which makes these assets, like cars and medical equipment, devices on the internet of things. New government actors, companies, goals, and technologies are expanding and transforming space activities. However, neither space policy nor cybersecurity policy is prepared for the challenges created by the meshing of space and cyberspace, which could increase national security risks. To meet these challenges, government, industry, and international action is needed. The Donald J. Trump administration’s National Space Council should develop cybersecurity recommendations for space activities, and federal agencies should prioritize these within the government and in cooperation with the private sector. In crafting needed legislation for commercial space activities, Congress should bolster industry efforts to strengthen cybersecurity. Private-sector actors should strengthen their adoption of cybersecurity best practices and collaborate with one another on improving implementation of cybersecurity strategies. Internationally, the United States should pursue collaboration on space cybersecurity through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), plurilateral space cooperation mechanisms, and bilateral forums.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Space
Political Geography:: United States and North America

11. Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for U.S.-China Cooperation

Author:: Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:: 04-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Emerging challenges to international order require cooperation between the United States and China, two countries that share a common interest in preventing the world from becoming more dangerous and disorderly. U.S.-China relations are becoming more strained and antagonistic, however, and the prospects for cooperation appear to be receding. To explore whether there are still grounds for cooperation on issues of common concern between the two countries, in March 2018 the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations convened a group of fifteen experts from the United States and China for the workshop “Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for U.S.-China Cooperation.” CPA partnered with Peking University’s School of International Studies in Beijing for the workshop and also met with experts at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations in Beijing and the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies in Shanghai. During the workshop, President Donald J. Trump announced plans to impose about $60 billion in new tariffs on Chinese imports. While trade was a major topic of discussion, it was by no means the only area discussed. Workshop participants assessed conflicting views of the sources of global disorder and examined areas of global governance such as international trade, development, the environment, and the future of various multilateral institutions. They also discussed the most pressing security challenges in East and Southwest Asia. Participants highlighted the need for a greater understanding between the United States and China on the evolving international order. No major transnational problems will be solved without some cooperation between the two powers. It is therefore imperative that the two countries avoid a further deterioration of the relationship and instead identify areas of potential cooperation.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Tariffs, and Social Order
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, and North America

12. Sharing Classified Cyber Threat Information With the Private Sector

Author:: Robert K. Knake
Publication Date:: 05-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The U.S. government and private industry have been stuck at an impasse concerning cybersecurity information sharing for over a decade. While the Barack Obama administration rolled out executive and legislative efforts to increase information sharing, many U.S. companies still argue that the federal government should do more to provide them with useful intelligence on cyber threats. But the U.S. intelligence community argues that greater declassification and sharing of information with private companies could put technical sources and methods at risk. Fixes to this problem exist. The Department of Defense already provides a classified network for cleared defense contractors to receive intelligence on threats to their companies. Replicating this network for cyber threats has long been discussed as a way to share more information with the financial sector, electricity suppliers, and other private-sector entities critical to the U.S. economy. Expanding this network requires increasing the number of cleared personnel and of facilities that can hold classified information, as well as changing intelligence collection priorities. These hurdles can be addressed by cooperative efforts between the public and private sectors. As a crucial first step, the U.S. government should begin the targeted collection of intelligence on cyber threats to critical infrastructure. To disseminate this information, the government should establish security standards different from those applicable to defense contractors to determine who may hold clearances.
Topic:: Security, Cybersecurity, Information Age, and Private Sector
Political Geography:: United States and North America

13. The U.S.-Southeast Asia Relationship: Responding to China’s Rise

Author:: Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:: 05-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Although the Barack Obama administration rhetorically made Southeast Asia a centerpiece of its “rebalance to Asia” strategy, the administration still largely focused on the Middle East and Europe, and Southeast Asia remained a low U.S. policy priority. The Obama administration did try to boost U.S. economic ties with Southeast Asia in 2016 by forging the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but that trade deal was broadly unpopular in the United States. The following year, the Donald J. Trump administration ended U.S. participation in the TPP, and it also suggested launching punitive economic measures against Southeast Asian states currently running trade surpluses with the United States. Many Southeast Asian leaders now worry that Washington has no clear security or economic strategy for the region, other than applying pressure on Beijing to respect freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. In this perceived void of U.S. leadership and strategy, workshop participants assessed how Southeast Asia might change as China becomes an increasingly dominant regional security and economic actor. They also discussed the future of U.S. strategic and economic relationships with important partners in the region, including Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Participants further considered how China might use its growing leverage in Southeast Asia, and whether Beijing’s tactics could backfire. Finally, several workshop participants posited that the United States, China, and Southeast Asian states could cooperate on at least some nontraditional security issues, such as combating piracy and terrorism.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

14. Domesticating the Giant: The Global Governance of Migration

Author:: Patrycja Sasnal
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Migration is a natural and defining phenomenon of the globalized world. The challenge of governing migration lies in its inevitability, volume, and heterogeneity. As a portion of the global population, migrants represent around 3 percent, but their absolute number is rising. There were 170 million migrants in 2000; today there are roughly 260 million. Migration levels will certainly grow while hostilities continue in the most conflict-ridden regions of sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, the global wealth gap persists, climate change aggravates living conditions in many areas, and the poorer half of the globe becomes more populous. Moreover, migration is a complex heterogeneous process. Depending on the cause, duration, and legality, migration can be voluntary or forced (refugees and internally displaced persons, including survival migrants such as climate and disaster refugees), permanent or circular, regular or irregular. Politically, migration poses a twofold challenge: balancing security and freedom and harmonizing international obligations with domestic laws. Traditional discussion of migratory movements divided the world into the sending global south and the receiving global north. Interests of the former lay primarily in safeguarding the rights of their citizens regardless of immigration status and ensuring remittance flow. Interests of the latter lay in accommodating the “useful” migrants and restricting the rest. With the shifts in global wealth distribution, this division is losing tenacity. Countries that once were sending migrants are also receiving them today. For nations, migration affects the most rudimentary pillar of sovereignty (national borders), the core of democratic political systems (human rights), and atavistic social needs (national identity). Perceptions of migration affect political popularity: political parties are tempted to use selective, mostly negative, aspects of migration to rally the electorate around national identities. This in turn disproportionately, and often contrary to the objective needs of the host countries, vilifies migration generally. Political opposition to migration occurs despite a consensus that the economies of both sending and receiving countries benefit economically from migration. Even though the sending countries may experience labor and brain drain, they benefit from remittance flows from receiving countries; similarly, the receiving countries get a boost of human capital.
Topic:: Human Rights, Migration, United Nations, and Governance
Political Geography:: Global Focus

15. Digital Decarbonization

Author:: Varun Sivaram
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: In2017,theEconomistproclaimedthatdatawasthenewoil. Justastrade in oil has underpinned the global economy for a century, flows of data— the most valuable resource of the twenty-first century—now drive eco- nomic value. Indeed, in 2017, all five of the world’s most valuable publicly traded companies specialized in digital technologies, whereas just a decade earlier three of the top five companies were in the energy sector. This does not mean that the energy sector has been left behind by the digital revolution. To the contrary, digitalization is at the heart of the tectonic shifts that are starting to reshape the energy landscape. As energy industries produce ever more data, firms are harnessing greater computing power, advances in data science, and increased digital con- nectivity to exploit that data. These trends have the potential to trans-form the way energy is produced, transported, and consumed. An important potential benefit of this digital transformation of energy is a reduction in global emissions of greenhouse gases that cause climate change; the elimination of such emissions from the global economy is known as decarbonization. By enabling clean energy sys- tems that rely on low-carbon energy sources and are highly efficient in using energy, digital innovations in the energy sector can speed decar- bonization. Yet they are not guaranteed to do so. In fact, digital innova- tions could well increase global greenhouse emissions, for example, by making it easier to extract fossil fuels.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Science and Technology, and Digital Economy
Political Geography:: Global Focus

16. Global Monetary Policy Divergence and the Reemergence of Global Imbalances

Author:: Daniel Gros
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Developed economies are paying remarkably little attention to coordinating their monetary policies. This is an unavoidable consequence of the independence of central banks, which faithfully follow their purely domestic mandates except in times of crisis. As a result, global monetary policies have reached unprecedented levels of divergence. This divergence is set to widen—primarily due to differences in the relative strength of labor markets—while global current account imbalances return. Meanwhile, exchange rates have not reacted as economists expected; the dollar has weakened even as policy rates have increased. Economic tensions will likely become more disruptive the longer global imbalances go uncorrected. Likewise, the global economy will become more vulnerable to shocks. Yet by focusing on bilateral trade imbalances, the United States has mistakenly singled out China when the global imbalances between the United States and the eurozone is the more critical issue. The growing global imbalances are reflected more in the eurozone current account surplus and U.S. fiscal policy than in China’s shrinking surplus.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Monetary Policy, Exchange Rate Policy, and Economic Inequality
Political Geography:: Global Focus

17. Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation

Author:: Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:: 08-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Despite recent turbulence in the transatlantic relationship, the United States and the European Union share a common interest in managing emerging sources of global disorder. To explore prospects for and challenges to transatlantic cooperation, the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations convened an international group of twenty-three experts at the Tufts University Center in Talloires, France, on July 12–13, 2018, for the workshop “Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for Transatlantic Cooperation.” The workshop is the third in a series of meetings supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. It is premised on the belief that the United States, China, the European Union, and Russia not only share a common interest in preventing the world from becoming more dangerous and disorderly, but also that the nature and scope of this task necessitates cooperation among them. Workshop participants discussed their perceptions of the growing sources of disorder in the world, examined areas of strategic cooperation, and explored where the United States and the European Union might work together to address a variety of regional concerns emanating from Africa, China, the Middle East, and Russia. While highlighting how the two can work together to address increasing political instability and violent conflict, participants also cited the importance of the transatlantic relationship in preventing or mitigating the demise of the liberal international order.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: United States, Europe, North America, and Atlantic Ocean

18. Global Governance to Combat Illicit Financial Flows

Author:: Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:: 10-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: International efforts to curb illicit financial flows (IFFs) resemble post–Cold War collaboration in other issue areas that have risen on the global agenda: climate change, global health, internet govern- ance, and cybersecurity. Nongovernmental actors, including private corporations and nongovern- mental organizations (NGOs), have often driven agenda-setting in those domains. The focus has shifted over time, as new issues have been added and as older issues have assumed renewed im- portance. That reshaped agenda has in turn affected the institutional ecosystem of global action, which is captured only in part by formal and informal intergovernmental institutions. These new is- sue areas are characterized not by a single dominant institution or core set of institutions but by mul- tiple clusters of institutions that have each claimed a segment of the agenda and the instruments of cooperation. The result is a fragmented landscape with disjointed actors and organizations that often compete, collaborate, and act in parallel in pursuing their collective ends.1 The term of art for such an institutional landscape, one with several institutional or legal founda- tions, is “regime complex.”1 The regime complex for combating IFFs differs in its complexity from other, similar issue areas. Defining IFFs produces disagreement among researchers, activists, and policymakers. “Illicit” captures a normative judgment perhaps broader than “illegal.” For law en- forcement, IFFs are framed by predicate crimes, activities that are illegal in one jurisdiction or anoth- er and often of greater interest to authorities than IFFs. For those interested in broader global out- comes, such as the effects of IFFs on economic development, “illicit” could include cross-border fi- nancial flows associated with activities that they believe should be forbidden, such as tax avoidance by multinational corporations (MNCs). Those activities may not be illegal, however.2 These categories shift over time: bribery of foreign officials by corporations based in Organization for Economic Co- operation and Development (OECD) countries was made illegal in the United States well before it was criminalized in other industrialized countries. Variations in national treatment of both IFFs of certain kinds and the underlying predicate crimes have made harmonization of national policies and their implementation in many IFF domains difficult. IFFs are also one of the most important features of globalization’s dark side. Unlike other illicit or dangerous cross-border flows, however, IFFs bear almost no markers in and of themselves: pecunia non olet. Tainted food, endangered species, and dangerous individuals all present fewer problems of identification. For IFFs, it is suspicious activity rather than a characteristic of the funds themselves that generates the attention of those attempting to curb the flows. These definitional and identification problems make measuring the effectiveness of counter-IFF policies more difficult than assessing the effectiveness of policies in other issue areas. As many skep- tics and critics have pointed out, without a clear grasp of the scale of underlying flows, the scale of effects, though perhaps not the direction, of policies to counter those flows cannot reliably be deter- mined.3 If the costs of enforcement and compliance or unintended negative effects are included in estimates, the balance sheet becomes even more uncertain. International collaboration to curb IFFs and domestic measures to support that collaboration are directed to a wide array of predicate crimes that produce IFFs (drug trafficking, terrorism, or tax eva- sion) or to negative externalities (global “bads,” such as corruption) that both support IFFs and are sustained and promoted by them. This diversity of IFF sources and effects, and the public policy goals that follow, mobilize an unusually large number of actors: law enforcement agencies, financial super- visors and ministries, private financial institutions, and NGOs. These actors are interested more in certain IFFs and predicate crimes than in others. The links between specific crimes or categories of crime and larger global outcomes of interest, whether economic development or international securi- ty, are often second or third order. As a result, political attention to these issues—and willingness to bear the costs of implementation—fluctuates over time and across jurisdictions. As Peter Reuter and Edwin M. Truman observed in their classic 2004 account, the anti–money laundering (AML) regime (a subset of the complex countering IFFs) “reflects shifting priorities, compromises, and trade-offs.”4 This variation over time is particularly important in combating IFFs, because enforcement depends largely on national governments and both their incentives and their capacity to enact anti-IFF poli- cies. Financial markets and naming-and-shaming campaigns can strengthen those national efforts; they can also direct attention and effort against particular IFFs. However, they cannot substitute en- tirely for government action. What follows is a summary and introduction to organized international efforts to combat IFFs. In order to limit the policy universe, the narrower definition of IFFs used by the World Bank—“money illegally earned, transferred, or used that crosses borders”—will be used to define the wider interna- tional regime complex to combat IFFs.5 Mapping the institutions and actors involved in this issue area over time will capture the evolution of the global IFF agenda and the politics surrounding its de- velopment and implementation.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Governance, Institutionalism, and Illegal Trade
Political Geography:: Global Focus

19. Women and the Law

Author:: Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:: 10-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The connection between women’s economic participation and global prosperity is undeniable. Over the past two decades, international organizations and world leaders have increasingly recognized how critical women’s economic empowerment and financial inclusion are to economic prosperity and growth. Analyses from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Bank, and other leading institutions demon- strate the growth potential of women’s increased economic partici- pation. UN frameworks such as the Sustainable Development Goals recognize the relationship between economic opportunity for women and development, and include time-bound targets—such as equal access to financial services, natural resources, and technology, and equality in property ownership and inheritance—to advance women’s economic participation. However, despite growing awareness that women’s economic empowerment is critical to women, their families, and broader eco- nomic prosperity, many countries still legally undermine women’s economic participation and undervalue women’s work. Of the 189 economies surveyed in the World Bank’s Women, Business and the Law 2018 report, 90 percent have at least one regulation that impedes wom- en’s economic opportunities. More than one hundred economies still prevent women from working in certain jobs; fifty-nine economies provide no legal recourse to women who experience sexual harassment in the workplace; and in eighteen countries, men can legally prevent their wives from working outside the home. An array of other legal barriers—from limitations on access to finance to laws restricting women’s agency and mobility—prevent women from fully participat- ing in the economy. Even in 2018, the legal landscape for women in the economy fails to reflect the value women’s participation adds to eco- nomic growth. But change is on the horizon. Over the last decade, several countries have enacted legal reforms that significantly advance women’s rights. Today, all but thirty-two countries legally guarantee gender equality in their constitutions, and a record number of countries now have laws prohibiting discrimina- tion or violence against women. While these gains—rightfully cel- ebrated—show that progress is possible, proposals to eliminate the critical barriers that limit women’s economic potential remain absent from mainstream discussions on international and national economic policy, and barriers to female economic enfranchisement persist in every region of the world. In order to realize the economic potential of 50 percent of the world’s population, nations need to do more to level the legal playing field for women. This volume collects in-depth analysis and commen- tary on legal barriers to women’s economic participation, with a focus on five areas in which the greatest obstacles to women’s economic par- ticipation endure: financial inclusion, identification laws, land rights, workplace discrimination, and family law. In the opening essay, I make the economic case for eliminating legal barriers that inhibit women’s economic participation. Closing gender gaps in the workplace could add an estimated $12 trillion to the global economy. Countries simply cannot afford to waste this economic poten- tial—and governments from Saudi Arabia to Japan are taking notice and enacting policies to promote women’s workforce participation. A web of discriminatory laws impedes women’s access to financial services and undermines their capacity to borrow, save, or obtain insur- ance. In an essay on financial inclusion, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Senior Fellow Jamille Bigio highlights how banks stand to ben- efit economically by ensuring women’s access to and use of financial services, by sharing the experience of a Nigerian woman who employed digital tools to save for her daughter’s school fees. CFR Senior Fellow Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, reporting on a successful financial inclusion program in Tanzania, explores how education can help women over- come legal and social barriers to opening bank accounts. The economic case for legal reform to promote women’s financial inclusion is strong: when women can use financial services without spousal consent and have control over where they live, and when unpaid work is recognized in marital property regimes, gender gaps in financial inclusion are nar- rowed. Legal reform needs to be a central component of any strategy to advance women’s access to and use of savings, credit, and insurance.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Women, Feminism, and Participation
Political Geography:: Global Focus

20. Arctic Governance

Author:: Zhao Long
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Over the past few decades, climate change and globalization have dramatically transformed the Arctic. As a result of global warming, the Arctic sea ice has been melting rapidly, potentially easing access to natural resources and opening up new maritime routes in the region. These changes have increased global attention on potential commercial opportunities, research, and peace and stability in the region. As national governments, international institutions, and nonstate actors explore different approaches to Arctic governance, a cohesive regime complex—a set of functionally specific regimes that together serve as a foundation for efficient governance—that integrates existing frameworks could help address the environmental, economic, sociocultural, and geopolitical challenges this region faces. The recent transformation of the Arctic is driven largely by sea ice melting at an accelerated rate. Between 1979 and 2015, the Arctic sea ice extent—the surface area of the ocean covered by sea ice—decreased by 4.7 percent per decade and the thickness of sea ice dwindled by 10 to 15 percent. Even if global temperature rises by less than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels, the Arctic could see a sea ice–free summer at least once a decade. Decreased sea ice allows for additional human activity in the Arctic; this in turn exacerbates the damage to the Arctic ecosystem. Decreasing sea ice and permafrost—as a result of which more fresh water enters the Arctic Ocean—can change weather and climate conditions in other parts of the globe.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, International Cooperation, and Governance
Political Geography:: Arctic

21. Advancing Natural Gas Reform in Ukraine

Author:: Sagatom Saha and Ilya Zaslavskiy
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: A prerequisite for Ukraine’s economic and political success is reform of its energy sector. Enduring corruption and mismanagement in the energy sector have generated pernicious budget deficits, eroded sovereignty, jeopardized energy security, and limited economic potential. Although all post-Soviet states have encountered obstacles in transitioning to market economies, Ukraine has been remarkably slow to introduce market reforms, and its sclerotic energy sector is at the center of its economic dys- function. Even after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Orange Revolution, and nine International Mon- etary Fund (IMF) loans conditional on reform, Ukraine’s energy sector remains a drain on taxpayers, a playground for corrupt oligarchs, and an unattractive destination for international investment. However, Ukraine now has a small but important window of opportunity. The 2014 Euromaidan Revolution—the series of pro-European demonstrations that culminated in Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s removal—provided a mandate and framework for energy reform. Beginning in 2015, Ukraine moved to cut implicit subsidies on natural gas, adopted laws to restructure the state-owned oil and gas company Naftogaz, and halted imports of Russian gas. These advances are welcome news not only for Ukraine, but also for the United States. A prosper- ous and energy-secure Ukraine, capable of standing up to Russian interventionism, would advance U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region. Recognizing this, Washington already provides technical, financial, and military assistance to Kiev.1 The United States has focused particularly on encouraging Ukraine’s energy-sector reforms, last year tasking the State Department with promoting the country’s energy security with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. Unfortunately, Ukraine’s energy-sector reforms to date do not go far enough. To achieve lasting reform, Ukraine must curtail its population-wide subsidies, reinforce the independence of its energy regulator, and dismantle the monopolies that exist in every segment of the natural gas sector. The benefits that would result from these steps are manifold. End consumers would enjoy better energy services and lower prices; the domestic energy sector would create high-skilled jobs and boost eco- nomic output; and the government would secure new revenue streams that could bolster national priorities such as defense and social services. Further reforms in Ukraine’s energy sector could mean the difference between economic growth at the current sluggish rate of 2 percent and reaching 6 percent or more, which some experts suggest is possible.2 Ultimately, Ukraine will be the arbiter of its own success in energy-sector reform. But the United States can and should do more to help it achieve politically and technically complex reforms. Apply- ing greater diplomatic pressure, providing technical assistance, and offering targeted financial in- centives—and disincentives—could speed the pace of Ukraine’s reform efforts. The Donald J. Trump administration, which has not yet articulated a clear strategy toward the country, should place energy-sector reform at the center of its relationship with Ukraine. Doing so would constitute a low-risk, high-reward strategy for Washington to counter Moscow’s influence at the North Atlan- tic Treaty Organization (NATO) border without overcommitting to military options and antagoniz- ing Russia. Moreover, by helping Ukraine reform its energy sector, the Trump administration may create opportunities for trade in energy equipment and services, advancing its strategy of U.S. en- ergy dominance.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Reform, and Gas
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

22. Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on America’s Fourth Coast

Author:: Thad W. Allen, Christine Todd Whitman, and Esther Brimmer
Publication Date:: 03-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: "The United States, through Alaska, is a significant Arctic nation with strategic, economic, and scientific interests," asserts a new Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored (CFR) Independent Task Force report, Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. Strategy on America's Fourth Coast. With the Arctic "warming at twice the rate as the rest of the planet" and melting sea ice opening up this resource-rich region to new trade routes and commercial activities, the report stresses that "the United States needs to increase its strategic commitment to the region or risk leaving its interests unprotected." The report notes that while Russia has numerous ice-breaking vessels and China is building a third icebreaker, the United States owns only two operational icebreaking ships—one heavy icebreaker and one medium-weight icebreaker—to serve both the Arctic and the Antarctic. Asserting that "icebreakers are a national capacity" required for a range of maritime missions to support U.S. security, economic, and commercial needs, the Task Force recommends that the United States fund and build additional icebreakers. The report also finds that the United States needs greater investment in Alaskan infrastructure, including deepwater ports, roads, and reliable telecommunications, to support economic development and a sustained security presence in the region. Currently, "almost no marine infrastructure is in place within the U.S. maritime Arctic."
Topic:: Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

23. Follow the External (Balance of Payments) Breakevens of the Oil Exporters

Author:: Brad W. Setser
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The global impact of oil’s fall from $100 plus to under $50 a barrel has not gotten as much attention as I think it deserves. For most oil exporters, it has been a profound shock—one that forced such a massive contraction in imports that it pulled down global trade (far more than the trade remedies that tend to dominate the ‘trade” news). A few countries adjusted quickly and relatively efficiently (Russia), though not painlessly. A few have struggled to adapt—notably, because of its large external debt, poor policies, and growing political crisis, Venezuela.
Topic:: Oil and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:: Global Focus

24. Southeast Asian Perspectives on U.S.–China Competition

Author:: Aaron Connely
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: In April 2016, the Lowy Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations' International Institutions and Global Governance program held a workshop on Southeast Asian perspectives on U.S.–China competition, which informed this publication. That workshop was made possible in part by the generous support of the Robina Foundation. This report is a collaboration between the Lowy Institute and the Council on Foreign Relations. The views expressed in this report are entirely the authors' own and not those of the Lowy Institute, the Council on Foreign Relations, or the Robina Foundation.
Topic:: Governance and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:: China and America

25. Managing a Smaller U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve

Author:: Jennifer Harris
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Comprising roughly 700 million barrels of crude oil stored in caverns throughout Texas and Louisiana, the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) was established by Congress in the mid-1970s in response to the 1973–74 Arab oil embargo and ensuing oil price shocks. Its purpose was to insulate the United States from crude oil supply disruptions. In the decades since, despite significant changes in global oil markets, the basic logic and design of the SPR have remained largely unchanged.
Topic:: Global Political Economy
Political Geography:: America

26. Interactive: Oil Exporters' External Breakeven Prices

Author:: Brad Sester and Cole Frank
Publication Date:: 07-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The 2014 fall in global oil prices, from over $100 a barrel to around $50 a barrel, reduced the export proceeds of the world’s main oil- and gas-exporting economies by about $1 trillion. After a decade of largely uninterrupted high oil prices, this dramatic swing has tested the economic resiliency and political adaptability of oil-exporting countries. One of the best single measures of the resilience of an oil- or gas-exporting economy is the oil price that covers its import bill—the external breakeven price.
Topic:: Oil and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:: America

27. Geostrategic Implications of China’s Twin Economic Challenges

Author:: William Norris
Publication Date:: 06-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The Chinese government has embarked on an effort to reorient its economy from an investment- and export-driven model toward one predicated on a larger role for consumption and market forces. At the same time, China is also experiencing a new normal of much slower economic growth. The economic downturn and concomitant structural shift in China’s economy has already begun affecting its foreign policy. Security, not economics, is becoming one of President Xi Jinping’s—and China’s—top strategic priorities.
Topic:: Global Political Economy
Political Geography:: China

28. The Case for Reforming Section 702 of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law

Author:: Laura K. Donohue
Publication Date:: 06-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: On December 31, 2017, section 702 of the 2008 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act (FAA) will expire. Section 702 governs the domestic interception of foreigners’ communications, when the targets are believed to be outside the United States. Although externally directed, this statute is being used by agencies to monitor, collect, and search U.S. citizens’ communications for foreign intelligence and criminal activity. Congress has an opportunity to amend section 702 to safeguard U.S. national security, protect citizens, and comply with the Constitution.
Topic:: Global Security
Political Geography:: America

29. Council of Councils Sixth Annual Conference

Author:: The Council of councils
Publication Date:: 06-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: On May 7–9, 2017, the Council on Foreign Relations hosted the sixth annual conference of the Council of Councils. The conference was made possible by the generous support of the Robina Foundation for CFR’s International Institutions and Global Governance program. The views described here are those of workshop participants only and are not CFR or Robina Foundation positions. The Council on Foreign Relations takes no institutional positions on policy issues and has no affiliation with the U.S. government. In addition, the suggested policy prescriptions are the views of individual participants and do not necessarily represent a consensus of the attending members.
Topic:: International Cooperation and International Affairs
Political Geography:: Global Focus

30. Lessons From Guatemala’s Commission Against Impunity

Author:: Matthew Taylor
Publication Date:: 06-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Guatemala has made notable gains in the fight against corruption and impunity in the last decade. President Otto Perez Molina resigned in 2015 and was tried and jailed on charges of corruption, alongside his vice president and several ministers. Several prominent criminal figures have been extradited to the United States, including another former president, Alfonso Portillo. Supreme Court justices and members of congress have been removed from office, drug lords jailed, and extortion rings dismantled. The overall impunity rate for homicides fell from 95 percent to 72 percent [PDF] between 2006 and 2012.
Topic:: Corruption, International Security, and Political stability
Political Geography:: Guatemala

31. Building Inclusive Economies How Women’s Economic Advancement Promotes Sustainable Growth

Author:: Gayle Tzemach Lemmon and Rachel B. Vogelstein
Publication Date:: 06-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The connection between women’s economic participation and prosperity is undeniable. Over the past two decades, a growing number of international organizations and world leaders have recognized that the economic empowerment of women is critical to economic growth and stability. Multilateral bodies such as the Group of Twenty and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum have ratified agreements to promote women in the economy as a means to stimulate growth, and governments from the Ivory Coast to Rwanda to Japan have adopted reforms to increase women’s ability to contribute to their economies
Topic:: Gender Issues and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:: Global Focus

32. A New Deal for the Twenty-First Century

Author:: Edward Alden and Robert Litan
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The challenge of how to help those left behind by rapid economic change—whether caused by technology or global competition—has moved to the center of the U.S. national debate in a way it has not been since the 1930s. Trade competition, especially from China, has been a significant factor in declining U.S. manufacturing employment over the past decade. Trade also became a major issue in the 2016 presidential campaign, despite the larger role played by automation and technological change in displacing manufacturing workers for decades. This process will only continue in coming years, with advances in robotics, artificial intelligence, and software that will eliminate many jobs while creating others, regardless of what policies the federal government may adopt toward trade and outsourcing.
Topic:: International Relations and International Affairs
Political Geography:: America

33. Harnessing International Cooperation to Advance Energy Innovation

Author:: Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: On March 29 and 30, the Council on Foreign Relations convened a workshop in New York to explore how international cooperation can accelerate energy innovation. The workshop, hosted by Douglas Dillon Fellow and Acting Director of the Energy Security and Climate Change Program Varun Sivaram, was made possible by the support of the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. The views described here are those of workshop participants only and are not CFR or Sloan Foundation positions. CFR takes no institutional positions on policy issues and has no affiliation with the U.S. government.
Topic:: Energy Policy
Political Geography:: Global Focus

34. Increasing the Use of Natural Gas in the Asia-Pacific Region

Author:: Ian Cronshaw
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Increased use of natural gas in the Asia-Pacific region could bring substantial local and global benefits. Countries in the region could take advantage of newly abundant global gas supplies to diversify their energy mix; the United States, awash in gas supplies thanks to the fracking revolution, could expand its exports; and climate change could slow as a result of gas displacing coal in rapidly growing economies.
Topic:: Energy Policy
Political Geography:: Asia-Pacific

35. Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for U.S.-Russian Cooperation

Author:: Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:: 08-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: While relations between the United States and Russia have deteriorated in recent years, making it exceedingly difficult for both countries to collaborate in managing a variety of common concerns, emerging challenges to global order make such cooperation increasingly imperative. To explore where U.S.-Russia cooperation is desirable and, in some places, even necessary, the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations convened an international group of twenty-three experts at the Tufts University European Center in Talloires, France, on June 9 and 10, 2017, for the workshop “Managing Global Disorder: Prospects for U.S.-Russian Cooperation.”
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

36. How Anonymous Shell Companies Finance Insurgents, Criminals, and Dictators

Author:: Jodi Vittori
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The Panama Papers leak of eleven million documents in April 2016 revealed that former Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, the brother-in-law of Chinese President Xi Jinping, longtime friends of Russian President Vladimir Putin, drug kingpins, and even a soccer megastar had something in common: they all channeled money through anonymous shell companies. Anonymous shell companies are entities that usually employ few or no workers, do not conduct any substantive business, and allow their owners to store or route money while hiding their identities. Because of the secrecy they can provide, anonymous companies represent an important nexus of corruption, money laundering, transnational organized crime, and terrorism, which directly harm U.S. interests. As one of the main facilitators of anonymous companies, the United States should pass legislation to disclose ownership information for all companies, increase federal contract transparency, and boost other business and government transparency mechanisms at home and abroad. Doing so would significantly cut back on the ability of terrorists, criminals, and their ilk to use American corporations, real estate, and trusts to finance activities that harm the United States and its foreign interests.
Topic:: Corruption, International Trade and Finance, Transparency, and Panama Papers
Political Geography:: Global Focus

37. Innovations in Global Governance

Author:: Miles Kahler and Deborah Avant
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Over the last three decades, a diverse collection of actors—private corporations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and subnational (state, provincial, and urban) governments—has developed and promoted a global agenda of collective action. From advancing human rights to combating climate change, these actors have become new governors in world politics. More recently, a second movement—a loose array of populist and nationalist groups and governments—has questioned the forward momentum of institutionalized global cooperation. Brexit, followed by the Donald J. Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Paris Agreement on climate change, as well as proposed cuts in U.S. contributions to the United Nations and development assistance, suggest a weakening—if not undermining—of the network of treaties, institutions, and relationships constructed over the last seventy years. Each of these movements aims to transform a global order based on intergovernmental agreements and institutions. The first movement has already done so by increasing participation in global governance of new actors who are pursuing cooperative outcomes in collaboration with and independently of national governments and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Their involvement both complements and complicates the traditional international order. The second movement, in contrast, asserts national interest and sovereignty against the constraints of global governance. Although the conflict between these two movements remains unresolved, they will likely shape the future global order.
Topic:: Climate Change, Human Rights, Governance, and NGOs
Political Geography:: Global Focus

38. What the Trump Administration’s NAFTA Priorities Get Right (and Wrong) About Digital Trade

Author:: Anupam Chander
Publication Date:: 09-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Digital commerce and trade are increasingly important to the global economy. Seven of the ten most valuable firms today are technology companies (Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, Facebook, Alibaba, and Tencent). Data, according to some analysts, is the new oil. A major study concluded that the internet has powered some one-fifth of recent economic growth within the leading economies. Jobs are increasingly dependent on digitization; digital skills are needed for all but two job categories [PDF] in the United States: dishwashing and food cooking. Just as national economies are becoming more digitized, barriers to digital trade are being erected. These barriers limit opportunities for consumers to access global providers and for small- and medium-sized enterprises to reach new customers. It is not only technology firms that suffer; all enterprises with international operations need cross-border data flows to process, analyze, and transfer data about employees, customers, and operations. Global supply chains depend on the flow of goods, data, and services across borders. Moreover, commitment to the free flow of information across borders is essential to freedom of expression. Digital trade is about more than access to markets; it is about access to information. The renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is an excellent opportunity to set the gold standard for digital free trade. Despite public pronouncements about the harm free trade causes to the steel and automobile industries, the Donald J. Trump administration, to its credit, recognizes the importance of removing digital trade barriers in its stated objectives for the NAFTA renegotiation [PDF]. In its negotiations with Canada and Mexico, the Trump administration should seek rules limiting data localization, promote a balanced approach to intellectual property protections, support cross-border privacy rules, and remove barriers that hinder the trade of services.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Digital Economy, and NAFTA
Political Geography:: United States, Canada, North America, and Mexico

39. Countering Sexual Violence in Conflict

Author:: Jamille Bigio and Rachel Vogelstein
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Armies and armed groups often subject noncombatants—particularly women and children—to conflict-related sexual violence, such as rape, sexual slavery, and forced marriage. Despite international recognition of this devastating abuse as a crime against humanity, sexual violence continues to plague conflicts from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Syria. This practice has also proliferated among extremist groups, including Boko Haram in Nigeria and the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, sexual violence has tarnished the operations of peacekeepers charged with protecting civilians, thereby undermining the integrity and effectiveness of international peacekeeping institutions across the globe. Sexual violence in conflict is not simply a gross violation of human rights—it is also a security challenge. Wartime rape fuels displacement, weakens governance, and destabilizes communities, thereby inhibiting postconflict reconciliation and imperiling long-term stability. Combating conflict-related sexual violence merits a higher place on the U.S. foreign policy agenda. Although the U.S. government has taken modest steps to address sexual violence in conflict under successive Republican and Democratic administrations, more action is needed. To counter such violence, the Donald J. Trump administration should require training on conflict-related sexual violence in U.S. security cooperation efforts; expand the number of women serving in militaries, police, and peacekeeping forces around the world; increase accountability for the crime of sexual violence; and undermine terrorist financing streams raised through the abduction of women and children. These steps will help the United States and its allies respond effectively to the security threat posed by conflict-related sexual violence and advance U.S. interests in peace and stability.
Topic:: Human Rights, Gender Based Violence, Conflict, and Sexual Violence
Political Geography:: United States, Iraq, Syria, Nigeria, and Congo

40. Chinese Investment in Critical U.S. Technology: Risks to U.S. Security Interests

Author:: Council on Foreign Relations
Publication Date:: 10-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Chinese firms, both private and state-owned, have in recent years invested billions of dollars in the U.S. technology industry, raising concerns that a powerful rival has gained or could soon gain access to sensitive and, in some cases, critical technologies that underpin American military superiority and economic might. At the workshop entitled “Chinese Investment in Critical U.S. Technology: Risks to U.S. Security Interests,” held in San Francisco, on July 18, 2017, CFR convened nearly thirty current and former government officials, academics, bankers, investors, and corporate executives to explore whether the large and growing early-stage Chinese investment in critical U.S. technology poses a threat to U.S. national security, and, if so, to outline policies that mitigate the risks of unbridled Chinese investment and to bolster U.S. competitiveness.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, and North America

41. China and the U.S.-ROK Alliance: Promoting a Trilateral Dialogue

Author:: Heung-kyu Kim
Publication Date:: 11-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: As the Republic of Korea faces an increasing threat from North Korea, evolving U.S.-China relations are becoming important to Seoul’s strategy for dealing with Pyongyang. The United States and China are competitors, but they also seek cooperation on a range of global issues. And although South Korea seeks to have good relations with both great powers, it is increasingly being pushed to take sides in the ongoing U.S.-China competition. As the U.S.-China relationship becomes more complex, South Korea needs to carefully evaluate its policy toward China in order to find the best ways to ensure Chinese cooperation on the North Korean issue, particularly taking into account China’s evolving view of North Korea. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, China is profoundly changing its foreign policy, including its relations with the United States and the two Koreas. With more confidence in its own diplomatic, military, and economic capacity to protect its national interests, China under Xi’s leadership has begun to regard the entire Korean Peninsula as part of its sphere of influence.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

42. Economic Constraints on Russian Foreign Policy

Author:: Christopher Smart
Publication Date:: 11-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The recent collapse in the U.S.-Russia relationship has roots that stretch back to fundamental misunderstandings at the end of the Cold War. Western democracies have watched with dismay as tightening political controls in Russia have throttled domestic pluralism, while Moscow’s roughshod foreign policy and military tactics have driven its neighbors into submission or open hostility. Russia has bemoaned what it sees as Western arrogance and a stubborn refusal to recognize its security concerns and great-power status. Today, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, support of Syrian repression, and, above all, meddling in the U.S. presidential election have shattered any desire in Washington—at least outside the Oval Office—to search for common ground. Indeed, amid congressional logjams on nearly every issue, overwhelming bipartisan majorities passed a stiffer sanctions regime. The narrative in Moscow, meanwhile, paints a consistent picture of Washington actively rallying Europeans to expand footholds around Russia’s borders with an ultimate goal of regime change in the Kremlin itself. In spite of President Donald J. Trump’s apparent eagerness to improve relations, deepening resistance across the political spectrum makes any progress fanciful at this stage.Whether either side understands how to get relations back on track remains uncertain. What is clear is that neither side wants to. Deep-seated U.S. mistrust and an unyielding Russian government seem likely to confine the bilateral relationship to a series of sour exchanges and blustery confrontations for now. Yet one persistent weakness will ultimately limit Russia’s foreign agenda: an economy that is likely to fall increasingly behind those of its major neighbors and partners. For now, Russia has largely learned to tolerate Western economic sanctions, and its companies have found ways to live with restricted access to finance. Without reform and economic integration with the West, however, Russian influence will drift toward the margins of global diplomacy. Russia’s economy will atrophy from a combination of hyperconcentrated decision-making, continuing dependence on hydrocarbons, and persistent financial isolation. Core goals of Russia’s foreign policy will steadily recede from view, including important elements of the economic agenda with its immediate neighbors, the European Union and China. Though a snapback of oil prices would undoubtedly delay any day of reckoning, even large new inflows of petro-profits will not fundamentally close the widening gap with major partners.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

43. Countering Russian Information Operations in the Age of Social Media

Author:: Keir Giles
Publication Date:: 11-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: As investigations into attempts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election continue, more aspects of Russia’s approach to information warfare are coming to light. A steady stream of new disclosures is revealing a complex blend of hacking, public disclosures of private emails, and use of bots, trolls, and targeted advertising on social media designed to interfere in political processes and heighten societal tensions. Moscow’s hostile actions are driven by the belief that Russia is already in a state of conflict with the West, led by the United States, and that the internet is a domain for waging this conflict. From the earliest stages of the internet’s development, Russia has held a starkly different view from the West of its benefits and its potential. Russia’s national security establishment immediately saw connectivity as a threat and a potential weapon—and eventually as one that could help achieve regime change and deprive a country of its sovereignty—rather than as an enabler of economic development. The organization of Russia’s information-warfare capabilities, which include cyber operators, media outlets, and false flag entities, is shrouded in secrecy. In the West, generally only the intelligence community has a clear picture of how Russian capabilities are directed. Barring the sudden appearance of a Russian counterpart to Edward Snowden, the only view into Russia’s information toolbox is provided by cybersecurity companies and criminal prosecutions. The picture is further muddied because the Russian government keeps many of its cyberwarfare actors at arm’s length by employing contractors and former criminals through middlemen, giving Moscow a degree of deniability if caught. Nevertheless, both Western governments and private industry can take steps to mitigate Russian influence operations. Western governments should swiftly and decisively denounce Russian information activities as soon as they are identified, and their counterintelligence agencies should identify quantitative means to measure the effectiveness of Russia’s methods. Social media companies should more aggressively police their platforms for malicious state-sponsored content, and they should work with news organizations to promote verified and fact-checked content on their platforms.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Political stability, Disinformation, and Election Interference
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

44. The Challenge From North Korea

Author:: Riccardo Alcaro and Ettore Greco
Publication Date:: 11-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: A nuclear-armed North Korea is a threat to the fragile strategic equilibrium on the Korean Peninsula and to international security at large. Emboldened by a nuclear arsenal, the highly militarized regime of President Kim Jong-un could be tempted to embark on aggressive acts. Meanwhile, the United States could opt for preventive military action. Even if neither party seeks a military confrontation, conflict could ensue due to miscalculation or simple misreading of each other’s intentions. Limited military exchanges could spiral out of control, eventually involving not only North Korea, the United States, and its allies in the region—Japan and South Korea—but also China. The repercussions of North Korea’s nuclear challenge may not be limited to Northeast Asia, not least because the nonproliferation regime, a pillar of international security, would be dealt a serious, if not fatal, blow if regional adversaries sought to meet it by acquiring their own nuclear arsenals. The destabilizing effects of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic programs on regional and international security cannot be overestimated. In devising a response to the North Korean challenge, regional actors should remain committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but they should also implement security measures with observable results short of full denuclearization. Specifically, the United States and its allies should concentrate on sanctioning North Korea and on diplomatic action, actively seeking the involvement of China and Russia, while employing a strategy of deterrence and containment.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

45. U.S.-ASEAN-ROK Cooperation on Nontraditional Security

Author:: Jaehyon Lee
Publication Date:: 12-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Traditional security issues in the Asia-Pacific, such as tensions on the Korean Peninsula or disputes over the South China Sea, consistently attract the attention of policymakers within the region and abroad. But their consequences for ordinary people are often dwarfed by the fallout from nontraditional security (NTS) events, such as climate change, resource scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, famine, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and transnational crime. For countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the human and economic losses from NTS threats can be staggering. Moreover, economic and social costs from NTS threats consume resources that otherwise could be channeled toward economic growth and social welfare. Historically, there have been bilateral and multilateral attempts at cooperation on NTS in the Asia-Pacific, but they have not been enough. Trilateral cooperation among the United States, ASEAN, and South Korea would benefit not just the participating parties, but also the region as a whole. Such cooperation would allow South Korea to contribute to the region and is consistent with the Moon Jae-in government’s desire to play a greater foreign policy role beyond the Korean Peninsula. It would also advance the U.S.-South Korean alliance and give South Korea experience that could be used in future NTS crises in North Korea such as famines, natural disasters, or pandemics.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Natural Disasters, Natural Resources, and Drugs
Political Geography:: United States, Asia, South Korea, and Southeast Asia

46. Writing New Rules for the U.S.-China Investment Relationship

Author:: Jennifer M. Harris
Publication Date:: 12-2017
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: Chinese outbound investment is on the rise, and much of it is finding its way into the United States. Be- tween 2010 and 2015, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the United States grew by an average of 32 percent annually.1 Within the past two years alone, Chinese foreign investment inflows to the United States increased four-fold, and available data suggests 2017 will see the second highest annual investment on record, after 2016.2 This is not a two-way street: the United States and other foreign investors do not enjoy similar open market access in China. China maintains a dizzying assortment of formal and informal barriers to for- eign investment—from outright restrictions and quotas to mandatory joint ventures, forced localization measures, and domestic licensing regimes. Despite years of negotiations, these barriers are, if anything, growing more cumbersome in many sectors. U.S. firms paint a darkening picture of the business climate they face in China. U.S. FDI in China has slowed considerably in recent years: after growing roughly 180 percent from 2002 to 2007 (albeit from a low baseline), U.S. FDI flows into China have declined since 2012.3 The one-way surge of Chinese investment into the United States comes against a backdrop of strategic mistrust between Washington and Beijing. Ongoing accusations of state-sponsored cyber predation of U.S. firms, Beijing’s increasing aggressiveness over territorial disputes, its systematic efforts to under- mine the U.S. alliance system in Asia, and mounting tensions over North Korea all contribute to a dark- ening mood in the U.S.-China relationship. And, like so much involving China, this investment is simply different. Rarely, if ever, has the United States seen an increase in investment of this magnitude—espe- cially from a non-ally and especially from one where the lines between state ownership and private own- ership are so inherently blurred. For all the concern surrounding Japanese investment in the United States in the 1980s—coming as it did amid fierce economic competition—those debates ultimately re- mained under the umbrella of the U.S.-Japan military alliance. All of this raises questions about whether the United States needs to tighten its stance on Chinese in- bound investment; proposals to that effect have bipartisan support in the Congress. The Donald J. Trump administration has signaled its desire for a tougher approach in its economic dealings with China, which U.S. businesses seem to welcome. One foundation for such an approach is the principle of reciprocity. Roughly two dozen sectors in China—construction, mining, banking, insurance, and so on—remain effectively off-limits to American investment, because the Chinese government protects its domestic companies through regulations and financial subsidies. Even in sectors that technically allow foreign investment, discriminatory industrial policies tilt the playing field in favor of Chinese firms. Until this changes, Washington would be justi- fied—even obligated—to limit Chinese investment in the U.S. market. However, U.S. policymakers do not have a consensus on what a policy of reciprocity would entail, and different policy interpretations could spell quite different economic and foreign policy consequences for the United States. The United States should aim for a version of reciprocity that allows it the flexibility to maximize pressure on the broad range of Chinese industrial policy concerns while leaving a clear route to negotiations. The United States should also encourage European and other Western countries, many of which are seeing similar increases in Chinese investment, to adopt this new approach.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:: United States, China, Asia, and North America

47. A Sharper Choice on North Korea: Engaging China for a Stable Northeast Asia

Author:: Mike Mullen, Sam Nunn, and Adam Mount
Publication Date:: 09-2016
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: A new Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Independent Task Force report, A Sharper Choice on North Korea: Engaging China for a Stable Northeast Asia, finds that the United States’ policy of “strategic patience” with North Korea will neither halt that country’s recurring and dangerous cycle of provocation nor ensure the stability of Northeast Asia in the future. To the contrary, the Task Force warns, “If allowed to continue, current trends will predictably, progressively, and gravely threaten U.S. national security interests and those of its allies.” Asserting that “China’s policy toward the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] will critically affect the fate of the region,” the Task Force urges U.S. officials to encourage China to work with the United States, Japan and South Korea to establish a nonnuclear and unified Korean Peninsula. “Encouraging a transformation of China’s policy toward North Korea should be the next administration’s top priority in its relations with China,” says the report. “If China, the United States, and U.S. allies can work together to pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear program and mitigate its threatening military posture,” the Task Force contends, “a stable, prosperous Northeast Asia led by China and U.S. allies can emerge.” To the extent that China declines to cooperate and North Korea continues to refuse to negotiate, however, the report finds that United States will have no choice but to work with Japan and Korea to “consider more assertive military and political actions, including those that directly threaten the existence of the [North Korean] regime and its nuclear and missile capabilities.” The Task Force proposes that the United States take steps to sharpen the consequences for North Korea, by imposing escalating costs on continued defiance and offering incentives for cooperation.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Peace, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

48. Working With a Rising India

Author:: Charles R. Kayne, Joseph S. Nye Jr., and Alyssa Ayres
Publication Date:: 11-2015
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: “A rising India offers one of the most substantial opportunities to advance American national interests over the next two decades,” asserts a new Independent Task Force report sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Working With a Rising India: A Joint Venture for the New Century. Over the past ten years, India, the world's largest democracy, has lifted more than 130 million people out of poverty. The country has rebounded from a recent economic growth slump, surpassing China this year to become the world's fastest-growing major economy. “If India can maintain its current growth rate, let alone attain sustained double digits, it has the potential over the next two to three decades to follow China on the path to becoming another $10 trillion economy,” notes the Task Force. With Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's prioritization of economic growth and foreign policy revitalization, the country now has a window of opportunity to either make the necessary reforms or risk being left behind. “[India] will have to decide whether it wants to become a major part of global trade flows and deeply integrated into global supply chains. Doing so would boost India's efforts to grow its manufacturing sector and its economy; choosing not to will make that ambition harder to achieve.” Because India does not seek an alliance with the United States and closely guards its policy independence, U.S.-India relations will not resemble those Washington has with its conventional allies. For that reason, the Task Force recommends that “U.S. policymakers [should] explicitly emphasize a ‘joint-venture’ model for U.S.-India relations, focused on a slate of shared pursuits on which interests converge—and with clear mechanisms for coordinating and managing the known and expected disagreements.” The bipartisan Task Force is chaired by Charles R. Kaye, co-chief executive officer of the private equity firm Warburg Pincus and former chairman of the U.S.-India Business Council, and Joseph S. Nye Jr., distinguished service professor and former dean of the Harvard Kennedy School. Directed by CFR Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia Alyssa Ayres, the Task Force is composed of sixteen prominent experts from government, academic, nonprofit, and other sectors.
Topic:: Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Democracy, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:: India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

49. Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China

Author:: Robert D. Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger, and Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:: 04-2015
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: "China represents and will remain the most significant competitor to the United States for decades to come. As such, the need for a more coherent U.S. response to increasing Chinese power is long overdue," write CFR Senior Fellow Robert D. Blackwill and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate Ashley J. Tellis in a new Council Special Report, Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China. "Because the American effort to 'integrate' China into the liberal international order has now generated new threats to U.S. primacy in Asia—and could result in a consequential challenge to American power globally—Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy." The authors argue that such a strategy is designed to limit the dangers that China's geoeconomic and military power pose to U.S. national interests in Asia and globally, even as the United States and its allies maintain diplomatic and economic interactions with China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:: China

50. Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa

Author:: Paul D. Williams
Publication Date:: 05-2015
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:: The number of UN peacekeepers is at a record high, with nearly 110,000 uniformed deployed "blue helmets" worldwide, most of them in Africa. But the status quo is "untenable," warns Paul D. Williams, author and associate professor of international affairs at George Washington University, in a new Council Special Report, Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa. Unrealistic mandates, unsustainable supplies of personnel, hostile host governments, and mission creep have undermined peace operations, Williams writes. "Given the growing interest in fostering a stable and prosperous Africa, the United States should wield its political influence to address these challenges."
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Aid, War, Fragile/Failed State, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:: Africa

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS