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41. Land Rights For Urban Slum Dwellers: A Review of the Odisha Land Rights to Slum Dwellers Act, 2017 and the Jaga Mission

Author:
Mugdha Mohapatra
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
Theorists of economic development have emphasized the importance of clear, legally guaranteed property rights in ensuring economic development. Legally enforceable rights over land are thought of as a solution to incentivize investment in land, ensure optimal use of resources and create the conditions for market led-growth. Land rights (either through titling or restricted rights over land) have long been considered as a precondition for development because they increase access to formal credit. In the specific context of urban slum dwellers, the added benefit of land rights is that these rights can be used to ensure tenure security, help provide municipal services and other social benefits. Based on these presumptions in 2017, the Odisha Land Rights to Slum Dweller Act (OLRSDA) and the Odisha Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act (OMC) were enacted. These enactments along with the implementation of the Odisha Liveable Habitat Mission, (also known as the JAGA mission) kickstarted a process of urban redevelopment. The policy measure of providing land rights to slum dwellers has been replicated in Punjab under the “BASERA” scheme and is under consideration in Himachal Pradesh. In this paper, I have analysed Odisha’s legislative and policy-based interventions to alleviate urban poverty through land rights. My key findings in this paper are as follows: (i) land rights under the OLRSDA are not sufficiently integrated within the existing legal framework and there exist several ambiguities. As a result, the land right granted cannot be used as an economic resource and offers limited increase in tenure security; (ii) land rights are beneficial yet insufficient to lead to the proposed goals of increasing access to municipal services and access to subsidies; (iii) government intervention is required at each stage of the slum redevelopment process to ensure the achievement of these goals.
Topic:
Urban, Land Rights, Economic Development, and Slums
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

42. The State of India’s Pollution Control Boards: Who has a seat at the table?

Author:
Arunesh Karkun, Sharon Mathew, Shibani Ghosh, and Bhargav Krishna
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
The Indo-Gangetic plain (IGP) in India is one of the most polluted regions in the world. A densely populated region, with a large number of sources emitting a range of pollutants, regulating air pollution here is an extremely difficult and complex task. Several measures are afoot to improve air quality in this region, and the State Pollution Control Boards and Pollution Control Committees (SPCBs/PCCs) are playing a key role. However, these frontline agencies in pollution regulation are faced with several institutional constraints and challenges in discharging their mandate effectively. In ‘The State of India’s Pollution Control Boards’, we explore some of these key institutional issues faced by Boards in the IGP through a series of working papers: 1) “Who has a seat at the table?” – Examines the composition of the Boards and their ability to engage in policymaking and take decisions in furtherance of statutory goals; 2) “Who is at the helm?” – Analyses the qualifications of the Board's leadership - the Chairperson and the Member Secretary, the length and stability of their tenure, and whether they are well-placed to guide the Boards' functioning; and 3) “Who is in the field?” – Evaluates the adequacy of the Boards' capacity – particularly technical capacity – to perform critical functions like consent granting, inspection, monitoring, and enforcement. In this paper – the first in the series – we focus on the Board composition. The Water Act1 and the Air Act2 prescribe up to fifteen members on the Board which is headed by a Chairperson and a Member Secretary. Who are these members and what are their qualifications? The laws require various constituencies to be represented: officials representing State Government departments, urban local bodies, and public sector corporations. Three members may be nominated to represent interests of agriculture, fishery, industry, trade or any other interest. The laws do not lay down the qualifications of these members, apart from the requirement under the Air Act that at least two persons on the board must have special knowledge or practical experience in the field of air quality management.
Topic:
Governance, Regulation, Legislation, and Pollution
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

43. The State of India’s Pollution Control Boards: Who is in the field?

Author:
Bhargav Krishna, Arunesh Karkun, Sharon Mathew, Prannv Dhawan, and Shibani Ghosh
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
The Indo-Gangetic plain (IGP) in India is one of the most polluted regions in the world. A densely populated region, with a large number of sources emitting a range of pollutants, regulating air pollution here is an extremely difficult and complex task. Several measures are afoot to improve air quality in this region, and the State Pollution Control Boards and Pollution Control Committees (SPCBs/PCCs) are playing a key role. However, these frontline agencies in pollution regulation are faced with several institutional constraints and challenges in discharging their mandate effectively. In ‘The State of India’s Pollution Control Boards’, we explore some of the key institutional issues faced by Boards in the IGP through a series of working papers: 1) “Who has a seat at the table?” – Examines the composition of the Boards and their ability to engage in policymaking and take decisions in furtherance of their statutory goals; 2) “Who is at the helm?” – Analyses the qualifications of the Board's leadership - the Chairperson and the Member Secretary, the length and stability of their tenure, and whether they are well-placed to guide the Boards' functioning; and 3) “Who is in the field?” – Evaluates the adequacy of the Boards' capacity – particularly technical capacity – to perform critical functions like consent granting, inspection, monitoring, and enforcement. In this paper – the third in the series – we focus on the technical capacity of the Boards, specifically the state of technical staff (engineers and scientists) employed by the Boards. The environmental engineers and scientists of an SPCB form the backbone of the institutional structure for pollution regulation. They carry out the fundamental task of the SPCBs, namely the review and grant of approvals under the environmental law regime. They evaluate applications from industries, conduct inspections or inquiries, collect and evaluate air and effluent samples, and issue approvals where applicable. Through their work, they provide the structural underpinnings to the “command and control” approach to pollution management. Several earlier reports have highlighted the significant staff constraints under which SPCBs function, highlighting in particular the high rate of vacancies among technical staff (1–3). In the context of a rapidly industrializing State, and an evolving environmental regulatory regime, there is a need for SPCBs to be appropriately skilled and staffed.
Topic:
Environment, Governance, Regulation, Pollution, and Personnel
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

44. The State of India’s Pollution Control Boards: Who is at the helm?

Author:
Shibani Ghosh, Sharon Mathew, Arunesh Karkun, and Bhargav Krishna
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
The Indo-Gangetic Plain (IGP) in India is one of the most polluted regions in the world. A densely populated region, with a large number of sources emitting a range of pollutants, regulating air pollution here is an extremely difficult and complex task. Several measures are afoot to improve air quality in this region, and the State Pollution Control Boards and Pollution Control Committees (SPCBs/PCCs) are playing a key role. However, these frontline agencies in pollution regulation are faced with several institutional constraints and challenges in discharging their mandate effectively. In ‘The State of India’s Pollution Control Boards’, we explore some of the key institutional issues faced by Boards in the IGP through a series of working papers: 1) “Who has a seat at the table?” – Examines the composition of the Boards and their ability to engage in policymaking and take decisions in furtherance of their statutory goals; 2) “Who is at the helm?” – Analyses the qualifications of the Board's leadership - the Chairperson and the Member Secretary, the length and stability of their tenure, and whether they are well-placed to guide the Boards' functioning; and 3) “Who is in the field?” – Evaluates the adequacy of the Boards' capacity – particularly technical capacity – to perform critical functions like consent granting, inspection, monitoring, and enforcement. In this paper – the second in the series – we focus on the Board leadership – the Chairperson and the Member Secretary. They play a crucial role in heading these agencies and ensuring their functioning is in accordance with the statutory mandate. Under the Water Act1 and the Air Act,2 important statutory functions of the Board are delegated to them, and they need to be qualified to perform these functions effectively. The Water Act and the Air Act provide limited guidance on the qualifications of persons who should hold these posts. The issue of who can lead a pollution control board has been discussed in several reports and government correspondence. Specific appointments to leadership positions in different states have been challenged in High Courts over the years. The most comprehensive judicial consideration of the issue was in a 2016 judgment of the National Green Tribunal (NGT).3 Although the final outcome of the NGT’s judgment was overturned by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court shared the NGT’s anguish at the state of governance of these boards, and significantly, directed states to form rules or guidelines for the recruitment of qualified persons to these two posts.
Topic:
Governance, Regulation, Leadership, and Pollution
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

45. Frontline Workers and the Covid-19 Pandemic

Author:
Gokulnath Govindan
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
The Covid-19 pandemic proved to be a global disaster that took countless lives, many of whom were frontline functionaries deployed to contain this crisis. As a result, the Indian state, unlike before, had to acknowledge the risk that accompanied their workers in this crisis. They promised them vaccination, health & life insurance, amongst other material benefits to protect, insure and motivate such cadres. The paper attempts to study these promises, in particular its vaccination and insurance policies, to better understand what it meant to be a frontline worker in this crisis. Did the Indian administration account for all at-risk workers and their context, or did they simply exclude many of them in their policies ? The essay, at its core, will answer this question as it examines the Indian state’s capacity to celebrate its frontline workers.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Crisis Management, Risk, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

46. Debates on Administrative Reform in India: Transfers

Author:
Akila Ranganathan
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
India has a long history of periodic transfers of senior administrators. As the First Administrative Reforms Commission, 1969 (First ARC), notes, the practice of periodic transfers was historically devised with the view of preventing officials from acquiring personal influence in a manner that could harm or diminish the influence of the ruling political powers. Officers used to be rotated from their posts every 3 to 4 years. The First ARC declared such a system of periodic transfers to be “antiquated,” stating that “it [was] no longer necessary for the Government to be suspicious of its own employees” (1966, p. 110). The commission argued that frequent transfers also interfered with development work, which required officers to be closely associated with the programmes and communities that they were serving. Further, these transfers hamper the officers’ job satisfaction and sense of achievement. Thus, the First ARC laid down that periodic transfers should be exercised only where a post carried regulatory responsibilities; in any post involving development activities and programme management, transfers should be an exception. Despite these recommendations, transfers have remained an inexorable feature of the higher civil services in India. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission, 2008 (Second ARC), notes that “frequent transfers of civil servants continue to be one of the most vexatious governance problems still facing India” (p. 182). The Commission details that, between 1986 and 2006, 48–60% of the total strength of the IAS spent less than 1 year in their respective postings. The number of IAS officers who spent more than 3 years in their respective postings is consistently less than 10% of the total strength in that period. Similarly, another study of the bureaucracy has shown that, from 1980 to 2000, the average tenure of IAS officers at their posting was only 16 months (Iyer and Mani, 2012). This working paper provides an overview of the reform discourse on the process of transfers of higher civil services officers in India. An analysis of various reform committee reports since the 1980s, shows that transfers are associated with two broad attributes of the higher civil services: the effectiveness of administration and governance, and the insulation of civil servants from political interference. In addressing the issues around transfers, recommendations of reform committees have been aimed at enhancing the former and restoring the latter. These recommendations include monetary benefits, fixation of a minimum tenure for officers, and the establishment of an independent body to oversee transfers.
Topic:
Reform, Civil Servants, Personnel, and Administration
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

47. Debates on Administrative Reform in India: Expertise

Author:
Karnamadakala Rahul Sharma, Aditya Unnikrishnan, and Sonakshi Sharma
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
Historical accounts show that the education and training of the colonial civil servant was purposely made non-specialised. Autobiographical narratives of ICS officers who received their training at Halieybury (England), reveal that the quality of education was low and students were tested on their knowledge of languages such as Persian and Sanskrit, which had little practical use once they arrived in India. After the Service was made merit-based in 1853, officer training included more practical aspects such as attending court proceedings and writing reports, however, it did not involve in-depth specialisation in any one field. The non-specialised character of training and the expertise gained, were well suited to the nature of the polity that required district officials to hold multiple portfolios. Earl Cornwallis, the third Governor General of Bengal who is credited with making extensive changes in the civil service from 1793 to 1859, tried to differentiate the judicial and supervisory functions for land revenue assessment and collection. He created the office of the District Collector as a supervisory role to oversee collection of revenue from landholders, whereas the administration of law was to be the responsibility of a civil judge and magistrate. However, after the annexation of Awadh and the territorial expansion of the company, it proved impossible for a District Collector to separate their judicial and supervisory functions, particularly in the newly acquired territories (Cohn, 1987, p. 509). The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) we have today inherited this generalist notion of the civil servant from its predecessor, the ICS. Post-independence, even though different services were created to undertake specific responsibilities, the imagination of the expertise of the IAS officer continues to be organised around the principles of the colonial civil service. This has led many to argue that the skills and knowledge of the IAS were unsuited to the nature of polity and demands of governance (Administrative Reforms Commission, 1969). More than fifty years later, the same tension concerning the personnel involved in governance and the skills/ knowledge required for these roles persists. As a result, two fundamental questions are central to the debates on expertise in the country’s government. First: What kind of knowledge and expertise is most useful for administrators? This debate has frequently been framed as a choice between generalists and specialists. And second: How can this expertise be embedded in administration, particularly at senior levels? Two kinds of solutions dominate this discourse, one where internal mechanisms are restructured to make best use of existing internal talent (via domain assignment) and the other involving the recruitment of external experts (via lateral entry). This working paper delves into the detailed discussion on these two questions by reviewing the First and Second Administrative Reforms Commissions (ARC), Central Pay Commission Reports, the Surinder Nath Committee report, Sarkaria Commission report, NITI Three Year Action Agenda and Parliamentary Standing Committee reports. The first section of the working paper attempts to present a discursive overview of the generalist-specialist binary. The next two sections, on Domain Assignment and Lateral Entry respectively, explain the dominant approaches that have been considered to address the expertise problem. 2. Generalists vs Specialists: origins and tensions As with any job, there is consensus within the reform discourse that bureaucrats must display a high degree of ability and expertise. However, there are opposing views on what constitutes this expertise at the highest levels of the bureaucracy. These differences have frequently been expressed in the language of ‘generalists’ and ‘specialists’ partially as a result of the structure of India’s Civil Service which consists of generalist and specialist services as described in the next sub-section. The next two subsections throw light on the evolution of reform thinking on the kind of expertise needed—from narrow technical knowledge to domain competence, and eventually towards a more complex understanding that expertise is gained on the job that cannot be achieved through appropriate training alone. In the timeline on page 6, we present the sequence of events and reports of the last few decades that we consider salient for understanding the debate on generalist versus specialist roles. The timeline offers a bird’s eye view of reform trajectory when read alongside the detailed information provided in the following sections.
Topic:
History, Reform, Colonialism, and Administration
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

48. Debates on Administrative Reform in India: Performance Management

Author:
Aditya Unnikrishnan, Sonakshi Sharma, and Karnamadakala Rahul Sharma
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
In the early nineteenth century, a civil servant employed by the English East India Company had a considerable amount of autonomy. On the one hand, their actions could be questioned at the following levels: regional, provincial, at the Presidency, in London at the Court of Directors, the Board of Control and ultimately at parliament. However, as historians have noted, “given the difficulties of communication and the sheer bulk of information and correspondence which had to pass between India and London, it often took two or three years for matters originating in a district to be commented on in London” (Cohn, 1987, p. 512). In such a scenario, monitoring and measuring the performance of civil servants was particularly challenging. Accounts of civil servants have not yet been analysed to understand on what basis they were picked for promotion by their superiors or the Governor General. This changed postindependence, when clear processes were put in place for measuring performance, and performance appraisals were at the core of this shift. Measuring, reporting, and rewarding performance appropriately are critical for motivating and developing people’s capabilities across organisations and professions. In the public sector, for example, a recent survey of 23,000 civil servants in Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America finds that “civil servants are more satisfied, committed and, at times, motivated to serve the public, work hard and perform, where they perceive that performance shapes their pay, promotion and job stability prospects” (Sahling et al., 2018, p. 36). However, measuring and rewarding performance in the public sector can be challenging because government employment often lacks the classic drivers and incentives that foster performance in other organisations. Employees in government and public sector organisations function in the absence of clear profit motives or market competition, which other organisations use to measure and reward performance (Moriarty & Kennedy, 2002). Government employees also have to contend with multiple ‘principals’, such as politicians, bureaucrats and the citizen population, each of whom have differing objectives. Measuring performance and linking it to multiple outcomes in such contexts can be complex (Pollitt, 1986). Finally, most civil service contracts have strong protections against dismissal, which severely limits the incentive tools available to managers in the private and nonprofit sectors (Esteve and Schuster, 2019). The design or assessment of performance appraisal systems in the public sector, therefore, need to consider these boundary conditions seriously. This working paper examines reforms related to the design of performance appraisals in the Indian Civil Services. Within the Indian government and especially senior administrative roles, performance appraisals have served as the primary tool by which employee performance is assessed and rewarded. This system, established in 1985, was meant to assess and rate officers annually against ex ante targets set at the beginning of the year (Surinder Nath Committee, 2002). By linking performance to career advancement, appraisals sought to motivate and incentivise better performance by government employees. Weaknesses in this appraisal process have, however, severely limited its impact on performance, requiring the government to undertake multiple reforms over the years.
Topic:
Reform, Management, Performance Evaluation, Civil Servants, and Administration
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

49. Debates on Administrative Reform in India: Training

Author:
Sonakshi Sharma, Aditya Unnikrishnan, and Karnamadakala Rahul Sharma
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
Since Independence, the government’s approach to training the IAS has undergone a sea of change. The IAS has evolved “from being a postcolonial civil service… to one that is rooted in the empirical realities of a developing and resurgent India” (Kiran Aggarwal Committee, 2014, p.1). Training programmes for the IAS have shifted their focus from regulation to socioeconomic development in keeping with the new demands faced by governance and administration (Second Administrative Reforms Commission, 2008). In spite of these changes, there remain similarities with the colonial civil service. Like the ICS, the IAS is a high-functional generalist service tasked with handling a variety of responsibilities. Reform committees continue to express concerns that trainees do not attach adequate value to the training process (Second Administrative Reforms Commission, 2008). Training is still expected to create strong bonds between officers and establish a camaraderie. Most importantly, the central principle remains the same; a merit-based process is used to select young people with little or no experience in governance and place them in positions of great responsibility. This kind of system inevitably relies heavily on training to impart skills. Better training, both at the formative and mid-career stages, is expected to bridge the “wide chasm between public expectation and service delivery” (Kiran Aggarwal Committee, 2014, p. 3). For this reason, it is vital to examine the history of reform debates and conversations on the subject. Tracing the evolution of these reform threads will better equip us to analyse current and future reform measures by understanding which problems are being addressed and how. To this end, this working paper closely reads the following: the Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) reports, Central Pay Commission (CPC) reports, and reports produced by reform commissions like the Alagh Committee, Kiran Aggarwal Committee, Hota Committee, Kothari Committee, Yugandhar Committee, VT Krishnamachari Committee and the Surinder Nath Committee. Apart from this, the working paper also draws on theNational Training Policy, 1996 and2012, and documents on Mission Karmayogi that reflect the government’s vision for IAS training. This paper begins with a short description of the current training format and the IAS ecosystem. This is followed by an analysis of the three streams that dominate reform thinking on IAS training: the strategy, structure and content of training; the role of and need for incentives in training programmes, and the institutional apparatus in place to operationalise training programmes.
Topic:
History, Reform, Colonialism, Training, Civil Servants, and Administration
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

50. Debates on Administrative Reform in India: Examinations and Recruitment

Author:
Archana Sivasubramanian
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
Over the last 50 years, norms for recruitment in the Indian Civil Services have undergone several changes to reflect the needs of the administration, the aspirations of a democratic society and the changes in the country’s political economy. There were two developments that led to these changes. The first development is domestic in nature—reform committees were set up to examine the different features of the examination and the recruitment system for entry into the All India Civil Services. A reform committee setup under A.D. Gorwala in 1951, published independent India’s first report on public administration. Subsequent reform committees addressed several other aspects of the Civil Services examination system including educational qualifications, age for entry into the services, number of attempts and service allocation rules. The second, and a connected development is international in its scope and nature. Other Westminster democracies across the world were implementing new theories of public management—such as market-oriented reform of the Civil Services—and these developments advanced India’s thinking on reforms for its own Civil Services. Every reform committee has highlighted the importance of the recruitment exercise as a channel to draw people with merit into the services. Reforms were proposed to “weed out the dead wood” and professionalise the Civil Services in order to realise an efficient, incorrupt and a result-oriented bureaucracy (Alagh Committee, 2001, p. 35). This, the committees suggested, must be routed through the recruitment funnel by finding the ‘right type of persons’—candidates who can combine intellectual competence with a strong ethical value system and a positive public service orientation. An important objective of the recruitment system has been to also ensure that the Civil Services is more equal and representative and guarantees representation to historically underrepresented groups through recruitment quotas. However, some studies have argued that the recruitment pattern reveals a distinct upper caste, urban bias, stressing the need for corrective measures to democratise the Civil Services (Barik, 2004). Keeping this backdrop in mind, many debates pertinent to the recruitment and examination architecture have been held. On the surface, these debates appear to be procedural as they concern themselves with questions about age limits and number of attempts that applicants are eligible for. But a closer examination of the debates reveals that they are also fundamentally about questions of meritocracy and representation in the Civil Services. The Civil Services Examination (CSE ) is expected to allow for equal opportunity and representation of all castes and classes in the Services. In addition, meritocracy plays an important role in the design of this system, but there are discussions on the validity of this idea of merit itself. Examining some of these debates will serve as entry points for us to understand the examination and recruitment apparatus, a small but critical cog in the machinery of India’s bureaucracy. The main objective of this working paper on examinations and recruitment in the Civil Services is to trace the origins of these debates in order to contextualise the present through an understanding of the past. The focus of this working paper is only on the All India Civil Services, although equally interesting and meaningful, reforms in the State Civil Services institutions—like the Punjab government’s decision to mandate 33 percent reservation for women in direct recruitment for the Punjab Civil Services—have not been touched upon. There is a large volume of material to explore on the State Civil Services and we hope that this working paper lays the foundation for further studies in this regard. This working paper analyses various committee reports that were set up to reform the Civil Services. Most of the analyses are drawn from the Kothari Commission Report (1977), the Satish Chandra Committee Report (1989), the Alagh Committee Report (2001), the P. C. Hota Committee Report (2004) and the Second Administrative Reforms Commission Report (Second ARC) (2009). Figure 1 outlines a timeline of committees that have made important observations on the debates on examinations and selection. The committee reports reveal a discernible pattern—three key debates that have been found to recur over and over again: eligibility status, examination process and service allocation. These debates may not cover the entire gamut of arguments but have been addressed in this paper because of the importance given to them in the committee reports and their relevance to contemporary India. Overall, this working paper does three things: first, it synthesises the main ideas from the reform committee reports; second, through a discussion section, it highlights the normative principles that underpin the selection processes and third, it asks a few open-ended questions that warrant careful analysis, stakeholder conversations, and reflection.
Topic:
Reform, Recruitment, and Civil Services
Political Geography:
South Asia and India