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1. Atomic Strait: How China’s Nuclear Buildup Shapes Security Dynamics with Taiwan and the United States

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the intersection of China’s nuclear modernization and cross-Strait tensions, especially how they might play out during a crisis, contingency, or conflict involving China, Taiwan, and the United States. Beijing is rapidly modernizing its nuclear arsenal to make it larger and more sophisticated. Changes include an increase in warhead numbers from more than 400 today to potentially 700 by 2027 and more beyond, consolidating a nuclear triad, developing new delivery systems, and digging at least 300 new missile silos. Some factors still could constrain the growth of China’s arsenal or the policies that shape the way Chinese leaders employ it. They range from fissile material stocks to competing military spending priorities, considerations about China’s international reputation, and upholding Beijing’s claimed No First Use policy. But nearly all those constraining factors either already have weakened or could do so in the near future. China’s expanding nuclear arsenal suggests that the force will be designed to fulfill new missions. Some part of Beijing’s buildup surely is meant to bolster its second-strike retaliatory capability in the face of what China perceives as shifts in U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities and policies. China’s long-term goal for the expansion, however, could be more ambitious and potentially even include seeking to build an arsenal on par with Washington’s and Moscow’s. Meanwhile, China continues to ramp up pressure on Taiwan using political, economic, and military tools. Beijing’s campaign could provoke more crises in the coming years. The three major roles that nuclear weapons could play for China when dealing with cross-Strait crises or conflicts are: to shield China from U.S. nuclear coercion, to threaten Chinese nuclear use to try to forestall U.S. intervention, and to conduct a limited Chinese nuclear detonation in an attempt to force U.S. and Taiwanese capitulation. The report concludes with recommendations for U.S. policymakers. It calls for carrying out U.S. nuclear modernization plans to deter China but avoiding nuclear arms racing as a strategy in itself. It recommends incorporating nuclear elements into contingency planning and scenario exercises related to Taiwan, both unilaterally and with allies and partners. The report then calls for improving Taiwan’s conventional military capabilities while maintaining a consistent U.S. policy on cross-Strait issues and ensuring Taiwan forgoes pursuing indigenous nuclear weapons. Finally, the report argues in favor of pushing forward tough-minded bilateral engagement with Beijing on strategic stability and security issues while crafting a multilateral arms control strategy that builds coalitions to incentivize China to join and impose costs on Beijing if it opts to stay outside of key agreements.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. Avoiding the Brink: Escalation Management in a War to Defend Taiwan

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States is entering an unprecedented multipolar nuclear era that is far more complex and challenging than that of the Cold War. This report examines potential triggers, thresholds, and targets for Chinese nuclear use as well as options for the United States and its allies and partners to avoid and manage escalation. It uses the results of two exploratory tabletop exercises (TTXs) focused on how China’s expanding nuclear arsenal could impact the risk of nuclear escalation in a conventional conflict over Taiwan. From these two TTXs, the authors derived tentative insights into how nuclear escalation in a war over Taiwan might unfold and identified areas where further research is needed. First, the expansions and improvements projected for China’s nuclear forces will provide it with a wider range of coercive options. With a secure second-strike capability and more diverse theater nuclear options, China may be willing to brandish its nuclear weapons to attempt to deter the United States from entering a war. There are few incentives to conduct nuclear strikes early in such a conflict, but a war over Taiwan might well lead to a protracted war between the great powers—another area where more study will be critical. The authors also found that American policymakers today might not find the PRC’s nuclear threats credible because of its smaller arsenal size and historic policy of no first use (NFU). Furthermore, the authors found that attempts to degrade key conventional capabilities might lead either side to cross the other’s red lines, setting off an escalatory spiral and transforming a regional conflict into a great-power war. Both the United States and China will have to weigh the value of eliminating certain targets with the risk of crossing an adversary red line. Last, the authors found an asymmetry between the targets available to the United States and China in a Taiwan contingency. With fewer categories of targets to strike and types of capabilities with which to strike them, the United States may have fewer options to manage escalation. All these findings merit further study. The two TTXs, conducted in summer 2022, pitted a U.S. Blue team against a Chinese Red team in a war over Taiwan. The two wargames were designed as a controlled comparison to focus on the impact of one specific variable—the size and composition of the PLA’s nuclear arsenal—on the Red team’s decision-making and its propensity to deliberately escalate and on the Blue team’s ability to defend its allies and partners while managing escalation. By holding most other factors constant but changing Red’s nuclear force structure, the authors aimed to concentrate on the role that nuclear weapons played. In TTX 1, the players had a notional 2027 order of battle with a nuclear arsenal of about 700 warheads, diverse in yield and delivery system type and range. The second TTX, set in 2030, included a similarly diverse Red arsenal of over 1,000 nuclear warheads. After analyzing the results of both exercises, the authors contextualized and expanded the findings through research on existing literature on nuclear deterrence and escalation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

3. Democracy under Threat: How the Personalization of Political Parties Undermines Democracy

Author:
Erica Frantz, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Joseph Wright, Jia Li, Carisa Nietsche, Nicholas Lokker, and Nicolas Rice
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In 1998, Viktor Orbán was elected the prime minister of Hungary in free and fair elections. He was supported by the Fidesz party—a movement he founded in 1988 that became a political party in 1990. After losing reelection in 2002, Orbán returned to the prime ministership in 2010 having internalized the lesson that surviving in Hungarian politics “requires strong leadership and absolute control over the party.”1 From 2002 to 2010, Orbán increased his influence within Fidesz, including by changing the party constitution to give himself control of the selection of local party leaders, all parliamentary candidates, and the leader of the party’s parliamentary group. Orbán’s increasing influence within the party paved the way for his efforts over the next decade to remove checks on his power. His control over the party, along with Fidesz’s constitutional majority, enabled Orbán to change Hungary’s constitution in ways that weakened executive constraints, including from the Constitutional Court, the election commission, independent media, and civil society. Orbán’s disproportionate power within the political system allowed him to dismantle democracy in the years that followed, pushing Hungary into authoritarianism. This pattern of democratic decay is not unique to Hungary. Freedom House reports that democracy has been in decline for the last 16 consecutive years, with much of the deterioration occurring in countries classified as democracies.2 In some instances these declines left democracy compromised but intact (as in Poland). In other cases, the declines gave way to the onset of authoritarianism (as in Serbia). Importantly, along with the decline in democracy, there has been a clear change in the way that democracies are breaking down.3 Before 2000, coups were the primary way that democracies failed. Since 2000, however, incumbent takeovers—or the ability of democratically elected leaders to dismantle democracy from within—have grown more prevalent. In the 2010s, 64 percent of the democracies that broke down did so due to incumbent power grabs, while only 36 percent of those that collapsed did so because of a coup.4 Simply put, the greatest threat to democracy now comes from democratically elected leaders.
Topic:
Democracy, Political Parties, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

4. Peninsula Plus: Enhancing U.S.–South Korea Alliance Cooperation on China, Multilateralism, and Military and Security Technologies

Author:
Jacob Stokes and Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States–Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) alliance has entered a critical phase. In 2023, the two countries will commemorate the 70th anniversary of signing their bilateral mutual defense treaty. This year also marks the first full year under national leaders President Joe Biden and President Yoon Suk Yeol. After several challenging years in the two countries’ relationship, ties are improving. Better alliance relations have, unfortunately, coincided with a deterioration in the regional and global security environment, specifically due to threats from North Korea, China, and Russia. This report examines the U.S.-ROK alliance as it adapts to the new regional context by exploring how the United States and South Korea can sustain and deepen their relationship in three vital policy areas: coordination on China, alignment in minilateral and multilateral settings, and defense technology collaboration. Perhaps the biggest shift in alliance priorities in recent years has been the growing importance of the China challenge. During Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping’s decade in power, Beijing has adopted a more muscular foreign policy. Both the United States and South Korea have reshaped their approaches toward China in response. ROK concerns about China have grown as Beijing shields Pyongyang and acts aggressively elsewhere in the region, including toward Taiwan. But South Korea’s approach to China will continue to differ from that of the United States. The allies have divergent preferences regarding the speed, manner, and degree of partial decoupling with China. Moreover, South Korea’s deep trade ties with China will continue to make it vulnerable to Chinese political and economic coercion.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Alliance, Multilateralism, Cooperation, and Military
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

5. India-China Border Tensions and U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Lisa Curtis and Derek Grossman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
India-China border intrusions and clashes have become more frequent and threaten to lead to all-out conflict between the two Asian giants. In recent years, China has upped the ante in its border disputes with India through infrastructure development, military deployments, capability enhancements, and periodic efforts to encroach into territory controlled by India. The first deadly border clash between the two countries in 45 years occurred on June 15, 2020, in the Galwan River Valley, where 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were killed. More recently, on December 9, 2022, Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the disputed border in the mountains near Tawang in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh after an estimated 300 Chinese PLA soldiers tried to cross the border. While the Chinese and Indian militaries have since pulled back forces from the most contentious standoff sites where the 2020 buildup occurred and established temporary buffer zones, both sides retain high numbers of troops forward deployed along the disputed frontier, and there are several flashpoints that could erupt into another border crisis at any time. The most recent clash that took place near Tawang is a reminder that, even though recent attention has been focused on the Ladakh region, there are multiple trigger points along the 2,100-mile-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that bear monitoring.1 With both China and India enhancing infrastructure and introducing new and advanced weapons systems on their sides of the disputed border, combined with forward deployments and heightened lack of trust, the chances for continued standoffs that could erupt into local or even full-blown conflict remain high.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

6. Buying Time: Logistics for a New American Way of War

Author:
Chris Dougherty
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Discussions about defense strategy that focus on combat units and fail to account for logistics are irrelevant when it comes to understanding how well the United States can deter or defeat aggression by China or Russia. Planes, ships, and tanks are just weapons systems; making them combat capabilities requires getting them and their crews into the fight; supplying them with fuel, food, water, medical care, and munitions; and keeping them maintained. Logistics, more than the quantity of forces or the quality of technology, will determine the potential combat power available to the United States in future conflict scenarios with China or Russia. It will influence Chinese and Russian decisions about going to war, and when, where, and how to fight. It will bound the military courses of action available to U.S. commanders and delineate the strategic options available to presidents. Despite this critical role, the Department of Defense has systemically underinvested in logistics in terms of money, mental energy, physical assets, and personnel. Neglect of logistics arguably became most severe in the post–Cold War era. Pressure to save money through efficiency and misguided attempts to run the department like a “lean” business disproportionately impacted logistics. Maximizing the ratio of combat “tooth” to logistical “tail” saved money, but at the cost of leaving U.S. armed forces with a logistical system that is stretched thin supporting peacetime operations and wholly unsuited to the demands of warfare with China or Russia. Recognizing U.S. dependence on strained logistics networks, China and Russia have developed means to attack these networks, including long-range missiles and cyberattacks. Barring changes to U.S. logistics and sustainment concepts, such attacks present a grave threat to the department’s ability to uphold U.S. security commitments in East Asia or eastern Europe.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Logistics
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

7. “Production Is Deterrence”: Investing in Precision-Guided Weapons to Meet Peer Challengers

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report explores whether the fiscal year (FY) 2024 U.S. defense budget request for key conventional precision-guided munitions (PGMs) aligns with the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) by prioritizing weapons needed for the “pacing challenge” China poses and dealing with the “acute threat” from Russia, while taking risk in lower priority areas. The FY24 presidential budget request builds on the shift that began in FY23 to support the NDS: increasing buys of key long-range and antiship missiles to prepare for a fight in the Pacific, starting to fill the cruise missile defense gap, bolstering production of the land-attack weapons needed in Europe, and test-running multiyear procurement and large lot procurement for key munitions to strengthen the defense industrial base. In the Department of Defense’s (DoD) budgeting process, ships, aircraft, and vehicles tend to be prioritized, leaving missiles and munitions with inadequate funding. Moreover, the Pentagon does not take a holistic approach to procuring key conventional PGMs, making it difficult to assess the joint portfolio. If the United States is going to effectively compete with China and Russia, that needs to change. To deter and—if deterrence fails—defeat China, the DoD needs large stockpiles of standoff missiles, maritime strike weapons, and layered air and missile defenses. The authors conclude that after years of underinvestment, the DoD is buying more long-range and medium-range missiles, which would be essential in a China war fight. While historically the Pentagon has overinvested in bombs and missiles to attack targets on the land and neglected antiship weapons, the FY24 budget saw a notable uptick in air-launched antiship weapons. For the past decade, the DoD has consistently invested in air defenses, but its purchases have focused on expensive ballistic missile defense interceptors, while neglecting cruise missile defenses. The FY24 budget reverses this trend. Additionally, the DoD is investing in PGMs to arm Ukraine and replenish American and allied stores of weapons that are needed to counter Russia. Except for surface-to-air missiles, the weapons for Ukraine are relatively short-range land-attack PGMs that U.S. forces do not need in the Indo-Pacific. A large portion of the funding for these weapons is coming from Ukraine supplemental appropriations, not the base defense budget. Supplemental appropriations are also resourcing significant investments in U.S. production lines, but the DoD has made only moderate progress rebuilding American stockpiles of the PGMs given to Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Budget, Weapons, Deterrence, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

8. U.S.-China Competition and Military AI: How Washington Can Manage Strategic Risks amid Rivalry with Beijing

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Alexander Sullivan, and Noah Greene
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Two tectonic trends in the international security environment appear to be on a collision course. The first trend is the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China). The second trend is the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. This report explores how the United States can manage strategic risks—defined as increased risks of armed conflict or the threat of nuclear war—that could be created or exacerbated by military AI in its relationship with China. It begins by providing an overview of China’s views on and policies toward AI. Beijing sees AI playing roles in both its civilian economy and the modernization of its military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). At home, Chinese leaders want to leverage AI to boost growth and innovation, address economic and social challenges, and secure the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic rule. AI also plays a key role in China’s military ambitions, especially its goal to become a “world-class military” by midcentury, in part through the “intelligentization” of its forces. Intelligentization relies on integrating AI and other emerging technologies into the joint force with the goal of gaining an edge on the United States. China argues that its governance model, including its military-civil fusion policy, gives Beijing a competitive advantage over Washington. Realization of that vision, however, remains uncertain and will require China to overcome external and internal obstacles.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

9. The Future of Civilians in National Security: Challenges and Opportunities

Author:
Katherine L. Kuzminski, Nathalie Grogan, and Celina Pouchet
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Imagine you’re a high-achieving college student, interested in serving in a national security role in the federal government. You invest years in learning a critical language—perhaps of an ally, perhaps of an adversary—a language for which the federal government has a high demand and a limited workforce. You’re selected for not one, but two prestigious overseas government-sponsored fellowships and are encouraged to participate in both. After returning to the States, you move to Washington, D.C., to pursue a graduate degree at a competitive policy school. You apply for opportunities to serve in a national security position. But because you had fellowships abroad—administered by the federal government—the hiring process takes more than two years.CNAS Focus Group, March 11, 2022.1 The national security workforce is full of stories like this one—which is the experience of someone who successfully navigated into the system. Many others decide not to pursue government service in the first place, whether because they believe the option isn’t open to them, or because the hiring process is so onerous that they lose interest or pursue more readily available options. To meet the challenge of protecting the country and its national interests, the federal government must attract, recruit, and retain experienced, educated individuals with skills specific to national security, including foreign language proficiency, regional knowledge, legal expertise, or a background in engineering, computer science, or data analytics. It also needs people who can lead, manage, and communicate. Fortunately, there are highly motivated Americans—from undergraduate college students through senior-level professionals—who are developing the education, experience, and credentials required for work in national security departments and agencies. This population has a strong interest in serving the country even as other opportunities present themselves. But challenges such as opaque hiring practices, long clearance processes, and limited access to professional networks hinder people’s chances at employment in the federal government. As a result, the government is unable to fill critical national security roles, while individuals with the necessary skill sets and desire to serve are sidelined from a federal career. To attract, recruit, and retain those with the required qualifications and interests, departments and agencies must understand the motivations of the next generation and the challenges they face when seeking government careers in national security. As part of this project, CNAS researchers organized focus groups and conducted a survey to identify the motivations, priorities, and skill sets of those interested in government service, along with the challenges, barriers, and opportunities in taking this path. The project examines the current civilian national security talent pipeline and explores the problems associated with the recruitment and retention of civil servants in national security departments and agencies. What did we find? Improvements to the federal hiring process and the clearance timeline, greater access to talent beyond Washington, D.C., and expansion of initial pathways into government service could ensure that the federal government has the employees it needs to secure the nation. These improvements require action from the executive branch and Congress.
Topic:
National Security, Employment, Public Service, and Skills
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

10. Campaign of Denial: Strengthening Simultaneous Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe

Author:
Becca Wasser
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States faces an unprecedented challenge: simultaneously deterring large-scale conventional aggression by two nuclear-armed powers. The nation will need to deter these major adversaries from overt aggression in the near term in two primary, yet distinct, regions: China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe. However, the U.S. military is unprepared to concurrently meet the challenges posed by China and Russia. These challenges have become more pronounced as Beijing continues its ambitious military modernization and Moscow continues to threaten European security despite its currently diminished military strength. Effective simultaneous deterrence requires the United States to reembrace the basic principles of deterrence to reverse unfavorable trends in military power that are eroding long-standing U.S. warfighting advantages. It necessitates U.S. forces to project power into far-flung regions that are contested by China and Russia to uphold America’s extended deterrence commitments to its allies and partners. To do so, the Pentagon must shift from previous approaches designed to deter opportunistic aggressors and respond to crises. While the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has realigned its strategy to focus on great-power deterrence, it has faced hurdles in strategy implementation that have stymied changes needed to organize more effectively for simultaneous deterrence. This is due in part to a sizable mismatch between strategy and resources. The U.S. military does not have the kinds and numbers of forces required to simultaneously deter China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe from conventional conflict. This deficit is especially telling in two priority scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China, and a Russian invasion of the Baltics. American forces lack the modernized capabilities, necessary posture, right levels of readiness, and familiarity with executing the types of warfighting missions needed to meet the current challenge.1 The balance between meeting global demands and responding to persistent threats while shifting to emphasize deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe is precarious. Concentrating on strategic priorities requires accepting risk in other regions, as the United States, with fewer forces and resources stretched around the globe, moves capabilities and forces to priority theaters. A new approach to simultaneous deterrence is needed. The Biden administration has outlined the concept of campaigning as a key component of peacetime deterrence. This concept seeks to sequence and link military activities so they intentionally counter coercion by priority adversaries. The intent is to enable the Pentagon to respond to challenges posed by China and Russia, while still meeting global demands. But the concept is currently ill-defined and expansive, and its broad interpretation does not help the DoD meet its deterrence requirements or align strategy and resources. Instead, campaigning runs the risk of engaging U.S. forces in activities that do not contribute to or are counterproductive to deterrence. A failure to curb these activities will result in either the need to expand force size, or the hindrance of modernization efforts.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

11. Strengthening the Shield: Japan’s Defense Transformation and the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Lisa Curtis, Joshua Fitt, Joseph I. Grimm, and Rebecca Wittner
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In December 2022, Japan’s government released three major strategic documents: the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program. Although Japan has made incremental changes to its security policies and capabilities over the last decade, the new documents mark a notable shift in Japan’s approach to strengthening its defense. The documents reflect Tokyo’s assessment of the rising threats that could challenge Japan’s security and signal Japan’s commitment to build the military capabilities necessary to meet them. This report examines Tokyo’s defense transformation and assesses its implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance and Washington’s strategy toward the Indo-Pacific. Japan is “fundamentally reinforcing” its national security and defense policies to cope with its increasingly severe security environment. The military threats posed by China, North Korea, and Russia have been growing steadily for years but appear to be peaking simultaneously. Tensions between Japan and China have occasionally flared in the five decades since they normalized diplomatic relations. But those tensions have reached new heights since 2012, when China began to regularly contest Japan’s administration of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. By August 2022, Beijing fired five ballistic missiles into Japan’s exclusive economic zone during China’s live-fire military exercises after then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. The aim of the missile launches was to signal there would be consequences for Japan if Tokyo were to intervene in a Taiwan contingency. Meanwhile, North Korea’s unprecedented rate of missile testing since 2022 and Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine have deepened Japanese concerns about the potential for the use of force in the Indo-Pacific. Japan is taking steps to improve its ability to defend itself and deter an invasion, including through changes to security funding and policy. Tokyo has announced plans to increase its defense spending by 65 percent over the next five years, acquire standoff weapons that could be used for a counterstrike mission, and adopt an “active cyber defense” posture. Japan has clarified the roles of its military, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and Coast Guard in the event of an attack; committed to establishing a permanent Joint Headquarters for SDF operations; and created a program for supplying partner militaries with security assistance. Effectively employing counterstrike and active cyber defense, however, will require a clearer delineation of the legal authorities for their use as well as the overall military strategies that they would support. In addition, pressure from the Japanese public over tax hikes required to pay for the defense spending increase amid other fiscal pressures could pose a barrier to implementation. Japan plans to strengthen the SDF through boosting readiness and resilience of current forces, acquiring counterstrike and other advanced capabilities, and improving force posture and mobility. The SDF has been plagued by a chronic lack of munitions and other supplies, and most of its facilities do not meet its own standards for resilience against enemy attack. Addressing these shortfalls is essential, though these types of programs often lose out to more high-profile programs. For its counterstrike mission, Japan has announced it will buy U.S.-made Tomahawk cruise missiles. This initial purchase will provide a stopgap until Japan is able to produce its own longer-range missiles later in the decade. Japan has also announced it will pursue new capabilities in uncrewed systems, space, cyber, and artificial intelligence (AI). But fulfilling these ambitions will be challenging given some short-falls in Japan’s technology base and SDF personnel. Lastly, the SDF is grappling with how to expand its forces in Japan’s southwest islands while maintaining a sufficient presence throughout the country to deter aggression from a range of possible threats. Next, Japan’s strategy emphasizes enhancing security partnerships regionally and across the globe. Japan has recently stepped up its defense cooperation with several Indo-Pacific and European countries. With Australia, Japan is building on a 10-year effort to deepen strategic cooperation, a process that culminated in January 2022 with the completion of a Reciprocal Access Agreement. New bilateral strategic cooperation includes enhancing interoperability between the SDF and the Australian military, increasing rotational SDF training deployments to Australia, and announcing a new joint security declaration that commits to a combined response to military contingencies. Similarly, Japan has long recognized the strategic importance of India and continues to build on the Japan-India relationship through maritime security cooperation, a new joint fighter exercise, and operationalization of their Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement. Japan and the Philippines are also expanding their defense ties through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief training exercises and an important emerging trilateral security relationship with the United States. Over the past year, Japan and South Korea have made significant strides to repair relations since the latest downturn that began in 2018. This will be an incremental process, but there has been progress in the form of leader-level summits and ministerial dialogues, plans to cooperate on sharing data about North Korean missiles, and new trilateral ballistic missile and anti-submarine drills with the United States. Japan also is building defense connections and relationships with European nations. It is pursuing the development of a sixth-generation fighter jet with the U.K. and Italy and, particularly since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, has sought to deepen strategic ties with NATO. These comprehensive changes to Japan’s defense policies will necessarily reshape the military and security pillars of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Tokyo’s acquisition of counterstrike capabilities will position Japan to potentially take on some offensive tasks, even while retaining its primarily defensive orientation. This also has implications for alliance contingency planning related to defending Japan directly as well as around Taiwan, the Korean Peninsula, and the South China Sea. However, increased joint planning will require updates to alliance command and control (C2) and information-sharing mechanisms. Additionally, given resource constraints, the alliance would be well-served to find additional opportunities for military technology sharing, codevelopment, and coproduction, such as through Japanese involvement in the second pillar of the AUKUS (Australia-United Kingdom-United States) partnership focused on cooperation on advanced capabilities and defense technology innovation. And the alliance must take steps to improve force posture and readiness, including through enhancing base resiliency and increasing munitions stockpiles. Japan’s fundamental transformation of its defense posture will mean significant changes for the U.S.-Japan alliance. The United States must adapt its approach to alliance coordination to maximize new opportunities and manage any new challenges. In this context, U.S. policymakers should: Prepare to update the alliance, while recognizing that Japan’s new defense policies will require significant time, resources, and political will to implement. Stay closely aligned with Tokyo on the threat land- scape as well as engagement with geopolitical competitors, especially China. Integrate U.S.-Japan command and control structures. Create an alliance readiness, resilience, and posture implementation task force. Deepen planning for contingencies and bolster extended deterrence. Create a road map for expanding defense technology cooperation concurrently with Japan’s implementation of specific improvements to its information security practices and infrastructure. Innovate operational concepts for uncrewed systems and counterstrike capabilities. Leverage the U.S.-Japan alliance as a hub for minilateral and multilateral security engagement. Build U.S.-Japan alliance mechanisms that will expand cooperation on cyber security and defense. Stand up an alliance dialogue on military personnel issues.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and United States of America

12. Rolling the Iron Dice: The Increasing Chance of Conflict Protraction

Author:
Andrew Metrick
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The prospect of a Sino-American war looms on the horizon. No scenario for such a conflict has garnered more interest than the potential invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the United States, discussions have focused on the early days of a conflict, in particular sinking the PRC’s amphibious fleet.1 Both the United States and the PRC place great emphasis on offensive military operations that heavily use the fruits of the precision strike revolution (PSR).2 This focus on early offensive action leads immediately to considerations of forces and weapons. U.S. defense planners are unsurprisingly most comfortable with the dynamics of short, sharp wars, having spent the past decade focused on deterring or defeating adversary faits accomplis, short and often opportunistic campaigns of aggression. Speed, political sophistication, and immediate military overmatch seemed to be the key ingredients for victory. Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 was seen as a template for other future aggressors to follow.3 Prolonged wars of attrition, particularly those involving the United States, were thought no longer possible. Russia’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine in 2022 turned this vision on its head, demonstrating the military and political consequences of trying and failing to obtain a similar fait accompli on a larger scale. The ongoing Russian experiences in Ukraine indicate a need to reevaluate such thinking and consider the potential of protraction in the context of a hypothetical U.S.-PRC conflict. Most work on this topic has considered only the initial days and weeks of hostilities, usually over Taiwan or in the South or East China Seas.4 There has been comparably little discussion of what comes after.5 There are three key concepts that inform the following discussions: exhaustion, sanctuary, and protraction. Exhaustion is the point when large-scale offensive operations are no longer possible as offensive military capabilities have been used up. Afterward, some period of reconstitution and recovery is needed. This requires sanctuary, the relative freedom from attack sufficient for the rebuilding of military forces and capacities. Protraction occurs after at least one cycle of exhaustion and recovery. It is closely tied to pre-conflict leadership beliefs about the length of the looming war. A simplified definition of a protracted war is a conflict that lasts longer than leaders expect; it is a mismatch between political-military expectations and reality. Doctrinal developments in both the PRC and the United States, influenced by improvements in technology, place significant emphasis on the early stages of conflict and rapid, offensive operations. The emphasis by both the PRC and the United States on the early stages of the conflict can be seen in the PRC’s system destruction warfare and United States’ denial-centric concepts that aim for rapid decisive results.6 These approaches focus almost exclusively on the operational level of war, ignoring strategic factors animating the conflict and shaping its termination. Should PRC President Xi Jinping commit the PLA to seizing Taiwan by force, enter a war with the United States, and “roll the iron dice,” protraction appears increasingly likely, contrary to most contemporary military thinking and preparation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. No Winners in This Game: Assessing the U.S. Playbook for Sanctioning China

Author:
Emily Kilcrease
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is marked by both geopolitical tensions and deep economic linkages. While policymakers may have once believed that economic integration would inject stability into the overall relationship and provide a deterrent to conflict, that idealistic vision has been shaken by Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine. No longer can the United States and its partners assume that the PRC’s economic interest in retaining ties to the global economy will override its nationalist impulses. The once unthinkable idea of imposing severe sanctions on China has become a strategic imperative to consider, as one of a range of measures that the United States and its partners may consider if relations with the PRC deteriorate further. Yet, sanctioning China represents a challenge more complex than any other in the modern era of sanctions. The scale and interconnected nature of China’s economy means that the damage from sanctions will not be contained in China; instead, the negative effects will rebound globally through China’s deep economic ties to nearly every country around the world, including the United States. China has substantial capacity in key economic areas, such as manufacturing, that provide it with important means to retaliate against U.S. sanctions or impose its own economic costs on the United States and its partners. This report seeks to advance policy debates on how to sanction China, if geopolitical conditions warranted doing so at scale. It builds on prior Center for a New American Security (CNAS) research, including a 2023 report that outlines how the United States currently uses a variety of sanctions tools to manage the strategic relationship with the PRC.1 A key finding of the earlier work is that the United States imposes sanctions at a relatively limited scale compared to the scope of challenges that exist in the bilateral relationship, with the notable exception of an increasing range of technology-related sanctions. A large divide separates the existing level of sanctions on China and the full range of economic measures that the United States may consider. This report attempts to envision that fuller range of economic measures and consider whether the use of sanctions would meaningfully advance U.S. interests during a potential conflict. The report begins, in chapter 1, with an assessment of the main economic and political characteristics that would determine China’s vulnerability to, and resolve to withstand, sanctions pressure. The concentration of power at the very top of the PRC’s political system, along with a willingness to subordinate economic objectives to political ones, indicate that China may have a high degree of resolve to absorb the costs of sanctions. China’s continued reliance on the U.S.-dominated global financial infrastructure is a key area of vulnerability to sanctions pressure. But, China retains significant economic leverage through its manufacturing relationships, as well as through the importance of its large domestic market to foreign multinational companies. Attempting to impose sanctions that are asymmetrically more painful to China will be a fraught exercise, given the degree to which China is embedded in global supply chains. In chapter 2, the report examines sanctions actions that the United States and its partners may impose during a conflict scenario, drawing from the sanctions playbook used against Russia and projecting adaptations that would be needed in the China context. The main objective of this analysis is to identify points of asymmetric leverage in the U.S.-China economic relationship, where imposition of a sanction would be more economically damaging to China than to the United States and its partners. The sanctions actions are examined through the lens of a ends-ways-and-means framework, loosely borrowing concepts from the defense community and mapping them into the economic domain. The value in such an exercise is to impose discipline in identifying why a particular economic measure may be taken and what the intended impact would be. It can also enhance the ability to integrate economic actions with those being considered in military or other domains. The report examines possible actions under three broad categories, based on the objective of the sanctions: technology denial, embargo of commodities and materials, and macroeconomic pressure. The research includes analysis by the CNAS Energy, Economic & Security team of economic data and research interviews with a wide range of sanctions, export controls, macroeconomics, trade and finance, and China experts in the United States, Europe, and Asia. In addition to examining potential sanctions options on a sectoral basis, the report also includes a company-by-company lens to assess the potential impact of sanctioning specific Chinese companies. The report finds that the U.S. options to impose harsh sanctions on China are severely constrained. U.S. options to deny militarily relevant technology to China are modest, at best. Certain areas, such as maritime capabilities, will be difficult to target due to the nearly entirely domestic supply chains of China’s main military shipbuilders. Other areas, such as semiconductors, cannot be targeted without running the risk of disruption to critical U.S. supply chains. Overall, efforts to deny technology to China require a longer time horizon to be effective and may have less utility in an immediate run-up period to a potential conflict. Attempts to use sanctions tools to deny commodities or materials to China will require innovation and the development of new sanctions tools. Key commodities, such as energy, are inherently substitutable and globally available, including from many countries that will likely not align with the United States in a conflict with the PRC. Building on the example of the oil price cap used in the Russia context, the United States and partners will need to consider novel policy approaches that provide positive economic inducements to align with U.S. policies, in addition to using traditional sanctions tools.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Sanctions, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America