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81. Addressing the Continuing Phenomenon of Enforced Disappearances

Author:
Diane Webber and Khaola Sherani
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
An enforced disappearance is the “arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty” by state agents or their proxies, followed by a refusal to acknowledge or disclose the fate of a seized individual. Unlike arbitrary detention, which may also involve arrest and inhumane treatment, enforced disappearances frequently leave families with no information as to the victim’s whereabouts or status. In many cases, it is ultimately revealed that the victim was killed rather than detained. Enforced disappearances violate multiple human rights, including the right to security and dignity of person; the right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; the right to liberty; the right to humane conditions of detention; the right to a legal personality; the right to a fair trial; the right to a family life; and the right to life. The phenomenon of enforced disappearances first emerged as a state practice during the Nazi era but became widespread under the military regimes in Latin America during the 1960s. The Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala found that from the mid-1960s until the 1996 peace agreement, security forces and “death squads” carried out approximately 45,000 enforced disappearances against anti-government forces and suspected opponents, including members of Mayan communities. The governments of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru developed a transnational cooperation mechanism called “Operation Condor” to share intelligence about political dissidents for the purposes of carrying out transnational enforced disappearances. The practice of enforced disappearances was soon taken up by governments in other parts of the world, as well. In Sri Lanka, for example, Amnesty International estimates that there have been “at least 60,000 and as many as 100,000 cases of enforced disappearance” since the 1980s. The problem persists today, occurring at a large scale in many countries in the context of both armed conflicts and repressive, unaccountable regimes. The Syrian Network for Human Rights reported that from 2011 to 2021, the Syrian regime carried out 102,000 disappearances to suppress dissent during the civil war. Meanwhile, China’s Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location (RSDL) decree empowers authorities to detain foreign or Chinese nationals for a period of six months without disclosing their location. A Spain-based rights group, Safeguard Defenders, claims that between 27,000 and 57,000 people have gone through China’s RSDL system since 2013, citing data from the Supreme People’s Court and the testimony of survivors and lawyers. Altogether, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (UN Working Group) has recorded more than 59,000 cases of enforced disappearances across 110 countries since 1980, including 651 new cases originating in 30 countries in its most recent annual report. More than 46,000 cases remain unresolved. The international community was slow to respond to the growing problem of enforced disappearances, initially addressing the problem only as part of broader “ad hoc working groups” on human rights issues in countries like Chile and Cyprus. It was not until 1992 that the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, which condemned acts of enforced disappearance as violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and called on states to prevent, eradicate, and punish acts of enforced disappearance under criminal law. The international legal regime has since expanded: in 1996, the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons (Inter-American Convention) entered into force, and in December 2010, the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Enforced Disappearance Convention) came into force. Enforced disappearances can also now be prosecuted as a crime against humanity under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Criminal Court (ICC), Humanitarian Crisis, and Legal Sector
Political Geography:
Global Focus

82. Creating a New Energy Strategy for a Post Ukraine War World

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There is every reason for the U.S. to focus on the dangers of climate change and the need to change the sources of its energy supplies to reduce carbon emissions. The new Inflation Reduction Act that President Biden signed on August 16, 2022, is an important step toward achieving these goals. At the same time, the U.S. needs to work with its European strategic partners to permanently reduce their dependence on Russian oil and gas exports and work with Asian partners like Japan and South Korea to ensure that they will not confront a similar threat in the future from China.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, International Cooperation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Global Focus

83. Venezuela's 2024 Elections: Understanding Participation under Unfree and Unfair Conditions

Author:
Ryan C. Berg and Henry Ziemer
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
For many observers, the upcoming presidential elections in Venezuela serve as a focal point on which to pin hopes for a democratic transition. However, the challenges faced by the opposition—from internal divisions to an ongoing humanitarian crisis, captured electoral institutions, and persistent human rights abuses—cannot be understated. While there is potential for elections in 2024 to generate momentum and re-galvanize resistance to the Maduro regime, the balance sheet of risks and rewards remains indecisive. This report breaks down the positive and negative aspects of elections in Venezuela and outlines three likely scenarios for policymakers to consider as Venezuela’s 2024 presidential election approaches.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Elections, Democracy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
South America and Venezuela

84. Demographic Change in the Arab/Persian Gulf: A Case Study by Country Image

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
It is hard for anyone who has not traveled extensively in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) over a period of decades to realize just how much each nation in the region has changed in terms of basic demographics. There has been a massive increase in population in every MENA country since the end of World War II and the colonial period, and the nations in the Arab/Persian Gulf are no exception. The Emeritus Chair in Strategy has prepared a three-part analysis of the MENA’s demographics and detailed how population pressure has impacted the region’s stability. This first part is entitled Demographic Change in the Arab/Persian Gulf: A Case Study by Country. A downloadable copy is attached at the end of this transmittal, and it is available on the CSIS website at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/220829_Cordesman_Arab_Demographics.pdf?vbd_oUraxn6ZI7VyBKiThkc1Z6lZ8Ogx There are no precise figures for population growth that are fully reliable, but the broad trends are still clear. Many MENA countries have never had a credible census, and even reliable broad estimates of population trends only became available for many countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Work by the UN and World Bank is now reliable enough, however, to show that all MENA countries experienced massive increases in population through 2021 and that the resulting pressures on their economies, governance, and social stability have been—and will be—a key factor affecting their stability.
Topic:
Demographics, Population, Regionalism, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Middle East and Persian Gulf

85. Software-Defined Warfare: Architecting the DOD's Transition to the Digital Age

Author:
Nand Mulchandani and John Shanahan
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) massive bureaucracy struggles with the kind of periodic “tech refresh” that has been instrumental to commercial industry success. While it is insulated from market competition within the U.S. economy, the DOD is not immune from the kind of revolutionary, secular, and wide-ranging technological changes happening outside the government. Nor is it immune from the threat of competition with other militaries around the world. In the future, warfighting will only become more complex, even more chaotic, and even faster. The only way for the DOD to stay competitive in a new warfighting environment is to ensure that it uses the most potent weapon available: technology, and more specifically, software. For the United States to retain its dominant position in the future— which is not a guaranteed outcome—the DOD needs a new design and architecture that will allow it to be far more flexible, scale on demand, and adapt dynamically to changing conditions. And it must do so at a dramatically lower cost as it delivers its critical services. This paper provides a blueprint for the way forward.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, Digitalization, and Software
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

86. The CNO’s Navigation Plan for 2022: A Critique

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There should be a clear difference between efforts to provide unclassified documents that explain and justify U.S. military forces and issuing official reports that are little more than public relations exercises. The U.S. faces major security challenges and the annual cost of U.S. defense is over $760 billion, even if one ignores the cost of nuclear weapons, the Veterans Administration, related activities of the State Department and other agencies, and substantial additional intelligence activity. The effort to shape U.S. forces and strategy must deal with very real threats. They include a Russia that has invaded the Ukraine, a China that is actively seeking to challenge the U.S. in military and economic power, and regional threats like Iran and North Korea. The U.S. must cope with emerging and disruptive technologies that constantly alter the nature of military forces in unexpected ways, support America’s strategic partners on a global level, and deal with near collapse of many arms control efforts and major increases in Russian and Chinese nuclear and long-range strike programs. Far too often, however, the Department of Defense issues documents that are little more than sales pitches – filled with slogans, and that are an awkward cross between a shipping list that borders on being a child’s letter to Santa Claus and a used car commercial. The CNO’s Navigation Plan for 2022 is a case in point. In fairness, does highlight a long list of important points about the threat, and the need to reshape U.S. naval forces, but it comes far too close to burying them in overall and hype. It fails to meaningfully address and justify the cost of the U.S. Navy, to provide any clear picture of the threat, to address the need to cooperate with key U.S. allies, and to provide a clear program for shaping the Navy’s future. It is scarcely unique in failing to provide a clear and meaningful plan. The defense budget requests talk about being strategic documents, but almost all of their contents are shopping lists for individual military services. U.S. strategy documents have become little more than long lists of broad goals and wish lists with no actual plan, program, or budget.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Public Relations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

87. Renew SBIR, Just Defend the Recipients against China

Author:
Charles Wessner and Sujai Shivakumar
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
An April 2021 internal report by the Department of Defense (DOD) found that companies funded by the DOD’s Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program are being targeted by state-sponsored Chinese firms. Based on an examination of a sampling of SBIR award recipients, the Pentagon study concluded that “nearly all cases show that China, not the U.S., is the ultimate beneficiary of DoD and other U.S. government research investments, some of which are significant in size.” The study’s authors cautioned that the study sample was small and that their methodologies warrant review, but their findings are clearly a matter of concern for U.S. policymakers. This justified concern, however, seems to have morphed into quite a different approach. Citing the Pentagon study’s findings, Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), the senior Republican on the Senate Small Business and Entrepreneurship Committee, said in June 2022 that he would not support reauthorizing the SBIR program “without reforms to strengthen research security and stop abusive behavior by bad actors lining their pockets with taxpayer dollars.” In a move unrelated to national security, Senator Paul and several other lawmakers are also seeking limits on the number of awards that can be made to individual SBIR companies. (There is no empirical basis for such a restriction, nor could it be effectively implemented, but the proposed measure emerges anew as SBIR comes up for reauthorization.) The risks, however, are real. The Wall Street Journal reported in July that SBIR and the related Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) program face “an overhaul or outright extinction” if Congress does not renew their budgets and funding runs out at the end of September. The DOD has already canceled a round of SBIR award solicitations “because of uncertainty over the program’s future.”
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Business, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

88. Civics for Adults: A Guide for Civics Content Providers

Author:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This guide is focused on fostering greater understanding among adults of the nuts and bolts of our democratic republic and how individuals can and must hold institutions accountable and move us toward a more perfect union. Reinvigorating civics knowledge and civic skills has become a national and economic security imperative. The urgency requires reaching not just K-12 students but also adults. This guide is for civics experts and content providers developing or adapting civics resources to engage adults in their workplaces and their communities. The guide can also be used by businesses, government (including the military), and others seeking to provide civics knowledge and skills to employees, partners, and associates
Topic:
Education, Democracy, and Civic Engagement
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

89. The Importance of Democracy Promotion to Great Power Competition in Latin America and the Caribbean

Author:
Rebecca Aaberg
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
There are many reasons to believe democracy and democracy promotion are imperative in the great power competition with China, which is occurring with ever-greater intensity in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). LAC has played host to great power competition in previous eras, but in grand strategic terms, competition with China in the twenty-first century is fundamentally different than the rivalry of the Cold War against Soviet Russia. Whereas during the Cold War the United States supported friendly, anti-communist military regimes in LAC, success against China in the twenty-first century will necessitate robust support for democracy, liberal institutions, and democracy promotion. The Kirkpatrick Doctrine—which advocated for supporting “friendly authoritarian” regimes that went along with Washington’s aims—applied so deliberately to LAC during the Cold War, is outmoded and likely to be highly counterproductive today. On the contrary, there are many reasons to believe that successfully countering China in great power competition will be intimately linked to the democratic health of LAC as a region. This is the democracy imperative. This paper begins with background on U.S. policy toward LAC during the Cold War. Then, it places the question of a Kirkpatrick Doctrine for the twenty-first century within the context of great power competition with China and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has prompted the Biden administration to consider re-engaging pariah regimes such as the Maduro dictatorship in Venezuela. The paper will then adumbrate reasons why great power competition with China is fundamentally different than previous iterations of competition against Soviet Russia, which saw U.S. support for anti-communist military regimes.
Topic:
Security, Hegemony, Democracy, and Competition
Political Geography:
Latin America, Caribbean, North America, and United States of America

90. Supporting Water Programming in the Sahel

Author:
Conor M. Savoy and Alexandra Norris
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Sahel region of Africa is one of the most climate-affected regions in the world. Temperatures are rising 1.5 percent faster than the global average rate. Increasing temperatures and irregular rainfall have resulted in regular droughts and floods that disrupt traditional agropastoral patterns and contribute to broader instability and fragility. Lake Chad, a crucial water and livelihood source for 30 million people in the Sahel, has shrunk by 90 percent since 1960, displacing 2.3 million people and creating a humanitarian crisis. Periods of prolonged and intense drought and improper land use have degraded much of the soil in the Sahel. In Burkina Faso, over one-third of farmland is degraded, meaning some land cannot sustain agriculture even when there is enough rainfall. A rapidly increasing population, coupled with the impact of climate change, means more people are competing for diminishing water resources. This results in a vicious cycle of population growth, land degradation, and food instability. The greater the population, the greater the demand for food and the greater the use of unsustainable farming practices, exacerbating food scarcity and demand for additional farmland. As the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) updates its water strategy, it is important to examine the interplay of economic and conflict fragility, irregular migration, climate change, and water availability in the Sahel to identify interventions for greater resilience. In a region like the Sahel, water is critical to resilience and adaptation to the effects of climate change. While water strategy is not a cure-all, it can improve outcomes for other challenges. The Biden administration recently announced the new Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), an initiative to mobilize private capital investment in infrastructure. The four pillars of this initiative—climate and energy security, digital connectivity, health and health security, and gender equality and equity—could support additional investments in water infrastructure.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Health, Water, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
Africa and Sahel

91. Of Ships and Cyber: Transposing the Incidents at Sea Agreement

Author:
Alexander Klimburg
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Amid the geopolitical crises caused by Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it may seem wildly optimistic—or even bad diplomacy—to consider future arms-control scenarios for cyber operations. However, good policy needs to prepare for the day after tomorrow, and smart policy will look at what has gone wrong today and what can be learned from yesterday. Arguably, one element that may have contributed to rising geopolitical tensions over the past decade has been a lack of clear cyber signals among the main adversaries. This makes it even more urgent to consider what can be learned from past arms-control exercises such as the vaunted Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement—especially as this accord was conceived in the wake of several of its own perilous crises. In 1962, a lack of agreed signaling protocols nearly led to World War III. According to a riveting account in the 2020 book Nuclear Folly, 1 on October 27, 1962—at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis—the U.S. Navy cornered one of the few Soviet submarines unaccounted for off Cuba. In an effort to convince the Foxtrot-class B-59 submarine to surface, the destroyer USS Cony employed practice depth charges—which were not accurately identified as such by B-59’s beleaguered crew. When, in the middle of the night, the submarine did indeed surface, a low-flying anti-submarine aircraft dropped flares and pyrotechnics so it could take better photographs. This seemed like an attack to the submarine, and the exhausted captain of B-59 ordered a crash dive and speculated that perhaps the war had already broken out. He gave orders to prepare to launch a 10-kiloton nuclear torpedo at the U.S. Navy task force. It took a near-mutiny by senior officers to stop him. This close call remained unknown until fairly recently. But several more prominent naval incidents throughout 1960s convinced the Soviet Union and the United States that a basic common agreement was necessary, and the Cold War “thaw” of the early 1970s made this possible.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

92. Hard Choices in a Ransomware Attack

Author:
Emily Harding and Harshana Ghoorhoo
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Ransomware attacks started as a novelty but have now become a clear and present danger to entities of every size and function. The number of ransomware attacks and the price of demanded ransoms have escalated steeply since 2018. Legislation and policy have not kept up. Policymakers have sought to shape the incentive structure for victims to incentivize defense and disincentivize ransom payments. While they are sympathetic to businesses who fall victim to these attacks, which can sometimes be existentially threatening, few policymakers (or their staff) have ever experienced the shock of an attack firsthand and, as a result, are searching with incomplete information for the right combination of carrots and sticks that will help victims and hurt attackers. This report aims to put the reader in the shoes of the victim—the shocking, powerless moment of realization of a ransomware attack. It walks through a set of decisions that victim must make on their worst day and in the weeks to follow. How well an entity succeeds in navigating that peril depends on decisions made well before an attack, so the report also makes recommendations for both government and industry on how to encourage preparation and simple defensive steps.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

93. Gender Equity to Improve Immunization Services

Author:
Katherine E. Bliss and Alicia Carbaugh
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Covid-19 pandemic has underscored the importance of a strong health workforce to outbreak response, as well as of vaccine delivery to prevent further outbreaks. Women and men providing care, transporting supplies, analyzing data, and delivering vaccines to patients and their families have all contributed to pandemic-related activities while maintaining a focus on routine health programs. Women comprise an estimated two-thirds of the formal health workforce worldwide—and a high percentage of the unpaid health workforce as well. Yet gender inequities, including those related to training, compensation, and professional advancement, limit opportunities for female health workers to perform their duties and develop professionally, with implications for quality of care and health outcomes. By prioritizing gender equity within their own health workforces; gathering data on gender dynamics within the immunization programs they support; and supporting initiatives to train, retain, and advance the careers of female immunization workers, donor governments—including the United States, working with bilateral and multilateral partners—can strengthen quality of care, improve global immunization coverage, and reinforce health security in the long run.
Topic:
Governance, Medicine, Equality, Immunization, and Gender
Political Geography:
Global Focus

94. It's Moving Time: Taiwanese Business Responds to Growing U.S.-China Tensions

Author:
Scott Kennedy
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
A new report by the CSIS Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics interprets a formal survey of over 500 Taiwanese business executives, documenting their views about the evolving environment on the island and beyond. The Washington policy community is quite familiar with the views that U.S. and European companies hold toward China, but less clear are the views of Taiwanese companies that are central to the story of the world’s interaction with China. Their opinions have implications for Taiwan’s economic trajectory, cross-strait relations, global supply chains, and the effectiveness of U.S. policy in the region. The report documents that Taiwanese companies are highly concerned about their potential overdependence on the Chinese economy and the possibility of a military conflict. As a result, there is significant support for expanding trade and investment ties via regional arrangements and bilaterally with the United States, as well as for maintaining Taiwan’s technological edge through more spending on research and development and broadening restrictions for technology transfer to China. But perhaps the most noteworthy finding is that Taiwanese companies appear to be moving their businesses at record levels from Mainland China, but also from Taiwan. This report, by Trustee Chair Scott Kennedy, explains how the survey was carried out, then analyzes the sources of Taiwanese companies’ anxieties and the ways they are responding, and concludes by considering the policy implications for all parties involved. The report’s appendix provides a full summary of the original survey results.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, Business, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

95. Reshoring Semiconductor Manufacturing: Addressing the Workforce Challenge

Author:
Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On August 9, 2022, President Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act, sweeping legislation that seeks to strengthen the U.S. semiconductor supply chain, encourage investments in semiconductor manufacturing facilities in the United States, stimulate semiconductor research and development (R&D), and disincentivize U.S. investments in chip-making plants in China. Among other things, the legislation will provide $52.7 billion in federal outlays over five years for loans, loan guarantees, grants, and other financial support for domestic chip-making investments, as well as a 25 percent tax credit for semiconductor investments in the United States. Bolstered by this unprecedented level of federal support, six major chip makers are investing in new wafer fabrication facilities (“fabs”) in the United States: Intel, Samsung, TSMC, GlobalFoundries, Texas Instruments, and Micron Technology.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Manufacturing, Industrialization, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

96. What If . . . Alternatives to a Chinese Military Invasion of Taiwan Image

Author:
Benjamin Jensen, Riley McCabe, and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
With the 20th Party Congress approaching and Xi Jinping seeking an unprecedented third term, it is important to explore the full range of actions Beijing could take to coerce Taiwan over the next 10 years. History provides a range of historical cases that suggest alternatives to a full-scale invasion. As part of its On Future War series, the CSIS International Security Program adapted six historical cases of coercion China could use to target Taiwan short of a costly amphibious invasion. The report looks back to look ahead, using the logic of historical cases ranging from the 1948 Berlin Airlift to the 1980s Tanker War in the Arabian Gulf to identify ways and means Beijing could use to compel Taiwan. The resulting range of scenarios point toward an urgent need to develop new escalation management frameworks supporting the new integrated deterrence strategy.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

97. Choking off China’s Access to the Future of AI

Author:
Gregory Allen
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On October 7, 2022, the Biden administration announced a new export controls policy on artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor technologies to China. These new controls—a genuine landmark in U.S.-China relations—provide the complete picture after a partial disclosure in early September generated confusion. For weeks the Biden administration has been receiving criticism in many quarters for a new round of semiconductor export control restrictions, first disclosed on September 1. The restrictions block leading U.S. AI computer chip designers, such as Nvidia and AMD, from selling their high-end chips for AI and supercomputing to China. The criticism typically goes like this: China’s domestic AI chip design companies could not win customers in China because their chip designs could not compete with Nvidia and AMD on performance. Chinese firms could not catch up to Nvidia and AMD on performance because they did not have enough customers to benefit from economies of scale and network effects. Because of the new export controls, revenues that formerly flowed to U.S. chip companies will now go to Chinese chip companies, offering a viable path to economies of scale and competitive performance. In the short term, this policy will significantly harm Chinese AI data center companies. However, blocking U.S. AI chip designers from selling their world-leading chips is actually good for China in the longer term because it will strengthen China’s domestic chip design ecosystem. While the reasoning in this criticism is sound, it does not imply that the Biden administration’s actions are self-defeating. Rather, it shows how the policy as disclosed in September was incomplete. A policy like this would not make sense if that is the only step the administration planned to take. Clearly something was missing, and industry experts have been waiting for the other shoe to drop ever since. On October 7, the other shoe dropped. The Biden administration announced a massive policy shift on semiconductor exports to China as well as revised rules for how the lists of restricted parties are managed. In recent decades, U.S. semiconductor policy has been primarily market driven and laissez faire. With the new policy, which comes on the heels of the CHIPS Act’s passage, the United States is firmly focused on retaining control over so-called “chokepoint” (or as it is sometimes translated from Chinese “stranglehold”) technologies in the global semiconductor technology supply chain. The most important chokepoints in the context of this discussion are AI chip designs, electronic design automation software, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and equipment components. The Biden administration’s latest actions simultaneously exploit U.S. dominance across all four of these chokepoints. In doing so, these actions demonstrate an unprecedented degree of U.S. government intervention to not only preserve chokepoint control but also begin a new U.S. policy of actively strangling large segments of the Chinese technology industry—strangling with an intent to kill.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Hegemony, Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

98. Engines of Prosperity: The Promise of the Zones for Employment and Economic Development (ZEDEs) in Honduras Image

Author:
Ryan C. Berg and Matthew Carusi
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Special economic zones (SEZs) are autonomous zones designed to facilitate free-trade operations. SEZs can be broken down into the following types of zones: free-trade zones, which are duty-free areas to warehouse and transit goods; enterprise zones, which provide tax benefits to underperforming industries; specialized zones, which include technology parks; and freeports—the largest type of economic zones, combining work and residential spaces. A 2008 World Bank report defined SEZs as having the following characteristics: a geographically secured area, a single management system, eligibility for benefits based on the location within the zone, and a separate customs area. Advocates of SEZs argue that they can improve a country’s economic standing by making it more competitive on the global stage. One way to achieve this goal is by improving a country’s infrastructure. Building out more extensive road networks or port systems is beneficial not only for businesses operating inside the SEZ, but also for the entire country’s future economic trajectory. Another argument in favor of SEZs is that they strengthen a country’s institutional framework. In developing countries, this narrative can be particularly relevant because weak institutions often constrain foreign investors from making large-scale commitments. SEZs attempt to fill this gap by increasing the efficiency of the regulatory frameworks, property rights, and investment flows. Since a wealth of SEZs are awarded a certain level of legal autonomy, establishing these unique governance structures can be arranged. SEZs offer similar advantages for streamlining efficiency in the labor market. Wages can be more flexible and the process of hiring and firing employees can become easier. Workers can further be attracted by the availability of better healthcare and education systems, as well as by the availability of internet or phone services. All these factors are crucial in attracting the best possible talent, both domestically and internationally, giving them reasons to set up operations inside an SEZ. The intended results of these characteristics are that GDP per capita within the SEZ would increase substantially and that surrounding areas would be able to reap these rewards. These are known as spillover effects, wherein new influxes of foreign and intellectual capital would spill over into the surrounding communities. However, the verdict on this subject is less clear. According to a 2017 World Bank study, the literature on SEZs does not confirm a clear link between achieving widespread spillovers and increasing regional employment levels. There is more evidence to support the claim that limited spillover effects exist in surrounding areas up to 50 kilometers outside the SEZ.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Employment, and Special Economic Zones
Political Geography:
Central America, North America, and Honduras

99. How Innovative Financing Models Can Support the Scaling of Supply Chain Innovations

Author:
Allie Dichiara and John Simon
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Substantial progress has been made toward achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3: Health and Well-Being for All. However, progress is plateauing as global health development funding decelerates, and much of the remaining gaps are among the hardest to address, especially for the most vulnerable and hardest-to-reach communities. A key element to reigniting progress toward SDG 3 is significantly improving the effectiveness of the current fragmented health commodity supply chain, through which billions in spending—approximately $6 billion in donor funds in 2015 and $50 billion in overall spending in 2017—flow each year to low- and lower-middle-income countries (LMICs). Fortunately, there is a growing number of innovative supply chain solutions available across sub-Saharan Africa that could have the potential to dramatically improve the underperforming status quo.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Africa

100. CCP Inc. in Greece: State Grid and China’s Role in the Greek Energy Sector

Author:
Briana Boland, Jude Blanchette, and Cory Combs
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
How did one of China’s core state-owned enterprises gain a foothold in Greece’s electricity sector? This case study examines the “CCP Inc.” ecosystem of Chinese officials, state-owned enterprises, policy banks, and private firms that helped State Grid Corporation of China (State Grid) and other Chinese companies gain a stake in the national electric grid and renewable energy projects in Greece. State Grid is the world’s largest utility company, pursuing an international strategy of expansion that both implements and informs Beijing’s policy goals for global energy infrastructure. By investigating how State Grid acquired a stake in Greece’s national power grid operator, the Chinese financing and energy sector business deals that followed State Grid’s investment, and the constraints that limited State Grid’s later efforts to expand its control over Greece’s electric grid, this case study offers insight to the role of state-owned enterprises in the global reach of China’s state capitalist system.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Finance, Electricity, and State-Owned Enterprises
Political Geography:
China and Asia