Publishing Institution: Center for Strategic and International Studies / Topic: Military Strategy

1. Counterterrorism from the Sky? How to Think Over the Horizon about Drones

Author:: Erol Yayboke and Christopher Reid
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: August 31, 2021, marked the end of the United States’ two-decade military presence in Afghanistan. It also marked the end of U.S. military and intelligence eyes and ears on the ground in a place known to be a safe haven for violent extremist groups. In Afghanistan and other areas where the United States lacks a persistent, physical presence, the Biden administration announced a pivot to “over-the-horizon” counterterrorism operations (OTH- CT) that rely heavily on stand-off assets, such as overhead satellite technology and airpower, in the absence of eyes and ears. While the use of drones—or “remotely piloted aircraft” (RPAs)—to target potential terrorist threats seems to be a cost-effective approach from a military perspective, their use has come under increasing pressure from Capitol Hill, human rights and humanitarian organizations, and others for their effects on civilian populations. Military action almost always carries risk of collateral damage, but the disproportionate civilian impact associated with RPAs is not only troubling from rights and humanitarian perspectives, but it also calls into question the strategic, longer-term rationale of using them for counterterrorism purposes in the first place. Congressional leaders sent a letter to the president on January 20, 2022, about the ongoing OTH-CT strategy review. In it, they point out that “while the intent of U.S. counterterrorism policy may be to target terrorism suspects who threaten U.S. national security, in too many instances, U.S. drone strikes have instead led to unintended and deadly consequences—killing civilians and increasing anger towards the United States.” They, therefore, call on the administration to “review and overhaul U.S. counterterrorism policy to center human rights and the protection of civilians, align with U.S. and international law, prioritize non-lethal tools to address conflict and fragility, and only use force when it is lawful and as a last resort.” Reconciling the risks and implications of RPA strikes is necessary for genuinely implementing President Biden’s calls for a “targeted, precise strategy that goes after terror.” In doing so, the administration also needs to address concerns over civilian casualties alongside meaningful and justifiable military utilization of RPAs. Using RPAs against those who pose an imminent threat to the United States or its allies and partners is sometimes necessary and appropriate, especially in scenarios that are high-risk for crewed aircraft or ground forces. So why wouldn’t the United States use RPAs more broadly at low risk to blood and treasure? Why put soldiers in danger when we can extensively monitor threats and eventually address them from a remotely piloted aircraft high above? The answers are at once simple (e.g., impact on civilians) and complicated (e.g., limited military alternatives), exposing a gulf in understanding and approach to RPA utilization between the advocacy community (and some congressional leaders) and military and intelligence planners. This CSIS brief explores the challenge ahead for the Biden administration. It starts with a contextualization of the OTH-CT strategy review, followed by assessments of the short- and longer-term risks associated with RPA utilization and how to think about risk itself. Offering evidence and framing throughout, the brief ends by detailing two sets of recommendations
Topic:: Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Drones
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

2. What Does $40 Billion in Aid to Ukraine Buy?

Author:: Mark F. Cancian
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Congress has approved $40 billion in aid for Ukraine and other countries affected by the conflict―the sixth aid package since the war began. A major change is that this package looks ahead months rather than weeks. The aid package provides $19 billion for immediate military support to Ukraine, continuing the effort that has been vital to sustaining Ukrainian resistance, and $3.9 billion to sustain U.S. forces deployed to Europe. The package also contains about $16 billion for economic support to Ukraine, global humanitarian relief, and a wide variety of international programs as well as $2 billion for long-term support to NATO allies and DOD modernization programs. Although some elements of the aid package will be available quickly, many will take years to fully implement. This raises questions about why long-term elements could not have gone through the regular congressional authorization and budget processes.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

3. The Pillars Necessary for a Strong Domestic Semiconductor Industry

Author:: Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: All major U.S. defense systems and platforms rely on semiconductors for their performance, and the erosion of U.S. capabilities in microelectronics is a direct threat to the United States’ ability to defend itself and its allies. The COMPETES and USICA legislation, currently being reconciled in Congress, represents a national strategy to secure U.S. competitiveness and national security in the twenty-first century. Both the House and Senate legislation call for $52 billion to support U.S.-based semiconductor research and production. They also authorize several programs to both expand U.S. semiconductor fabrication capacity and support the continued research and development (R&D) of advanced chips. The key question is how these intentions can best be turned into reality. There are several challenges that the domestic semiconductor industry confronts, such as international competition, capital investment requirements, workforce needs, gaps in the supply chain, and the shortfall in venture capital funding and technical support needed to enable commercialization of promising technologies.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Innovation, Industrialization, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

4. The Challenge of European Political Will

Author:: Rachel Lutz Ellehuus and Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: In this follow-on report to 2021’s Europe's High-End Military Challenges: The Future of European Capabilities and Missions, the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and International Security Program examine the other side of the coin of European military effectiveness: the political will of European countries to conduct military missions and operations. The report identifies the endogenous and exogenous factors constraining or increasing political will and maps them onto six country case studies. Four prototypes of political will emerged from the analysis: global partners, international activists, constrained partners, and minimalists. The report then assesses the political will of European allies and partners to conduct fifteen types of military missions and operations worldwide, from peacekeeping to large-scale combat. It concludes with a summary of key findings. First, it finds that internal and external factors—such as strategic culture and alliance dependence, respectively—will continue to constrain European political will in many cases, even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Second, European states are more likely to have the political will to engage in military missions at the lower end of the conflict spectrum (such as maritime patrol missions) and less likely at the higher ends of the spectrum, except in cases of significant collective or national defense.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Politics, Military Strategy, Regionalism, and Intervention
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. U.S. Defense Posture in the Middle East

Author:: Seth G. Jones and Seamus P. Daniels
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: There are growing calls for a decrease in the U.S. military presence in the Middle East. Proponents of a major reduction of forces argue that it is necessary because of growing competition with China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe, a declining U.S. reliance on Gulf oil and gas, a reduced threat from terrorist groups, and a need to focus on diplomacy rather than military force. To inform the debate over the United States’ military presence in the Middle East, this report assesses three posture options for U.S. forces in the region. This report finds that the United States should keep a notable but tailored presence in the Middle East to contain the further expansion of Chinese and Russian military power and to check the actions of Iran and terrorist organizations that threaten the United States and its allies and partners.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

6. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Identity, History, and Conflict

Author:: Jeffrey Mankoff
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine constitutes the biggest threat to peace and security in Europe since the end of the Cold War. On February 21, 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin gave a bizarre and at times unhinged speech laying out a long list of grievances as justification for the “special military operation” announced the following day. While these grievances included the long-simmering dispute over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the shape of the post–Cold War security architecture in Europe, the speech centered on a much more fundamental issue: the legitimacy of Ukrainian identity and statehood themselves. It reflected a worldview Putin had long expressed, emphasizing the deep-seated unity among the Eastern Slavs—Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians, who all trace their origins to the medieval Kyivan Rus commonwealth—and suggesting that the modern states of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus should share a political destiny both today and in the future. The corollary to that view is the claim that distinct Ukrainian and Belarusian identities are the product of foreign manipulation and that, today, the West is following in the footsteps of Russia’s imperial rivals in using Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of an “anti-Russia project.” Throughout Putin’s time in office, Moscow has pursued a policy toward Ukraine and Belarus predicated on the assumption that their respective national identities are artificial—and therefore fragile. Putin’s arguments about foreign enemies promoting Ukrainian (and, in a more diffuse way, Belarusian) identity as part of a geopolitical struggle against Russia echo the way many of his predecessors refused to accept the agency of ordinary people seeking autonomy from tsarist or Soviet domination. The historically minded Putin often invokes the ideas of thinkers emphasizing the organic unity of the Russian Empire and its people—especially its Slavic, Orthodox core—in a form of what the historian Timothy Snyder calls the “politics of eternity,” the belief in an unchanging historical essence. The salience that Putin and other Russian elites assign to the idea of Russian-Ukrainian-Belarusian unity helps explain the origins of the current conflict, notably why Moscow was willing to risk a large-scale war on its borders when neither Ukraine nor NATO posed any military threat. It also suggests that Moscow’s ambitions extend beyond preventing Ukrainian NATO membership and encompass a more thorough aspiration to dominate Ukraine politically, militarily, and economically. It also helps explain Russia’s military strategy. Moscow appeared to calculate that enough Ukrainians, at least in the eastern part of the country, would accept some form of reintegration into a Russian sphere of influence because of shared cultural, linguistic, religious, and other ties with Russia. Despite pre-war polls showing large numbers of Ukrainians willing to take up arms to defend their country against a Russian invasion, Moscow’s wager was not entirely implausible given the recentness of the shift and the persistence of family and other ties across the Russian-Ukrainian border. Nonetheless, Russia’s war has become bogged down in no small part because this calculation about Ukrainian identity has proven dramatically wrong.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

7. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
Topic:: War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

8. The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War

Author:: Benjamin Jensen and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Based on three crisis simulations held in late March 2022 with think tank fellows, military planners, and congressional staffers, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will likely struggle to address escalation vectors almost certain to push the current war in Ukraine beyond the country’s borders. This paper captures key insights from across these simulations based on two triggering events: (1) a Russian surgical strike on a NATO logistics hub used to provide weapons to Ukraine in southeast Poland, and (2) Russian use of chemical weapons along the Polish border while simultaneously mobilizing to threaten the Baltics. As the conflict crossed a key threshold and risked becoming a regional war, most participants found a natural pull to escalate in each scenario despite limited expectations of achieving a position of competitive advantage. Analyzing how individuals and teams approached decision making provides insights on rethinking escalation models in the twenty-first century and taking advantage of new concepts and capabilities to better support signaling during a crisis.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

9. Russia’s Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine: Lessons in Modern Warfare

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Russia has failed to achieve most of its objectives in Ukraine because of poor military planning, significant logistical problems, low combat readiness, and other deficiencies, which undermined Russian military effectiveness. These and other challenges—including Ukrainian military efforts and Western aid—severely impacted Russian air, ground, cyber, and maritime operations. Russia’s failures will force the Russian military to fundamentally rethink its training practices, organizational structure, culture, logistics, recruitment and retention policies, and planning efforts. Nevertheless, Russia is still attempting a de facto annexation of parts of eastern and southern Ukraine that it controls.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

10. The Lessons of the Afghan War That No One Will Want to Learn

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: At the best of times, the U.S. tends to rush out heavily politicized studies of the lessons of war that are more political ammunition than serious analyses, and while these are followed by long formal studies that are often quite good, they then are often ignored as the flow of events moves on. These are scarcely the best of times. The collapse of the Afghan government and forces has occurred during one of the most partisan periods in American politics, followed by a totally different kind of conflict in Ukraine, all while the U.S. focus on terrorism and regional conflicts that began with 9/11 has been replaced by a focus on competition with nuclear superpowers like Russia and China. The very fact that the war stretched out over two decades has meant that much of the focus on lessons has ignored the first half or more of the war, and the almost inevitable chaos following the U.S. decision to withdraw has led to the focus on the collapse of the Afghan forces and the central government rather than on the actual conduct of the war – and few within the U.S. government now want to rake over the list of past mistakes that turned an initial tactical victory into a massive grand strategic defeat.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

11. Cyber War and Ukraine

Author:: James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: This is a preliminary review of cyber operations in the Ukraine conflict based on publicly available information. Ukraine was not the first “cyber war”—the term itself makes little sense—but it was the first major conflict involving large-scale cyber operations. The so-far inept Russian invasion, where cyber operations have provided little benefit, raises questions about the balance between defense and offense in cyberspace, the utility of offensive cyber operations, and the requirements for planning and coordination. Better-than-expected Ukrainian defenses seem to be one hallmark of this invasion and the primary reason why Russian cyber efforts have had limited effect. It is likely that Ukraine, forewarned by Russian cyber actions that began as early as 2014, was better prepared as a result. It was also assisted in its cyber defense by friendly countries and private actors with whom it had developed cooperative relationships before the conflict. This preparation allowed it to deflect many Russian offensive cyber operations, suggesting that a well-prepared and energetic defense can have the advantage over offense in cyberspace. Russia had previously used cyberattacks against Ukraine to destroy or damage infrastructure and data. It attempted to do so again in 2022. Based on publicly available information, Russia launched a broad cyber campaign shortly before the invasion (see the appendix for a list of known events). Some reporting showed a huge increase in exploits on the first day. The intent appears to have been to create disorder and overwhelm Ukrainian defenses. Russia sought to disrupt services and install destructive malware on Ukrainian networks included phishing, denial of service, and taking advantage of software vulnerabilities. One company identified eight different families of destructive software used by Russia in these attacks. The primary targets were Ukrainian government websites, energy and telecom service providers, financial institutions, and media outlets, but the cyberattacks encompassed most critical sectors. This was a wide-ranging attack using the full suite of Russian cyber capabilities to disrupt Ukraine, but it was not a success. Russia’s most significant cyber success so far was the disruption of the Viasat Inc’s KA-SAT satellite. This created significant damage that spread beyond Ukraine but ultimately did not provide military advantage to Russia. The attack may have been intended to be part of a larger, coordinated cyberattack that proved unsuccessful, or the Russians may not have expected the rapid restoration of service that was provided with outside assistance. The metric for Viasat and for other actions is not whether a cyberattack is effective in terms of network penetration or the disruption of services or data, but whether its effect helps achieve in this case, the occupation of Ukraine and the elimination of its elected government. By this metric, the Viasat attack was not a success.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Ukraine

12. The Collapse of One China

Author:: Ivan Kanapathy
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: As the One China policy accommodation unravels and China’s military attains a credible capability to mount a cross-strait invasion, the United States and its allies should stop hedging and adopt enhanced measures to deter Beijing.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The partnership between China and Russia has become one of the most critical features of the contemporary strategic relationship. Russia’s war in Ukraine has created economic and diplomatic dilemmas for China, but it hasn’t altered the fundamental alignment of interests and autocratic values that drives that relationship. In this Marshall Paper, David Shullman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor explain why the Sino-Russian relationship will only get deeper as a result of the war—even as it reveals strains and divisions that the United States and its allies may, eventually, be able to exploit.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

14. Indispensable: NATO’s Framework Nations Concept beyond Madrid

Author:: Sean Monaghan and Ed Arnold
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: s NATO’s leaders gather in Madrid this month to unveil the alliance’s eighth strategic concept at a crucial time for European security, they should take inspiration from earlier concepts. In 2014, NATO launched its Framework Nations Concept at the Wales summit to enhance collective defense through multinational cooperation. The idea is built on the basic principles established in NATO’s first strategic concept in 1949. Beyond Madrid, allied leaders should agree to develop the Framework Nations Concept in three ways
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Global Focus

15. Resetting NATO’s Defense and Deterrence: The Sword and the Shield Redux

Author:: Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: There is a saying: “If you want a new idea, read an old book.” For the authors of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) new strategic concept looking for a new approach to its core task of defense and deterrence, the best “old books” to consult might be the seven strategic concepts NATO has published since 1949. The first four of these were classified and made public in 1997.1 Since 1991, three concepts have been published openly, the latest in 2010. This paper examines NATO’s first seven strategic concepts to chart the progress of the alliance’s approach to defense and deterrence. The main purpose of doing so is to give today’s leaders and planners a better understanding of their forebearers’ efforts, to learn their lessons, and avoid their mistakes. The analysis also reveals three broad insights that can be applied today: plan against Russia’s maximum intentions; revitalize the sword and the shield; and modernize the sword and the shield.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

16. The Need for a New NATO Force Planning Exercise

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman and Grace Hwang
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: NATO countries have already provided massive amounts of military aid to Ukraine, deployed additional forces to support the NATO countries that share a border with Russia, improved the Alliance’s ability to rapidly deploy forces forward in a crisis, and worked with key powers like Poland to strengthen its capabilities. NATO has accepted Finland and Sweden as future members of the Alliance, and it has made numerous other short-term adjustments to its force posture that enhance its deterrence and defense capabilities. NATO faces a future, however, where it cannot predict how much territory Ukraine will lose and where it must now view Russia as an ongoing major threat at virtually every level from the limited conventional threats Russia poses to the NATO countries on its border to the major increases in its threat of strategic nuclear forces. NATO cannot continue to treat Russia as a potential partner, and that seems to be an unlikely path forward so long as Putin or anyone like him is in power. NATO also cannot ignore the rise in China’s military and economic power or the prospects of closer Russian and Chinese strategic cooperation. The challenge NATO faces goes far beyond Ukraine. The days in which NATO countries could keep taking peace dividends by cutting their forces, failing to modernize, and failing to adopt new forces of tactics and interoperability are over. NATO cannot deal with the Russian threat in terms of half-measures or by continuing to focus on empty and virtually meaningless force goals like spending 2% of national GDP on defense and 20% of defense expenditure on equipment. NATO needs to act now to look far beyond the short-term priorities of the Ukraine conflict. It needs to revitalize its entire force planning progress. It needs to create effective levels of deterrence and defense capability, while it modernizes its forces to deal with radically new requirements like joint all-domain operations (JADO), emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs), new precision-strike capabilities, changes in air and missile warfare and defense, and the revival of Russian naval power and the growth of a Chinese blue-water navy. The Emeritus Chair in Strategy has prepared a report, entitled, The Need for a New NATO Force Planning Exercise, that examines how NATO must approach an effective force planning exercise that can give its new strategy real meaning. This report documents the pointless character of NATO’s present emphasis on burdensharing, and it examines the real-world shifts in spending and forces in NATO since 2014, as well as how these changes have affected the national forces in given sectors of Europe.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

17. North America Is a Region, Too: An Integrated, Phased, and Affordable Approach to Air and Missile Defense for the Homeland

Author:: Tom Karako, Matthew Strohmeyer, Wes Rumbaugh, and Ken Harmon
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: U.S. air and missile defense efforts have long been characterized by a striking dichotomy. Defenses for the homeland have largely focused on long-range ballistic threats, while cruise missile defense and other air defense efforts have focused on regional and force protection applications to the exclusion of the homeland. This compartmentalization assumes that battles in one place will only consist of certain parts of the threat spectrum, and battles elsewhere will consist only of others. That lingering dichotomy creates a vulnerability that near-peer adversaries now seek to exploit. In a sense, the homeland-regional dichotomy ignores the fact that North America is a region, too. As with any other region, attacks on assets in North America could be designed to shape the political and military calculus of U.S. policymakers. This report explores the strategic significance of air and missile defense for the homeland, considers principles informing defense design, and develops and costs an architecture based on those principles.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Homeland Security, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

18. Software-Defined Warfare: Architecting the DOD's Transition to the Digital Age

Author:: Nand Mulchandani and John Shanahan
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The U.S. Department of Defense's (DOD) massive bureaucracy struggles with the kind of periodic “tech refresh” that has been instrumental to commercial industry success. While it is insulated from market competition within the U.S. economy, the DOD is not immune from the kind of revolutionary, secular, and wide-ranging technological changes happening outside the government. Nor is it immune from the threat of competition with other militaries around the world. In the future, warfighting will only become more complex, even more chaotic, and even faster. The only way for the DOD to stay competitive in a new warfighting environment is to ensure that it uses the most potent weapon available: technology, and more specifically, software. For the United States to retain its dominant position in the future— which is not a guaranteed outcome—the DOD needs a new design and architecture that will allow it to be far more flexible, scale on demand, and adapt dynamically to changing conditions. And it must do so at a dramatically lower cost as it delivers its critical services. This paper provides a blueprint for the way forward.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, Digitalization, and Software
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

19. The CNO’s Navigation Plan for 2022: A Critique

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: There should be a clear difference between efforts to provide unclassified documents that explain and justify U.S. military forces and issuing official reports that are little more than public relations exercises. The U.S. faces major security challenges and the annual cost of U.S. defense is over $760 billion, even if one ignores the cost of nuclear weapons, the Veterans Administration, related activities of the State Department and other agencies, and substantial additional intelligence activity. The effort to shape U.S. forces and strategy must deal with very real threats. They include a Russia that has invaded the Ukraine, a China that is actively seeking to challenge the U.S. in military and economic power, and regional threats like Iran and North Korea. The U.S. must cope with emerging and disruptive technologies that constantly alter the nature of military forces in unexpected ways, support America’s strategic partners on a global level, and deal with near collapse of many arms control efforts and major increases in Russian and Chinese nuclear and long-range strike programs. Far too often, however, the Department of Defense issues documents that are little more than sales pitches – filled with slogans, and that are an awkward cross between a shipping list that borders on being a child’s letter to Santa Claus and a used car commercial. The CNO’s Navigation Plan for 2022 is a case in point. In fairness, does highlight a long list of important points about the threat, and the need to reshape U.S. naval forces, but it comes far too close to burying them in overall and hype. It fails to meaningfully address and justify the cost of the U.S. Navy, to provide any clear picture of the threat, to address the need to cooperate with key U.S. allies, and to provide a clear program for shaping the Navy’s future. It is scarcely unique in failing to provide a clear and meaningful plan. The defense budget requests talk about being strategic documents, but almost all of their contents are shopping lists for individual military services. U.S. strategy documents have become little more than long lists of broad goals and wish lists with no actual plan, program, or budget.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Public Relations
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

20. What If . . . Alternatives to a Chinese Military Invasion of Taiwan Image

Author:: Benjamin Jensen, Riley McCabe, and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: With the 20th Party Congress approaching and Xi Jinping seeking an unprecedented third term, it is important to explore the full range of actions Beijing could take to coerce Taiwan over the next 10 years. History provides a range of historical cases that suggest alternatives to a full-scale invasion. As part of its On Future War series, the CSIS International Security Program adapted six historical cases of coercion China could use to target Taiwan short of a costly amphibious invasion. The report looks back to look ahead, using the logic of historical cases ranging from the 1948 Berlin Airlift to the 1980s Tanker War in the Arabian Gulf to identify ways and means Beijing could use to compel Taiwan. The resulting range of scenarios point toward an urgent need to develop new escalation management frameworks supporting the new integrated deterrence strategy.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

21. Keeping the U.S. Military Engine Edge: Budget and Contract Trends

Author:: Gregory Sanders and Nicholas Velazquez
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Military aircraft engine technology is a qualitative edge for the United States, one enabled by a world-leading industrial base. However, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) faces critical decisions regarding the future of engine investments and the industrial base of the F-35. This platform dominates present U.S. tactical aircraft purchases and faces a growing engine modernization imperative. The following questions help inform key debates: How does the DOD prioritize investments in engines compared to other systems? Where is investment targeted? And how can competition best be fostered? Recent years have shown a spike in the purchase of products for military engines amid a decline in research and development (R&D) spending relative to the early 2000s. Military engine R&D is now largely dependent on the Air Force, as the Navy has taken a step back to focus funding on other service priorities. Finally, competition for military engine contract spending has been on the decline as the F-35, with its single-engine option, dominates the procurement landscape. The future of the military engine industrial base will be shaped by the DOD’s choice between spending more up front to introduce competition into the fifth-generation fighter fleet or waiting until the end of this decade as the first sixth-generation fighter is expected to enter production.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

22. Baltic Conflict: Russia’s Goal to Distract NATO?

Author:: Courtney Stiles Herdt and Matthew "BINCS" Zublic
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The Baltics are a key strategic region where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russian military and economic interests overlap. Sabotage of the Nordstream 2 pipeline, regardless of who executed the attack, has signaled that conflict in the region is no longer left of bang. Gray zone operations are underway, and the United States, NATO, and their partners need to be ready to act in unity against an increasingly hostile Russia that is now trying to distract attention from its military shortcomings in Ukraine. In this effort, Russia’s playbook will test the limits and try to exploit the seams of the alliance. An exacting response is needed to deny Russia control and ensure full conflict is avoided. The NATO summit in Vilnius will be critical to strengthening resolve and a path forward to a combined strategy to deter further Russian aggression.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North America, and Baltic States

23. A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: t is obvious that the world now faces a wide range of potential wars and crises. What is far less obvious is the level of confrontation between the U.S. and its strategic partners with both Russia and China, the rising levels of other types of violence that are emerging on a global level, how serious these wars and crises can become, and what kind of future could eventually emerge out of so many different crises, confrontations and conflicts, and trends. These issues are addressed in depth in a new analysis by the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the CSIS entitled A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023. This analysis explores the risk on the basis that war does not have to mean actual military conflict. Here, it is important to note that avoiding or minimizing combat is scarcely peace. As Sun Tzu pointed out in the Art of War well over 2,000 years ago, “war” does not have to involve the use of military force or any form of actual combat. His statement that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” applies to every form of major military confrontation and gray area warfare between opposing powers. It recognizes that it is all too easy to predict dire outcomes from the War in Ukraine, the current arms races with Russia and China, and growing levels of violence and confrontation between other states. There is still a case, however, for examining the broader impact of the war, the growing intensity of the arms races with Russia and China, and the current overall patterns of global conflict as the world enters the winter of 2022-2023. It is already clear that this will be a deeply troubled winter in many areas of the globe, that the level of confrontation between major powers has risen sharply, that they do seek to subdue the enemy without fighting, and their rivalry has become the equivalent of political and economic warfare. It is equally clear that the wide range of lower-level conflicts between other powers, their civil wars, and the abuses many governments commit against their own citizens are also intensifying, although many of these conflicts have been going on in some form for years or even decades. In far too many cases, the world is not moving toward peace. It is moving towards repression and war. Accordingly, this analysis argues that the world already faces a series of possible and ongoing “Winter Wars” in 2022-2023 that may not escalate to open military conflict but that are wars at the political and economic level and in competition to build-up more lethal military forces both for deterrence and to exert political leverage. It also shows that these “Wars” already pose serious risks and could escalate sharply and in unpredictable ways for at least the next five to ten years.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

24. A Green Wave?

Author:: Jessica Drun
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Edited by Jude Blanchette of CSIS and Hal Brands of SAIS, the Marshall Papers is a series of essays that probes and challenges the assessments underpinning the U.S. approach to great power rivalry. The Papers will be rigorous yet provocative, continually pushing the boundaries of intellectual and policy debates. In this Marshall Paper, Jessica Drun examines how political and identity trends within Taiwan are likely to affect cross-strait relations. Primarily a reaction to assertive actions and policies from Beijing, Drun argues, these trends are moving away from Beijing’s preferences and in Drun’s view are likely to fuel rising PRC belligerence through 2027 and beyond. With this in mind, she suggests the United States should proceed with a long-overdue review of its Taiwan policy, built on a more nuanced understanding of domestic political realities within Taiwan, changes in the cross-strait military balance, growing PRC influence in international organizations, and the broader geopolitical environment.
Topic:: Security, Politics, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

25. “Reunification” with Taiwan through Force Would Be a Pyrrhic Victory for China

Author:: Jude Blanchette and Gerard Dipippo
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Many commentators and officials speculate about Beijing’s plans to compel “reunification” with Taiwan. Much of the existing commentary focuses on how or when a Chinese attack on Taiwan could occur, but there is little discussion of the nonmilitary consequences of such a scenario for China and the world. This brief explores the implications of a Chinese attack on Taiwan based on reasonable, albeit speculative, assumptions. When considered more holistically, the implications of an attack on Taiwan would be grim for Beijing, even if Chinese forces “successfully” capture the island. China would probably be diplomatically and economically isolated from key advanced economies, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping would have to tread a narrow path to avoid dire consequences for China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a whole. This analysis helps clarify what could be at stake for the world and reaffirms the importance of deterring Beijing from contemplating such an attack on Taiwan.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, and Asia

26. NATO and the South after Ukraine

Author:: Pierre Morcos
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The war in Ukraine will have a pervasive impact on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which is set to adopt a new strategic concept at the upcoming Madrid summit in June 2022. There is little doubt that adapting the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture in Eastern Europe will be a strategic priority on the road to Madrid. However, the alliance should not neglect other challenges and priorities, including preserving stability in its southern neighborhood. Spanning from North Africa and the Sahel to the Balkans and the Middle East, NATO’s “South” remains fraught with growing vulnerabilities—and is not impervious to the broader strategic competition with Russia and China. Rather than transforming NATO into a unidirectional entity, the future strategic concept offers the alliance an opportunity to reimagine its approach toward the South.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, North America, and Global South

27. On the Horizon Vol. 4: A Collection of Papers from the Next Generation of Nuclear Professionals

Author:: Reja Younis
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The Nuclear Scholars Initiative is a signature program run by the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) to engage emerging nuclear experts in thoughtful and informed debate over how to best address the nuclear community’s most pressing problems. The papers included in this volume comprise research from participants in the 2021 Nuclear Scholars Initiative. These papers explore a range of crucial debates such as the future of arms control and deterrence, emerging technologies, SSBN vulnerability, public opinion, cyber norms, and the role of regional dynamics including China and India in nuclear security.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Global Focus

28. The Department of Defense Contributions to Pandemic Response

Author:: Tom Cullison and J. Stephen Morrison
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The Department of Defense (DOD) should be systematically incorporated into any evolving U.S. government vision on international health security. A process of strategic planning that encompasses a spectrum of valuable DOD contributions to contain the global Covid-19 pandemic should begin right away. DOD has broad capabilities that have consistently proven their high value in addressing the current Covid-19 pandemic and other historical disease outbreaks, in support of the U.S. civilian-led response. The knowledge and experience gained in crisis response at home and overseas contribute to military readiness and improved coordination of all actors involved in preventing, detecting, and responding to infectious disease events. This report draws from months of deliberations organized by the CSIS Commission on Strengthening America’s Health Security’s DOD Working Group. It lays out four concrete and pragmatic recommendations to strengthen DOD’s contributions overseas in advancing U.S. global health security interests
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

29. Russia Futures: Three Trajectories

Author:: Cyrus Newlin and Andrew Lohsen
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Beginning in 2018, the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS initiated a research project to explore scenarios related to Russia’s future development and to consider the transatlantic implications of each scenario. The project, which was generously funded by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, was intended to provide policymakers with an understanding of how Russia’s domestic political situation, economic outlook, military activities, and foreign policy might evolve in response to modern-day challenges including climate change, growing competition in the Arctic, and the fraught relationship between China and the collective West. Based on original research and workshops involving U.S., Norwegian, and European experts, CSIS identified three potential scenarios for Russia’s future development. The first scenario envisioned a path of continuity, in which Russian leaders strove to maintain the status quo. The second scenario foresaw a trend of risk reduction in the Kremlin’s decisionmaking that led to a partial normalization of relations with the West. The third scenario considered a darker future, in which Russian leaders accepted a higher degree of risk to manage mounting problems at home and abroad, leading to sustained confrontation with the West and the further detachment of the Russian government from its people. These scenarios were being prepared for publication when Russian president Vladimir Putin launched a renewed invasion of Ukraine on February 24 and ushered in a period of deep uncertainty for European and global affairs. Almost immediately, Russia’s act of aggression turned the country into a global pariah, triggering international sanctions far beyond the Kremlin’s expectations and consolidating transatlantic unity to an extent that was difficult to imagine in the tense months immediately preceding the invasion. As orthodoxies have been challenged and expectations reconsidered, contingencies that were thought impossible—from embargoes of Russian hydrocarbons to the potential use of nuclear weapons by the Kremlin—are starting to feature into conversations among policymakers and analysts.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Development, Economics, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

30. Space Threat Assessment 2022

Author:: Todd Harrison, Kaitlyn Johnson, Makena Young, Nicholas Wood, and Alyssa Goessler
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Welcome to the fifth edition of Space Threat Assessment by the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Over the past five years, this assessment has used open-source information to track the developments of counterspace weapons that threaten U.S. national security interests in space. The United States has relied heavily on its space infrastructure since the first satellites were launched to track and monitor nuclear missile launches during the Cold War. Over the past six decades, the United States has grown more reliant on the information, situational awareness, and connectivity provided by military, civil, and commercial space systems. It should be no surprise that these assets are a target for adversaries attempting to gain asymmetric military advantage. The Space Threat Assessment is critical to understanding the changing nature of the space domain and monitoring trends in space and counterspace weapons.
Topic:: Security, Military Strategy, Governance, and Space
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

31. CSIS European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues

Author:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The European Trilateral Track 2 Nuclear Dialogues, organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in partnership with the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), have convened senior nuclear policy experts from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States (P3) for the past 13 years to discuss nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation policy issues. By identifying areas of consensus, the group seeks to improve collaboration and cooperation among the three nations across a range of challenging nuclear policy concerns. The majority of the experts are former U.S., UK, and French senior officials; the others are well-known academics in the field. Since the Dialogues’ inception, currently serving senior officials from all three governments have also routinely participated in the discussions. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France hold common values and principles directed toward a shared purpose of sustaining global peace and security, as well as an understanding of their respective roles as responsible stewards of the nuclear order. While each of the three nations has unique perspectives and policies regarding nuclear issues and the nature of today’s security environment, as the three nuclear weapons states in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance, they play a unique and enduring role in the stewardship of international alliances and partnerships, especially in matters of nuclear deterrence, nonproliferation and arms control. In 2021, the group’s discussion addressed a range of growing challenges in the international security environment and beyond, prompting the group’s Track 2 participants to issue this statement reflecting their consensus after two rounds of meetings (one virtual and one in person). Moreover, recent events in Ukraine, including Russia’s violent cross-border aggression, endangerment of nuclear power sites, and blatant nuclear saber-rattling drive home the inescapable risks of war that occurs under a nuclear shadow and the enduring importance of close collaboration and solidarity of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France as responsible nuclear weapons states and NATO alliance members. All signatories agree to this statement in their personal capacities, which may not represent the views of their respective organizations.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe

32. Defense Acquisition Trends 2021

Author:: Gregory Sanders, Won Joon Jang, and Alexander Holderness
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Defense Acquisition Trends 2021 is the latest in an annual series of reports examining trends in what the DoD is buying, how the DoD is buying it, and from whom the DoD is buying using data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). This report analyzes the current state of affairs in defense acquisition by combining detailed policy and data analysis to provide a comprehensive overview of the current and future outlook for defense acquisition. It provides critical insights into understanding the current trends in the defense-industrial base and the implications of those trends on acquisition policy.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, Military Strategy, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

33. Beyond Foreign Military Sales: Opportunities to Enhance Japan-U.S. Defense Industrial Cooperation

Author:: Takashi Kodaira
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The security environment in the Indo-Pacific region is becoming increasingly severe due to China’s growing military power. Further cooperation between the Japanese and U.S. defense industries will strengthen deterrence, although Japan’s defense industry is currently in a difficult situation, with domestic procurement stagnating. For Japan to fully take advantage of its role in the U.S.-Japan alliance, it must maintain and strengthen the defense industry through defense industrial cooperation with the United States. This report examines trend lines in Japan’s defense industrial strategy and potential avenues for bilateral cooperation to enhance capabilities critical to managing complex security challenges facing the U.S.-Japan alliance.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, Military Strategy, Defense Industry, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

34. Measuring Congressional Impact on Defense Acquisition Funding

Author:: Seamus P. Daniels and Todd Harrison
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Congress exercises its oversight authority on the executive branch’s defense policy via the appropriations process and can choose to match, modify, or eliminate the Department of Defense’s (DoD) requested funding levels for acquisition programs primarily funded by the procurement and research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) accounts. Congress’s decisions in this process can have a significant impact on the executive branch’s defense plans by making adjustments to acquisition projects’ program of record. This in turn can force DoD program management teams to alter schedules and contracting actions, causing second-order effects on private sector partners in the acquisition process. To measure Congress’s impact on defense acquisition funding, this study compares the actual funding level for procurement and RDT&E accounts with the original level proposed in the administration’s budget request and identifies patterns in which accounts are regularly adjusted by Congress. It assesses procurement and RDT&E accounts between fiscal year (FY) 2001 and FY 2020 and conducts data cuts of acquisition funding at the account, category, military department, and budget activity levels. This analysis ultimately aims to inform defense planners, acquisition officials and program managers, and industry partners of trends in congressional appropriations for defense so they can better anticipate Congress’s impact on defense acquisition funding.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Legislation, Defense Industry, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

35. How Will a Revival of the JCPOA Affect Regional Politics and Iranian Militias?

Author:: Munqith Dagher
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The news about the imminent revival of the nuclear deal between the United States and Iran is heightening concerns, especially across the Middle East. The deal would involve the lifting of economic sanctions, resulting in Iran enjoying a significant flow of income. This analysis attempts to address two important questions: First, free of the U.S. sanctions, will Iran indeed decide to increase its regional influence by funding its regional militias? And second, how will Iran’s strategic direction and regional politics change in the near future? This analysis reveals that the geostrategic threats currently facing Iran as a result of its adopted hostile regional policy outweigh the gains from continuing in its current trajectory. In general, despite the long history of conflict, dispute, and mistrust, the region seems to be gearing toward an era of de-escalation. For the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to justify its continued presence, there is a need for its involvement in continuous conflicts, especially since it currently controls more than two-thirds of the Iranian economy. However, this buckling economy itself is now in dire need of renewal and revival to continue Iran’s ability to prop up the regime and all its components.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and JCPOA
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

36. Battle Networks and the Future Force

Author:: Todd Harrison and Christopher Reid
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: This CSIS brief is the third in a series on the future of battle networks and Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2). The first brief in the series examined the importance of battle networks to modern military operations and presented a framework of five functional elements that make up a battle network. The second brief used lessons learned from previous attempts to improve battle network integration to explore how the Department of Defense (DoD) can properly scope the problem it is trying to solve and organize itself to effectively and efficiently acquire the systems needed to realize its vision for JADC2. This brief focuses on the importance of integrating allies and partners into future battle networks, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region. It explores existing agreements, opportunities for new agreements, and the technical and policy challenges for battle network integration across allied and partner nations. It concludes with an assessment of how combined battle networks with allies and partners can serve as the key enabling technology toward a new offset strategy.
Topic:: Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Indo-Pacific

37. U.S. Military Forces in FY 2022: Peering into the Abyss

Author:: Mark F. Cancian
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: CSIS senior adviser Mark Cancian annually produces a series of white papers on U.S. military forces, including their composition, new initiatives, long-term trends, and challenges. This report is a compilation of these papers. It takes a deep look at each military service, as well as special operations forces, DOD civilians, and contractors in the FY 2022 budget. This report also discusses the debate about legacy equipment, the interaction of the budget and force size, and the decline in force size that the services face with retiring older systems without adequate replacements.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Defense Industry, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

38. Russia’s Losing Hand in Ukraine

Author:: Seth G. Jones, Philip G. Wasieleswki, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The United States and its partners and allies should be prepared to conduct a sustained diplomatic, economic, military, and humanitarian campaign that supports Ukraine and raises the financial and military costs for Moscow of meddling in Ukraine—both now and in the future. Russia has several weaknesses that can be exploited, and Ukrainian nationalism and Western resolve could present formidable, long-term problems for Moscow.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

39. The United States’ Soft War with Iran

Author:: Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Iran is engaged in a soft war, or jang-e narm, with the United States. Iran uses formal and informal means to influence populations across the globe and has expanded its information campaign utilizing the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, cultural centers, universities, and charitable foundations. But Iran’s authoritarian political system and attempts to control access to information make it vulnerable to a U.S. and Western information campaign. Iran’s weaknesses suggest that a major component of U.S. competition with Tehran should be ideological.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, Ideology, and Disinformation
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

40. NATO: Going From the 2% Non-Solution to Meaningful Planning

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: As the Secretary General’s Annual Report for 2018 makes clear, NATO has many productive initiatives underway that focus on its real security needs, and that will help deter Russia and deal with the key issues in its military readiness and force planning. In fact, some 90% of the Secretary General’s report focuses on such issues. At the same time, NATO does not issue any net assessments of the balance between NATO and Russia and its capability to deter and fight. It does not openly address any of the many national problems and issues in current force structure nation-by-nation strength and readiness, and it has no coherent force and modernization plans for the future.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Military Spending, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

41. Space Force or Space Corps?

Author:: Kaitlyn Johnson
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: In 2018, President Trump requested that the U.S. military restructure its space offices and personnel to create a U.S. Space Force. Since then three competing visions for how the Department of Defense (DoD) should be restructured to better support its national security space enterprise have been crafted: one from the DoD itself and two from either chamber of Congress. This brief compares these three legislative proposals to create a new military service for space.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Space, and Space Force
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

42. Tell Me How This Ends: Military Advice, Strategic Goals, and the “Forever War” in Afghanistan

Author:: Mark F. Cancian
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: When the United States invaded Afghanistan after the attacks on September 11, 2001, and then overthrew the Taliban regime, senior military officers were not predicting that the United States would be militarily involved 18 years later. Yet, after expending nearly $800 billion and suffering over 2,400 killed, the United States is still there, having achieved at best a stalemate. This CSIS report concludes that the mission in Afghanistan expanded from a limited focus on counterterrorism to a broad nation-building effort without discussion about the implications for the duration and intensity of the military campaign. This expansion occurred without considering the history of Afghanistan, the Soviet experience, and the decades-long effort required in successful nation-building efforts. The report makes a series of recommendations: improving the dialogue between senior military and civilian officials about desired goals/end states and the implied intensity/duration of a military campaign; continuing the development of military strategists; revising military doctrine publications to include discussion of choices about goals/end states; and taking more seriously the history and experience of others.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

43. Creating a Real Peace in Afghanistan

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: It has been a long, grim war since the first U.S. troops appeared in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. The fighting has now lasted close to 18 years, and the conflict has become one of the worst managed wars in American history. The effort to reinvent Afghan government as a functioning democracy has so far been an unstable nightmare mixing corruption and uncertain central leadership with power brokers, ex-warlords, and divided leadership. Efforts at economic growth and reform have fallen far short of their goals, vast sums have been wasted or lost through corruption, and the current Afghan economy now survives on the basis of outside aid and domestic narcotics exports. Major security efforts have at best produced an uncertain stalemate and one where the Afghan government increasingly seems to be losing control in the countryside in order to maintain its hold on major population centers. Three different Presidents have made major errors in overall strategy. President Bush gave priority to Iraq at the cost of giving the Afghan war proper attention and providing adequate forces to deal with the return of the Taliban. President Obama first authorized a surge — which wasted major resources in Helmand — and then called for a premature U.S. withdrawal based on totally unrealistic goals for Afghan force development. President Trump has adopted a strategy which has no clear political or economic element, and is unclear as to whether the U.S. is willing to keep supporting Afghan government military efforts or is giving priority to peace more as part of an effort to withdraw U.S. forces than to achieve a lasting and meaningful peace settlement. This report addresses the options for staying in Afghanistan, for reaching a cosmetic or real form of peace, and for some form of unilateral withdrawal. It describes the challenges in each area: the current stalemate in conflict and the debate over Afghan Government versus Taliban control, the critical problems in Afghan governance, the weaknesses in the Afghan economy, and the many remaining challenges in creating Afghan forces that can stand on their own. It addresses the challenges in cutting or removing U.S. land and air forces. Finally, it addresses critical problems in assessing and costing the current level of U.S. involvement in the war, and in estimating the future cost of supporting a peace or continuing the fighting.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Public Opinion, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, Asia, Vietnam, North America, and United States of America

44. China’s New 2019 Defense White Paper

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: For all the furor over Iran and the Gulf, or Britain and Brexit, the most important foreign news of the month is what would normally be a relatively obscure Chinese official document: China’s National Defense in the New Era. This White Paper was issued on July 22nd in both Chinese and English. Unlike China’s previous defense white papers — the most recent of which came out in 2015 and was blandly reassuring to the point of being vacuous — the new White Paper picks up the gauntlet that the U.S. threw down in its 2017 National Security Strategy and in 2018 National Defense Strategy. Both of these documents effectively made China the key objective in strengthening U.S. military forces and single it out as America’s primary strategic competitor. China’s National Defense in the New Era is a clear and detailed 51-page response to the massive shift in U.S. strategy from a focus on counterterrorism and extremism to competition and possible conflict with China and Russia. It flags the fact that America and China are now competing superpowers, and that China’s growing military forces are developing to the point where they will be able to challenge the United States. More than that, the detailed contents of the White Paper are a direct response to the official U.S. reports on Chinese Military Power issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Intelligence, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

45. ‘Peace’ in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: In fairness, peace almost always consists of a pause in the fighting that becomes a prelude to war. Taking modern Europe as an example, the Napoleonic wars were punctuated by failed peace attempts, and then led to the rise of Germany and a whole new series of wars with Austria, Denmark, and France. The repressive peace settlements following Europe’s upheavals in 1848 set the stage for decades of new rounds of conflict and revolution. World War I led to World War II, and then led to the Cold War and now to the Ukraine. Nevertheless, the current U.S. efforts to support peace negotiations in Afghanistan and the Middle East seem remarkably weak even by historical standards. In the case of Afghanistan, “peace” is being negotiated without even the same cosmetic level of local government participation that occurred in Vietnam. It is being negotiated when there is no political stability to build upon, and no apparent prospect that the coming election can bring real unity or effective leadership.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Africa, Iraq, Middle East, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Gulf Nations

46. Achilles’ Heel: Adding Resilience to NATO’s Fragile Missile Shield

Author:: Ian Williams
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Tensions with Iran are once again increasing. The slow implosion of the nuclear accord, Iran’s harassment of cargo ships, and the downing of a U.S. unmanned aircraft have made plain the risk of conflict between Iran and the United States. The dispute should also draw attention to the questionable preparedness of the United States and its allies to fight a war with Iran on short notice and deal with that war’s blowback across the Middle East and Europe. Regional missile defense architectures are an important part of that preparedness. Iran has the largest and most diverse supply of ballistic missiles in the Middle East region, and Tehran has shown an ability and willingness to use them in combat operations.1 Iran is also learning to employ other kinds of aerial threats, such as long-range cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In a conflict with Iran, U.S. and allied forces would likely face a wide spectrum of air and missile threats. The biggest U.S. investment in Iran-centric missile defenses has been the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). EPAA is a phased buildup of U.S. missile defense assets in and around Europe to deter and, if necessary, limit damage from an Iranian missile attack on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Yet the EPAA architecture is heavily dependent on the nominal, unencumbered performance of a single radar deployed relatively close to Iran. This produces a single point of failure susceptible to malfunction or operator error. It also presents an Achilles’ heel that a determined or imaginative adversary could exploit. Iran certainly fits both descriptors. In 1958, strategist Albert Wohlstetter wrote that U.S. confidence in its nuclear second-strike ability was achieved only by “ignoring the full range of sensible enemy plans.”2 This same critical judgment should be applied to confidence in the EPAA as currently configured. Inasmuch as a sensible adversary such as Iran relies upon its missile forces to achieve its defense goals, it should be credited with the foresight to target single points of failure that would preclude the effective application of that missile force. Fortunately, there are practical steps that NATO and the United States can take to further adapt EPAA for greater resiliency. Upgrades to existing radars, the integration of allied radars into the missile defense mission, and the addition of air and space-based sensors would do much to improve EPAA’s capability and survivability, improving U.S. and NATO preparedness for an unexpected Middle East conflict.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, North Atlantic, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

47. Acquisition of Software-Defined Hardware-Based Adaptable Systems

Author:: Maura Rose McQuade, Andrew Philip Hunter, and Schuyler Moore
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The increasing importance of software has created an opportunity for the Department of Defense (DoD) to harness innovation through the acquisition and modification of adaptable systems that are 1) inherently multifunctional and 2) designed for continuous modification. Identifying an acquisition approach to these types of adaptable systems that are software-defined and hardware-intensive is particularly challenging from an acquisition perspective as these systems do not fall into typical acquisition phases that discretely differentiate between phases such as research & development and production. However, there are several existing enablers that, if adopted, can mitigate barriers to the acquisition of adaptable systems.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Infrastructure, and Innovation
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

48. The State of the Fighting in the Afghan War in Mid-2019

Author:: Anthony H Cordesman
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The Afghan War has entered a critical period in which the U.S. is actively seeking a peace settlement with the Taliban, and doing so in spite of the fact that it is negotiating without the full participation of the Afghan government. Peace is a highly uncertain option. There are no official descriptions of the terms of the peace that the Administration is now seeking to negotiate, but media reports indicate that it may be considering a full withdrawal within a year of a ceasefire, and other reports indicate that it is considering a 50% cut in U.S. military personnel even if a peace is not negotiated. As of mid-August 2019, the Taliban has continued to reject any formal peace negotiations with the Afghan government, and has steadily stepped up its military activity and acts of violence while it negotiates with the United States. Terrorist groups like ISIS-K add to the threat, as do the many splits within the Afghani government and political structure. The Taliban has not encouraged further ceasefires, or shown any clear willingness to accept a lasting peace on any terms but its own. It may well see peace negotiations as a means of negotiating a withdrawal of U.S. and other allied forces and a prelude to a peace that it could exploit to win control of Afghanistan. At the same time, major uncertainties also exist regarding continuing support for the war. Some press reports indicate the Administration is seeking a 50% reduction in active U.S. military manpower in country by the end of 2019 or some point in mid-2020 regardless of whether a peace settlement is reached. Some members of Congress have called for major U.S. force cuts and shown only a limited willingness to keep up U.S. support of the Afghan government and forces if peace negotiations do not succeed. Much depends on current trends in the war, and the extent to which the Afghan Government or the Taliban are winning control and influence over the country. Much also depends on the degree to which the Afghan government forces can stand on their own if a peace negotiation leads to the withdrawal of U.S. and Resolute support forces, or if the U.S. makes major further force cuts.
Topic:: Development, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

49. The Civil Challenges to Peace in Afghanistan

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The Afghan War has entered a critical period in which the U.S. is actively seeking a peace settlement with the Taliban, and doing so in spite of the fact that it is negotiating without the full participation of the Afghan government. Its options now consist of finding some form of peace, leaving the country without any form of victory or security, or fighting indefinitely in a country whose central government has no near or mid-term capability to either defeat its opponents or survive without massive military and civil aid. Peace is a highly uncertain option. There are no official descriptions of the terms of the peace that the Administration is now seeking to negotiate, but media reports indicate that it may be considering a full withdrawal of its military support within one to two years of a ceasefire, and other reports indicate that it is considering a 50% cut in U.S. military personnel even if a peace is not negotiated. As of late-August 2019, the Taliban continued to reject any formal peace negotiations with the Afghan government, and its military activity and acts of violence while it negotiated with the United States. Terrorist groups like ISIS-K add to the threat, as do the many splits within the Afghani government and political structure. The Taliban has not encouraged further ceasefires, or shown any clear willingness to accept a lasting peace on any terms but its own. It may well see peace negotiations as a means of negotiating a withdrawal of U.S. and other allied forces and a prelude to a peace that it could exploit to win control of Afghanistan. At the same time, the other options are no better. They either mean leaving without a peace and the near certain collapse of the Afghan government, or continuing the war indefinitely with no clear timeframe for victory or the emergence of an Afghan government that can fight on its own or act as an effective civil government. Much of the analysis of these three options has focused on the possible terms of the peace, the immediate progress in the fighting, and/or the coming Afghan election and Afghanistan’s immediate political problems. These are all important issues, but they do not address the basic problems in Afghan security forces that will limit its military capabilities indefinitely into the future, or the scale of the civil problems in Afghanistan that have given it failed governance and made it the equivalent of a failed state, and that will shape its future in actually implementing any peace or in attempting to continue the war.
Topic:: Civil Society, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Peace
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

50. The Return of ISIS in Iraq, Syria, and the Middle East

Author:: Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: The U.S., its European allies, and its Strategic Partners in the Middle East achieved a significant victory in breaking up the ISIS protostate – or “caliphate” – in Syria and Iraq. This break up has sharply reduced the fighting against ISIS in Iraq, and in Eastern Syria. The U.S.-led Coalition did not, however, fully defeat ISIS in either Iraq or Syria or eliminate ISIS and other forms of extremism as serious threats. It did not bring lasting stability to Iraq or end the Syrian civil war, and it did not eliminate the threat from ISIS and other extremist groups in the rest of the MENA area. This analysis covers two important aspects of the crisis in Iraq and Syria since the break of the “caliphate.” First, it summarizes key official reporting on the resurgence of ISIS as a serious threat in both Syria and Iraq. Second, it puts ISIS in perspective – showing that it did not dominate the violence and levels of terrorism in Syria even at its peak, and noting that ISIS is only one of the major threats to stability in Iraq.
Topic:: Terrorism, Military Strategy, ISIS, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS