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1. Use it or Lose it: Corporate Over-Planning in the Air Force

Author:
Ross Fetterly
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The Canadian government allocates funds to departments through the annual federal budgetary process. With a Department of National Defence (DND) budget in the fiscal year 2019-20 of close to $22 billion,2 and expenditures spread out across a broad range of very different and distinct activities, expending the full allocation can be a significant challenge. While federal departments are permitted some carry-forward of eligible lapsing funds from one fiscal year to the next, in fiscal year 2018-19 the amount designated was up to five per cent of the operating budgets in their Main Estimates.3 With the federal government projecting significant budgetary deficits in the coming years, restricting or eliminating carry-forward of funding may be limited or eliminated to reduce deficits. Past practice within the department has been for the Investment Resource Management Committee (IRMC), chaired by the deputy minister, to decide on funding allocations of the carry-forward, based on departmental corporate priorities. While from an institutional perspective that aligns funding with optimal funding requirements, the consequence to organizations such as the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) is that only a limited amount of lapsed funding may be allocated the following fiscal year. Thus, the air force has a significant incentive regarding its budget: to “use it or lose it”.4 RCAF corporate over-planning (COP) is a principal in-year strategy to maximize the use of allocated financial resources. Yet, at the operational and tactical level, the concept and application of in-year over-planning is not sufficiently understood. This paper will frame over-planning within the context of the RCAF and then recommend strategies to integrate over-planning into the air force culture. Corporate over-planning is essentially a means toward an end; specifically, that of maximizing output given by defined resource allocation. The paper will first consider defence planning approaches and budget allocations, and then consider the strategic environment within which the organization operates. The third section will emphasize the need for change in how the RCAF manages financial resources, followed by a section on adapting to change. The fifth section will review the concept of over-planning. That will be followed by a discussion of RCAF institutional corporate over-planning. The seventh section will consider budgeting as communication and how this supports maintenance of a common operating picture within the RCAF on over-planning. The final section will focus on RCAF corporate over-planning by discussing the structural unexpended rate, applying an absorption rate in operations and maintenance activities, and planning investment opportunities.
Topic:
Government, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Budget
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

2. Enabling NATO for 21st Century Operations: Fielding Agile, Responsive and Innovative Reserve Forces

Author:
Howard Coombs
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Canada has built on the findings of the Netherlands’ report, Lessons Learned from Commitment of Reservists in Operations (LLRO), and provided an overview of NATO ability for the international deployment of reservists by specifically examining the pre-deployment phase of operations. Through both national questionnaires and research, Canada has collected, analyzed and communicated key observations and lessons from NATO NRFC member and partner nations to address the institutional support and structures required to set the conditions for the force generation and successful deployment of capable, multi-purpose, integrated reserve forces. This has resulted in a comparative analysis of the triad of military, family and employer support that enhances the deployment of NATO reservists prior to operations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

3. Defence Procurement Canada: Opportunities and Constraints

Author:
Jeff Collins
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Substantive defence issues rarely make national political campaign platforms. However, in the 2019 federal election, reforming the defence procurement bureaucracy to overcome delays became a highlight for not one but two of the country’s main political parties. To “ensure that priority projects are progressing on time and on budget”, the Conservatives called for the creation of a defence procurement secretariat within the Privy Council Office, akin to a model used by the Robert Borden government in the First World War. The winning Liberal party went further and promised to create a separate defence procurement agency, called Defence Procurement Canada (DPC). As of this writing, details remain sparse, but as with the Conservatives, the ostensible purpose of such a reform is to ensure that “Canada’s biggest and most complex defence procurement projects are delivered on time and with greater transparency …” Considering that the government’s own defence white paper, 2017’s Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) found that 70 per cent of all defence procurement projects were not delivered on time, the existing bureaucratic process warrants a serious look. In fact, a substantial shake-up of the Canadian defence procurement bureaucracy has not taken place since the last separate procurement organization, the Department of Defence Production (DDP), was abolished in 1969. Arguments for altering the bureaucratic architecture of Canadian defence procurement have ebbed and flowed since the mid-2000s, when the first of successive governments began acquisition plans for replacing decades-old fleets of equipment, including CF-18 jets, Protecteur-class auxiliary oiler replenishment ships, Halifax-class frigates and Iroquois-class destroyers. With much publicized delays in these and other major Crown projects (MCPs), reform advocates have drawn attention to Canada’s multi-departmental procurement process as a source of frustration. Unique among allies, Canada relies principally upon three departments – National Defence (DND), Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) and Innovation, Science and Economic Development (ISED) – for acquiring MCPs. Other countries typically rely on one of three approaches to acquiring material for their armed forces: procurement by individual armed services (United States); centralized government organizations (United Kingdom) or independent civilian corporations (Sweden). Although it is not clear whether the Liberal proposal is a new department (akin to the DDP), a Crown corporation or an agency under the DND’s auspices, any restructuring of the defence procurement system will not be easy. No matter what shape it takes, any new organization must deal with rearranging a complex set of institutional realities based on decades’ worth of statutes, policy frameworks and human resources allocations. Political realties still apply, too. Any new organization must contend with Canadian procurement politics, including the impact of new governments, differing priorities, regionalism and purchasing patterns.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Politics, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

4. Breaking the Ice Curtain? Russia, Canada, and Arctic Security in a Changing Circumpolar World

Author:
P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Suzanne Lalonde, Viatcheslav Gavrilov, P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Alexander Sergunin, Troy Bouffard, Andrea Charron, Jim Fergusson, Robert Huebert, and Suzanne Lalonde
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Book
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Canada and Russia are the geographical giants, spanning most of the circumpolar world. Accordingly, the Arctic is a natural area of focus for the two countries. The region plays strongly into their identity politics, with leaders often invoking sovereignty and security frames to drum up support for investments in this “frontier of destiny.”1 The purported need to protect sovereign territory and resources from foreign encroachment or outright theft, backed by explicit appeals to nationalism, can produce a siege mentality that encourages a narrow, inward-looking view. Although the end of the Cold War seemed to portend a new era of deep cooperation between these two Arctic countries, lingering wariness about geopolitical motives and a mutual lack of knowledge about the other’s slice of the circumpolar world are conspiring to pit Canada and the Russian Federation as Arctic adversaries. Are Russian and Canadian Arctic policies moving in confrontational direction? Can efforts at circumpolar cooperation survive the current crisis in Russian-Western relations, or does an era of growing global competition point inherently to heightened Arctic conflict?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Sovereignty, International Security, Territorial Disputes, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Canada, North America, and Arctic

5. The Global Exchange (Spring 2018)

Author:
Adam Frost, David J. Bercuson, Andrew Rasiulis, Ross Fetterly, Lindsay Rodman, Lindsay Coombs, Stephen M. Saideman, Eugene Lang, David Perry, Alan Stephenson, Ian Mack, Adam Lajeunesse, Charity Weeden, and David Higgins
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Global Exchange
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
“Canada is a fireproof house, far from inflammable materials.” These were the naïve words of Canadian Senator Raoul Dandurand during his 1924 address to the League of Nations. Ironically, his speech took place between the two most devastating global conflicts in human history, and Canada was an active belligerent in both. However misguided Dandurand’s statement may have been, its sentiment has been woven into Canadian psyche by virtue of geographic reality. Canadians enjoy the privilege of a tremendously productive relationship with the United States, which remains the global hegemon. With geographical ties, Canadians and Americans also share a common history and broad cultural kinship. The strength of this relationship has afforded Canada a degree of security that would otherwise be unattainable, which affects Canadians’ perception of national security. It is an exceptional privilege of circumstance that defence is not required to be frequently in the forefront of public dialogue. However, while it is unlikely Canada will be confronted with an existential threat in the foreseeable future, it would be foolhardy for Canada to become complacent about preserving the means to defend its national interests when necessary. The 21st century international arena is rife with instability and change. These conditions create uncertainty. Canada’s armed forces are charged with the task of safeguarding and advancing Canada’s national interests when called upon, often in the most challenging of circumstances and environments. In order for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to be successful, the government of the day must adopt and implement pragmatic defence policy, and provide the CAF with the appropriate resources to meet expectations. This issue contends with the questions of how best Canada can enable the CAF to succeed in its assigned tasks, and outlines what some of those tasks ought to be to defend against contemporary threats in our era of increasing uncertainty. Policy-makers must consider the evolving threat environment in order to enable the CAF to effectively defend Canada’s interests. The proliferation of long-range ballistic missiles and offensive cyber capabilities poses significant threats to Canada and its closest allies. Climate change is also exposing Canada to new challenges in our Arctic territories, creating a growing need for surveillance and governance in the high Arctic to protect Canadian sovereignty. These are only a few of the emerging threats addressed in this issue. For the CAF to be capable of adapting to the multiplex of eventualities that it must be prepared to confront, it requires sufficient personnel and materiel. The mix of skills required in today’s armed forces is very different than in bygone eras. Personnel must also be properly equipped if they are to be effective in their roles. Therefore, recruiting and retaining people with expertise in diverse trades and the efficient and timely procurement of vital equipment are paramount if the CAF is to be a capable, adaptable and effective force.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Budget, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and United States of America

6. The Dragon and Great Power Rivalry at the Top of the World: China’s Hawkish, Revisionist Voices Within Mainstream Discourse on Arctic Affairs

Author:
David Curtis Wright
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
This paper discusses China’s Arctic policy white paper, covers China’s appreciation of the region’s strategic value, and samples scholarly articles across the wide spectrum of opinion and policy recommendation regarding China’s participation in Arctic affairs. It describes the articles, offers translated segments from them, and refers readers who want to read more about the articles and more extensive translated passages from them to the Appendix, where they are included in fuller form. This paper’s main contention and conclusion is that the military and strategic dimensions of China’s interests in the Arctic are part and parcel of mainstream Chinese discourse on the Arctic today. One important motivation behind China’s burgeoning interest and engagement in Arctic affairs is the eventual utilisation of the region as strategic space from which to threaten the security of North America. China’s activities in the Arctic bear close, careful, and continuous scrutiny. It is imperative that Canada not succumb to the siren song of complacency and inaction regarding China’s ambitions in the Arctic region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Power Politics, Military Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and Arctic

7. The Global Exchange (Fall 2017)

Author:
Colin Robertson, David J. Bercuson, Julian Lindley-French, Yves Brodeur, Ian Brodie, Andrea Charron, Andrew Rasilius, Richard Cohen, Rolf Holmboe, Lindsay Rodman, and Ariel Shapiro
Publication Date:
09-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Global Exchange
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The Global Exchange is the Canadian Global Affairs Institute’s quarterly magazine featuring topical articles written by our fellows and other contributing experts. Each issue contains approximately a dozen articles exploring political and strategic challenges in international affairs and Canadian foreign and defence policy. This Fall 2017 issue focuses on NATO.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Treaties and Agreements, Military Affairs, Economy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Canada, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

8. The Dispatch (Summer 2016)

Author:
David J. Bercuson, Stefanie Von Hlatky, Thomas Juneau, Barry Cooper, Candice Malcolm, Paul Dewar, Ferry de Kerckhove, Colin Robertson, Glenn Davidson, Paul Durand, Thomas Keenan, Andrew Rasiulis, and Hugh Stephens
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Global Exchange
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The Dispatch (later called The Global Exchange) is the Canadian Global Affairs Institute’s quarterly magazine featuring topical articles written by our fellows and other contributing experts. Each issue contains approximately a dozen articles exploring political and strategic challenges in international affairs and Canadian foreign and defence policy. This Summer 2016 issue includes articles on immigration, defense policy, arms deals and more.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Immigration, Military Affairs, Weapons, Arms Trade, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Canada, Taiwan, South America, Saudi Arabia, and North America

9. The Royal Canadian Navy: Facing Rough Seas

Author:
Robert Huebert
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Recently the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) has received significant media attention, much of it negative. This has been caused by a series of mishaps that have highlighted some of the very serious challenges that the Navy is facing. The fire aboard HMCS Protecteur, which ultimately resulted in the retirement of both of the Canadian replenishment vessels, along with two of the three remaining Destroyers, have brought a significant amount of negative attention to the RCN. There are serious questions being asked about the future direction that the Navy will move in as difficult decisions are made (or not made) about its future. But not all is as bleak as the media reports indicate. The mid-life refit of the Halifax-class frigates is proceeding on schedule and in some instances ahead of schedule. Construction has finally begun on the Canadian Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships. The purpose of this paper is to consider and assess some of the major challenges that are now facing the Royal Canadian Navy. Is the Navy really sinking or is it only facing rough seas? While space limits make it impossible to consider all of the institutional, strategic, operational and tactical issues and challenges now facing the RCN, it is possible to examine how the Royal Canadian Navy has been able to respond to the need to rebuild. What can be learnt by the actions of the Canadian government and the Canadian Forces as they respond to the current need to rebuild most of the existing fleet?
Topic:
Military Affairs, Navy, and Seapower
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

10. The Asia-Pacific and the Royal Canadian Navy

Author:
Eric Lerhe
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Over the past five years, there have been repeated academic and media calls for greater Canadian engagement in the Asia-Pacific, with the Royal Canadian Navy taking the lead. Such engagement, it was claimed, was needed to reflect Canada’s increasing economic links, rapidly-growing personal ties to the area, and the deteriorating security climate, especially in the South China Sea. Despite government claims that Canada “gets it” as to the importance of the region, little of consequence has occurred and our Navy’s Atlantic dominance remains. For this and other reasons, Canada is now widely considered “absent” from the region. This paper argues that this cannot safely continue as both our security and our access to the rapidly growing Pacific economies will be at risk. The paper then examines our history in the area, the 2011 U.S. “Pacific pivot,” our own weak “mini pivot,” and the current security situation before providing detailed recommendations for greater Canadian naval engagement.
Topic:
International Affairs, Military Affairs, and Navy
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, Asia-Pacific, United States of America, and South China Sea

11. No, But Yes. Military Intervention in the New Era: Implications for the Canadian Armed Forces

Author:
Bernd Horn
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The current complexity, ambiguity and chaos in the contemporary operating environment creates, for most national governments and their militaries, difficulty in adequately understanding, coping and responding to the myriad of security concerns. The challenge is normally one of scope and viable options. Canada is no different. Both the Government and the Canadian public are war-weary from over a decade of savage insurgency in Afghanistan. Further, the dire international economic situation has necessitated fiscal austerity measures that have had a significant impact on the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). As a result, the Government is reluctant, if not downright opposed, to any form of military intervention that may lead to becoming embroiled in another long drawn-out conflict with ground forces that will create a drain on national blood and treasure. Therefore, there is a tendency to say “No” to military intervention. Yet, for the government to maintain its status and influence with Allies, friends and global partners, it cannot be so naïve. It must do its share of “heavy lifting” with regard to ensuring world stability and security. As such, this article examines the necessity for the CAF, which will find itself squeezed by the fiscal necessity of the times, to simultaneously deliver relevant, strategic expeditionary capabilities that can quickly deploy and that will allow the Canadian government to maintain its credibility as a reliable ally and global partner.
Topic:
Insurgency, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Canada, and North America

12. Championing the Joint Force: a Job for the Public and our Political Leaders – Not Just Military Professionals Alone

Author:
Stuart Beare
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Canada’s security interests and the mission of our Armed Forces – to defend Canada, defend North America and promote peace and security abroad – largely remains unchanged and timeless. The nature of the security environment, however, has not – nor will it be in the years to come. An effective and relevant Canadian Armed Forces will continue to require capable, well-equipped and operationally ready maritime, air and land forces, which are largely raised and trained within our Army, Navy and Air Force. But in order for defence to remain relevant and effective in an era of increased instability, volatility and unpredictability, our Armed Forces need an increased understanding of what is going on and preparedness for what is to come. This is the business of our military’s Joint Force – those that include and that go beyond the tactical units that the services provide. Joint organizations and networks generate intelligence, provide understanding and lead the partnering, planning, force-posturing and practicing that is essential to anticipating, preparing for and conducting operations, particularly in a world of unrelenting complexity. A decade after former Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier’s extraordinary initiatives to transform our Armed Forces from a service-centric, machine-age force to one focused on the business of operations, which thinks and acts as Canadian Forces (joint) first, we see evidence of real progress in the approach to joint operations. There is also an improved appreciation of our military’s joint functions and capabilities. Unlike the political and public calls for strong services and the modernization of their major platforms, however, this progress has been realized largely through efforts internal to the Armed Forces themselves. The initiative has been without political leadership and external policy top-cover, rendering it vulnerable and reversible. This paper describes the functions of the Joint Force, advocates for the capabilities required to enable partnerships, enhance understanding and advance mission preparedness, and calls for unified leadership of the joint domain and over our military’s joint culture. Our traditional international partners have travelled this road. They too see that clarity on joint functions, joint capability, joint domain leadership and stewardship over joint culture are vital to the military’s relevance and operational effectiveness. This is also critical to its agility and flexibility in the years to come. Their progress is the result of internal professional transformation, as well as the requirement by political leaders and modern defence policy to make this so. Here in Canada, the forming of a new government this autumn calls for a new look at defence policy, providing an opportunity to invite that same political leadership and influence. Joint functions, joint capabilities and clear joint leadership are vital to our military’s relevance to, and effectiveness in, our national defence and operations. A Joint Force and the joint domain, like a strong and capable Army, Navy and Air Force, need to be led, resourced and fully engaged before planes fly, ships sail and troops deploy. Joint-ness requires external understanding and proponents, and, within the Forces, a clearly identifiable champion. In Canada, however, these range from ambiguous to absent.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

13. Canada and Asia: Prosperity and Security

Author:
Marius Grinius
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Arguably the mid-1990s were Canada’s “Golden Age of Asia”, highlighted by the Team Canada trade visits by Prime Minister Jean Chretien and the provincial Premiers to China, India, Pakistan and Japan, as well as to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand. At the same time Canada played a prominent role in Asian security matters. This included Canadian expert participation in multilateral discussions on the South China Sea and in the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, a Canadian initiative. That particular Golden Age culminated with the Government proclaiming 1997 as “Canada’s Year of Asia Pacific”. Trade statistics indicate that Canada has once again rediscovered Asia, at least in terms of commercial prospects. What is less clear, however, is Canada’s commitment to the security and stability challenges that Asia continues to face. Notwithstanding all of the positive indicators of economic success in the Asia-Pacific region and all of the incentives for even greater prosperity within a predictable and peaceful environment, there are still many instances of potential military conflict that could jeopardize Asia’s economic successes. While Canada has considerable economic interests in Asia Pacific, its security record there is modest. Now, when China is our number two trading partner and Japan is number three, when we have our first Asian Free Trade Agreement, when we are looking to closer economic ties with the Asia-Pacific region, it would make sense for Canada to contribute more substantially to Asia Pacific’s long-term stability and security architecture. It has in the past. Canada has expressed its desire to join the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Forum. It appears, however, that ASEAN is still not quite convinced of Canada’s commitment to Southeast Asia, or to Asia, and continues politely to stall until such time as Canada can show a serious, long-term track record of participation in ASEAN strategic and security priorities. The Asian way requires frequent and consistent face-time. Relationships matter. The regular message from polite ASEAN interlocutors remains the same: where is Canada? From the late 1980s and to about 2006, Canadian academic experts were closely involved in all relevant Asian fora, including the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific and the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue. The Canadian Consortium on Asia Pacific Security, a group of some one hundred researchers across Canada, was highly active in Track II diplomacy (informal, non-governmental and unofficial) on Asian security issues. This included Canadian Law of the Sea experts who addressed South China Sea issues, a ten-year effort co-hosted and funded by Indonesia and CIDA. Government of Canada funding for this type of work, however, has dried up. All current Canadian Track II efforts are funded by private institutions. Just when China is taking an aggressive stance in the South China Sea, Canada is absent. Canada must demonstrate a stronger and more consistent commitment to Asia that goes well beyond the economic-commercial dimension. It must include a robust defence and security dimension. Canada has, for now, chosen to emphasize a mercantile foreign policy. Such an approach, however, must not ignore the need for a strong defence policy anchored within a vigorous foreign policy that is able to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. This applies to Canada’s approach to the Asia-Pacific region as much as to the rest of the world. Neither a “Global Markets Action Plan” nor a separate “Canada First Defence Strategy”, both formulated in a policy vacuum, is sufficient. There is a serious need for a Foreign Policy and complementary Defence Policy review, one where the Asia-Pacific region will be prominent.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Economics, Military Affairs, and Trade
Political Geography:
Canada, Asia, and North America

14. After America, Canada’s Moment?

Author:
Ian Brodie
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The last decade has seen serious setbacks to the global role of the United States. Iraq, Afghanistan and the 2008 economic crisis provoked deep partisan debates about American policy but little in the way of consensus on how to respond. Meanwhile, America’s rivals have gained strength and a new south-south economy of investment and trade has emerged. There is little disagreement that the U.S. has lost its relative power to influence developments around the world. Is this Canada’s moment to extend our global influence? Canada’s privileged geography gives us freedom to choose where and how to engage beyond North America. We have opportunities across the Atlantic and across the Pacific, as evidenced by our simultaneous negotiations at the CETA and TPP tables. But freedom of choice means we have trouble committing to relationships beyond North America. Unlike, say, Australia, which must engage in the Pacific, we face no natural imperative to be “all in” in Asia. Moreover, even though Canada does not have a history as a colonial power, we are often ambivalent about engaging with the new global south. We prefer to deal with emerging economic powers through clubs we already belong to - the G-20, the Commonwealth and the Francophonie. But as south-south institutions displace the influence of the “world America made”, the room for Canada to exercise global influence has declined. We were once welcome as a dependable joiner of international clubs, but we are having trouble joining newer, more dynamic clubs like the Pacific Alliance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Economy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and United States of America