1. Cutting Through Narratives on Chinese Arctic Investments
- Author:
- Anders Christoffer Edstrøm, Guðbjörg Ríkey Th. Hauksdóttir, and P. Whitney Lackenbauer
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- China’s overtures have been met with suspicion in the Arctic states, where some analysts and commentators read nefarious intent into Chinese actions and statements. China’s construction of critical infrastructure and investments in the strategically located and resource-rich Arctic have raised concerns about national security. This is particularly the case in the seven out of eight Arctic states (excluding Russia), all of whom are now members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). What is more, questions abound about the dual-use applicability of Chinese research activities in the region.1 The Arctic is a highly strategic location, and activities here are often framed in geopolitical terms. In an era of intensifying great power competition between the United States and China, this suspicion has generated several core narratives2 about China’s Arctic interests and its engagement with and in the region. Xi Jinping launched China’s Belt and Road Initiative3 (BRI) in 2013. The initiative envisages interconnectivity across the Eurasian continent, primarily from China to Europe. Since then, the project has expanded to other areas of the globe, including the Arctic region. The Arctic region was officially made a part of the Belt and Road Initiative via the Maritime Cooperation Vision statement (“一帶一路”建設海上合作設想).4 Later, China established the Polar Silk Road (冰上丝绸之路) in its 2018 Arctic Policy White Paper5 connecting Asia and Europe through the Arctic Ocean. In the 2018 White Paper, the State Council of the PRC refers to its country as a “Near-Arctic State,” a statement that has remained highly controversial. While the White Paper emphasizes the Chinese government’s commitment to peaceful cooperation in the region, as well as a desire to contribute to Arctic research, protection, and development in accordance with international law, it also articulates Beijing’s aim of increasing its participation and influence in Arctic governance. It further iterates Beijing’s responsibility for maintaining security and stability in the region as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. China became an observer to the Arctic Council in 2013; since then it has contributed to scientific knowledge through research stations and expeditions, invested in Arctic business and competence, engaged in infrastructure projects, traded with Arctic states, and participated in multilateral international agreements such as the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement.6 Chinese Arctic ambitions and activities are contentious. Commentators in the seven Arctic states often frame Chinese investments in an adversarial way, describing Chinese activity in alarmist language in terms of scale, scope, and risk. Analysts have the tendency to mix proposed investments with actual investments. For example, some analysts estimate that Chinese investments in the Arctic top $90 billion7 and call this level of investment “unconstrained.”8 According to one mainstream narrative, China will use this “inflow of investments”9 to increase its influence among Arctic nations by means of debt-trap diplomacy.10 Our research finds that these numbers are highly exaggerated and often mobilized to support a narrative in which China is successfully “buying up” the Arctic region, but that these inflated numbers include unsuccessful investment projects and proposed projects that have not been implemented. To facilitate informed debate and decision-making, this policy paper attempts to outline, although not to summarize, the actual level and state of Chinese ownership in the Circumpolar Arctic. To help illustrate our findings, we present a map displaying geographical locations of investment interests (See Figure 1), containing two further information layers. The first information layer displays the type of known Chinese interests in the Arctic, and the second information layer indicates whether this interest materialized, is paused/in question, or has been cancelled. For further description of our mapping methodology, see Appendix A. We use the term “investment” generously in this brief, including traditional foreign direct investment (FDI) according to established definitions, but also other modes of Chinese economic engagements. We have relied on open-source material in various languages to support our analysis, including Russian, Chinese, English, Icelandic, Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish. For a detailed description of our methodology, see Appendix A. This inclusiveness means that the amount of investments appears larger than with a more restrictive definition of FDI.
- Topic:
- National Security, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, and Critical Infrastructure
- Political Geography:
- China and Arctic