Publishing Institution: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University / Publication Year: within 25 Years and within 5 Years

1. The Offsetting Mechanism in Guangdong Province’s ETS: Lessons Learned and the Way Forward

Author:: Yang Shu
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: As one of the first low-carbon pioneering provinces in China, Guangdong launched its carbon market in 2013. An important design feature of the Guangdong Province emissions trading system (ETS) has been the use of offset credits. This brief, in both Chinese and English, explores the Guangdong ETS’s offset mechanism and its possible future evolution. The brief builds on discussions in an online research workshop on Guangdong Province’s ETS, conducted June 16 – 17, 2021 by the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements and the Research Center for Climate Change, Guangdong University of Technology, directed by Professor Zeng Xuelan. Information on the workshop, including the agenda, participant list, and most presentations, is here. The Harvard Project’s initiative on Guangdong Province’s ETS is supported by Energy Foundation China.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: Asia-Pacific

2. Increasing the Emissions-Reduction Efficiency of Carbon Trading Schemes in China Under the “30.60” Target: Reflection on the Carbon Markets of Guangdong Province, China

Author:: Chen Shaoqing
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Key Points: • Guangdong currently has two pilot carbon-emissions-trading markets (in Shenzhen — and in Guangzhou, for the remainder of Guangdong Province). The Guangdong—Hong Kong—Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA) carbon market will be established in the near future. Therefore, Guangdong Province has regional advantages in innovation in the low-carbon field. • In September 2020, China announced its intention to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. To meet its responsibilities under the “30.60” target, GBA needs to choose a less costly and more efficient way to reduce emissions, build resilience to climate impacts, and promote green economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. • In terms of accounting methods, life-cycle accounting from production and consumption perspectives should be the methodological basis for cities, parks, and enterprises to participate in carbon trading. • Trading activity in China’s carbon markets needs to be increased. In the future, carbon markets can gradually be opened to small and medium-sized enterprises and individuals, and cross-border trade can also be included in carbon trading mechanisms, with proper risk management. • At present, carbon quotas in local pilots and the national market are allocated freely. In the future, a reasonable mix of auctioned allocation and free allocation can be considered to establish a transparent, fair, and dynamic carbon-quota-allocation mechanism. • After starting with the electricity industry, the national carbon market will continue to include other key high-carbon industries; China should seek balanced development between local pilots and the national carbon market to improve the efficiency of emission reduction.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Carbon Emissions, and Air Pollution
Political Geography:: Asia-Pacific

3. Technological Innovation and the Future of Energy Value Chains

Author:: Nicola De Blasio
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The transition from energy systems dominated by fossil fuels1 to ones based on renewable electricity and carbon-free molecules will significantly impact existing value chains2 and forge new pathways and transformation steps from production to consumption. This transition will bring not only substantial cost challenges but also promises to dramatically alter stakeholders’ interactions along value chains. Technological innovation is driving dynamics not seen in the energy sector since the Industrial Revolution, and it will be key to accelerating the transition to a low-carbon economy while sustaining growth and achieving prosperity for all. But as new technologies develop to meet growing energy needs, understanding how these technologies will impact existing energy value chains is crucial for navigating the energy transition successfully. To elucidate these dynamics, we must first identify the key technologies3 driving disruptive change and then understand how their deployment at scale might impact existing value chains or cause new ones to emerge.
Topic:: Environment, Natural Resources, Innovation, Renewable Energy, Value Chains, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:: Global Focus

4. Toward a Better Immigration System: Fixing Immigration Governance at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Author:: Doris Meissner and Ruth Ellen Wasem
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Whether it is record-breaking numbers of unaccompanied child and family migrants crossing the southwest border or unprecedented backlogs in immigration and naturalization petitions, immigration governance is buckling from breakdowns in performance across key Department of Homeland Security (DHS) immigration components and partner agencies. Rethinking immigration governance at DHS and across the executive branch is essential. Although many of the issues plaguing the immigration system are due to Congress’s failure to update immigration laws to reflect national needs, the management of DHS’ immigration components is the responsibility of the executive branch. DHS’ current chain of command and coordination capabilities are not strong enough to counteract the centrifugal forces of better-resourced, singular operations (e.g. border security and immigration detention). The DHS components and the agencies they collaborate with in other federal departments lack the assuredness and agility to effectively recalibrate and adjust to new circumstances. The challenge for the DHS immigration components is to fuse broader immigration policy and performance outcomes with enduring border and national security imperatives. This paper examines questions of structure—as compared with leadership and policy—and proposes changes that would enable more effective and humane implementation of the nation’s immigration laws. It identifies four key organizational areas of concern—mission, institutional structures, funding priorities, and institutional culture—essential to the vitality and governance of the U.S. immigration system. We argue that immigration is a system that spans both intra-DHS and interagency organizational entities and processes, and that it must operate as a system to successfully carry out its duties. Managing immigration as a system calls for coordinated operational capabilities, decision-making structures, and resource allocations. The paper provides recommendations that can be accomplished within the current authority of the secretary of homeland security and the executive branch. In addition, it closes with select proposals for a longer-term change agenda that would require legislation.
Topic:: Immigration, Governance, Homeland Security, and Borders
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

5. North Korean Cryptocurrency Operations: An Alternative Revenue Stream

Author:: Heeu Millie Kim, June Lee, and Rachel Paik
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: As cryptocurrency has risen to prominence within the past decade, its widespread use has like- wise created great potential for exploitation by malicious actors. With a cyber arsenal capable of reaching cryptocurrency platforms and users, North Korea has increasingly targeted virtual assets as a source of revenue for its regime. In its 2021 final report, the United Nations Panel of Experts estimated that North Korea stole approximately $316.4 million in virtual assets between January 2019 and November 2020. The decentralized nature of the cryptocurrency market is well-suited for a heavily-sanctioned and financially-isolated state like North Korea, especially given tighter trade restrictions and border closures during the COVID-19 pandemic. The ease of obscuring ownership of virtual assets and the lack of regulatory oversight make cryptocurrency all the more attractive for North Korea. Although North Korean cyber operations have been widely publicized, the purpose of this report is to focus on three ways North Korea obtains cryptocurrencies, specifically cryptomining, cryptojacking, and fraudulent initial coin offerings (ICOs). Given observed trends and changes in the cryptocurrency environment—namely, the rise of decentralized finance (DeFi) and over-the-counter brokers—this paper finds that North Korea’s crypto operations are consistent with its national objectives and likely to continue. Second, North Korea’s cryptocurrency operations offer an attractive and transferable model for other financially-isolated states and non-state actors. Finally, governments should work with law enforcement agencies, multilateral institutions, and non-traditional actors to mitigate the national security threat from North Korea’s cryptocurrency activities.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Finance, Cryptocurrencies, and Virtual Assets
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

6. Toward an Integrated North American Emergency Response System

Author:: Juliette N. Kayyem
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Disasters and emergencies have never respected borders, and current climate and development trends are only generating greater challenges for emergency management across North America. Natural disasters are evolving: wildfires are growing in frequency and intensity, advancing across borders, destroying forests, homes, and croplands; hurricanes increase in strength and travel trajectory, reaching farther north and leaving greater destruction in their wake; lengthy droughts persist, which fuel greater fire danger and present an urgent water problem for municipalities and agriculture; and environmental migration is a growing reality. Simultaneously, population growth increases demand for housing, services, food, mobility, and more. Additionally, the next pandemic and human-made disasters, whether terrorist in origin or stemming from the cross-border movement of dangerous substances, must remain a planning and response priority. The rapidly intensifying effects of climate change, the increased globalization and potential spread of infectious disease outbreaks, and the rise in both the threat and impact of disruption to technology or infrastructure pose an expanded risk across North America. As the risk profile evolves, so does the need for improved coordination among the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Although the need for collaboration is clear, the distinct federal systems that operate in each country and their politics complicate intergovernmental collaboration, as do the different roles that national, regional, and private corporations can and should play across all of these separate jurisdictions. Each lever of power, governmental or private sector, provides a unique set of capabilities, yet none can address these urgent issues alone. To meet these challenges, North America must progress beyond the historic approach to cross- border emergency management, which has consisted primarily of sharing information, to a more systemic and operational cooperation. Establishing a North American approach is a key component to more comprehensive and effective emergency management structured to meet current and emerging threats. This paper briefly examines the history of emergency response coordination among the United States, Mexico, and Canada, highlighting some of the major bilateral, regional and non-governmental agreements. It analyzes the challenges in emergency response and the resulting shortfalls of existing agreements, as well as considering lessons from COVID-19 pandemic. These historic and current deficiencies support the creation of a more robust tri-lateral agreement to deal with the pressing nature of evolving emergency response threats in the future. The paper concludes with recommendations on how to adapt the current emergency response systems to function as a North American Emergency Response Compact.
Topic:: Climate Change, Natural Disasters, Homeland Security, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: North America

7. Dismantling Migrant Smuggling Networks in the Americas

Author:: Guadalupe Correa-Cabrera
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Migration trends in the Americas recently have undergone a significant transformation. During the past few years, an increasing number of migrants and asylum seekers from different parts of the hemisphere—and other regions of the world, including Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia and the African continent—have been undertaking a very long and arduous journey to the United States. Migrant mobility has been facilitated by sophisticated smuggling networks (that operate often in tandem with other criminal organizations) and corrupt officials. The journey to the United States of economic migrants and asylum seekers from developing countries or countries at war is invariably perilous. At the same time, current migration trends and organized mass irregular migrations pose substantial homeland security risks. This paper proposes the dismantling of migrant smuggling networks through intelligence and targeted actions as important elements both of border security and enforcement and humanitarian migration management. In addition to these policies, the U.S. government should collaborate closely with other governments to cooperatively redesign asylum systems.
Topic:: Migration, Homeland Security, Human Trafficking, and Asylum
Political Geography:: North America

8. Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Storage: Technologies and Costs in the U.S. Context

Author:: Jonathan M. Moch, William Xue, and John P. Holdren
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The Biden administration has set a goal of reaching net zero economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.1 Carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS)—a suite of current and emerging technologies that remove carbon dioxide emissions (CO2) from energy or industrial processes and then either sequester the carbon underground or use it for production of a variety of fuels or products2—is very likely to be a key technology on most of the plausible paths for reaching this goal. Among various applications of the technology, CCUS in combination with natural gas powerplants can be used to provide firm baseload electricity or could serve as backup for intermittent renewable power in place of multi-day electricity storage.3 Additionally, CCUS could be used to decarbonize hard-to-electrify industrial processes4 and to provide synthetic fuels for decarbonizing nonelectric energy uses.5 The key barrier to CCUS filling these various roles and living up to its technical potential is high costs relative to current incentives: despite current U.S. government support through tax policy, CCUS is not economically competitive today in most of its applications. Unless and until it becomes so or is required by law, it will not achieve widespread deployment.
Topic:: Environment, Science and Technology, Natural Resources, Coal, Carbon Emissions, and Energy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

9. China’s Rise and U.S. Defense Implications

Author:: Marco Lyons and Natalia Angel
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: What are the international implications of China’s rise? What developments may be expected, and what should U.S. national defense leaders do about the likely effects of these developments? China is a rising power but even if that cannot be said to translate into a security threat to the United States directly, there is little reason to believe that Beijing will not take action to get out from under what it perceives as unfriendly U.S.-led global diplomatic, economic, and security orders. In very broad terms, U.S. defense policy makers will need to address the change from military capabilities for enforcing a liberal international order, to capabilities for both advancing and protecting friendly regional or even sub-regional orders. China’s potential power is sizable and increasing based on a large population and growing national wealth and this potential power makes its neighbors fear that it will become the regional hegemon. Since other states in the region cannot predict if or when Beijing will make a bid for hegemony, relations are beset with uncertainty. Weaker neighbors, like Vietnam and Laos in Southeast Asia, can be expected to accommodate Beijing more while trying to benefit from Chinese economic growth when and where possible.1 The U.S. security allies can be expected to cooperate more with each other while calling for more visible displays of U.S. commitment (including more military force presence).2 India will become more important to U.S. strategy as a link between Australia and Thailand, and the Middle East and Central Asia, and the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, and International Security
Political Geography:: China and United States of America

10. The Challenges of Decarbonizing the U.S. Electric Grid by 2035

Author:: Jonathan M. Moch and Henry Lee
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The Biden administration has established a national goal of 100% carbon-free electricity by 2035 and reaching net-zero economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions by 2050.1 To realize these goals, the United States must not only transition the production of power, but also build thousands of miles of upgraded or new transmission. The U.S. electric grid consists of 600,000 miles of transmission lines connected to over 1 million megawatts of electricity generation capacity.2 Over 70% of these lines are more than 25 years old, well into their approximately 50-year lifetime.3 Furthermore, to meet President Biden’s 2050 goal, experts claim that over a million miles of new transmission will have to be built over a three-decade time span.4 Most plausible pathways to net-zero emissions call for the electrification of multiple services, such as heating and transportation.5 The resulting increase in electricity demand will require major upgrades to the grid, with some studies suggesting a 60% increase in peak demand by 2050.6 In the United States, the greatest potential wind energy resources are in the Midwest and along the two coasts,7 while the greatest solar energy resources are in the Southwest and in Florida.8 New transmission lines will be needed to carry the electricity from the areas where the renewable resources are most plentiful to distant load centers.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, Electricity, Decarbonization, and Energy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

11. The Role of Blockchain in Green Hydrogen Value Chains

Author:: Nicola De Blasio and Charles Hua
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: A rainbow of colors currently dominates almost every conversation on the transition to a low-carbon economy: green, grey, blue, turquoise, pink, yellow[1] - an ever-increasing palette to describe the same colorless, odorless, and highly combustible molecule, hydrogen. The only difference is the chemical process used to produce it. The colors of hydrogen are crucial for the energy transition because each production pathway generates different amounts of greenhouse gas emissions. For example, while grey hydrogen, produced from fossil fuels, yields up to 20 tons of carbon dioxide per ton of hydrogen, green hydrogen, produced from renewable energy sources like solar and wind, yields no emissions. Furthermore, although these colors all refer to the same molecule, production costs differ: green hydrogen remains substantially more costly today. With aggressive development and deployment of electrolyzers and other hydrogen technologies at scale, green hydrogen could become cost-competitive with blue hydrogen, produced from natural gas with carbon capture, by 2030 in many countries.[2] Overall, the rate at which green hydrogen costs decrease will also depend on government policies and incentives, such as carbon pricing and tax credits. Therein lies a critical challenge for the successful transition to a low-carbon economy. As energy systems increasingly evolve from centralized to decentralized, from “grey” to “green,” stakeholders will need to efficiently account for and track emissions and green molecules in a transparent, secure, and standardized way, and must be able to do so along value chains from production to consumption.
Topic:: Environment, Science and Technology, Natural Resources, Innovation, Renewable Energy, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:: Global Focus

12. The European Union at a Crossroads: Unlocking Renewable Hydrogen’s Potential

Author:: Nicola De Blasio and Alejandro Nuñez-Jimenez
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: European countries are at a crossroads on their path to carbon neutrality. Today, they are at the forefront of the global clean hydrogen race but going forward they would be better served by collaborating instead of working alone. Overall, the European Union (EU) is highly competitive in clean technologies manufacturing and thus well-positioned to benefit from the emergence of global hydrogen markets. But a narrow focus on short-term cost considerations could drive member states to implement national roadmaps with little or no coordination among themselves and hence little or no chance of competing globally. As a bloc, the EU has pledged to reach carbon neutrality by 2050. Clean hydrogen is a cornerstone of this transformational effort; accordingly, in July 2020, the EU adopted its hydrogen strategy with the ambition of deploying open and competitive clean hydrogen markets for all energy sectors and segments by 2050.1 Success hinges around implementing a cohesive long-term strategy to address a fundamental ques- tion and its associated challenges: where could the EU source competitive and secure renewable hydrogen supplies? As our previous research shows, all countries have access to renewable resources (such as solar or wind), to different degrees, and could produce some renewable hydrogen locally. However, while resource-rich countries, such as Spain, could evolve into regional exporters, no EU member state has the potential to become a global export champion. At the same time, North African countries, such as Morocco, are well-situated to act as key suppliers to the EU. Furthermore, imports from resource-rich regions like North America could help to address security of supply concerns.2 Today, EU hydrogen demand stands at 7.8 million tons per year (Mt/yr), equivalent to about 10% of global demand. Germany and the Netherlands are the largest consumers, accounting for over a third of EU demand, followed by Poland, Spain, Italy, Belgium, and France, which consume about 0.5 Mt/yr each.3 According to available projections, as hydrogen use grows across all economic sectors, EU hydrogen demand could reach 76 Mt/yr by 2050. But while the EU strategy sets clear targets on electrolyzer deployment by 2030, it provides very few details on how the bloc could meet demand—and at what cost—by 2050.
Topic:: Economics, Environment, Science and Technology, Natural Resources, European Union, Innovation, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe

13. Offshore Wind in the Eastern United States

Author:: Katie Segal and Henry Lee
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: In the last decade, many states set ambitious goals to decarbonize their energy portfolios. Seven states along the Atlantic coast are pursuing 100% clean electricity targets, while others have adopted stringent emissions reduction targets.1 Realizing these goals requires scaling wind, solar, and other renewable resource electricity generation at rates three to four times recent levels. If wind is to play a significant role in decarbonizing the electricity sector in the densely populated northeast section of the United States, a substantial proportion of the investment must occur offshore, as onshore wind speeds and available land area are limited. Some states have taken an additional step by establishing specific offshore wind targets. For example, New York's 2019 Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act contains a goal of 9,000 MW of offshore wind by 2035.2 This policy brief examines the economic and technical feasibility of substantial wind generation development along the Eastern Seaboard.
Topic:: Environment, Natural Resources, Renewable Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

14. Technical Difficulties of Contact Tracing

Author:: Amy Robinson and James Waldo
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: In mid-October, thousands of English and Welsh citizens received phantom alerts that they had potentially been exposed to COVID-19. A quick Twitter tour reveals the spiraling fear, frustration, and confusion that ensued. Even though National Health Service (NHS) later updated the app, built using an Exposure Notification System (ENS) developed by Apple and Google, the incident still amplified mass hysteria and confusion.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Public Health, COVID-19, and Contact Tracing
Political Geography:: Global Focus

15. The Geopolitics of Renewable Hydrogen

Author:: Nicola De Blasio and Fridolin Pflugmann
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The transition to a low-carbon energy system will likely shake up the geopolitical status quo that has governed global energy systems for over a century. Policymakers need to rethink the role their country could play in a new energy world. Renewables are widely perceived as an opportunity to shatter the hegemony of fossil fuel-rich states and democratize the energy landscape. Virtually all countries have access to some renewable energy resources (especially solar and wind power) and could thus substitute foreign supply with local resources. Our research shows, however, that the role countries are likely to assume in decarbonized energy systems will be based not only on their resource endowment but also on their policy choices. Renewable hydrogen is enjoying growing political and commercial momentum as a versatile and sustainable energy carrier with the potential to play a key role in the global transition to a low-carbon economy; and it is often described as the ‘missing link’ in global decarbonization—especially for energy intensive sectors where emissions are hard to abate and electrification is not the preferred solution, such as steel production, high-temperature industrial heat, shipping, aviation, and heat for buildings. But making renewable hydrogen a significant part of the world’s future energy mix will require defining new and innovative national and international policies while developing appropriate market structures aimed at spurring innovation along value chains; scaling technologies while significantly reducing costs; and deploying enabling infrastructure at scale. Success is possible, but this transformational effort will require close coordination between policy, technology, capital, and society to avoid falling into the traps and inefficiencies of the past. Renewable hydrogen can be used for both mobility and stationary applications. As a sustainable mobility energy carrier, it can power fuel-cell electric vehicles or be the base for synthetic fuels. In stationary applications, it can be used to store renewable energy, both at utility scale or off-grid, providing backup to intermittent renewable energy sources and serving as a carbon-free heating source. From a geopolitical perspective, whether future renewable hydrogen energy systems will be as concentrated as today’s oil and gas supply or decentralized like renewables is strongly related to future market structures, technology, and enabling infrastructure availability.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, Renewable Energy, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:: Global Focus

16. China: The Renewable Hydrogen Superpower?

Author:: Nicola De Blasio and Fridolin Pflugmann
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: President Xi Jinping’s pledge during the 2020 United Nations General Assembly, that China would reach peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060, is a significant step in the fight against climate change. Since China is the world’s top contributor of greenhouse gases, there is no doubt that Beijing needs to be front and center of any effort to curb global emissions. In 2019, China accounted for almost 30 percent of global emissions, about twice as much as the second largest emitter, the United States.1 But while U.S. emissions have been on an overall decline since 2007,2 China’s have increased, raising concerns over whether Beijing can actually deliver on its targets. This reality should not distract from the fact that China is also the world’s top developer of renewables and other clean energy technologies. For example, China was the world’s largest installer of photovoltaics (PV) by 2013 and, in less than two years, also became the global leader in solar module manufacturing. At the same time, China leveraged its industrial might and economies of scale to drive down modules’ costs—which, by the end of 2018, were 90 percent lower than only ten years before. In this context, renewable hydrogen could significantly accelerate China’s transition to a low-carbon economy, increasing the likelihood of meeting its carbon neutrality goal. Renewable hydrogen offers significant advantages for China. It can help Beijing meet its climate and pollution goals—at a time when coal continues to dominate—while avoiding increased reliance on imported fuels. As a readily dispatchable means of storing energy, hydrogen can help to address intermittency and curtailment issues as renewable energy increases its share of China’s energy mix. As a sustainable mobility energy carrier, it can power fuel-cell electric vehicles or be the base for synthetic fuels. Finally, renewable hydrogen can open new avenues for developing clean technology manufactured goods for both internal and export markets. Today, most of China’s hydrogen is produced from coal via 1,000 gasifiers, accounting for 5% of the country’s total coal consumption. Hydrogen costs vary significantly as a function of production technology and prices of fossil fuels and electricity. Production from coal remains the lowest cost option: about 30 percent cheaper than hydrogen from natural gas. Therefore, reducing the carbon footprint of coal-based hydrogen will be critical in a low-carbon economy. In the medium term, coal-based hydrogen with carbon capture, utilization and storage will likely remain China’s lowest-cost clean hydrogen production pathway. Hence, the underlying question is whether Beijing will prioritize cost considerations or put its full industrial might behind the development and deployment of renewable hydrogen. In March 2019, the Chinese government took a significant step forward by announcing measures to promote the construction of hydrogen facilities for new energy vehicles. Wan Gang, who is known as China’s “father of the electric car,” called for China to “look into establishing a hydrogen society” and “move further toward fuel cells.”3 Given that Gang made a similar call two decades ago on vehicle electrification, which played a key role in China’s current battery electric vehicles market dominance, close attention is warranted.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, Renewable Energy, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:: China and Asia-Pacific

17. Using Advance Market Commitments for Public Purpose Technology Development

Author:: Alan Ho and Jake Taylor
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Over the last year, there has been a renewed focus on improving American competitiveness in key fields of science and technology. Numerous bills and executive initiatives have been implemented or proposed to dramatically increase investment into science and technology. Recent examples, including the Endless Frontiers and the Clean Futures Act, use a wide variety of policy tools to advance research and development (R&D) along multiple axis. Here we consider the free market portion of these tools, in which the private sector plays a key role in determining topic and direction, while the public sector supports these activities through high-level directives, conditional contracts, and other mechanisms. While other approaches such as public purpose consortia and R&D tax credits have been considered elsewhere, here we focus on Advance Market Commitments. Advance Market Commitments (AMCs)are a powerful policy tool that can be used to ensure that America can retain leadership in technology fields such as climate change, computing, and medicine. In an AMC, a U.S. agency commits to buying some specified new technology before that technology exists. This provides a price, specification, and framework for evaluation that can streamline decision making and funding approaches in the private sector and accelerate progress towards well defined technical outcomes without being directed about the underlying solution and steps along the path. As such, AMCs represent a powerful option for ground-up technological building where private investment replaces the role of more traditional, blue sky government funding, and the larger market for the resulting product is jump-started by an initial government market.
Topic:: Markets, Science and Technology, and Vaccine
Political Geography:: Global Focus

18. The Government Technology Silver Bullet: Hiring In-House Technical Talent

Author:: Mark Lerner
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: We have seen software failures across every layer of government over the course of this pandemic. State governments have had significant issues with their unemployment insurance websites. Local governments have had outages and troubles with vaccine distribution services. Software systems at the Federal level have experienced significant security breaches. Trust in government is at “near-record lows,” in no small part because modern public services continually fail to meet people’s needs. The past year has shown that our public services continue to fail in the traditional ways: they cost too much, take too long to deliver, have a subpar quality, and regularly face security breaches. We have not made significant enough progress in improving government technology to prevent these troubles, let alone to provide effective, modern digital tools and technologies. Government services have largely not kept up with the raised expectations of the digital era, leaving many people without access to critical services they need. And yet, there is incredible momentum growing in the government technology space. As I mentioned in a previous blog post, we are seeing a wave of technologists from the private sector expressing deep interest in working in the government, with many actually coming into government for the first time. Anecdotally, I’ve personally heard from all manner of technologists—from fresh graduates to high-level executives— looking to work in the public sector for the first time. Thousands of technologists are applying for jobs at the U.S. Digital Service, and thousands more are signing up to volunteer with the U.S. Digital Response. These people are deciding to work and make public services better after years of becoming more aware of the ways in which our public infrastructure is failing our neighbors in most need. The federal government is also allocating more money towards these problems, in recognition of their severity. The American Rescue Plan gave $200M to the U.S. Digital Service, and $1B to the Technology Modernization Fund. The Biden-Harris Administration’s FY2022 budget request calls for even more money for tech modernization programs. These massive investments show that Congress and the Administration take these challenges seriously, and are looking for ways to address this years-long problem. If we want to have a lasting impact on the way that our country serves its people, we need to make the most of this momentum to address the root causes beneath these repeated failures. We need to focus our efforts onto the long-term work of addressing the systemic problems that cause our most critical services to fail when they are most needed. I believe that hiring more in-house technical talent might be a silver bullet to addressing the federal government’s technology problems. In this report, I hope to convince you that we need to make hiring in-house technical talent our number one technology priority in building better digital services.
Topic:: Government, Science and Technology, COVID-19, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

19. The Need for Greater Technical Talent in the Government: A Case Study

Author:: Catherine McAnney
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Lessons from the software behind America’s immigration system show us why modern technologists, from product managers to designers, are needed in government now more than ever. We know government tech projects often fail. Timelines get pushed out, contractors rapidly turn over, costs increase, and, ultimately, public services fail to meet the needs of the American people—often just as they need them most. One of the major reasons for these problems is that the federal government does not have the modern technical talent necessary to deliver large-scale IT programs that consistently work for the end user. This does not just include software engineers, but designers, researchers, and product managers too. In this case study, we’ll look at this issue through the lens of one of the most storied federal IT programs—the U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) Electronic Immigration System (ELIS). We found that the program had challenges with its technical talent through the burdensome, nontechnical oversight and the lack of technical expertise on the ground. This case study pulls information from 13 GAO and OIG reports between 2005 and 2021, as well as interviews with 6 current or former senior leaders within USCIS, with a particular focus towards the technical talent associated with the project.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Immigration, Governance, and Information Technology
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

20. Supporting a Public Purpose in Research & Development: The Role of Tax Credits

Author:: Jake Taylor
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Tax credits for research and development are a means of incentivizing the private sector to invest their own resources on challenging problems. However, in practice, the fungibility of tax credits and other monetary elements can lead to misalignment between the public good represented by R&D and the actions of the company. In this policy brief, we consider the existing mechanism of tax credits. We see how they can encourage private sector risk-taking to enable research and development (R&D) outcomes. However, our goal is to go beyond economic growth benefits, and to include the less tangible considerations of public good and public purpose in the research and development domain. We then suggest an expansion of tax credits focused on supporting the researchers involved in the R&D and encouraging innovation in both large organizations and in startups and small businesses. This approach builds upon the existing framework of agency-led, mission-defined support of the private sector used by the U.S. government, as occurs in other programs such as America’s Seed Fund (sometimes known by its acronyms, SBIR and STTR). The integration of specific agency- and mission-focused elements to the credit system ensures that these additive credits support research and researchers whose R&D outcomes will improve the health, prosperity, and opportunity for the U.S. as a whole. Specific means of implementing this public-purpose R&D credit system under existing authorities within the executive branch are suggested, along with the public-facing mechanisms for creating and maintaining the evaluation approach of what constitutes “public purpose” as science and society progress.
Topic:: Economics, Science and Technology, International Affairs, Tax Systems, and Tax Credits
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

21. Sustainable Mobility: Renewable Hydrogen in the Transport Sector

Author:: Nicola De Blasio, Charles Hua, and Alejandro Nuñez-Jimenez
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The transportation sector is the second-largest source of CO2 emissions, after electricity and heat generation, accounting for about 25 percent of global emissions.1 However, it is also one of the most challenging to decarbonize due to its distributed nature and the advantages of fossil fuels in terms of high energy densities, ease of transportation, and storage. Moreover, the degree of difficulty in decarbonizing varies significantly across the sector, making the challenge even more daunting. So far, emissions reduction strategies have focused on improving vehicle and system-wide efficiencies, mode switching, and electrification. The latter is proving relatively easy for smaller vehicles that travel shorter distances and carry lighter loads. However, sector-wide decarbonization pathways will require a transition to low-carbon fuels and the deployment of enabling infrastructure to support innovation at scale. Renewable hydrogen holds promise in sustainable mobility applications, whether by powering fuel-cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) like cars, trucks, and trains or as a feedstock for synthetic fuels for ships and airplanes. Fuel cells convert hydrogen-rich fuels into electricity through a chemical reaction. FCEVs use a fuel cell, rather than a battery, to power electric motors, and operate near-silently and produce no tailpipe emissions. Hydrogen-powered vehicles offer key advantages, including shorter refueling times, longer ranges, and a lower material footprint compared to lithium battery-powered alternatives. However, high costs of ownership and a lack of enabling infrastructure are key challenges that must be addressed through policy support, technological innovation, and financial investment. Hydrogen can complement existing efforts to electrify road and rail transportation and provide a scalable option for decarbonizing shipping and aviation. Figure 1 summarizes the mobility segments for which battery electric vehicles (BEVs), FCEVs, and vehicles running on bio- or hydrogen-based synthetic fuels are most applicable.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, Renewable Energy, Transportation, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:: Global Focus

22. Hydrogen Deployment at Scale: The Infrastructure Challenge

Author:: Nicola De Blasio, Fridolin Pflugmann, and Henry Lee
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Clean hydrogen is experiencing unprecedented momentum as confidence in its ability to accelerate decarbonization efforts across multiple sectors is rising. New projects are announced almost every week. For example, an international developer, Intercontinental Energy, plans to build a plant in Oman that will produce almost 2 million tons of clean hydrogen and 10 million tons of clean ammonia.1 Dozens of other large-scale projects and several hundred smaller ones are already in the planning stage. Similarly, on the demand side, hydrogen is gaining support from customers. Prominent off-takers such as oil majors like Shell and bp, steelmakers like ThyssenKrupp, and world-leading ammonia producers like Yara are working on making a clean hydrogen economy a reality. Despite the optimism surrounding clean hydrogen, key uncertainties remain. One of hydrogen’s attractions is that it can provide carbon-free energy in multiple sectors—transport, heating, industry, and electricity generation. But this advantage also creates uncertainties. The infrastructure needed in an economy in which hydrogen is primarily used as a transport fuel is very different from one in which its primary value is as a heating fuel. Today no major hydrogen pipeline networks exist,2 and no liquified hydrogen ships are in commercial operation. There is a true chicken and egg problem. If there is no infrastructure to move hydrogen, will investments in supply and demand happen at the pace needed to meet national decarbonization targets? This challenge raises an even more pressing question: what should be the respective roles of the public and private sectors in deploying enabling infrastructure at scale?
Topic:: Climate Change, Energy Policy, Infrastructure, Renewable Energy, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:: Global Focus

23. What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence

Author:: Ian D. Henry
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Leaders often believe that states that demonstrate disloyalty toward an ally will acquire a reputation for disloyalty, and thus damage other alliances. But in some circumstances, excessive loyalty to one ally can damage—perhaps even destroy—other alliances. The First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–55) shows that alliance interdependence is governed not by a reputation for loyalty, but by assessments of allied reliability.
Topic:: Security, History, Partnerships, Alliance, and State
Political Geography:: Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

24. Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States

Author:: Risa Brooks
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The U.S. military’s prevailing norms of military professionalism are poorly suited to meet today’s civil-military challenges. These norms, based on Samuel Huntington's objective civilian control model, argue that the military should operate in a sphere separate from the civilian domain of policymaking and decisions about the use of force. Yet, these norms also undermine the military’s nonpartisan and apolitical ethos, weaken civilian leaders' control of military activity, and undercut the country’s strategic effectiveness in armed conflict.
Topic:: Government, Military Affairs, Public Policy, and Norms
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

25. Normalization by Other Means—Technological Infrastructure and Political Commitment in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis

Author:: Christopher Lawrence
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The 1994 Agreed Framework called for North Korea to dismantle its plutonium-production complex in exchange for civilian light water reactors (LWRs) and the promise of political normalization with the United States. Today, scholars look back at the Agreed Framework as a U.S. offer of “carrots” to bribe the regime, but this framing overlooks the credibility challenges of normalization and the distinctive technical challenges of building LWRs in North Korea. Political and technical analysis reveals how the LWR project helped build credibility for the political changes promised in the Agreed Framework.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Politics, Science and Technology, History, Infrastructure, Crisis Management, and Normalization
Political Geography:: Asia, North Korea, North America, Korea, and United States of America

26. Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression: China’s Changing Strategy in Xinjiang

Author:: Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee, and Emir Yazici
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: In early 2017, the Chinese Communist Party changed its internal security strategy in Xinjiang, escalating collective detention, ideological re-education, and pressure on Uyghur diaspora networks. This strategy shift was likely catalyzed by changing perceptions of Uyghur involvement in transnational Islamic militancy in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, heightening perceived domestic vulnerability to terrorism.
Topic:: Security, Human Rights, Minorities, Counter-terrorism, and Repression
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Xinjiang

27. Chinese Coercion in the South China Sea: Resolve and Costs

Author:: Ketian Zhang
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: China’s coercive behavior in the post–Cold War period suggests three patterns. First, China uses coercion when it wants to establish a reputation for resolve. Second, China has been a cautious bully, resorting to coercion only infrequently. Third, when China perceives the “geopolitical backlash cost” of military coercion to be high, it chooses instead to use sanctions and grayzone coercion. (“Geopolitical backlash cost” refers here to the possibility that the target state will seek to balance against China, with the potential for U.S. military involvement.) When China perceives the geopolitical backlash cost to be low, it is more likely to use military coercion.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Power Politics, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South China Sea

28. Central Bank Digital Currencies: Tools for an Inclusive Future?

Author:: Eve Lee
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) have rapidly evolved from a sci-fi concept to a plausible alternative to cash that is being studied by central banks all over the world. According to a Belfer Center tracker, over 50 central banks have pursued or are engaging in CBDC work as of August 2020. However, while 10 central banks have already piloted or announced plans to pilot a CBDC in the near term, most are in the early stages of research and experimentation. In this brief, we outline the common motivations driving central bank work on CBDCs. We then explore CBDCs’ potential impacts on financial inclusion, a primary motivation in developing and emerging markets that has also gained significant traction in developed economies during the COVID-19 related global recession. We conclude that for CBDCs to achieve its financial inclusion goals, more technical advancement in offline adaptability and policy deliberations around issues of identity and traceability are needed.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, International Affairs, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:: Global Focus

29. The Public-Purpose Consortium: Enabling Emerging Technology with a Public Mission

Author:: Jake Taylor
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Imagine a speculative technology, one that is destined to change lives and improve the world, but also one where many scientific and practical questions remain to be answered. Companies and entrepreneurs, already seeing the potential, have begun spinning up new efforts and launching startups to realize products and services. You know that investors are likely underestimating both the difficulty posed by the technology and the long-term impact. The science and engineering remain far from that necessary to achieve those goals, much less understand the unintended consequences. You are now tasked with enabling the economic growth implied by these opportunities while ensuring both scientific progress and minimizing unintended negative outcomes. What do you do? Faced with this challenge in the still esoteric field of quantum information science, leaders in the Government and I worked with stakeholders from across the United States and around the world to build a foundational approach for this new technology. Rather than using a roadmap with product or milestone driven development, we instead focused on building a community around the emerging technologies and scientific challenges necessary to build quantum computers. These are devices that operate at the very limits set by nature in what and how they compute and are fantastically hard to create – so much so that their basic operation and architecture are areas of active research. And their impact is fantastically broad, thus the need to both temper expectations and enable cooperation. In executing a program to enable this new sector, we developed a specific approach for solving the challenge of blending profit motive and public good that leverages the mechanism of consortia. We are at a moment in time where cooperation between public-purpose stakeholders and profit-motive stakeholders can be an effective means of integrating public purpose into technology as it emerges. This brief covers the basic concept of a public-purpose consortium (PPC), examination of what combination of factors lead to their use for emerging technologies, and considers the key principles for organizing PPCs and enabling their success: Build Community, Enable Cooperation, Ensure Value, Institute Governance, and Keep It Lightweight.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Stakeholders, and Engineering
Political Geography:: Global Focus

30. The Future of Carbon Offset Markets

Author:: Henry Lee and Abigail Mayer
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Corporations, organizations, and even governments are purchasing offsets to reduce their carbon footprint. This policy brief provides an overview of the offset process – who buys them, who produces them, and who certifies them; describes the emerging challenges facing this market; and makes recommendations for the future.
Topic:: Climate Change, Energy Policy, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:: Global Focus

31. Mis/ Disinformation and Cyber Incident Communications Response: Top Takeaways

Author:: Belfer Center
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The top priority in a cyber crisis or in the face of mis and disinformation, will be to maintain public trust. The most effective way to achieve that goal is to respond confidently and quickly. Although response to both types of incidents will differ, there are a number of common best practices you can apply in your preparation ahead of election day. This summary guide helps detail common and specific responses to each type of incident.
Topic:: Communications, Elections, Misinformation, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:: Global Focus

32. Final Week Cybersecurity Considerations: Top Takeaways

Author:: Belfer Center
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: This election has already faced threats from cyber adversaries seeking to influence its outcome. The joint CISA-FBI alert confirming Russian state-sponsored activity targeting government networks on October 22 builds on other advisories around potential cyberattacks on election systems ahead of the election, including advisories of DDOS attacks against election infrastructure. Making unplanned or last-minute changes ahead of election day can introduce serious risks, especially given the short window to test changes. Here are some considerations as you work to address and prepare to counter potential cyber threats.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Elections, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: Russia and United States of America

33. What We Can Learn From the Wonder Women of COVID-19

Author:: Izzy Ernst and Grace Pringle
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The one good news story of 2020 seems to have been the rise of female leadership. In April, a Washington Post headline declared that female leaders were “hailed as voices of reason amid the coronavirus chaos.” High-profile figures like German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen emerged as perfect foils to UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson and U.S. President Donald Trump. Since then, our research confirmed that male-led countries had 1.9 times more COVID-19 deaths per million than their female counterparts during the first five months after outbreak or roughly the first wave of coronavirus.1 However, despite the appealing headlines, our research also found that there is a catch: female leaders did not perform better because of their sex, but rather because of their leadership skills. We tested four popular theories commentators put forward to explain the coronavirus gender gap. Were female leaders more likely to: involve experts in decisions, show empathy, communicate instructions clearly, or take early action to avoid loss of life? These traits roughly track with leadership research that suggests that female leaders are more likely to be participative or democratic, other-directed, and risk averse. In contrast, male leaders tend to be authoritarian, self-directed, and risk-takers. These trends may be explained by socialization and experiences of women. As Professor Zoe Marks notes, “women in male-dominated fields often incur penalties for assertive, power-seeking behavior.” Men and white people also tend to perceive risks as less likely than women and people of color respectively. However, it turns out none of the leadership behaviors we analyzed are correlated with women any more than with men. Successful leaders with the fewest COVID-19 deaths—wonder woman New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern as well as Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison—share two leadership traits in common: early, decisive action and clear, instructive communication. They locked down earlier and communicated clearly, plainly explaining harsh realities, instructions and warnings. No one can argue that President Trump’s statement that “like a miracle, [COVID] will disappear” has aged well.
Topic:: Women, Leadership, Crisis Management, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Global Focus

34. An Intelligence Agenda for a New Administration

Author:: Belfer Center
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: America’s Intelligence Community (IC) faces a daunting array of traditional national security challenges. Terrorism remains a persistent global problem in form of Islamic extremism as well as far-right nationalism. Russia, China and other nation state threats have become a higher priority after a long period of neglect. Regional conflicts simmer and occasionally boil over, reminding us that our agencies must provide global coverage. And we are now engaged in perpetual cyber conflict, with ambient digital espionage and conflict raging across global networks. At the same time, the Covid-19 pandemic has shown us that there are other threats to national security which require our intelligence agencies to broaden their focus beyond the familiar threats that have defined their missions since inception. America’s intelligence agencies must be able to support our national response to the existential challenges of our time - pandemic and biothreats, climate change, and nuclear insecurity. Each represents a high probability and high consequence set of risks for the nation and the world. As a President-Elect Biden’s team prepares to assume power, it should examine: Independence: Has political interference degraded the IC’s capability to collect and protect intelligence, and has the IC’s independence and objectivity eroded? How can we ensure that political interference never degrades IC capabilities and objectives? Priorities: How well prepared is our Intelligence Community (IC) to play its role of providing warning, perspective and options in a new world of disinformation, pandemic and climate change? Keeping Pace: Has the IC’s ability to provide intelligence needed to keep America safe kept pace with the rapid changes in technology and society?
Topic:: Security, Intelligence, and Public Policy
Political Geography:: North America

35. China’s National Carbon Market: Paradox and Potential

Author:: Cecilia Springer
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: China announced it would launch a national carbon market in 2017, yet this policy is taking years to come into effect. What will it take for a carbon market to work in command-and-control China? This policy brief explores an understudied challenge—emissions accounting—and identifies potential opportunities that have arisen in the first phase of China’s national carbon market.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economics, Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: China and Asia-Pacific

36. A Proposal for a Stability Mechanism for the Gulf Cooperation Countries

Author:: Rabah Arezki and Aitor Erce
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—face the dual shock of a pandemic caused by the novel coronavirus and a persistent collapse in oil prices. Because of the dual shock, the growth downgrade for the GCC as a whole is 7.5 percentage points in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). This can be considered as the cost of the dual shock—Arezki and others, 2020. But there is wide uncertainty about the estimate, which could be even higher. GCC countries must act collectively and boldly today to reduce the risk of an economic depression. A delayed and tenuous response may force authorities to spend even more in the future to, among other things, rescue cash-strapped members, as non-performing loans and bankruptcies become widespread (Ari et al., 2020). A powerful joint mechanism to cushion the blow, and ensure solidarity and stability of the GCC is warranted.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Civil War, Political stability, Conflict, and Gulf Cooperation Council
Political Geography:: Middle East

37. Technology Factsheet: Synthetic Biology

Author:: Colin O'Leary
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Synthetic biology (sometimes referred to as “SynBio”) is broadly defined as the application of engineering principles to biology, and in practice, refers to emerging technology that allows living organisms to be modified to serve user-defined purposes. While traditional biotechnology involves the transfer of smaller amounts of genetic material from one biological species to another, synthetic biology will permit the inten- tional construction of an entire organism.1 It has the potential to allow scientists to design living organisms distinct from any found in nature and to redesign existing organisms to have novel or enhanced qualities.2 The use cases of synthetic biology range from developing new therapeutics and vaccines for infectious disease to manufacturing novel biomaterials, biosensors, and biofuels. As scientists better understand biological systems, the potential applications of SynBio are anticipated to expand in scale and scope. The continued growth of the bioeconomy—defined as the “production, utilization and conservation of biological resources, including related knowledge, science, technology, and innovation, to provide information, products, processes and services across all economic sectors”—is giving space for synthetic biology technology to become a more significant part of the overall economic landscape.3 As with any technology that has a high potential for impact, SynBio presents a variety of pronounced opportunities, as well as risks. As the technology continues to mature and the number of market-ready applications grows, it is important for policymakers to consider how to promote the large number of opportunities the technology presents in the space of health and medicine, energy production, environmental recovery, food production, and more, while simultaneously protecting the public from foreseeable negative impli- cations and risks, such as weaponization, consumer safety, and ecological stability. Since synthetic biology bears significant similarities to previous biotechnology research on genetical- ly-modified organisms and recombinant DNA, existing regulations in the United States place the majority of synthetic biology products into the current biotechnology regulatory framework. As SynBio becomes more prominent though, it will be important for regulatory schemes to uniquely target the technology and its implications beyond those captured through biotechnology frameworks. Policymakers must continue to engage in the progression of the technology, understanding how regulation and governance must evolve to ensure the public can realize the opportunities, while being protected from the risks.
Topic:: Health, Science and Technology, and Biology
Political Geography:: Global Focus

38. Technology Factsheet: Quantum Computing

Author:: Akhil Iyer
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Quantum computing refers to the use of quantum properties—the properties of nature on an atomic scale—to solve complex problems much faster than conventional, or classical, computers. Quantum computers are not simply faster versions of conventional computers, though they are a fundamentally different computing paradigm due to their ability to leverage quantum mechanics. Harnessing quantum properties, namely the ability for the quantum computer bits (called “qubits”) to exist in multiple and interconnected states at one time, opens the door for highly parallel information processing with unprecedented new opportunities. Quantum computing could potentially be applied to solve important problems in fields such as cryptography, chemistry, medicine, material science, and machine learning that are computationally hard for conventional computers. Although it is still unclear which specific tasks can benefit from parallelized quantum processing, known as quantum parallelism, it is expected that solutions to a number of problems, especially those related to optimization, can be greatly accelerated by using a quantum computer. Though the field is still in its early stages, the anticipated opportunities offered by the unique computational power of quantum computers have attracted investment from not only research universities, but also startups, technology giants like Google, IBM and Microsoft, and directed investment by governments around the world. This cross-sectoral ecosystem has supported recent progress in underlying hardware, software, and algorithms necessary to make the computers work. The field has seen rapid advancement, however systems that can accomplish various kinds of computation, and especially those that can be commercially viable, are still likely to be decades away. There are expected to be some near- term applications on the horizon though, making quantum computing as relevant as ever. Currently, U.S. governance and regulation regarding quantum computing—a subset of the broader field of quantum information science, which also encompasses quantum communication and quantum sensing—focus on investments in the technical knowhow, collaborative research ecosystem, and human capital required to advance the technology. Given quantum computing’s potential for impact, especially in the fields of digital security, healthcare, energy, and machine learning and artificial intelligence, it is important for policymakers to understand the likely trajectories of the technology over the coming decades, as well as the pace of development both within the U.S. and abroad. Furthermore, policymakers must consider how to effectively promote the development, application and implementation of general-purpose quantum technologies to realize their larger economic and social benefits, while simultaneously mitigating foreseeable risks to privacy, safety, security, and inclusion.
Topic:: Security, Science and Technology, Governance, Regulation, Privacy, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:: United States of America

39. Should Regulators Make Electric Utilities Pay Customers for Poor Reliability?

Author:: Shefali Khanna and Kevin Rowe
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: In September 2017, the Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (DERC) required that the city’s regulated electricity distribution utilities pay compensation to customers experiencing power outages of three hours or longer. The measure was intended to incentivize the utilities to invest in the infrastructure and management practices needed to deliver higher levels of service quality. In 2019, India’s central government announced that it was considering rolling out a similar policy for utilities across the country. Can outage compensation policies help India’s power system achieve better reliability for all customers? This policy brief describes the persistent challenge of poor electricity reliability in India and how it interacts with key regulatory policies, analyzes Delhi’s experience with outage compensation since 2017, and highlights areas for additional economic and policy research on this topic.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Economic Policy, and Electricity
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, and Asia-Pacific

40. China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing's International Relations

Author:: Alastair Iain Johnston
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Many scholars and policymakers in the United States accept the narrative that China is a revisionist state challenging the U.S.-dominated international liberal order. The narrative assumes that there is a singular liberal order and that it is obvious what constitutes a challenge to it. The concepts of order and challenge are, however, poorly operationalized. There are at least four plausible operationalizations of order, three of which are explicitly or implicitly embodied in the dominant narrative. These tend to assume, ahistorically, that U.S. interests and the content of the liberal order are almost identical. The fourth operationalization views order as an emergent property of the interaction of multiple state, substate, nonstate, and international actors. As a result, there are at least eight “issue-specific orders” (e.g., military, trade, information, and political development). Some of these China accepts; some it rejects; and some it is willing to live with. Given these multiple orders and varying levels of challenge, the narrative of a U.S.-dominated liberal international order being challenged by a revisionist China makes little conceptual or empirical sense. The findings point to the need to develop more generalizable ways of observing orders and compliance.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Military Affairs, Information Age, and Liberal Order
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Asia

41. Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation

Author:: Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Chinese views of nuclear escalation are key to assessing the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, but they have not been examined systematically. A review of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with members of China's strategic community suggest that China is skeptical that nuclear escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons are used and, thus, leaders would be restrained from pursuing even limited use. These views are reflected in China's nuclear operational doctrine (which outlines plans for retaliatory strikes only and lacks any clear plans for limited nuclear use) and its force structure (which lacks tactical nuclear weapons). The long-standing decoupling of Chinese nuclear and conventional strategy, organizational biases within China's strategic community, and the availability of space, cyber, and conventional missile weapons as alternative sources of strategic leverage best explain Chinese views toward nuclear escalation. China's confidence that a U.S.-China conflict would not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons may hamper its ability to identify nuclear escalation risks in such a scenario. Meanwhile, U.S. scholars and policymakers emphasize the risk of inadvertent escalation in a conflict with China, but they are more confident than their Chinese counterparts that the use of nuclear weapons could remain limited. When combined, these contrasting views could create pressure for a U.S.-China conflict to escalate rapidly into an unlimited nuclear war.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Asia

42. Home, Again: Refugee Return and Post-Conflict Violence in Burundi

Author:: Stephanie Schwartz
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Conflict between returning refugees and nonmigrant populations is a pervasive yet frequently overlooked security issue in post-conflict societies. Although scholars have demonstrated how out-migration can regionalize, prolong, and intensify civil war, the security consequences of return migration are undertheorized. An analysis of refugee return to Burundi after the country's 1993–2005 civil war corroborates a new theory of return migration and conflict: return migration creates new identity divisions based on whether and where individuals were displaced during wartime. These cleavages become new sources of conflict in the countries of origin when local institutions, such as land codes, citizenship regimes, or language laws, yield differential outcomes for individuals based on where they lived during the war. Ethnographic evidence gathered in Burundi and Tanzania from 2014 to 2016 shows how the return of refugees created violent rivalries between returnees and nonmigrants. Consequently, when Burundi faced a national-level political crisis in 2015, prior experiences of return shaped both the character and timing of out-migration from Burundi. Illuminating the role of reverse population movements in shaping future conflict extends theories of political violence and demonstrates why breaking the cycle of return and repeat displacement is essential to the prevention of conflict.
Topic:: Civil War, Migration, National Security, and Global Security
Political Geography:: Africa, Tanzania, Burundi, and East Africa

43. The Domestic Politics of Nuclear Choices

Author:: Elizabeth N. Saunders
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: When and how do domestic politics influence a state's nuclear choices? Recent scholarship on nuclear security develops many domestic-political explanations for different nuclear decisions. These explanations are partly the result of two welcome trends: first, scholars have expanded the nuclear timeline, examining state behavior before and after nuclear proliferation; and second, scholars have moved beyond blunt distinctions between democracies and autocracies to more fine-grained understandings of domestic constraints. But without linkages between them, new domestic-political findings could be dismissed as a laundry list of factors that do not explain significant variation in nuclear decisions. This review essay assesses recent research on domestic politics and nuclear security, and develops a framework that illuminates when and how domestic-political mechanisms are likely to affect nuclear choices. In contrast to most previous domestic arguments, many of the newer domestic-political mechanisms posited in the literature are in some way top-down; that is, they show leaders deliberately maintaining or loosening control over nuclear choices. Two dimensions govern the extent and nature of domestic-political influence on nuclear choices: the degree of threat uncertainty and the costs and benefits to leaders of expanding the circle of domestic actors involved in a nuclear decision. The framework developed in this review essay helps make sense of several cases explored in the recent nuclear security literature. It also has implications for understanding when and how domestic-political arguments might diverge from the predictions of security-based analyses.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Domestic Politics, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, Iran, and North Korea

44. How to Enlarge NATO: The Debate inside the Clinton Administration, 1993–95

Author:: M.E. Sarotte
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Newly available sources show how the 1993–95 debate over the best means of expanding the North Atlantic Treaty Organization unfolded inside the Clinton administration. This evidence comes from documents recently declassified by the Clinton Presidential Library, the Defense Department, and the State Department because of appeals by the author. As President Bill Clinton repeatedly remarked, the two key questions about enlargement were when and how. The sources make apparent that, during a critical decisionmaking period twenty-five years ago, supporters of a relatively swift conferral of full membership to a narrow range of countries outmaneuvered proponents of a slower, phased conferral of limited membership to a wide range of states. Pleas from Central and Eastern European leaders, missteps by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and victory by the pro-expansion Republican Party in the 1994 U.S. congressional election all helped advocates of full-membership enlargement to win. The documents also reveal the surprising impact of Ukrainian politics on this debate and the complex roles played by both Strobe Talbott, a U.S. ambassador and later deputy secretary of state, and Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister. Finally, the sources suggest ways in which the debate's outcome remains significant for transatlantic and U.S.-Russian relations today.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, International Security, and Clinton Administration
Political Geography:: Russia and United States

45. Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion

Author:: Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Liberals claim that globalization has led to fragmentation and decentralized networks of power relations. This does not explain how states increasingly “weaponize interdependence” by leveraging global networks of informational and financial exchange for strategic advantage. The theoretical literature on network topography shows how standard models predict that many networks grow asymmetrically so that some nodes are far more connected than others. This model nicely describes several key global economic networks, centering on the United States and a few other states. Highly asymmetric networks allow states with (1) effective jurisdiction over the central economic nodes and (2) appropriate domestic institutions and norms to weaponize these structural advantages for coercive ends. In particular, two mechanisms can be identified. First, states can employ the “panopticon effect” to gather strategically valuable information. Second, they can employ the “chokepoint effect” to deny network access to adversaries. Tests of the plausibility of these arguments across two extended case studies that provide variation both in the extent of U.S. jurisdiction and in the presence of domestic institutions—the SWIFT financial messaging system and the internet—confirm the framework's expectations. A better understanding of the policy implications of the use and potential overuse of these tools, as well as the response strategies of targeted states, will recast scholarly debates on the relationship between economic globalization and state coercion.
Topic:: International Relations, Globalization, Information Age, Global Security, and Weapons
Political Geography:: United States and Global Focus

46. “We Have Captured Your Women”: Explaining Jihadist Norm Change

Author:: Aisha Ahmad
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: In recent years, jihadists across the world have transformed their gendered violence, shocking the world by breaking from prior taboos and even celebrating abuses that they had previously prohibited. This behavior is surprising because jihadists represent a class of insurgents that are deeply bound by rules and norms. For jihadists, deviating from established Islamist doctrines is no easy feat. What then explains these sudden transformations in the rules and norms governing jihadist violence? An inductive investigation of contemporary jihadist violence in Pakistan and Nigeria reveals a new theory of jihadist normative evolution. Data from these cases show that dramatic changes in jihadist violence occur when an external trigger creates an expanded political space for jihadist entrepreneurs to do away with normative constraints on socially prohibited types of violence. As these jihadist leaders capitalize on the triggers, they are able to encourage a re-socialization process within their ranks, resulting in the erosion of previously held taboos, the adoption of proscribed behaviors, and the emergence of toxic new norms.
Topic:: Political Violence, Gender Issues, Islam, Terrorism, Women, and Gender Based Violence
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Middle East, and West Asia

47. Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea

Author:: Ketian Zhang
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Since 1990, China has used coercion in its maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, despite adverse implications for its image. China is curiously selective in its timing, targets, and tools of coercion: China rarely employs military coercion, and it does not coerce all countries that pose similar threats. An examination of newly available primary documents and hundreds of hours of interviews with Chinese officials to trace the decisionmaking processes behind China's use and nonuse of coercion reveals a new theory of when, why, and how China employs coercion against other states, especially in the South China Sea. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings show that China is a cautious bully that does not use coercion frequently. In addition, when China becomes stronger, it tends to use military coercion less often, choosing instead nonmilitary tools. Moreover, concerns with its reputation for resolve and with economic cost are critical elements of Chinese decisionmaking regarding the costs and benefits of coercing its neighbors. China often coerces one target to deter others—“killing the chicken to scare the monkey.” These findings have important implications for how scholars understand states' coercive strategies and the future of Chinese behavior in the region and beyond.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Military Affairs, and Maritime
Political Geography:: China, Beijing, and South China

48. The End of War: How a Robust Marketplace and Liberal Hegemony Are Leading to Perpetual World Peace

Author:: Michael Mousseau
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Permanent world peace is beginning to emerge. States with developed market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination of all states as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. Among other states, weaker powers, fearing those that are stronger, tend to bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers. The result is a powerful liberal global hierarchy that is unwittingly, but systematically, buttressing states' embrace of market norms and values, moving the world toward perpetual peace. Analysis of voting preferences of members of the United Nations General Assembly from 1946 to 2010 corroborates the influence of the liberal global hierarchy: states with weak internal markets tend to disagree with the foreign policy preferences of the largest market power (i.e., the United States), but more so if they have stronger rather than weaker military and economic capabilities. Market-oriented states, in contrast, align with the market leader regardless of their capabilities. Barring some dark force that brings about the collapse of the global economy (such as climate change), the world is now in the endgame of a five-century-long trajectory toward permanent peace and prosperity.
Topic:: Peace Studies, War, Hegemony, Peacekeeping, Global Security, and Liberal Order
Political Geography:: United States, United Nations, and Global Focus

49. Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order

Author:: John J. Mearsheimer
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The liberal international order, erected after the Cold War, was crumbling by 2019. It was flawed from the start and thus destined to fail. The spread of liberal democracy around the globe—essential for building that order—faced strong resistance because of nationalism, which emphasizes self-determination. Some targeted states also resisted U.S. efforts to promote liberal democracy for security-related reasons. Additionally, problems arose because a liberal order calls for states to delegate substantial decisionmaking authority to international institutions and to allow refugees and immigrants to move easily across borders. Modern nation-states privilege sovereignty and national identity, however, which guarantees trouble when institutions become powerful and borders porous. Furthermore, the hyperglobalization that is integral to the liberal order creates economic problems among the lower and middle classes within the liberal democracies, fueling a backlash against that order. Finally, the liberal order accelerated China's rise, which helped transform the system from unipolar to multipolar. A liberal international order is possible only in unipolarity. The new multipolar world will feature three realist orders: a thin international order that facilitates cooperation, and two bounded orders—one dominated by China, the other by the United States—poised for waging security competition between them.
Topic:: International Relations, International Relations Theory, and Liberal Order
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Europe

50. A Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal International Order Concept Is Misguided

Author:: Charles L. Glaser
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Well before President Donald Trump began rhetorically attacking U.S. allies and the open international trading system, policy analysts worried about challenges to the liberal international order (LIO). A more fundamental issue, however, has received little attention: the analytic value of framing U.S. security in terms of the LIO. Systematic examination shows that this framing creates far more confusion than insight. Even worse, the LIO framing could lead the United States to adopt overly competitive policies and unnecessarily resist change in the face of China's growing power. The “LIO concept”—the logics that proponents identify as underpinning the LIO—is focused inward, leaving it ill equipped to address interactions between members of the LIO and states that lie outside the LIO. In addition, the LIO concept suffers theoretical flaws that further undermine its explanatory value. The behavior that the LIO concept claims to explain—including cooperation under anarchy, effective Western balancing against the Soviet Union, the Cold War peace, and the lack of balancing against the United States following the Cold War—is better explained by other theories, most importantly, defensive realism. Analysis of U.S. international policy would be improved by dropping the LIO terminology entirely and reframing analysis in terms of grand strategy.
Topic:: International Relations, Grand Strategy, International Relations Theory, Liberal Order, and Trump
Political Geography:: United States and China

51. Proliferation and the Logic of the Nuclear Market

Author:: Eliza Gheorghe
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The evolution of the nuclear market explains why there are only nine members of the nuclear club, not twenty-five or more, as some analysts predicted. In the absence of a supplier cartel that can regulate nuclear transfers, the more suppliers there are, the more intense their competition will be, as they vie for market share. This commercial rivalry makes it easier for nuclear technology to spread, because buyers can play suppliers off against each other. The ensuing transfers help countries either acquire nuclear weapons or become hedgers. The great powers (China, Russia, and the United States) seek to thwart proliferation by limiting transfers and putting safeguards on potentially dangerous nuclear technologies. Their success depends on two structural factors: the global distribution of power and the intensity of the security rivalry among them. Thwarters are most likely to stem proliferation when the system is unipolar and least likely when it is multipolar. In bipolarity, their prospects fall somewhere in between. In addition, the more intense the rivalry among the great powers in bipolarity and multipolarity, the less effective they will be at curbing proliferation. Given the potential for intense security rivalry among today's great powers, the shift from unipolarity to multipolarity does not portend well for checking proliferation.
Topic:: International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, and International Relations Theory
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, and China

52. Buying Allies: Payment Practices in Multilateral Military Coalition-Building

Author:: Marina Henke
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Many countries serving in multilateral military coalitions are “paid” to do so, either in cash or in concessions relating to other international issues. An examination of hundreds of declassified archival sources as well as elite interviews relating to the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Iraq War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization operation in Afghanistan, the United Nations–African Union operation in Darfur, and the African Union operation in Somalia reveals that these payment practices follow a systematic pattern: pivotal states provide the means to cover such payments. These states reason that rewarding third parties to serve in multilateral coalitions holds important political benefits. Moreover, two distinct types of payment schemes exist: deployment subsidies and political side deals. Three types of states are most likely to receive such payments: (1) states that are inadequately resourced to deploy; (2) states that are perceived by the pivotal states as critical contributors to the coalition endeavor; and (3) opportunistic states that perceive a coalition deployment as an opportunity to negotiate a quid pro quo. These findings provide a novel perspective on what international burden sharing looks like in practice. Moreover, they raise important questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of such payment practices in multilateral military deployments.
Topic:: Security, National Security, Regional Cooperation, International Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Alliance
Political Geography:: United States, Iraq, Kuwait, Vietnam, Korea, and Somalia

53. Power and Profit at Sea: The Rise of the West in the Making of the International System

Author:: J.C. Sharman
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The making of the international system from c. 1500 reflected distinctively maritime dynamics, especially “gunboat diplomacy,” or the use of naval force for commercial gain. Comparisons between civilizations and across time show, first, that gunboat diplomacy was peculiarly European and, second, that it evolved through stages. For the majority of the modern era, violence was central to the commercial strategies of European state, private, and hybrid actors alike in the wider world. In contrast, large and small non-Western polities almost never sought to advance mercantile aims through naval coercion. European exceptionalism reflected a structural trade deficit, regional systemic dynamics favoring armed trade, and mercantilist beliefs. Changes in international norms later restricted the practice of gunboat diplomacy to states, as private navies became illegitimate. More generally, a maritime perspective suggests the need for a reappraisal of fundamental conceptual divisions and shows how the capital- and technology-intensive nature of naval war allowed relatively small European powers to be global players. It also explains how European expansion and the creation of the first global international system was built on dominance at sea centuries before Europeans’ general military superiority on land.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Navy, Law of the Sea, and Maritime
Political Geography:: United States and Europe

54. India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities

Author:: Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Is India shifting to a nuclear counterforce strategy? Continued aggression by Pakistan against India, enabled by Islamabad's nuclear strategy and India's inability to counter it, has prompted the leadership in Delhi to explore more flexible preemptive counterforce options in an attempt to reestablish deterrence. Increasingly, Indian officials are advancing the logic of counterforce targeting, and they have begun to lay out exceptions to India's long-standing no-first-use policy to potentially allow for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, India has been acquiring the components that its military would need to launch counterforce strikes. These include a growing number of accurate and responsive nuclear delivery systems, an array of surveillance platforms, and sophisticated missile defenses. Executing a counterforce strike against Pakistan, however, would be exceptionally difficult. Moreover, Pakistan's response to the mere fear that India might be pursuing a counterforce option could generate a dangerous regional arms race and crisis instability. A cycle of escalation would have significant implications not only for South Asia, but also for the broader nuclear landscape if other regional powers were similarly seduced by the temptations of nuclear counterforce.
Topic:: National Security, Terrorism, International Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, India, and Asia

55. The Demographic Transition Theory of War: Why Young Societies Are Conflict Prone and Old Societies Are the Most Peaceful

Author:: Deborah Jordan Brooks, Stephen G. Brooks, Brian D. Greenhill, and Mark L. Haas
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The world is experiencing a period of unprecedented demographic change. For the first time in human history, marked disparities in age structures exist across the globe. Around 40 percent of the world's population lives in countries with significant numbers of elderly citizens. In contrast, the majority of the world's people live in developing countries with very large numbers of young people as a proportion of the total population. Yet, demographically, most of the world's states with young populations are aging, and many are doing so quickly. This first-of-its kind systematic theoretical and empirical examination of how these demographic transitions influence the likelihood of interstate conflict shows that countries with a large number of young people as a proportion of the total population are the most prone to international conflict, whereas states with the oldest populations are the most peaceful. Although societal aging is likely to serve as a force for enhanced stability in most, and perhaps all, regions of the world over the long term, the road to a “demographic peace” is likely to be bumpy in many parts of the world in the short to medium term.
Topic:: Demographics, War, International Security, Democracy, and International Relations Theory
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Japan, China, Germany, and Global Focus

56. Bad World: The Negativity Bias in International Politics

Author:: Dominic D.P. Johnson and Dominic Tierney
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: A major puzzle in international relations is why states privilege negative over positive information. States tend to inflate threats, exhibit loss aversion, and learn more from failures than from successes. Rationalist accounts fail to explain this phenomenon, because systematically overweighting bad over good may in fact undermine state interests. New research in psychology, however, offers an explanation. The “negativity bias” has emerged as a fundamental principle of the human mind, in which people's response to positive and negative information is asymmetric. Negative factors have greater effects than positive factors across a wide range of psychological phenomena, including cognition, motivation, emotion, information processing, decision-making, learning, and memory. Put simply, bad is stronger than good. Scholars have long pointed to the role of positive biases, such as overconfidence, in causing war, but negative biases are actually more pervasive and may represent a core explanation for patterns of conflict. Positive and negative dispositions apply in different contexts. People privilege negative information about the external environment and other actors, but positive information about themselves. The coexistence of biases can increase the potential for conflict. Decisionmakers simultaneously exaggerate the severity of threats and exhibit overconfidence about their capacity to deal with them. Overall, the negativity bias is a potent force in human judgment and decisionmaking, with important implications for international relations theory and practice.
Topic:: Political Theory, Emotions, International Relations Theory, and Psychology
Political Geography:: Global Focus

57. Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage

Author:: Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Can countries easily imitate the United States' advanced weapon systems and thus erode its military-technological superiority? Scholarship in international relations theory generally assumes that rising states benefit from the “advantage of backwardness.” That is, by free riding on the research and technology of the most advanced countries, less developed states can allegedly close the military-technological gap with their rivals relatively easily and quickly. More recent works maintain that globalization, the emergence of dual-use components, and advances in communications have facilitated this process. This literature is built on shaky theoretical foundations, however, and its claims lack empirical support. In particular, it largely ignores one of the most important changes to have occurred in the realm of weapons development since the second industrial revolution: the exponential increase in the complexity of military technology. This increase in complexity has promoted a change in the system of production that has made the imitation and replication of the performance of state-of-the-art weapon systems harder—so much so as to offset the diffusing effects of globalization and advances in communications. An examination of the British-German naval rivalry (1890–1915) and China's efforts to imitate U.S. stealth fighters supports these findings.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Cybersecurity, and Information Age
Political Geography:: Britain, United States, China, and Germany

58. The Silk Road and the Gulf: A New Frontier for the RMB

Author:: Michael B Greenwald
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Many view the Belt and Road Initiative as the most geoeconomically significant infrastructure project since the Marshall Plan. Promising alternative trade routes, abundant capital flows, and advanced infrastructure to the developing world, the program has scaled significantly since its inception in 2013.
Topic:: International Affairs
Political Geography:: Global Focus

59. In the Gulf, China Plays to Win but US has Upper Hand

Author:: Michael B Greenwald
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Saudi Vision 2030 — Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s bid to diversify his nation’s oil-dependent economy — is one of the most consequential development plans in modern history. So it was no surprise to see MbS, as he is known, grinning with Chinese leaders during his Asian investment trip last month. As Chinese officials raved about the “enormous potential” of the Saudi economy, Saudi officials praised the compatibility of Chinese and Saudi cultures, and MbS even defended China’s maltreatment of Muslim Uighurs
Topic:: International Affairs
Political Geography:: Global Focus

60. Envisioning a New Economic Middle East: Reshaping the Gulf with Israel

Author:: Michael B Greenwald
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: We can envision the advent of a new economic revolution forming in the Shia crescent as a new, cohesive political force in the Middle East between Sunni Gulf Arabs and Israel by deepening rapprochement to counter Iran’s expansion. Alongside years of discreet contact and informal diplomatic backchannels between Gulf Countries and Israel, the future portends closer economic links between these power blocs. With the combination of Israeli technology and Gulf capital, there is no shortage of synergies eager to be developed, as Gulf States explore new visionary economic reforms looking beyond a dependence on oil revenues.
Topic:: International Affairs
Political Geography:: Israel

61. Kazakhs Wary of Chinese Embrace as BRI Gathers Steam

Author:: Philippe Le Corre
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Kazakhstan is one of China’s direct neighbours, and a prominent one by size and border. As the Chinese proverb states, “a close neighbour is more valuable than a distant relative”,[1] hence the importance of Sino-Kazakh ties, especially at a time when Beijing tries to promote its “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) across Eurasia. The country has a 1782.75 km-long border with China, and shares much history and people with the former Middle Kingdom. Although data is sparse, it is known that many Uyghurs –the main tribe of Xinjiang, China’s troubled autonomous region – live in Kazakhstan. There are also ethnic Kazakhs living on the Chinese side, in Xinjiang (many of them facing great political difficulties, if not persecutions).
Topic:: International Relations and International Affairs
Political Geography:: China

62. The Islamic Revolution at 40

Author:: Djavad Salehi-Isfahani
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The Islamic Republic of Iran marks its 40th anniversary this week. But, with the country beset by a severe economic crisis, the question on everyone’s lips –within Iran and the diaspora alike – seems to be whether the Islamic Revolution has actually improved Iranians’ lives.
Topic:: International Political Economy and International Affairs
Political Geography:: Iran

63. 3 Reasons Why the Fed Wants to Keep Raising Interest Rates

Author:: Martin S. Feldstein
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Earlier this month, the Federal Reserve’s policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee voted unanimously to increase the short-term interest rate by a quarter of a percentage point, taking it from 2.25% to 2.5%. This was the fourth increase in 12 months, a sequence that had been projected a year ago, and the FOMC members also indicated that there would be two more quarter-point increases in 2019. The announcement soon met with widespread disapproval.
Topic:: International Affairs and Financial Markets
Political Geography:: Global Focus

64. National Counter-Information Operations Strategy

Author:: Gabriel Cederberg and Jordan D'Amato
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: American democracy is under attack. From the daily news to our social media feeds, nation-state competitors target the United States and its citizens, seeking to fuel division and chaos at home while undermining our interests abroad and our will to defend them. It is critical that policymakers and citizens understand these threats and how to counter them. This playbook seeks to ensure that U.S. citizens, not foreign actors, determine the future of U.S. democracy.
Topic:: Global Focus
Political Geography:: Global Focus

65. A Vision for Nuclear Security

Author:: Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The goal of global nuclear security efforts should be a world in which all countries with nuclear weapons, highly enriched uranium (HEU), separated plutonium, and nuclear facilities whose sabotage could cause a major radiation release have reduced the risk of nuclear theft and sabotage to the lowest possible level. This will require policymakers, regulators, and operators to commit to a continuous process of striving for excellence in nuclear security performance.
Topic:: Security, Environment, Science and Technology, International Security, Natural Resources, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Global Focus

66. Combating Complacency about Nuclear Terrorism

Author:: Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Complacency about the threat of nuclear terrorism—the belief that nuclear and radiological terrorism threats are minimal and existing security measures are sufficient to address them—is the fundamental barrier to strengthening nuclear security. Many factors can lead to complacency, but the most significant contributors are lack of knowledge about: events related to nuclear terrorism; weaknesses of nuclear security systems; and the capabilities demonstrated by thieves around the world. People will be more likely to take action to strengthen nuclear security if they believe that nuclear terrorism poses a real threat to their own country’s interests and their actions can significantly reduce the threat. There have been many incidents in recent years that demonstrate the need for strong and sustainable security at both military and civilian nuclear facilities.
Topic:: Security, Environment, Science and Technology, International Security, Natural Resources, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: Global Focus

67. Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials Worldwide: Expanded Funding Needed for a More Ambitious Approach

Author:: Matthew Bunn, Nickolas Roth, and William H. Tobey
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The Trump administration budget request for programs to reduce the dangers of nuclear theft and terrorism is too small to implement the ambitious approach that is needed. Congress should increase funding in this critical area; direct the administration to develop and implement a comprehensive plan for improving security for nuclear weapons and materials worldwide; and exert expanded oversight of this effort. This brief highlights the importance of ongoing nuclear security work; describes the evolving budget picture; and outlines recommendations for congressional action.
Topic:: Security, Environment, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, International Security, Natural Resources, and Budget
Political Geography:: United States of America

68. India's New Nuclear Thinking: Counterforce, Crises, and Consequences

Author:: Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Bottom Lines Counterforce incentives. Pakistan’s threats of nuclear first use have given India incentives to develop disarming capabilities that might neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities in a future conflict. The goal of such a shift would be to allow New Delhi to recapture the space it believed it had lost for conventional retaliation, without fear of nuclear use from Pakistan and without having to engage in tit-for-tat nuclear warfighting. Expanding options without doctrinal change. This risk of first-strike instability may force India to consider circumstances under which it could use nuclear weapons preemptively, posing a challenge to its long-standing “no first use” (NFU) declaration. Senior former officials have argued that preemption may be consistent with India’s NFU policy, meaning that Indian nuclear strategy may be changing even without any public revisions to its declaratory doctrine. Growing but still insufficient capabilities. India has dramatically expanded the number of precise nuclear-armed and conventional weapons that it possesses that can strike deep into Pakistan, along with the necessary systems and infrastructure to find and destroy Pakistani nuclear systems and intercept any forces it may miss with missile defenses. Nevertheless, it is far from achieving the ability to execute counterforce strikes against Pakistani nuclear targets, but even the mere pursuit of such options creates both an arms race on the Indian subcontinent as well as dangerous incentives to strike first in a crisis.
Topic:: International Security, Military Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

69. A Europe that Protects? U.S. Opportunities in EU Defense

Author:: Seth Johnston
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Europe is pursuing significant new defense initiatives that span capability development, policy, and institutional cooperation. Many of these efforts occur under the auspices of the European Union and are part of the EU’s longstanding aim to grow itself as a security and foreign policy actor. But real security challenges in Europe—from Russian aggression to terrorism and regional instability—have contributed to the importance and potential of European efforts. The political dynamics of the transatlantic relationship may also favor Europe’s initiatives: although the Trump administration’s calls for greater European defense spending have rankled European leaders and U.S. officials have legitimate concerns about the details of EU initiatives, the larger issue of strengthening European defense is consistent with U.S. goals. The EU’s security and defense efforts have implications for the transatlantic economy and defense industry, the NATO alliance, and U.S.-European relations generally. While the United States should work to ensure continued transatlantic defense policy coordination, secure and competitive markets for the defense industry, and preservation of the longstanding principle of ‘no duplication’ with NATO, it should also broadly support European efforts to invest more and more wisely on defense. Both the United States and Europe stand to benefit from greater European defense investment and capability. The history of intra-European and transatlantic differences over European defense cooperation endures in the EU’s current efforts. But today’s environment favors change and represents a rare opportunity for bold action.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, International Security, Europe, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

70. Inadvertent Escalation and the Entanglement of Nuclear Command-and-Control Capabilities

Author:: James M. Acton
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: This policy brief is based on “Escalation through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and- Control Systems Raises the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War,” which appears in the summer 2018 issue of International Security.
Topic:: International Relations, International Security, and International Affairs
Political Geography:: Global Focus

71. How the U.S. Foreign Policy Establishment Constrains American Grand Strategy

Author:: Patrick Porter
Publication Date:: 06-2018
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Political scientists and historians continue to debate the sources of U.S. grand strategy. Some emphasize the importance of the United States’ material capabilities and large share of relative power; others point to the significance of ideas in shaping policymakers’ choices. Both accounts are incomplete. Two case studies—the first eighteen months of the presidency of Donald Trump and the presidency of Bill Clinton—demonstrate that the United States persists with a strategy of primacy because it has become a habit—an axiomatic, sacrosanct belief system that the American foreign policy establishment perpetuates.
Topic:: International Affairs and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Global Focus

72. Policy Evolution Under the Clean Air Act

Author:: Richard Schmalensee and Robert Stavins
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The U.S. Clean Air Act, passed in 1970 with strong bipartisan support, was the first environmental law to give the Federal government a serious regulatory role, established the architecture of the U.S. air pollution control system, and became a model for subsequent environmental laws in the United States and globally. We outline the Act’s key provisions, as well as the main changes Congress has made to it over time. We assess the evolution of air pollution control policy under the Clean Air Act, with particular attention to the types of policy instruments used. We provide a generic assessment of the major types of policy instruments, and we trace and assess the historical evolution of EPA’s policy instrument use, with particular focus on the increased use of market-based policy instruments, beginning in the 1970s and culminating in the 1990s. Over the past fifty years, air pollution regulation has gradually become much more complex, and over the past twenty years, policy debates have become increasingly partisan and polarized, to the point that it has become impossible to amend the Act or pass other legislation to address the new threat of climate change.
Topic:: Climate Change and International Affairs
Political Geography:: Global Focus

73. GHG Cap-and-Trade: Implications for Effective and Efficient Climate Policy in Oregon

Author:: Todd Schatzki and Robert Stavins
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Like many other states, Oregon has begun to pursue climate policies to attempt to fill the gap created by the lack of effective climate policy at the Federal level. After adopting a variety of policies to address climate change and other environmental impacts from energy use, Oregon is now contemplating the adoption of a greenhouse gas (GHG) cap-and-trade system. However, interactions between policies can have important consequences for environmental and economic outcomes. Thus, as Oregon considers taking this step, reconsidering the efficacy of its other current climate policies may better position the state to achieve long-run emission reductions at sustainable economic costs.
Topic:: International Affairs
Political Geography:: Global Focus

74. Jihadists from Ex-Soviet Central Asia: Where Are They? Why Did They Radicalize? What Next?

Author:: Edward Lemon, Vera Mironova, and William H. Tobey
Publication Date:: 08-2018
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: In the fall of 2016 Fletcher School professor Monica Duffy Toft and I were completing work on an issue brief in which we argued that the Islamic State should be further rolled back and dismantled rather than allowed to remain in the hopes that it would somehow become a normal state. IS was already in retreat at the time, having lost much of the territories it had once controlled in Syria and Iraq.
Topic:: International Affairs
Political Geography:: Global Focus

75. No Exceptions: The Decision to Open All Military Positions to Women

Author:: Ash Carter
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: As Secretary of Defense, I devoted a large amount of my time to visiting our troops at bases around the world. These were my favorite trips because they gave me the opportunity to spend time with the most important, dynamic, and inspiring part of the United States Armed Forces: our people In June 2016, I visited Fort Knox on one of these trips, where I met with Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) cadets and observed their training. These were college students training to be commissioned officers. Meeting with them, I felt an overwhelming sense of pride. Any American who had the chance to look these young women and men in the eye would be proud to observe how dedicated, disciplined, talented, and principled they are. And to know what they are doing for all Americans—to protect us and make a better world for our children—makes you even prouder.
Topic:: International Affairs
Political Geography:: Global Focus

76. Governance of Highly Decentralized Nonstate Actors: the Case of Solar Geoengineering

Author:: Jesse Reynolds and Gernot Wagner
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: New technologies, such as social media and do-it-yourself biotechnology, alter the capacities and incentives of both state and nonstate actors. This can include enabling direct decentralized interventions, in turn altering actors’ power relations. The provision of global public goods, widely regarded as states’ domain, so far has eluded such powerful technological disruptions. We here introduce the idea of highly decentralized solar geoengineering, plausibly done in form of small high-altitude balloons. While solar geoengineering has the potential to greatly reduce climate change, it has generally been conceived as centralized and state deployed. Potential highly decentralized deployment moves the activity from the already contested arena of state action to that of environmentally motivated nongovernmental organizations and individuals, which could disrupt international relations and pose novel challenges for technology and environmental policy. We explore its feasibility, political implications, and governance.
Topic:: Climate Change and International Affairs
Political Geography:: Global Focus

77. Governing Cooperative Approaches under the Paris Agreement

Author:: Michael A Mehling
Publication Date:: 11-2018
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Parties to the Paris Agreement can engage in voluntary cooperation and use internationally transferred mitigation outcomes towards their national climate pledges. Doing so promises to lower the cost of achieving agreed climate objectives, which can, in turn, allow Parties to increase their mitigation efforts with given resources. Lower costs do not automatically translate into greater climate ambition, however. Transfers that involve questionable mitigation outcomes can effectively increase overall emissions, affirming the need for a sound regulatory framework. As Parties negotiate guidance on the implementation of cooperative approaches under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement, they are therefore considering governance options to secure environmental integrity and address the question of overall climate ambition. Drawing on an analytical framework that incorporates economic theory and deliberative jurisprudence, practical case studies, and treaty interpretation, this Working Paper maps central positions of actors in the negotiations and evaluates relevant options included in the latest textual proposal.
Topic:: Climate Change and International Organization
Political Geography:: Global Focus

78. From Silicon Valley to Shenzhen: Dollar Exposures in Chinese Fintech

Author:: Michael B Greenwald
Publication Date:: 12-2018
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: In the post-9/11 era, Washington has waged innovative campaigns against terrorism finance, sanctions evasion, and money laundering. Leveraging America’s heavyweight status in the international financial system, the United States Treasury has isolated and bankrupted rogue regimes, global terrorists, and their enablers. As financial technology transforms global business, the traditional financial system faces new competition across a suite of offerings, ranging from brokerage services to peer to peer lending. In no area is this clearer than in mobile payments, where a global hegemon lies ready to exercise its weight, and it is not the United States
Topic:: International Relations, International Affairs, and Financial Markets
Political Geography:: Global Focus

79. The China Tariff Mess

Author:: Martin S. Feldstein
Publication Date:: 09-2018
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The cost to US consumers and firms imposed by tariffs on Chinese imports is not large relative to the gain that would be achieved if the US succeeds in persuading China to stop illegally taking US firms’ technology. But the Trump administration should state that this is the goal, and that the tariffs will be removed when it is met.
Topic:: International Cooperation, International Political Economy, and International Affairs
Political Geography:: Global Focus

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS