Publishing Institution: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University / Political Geography: China

1. Updating Estimates of Methane Emissions: The Case of China

Author:: Zichong Chen and Daniel Jacob
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The Harvard Initiative to Reduce Global Methane Emissions released its first publication in May 2023: a research brief titled “Updating Estimates of Methane Emissions: The Case of China.” The Initiative is one of five interdisciplinary research clusters funded by the Salata Institute for Climate and Sustainability at Harvard University. The Harvard Project on Climate Agreements collaborates in the implementation of the Initiative. The brief summarizes research by Professor Daniel Jacob and postdoctoral fellow Zichong Chen, atmospheric scientists at Harvard University, with their colleagues. Jacob and Chen use high-resolution data from the TROPOspheric Monitoring Instrument (TROPOMI), onboard a satellite launched in 2017, to estimate national and sectoral methane emissions more accurately than has been possible in the past. They draw upon atmospheric transport models to invert the satellite observations of methane concentrations, using advanced statistical methods, and infer emissions quantities and locations from the observed atmospheric concentrations. This method has yielded generally higher estimates of emissions than in previous reports, including in the case of China. Future methane-initiative briefs will address similar research the authors and their colleagues are conducting in the United States, Latin America, North Africa, and other countries and regions. An accurate picture of aggregate and sector-level methane emissions is important to better target mitigation policies. It is hoped that the results of the research described here and in subsequent briefs will advance national efforts and international collaboration aimed at reducing methane emissions. The Harvard Initiative to Reduce Global Methane Emissions seeks meaningful and sustained progress in global methane-emissions reductions through research and effective engagement with policymakers in government and key stakeholders in business, nongovernmental organizations, and international institutions. Reduced methane emissions can significantly reduce, in the near term, the magnitude of climate change and its associated impacts. The Initiative’s objectives span the full range of disciplines and topics associated with this challenge. Among its objectives are to build on scientific research on measurement and attribution of emissions; understand legal, regulatory, and political opportunities and constraints to methane-emissions reductions in the United States; design policies that might best contribute to methane emissions reduction; work effectively through existing international venues, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; and define roles that business and international and multilateral organizations can play in this effort.
Topic:: Climate Change, Methane, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: China and Asia

2. Outsiders Wanting In: Asian States and Arctic Governance

Author:: Calvin Heng and Eyck Freymann
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The strategic interests of Asian countries in the Arctic continue to grow despite the disruptions of the COVID-19 pandemic and the geopolitical fallout of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. China and India have their eye on Russia’s Arctic energy resources, and China is further seeking to leverage Russian weakness to expand its operational presence in the Arctic Ocean. Japan, South Korea, and Singapore are less prominent in Arctic regional institutions, yet they have distinctive interests in Arctic science, governance, and resources and are resuming dialogue about Arctic matters amongst themselves. This policy brief reviews the key differences in how Asian states are approaching the Arctic through a survey of their strategic documents, public statements, and diplomatic and commercial activities.
Topic:: Governance, Multilateral Relations, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Asia, South Korea, Singapore, and Arctic

3. China’s Rise and U.S. Defense Implications

Author:: Marco Lyons and Natalia Angel
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: What are the international implications of China’s rise? What developments may be expected, and what should U.S. national defense leaders do about the likely effects of these developments? China is a rising power but even if that cannot be said to translate into a security threat to the United States directly, there is little reason to believe that Beijing will not take action to get out from under what it perceives as unfriendly U.S.-led global diplomatic, economic, and security orders. In very broad terms, U.S. defense policy makers will need to address the change from military capabilities for enforcing a liberal international order, to capabilities for both advancing and protecting friendly regional or even sub-regional orders. China’s potential power is sizable and increasing based on a large population and growing national wealth and this potential power makes its neighbors fear that it will become the regional hegemon. Since other states in the region cannot predict if or when Beijing will make a bid for hegemony, relations are beset with uncertainty. Weaker neighbors, like Vietnam and Laos in Southeast Asia, can be expected to accommodate Beijing more while trying to benefit from Chinese economic growth when and where possible.1 The U.S. security allies can be expected to cooperate more with each other while calling for more visible displays of U.S. commitment (including more military force presence).2 India will become more important to U.S. strategy as a link between Australia and Thailand, and the Middle East and Central Asia, and the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, and International Security
Political Geography:: China and United States of America

4. China: The Renewable Hydrogen Superpower?

Author:: Nicola De Blasio and Fridolin Pflugmann
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: President Xi Jinping’s pledge during the 2020 United Nations General Assembly, that China would reach peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060, is a significant step in the fight against climate change. Since China is the world’s top contributor of greenhouse gases, there is no doubt that Beijing needs to be front and center of any effort to curb global emissions. In 2019, China accounted for almost 30 percent of global emissions, about twice as much as the second largest emitter, the United States.1 But while U.S. emissions have been on an overall decline since 2007,2 China’s have increased, raising concerns over whether Beijing can actually deliver on its targets. This reality should not distract from the fact that China is also the world’s top developer of renewables and other clean energy technologies. For example, China was the world’s largest installer of photovoltaics (PV) by 2013 and, in less than two years, also became the global leader in solar module manufacturing. At the same time, China leveraged its industrial might and economies of scale to drive down modules’ costs—which, by the end of 2018, were 90 percent lower than only ten years before. In this context, renewable hydrogen could significantly accelerate China’s transition to a low-carbon economy, increasing the likelihood of meeting its carbon neutrality goal. Renewable hydrogen offers significant advantages for China. It can help Beijing meet its climate and pollution goals—at a time when coal continues to dominate—while avoiding increased reliance on imported fuels. As a readily dispatchable means of storing energy, hydrogen can help to address intermittency and curtailment issues as renewable energy increases its share of China’s energy mix. As a sustainable mobility energy carrier, it can power fuel-cell electric vehicles or be the base for synthetic fuels. Finally, renewable hydrogen can open new avenues for developing clean technology manufactured goods for both internal and export markets. Today, most of China’s hydrogen is produced from coal via 1,000 gasifiers, accounting for 5% of the country’s total coal consumption. Hydrogen costs vary significantly as a function of production technology and prices of fossil fuels and electricity. Production from coal remains the lowest cost option: about 30 percent cheaper than hydrogen from natural gas. Therefore, reducing the carbon footprint of coal-based hydrogen will be critical in a low-carbon economy. In the medium term, coal-based hydrogen with carbon capture, utilization and storage will likely remain China’s lowest-cost clean hydrogen production pathway. Hence, the underlying question is whether Beijing will prioritize cost considerations or put its full industrial might behind the development and deployment of renewable hydrogen. In March 2019, the Chinese government took a significant step forward by announcing measures to promote the construction of hydrogen facilities for new energy vehicles. Wan Gang, who is known as China’s “father of the electric car,” called for China to “look into establishing a hydrogen society” and “move further toward fuel cells.”3 Given that Gang made a similar call two decades ago on vehicle electrification, which played a key role in China’s current battery electric vehicles market dominance, close attention is warranted.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, Renewable Energy, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:: China and Asia-Pacific

5. Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression: China’s Changing Strategy in Xinjiang

Author:: Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Myunghee Lee, and Emir Yazici
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: In early 2017, the Chinese Communist Party changed its internal security strategy in Xinjiang, escalating collective detention, ideological re-education, and pressure on Uyghur diaspora networks. This strategy shift was likely catalyzed by changing perceptions of Uyghur involvement in transnational Islamic militancy in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, heightening perceived domestic vulnerability to terrorism.
Topic:: Security, Human Rights, Minorities, Counter-terrorism, and Repression
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Xinjiang

6. Chinese Coercion in the South China Sea: Resolve and Costs

Author:: Ketian Zhang
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: China’s coercive behavior in the post–Cold War period suggests three patterns. First, China uses coercion when it wants to establish a reputation for resolve. Second, China has been a cautious bully, resorting to coercion only infrequently. Third, when China perceives the “geopolitical backlash cost” of military coercion to be high, it chooses instead to use sanctions and grayzone coercion. (“Geopolitical backlash cost” refers here to the possibility that the target state will seek to balance against China, with the potential for U.S. military involvement.) When China perceives the geopolitical backlash cost to be low, it is more likely to use military coercion.
Topic:: Sovereignty, Power Politics, Geopolitics, and Economy
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and South China Sea

7. China’s National Carbon Market: Paradox and Potential

Author:: Cecilia Springer
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: China announced it would launch a national carbon market in 2017, yet this policy is taking years to come into effect. What will it take for a carbon market to work in command-and-control China? This policy brief explores an understudied challenge—emissions accounting—and identifies potential opportunities that have arisen in the first phase of China’s national carbon market.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economics, Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: China and Asia-Pacific

8. Kazakhs Wary of Chinese Embrace as BRI Gathers Steam

Author:: Philippe Le Corre
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Kazakhstan is one of China’s direct neighbours, and a prominent one by size and border. As the Chinese proverb states, “a close neighbour is more valuable than a distant relative”,[1] hence the importance of Sino-Kazakh ties, especially at a time when Beijing tries to promote its “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) across Eurasia. The country has a 1782.75 km-long border with China, and shares much history and people with the former Middle Kingdom. Although data is sparse, it is known that many Uyghurs –the main tribe of Xinjiang, China’s troubled autonomous region – live in Kazakhstan. There are also ethnic Kazakhs living on the Chinese side, in Xinjiang (many of them facing great political difficulties, if not persecutions).
Topic:: International Relations and International Affairs
Political Geography:: China

9. China in a World of Orders: Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing's International Relations

Author:: Alastair Iain Johnston
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Many scholars and policymakers in the United States accept the narrative that China is a revisionist state challenging the U.S.-dominated international liberal order. The narrative assumes that there is a singular liberal order and that it is obvious what constitutes a challenge to it. The concepts of order and challenge are, however, poorly operationalized. There are at least four plausible operationalizations of order, three of which are explicitly or implicitly embodied in the dominant narrative. These tend to assume, ahistorically, that U.S. interests and the content of the liberal order are almost identical. The fourth operationalization views order as an emergent property of the interaction of multiple state, substate, nonstate, and international actors. As a result, there are at least eight “issue-specific orders” (e.g., military, trade, information, and political development). Some of these China accepts; some it rejects; and some it is willing to live with. Given these multiple orders and varying levels of challenge, the narrative of a U.S.-dominated liberal international order being challenged by a revisionist China makes little conceptual or empirical sense. The findings point to the need to develop more generalizable ways of observing orders and compliance.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, Military Affairs, Information Age, and Liberal Order
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Asia

10. Dangerous Confidence? Chinese Views on Nuclear Escalation

Author:: Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Chinese views of nuclear escalation are key to assessing the potential for nuclear escalation in a crisis or armed conflict between the United States and China, but they have not been examined systematically. A review of original Chinese-language sources and interviews with members of China's strategic community suggest that China is skeptical that nuclear escalation could be controlled once nuclear weapons are used and, thus, leaders would be restrained from pursuing even limited use. These views are reflected in China's nuclear operational doctrine (which outlines plans for retaliatory strikes only and lacks any clear plans for limited nuclear use) and its force structure (which lacks tactical nuclear weapons). The long-standing decoupling of Chinese nuclear and conventional strategy, organizational biases within China's strategic community, and the availability of space, cyber, and conventional missile weapons as alternative sources of strategic leverage best explain Chinese views toward nuclear escalation. China's confidence that a U.S.-China conflict would not escalate to the use of nuclear weapons may hamper its ability to identify nuclear escalation risks in such a scenario. Meanwhile, U.S. scholars and policymakers emphasize the risk of inadvertent escalation in a conflict with China, but they are more confident than their Chinese counterparts that the use of nuclear weapons could remain limited. When combined, these contrasting views could create pressure for a U.S.-China conflict to escalate rapidly into an unlimited nuclear war.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Nuclear Power, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Asia

11. The Domestic Politics of Nuclear Choices

Author:: Elizabeth N. Saunders
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: When and how do domestic politics influence a state's nuclear choices? Recent scholarship on nuclear security develops many domestic-political explanations for different nuclear decisions. These explanations are partly the result of two welcome trends: first, scholars have expanded the nuclear timeline, examining state behavior before and after nuclear proliferation; and second, scholars have moved beyond blunt distinctions between democracies and autocracies to more fine-grained understandings of domestic constraints. But without linkages between them, new domestic-political findings could be dismissed as a laundry list of factors that do not explain significant variation in nuclear decisions. This review essay assesses recent research on domestic politics and nuclear security, and develops a framework that illuminates when and how domestic-political mechanisms are likely to affect nuclear choices. In contrast to most previous domestic arguments, many of the newer domestic-political mechanisms posited in the literature are in some way top-down; that is, they show leaders deliberately maintaining or loosening control over nuclear choices. Two dimensions govern the extent and nature of domestic-political influence on nuclear choices: the degree of threat uncertainty and the costs and benefits to leaders of expanding the circle of domestic actors involved in a nuclear decision. The framework developed in this review essay helps make sense of several cases explored in the recent nuclear security literature. It also has implications for understanding when and how domestic-political arguments might diverge from the predictions of security-based analyses.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Domestic Politics, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, Iran, and North Korea

12. Cautious Bully: Reputation, Resolve, and Beijing's Use of Coercion in the South China Sea

Author:: Ketian Zhang
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Since 1990, China has used coercion in its maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea, despite adverse implications for its image. China is curiously selective in its timing, targets, and tools of coercion: China rarely employs military coercion, and it does not coerce all countries that pose similar threats. An examination of newly available primary documents and hundreds of hours of interviews with Chinese officials to trace the decisionmaking processes behind China's use and nonuse of coercion reveals a new theory of when, why, and how China employs coercion against other states, especially in the South China Sea. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the findings show that China is a cautious bully that does not use coercion frequently. In addition, when China becomes stronger, it tends to use military coercion less often, choosing instead nonmilitary tools. Moreover, concerns with its reputation for resolve and with economic cost are critical elements of Chinese decisionmaking regarding the costs and benefits of coercing its neighbors. China often coerces one target to deter others—“killing the chicken to scare the monkey.” These findings have important implications for how scholars understand states' coercive strategies and the future of Chinese behavior in the region and beyond.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Military Affairs, and Maritime
Political Geography:: China, Beijing, and South China

13. Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order

Author:: John J. Mearsheimer
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The liberal international order, erected after the Cold War, was crumbling by 2019. It was flawed from the start and thus destined to fail. The spread of liberal democracy around the globe—essential for building that order—faced strong resistance because of nationalism, which emphasizes self-determination. Some targeted states also resisted U.S. efforts to promote liberal democracy for security-related reasons. Additionally, problems arose because a liberal order calls for states to delegate substantial decisionmaking authority to international institutions and to allow refugees and immigrants to move easily across borders. Modern nation-states privilege sovereignty and national identity, however, which guarantees trouble when institutions become powerful and borders porous. Furthermore, the hyperglobalization that is integral to the liberal order creates economic problems among the lower and middle classes within the liberal democracies, fueling a backlash against that order. Finally, the liberal order accelerated China's rise, which helped transform the system from unipolar to multipolar. A liberal international order is possible only in unipolarity. The new multipolar world will feature three realist orders: a thin international order that facilitates cooperation, and two bounded orders—one dominated by China, the other by the United States—poised for waging security competition between them.
Topic:: International Relations, International Relations Theory, and Liberal Order
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Europe

14. A Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal International Order Concept Is Misguided

Author:: Charles L. Glaser
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Well before President Donald Trump began rhetorically attacking U.S. allies and the open international trading system, policy analysts worried about challenges to the liberal international order (LIO). A more fundamental issue, however, has received little attention: the analytic value of framing U.S. security in terms of the LIO. Systematic examination shows that this framing creates far more confusion than insight. Even worse, the LIO framing could lead the United States to adopt overly competitive policies and unnecessarily resist change in the face of China's growing power. The “LIO concept”—the logics that proponents identify as underpinning the LIO—is focused inward, leaving it ill equipped to address interactions between members of the LIO and states that lie outside the LIO. In addition, the LIO concept suffers theoretical flaws that further undermine its explanatory value. The behavior that the LIO concept claims to explain—including cooperation under anarchy, effective Western balancing against the Soviet Union, the Cold War peace, and the lack of balancing against the United States following the Cold War—is better explained by other theories, most importantly, defensive realism. Analysis of U.S. international policy would be improved by dropping the LIO terminology entirely and reframing analysis in terms of grand strategy.
Topic:: International Relations, Grand Strategy, International Relations Theory, Liberal Order, and Trump
Political Geography:: United States and China

15. Proliferation and the Logic of the Nuclear Market

Author:: Eliza Gheorghe
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The evolution of the nuclear market explains why there are only nine members of the nuclear club, not twenty-five or more, as some analysts predicted. In the absence of a supplier cartel that can regulate nuclear transfers, the more suppliers there are, the more intense their competition will be, as they vie for market share. This commercial rivalry makes it easier for nuclear technology to spread, because buyers can play suppliers off against each other. The ensuing transfers help countries either acquire nuclear weapons or become hedgers. The great powers (China, Russia, and the United States) seek to thwart proliferation by limiting transfers and putting safeguards on potentially dangerous nuclear technologies. Their success depends on two structural factors: the global distribution of power and the intensity of the security rivalry among them. Thwarters are most likely to stem proliferation when the system is unipolar and least likely when it is multipolar. In bipolarity, their prospects fall somewhere in between. In addition, the more intense the rivalry among the great powers in bipolarity and multipolarity, the less effective they will be at curbing proliferation. Given the potential for intense security rivalry among today's great powers, the shift from unipolarity to multipolarity does not portend well for checking proliferation.
Topic:: International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, and International Relations Theory
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, and China

16. The Demographic Transition Theory of War: Why Young Societies Are Conflict Prone and Old Societies Are the Most Peaceful

Author:: Deborah Jordan Brooks, Stephen G. Brooks, Brian D. Greenhill, and Mark L. Haas
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The world is experiencing a period of unprecedented demographic change. For the first time in human history, marked disparities in age structures exist across the globe. Around 40 percent of the world's population lives in countries with significant numbers of elderly citizens. In contrast, the majority of the world's people live in developing countries with very large numbers of young people as a proportion of the total population. Yet, demographically, most of the world's states with young populations are aging, and many are doing so quickly. This first-of-its kind systematic theoretical and empirical examination of how these demographic transitions influence the likelihood of interstate conflict shows that countries with a large number of young people as a proportion of the total population are the most prone to international conflict, whereas states with the oldest populations are the most peaceful. Although societal aging is likely to serve as a force for enhanced stability in most, and perhaps all, regions of the world over the long term, the road to a “demographic peace” is likely to be bumpy in many parts of the world in the short to medium term.
Topic:: Demographics, War, International Security, Democracy, and International Relations Theory
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Japan, China, Germany, and Global Focus

17. Why China Has Not Caught Up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage

Author:: Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Can countries easily imitate the United States' advanced weapon systems and thus erode its military-technological superiority? Scholarship in international relations theory generally assumes that rising states benefit from the “advantage of backwardness.” That is, by free riding on the research and technology of the most advanced countries, less developed states can allegedly close the military-technological gap with their rivals relatively easily and quickly. More recent works maintain that globalization, the emergence of dual-use components, and advances in communications have facilitated this process. This literature is built on shaky theoretical foundations, however, and its claims lack empirical support. In particular, it largely ignores one of the most important changes to have occurred in the realm of weapons development since the second industrial revolution: the exponential increase in the complexity of military technology. This increase in complexity has promoted a change in the system of production that has made the imitation and replication of the performance of state-of-the-art weapon systems harder—so much so as to offset the diffusing effects of globalization and advances in communications. An examination of the British-German naval rivalry (1890–1915) and China's efforts to imitate U.S. stealth fighters supports these findings.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Cybersecurity, and Information Age
Political Geography:: Britain, United States, China, and Germany

18. Comparative Assessment of China and U.S. Policies to Meet Climate Change Targets

Author:: Xianchun Tan and Henry Lee
Publication Date:: 02-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: China and the United States together emit more than 40 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide (CO2) according to the latest available data.[1] Therefore any successful global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions must include meaningful contributions from both countries. Each country has started down this path by committing to reduce CO2 emissions and both have announced plans, policies, and programs to meet those commitments. However, the character of the carbon problem in each country is different and so while the plans, programs, and policies they are pursuing have some similarities, the emphasis is different.
Topic:: Climate Change, Energy Policy, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: China and United States of America

19. Pursuing a Low-Carbon Action Plan: The Case of Chongqing City

Author:: Xianchun Tan and Henry Lee
Publication Date:: 05-2017
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: China has committed to stabilize its greenhouse gas emissions and increase the percent of non-fossil fuel energy to 20% by 2030. This goal will require significant programmatic and policy changes across all sectors of its economy. The challenge is how to make these changes without incurring measurable political and economic costs. Ideally governments will draw lessons from efforts in other countries, but the Chinese system is unique. Hence it has created its own learning experiences by investing in multiple pilot policies and programs at the provincial and city levels. Many of China’s cities are very large and include multiple districts, counties, and neighborhoods; and each one can serve as the locus of a separate low carbon pilot. These pilots are designed by local officials that are informed by guidelines from the central government. Thus, China often will have many “policy experiments” all taking place simultaneously. Lessons from these pilots are then used in the development of national and provincial programs and guidelines that shape future local initiatives across the country. These pilots are the ultimate example of “learning by doing.”
Topic:: Energy Policy, Environment, Natural Resources, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:: China and Asia

20. Racing toward Tragedy? China's Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma

Author:: G. John Ikenberry and Adam P. Liff
Publication Date:: 01-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: In the post–Cold War period, scholars have considered the Asia Pacific to be ripe for military competition and conflict. Developments over the past decade have deepened these expectations. Across the region, rising military spending and efforts of various states to bolster their military capabilities appear to have created an increasingly volatile climate, along with potentially vicious cycles of mutual arming and rearming. In this context, claims that China's rapid economic growth and surging military spending are fomenting destabilizing arms races and security dilemmas are widespread. Such claims make for catchy headlines, yet they are rarely subject to rigorous empirical tests. Whether patterns of military competition in the Asia Pacific are in fact attributable to a security dilemma–based logic has important implications for international relations theory and foreign policy. The answer has direct consequences for how leaders can maximize the likelihood that peace and stability will prevail in this economically and strategically vital region. A systematic empirical test derived from influential theoretical scholarship on the security dilemma concept assesses the drivers of bilateral and multilateral frictions and military competition under way in the Asia Pacific. Security dilemma–driven competition appears to be an important contributor, yet the outcome is not structurally determined. Although this military competition could grow significantly in the near future, there are a number of available measures that could help to ameliorate or manage some of its worst aspects.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, and Cold War
Political Geography:: China and Asia

21. Pakistan's Forgotten Genocide—A Review Essay

Author:: Sumit Ganguly
Publication Date:: 01-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: In The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide, Gary Bass convincingly argues that the Nixon administration did little to rein in its ally Pakistan from perpetuating genocide against its own population largely because of Islamabad's vital role in facilitating U.S. diplomatic contact with the People's Republic of China. He also shows how the low strategic significance of South Asia for much of the global community, combined with an inordinate regard for the norm of sovereignty, led to a lack of support for the principle of humanitarian intervention. The Blood Telegram partially affirms the proposition that acts of genocide can stem from the choices of a handful of individuals who are determined to achieve a political goal using all available means.
Topic:: Genocide
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and South Asia

22. The Impact of China on Cybersecurity: Fiction and Friction

Author:: Jon R. Lindsay
Publication Date:: 02-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The ubiquity and interconnectedness of computers in global commerce, civil society, and military affairs create crosscutting challenges for policy and conceptual confusion for theory. The challenges and confusion in cybersecurity are particularly acute in the case of China, which has one of the world's fastest growing internet economies and one of its most active cyber operations programs. In 2013 U.S. National Security Adviser Tom Donilon singled out Chinese cyber intrusions as “not solely a national security concern or a concern of the U.S. government,” but also a major problem for firms suffering from “sophisticated, targeted theft of confidential business information and proprietary technologies . . . emanating from China on an unprecedented scale.” One U.S. congressman alleged that China has “established cyber war military units and laced the U.S. infrastructure with logic bombs.” He suggested that “America is under attack by digital bombs.” The discourse on China and cybersecurity routinely conflates issues as different as political censorship, unfair competition, assaults on infrastructure, and internet governance, even as all loom large for practical cyber policy. Although they involve similar information technologies, there is little reason to expect different political economic problems to obey the same strategic logic, nor should one necessarily expect China to enjoy relative advantage in all spheres.
Topic:: Security
Political Geography:: China

23. The Inscrutable Intentions of Great Powers

Author:: Sebastian Rosato
Publication Date:: 02-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Can great powers reach confident conclusions about the intentions of their peers? The answer to this question has important implications for U.S. national security policy. According to one popular view, the United States and China are destined to compete unless they can figure out each other's designs. A recent Brookings Institution report warns that although “Beijing and Washington seek to build a constructive partnership for the long run,” they may be headed for trouble given their “mutual distrust of [the other's] long-term intentions.” Similarly, foreign policy experts James Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon argue that “trust in both capitals...remains scarce, and the possibility of an accidental or even intentional conflict between the United States and China seems to be growing.” Reversing this logic, many analysts believe that U.S.-China relations may improve if the two sides clarify their intentions. Thus the Pentagon's latest strategic guidance document declares that if China wants to “avoid causing friction” in East Asia, then its military growth must be “accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions.” Meanwhile China scholars Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell recommend that even as the United States builds up its capabilities and alliances, it should “reassure Beijing that these moves are intended to create a balance of common interests rather than to threaten China.”
Topic:: Security and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Beijing

24. Why China Won't Abandon Its Nuclear Strategy of Assured Retaliation

Author:: Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel
Publication Date:: 12-2015
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in U.S.-China strategic stability. In recent years, the United States has been developing strategic capabilities such as missile defenses and conventional long-range strike capabilities that could reduce the effectiveness of China's deterrent. Writings by Chinese strategists and analysts, however, indicate that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: United States, China, and East Asia

25. A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation

Author:: Charles L. Glaser
Publication Date:: 03-2015
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Despite the intense focus on China's rise, the United States has yet to confront the most challenging question posed by this power shift: Should it pursue a strategy of limited geopolitical accommodation to avoid conflict? U.S. policy continues to focus almost entirely on preserving the geopolitical status quo in Northeast Asia. Given the shifting power balance in Asia, however, there are strong theoretical rationales for considering whether significant changes to the status quo could increase U.S. security. A possibility designed to provide the benefits of accommodation while reducing its risks is a grand bargain in which the United States ends its commitment to defend Taiwan and, in turn, China peacefully resolves its maritime disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepts the United States' long-term military security role in East Asia. In broad terms, the United States has three other options—unilateral accommodation, a concert of Asian powers, and the current U.S. rebalance to Asia. Unilateral accommodation and the rebalance have advantages that make the choice a close call, but all things considered, a grand bargain is currently the United States' best bet.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, International Cooperation, International Security, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: United States and China

26. Primacy or World Order? The United States and China's Rise-A Review Essay

Author:: Yuen Foong Khong
Publication Date:: 04-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: One of the early exhibits of the 2010 Shanghai Expo that greeted the visitor was a display of the Chinese living room through time. What made the otherwise prosaic display rise above the ordinary was its point of departure: the year 1978. The 1978 room was dim, dowdy, and equipped with the most basic furniture, reflecting a poor household. The 1988 living room offered visible improvements, while the 1998 living room had many, but not all, of the accoutrements of the middleclass living room. The 2008 living room—whether aspiration or reality—had it all: ambient lighting, leather sofas, and a plasma television screen. The message was clear: China today would prefer not to dwell on the past; the focus needs to be on economic modernization and its payoffs that began with Deng Xiaoping's opening up of China's economy in 1978.
Political Geography:: United States and China

27. "Debating China's Assertiveness"

Author:: Alastair Iain Johnston, Xiaoyu Pu, and Dingding Chen
Publication Date:: 04-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: In "How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?" Iain Johnston argues that China's recent foreign policy is not as assertive as many scholars and pundits contend. Johnston's study is a welcome addition to the literature on Chinese foreign policy in three respects. First, it is the most comprehensive study by a leading China scholar on China's new assertiveness. Second, it challenges the conventional understanding that this assertiveness is both unprecedented and aggressive by design. Third, it addresses potential problems of overestimating the threat from China.
Political Geography:: China

28. Securing China's Nuclear Future

Author:: Hui Zhang and Tuosheng Zhang
Publication Date:: 03-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the threat of nuclear terrorism has become one of the most significant challenges to international security. China has worked to meet this challenge, but a continuing effort is needed. The 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits raised the issues of nuclear security to a higher political level and enhanced international consensus on the danger of nuclear terrorism. China actively participated in the first two summits, and President Xi Jinping will participate in the Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands in March 2014. China's commitment to nuclear security is now well established. Former president Hu Jintao emphasized in 2012 that, "the threat of nuclear terrorism cannot be overlooked." Meeting that threat, as President Hu recognized, "is a long and arduous task."
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, and Border Control
Political Geography:: China and Asia

29. Why China Needs New Institutions to Cope with Looming Water Scarcity

Author:: Scott Moore
Publication Date:: 03-2014
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Few places in the world are facing such acute scarcity of water as is northern China, the region surrounding the nation's capital in Beijing. Over the past three decades, rapid economic development and population growth have caused a dramatic water shortage in the region. Groundwater tables have dropped so precipitously that in some places wells cannot be dug deep enough to reach water. Climate change is making rainfall more unpredictable, further darkening the picture for a region that is vital to both the Chinese and world economies. This brief looks at the so-far inadequate responses of the Chinese government and makes the case that new institutions are needed to allow China to meet this growing challenge.
Topic:: Energy Policy, Science and Technology, and Water
Political Geography:: China and Asia

30. "Domestic Coalitions, Internationalization, and War: Then and Now"

Author:: Etel Solingen
Publication Date:: 04-2014
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The sources of World War I are numerous and widely studied. Some scholars have argued that they are underdetermining individually but overdetermining collectively. The purpose of this article is not to fuel the battle among theories claiming complete explanatory power, but rather to examine some lessons for contemporary international relations. Much of the recent commentary on the war's centenary evokes similarities between Germany in 1914 and China in 2014, and between globalization then and now. There are crucial differences on both accounts, however.
Topic:: International Relations, Security, and War
Political Geography:: China and Germany

31. Harvard-Tsinghua Workshop on Market Mechanisms to Achieve a Low-Carbon Future for China

Author:: Henry Lee, Scott Moore, Sabrina Howell, and Alice Xia
Publication Date:: 10-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: In recent decades there has been a gradual transformation in environmental policy away from command-and-control policies and toward the use of more flexible, market-based mechanisms. This transformation is evident in the environmental policy of the United States, and the European Union where many scholars and policymakers have accepted the argument that, in comparison with more traditional regulatory approaches, market-centered solutions offer a cheaper and more efficient way to achieve many environmental policy objectives. While market mechanisms may work in certain economies and certain countries, whether they are appropriate for addressing the problem of climate change for countries without an institutionalized domestic market economy, such as china, is still an open question. This report summarizes the discussions, conclusions, and questions posed during The Harvard- Tsinghua Workshop on Market Mechanisms to Achieve a Low-Carbon Future for China. As the report makes clear, most participants believe that market mechanisms have a powerful role to play in achieving a low-carbon future for China. However, considerable differences emerged among the participants regarding the proper design and implementation of market mechanisms, and sig-nificant questions remain concerning the proper role of market mechanisms in addressing climate change. This report, and the workshop it summarizes, does not attempt to resolve these differences, but aims to contribute to an ongoing discussion on the future of climate policy in China. The re¬mainder of this Introduction describes the context for the workshop, its three thematic sessions, and outlines three over-arching themes that emerged. These themes are explored in the summaries of the three thematic sessions, while the Conclusion raises issues for further research. The impetus for the workshop was laid out in three public keynote speeches that addressed, respec¬tively, China's desire to achieve a low-carbon future, reasons to prefer market mechanisms over other potential solutions, and the importance of sustaining innovation in achieving climate policy objectives. China has adopted pilot cap-and-trade programs in five Provinces and two cities – to¬gether accounting for seven percent of the country's total carbon dioxide emissions. These pilots support a vision of achieving a “third industrial revolution” where economic growth and value-creation is de-coupled from carbon dioxide emissions. Second, market mechanisms are generally preferred by economists to regulation and subsidies as a means to reduce emissions because they achieve reductions at a lower overall cost, tend to direct emissions to their highest-value uses, and demand less institutional capacity since emitters rather than governments decide how to reduce emissions. Third, emissions reductions need to be linked to continual technological and policy in¬novation, as well as the need for proper design and implementation of market mechanisms. This point was emphasized with reference to the European Union Emissions Trading System (EUETS), where initial carbon permit prices were too low to incentivize low-carbon research and develop¬ment. The low initial price of the EUETS made it more palatable to industry, but too low to send a significant market signal due to institutional weaknesses and the economic downturn. The keynote addresses framed the discussion for the remainder of the workshop, which consisted of three off-the-record thematic sessions. Each thematic session focused on a different set of mar¬ket mechanisms to address different facets of the climate policy challenge. The first session exam¬ined instruments designed to limit and reduce emissions of carbon dioxide, either by imposition of a tax designed to internalize the external cost of climate disruption or through establishment of a cap-and-trade system whereby permits to emit carbon dioxide are issued under an overall cap set by government, and which can then be traded as some emitters make efficiency improvements. The second session examined the use of subsidies and other incentives to encourage clean technol¬ogy innovation, and the third session examined the potential for a water-rights trading system to allocate water resources under conditions of increasing scarcity triggered by disruption in precipi¬tation and increased evaporation rates. The workshop concluded with a session devoted to developing a framework for further research and debate on the use of market mechanisms to refine and advance China's climate policy. The framework centered on three over-arching issues concerning market mechanisms: policy mix, innovation systems, and governance. The first of these issues concerns the inclusion of market mechanisms in a broader mix of policy responses, including command-and-control, which may be combined to achieve specific policy objectives. The second concerns the use of market mecha¬nisms to develop, sustain, and enhance innovation systems that continually create new solutions and technologies to achieve a low-carbon future. The third concerns the importance of institutional design and governance systems to ensure the proper functioning of market mechanisms.
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Europe

32. Low Carbon Shanghai Avoiding Carbon Lock-In through Sustainable Urbanization

Author:: Wing Ho Tom Cheng, Gautam Kamath, Kevin Rowe, Eleanor Wood, and Taisen Yue
Publication Date:: 08-2014
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Shanghai will lock in a future of high energy costs and worsening air pollution if it does not change current policies for the planning, construction, and operation of new urban developments, particularly transportation systems, and buildings. This report assesses the policy frameworks for these systems and their implications for Shanghai's prospects as a low carbon city. The major obstacles to efficient, low carbon development are the fragmented planning system for land use and transportation, the insufficiently stringent building energy efficiency codes and the lack of investment in opportunities to encourage efficient consumer behavior. Carbon lock-in occurs when infrastructure projects, or other developments with long lifetimes, are designed with high-carbon characteristics that are difficult to reverse later. This issue is par¬ticularly acute for rapidly-urbanizing Shanghai, where there is an emphasis on keeping project costs low and completion times short. This report was prepared as a case study for the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), a prominent government-affiliated think tank in China. The recommendations are addressed to the Shanghai Municipal Government. Many recommendations hold relevance for the governments of other fast-growing Chinese cities facing similar carbon lock-in challenges to Shanghai.
Political Geography:: China and Shanghai

33. In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries

Author:: Keren Yarhi-Milo
Publication Date:: 10-2013
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: How do policymakers infer the long-term political intentions of their states' adversaries? This question has important theoretical, historical, and political significance. If British decisionmakers had understood the scope of Nazi Germany's intentions for Europe during the 1930s, the twentieth century might have looked very different. More recently, a Brookings report observes that “[t]he issue of mutual distrust of long-term intentions . . . has become a central concern in U.S.-China relations.” Statements by U.S. and Chinese officials confirm this suspicion. U.S. Ambassador to China Gary Locke noted “a concern, a question mark, by people all around the world and governments all around the world as to what China's intentions are.” Chinese officials, similarly, have indicated that Beijing regards recent U.S. policies as a “sophisticated ploy to frustrate China's growth.”
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Europe

34. Identifying Options for a New International Climate Regime Arising from the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action

Author:: Robert N. Stavins, Ottmar Edenhofer, and Christian Flachsland
Publication Date:: 10-2013
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The goal of the Harvard Project on Climate Agreements is to help identify and advance scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically pragmatic public policy options for addressing global climate change. Drawing upon leading thinkers in Argentina, Australia, China, Europe, India, Japan, and the United States, the Project conducts research on policy architecture, key design elements, and institutional dimensions of domestic climate policy and a post-2015 international climate policy regime. The Project is directed by Robert N. Stavins, Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government, Harvard Kennedy School.
Topic:: Climate Change, Economics, Energy Policy, Industrial Policy, International Cooperation, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Europe, and India

35. China's Fear of Contagion: Tiananmen Square and the Power of the European Example

Author:: M.E. Sarotte
Publication Date:: 10-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: For the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), erasing the memory of the June 4, 1989, Tiananmen Square massacre remains a full-time job. The party aggressively monitors and restricts media and internet commentary about the event. As Sinologist Jean-Philippe Béja has put it, during the last two decades it has not been possible "even so much as to mention the conjoined Chinese characters for 6 and 4" in web searches, so dissident postings refer instead to the imaginary date of May 35. Party censors make it "inconceivable for scholars to access Chinese archival sources" on Tiananmen, according to historian Chen Jian, and do not permit schoolchildren to study the topic; 1989 remains a "'forbidden zone' in the press, scholarship, and classroom teaching." The party still detains some of those who took part in the protest and does not allow others to leave the country. And every June 4, the CCP seeks to prevent any form of remembrance with detentions and a show of force by the pervasive Chinese security apparatus. The result, according to expert Perry Link, is that in to-day's People's Republic of China (PRC), "Most young people have barely heard about the events of 1989."
Topic:: Security
Political Geography:: China and Europe

36. Correspondence: Debating India's Pathway to Nuclearization

Author:: Karthika Sasikumar, Andrew B. Kennedy, Gaurav Kampani, and Jason Stone
Publication Date:: 10-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: In his article, Andrew Kennedy attributes India's nuclear restraint from 1964 to 1989 to (1) implicit nuclear umbrellas extended by the two superpowers and (2) the normative beliefs of Indian leaders. Using newly available declassified documents, he argues that India's apparent absence of nuclear balancing against China and Pakistan until the 1980s was a distortion of reality, because the balancing occurred in secret. Its means were implicit nuclear umbrellas, first extended against China in the mid-1960s by both superpowers and then from 1970 to 1991 by the former Soviet Union. As Soviet power in the mid-1980s waned, India resorted to internal balancing by developing an independent nuclear arsenal (pp. 151-152). Kennedy further claims that Indian leaders first sought security through international disarmament institutions. Only when that quest failed did they proceed with nuclear acquisition (pp. 144-146).
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, and India

37. Is a Nuclear Deal with Iran Possible? An Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear Negotiations

Author:: James K. Sebenius and Michael K. Singh
Publication Date:: 12-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Since assuming the presidency of the United States in January 2009, Barack Obama has tried both outreach and sanctions in an effort to halt Iran's progress toward a nuclear weapons capability. Yet neither President Obama's personal diplomacy nor several rounds of talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council-China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States-plus Germany (the "P5 1") nor escalating sanctions have deterred Tehran. Iran has not only continued but accelerated its nuclear progress, accumulating sufficient low-enriched uranium that, if further enriched, would be sufficient for five nuclear weapons. Consequently, as Iran makes major advances in its nuclear capabilities, speculation has increased that Israel or a United States-led coalition may be nearing the decision to conduct a military strike to disable Iran's nuclear program.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, Iran, and France

38. Debating China's Rise and U.S. Decline

Author:: Michael Beckley and Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson
Publication Date:: 12-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Michael Beckley's article deserves attention for challenging the view that the United States is declining because China is rising. Its ambiguous definition of decline, how - ever, sends the wrong impression about the distribution of economic and military power between the United States and China. Without being explicit, Beckley implies that the United States is not declining because the absolute difference of economic, military, and technological capabilities between the United States and China is growing. In contrast, both theory and history suggest that it is more important that the relative distribution of economic and military capabilities between the United States and China is falling: as I propose below, decline is best defined as a decrease in the ratio of economic and military capabilities between two great powers. As a result, even if the United States maintains a large advantage in absolute capabilities, the fact that U.S. capabilities are decreasing relative to China's means that China will find it easier to advance its interests where U.S. and Chinese goals diverge, while the United States' ability to pursue its own interests in world affairs will be increasingly constrained by Chinese power.
Political Geography:: United States and China

39. "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful"

Author:: Nuno P. Monteiro
Publication Date:: 01-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Since the collapse of the Soviet Union more than two decades ago, the United States has been the world's sole great power. It maintains a military that is one order of magnitude more powerful than any other; defense spending close to half of global military expenditures; a blue-water navy superior to all others combined; a chance at a splendid nuclear first strike over its erstwhile foe, Russia; a defense research and development budget that is 80 percent of the total defense expenditures of its most obvious future competitor, China; and unmatched global power-projection capabilities. The post-Cold War international system is thus unipolar.
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, and China

40. "China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure"

Author:: Michael Beckley
Publication Date:: 01-2012
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: According to the Global Language Monitor, which tracks the top 50,000 media sources throughout the world, the "rise of China" has been the most read-about news story of the twenty-first century, surpassing the September 11 terrorist attacks, the Iraq War, the election of Barack Obama, and the British royal wedding. One reason for the story's popularity, presumably, is that the rise of China entails the decline of the United States. While China's economy grows at 9 percent annually, the United States reels from economic recession, costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and massive budget deficits. This divergence in fortunes has produced two pieces of conventional wisdom in U.S. and Chinese foreign policy debates. First, the United States is in decline relative to China. Second, much of this decline is the result of globalization-the integration of national economies and resultant diffusion of technology from developed to developing countries-and the hegemonic burdens the United States bears to sustain globalization.
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, China, Iraq, and America

41. To Stay Ahead of China, Stay Engaged in Asia

Author:: Michael Beckley
Publication Date:: 01-2012
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Despite the hype about the rise of China, current power trends favor continued U.S. dominance. National power has three main material components: wealth, innovation, and military power. Over the last twenty years, China has fallen further behind the United States in all of these areas.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Asia

42. The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy: The Case for No First Use

Author:: Michael S. Gerson
Publication Date:: 02-2011
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Despite heightened expectations for significant change in U.S. nuclear policy—especially declaratory policy— the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review changes little from the past. The NPR's declaratory policy retains the option for the United States to use nuclear weapons first in a variety of circumstances, including in a first strike against Chinese, North Korean, Russian, and (perhaps) future Iranian nuclear forces. Equally important, the United States can threaten the first use of nuclear weapons to deter and, if necessary, respond, to a variety of nonnuclear contingencies, including large-scale conventional aggression by another nuclear power such as China or Russia and chemical or biological weapons (CBW) attacks from states such as Iran and North Korea.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, and North Korea

43. Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment

Author:: Paul MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent
Publication Date:: 05-2011
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: How do great powers respond to acute decline? The erosion of the relative power of the United States has scholars and policymakers reexamining this question. The central issue is whether prompt retrenchment is desirable or probable. Some pessimists counsel that retrenchment is a dangerous policy, because it shows weakness and invites attack. Robert Kagan, for example, warns, “A reduction in defense spending . . . would unnerve American allies and undercut efforts to gain greater cooperation. There is already a sense around the world, fed by irresponsible pundits here at home, that the United States is in terminal decline. Many fear that the economic crisis will cause the United States to pull back from overseas commitments. The announcement of a defense cutback would be taken by the world as evidence that the American retreat has begun.” Robert Kaplan likewise argues, “Husbanding our power in an effort to slow America's decline in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world would mean avoiding debilitating land entanglements and focusing instead on being more of an offshore balancer.... While this may be in America's interest, the very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies.... [L]essening our engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity. The disruptions we witness today are but a taste of what is to come should our country flinch from its international responsibilties.” The consequences of these views are clear: retrenchment should be avoided and forward defenses maintained into the indefinite future.
Topic:: Disaster Relief
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, and China

44. China's Aircraft Carrier: Chinese Naval Nationalism and Its Implications for the United States

Author:: Robert Ross
Publication Date:: 10-2011
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: In August 2011, after years of planning and development, China launched its first aircraft carrier—the refurbished Soviet carrier Varyag—which China purchased from Ukraine in 1998. This development represents a major benchmark in China's naval modernization program. In addition, there are reports that China is building two aircraft carriers, which means that within five years the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) could possess a total of three such vessels.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Ukraine

45. Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy

Author:: Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko
Publication Date:: 04-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Since the end of the Cold War, scholars and foreign policy analysts have debated the type of world order that the United States should strive to create—a hegemonic system, a multilateral institutional system, or a great power concert. Initially, a major issue was whether attempts to maintain U.S. primacy would stimulate counter - balancing from other states. But since the 2003 Iraq War, a new consideration has emerged—how to persuade other states to cooperate with U.S. global governance. States that do not oppose efforts by the United States to maintain stability may nonetheless decline to follow its leadership. This is a matter for concern because although the United States can act alone, it cannot succeed on such issues as controlling terrorism, curbing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), rebuilding failed states, or maintaining economic stability without help from other states.
Topic:: Cold War
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, and Iraq

46. "China's Search for Assured Retaliation: The Evolution of Chinese Nuclear Strategy and Force Structure"

Author:: M. Taylor Fravel and Evan S. Medeiros
Publication Date:: 09-2010
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: On October 16, 1964, China exploded its first nuclear weapon at the Lop Nor test facility in Xinjiang. China's subsequent development of its nuclear strategy and force structure presents a puzzle for scholars and policymakers alike. Following its initial development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile capabilities, China built a small, unsophisticated, and, arguably, highly vulnerable nu - clear force. In addition, for more than three decades, the pace of China's nuclear modernization efforts was slow and gradual despite the continued vulnerability of its force. In relative terms, China's nuclear forces were far smaller and less diverse than those of the United States or the Soviet Union both during and after the Cold War. At the same time, China did not develop detailed operational doctrine for overcoming its relative inferiority, let alone for the effective use of its arsenal. Such a nuclear posture called into question the credibility of China's ability to deter states with much larger arsenals, more refined doctrines, and more powerful conventional military forces. In retrospect, the degree of vulnerability that China was willing to accept after developing nuclear weapons is striking.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: United States and China

47. Energy Innovation Policy in Major Emerging Countries

Author:: Ruud Kempener
Publication Date:: 12-2010
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Over the past decade, the six BRIMCS countries— Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico, China, and South Africa—have become important global players in political and economic domains. In 2007, they were collectively responsible for a third of the world's energy consumption, driven by China's growing energy use. Despite their increasing significance in the world's energy sector, very little systematic analysis of their energy investments, innovation institutions, and energy innovation policies has taken place. The International Energy Agency (IEA) is one of the few agencies that have been collecting data on ERD investments, but none of the BRIMCS countries are members.
Topic:: Emerging Markets, Energy Policy, Oil, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:: Russia, China, India, South Africa, Brazil, and Mexico

48. Options for Reforming the Clean Development Mechanism

Publication Date:: 08-2009
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)-established by the Kyoto Protocol of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change-is an emissions offset program that allows industrialized countries to receive credits for funding emissions reduction projects in developing countries. The program is intended to provide a cost-effective way for industrialized countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, while at the same time supporting sustainable development in developing countries. However, the CDM has been criticized for its lengthy and expensive project approval procedures, its exclusion of many categories of potentially important mitigation activities, and its methodologies for calculating whether projects actually reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In response to these problems, this Issue Brief presents a variety of options for reforming the CDM.
Topic:: Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:: China, India, and Brazil

49. Improving U.S.-China Relations: The Next Steps

Author:: Richard N. Rosecrance
Publication Date:: 09-2009
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: A higher Renminbi will have two advantages: for the United States, it will help to equilibrate the past trade imbalance; for China, it will stimulate consumption (and enhance imports). It will therefore help China switch from a purely exporting strategy to one that maintains domestic growth through internal consumption. The goods that were to be sent abroad can now be consumed by an increasingly middle class nation at home. These steps will bring China and the United States closer economically and increase international stability. However, unless the military-security relations of the two countries improve, this will not be a sufficient remedy for the two nations' long term problems.
Topic:: International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Germany

50. On China's Commercial Reprocessing Policy

Author:: Hui Zhang
Publication Date:: 07-2009
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: China is currently operating eleven nuclear power reactors with installed capacity of 9 GWe, and it plans to increase its total nuclear capacity to 40 GWe by 2020. China is seeking to reprocess the civilian spent fuel, and to recycle the plutonium in MOX fuel for its light water reactors (LWRs) and fast breeder reactors (FBRs). A pilot reprocessing plant with a capacity of 50-100 THM/a is ready to operate now. A larger commercial reprocessing plant and a MOX fabrication plant are expected to be in commission around the year 2020. Also, the China Experimental Fast Reactor (CEFR), capable of producing 25 MWe of power, will be operating soon. Furthermore, larger commercial FBRs are planned to be commissioned around 2030-2035. This paper will first discuss the status of China's nuclear power reactors, breeders, and civilian reprocessing programs. In addition, this paper will examine whether the breeders and civilian reprocessing programs make sense for China, taking into account costs, proliferation risks, energy security tradeoffs, health and environmental risks, and spent fuel management issues.
Topic:: Security, Energy Policy, and Environment
Political Geography:: China

51. Bad Debts: Assessing China's Financial Influence in Great Power Politics

Author:: Daniel W. Drezner
Publication Date:: 10-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: China has challenged the United States on multiple policy fronts since the beginning of 2009. On the security dimension, Chinese ships have engaged in multiple skirmishes with U.S. surveillance vessels in an effort to hinder American efforts to collect naval intelligence. China has also pressed the United States on the economic policy front. Prime Minister Wen Jiabao told reporters that he was concerned about China's investments in the United States: “We have lent a huge amount of money to the U.S. Of course we are concerned about the safety of our assets. To be honest, I am definitely a little worried.” The head of the People's Bank of China, Zhou Xiaochuan, followed up with a white paper suggesting a shift away from the dollar as the world's reserve currency. China's government has issued repeated calls for a greater voice in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. To bolster this call, Beijing helped to organize a summit of the leaders of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) to better articulate this message.
Topic:: Security, Debt, Government, and Intelligence
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, India, and Brazil

52. Beyond Zero Enrichment: Suggestions for an Iranian Nuclear Deal

Author:: Matthew Bunn
Publication Date:: 11-2009
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The United States and the other members of the P5+1 are struggling to launch the first in-depth negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program in which the United States has participated. The United States comes to the table with few good options. Sanctions have failed to change Iran's decisions about its nuclear program, and no feasible set of sanctions (given the limits of what China, Russia, and others will agree to) is likely to convince Iran to give up its enrichment program. Military strikes against Iran would probably not set back Iran's program for longer than a brief period and would greatly increase Iran's incentive to go straight to the bomb at covert sites (as Iraq did after Israel destroyed its facilities at Osiraq).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, China, and Middle East

53. "Bridge over Troubled Water? Envisioning a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement"

Author:: Phillip C. Saunders and Scott L. Kastner
Publication Date:: 04-2009
Content Type:: Journal Article
Journal:: International Security
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: After eight years of cross-strait tensions, the decisive 2008 Taiwan election victories by the Kuomintang (KMT, or Nationalist Party) and KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou provide a major opportunity to improve relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party welcomed Ma's victory as reducing the threat of Taiwan independence and creating an atmosphere for resumed dialogue and closer ties. Recognizing that final resolution of Taiwan's status is currently impossible, leaders on both sides have raised the possibility of negotiating a peace agreement that might stabilize the cross-strait situation. If successful, an agreement might greatly reduce the chance of a crisis that could draw the United States and China into a military conflict. Such an agreement could also provide a positive example that might apply to other cases of long-term political or ethnic conflict. This article examines what a China-Taiwan peace agreement might look like and whether it could be effective in managing tensions and reducing the risk of war.
Topic:: War and Water
Political Geography:: United States, China, and Taiwan

54. Keeping an Eye on an Unruly Neighbor: Chinese Views of Economic Reform and Stability in North Korea

Author:: Scott Snyder, Bonnie Glaser, and John Park
Publication Date:: 01-2008
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Beijing viewed North Korea's explosion of a nuclear device in October 2006 as not only an act of defiance to the international community and a threat to regional stability, but also an act of defiance toward China. Chinese officials admit that their toolbox for managing the North Korean nuclear weapons challenge must now include a combination of pressure and inducements. Three considerations underpin Beijing's aid policy toward North Korea: 1) protecting China's military-strategic environment; 2) maintaining security and stability along the Sino-DPRK border; and 3) sustaining economic development and political stability in the three Chinese northeastern provinces that border North Korea. There are intense debates among Chinese analysts over: 1) whether North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons; 2) the strategic value of the DPRK to China; 3) whether the Sino-DPRK treaty should be revised, abandoned, retained and its ambiguity stressed to enhance deterrence; and 4) the likelihood of a rapid improvement in U.S.-DPRK relations and how such a development would affect Chinese interests. Chinese analysts are generally less concerned with North Korea's immediate economic prospects than they were last year, reporting severe but stable conditions. Inflation has subsided and market mechanisms have largely replaced government rations as the primary means for securing a livelihood. In contrast to last year, when Chinese analysts were consumed by the seeming zero-sum choice between stability and reform facing the North Korean leadership, North Korea's slightly improved economic situation seems to have allayed the immediacy of Chinese concerns about North Korea's economic stability. Chinese experts report no fundamental change in North Korea's economic policies following the 2002 reforms. Chinese analysts provide conflicting assessments of whether government attempts to prohibit selling of grain in markets are succeeding and the extent to which the grain rationing system is working. Chinese DPRK specialists are encouraged that the DPRK has haltingly adopted some agricultural and market reforms and allowed greater autonomy to individual factories and enterprises. But they acknowledge that North Korea has not yet allowed farmers to act independently of their work teams, a step China took as early as the late 1970s that raised productivity sharply. Chinese analysts anticipate that reforms will continue as long as they do not threaten central government control. Chinese analysts widely assert that the North Korean system remains stable and they are confident that it will remain so for at least several years absent the sudden death of Kim Jong Il or external interference aimed at destabilizing the regime. In the long run, however, sustainable development through economic reform remains an essential prerequisite for stability, and North Korea's ability to move down that path is not yet assured. There are numerous indicators that the Chinese examine to assess stability trends in North Korea. These indicators are grouped in the following manner: 1) factionalism in the regime and potential challenges to Kim Jong Il's leadership; 2) political controls and ideological education; 3) influences from the outside; 4) the general public's loyalty to the Kim family; 5) crimes and illicit activities; 6) the economy, food supply, and economic reform; and 7) Kim Jong Il's health and the leadership succession. Chinese analysts see few signs of immediate instability in any of these areas at present, but they worry that the potential for instability may grow. In the event of instability in North Korea, China's priority will be to prevent refugees from flooding across the border. If deemed necessary, PLA troops would be dispatched into North Korea. China's strong preference is to receive formal authorization and coordinate closely with the United Nations (UN) in such an endeavor. However, if the international community did not react in a timely manner as internal order in North Korea deteriorated rapidly, China would seek to take the initiative in restoring stability. Contingency plans are in place for the PLA to perform at least three possible missions in the DPRK: 1) humanitarian missions such as assisting refugees or providing help after a natural disaster; 2) peacekeeping or “order keeping” missions such as serving as civil police; and 3) “environmental control” missions to clean up nuclear contamination resulting from a strike on North Korean nuclear facilities near the Sino-DPRK border and secure “loose nukes” and fissile material. There is apparent new willingness among Chinese institute analysts and PLA researchers to discuss the warning signs of instability in North Korea and how China might respond if the situation gets out of control and threatens Chinese security. Some Chinese experts say explicitly that they favor holding a discussion on stability in North Korea in official channels with the United States, including possible joint responses in support of common objectives such as securing nuclear weapons and fissile material. Other analysts maintain that such discussions are premature.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and United Nations
Political Geography:: United States, China, Beijing, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

55. Osirak Redux?

Author:: Whitney Raas and Austin Long
Publication Date:: 04-2007
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: The use of military force to halt or reverse nuclear proliferation is an option that has been much discussed and occasionally exercised. In the 1960s, for example, the United States considered destroying China's nuclear program at an early stage but ultimately decided against it. More recently, the key rationale for the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the threat posed by Iraq's suspected inventory of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although significant evidence of WMD was not found in the Iraq case, the potential utility of military force for counterproliferation remains, particularly in the case of Iran. The possibility of military action against Iranian nuclear facilities has gained prominence in the public discourse, drawing comments from journalists, former military officers, and defense analysts. This makes the Iranian nuclear program a potential test case for military counterproliferation.
Topic:: International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: United States, China, Iran, and Asia

56. If Not Balancing, What? Forms of Resistance to American Hegemony

Author:: Jeremy Pressman
Publication Date:: 03-2004
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: While traditional understandings of international affairs would predict the formation of a balancing coalition against the dominant U.S. position in world affairs, some analysts now contend that the U.S. advantage is so comprehensive and so unprecedented that we have not seen and will not see balancing behavior on the part of second tier powers like China, Russia, Japan, and Germany. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that the absence of balancing means the United States will not face any meaningful opposition in the international arena. Though in the short term a bloc of states is unlikely to form a counter-coalition. the historical form of resistance to dominant powers other states still find important ways to resist U.S. dominance.
Topic:: International Relations and Defense Policy
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Japan, China, and Germany

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS