Publishing Institution: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) / Political Geography: Middle East / Publication Year: within 10 Years and within 25 Years

1. Youth, Peace, and Security in Iraq: Operationalizing Youth Peacebuilding Priorities in Practice

Author:: Arab Reform Initiative
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: In December 2020, the Government of Iraq, under the auspices of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, together with UNFPA and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (Swedish Agency for Peace, Security and Development), formally launched the National Coalition on Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS) in Iraq. As part of the government’s commitment to fulfilling the vision of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 (UNSCR 2250) and its subsequent resolutions 2419 and 2535, the Coalition seeks to act as a bridge linking grassroots youth peace activists and community leaders with formal decision-making circles in Iraq. The Coalition advocates for the implementation of the YPS agenda through policies and programs, facilitates the exchange of experiences, knowledge, and information amongst Coalition members and YPS actors, and supports the empowerment of youth to meaningfully participate and take leading roles in peace-building processes. The success of this Coalition is of prime importance at this critical juncture in Iraq’s history. In the aftermath of ISIS’ defeat, the wave of popular mobilization in the central and southern provinces largely led by youth, and the recent parliamentary elections in October 2021, Iraq is in an important phase of reconstruction. The country’s challenges are numerous and include maintaining stability and securing the sovereignty of the State, reinforcing pro-democracy forces and the rule of law, improving the economy and provision of services, and ensuring that redistribution meets citizens’ demands for economic, political, and social justice. More importantly, there exist important cohorts among young women and men in Iraq that are keen to participate in these various processes of reconstruction and to leave conflicts and disputes behind. Youth peace activists, youth-led grassroots initiatives and community leaders have already been conducting myriad actions on the ground to contribute to rebuilding the Iraqi society and many are of the opinion that this is one of the main paths to sustainable peace. The YPS agenda can be used as a common framework for dialogue and partnerships between youth and decision-makers. Moreover, including youth in decision-making processes can render policies not only better adapted to the needs and aspirations of citizens, but can also help increase the legitimacy of the process itself and ensure sustainability. Fulfilling the YPS agenda and creating successful mechanisms for Iraqi youth’s inclusion and incorporation in building, sustaining, and taking ownership of peace and development processes is thus essential to the reconstruction of the Iraqi nation-State and its prosperity and stability going forward. Yet, in order to ensure that youth’s participation is meaningful, it is essential to take as the point of departure youth’s own priorities for peace and security in practice, and what youth-owned political participation looks like on the ground. In other words, operationalizing the YPS agenda should aim to operationalize into practice the priorities that young women and men themselves set, with the support of decision-makers and YPS actors. On 7 December 2021, the Arab Reform Initiative and the Folke Bernadotte Academy organized a virtual closed policy dialogue, held under Chatham House Rule, bringing together governmental actors, youth activists (members of the YPS Coalition), researchers, policy makers, and advisors to collectively reflect on what meaningful youth inclusion in peace and development in Iraq looks like. This discussion included exploring what “peace,” “security,” and “participation” actually mean to Iraqi youth in theory and practice and considering examples of youth participation in peacebuilding on the ground and what good practices can be derived from them. The discussion also drew insights from good practices in other contexts in the region, and assessed the types of policies, approaches, and programs that can support Iraqi youth’s participation on both formal and informal levels. In doing so, this policy dialogue contributed to defining the various means and methods to operationalize a youth-owned YPS agenda in Iraq.
Topic:: Security, Youth, Peace, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

2. From inside and outside: Palestinian youth reshaping old electoral systems

Author:: Andrew Findell-Aghnatios and Tala Majzoub
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: In preparation for the first national elections in over 10 years, large numbers of Palestinian youth mobilized both inside and outside traditional political structures to voice their demands. This paper examines the modalities of their mobilization, their approaches to political reform, and the barriers that impede their meaningful participation in local politics. It concludes with recommendations on how to ensure greater integration of youth in the Palestinian political sphere.
Topic:: Social Movement, Elections, Democracy, Youth, Participation, and Mobilization
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

3. National ambition, divergent vision: Consensus and fracture among Iraqi youth activists of the Tishreen Movement

Author:: Sarah Anne Rennick and Adel Bakawan
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Since October 2019, Iraq has been witnessing a mass protest movement, heavily though not exclusively centered in Baghdad and the country’s southern provinces and largely led by youth. This new uprising, referred to as the October Revolution or Tishreen protests, while initially fueled by socioeconomic grievances and the lack of basic services, quickly transformed into a broader political movement calling for radical change to the political order. Rallying around the slogan “we want a homeland,” a hallmark of this new movement has been the effort on the part of activists to put forth a new collective Iraqi identity, moving past sectarian divides and envisioning new state-society relations and a break with the transactional social contract currently in place. Yet despite this overarching vision of national renewal through both radical political reform and reconceived bases of collective belonging, the extent to which the movement actually represents a unified vision for the Iraqi nation and a strategic means by which to renew the State is far from obvious. The radically different political trajectories that the country’s different regions have been on since 2011, and in particular since 2014, have led to important fractures in terms of security, ideology, and power structures at the sub-regional level. As a result, the relationship with and attitudes towards different ideas, forms of collective action, and political and security players vary considerably from region to region. Likewise, the difficulty with which activists can freely meet and move around has meant that exchange and the consolidation of their movement around a unified set of claims has not fully occurred. Indeed, in speaking with youth leaders of the Tishreen movement from various cities across the country,1 what becomes obvious is that while the large lines of national renewal are agreed upon – the need for a new Iraqi identity and new basis for Iraqi nationalism, radical transformation in the practice of power – important points of fracture in their own vision as well as methods for achieving change can be identified. Nonetheless, a shared oppositional consciousness and dedication to the movement itself, as well as underlying and perhaps generationally significant importance assigned to secularism, act as resources for continued mobilization despite repression and strategic impasse.
Topic:: Youth, Youth Movement, Consensus, and Activim
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

4. The Lebanese diaspora and the upcoming elections: Lessons from the 2018 voting

Author:: Georgia Dagher
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: This report examines the choices of the Lebanese diaspora in the 2018 parliamentary elections—the first time out of country voting was allowed—in order to offer some insights on the diaspora’s vote potential impact in the upcoming elections. Wide efforts to encourage the diaspora to vote, led by Lebanese activists all over the world, have succeeded in getting over 225,624 Lebanese on the out of country voters’ list—almost a threefold increase from the last elections in 2018.
Topic:: Diaspora, Elections, Voting, Participation, and Identity
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

5. Powerful tool or passing trend? Meanings and practices of social accountability in the Arab world, and why they matter

Author:: Sylvia I. Bergh, Francesco Colin, Hicham Jadaoun, Intissar Kherigi, and Ward Vloeberghs
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Commentary and Analysis
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Accountable governance has become a frequent demand by ordinary citizens across Arab societies. The region has witnessed a variety of bottom-up citizen-led initiatives in recent years, driven by widespread discontent at the uneven distribution of civil, political and social rights. Various countries have seen the emergence of “participatory” processes such as participatory budgeting, consultative committees, and social audits. These initiatives are often labeled as “social accountability initiatives”, a concept championed by civil society actors and donors alike, to empower citizens and bring about improved public services. What we mean by social accountability here is “any citizen-led action beyond elections that aims to enhance the accountability of state actors”. The concept was promoted by international organizations such as the World Bank, as a “short route to accountability” to strengthen the role of citizens as “service users” and generate greater government responsiveness. But beyond donor strategies, what does social accountability actually mean to local actors in the region? Is it an effective means to bring about improved governance? We studied such initiatives in Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco to examine how social accountability initiatives are being used by civil society actors in their strategies to make government more accountable to citizens. We found that the concept has many different meanings for people on the ground, and that civil society organizations in the region have developed a range of strategies for pressuring, coercing and cooperating with government to exact accountability. However, our study[1] also shows that doubts remain as to whether such initiatives can lead to systemic change in the region. [1] The study was based on a recent research project funded by the International Institute of Social Study (ISS) at Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR), the Centre of Expertise on Global Governance at The Hague University of Applied Sciences, and Erasmus University College Rotterdam (EUC). It was presented at a recent seminar discussion. We are grateful to Louise Haagh, Elodie Hermsen, and Mark Prins for taking useful notes at this seminar.
Topic:: Civil Society, Accountability, Social Order, and Social Change
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, Gulf Nations, and MENA

6. Impacting policies: Waste management and advocacy in Lebanon

Author:: Samar Khalil
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Since 1994, Lebanon's waste management policy has consisted of implementing a series of emergency plans, each partially and poorly executed, and extended until a new crisis emerged. Devoid of any measures to move to long-term, sustainable planning, these local emergency fixes to the lingering waste crisis have incurred high financial costs for citizens as well as negative environmental, health, and safety impacts. Lebanese citizens are paying a high price for solid waste management (SWM). Lebanon spends $154.5 to manage every ton of solid waste, compared to Algeria, Jordan, and Syria which spend $7.22, $22.8, and $21.55, respectively (Human Rights Watch, 2020). The solid waste sector ranked first in terms of environment-related government spending in Lebanon, with a total of $647 million spent between 1998 and 2008 (Arif & Doumani, 2014). Expenditures on SWM reached $2.2 billion between 1996 and 2015 (Akiki, 2019). Despite these high expenditures, the cost of environmental degradation (COED) from the solid waste sector was around $66.5 million (0.2% of national GDP) in 2012 (Arif & Doumani, 2014), increasing to $200 million (0.4% of GDP) in 2018 (MoE, UNDP, 2019). To date, around 20% of the waste is recovered, out of which only 6% reaches recycling facilities, 36% is landfilled, and 44% is dumped in around 940 open dumps scattered throughout the country (MoE, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, 2020). At the same time, the private company contracted since 1994 to collect and treat much of Lebanon’s waste – Sukleen (part of the Averda Group) – has generated over $170 million in revenues per year, one of the highest waste management revenues in the world (Chaaban, 2016). Sukleen has held a monopoly in waste management in Beirut and Mount Lebanon since the 1990s, when it won a contract for building, testing, and operating a waste incinerator located in the city of Amrousiyeh. Operation at that site was short-lived as angry residents burned the plant down in 1996, but through other contracts, Sukleen came to handle around 50% of the waste generated nationally, serving around 400 municipalities (Chaaban, 2016). The company’s contract was renewed three times by the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) without an open tender. With each contract renewal, collection and processing fees increased, all paid using transfers from the Independent Municipal Fund, an intergovernmental grant system that disburses taxes and fees to municipalities. Successive plans for integrated solid waste management (ISWM) – in 2006, 2010, 2014, 2015 and 2019 – never bore fruit. Instead, Sukleen’s monopoly persisted in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, with its contracts managed by the central government rather than the municipalities. Meanwhile, in other regions, municipalities and federations of municipalities managed their waste following a decentralized approach, with international aid being channelled to finance Mechanical-Biological Treatment (MBT) plants for sorting and composting, achieving low diversion rates from landfills and dumps (Azzi, 2017).
Topic:: Governance, Decentralization, Waste, and Management
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

7. Iraqi youth in contexts of conflict: Fragmentation, divergent strategies, and the impossibility of inclusion

Author:: Adel Bakawan
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: What are the various consequences on a young person’s life trajectory when she or he comes into adulthood in a context of conflict? What happens to anticipated plans for the future – education, marriage, first employment – when they are profoundly disrupted by the eruption of conflict, and what types of coping mechanisms and strategies are adopted by youth in the face of such disruptions? And how does the transition into adulthood in a fluid normative context – where violence can be abundant, gender traditional roles can be upended, and trauma widespread – shape individual political values and beliefs as well as social relations with the community and within the family? In exploring how youth navigate their own lives and construct themselves when the transition to adulthood occurs in a context of conflict, evidence shows that conflict acts as both an opportunity and a constraint to youth in terms of livelihood opportunities, pathways for wellbeing, experiences of political inclusion, and feelings of empowerment and disempowerment. At the same time, though, youth trajectories during contexts of conflict are neither linear nor strictly dependent on the structure of available opportunities. Indeed, how youth make decisions with regards to their own lives, and the factors that influence their decision-making, demonstrate complex processes involving specific contextual factors, the configuration of social relations, and positionality within conflict dynamics, among others. In this sense, youth trajectories in contexts of conflict are both highly diverse and often unexpected but also, critically, can shift repeatedly. Unpacking this complexity is of critical importance, though, if we are to grasp the multiple and even contradictory ways in which conflict impacts the trajectories of young adults. It also critical to understanding the broader implications at the societal level in terms of future patterns of political participation, beliefs, and attitudes as well social and gender relations within and between communities and generations. From 2020-2021, the Arab Reform Initiative undertook a broad research program to investigate the personal trajectories of youth in conflict, focusing on those who have come into adulthood since 2011 in Libya, Iraq, and Syria. This research, based on 75 qualitative semi-structured interviews in each country and, where possible, focus group discussions, has investigated the perceptions and decision-making processes of youth and broader-term implications in political, economic, social, and personal terms. More precisely, this research investigated youth trajectories and broader social and political implications through analysis at three distinct levels. At the micro-level, the research investigated the personal narratives of youth and how they view the impact of the conflict in terms of personal self-construction. This included investigating their decision-making matrices and aspirations, the coping strategies they have found, as well as how they have felt empowered/disempowered in the context of conflict. At the meso-level, the research explored the contextual factors mediating youth’s decision-making and their margins of maneuver, including war and peacebuilding economies, existing programming and external aid for youth, shifting power structures and social hierarchies, and normative fluctuations, conducting intersectional analysis to understand how different social positions (ethnicity, religion, gender, class, etc.) shape different narratives and strategies. Finally, at the meta-level, the research sought to assess the diverse political and peacebuilding content with regards to youth values, agency, and forms of engagement, focusing in particular on youth meaningful political participation, everyday practices of peacebuilding, and the establishment of gender equality if and where it occurred. The study presented here relays the outcomes of the research undertaken with Iraqi youth, where field interviews took place in 2020 in the cities of Mosul and Basra, sites where different types of conflict have occurred, ranging from the violent conflict with ISIS to the transformative social conflict of the Tishreen protest movement. In taking stock of these in-depth and highly personal interviews, this study contributes new knowledge and insights regarding how the transition to adulthood under conflict has impacted the acquisition of experiences and skills, needs and aspirations, and changes in perceptions and perspectives of Iraqi youth. The research presented here thus explores how youth narrate their personal trajectories and the impact of events on their own lives, but also how they understand the country’s political evolution and the nature of the conflict itself. The study explores what factors (moral, ideological, political, social, economic, personal, or other) motivate or drive their decisions, how they perceive of opportunities and constraints for their own pathways, and how they find or create opportunities for themselves. The study also investigates how gender norms and gender performative roles been transformed as a result of the conflicts and the impact of these changes in their own social relations and aspirations for the future. Finally, the study sheds light on Iraqi youth’s personal attitudes towards violence and non-violence, what concepts such as peace, justice, and reconciliation actually mean to them and what they look like in practice, and the extent to which youth perceive of agency in their own lives and the roles they seek to play in renewing the political order and social contract of Iraq.
Topic:: Youth, Youth Movement, Identity, and Inclusion
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

8. Unpacking solid waste management policies in Lebanon: Public policies based on power-sharing politics rather than evidence-based decision-making

Author:: Cynthia Kreidy
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: iles of garbage have again been accumulating on the streets of major Lebanese cities.1 2 A scenario that is all too familiar and takes us back to 2014 when Sukleen – the company contracted to manage solid waste in Beirut and Mount Lebanon – halted its operations and streets were filled with piles of garbage for months. 3 Once again Lebanon is on the verge of another waste crisis, but this time from a more vulnerable and dire state. Solid waste has been ravaging the streets of Beirut and Mount Lebanon for numerous reasons. These include the contractor not getting paid, the high cost of transportation which reduces the frequency of collection,4 the closure of landfills which are at capacity, or even the obstruction of works at the landfills due to trespassers waiting to collect metals and other valuable materials to sell them amid Lebanon’s heaviest economic and financial crises.5 The absence of sustainable and integrated solid waste management (SWM) in Lebanon has denied citizens their right to health.6 Open dumping and burning, which have been occurring due to the inaction of regulatory authorities, have negative health impacts on nearby residents. Some individuals have reported respiratory illnesses and skin problems, while others complain about bad mental health.7 Additionally, open burning could be linked to cancer and heart disease. These practices have disproportionately affected poor communities, given that burning sites are often in their vicinity and that they cannot afford health care.8 Moreover, the cost of environmental degradation due to the lack of a comprehensive SWM plan was equivalent to $66.5 million in 20129 ) and $200 million in 201810 . The cost of environmental degradation is reflected by a loss of welfare demonstrated by the degradation in the quality of life, economic losses, and environmental losses, among others.11 The solid waste sector contributed to around 10% of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2011, largely due to open dumping and burning across the country.12 13 An integrated solid waste management strategy at the national level is the only long-term solution to the solid waste problem. In the absence of such a plan, and following the solid waste crisis in 2015, several grassroots movements, civil society organizations and municipalities have tried to remedy the absence of a national plan by leading small-scale interventions based on sorting at source and waste valorization in order to minimize volumes of waste sent to landfills.14 15 16 However, none of these projects is implementable at the national level, since these initiatives rely on a municipality’s rare, and voluntary will. This paper employs a systems analysis to explore how solid waste mismanagement has been an intentional political decision-making process tailored to nurture and protect dysfunctionality through elite capture and clientelism. The hypothesis will be presented using a Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) which will then be analyzed and validated via case studies involving the municipalities of Beit Mery, Dhour Choueir, and Brih.
Topic:: Leadership, Waste, and Resource Management
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

9. Perceptions and Trajectories of Youth in Baghdad, Al-Basra, and Mosul after the 2014 Conflict with ISIS

Author:: Farah Al Shami
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: This infographics report analyzes and interprets quantitative data that was collected by the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) in Summer 2021 using an extensive in-person/face-to-face survey targeting 676 youth (aged 18-28) in three Iraqi cities (Baghdad, Al-Basra, and Nineveh-Mosul). By doing so, the report aims at assessing the impact of the 2014 conflict with ISIS in Iraq on the perceptions, aspirations, and actual trajectories of youth living in these three cities, namely in terms of education, employment and livelihoods, political participation, civic engagement and peacebuilding efforts, as well as choices for personal life. The survey is part of the Arab Reform Initiative’s broader work on how youth in Iraq and other Arab countries have navigated armed conflicts in the last decade. We find that the conflict has had a significant negative impact on Iraqi youth’s education and employment, and that this impact is more pronounced on education compared to employment. This impact happened mainly through the channel of economic hardship and – to a lesser extent – the channel of fear, uncertainty, and security concerns. This impact has also largely shaped the surveyed youth’s personal lives and choices. Moreover, surveyed youth expressed apathy towards formal politics and fear of engaging in politics or expressing political views/affiliations/support because of security concerns. The 2014 conflict has had a significantly more negative impact on Iraqi youth’s political participation than on their civic engagement. Although our data shows that the overall impact of the conflict on these different dimensions is significant, the magnitude of this impact is substantially less than one may have expected. We found that the negative impact of the conflict is of a higher magnitude on the actual status quo of Iraqi youth compared to their aspirations and their perceptions of its actual impact. For instance, when asked general questions about the factors affecting their trajectories, Iraqi youth did not or rarely chose “the Iraqi ISIS conflict,” whereas when they were directly asked about the impact of this conflict on their trajectories, their answers exhibited a significant importance given to the conflict. In our report, we present various reasons that explain these observations and discrepancies, some of which come from our data and others from our understanding of the Iraqi context.
Topic:: Security, Youth Culture, ISIS, Youth, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

10. Recycling Policies from the Bottom Up: Waste Work in Lebanon

Author:: Elizabeth Saleh
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Discussions on waste policy in Lebanon tend to focus on the country’s corrupt practices and the health and environmental impact of bad waste management. This paper examines an overlooked aspect: the story of waste pickers — many of whom are economic or forced migrants — who are essential to Lebanon’s garbage management. Through an ethnographic study of a group of underage waste pickers, it argues that it is time for policy debates on garbage in Lebanon to integrate the perspective of waste workers.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Labor Issues, Recycling, and Garbage
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

11. Iraq’s New Electoral Law: Old Powers Adapting to Change

Author:: Omar Al-Jaffal
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: In December 2019, the Iraqi parliament approved a new electoral law following demonstrations calling for fundamental political change. However, it took over 11 months for the president to ratify it as Iraq’s political parties fought over the shape of electoral districts. This article examines the disputes that surrounded the adoption of the law and the compromises that led to diluting its potential for reform. It concludes that while the new law represents a small step in the right direction, it ultimately is insufficient to respond to the aspirations of protestors looking for an overhaul of their political representation.
Topic:: Reform, Elections, Democracy, and Transition
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

12. COVID-19 Vaccination in the Time of Austerity: How and for Whom?

Author:: Joelle M. Abi-Rached and Pascale Salameh
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: As countries begin to roll out vaccination for COVID-19, the Lebanese caretaker government has yet to provide details about its vaccination strategy, raising concerns about its ability to provide vaccines due to the country’s economic and governance crisis. This paper, written by public health professionals, raises a number of questions about the vaccination strategy that the government should address and calls for an open, inclusive, and transparent process to placate the worries of citizens given the privatization and politicization of the country’s health sector.
Topic:: Public Health, Vaccine, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

13. Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic: Physician Safety and Coverage in Lebanon

Author:: Nadim El Jamal, Taghrid Hajjali, and Elie Al-Chaer
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Similar to other countries, Lebanon experienced the challenges that the COVID-19 pandemic imposed on its healthcare system. Physicians, among other healthcare workers, felt the large toll of the pandemic. The growing number of physicians infected with the coronavirus has uncovered gaps in the policies and laws meant to protect and ensure physician safety. These include gaps in physician coverage for healthcare, disability, and death, in addition to particular vulnerabilities of trainee physicians, along with the absence of specific laws, strategies, and agencies to ensure the safety of the healthcare work environment. This paper highlights these gaps and proposes solutions to address them.
Topic:: Security, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

14. Without Hassan Abbas, the World Is a Poorer Place

Author:: Bassma Kodmani
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: It is on purpose that I sidestep my emotions when writing this. I do so in an effort to make this easier for myself and to avoid what follows coming across as a fleeting remembrance or some tiresome duty where I am compelled to write about Hassan Abbas.
Topic:: Leadership, Academia, Experts, and Scholarships
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

15. The Environmental Impact of Syria’s Conflict: A Preliminary Survey of Issues

Author:: Roba Gaafar
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: The Syrian conflict has had devastating human and economic consequences, but it also greatly damaged the environment in the country. This paper provides a preliminary survey of a set of environmental challenges that impose significant health, social and economic costs, including air pollution, deforestation, soil and vegetation degradation, and water depletion, and suggests green solutions for post-conflict relief and reconstruction.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Health, Conflict, Green Technology, and Pollution
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

16. After the Fall: Lebanon’s Path towards Monetary Stabilization

Author:: Jean Tawile
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Lebanon is suffering the worst economic crisis in its history, caused by an economic model that produced a rentier economy feeding off a corruption-ridden state and preventing any economic growth and social justice. This model is not redeemable. This paper argues that stabilizing the currency is a first step to getting Lebanon’s economy back on the right track and explores possible pathways for doing so.
Topic:: Economics, Monetary Policy, Fiscal Policy, Strategic Stability, and Economic Stability
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

17. Which Tax Policies for Lebanon? Lessons from the Past for a Challenging Future

Author:: Alain Bifani, Karim Daher, Lydia Assouad, and Ishac Diwan
Publication Date:: 05-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: The tax system in Lebanon is unfair and inefficient. As part of rethinking Lebanon’s policies in light of the current crisis, this paper proposes key reforms to make tax incidence more progressive; strengthen tax compliance; and broaden the tax base. It also calls for considering a one-off wealth tax to help resolve the current crisis in a socially fair manner. It posits that the fight for fiscal justice and effectiveness needs to become more central in political debates as a just fiscal system is a requisite of any vision for a “new Lebanon”.
Topic:: Economics, Tax Systems, Economic Inequality, Fiscal Policy, and Wealth
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

18. Organizing in Exile: Dynamics of Mobilization and Engagement of New Arab Diasporas

Author:: Sarah Anne Rennick
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: The phenomenon of mobilization among the diasporas emanating from the MENA region is in many ways not new. Historic diasporas communities, such as the Armenian, Palestinian, Kurdish, and Lebanese, have existed for multiple decades, and their contributions to their homelands has been both documented in the literature and promoted by policymakers and development organizations alike. This includes both the economic impact of MENA diasporas and the critical importance of financial remittances to supporting development and growth back home,1 but also various forms of political mobilization that have been undertaken by diasporic communities for the purpose of contributing to nation/state-building2 and recognition processes3 or, under certain conditions, contesting homeland regimes.4 In this vein, much of the literature has focused on more traditional forms of diaspora political mobilization,5 including lobbying and advocacy work designed to shape international public opinion and pressure foreign governments. The idea that Arab diaspora communities can be viewed not only as an economic actor but also, potentially, a political one is not in itself new. Yet, much of this literature on Arab diasporas has been focused on unidirectional flow of remittance – from those in diaspora back to the homeland. Likewise, the view of diaspora communities as either a resource to be harnessed or a threat to be contained has been largely informed by the political and geopolitical realities of host and home states.6
Topic:: Migration, Diaspora, Social Movement, Humanitarian Crisis, and Mobilization
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, North Africa, and MENA

19. The UK Iraqi Diaspora and their Mobilization towards Iraq: Homeland Politics, Internal Dynamics, and the Fragmentation of Diasporic Transnationalism

Author:: Oula Kadhum
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: In 2003, for the first time in decades, Iraqis in the diaspora were able to return to their former homeland and help in the rebuilding of their country. Many returned in 2003 with ambitious plans and ideas to help in the country’s development, some through political parties and others through civil society. Due to political developments in Iraq however, and the subsequent ethno-sectarian political system installed under the US-led intervention, diaspora mobilization has been affected and shaped by homeland politics and dynamics, privileging some while thwarting others. Indeed, the post-2003 political system contributed to the fragmentation of diasporic mobilization along ethnic and sectarian lines due to homeland political dynamics. This, in turn, has shaped the issues and the type of transnational and translocal mobilization carried out by different groups. Focusing predominantly on the UK context and to a lesser extent the Swedish one,[i] this study explores both top-down and bottom-up approaches to Iraqi diaspora transnational mobilization, and assesses the opportunities and constraints for coordination in diasporic transnationalism. Drawing on 15 semi-structured interviews conducted with community gatekeepers, organizational representatives, and professionals working in specific sectors, as well as numerous informal interviews, and supplemented by interviews conducted from 2013 to 2018 in both London and Stockholm, this study assess the different waves of migration and socio-economic profiles of Iraqi migrants, how pivotal moments in Iraq’s recent history have affected diasporic transnationalism, and underlines the hindrances to mobilization. The study finds that where the first waves of UK migration saw the arrival of political and religious elites, medical professionals, and artists, latter waves saw the arrival of less skilled and educated workers, as well as refugees. This provides the background both to Iraqi diasporic mobilization and links to the post-2003 political system and to the fragmentation that would ensue. While some diasporic elites went on to serve in the Iraqi government, other diaspora individuals worked through civil society, providing development, training, knowledge transfer, and social welfare. The study also finds that the instability in Iraq, homeland dynamics affecting the positionality of groups vis-à-vis the country, and lack of funds are major obstacles to broader mobilization. To this point, while there is no denying the will of the diaspora to help in the rebuilding of Iraq, distrust in the diaspora among ethnic and sectarian groups presents a particular challenge to collaboration and cooperation. Building trust and reconciliation, helping to create a platform between diaspora groups, the wider public, and Iraqi organizations, and focusing efforts on cultural, heritage, health, and developmental issues – and avoiding party politics – could help overcome these obstacles to allow the diaspora to play a greater role in supporting the Iraqi state and society.
Topic:: Migration, Diaspora, Immigration, transnationalism, Humanitarian Crisis, and Mobilization
Political Geography:: Iraq, United Kingdom, Europe, and Middle East

20. Introduction: What is New about Post-2011 MENA Diasporas?

Author:: Sarah Anne Rennick
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: The phenomenon of mobilization among the diasporas emanating from the MENA region is in many ways not new. Historic diasporas communities, such as the Armenian, Palestinian, Kurdish, and Lebanese, have existed for multiple decades, and their contributions to their homelands has been both documented in the literature and promoted by policymakers and development organizations alike. This includes both the economic impact of MENA diasporas and the critical importance of financial remittances to supporting development and growth back home,1 but also various forms of political mobilization that have been undertaken by diasporic communities for the purpose of contributing to nation/state-building2 and recognition processes3 or, under certain conditions, contesting homeland regimes.4 In this vein, much of the literature has focused on more traditional forms of diaspora political mobilization,5 including lobbying and advocacy work designed to shape international public opinion and pressure foreign governments. The idea that Arab diaspora communities can be viewed not only as an economic actor but also, potentially, a political one is not in itself new. Yet, much of this literature on Arab diasporas has been focused on unidirectional flow of remittance – from those in diaspora back to the homeland. Likewise, the view of diaspora communities as either a resource to be harnessed or a threat to be contained has been largely informed by the political and geopolitical realities of host and home states.6 Our observations of diaspora political mobilization dynamics and the role that Arab diasporas can play in shaping homeland politics have been enlarged since 2011. Over the last decade, the many political, social, and economic upheavals that have transpired in the region – spanning national uprisings challenging the existing order, deepened authoritarianism and the closure of civic space, economic collapse and the undermining of collective morale, and the onset of violent intractable conflict – have produced multiple waves of migration of those seeking safe harbor abroad.7 While the image of Syrian migrants partaking in dangerous journeys to reach European shores dominates the popular narrative, the reality of this exodus from the Arab region over the last decade is much more complex.8 Indeed, what has evolved in the post-2011 period are Arab diaspora communities that have different and more diverse sociopolitical profiles from earlier epochs, with different degrees of attachment, identification to, and engagement with their homeland – both among new arrivals but also, importantly, those who have long since been in diaspora or who are second or third generation abroad. These Arab diaspora communities have also seen increased dispersal in terms of the geographic locations of resettlement, including both the enlargement and heterogenization of existing host sites but also the emergence of new destinations. Alongside these transformations in the profiles and locations of these Arab diasporas has been the emergence of new forms of political remittances, involving the transfer of political ideas, norms, and practices in multidirectional flows that challenge the state-bounded concept of transnational politics.9 These new political remittances and forms of diaspora community organization and mobilization are in many cases actively seeking to make substantive changes to homeland politics and to respond to the cascading crises at home. Yet in other cases, they are instead efforts on the parts of diaspora members to navigate the liminal and uncertain status of being caught somewhere along the spectrum of “here” and/or “there.” This collection of studies, written by Oula Kadhum, Houda Mzioudet, and Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen, seeks to investigate more closely these transformations within Arab diasporas in the post-2011, and to shed light onto what is actually “new” about them. Through three in-depth case studies looking at Iraqi, Libyan, and Yemeni communities in different locations abroad, the studies presented here assess the transformations within these diasporas in terms of profiles of members and locations of exile and how conflict dynamics at home inform not only patterns of migration but also relationships within diaspora communities themselves. The studies also expose new forms and directional flows of political remittances that are taking place, and the various factors that mediate the act of remitting politically. This includes assessing how political identity is formed/transformed through the experience of exile and observation of conflict dynamics from quite different external vantage points, as well as the impact of multiple and overlaying political opportunity structures. Finally, the studies shed light on the impact of these political remittances and offer an assessment of the opportunities and constraints that these new Iraqi, Libyan, and Yemeni diasporas face in their own efforts to contribute to rebuilding, reconstructing, and reimagining their homelands.
Topic:: Diaspora, Immigrants, Humanitarian Crisis, Identity, and Emigration
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, North Africa, and MENA

21. Partial Normalization: Morocco’s Balancing Act

Author:: Yasmina Abouzzohour
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Following the UAE, and Bahrain, and one month before Sudan, Morocco became the third country in the MENA region to normalize ties with Israel in 2020. In exchange for resuming ties with Tel Aviv, Rabat benefited from important security and financial deals with the United States and ensured the recognition of the kingdom’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. This paper explores the domestic, regional, and international politics that determined the kingdom’s approach and assesses how the kingdom has navigated competing pressures.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Peace
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, Israel, and Morocco

22. Sudan’s Normalization with Israel: In Whose Interests?

Author:: Magdi El-Gizouli
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: In January 2021, Sudan joined the UAE, Bahrain and Morocco and normalized its relations with Israel. This paper explores the record of largely back-door dealings between Khartoum and Tel Aviv, investigates the motives, weighs the bargains, and interrogates the ideological mystifications that cloud the policy choices of Sudan’s decision-makers.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Peace, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Africa, Sudan, Middle East, and Israel

23. How can activists best advance environmental reforms in MENA?

Author:: Rory Quick
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Decarbonising the current energy system does not secure a sustainable future if challenges beyond carbon emission are ignored and the economic model which continues to exacerbate the challenges we face is not rectified. Genuine environmental reform requires an intersectional approach, one which does not just patch over problems but instigates reform. The socio-political and environmental crises we face are symptoms of the same problem and must be treated as such. In order to reach a sustainable future, policies should resolve current issues without creating or exacerbating existing challenges. If there is a reason for social movements to exist, it is to challenge dominant values as flexible and changeable and to offer alternative ways to live. Across the MENA region, there are growing calls - from experts and activists - for reform in the region to simultaneously deal with wider socio-political issues whilst decarbonizing energy systems. In the MENA region, states are preoccupied with developing renewable energy (RE) at large scale. Examples include Morocco’s Ouarzazate Noor Solar Plant and Dubai’s Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park. This is an extension of the existing energy model. Megaprojects are political as much as economic projects. They support exclusionary political regimes and enable states to strengthen existing socio-political systems, and thus further reduce the political autonomy of the individual. Energy megaprojects are projections of state centralization, as they require no input from the localities in which they are placed. They therefore actively reduce political freedom. An alternative model - the decentralised RE model - allows for ownership and operation of RE to remain in the communities where it operates. Solar and wind technology is scalable, whereas previous technology was not. This allows for the creation of an energy system that is not only sustainable but also democratically owned and designed, and socially just. A decentralised system, whereby individuals have a direct say in how their energy systems operate, is vital in ensuring energy justice is achieved alongside climate justice.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Political Activism, Reform, and Green Technology
Political Geography:: Africa, Middle East, North Africa, and MENA

24. Lebanon’s Student Movement: A New Political Player?

Author:: Tala Majzoub
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: The victory of independent student groups in student council elections in late 2020 was hailed as a milestone in the fight against the influence of traditional sectarian political parties in Lebanon. This paper examines the significance of these student elections and the renewed mobilization of the student body. It aims to better understand the politics and strategies of the new student groups, notably their understanding of notions like independence, and attempts to address the role that these student groups can eventually play in national politics.
Topic:: Politics, Democracy, Youth, and Political Participation
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

25. Mental Health Reforms in Lebanon During the Multifaceted Crisis

Author:: Sara Catherine Mourani and Marie-Christine Ghreichi
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Multiple disasters over the past two years have greatly harmed the mental health of the Lebanese population. Despite a long history with political turmoil, discussing mental health in Lebanon remains culturally taboo. Responses to mental health remain under-supported and challenges surrounding this sector will be critical in Lebanon’s transition out of the crisis. This paper seeks to investigate the current state of the mental health system in Lebanon and provides policy recommendations to improve its adaptability in responding to the multifaceted crisis the country is currently experiencing.
Topic:: Health, Reform, Mental Health, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

26. Data with borders for a borderless virus: Insights and recommendations from the case of Lebanon

Author:: Ghinwa El Hayek, Sirine Anouti, Ghina R. Mumtaz, and Lilian A. Ghandour
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Timely access to complete and accurate data proved to be one of the major lessons learned for an evidence-informed national public health response. In Lebanon, COVID-19 data reporting was mired with issues such as the fragmentation of publicly available data across many official reporting sources. This paper addresses the issue of data collection and sharing and provides recommendations for ways forward.
Topic:: Public Health, Pandemic, Data, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

27. Informal settlements in Syria: What approach after the conflict?

Author:: Ahmad Sukkar, Sawsan Abou Zainedin, and Hani Fakhani
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: A large proportion of Syria’s population lives in informal housing, with estimates that informal housing represented 30 to 40% of total dwellings before the 2011 uprising. Such housing was particularly prevalent in the peri-urban areas that have suffered most of the destruction and displacement during the subsequent conflict. Despite its prevalence, informal housing and the rights of its residents have not received sufficient attention in recent policy discussions around Syria’s reconstruction or with respect to protecting the rights of Syrians to housing. In recent years, the government has approved tens of regulatory master plans in different cities for ‘reconstruction’ and ‘development’. While little actual reconstruction has taken place because of the economic crisis, the economic sanctions, and the absence of international funds, these master plans have paved the way for the government to begin with deliberate mass-scale demolitions in many areas. An examination of the few approved reconstruction projects that have proceeded shows some commonalities: most of the approved master plans are targeting areas of informal urban settlement, and the few projects that have advanced on the ground have tended to be in informal urban settlements. These patterns raise many questions about the government’s intentions and plans for reconstruction and make it clear that informality needs to be a core element in the reconstruction debate. This policy research report aims at mapping and analysing the government’s approach towards informality. It starts by laying a pre-2011 historical background about the interlinks between the rise of informality in Syria and the Ba’ath government’s socialist approach towards housing provision and land management. It provides a critical reading of the trajectory of the legal framework, which underpinned the government policies on land management, arguing that informality was a natural product of the government’s chronic and systematic failure in coping with the increased needs for housing. The report then examines the evolution of the government’s post-2011 approach to informality. It maps a series of planned and ongoing reconstruction projects in several neighbourhoods across different cities in Syria while closely observing the legal foundations underpinning each case, the official narratives around them, the implementations procedures, the progress made, and the impact of these projects on the population. The research deepens this analysis through two detailed case studies: al-Qabun district in Damascus suburbs and al-Haydariyya district in east Aleppo. This selection is based on profound similarities between the two areas that were both opposition strongholds severely impacted by the military campaigns waged by the government to retake them but also the significant difference in the legal frameworks governing the reconstruction, the phase of implementation of the reconstruction project, and, most importantly, the type of land ownership, with al-Qabun existing on private land in contrast to al-Haydariyya where the authorities expropriated the land long before the conflict. Drawing on the interlinks between the different case studies and the historical contexts of the conflict, the research concludes with observational patterns about the political, economic, and technical interests and motivations that might have shaped the government’s approach to informality. It finds that the government has found in the massive informal reality of Syrian cities — which predates the conflict — a loophole through which it can advance a major politically loaded gentrification process that would reconfigure the reality of post-conflict Syria in favour of capitalist cronies at the expense of the rights of local residents. This insight has not yet gained sufficient attention in the important work conducted by Syrian and international actors attempting to tackle the consequences of the government’s urban planning system and its legislative framework that is currently paving the ground for wider reconstruction. Addressing the situation is not just a matter of acknowledging some forms of informal land-tenure in the current legal frameworks. It requires reframing our understanding of informality beyond its mere articulation as a form of illegal tenure.
Topic:: Migration, Diaspora, Settlements, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

28. Activism in the Context of Reconstructing Nahr al-Bared Refugee Camp: Lessons for Syria’s Reconstruction?

Author:: Ismael Sheikh Hassan
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: The reconstruction of the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr al-Bared in Northern Lebanon, destroyed in 2007 after fierce battles between the Lebanese army and an armed Islamist group, is sometimes suggested as a useful case study that can inform reconstruction processes in Syria. Such impressions usually emerge due to the relative success of the local activists – who hailed from a refugee camp where residents lived in informal housing with little formal legal protection – in confronting the security visions of the Lebanese State and military for the reconstruction of the camp. This paper aims to discuss the usefulness but also the limitations of the Nahr al- Bared reconstruction experience to the Syrian context.
Topic:: Political Activism, Refugee Crisis, Settlements, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

29. Lebanese Trade Unions and Independent Professional Associations: A Review in Light of the Popular Movement

Author:: Jamil Mouawad
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: On 17 October 2019, Lebanon saw the rise of a popular movement denouncing the widespread corruption of the country’s ruling class. Dubbed the 17 October Uprising, the unprecedented movement swept through various major Lebanese cities, including Beirut, Saïda, Tyre, Tripoli, and many others. In parallel, academics and activists debated the importance of having various organizational frameworks (partisan, union-based, or professional) that could take charge of organizing popular protests. These organizations would help frame demands in political agendas that play a crucial role in achieving the desired democratic transition.[i] This discussion – or at least parts of it – resulted from the almost total absence of any effective official union role in the popular movement, as opposed to other uprisings in the Arab region, where independent professional associations or trade unions played a pivotal role in the action. They demanded change, organized protests, and even took part in negotiations – such as in Sudan’s case).[ii] In fact, a quantitative study carried out during the 17 October Uprising showed that 95% of protestors were unaffiliated with trade unions. It also revealed that only 5% of demonstrators were affiliated with free-profession unions, such as non-labour professional associations or unions that include physicians, lawyers, nurses, engineers or the Teacher Union for example.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Populism, Unions, and Trade Unions
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

30. Union Action and Protests in Iraq: A Problematic Relationship - Case Study on the National Union of Journalists

Author:: Ali Taher Alhammood
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: he overthrow of the dictatorial regime in Iraq on 9 April 2003 raised many questions about the prospects for change, which did not occur in the country by internal will, but rather by foreign intervention. External powers left the country war-torn and without a clear internal social base to manage and organize the process of change. The collapse of institutional structures, the need for new institutions, and the strong desire to break free from the constraints of the past motivated protesters and civil movements to take over Iraqi streets. These protests began since the very first days of political change after 9 April 2003. For instance, hundreds of military personnel who were discharged held protests in Baghdad; thousands protested against the American occupation in Najaf; and dozens demonstrated in support of the Personal Status Law, rejecting its amendment by the Islamists who joined the government for the first time after the dictatorial era had come to an end. Intellectuals, journalists, and activists played a leading role in mobilizing people and shaping public opinion, as well as in defending individual and collective freedoms since the first years following a regime change. These continuous activities, which lasted for an entire decade after 2003, led to the formation of a parallel union to the official Iraqi Journalists Syndicate, which was established in 1959. This experience contributed to successes that have had an impact on Iraqi media, culture, and society overall. The trajectory of this union also offered profound lessons about collective volunteer work, which is essential to the establishment of any similar union in the early stages. The importance of this paper lies in the fact that the National Union of Journalists is the first union to demonstrate continuity and lasting influence over an extended period, not to mention that it has had a significant impact on the political process, the lives of journalists, and the experience of collective work. The importance of delving into the experience of the national union also stems from the fact that it challenged the prevailing obedience to the State as the historically dominant employer and sole economic rent provider. As such, the emergence of the national union was a breakthrough, as the overall context discouraged such experiences. It was not in the interest of citizens, most of whom were State employees, to adopt projects that challenged its policies. This study aims to explore a unique experience of union action led by young independent journalists. It explores the difficulties of establishing unions in Iraq – not only because of the limited margin of freedom – but also because of the ongoing economic, legal and political problems that have lasted for several decades.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Governance, Protests, and Unions
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

31. The Mediterranean Region: A Hotspot of Inequalities in the Aftermath of COVID-19

Author:: Farah Al Shami
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic, which broke out in China in late 2019, reached the Mediterranean region by late winter 2020. While the impact of this crisis has been notorious on a global scale, it was remarkably more pronounced in the Mediterranean region as a result of economic fragility, exposure and transmissibility, and more importantly the quality of state and non-state responses which had a multidimensional multiplier effect on wealth distribution, access to health and education as well as other essential services, regional disparities and gender inequality, among others. Ever since its outbreak, COVID-19 has significantly exacerbated existing inequalities and has created new ones. It has also exacerbated vulnerabilities and created new forms of vulnerability, thus increasing the gaps on various levels between different social groups. These consequences were also more concentrated in the Mediterranean region as compared to the rest of the world, as the region had already been witnessing rising trends of inequality in the last decade, and especially before the pandemic hit, due to political instability, economic decay and inefficient public policies. While this reality has been experienced by both the northern and southern sides of the Mediterranean, it has been more intense in the latter. However, this is not to deny that constantly increasing inequalities in recent history has made both poles of the Basin much more susceptible to an enigmatic and acute shock such as COVID-19. The impact of COVID-19 on multifaceted inequality in the Mediterranean is neither consistent nor linear. The region has witnessed declines in several forms of inequality and surges in several others. Yet, the overall impact in terms of the number and magnitude of increased inequalities versus reduced ones is negative, making the Mediterranean a hotspot of inequality in the aftermath of the sanitary crisis. Moreover, amplified inequalities have manifested in the Mediterranean Basin in the form of inter-country inequalities and intra-country inequalities – the former being mostly part driven by inter-sectoral imbalances. Inter-country inequalities have likely further cemented the north-south divide in the Basin. This paper examines the different forms and faces of inequality in the region by trying to conceptualize the situations of different countries, despite their dissimilar and divergent contexts. It proves that COVID-19 has massively increased multidimensional inequality through various channels and at a relatively higher rate with respect to other regions. The paper also demonstrates that the Mediterranean is the microcosm of the north-south cleavage, as it is the closest place where the South meets the North, which makes it a natural starting point for dialogue concerning the north-south dichotomy and inequalities. As such, this paper highlights the need for tangible cooperation across borders, between sectors, and among citizens and their representatives, both within the region – between the North and the South – and with other regions, to advance reforms that address the factors of inequity and inequality in an already fragile and shaky regional context.
Topic:: Inequality, Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Middle East, and Mediterranean

32. Framing what's breaking: Empirical analysis of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya Twitter coverage of the Gaza-Israel conflict

Author:: Tala Majzoub
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Research Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: The role of social media’s fast coverage is ever more important in shaping grander narrative and exposing state bias. Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, both state-sponsored media, are emblematic of how these narratives are formed in the MENA region. This paper analyzes and compares the content of tweets from the official Twitter breaking news accounts of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya in order to observe the narratives and better identify the bias. Doing so, it aims to expose the tight link between the framing of breaking news and the changing political dynamics in the region.
Topic:: Mass Media, Territorial Disputes, Media, Social Media, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

33. The Palestinians and Arab normalization of Greater Israel

Author:: Mouin Rabbani
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: This paper explores the dynamics of the Palestinian response to the recent wave of normalization deals between Israel and certain Arab states. It analyzes the motivations that contributed to this wave of normalization, examines the state of Palestinian institutions, and concludes with options for a path forward.
Topic:: Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Institutions, Peace, and Normalization
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

34. “What is a State without the People?”: Statehood Obsession and Denial of Rights in Palestine

Author:: Alaa Tartir
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: The Palestinian political leadership’s obsession with the idea of statehood as a means to realise self-determination and freedom has proved to be detrimental to the struggle of decolonising Palestine. By prioritising “statehood under colonialism” instead of focusing on decolonising Palestine first and then engaging in state formation, the Palestinian leadership – under pressure from regional and international actors – disempowered the people and empowered security structures which ultimately serve the colonial condition.
Topic:: State Formation, Colonialism, Decolonization, and Repression
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

35. Lebanese Women and the Politics of Representation

Author:: Carmen Geha
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Lebanese women have been leaders in the revolution that has shaken Lebanon since October 2019. This paper argues that the next stage will be critical if women want to transform their involvement into equal rights. For them to do so, they need to move beyond informal revolutionary politics to formal electoral and party politics with meaningful and substantive representation.
Topic:: Gender Issues, Human Rights, United Nations, Social Movement, Feminism, and Revolution
Political Geography:: Middle East, Lebanon, and Beirut

36. After the Trump “Peace Plan”: One-State Solution is the Only Way Forward

Author:: Diana Buttu
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Last month, a Palestinian think tank, the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research, revealed its survey results following the release of the Trump/Netanyahu plan. In announcing the results, Dr Khalil Shikaki, the head of the polling centre, noted that 94 percent of Palestinian respondents opposed the plan: “I don't think we've ever seen such a level of consensus among the Palestinian public,” he said. These results are unsurprising, of course, as the Trump/Netanyahu plan effectively seeks Palestinian approval for Israeli land theft, ethnic cleansing and continued subjugation. But alongside the results of the question pertaining to the Trump/Netanyahu plan was a more important question: “Do you support the two-state solution?” A mere 39 percent of surveyed respondents answered affirmatively, while 37 percent indicated that they support a one-state solution. These results should be placed in their proper light: for more than two decades, as the Palestinian leadership and the international community have repeatedly called for the implementation of the two-state solution, increasing numbers of Palestinians have moved away from this view and increasingly supported one state, even though there is not a single Palestinian party – whether inside ‘48 borders or in the occupied territories – advocating for it. In fact, Palestinian leaders and the international community both espouse the common view of decrying the concept of one state and adamantly holding that “There is no Plan B.” The reason for this steadily increasing Palestinian support for one state has both everything and nothing to do with the Trump/Netanyahu plan. This plan makes clear that it aims to ensure that Palestinians will never have a state and instead remain forever under Israel’s boot. But it isn’t just the Trump plan. Over time, Palestinians increasingly have seen that the version of “two states” that the international community will support – and indeed press for – is not the version of two states that Palestinians demand. To the contrary, while the world spoke of a two-state settlement, Palestinians witnessed a tripling of the number of Israeli settlers living on their land. The international community appears content with allowing Israel to build and expand settlements, while at the same time allowing it to demolish Palestinian homes and schools and imprison Palestinians into cantons. This approach condones Israel holding our economy hostage and mercilessly besieging the Gaza Strip, with only the mildest, mealy-mouthed international condemnations. The world community has blocked attempts to press for a condemnation of Israeli settlements in the International Criminal Court and has, in some cases, criminalized support for boycott, divestment and sanctions (BDS). Even the European Union has been loath to uphold its trade agreement with Israel, under which Israeli settlement products should be labelled separately and should not benefit from free trade status. It has become clear that while the international community speaks of wanting a two-state settlement, it has shown itself wholly unwilling to do anything to make that happen. As someone who participated in the peace negotiations, I observed that a state for Palestinians was the furthest thing from the Israeli public and political leadership’s thinking. Instead, they were concerned with how to forever contain and control Palestinians, and how to maintain longstanding international community support in this endeavour. In short, the concept of two states has become devoid of all meaning, with the focus instead on form – whether labelled as a “state” and however dysfunctional and lacking any of the powers that actually define a state. This increasing realization has led many Palestinians to abandon the statehood project. This may sound like a defeatist position or the expression of frustration. Indeed, over the years, we have heard PLO leaders threaten to abandon the two-state project and, separately, threaten to dissolve the Palestinian Authority. Some support for one state is undoubtedly borne of that feeling. But not all. To be clear, my support for one state grew not from the futility of negotiations – even though they were indeed futile – but from a sense that the approach was incorrect. The attempt to divide land simply modelled the power structures I was attempting to fight – economic and political structures that aim to maintain Israeli power and control over Palestinians lives. Therefore, rather than focus on land – where Israel always has an advantage –, the focus should be on people and how we, as people, should live. The time has come to look to a model that focuses on equal rights for all, irrespective of religion; a model which seeks reconciliation and not separation and where people are protected and not viewed as subjects of control or, in the case of refugees, of wholesale and heartless exclusion. Today Israel and the occupied territories function as one territory, with rights and privileges granted to some and not to others. There are no separate border crossings for “Palestine” and no separate Palestinian currency. Yet Palestinians, including Palestinian citizens of Israel, are denied the same rights and privileges as Israeli Jews. I am under no illusion that achieving this equality will be easy. Power is never voluntarily given up by those who wield it but taken through pressing for rights. Palestinians will be better able to break down the system of ethnic-religious privilege that plagues Palestinians (a similar system ruled apartheid South Africa) by getting to the root cause – that of Zionism, a nationalist project that favours one group over another –, by pushing for BDS and for accountability internationally and by challenging racist Israeli laws. In short, we can and must create a just system for all, irrespective of whether we demand one or two states. History demonstrates that ethnic privilege ultimately fails in a multi-ethnic world. And given that Palestinians and Israelis are fated to live together, the real question is whether we will continue to allow this system of ethno-religious privilege to prevail or whether we will press for equality, irrespective of religion. Borders, flags, and currencies can wait.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Borders, Peace, and Settlements
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

37. After the Trump “Peace Plan”: Two Perspectives on Palestinian Options

Author:: Diana Buttu and Mouin Rabbani
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: The “Peace Plan” presented by Trump and his administration as the ultimate solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been overwhelmingly rejected by Palestinians and their leadership. But what comes next? What strategy should Palestinians adopt? These two papers, written by two leading Palestinian analysts, lay out two distinct approaches for attaining Palestinian rights and aspirations. Diana Buttu argues that it is time for Palestinians to push for a one-state solution focusing on equal rights for all, while Mouin Rabbani contends that a one-state approach will not succeed given the current power dynamics and, therefore, favours a renewed Palestinian strategy to preserve the pre-Trump international consensus focused on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 and a just resolution of the refugee question.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Borders, Peace, and Settlements
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

38. After the Trump “Peace Plan”: Ending the Occupation is the Priority

Author:: Mouin Rabbani
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: It is incontestable that a unitary state encompassing all of historic Palestine in which Palestinians and Israelis live in full equality represents the preferred resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Assuming this entity guarantees both individual and communal parity, and satisfactorily resolves the refugee question, it would achieve the fundamental Palestinian right to national self-determination and be consistent with the broader Palestinian aspiration of greater Arab integration. It is also irrefutable that a democratic one-state outcome in Palestine cannot be achieved without the disestablishment of Zionism, and specifically Israel’s renunciation of the core principles of Jewish political supremacy, demographic superiority, and territorial hegemony that have guided state policy since 1948. The cost-benefit calculation required for a one-state solution is thus one where Israel’s rulers determine that the price of maintaining a Zionist state has become unacceptably high and choose to relinquish it. In practice, there is no political pathway to such a resolution. Israel’s elites, and the overwhelming majority of its Jewish citizens from across the political spectrum, will contemplate a future without Zionism only as a consequence of decisive military defeat. Even then, the temptation of Israel’s leaders to rely on their nuclear arsenal to avert defeat – the so-called Samson option – cannot be dismissed. In view of the geopolitical realities which reinforce, rather than challenge, the prevailing balance of power between Israel and the Palestinians, the only one-state solutions currently on offer are those proposed by the United States in its January 2020 diplomatic initiative, and by the radical Israeli right whose agenda has been embraced by Washington. In other words, proponents of a unitary secular democratic state in Palestine who are unable to offer a credible military strategy for achieving it are dealing in unattainable illusions rather than feasible solutions. The dynamics that have produced these realities may well change, but the current state of the Palestinian national movement and the broader region suggests this will consume decades, not years. It should also be noted that economic pressure – far exceeding that exerted by the BDS movement – has had a particularly poor impact on regime change during the past century, and can play a secondary role at best. How, then, can and should the Palestinians respond to Washington’s latest proposal to formalize permanent Israeli control over the Palestinian people? Should they just abandon the two-state framework in hopes of an eventual democratic unified state? Widely condemned as the institutionalization of apartheid, the Trump-Netanyahu Plan, in fact, goes far beyond the model of structural racism devised by the white minority regime in South Africa. Israel seeks not to exploit a captive population, but rather to achieve its eventual permanent removal. Indeed, this Plan goes so far as to recommend changing the legal status of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian citizens of Israel to residents of a Palestinian entity that will be occupied territory in all but name. The Trump-Netanyahu Plan offers nothing to the Palestinians, neither presently nor in the future, and does not even pretend to do so. It was transparently devised to accomplish each and every Israeli strategic objective at the expense of all Palestinian rights, rather than lay the basis for meaningful negotiations between the two parties in which the core interests of each are met within the framework of international legality. The measures Washington has already undertaken concerning Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, the PLO, settlements, the legal status of the occupied territories and other issues reveal this agenda and require no further comment or analysis. It is thus imperative that the various Palestinian leaderships categorically refuse any interaction – whether direct or indirect – with this initiative, as such dealings will only serve to legitimize it and provide cover for regional and international parties to seriously engage with it. The strategic purpose and primary threat of the Trump-Netanyahu plan is to transform the international consensus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For better or worse, this consensus comprises the inadmissibility of territorial conquest, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967, living at peace with Israel within its 1949 boundaries, and a just resolution of the refugee question. Against this, Washington and Tel Aviv propose a resolution of the conflict on the basis that might makes right, that rights are irrelevant, and that international law is of no consequence. Rather than mobilize alongside the United States and Israel to denounce the international consensus of a two-state framework and demand its replacement, even if for radically different reasons and objectives, and to promote goals which - as noted above - are simply unattainable, Palestinians should do everything within their power to preserve, mobilize, and activate this consensus and present it as the litmus test for the preservation of the international order Washington is seeking to systematically dismantle. Indeed, under current circumstances, the only alternative is a one-state solution, which would permanently remove Palestinian national rights from the international agenda. One may not be enthusiastic about the two-state paradigm, but it would be dishonest to deny that the purpose of the Trump-Netanyahu plan is to replace it with something much worse. The above notwithstanding, to frame the Palestinian debate as a choice between a one-state solution and two-state settlement misses the point, and is today somewhat akin to a condemned prisoner spending the night before his execution agonizing over whether to spend next summer on the French or Italian Riviera. The core issue in 2020 is not about the form of eventual statehood, but rather about upholding the principle that Israel has no right to incorporate territories that international law and the international community consider to be occupied, and that its continued rule in these territories is both illegal and illegitimate. In contrast to a democratic one-state outcome, there are political avenues to ending the occupation that do not require the military resources that neither the Palestinians nor their regional allies currently possess. The cost-benefit calculation for ending the blockade of the Gaza Strip, reversing settlement expansion in the West Bank, and terminating the occupation does not require the wholesale transformation of the Israeli state. Yet, compelling Israel to dismantle the settlement enterprise and to withdraw from the occupied territories rather than annex them may – in the process – transform the state and establish pathways that in time would produce better outcomes It is commonplace to characterize the Trump administration approach to the Question of Palestine as a radical departure from traditional US policy. While this is true in certain respects, it is perhaps more useful to understand the Trump-Netanyahu Plan as the logical culmination of seven decades of US Middle East policy, and of the Oslo agreements, which never envisioned an end to occupation nor the realization of Palestinian self-determination, in particular. The prevalence of this reality and this debate attest above all to the extraordinarily weakened position in which the Palestinian people find themselves. Surpassing it will be particularly difficult, but is by no means impossible. First and foremost, Palestinians must resolve their internal differences and establish a unified national movement led by a credible leadership, with a clear strategy to disentangle from the matrix of control established by the Oslo agreements, as well as to mobilize Palestinians and their regional and international allies and supporters. Palestine needs to become a cause that stands above and beyond regional rivalries once again, rather than a political pawn used by petty autocrats for trivial advantage. It needs to once again become a primary issue on the international agenda, and a global litmus test for justice and decency, rather than a secondary dispute in a region roiled by conflict. In doing so it will also be able to rely on greater levels of popular support than perhaps ever before. A mobilized Palestinian national movement, capable of activating and – where necessary – coercing the support of regional governments, and deploying their collective wherewithal in the international arena, can successfully implement a combination of popular, political, economic, legal, and even military strategies to effectively challenge Israel’s occupation, and in critical instances compel foreign states to do the right thing out of self-interest. The Palestinians today are experiencing an existential moment. This is not a time to pursue the impossible at the expense of survival.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Occupation, Peace, and Settlements
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

39. Syria’s Growing Economic Woes: Lebanon’s Crisis, the Caesar Act and Now the Coronavirus

Author:: Jihad Yazigi
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: The already bleak prospects of the Syrian economy have worsened in recent months with the Lebanon crisis, the enactment of the Caesar Act and now the coronavirus pandemic. This paper examines their impact on the Syrian economy and the population at large. While the cumulative impact is hard to assess at this stage, Syria’s population will remain heavily dependent on the international humanitarian effort. The future of this effort will itself depend on major donor countries whose own economies are likely to emerge weakened from the coronavirus pandemic.
Topic:: Economics, Public Health, Humanitarian Crisis, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria

40. After the Pandemic: Reimagining the Role of State and Non-State Actors in (Re)building National Health Systems in the Arab World

Author:: Fadi El-Jardali
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: In the Arab region, countries have become increasingly dependent on non-state actors, notably the private sector, for healthcare provision and any response that includes the State alone may not be sufficient to address the COVID-19 pandemic. This paper explores how state and non-state actors in Arab countries have collaborated so far and suggests ways forward to ensure quality healthcare services for all.
Topic:: Non State Actors, Governance, Health Care Policy, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Africa and Middle East

41. Testing for COVID-19: What Should Lebanon Do?

Author:: Fatima Al Sayah
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Testing for COVID-19 is globally supported but is approached differently from country to country. This paper outlines Lebanon’s approach to testing so far and asks crucial questions about what the country can do at this stage given its limited testing resources, fragmented and under-financed healthcare system and dire economic circumstances.
Topic:: Health Care Policy, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

42. Is the Worst Part Behind Us? Epidemiology, Data and Lebanon’s COVID-19 Response

Author:: Sirine Anouti
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Data from Lebanon suggests that the country is experiencing a significant decrease in COVID-19 spread. Epidemiologists are monitoring to see if infection rates remain low for at least two incubation periods before declaring a successful containment. The lockdown strategy has come at a great cost to middle-to-low income groups given the absence of any social safety measure and the sustainability of lockdown measures will require urgent relief support.
Topic:: Public Health, Humanitarian Crisis, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

43. Will COVID-19 Mark the Endgame for Iraq’s Muhasasa Ta'ifia?

Author:: Ahmed Tabaqchali
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Iraq’s sectarian-based political system has depended on oil rents since 2003 to ensure its legitimacy and buy loyalty. Already running out of steam and challenged by protesters, it faces a major new test due to the drop in oil prices caused by the COVID-19 crisis. Unable to maintain its expensive patronage system, and in the absence of any real political reform, the days of the Muhasasa Ta’ifia may be running out.
Topic:: Reform, Protests, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

44. Lebanon: Managing COVID-19 in the Time of Revolution

Author:: Ishac Diwan and Joelle M. Abi-Rached
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: The Covid-19 pandemic in Lebanon is a crisis within a crisis. It occurred amidst a broader socio-economic meltdown that has shaken the country in recent months. While Lebanon appears to have responded effectively to the pandemic so far, a number of major challenges await it. With little measures to mitigate the economic impact of the confinement and protesters pushing to return to the streets, the country is entering an extremely volatile period. The only way out will be through measures that address the sanitary as well as underlying socio-economic issues that are threatening the entire country.
Topic:: Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

45. Lebanon: Government Recovery Plan Asks Too Much of Ordinary Lebanese, and Not Enough from Elites

Author:: Sami Halabi
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Facing an economy in free-fall, the Lebanese government has finally adopted a financial recovery plan that it has sent to the IMF and international donors. This paper argues that the plan fails to introduce strong accountability measures to address rampant corruption and mismanagement and does not tackle widespread inequality which could be done through a better distribution of losses and the introduction of more progressive taxation. Despite the government’s stated promise to “protect the poorest segments of the population from the dire consequences of the crisis”, the paper expects the plan to inevitably harm Lebanon’s poorest as well as its middle class.
Topic:: Economics, Financial Crisis, Governance, and Recovery
Political Geography:: Middle East and Lebanon

46. Iran’s Regional Role in the Arab World and Iranian State-Society Relations

Author:: Mahjoob Zweiri
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Iran’s regional role in MENA is influenced by the evolution of its state-society relations and shifts within its state institutions. This paper argues that the growing regional role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a reflection of the militarization and securitization of the Iranian political system. Conversely, frustration by segments of the Iranian population with the political system’s inability to deliver economically has increasingly manifested itself in criticism and contestation of the regime’s regional role.
Topic:: Civil Society, Regional Cooperation, Authoritarianism, and Militarization
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

47. Syria Torture Trial in Germany is an Arab Issue: Where are the Arab Media and Human Rights Organizations?

Author:: Mansour Omari
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: The opening in Germany of the trial of two Syrian security officers accused of crimes against humanity was marked by the absence of regional Arab interest, despite its importance for the fight against impunity in MENA. This paper seeks to understand this lack of coverage by Arab media and the absence of interest from national as well as regional Arab human rights organizations, and highlights the implications of the trial for Syria as well as MENA’s struggle for accountability.
Topic:: Human Rights, Non State Actors, Media, and Accountability
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

48. In the Footsteps of Martin Luther King: Will We Witness a Revolution Against Racial Discrimination in the Middle East?

Author:: Saad Salloum
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Afro-Iraqis, who number around 400,000, continue to suffer from racial discrimination and marginalization despite their repeated attempts to demand equality. This paper shows the struggle of black people in Iraq through the struggle and activism of Jalal Dhiab, founder of the Free Iraqi Movement, to restore a forgotten revolution and awaken an identity that has long been marginalized in Arab historical writings, in order to defend the rights of this minority and to combat racial discrimination against it in Iraq.
Topic:: Social Movement, Minorities, Discrimination, Protests, and Racism
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

49. Syria: Sanctions Should Not Be Lifted, but They Must Be Improved

Author:: Genevieve Zingg
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: While not the chief cause of Syria’s economic crisis, sanctions have exacerbated difficulties faced by the Syrian people – in particular as new humanitarian needs arise from the Covid-19 pandemic. This paper argues that sanctions are essential to sustain pressure in the pursuit of justice and accountability and should be maintained but that they must be improved to allow for a more effective use of humanitarian exemptions and to lessen their negative impacts on the Syrian people.
Topic:: Sanctions, Public Health, Humanitarian Crisis, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

50. How Demographics Erode the Patronage Buying Power of Iraq’s Muhasasa Ta’ifia

Author:: Ahmed Tabaqchali
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: Iraq’s post-2003 political order, characterized by Muhasasa Ta’ifia with political sectarian elites using employment in public services to strengthen clientelism, has become economically unsustainable. The author’s earlier paper for the Arab Reform Initiative examined the impact of the drop in oil prices on the system. This article examines how Iraq’s growing demography erodes the patronage buying power of the sectarian elites, even though spending on clientelism has mushroomed over the years.
Topic:: Demographics, Inequality, and Elites
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS