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1. Remittances and corruption perceptions in Africa

Author:
Alex Yeandle and David Doyle
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The relationship between remittances and corruption is contested. For some authors, external income endows individuals with financial buffers, which undermine these individuals’ incentive to hold governments to account and allow rent-seeking politicians to invest fewer resources in public goods. For others, remittance payments undermine clientelist networks and increase individual-level political engagement and accountability. For others still, remittances diffuse social norms, since senders are likely to live in large cities or wealthier countries where corruption is less tolerated. However, despite being rooted in individual-level assumptions, many of the conflicting results in the extant literature have an empirical focus at the aggregate level. In this paper we offer a corrective, explaining variation in individual-level perceptions of corruption among remittance recipients through a new mechanism. With survey data from 34 African countries, we show that recipients are endowed with greater cash income, which is used to bribe officials in the hope of securing preferential access to basic services. This act of paying bribes, coupled with the fact that access does not appear to improve, fuels perceptions that the government is corrupt.
Topic:
Corruption, Governance, Leadership, Accountability, and Bribery
Political Geography:
Africa

2. Keeping tabs? Perceptions of relative deprivation and political trust in Africa

Author:
Thomas Isbell
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
What are the implications of economic inequality for trust in government and state institutions? Political trust performs important functions in representative political systems, facilitating the efficient functioning of government, simplifying complex political processes, and reducing monitoring costs for ordinary people. The existing literature has shown that macroeconomic performance (including levels of inequality) and evaluations shape political trust. This paper addresses two gaps in the literature by focusing on the role of individual perceptions and subjective experiences of inequality and by studying cases in Africa. Using Afrobarometer survey data collected from more than 40,000 respondents in 34 African countries between late 2016 and mid-2018, I use multi-level modelling to demonstrate that perceptions of relative deprivation are significantly associated with less trust in representative government institutions and, more weakly, with less trust in state institutions. The effect of perceptions of relative deprivation remains significant when controlling for macroeconomic conditions and performance evaluations. In effect size, trust in representative government institutions is at least comparable to frequently cited covariates of trust such as location, level of education, and government economic performance, suggesting that perceived relative deprivation is indeed an important covariate of such trust. Feeling relatively advantaged is also significantly associated with greater trust in representative government institutions. This may reflect strong neo-patrimonial ties between citizens and political agents. In demonstrating that individual-level economic considerations affect political trust in Africa, we challenge the conventional wisdom that only macroeconomic factors affect trust.
Topic:
Politics, Governance, Institutions, and Trust
Political Geography:
Africa

3. Explaining the experience of political violence in Nigeria

Author:
Tunde A. Alabi
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Violence has been part of Nigeria’s politics since before political independence. While there have been attempts to understand why political violence happens in the country, little emphasis has been placed on explanatory factors for political-violence victimisation. This study investigates the influence of socio-demographic characteristics, presence of security apparatus, partisanship, political participation, and social group membership on the experience of political violence in Nigeria and examines how the influence of these factors varies between Northern and Southern Nigeria – two regions with major social and cultural differences. The study analyses data from the seventh round of the Afrobarometer survey, which were collected in 2017 from 1,568 adults across the 36 states and Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria. Multiple linear regression models were fitted. Our analysis finds that about one in four persons has experienced at least one form of political violence. Living in the South, being young, being poor, living in an area with no police presence, being partisan, participating in politics, and being active in social groups increase the likelihood of political-violence victimisation. While women were more likely than men to experience political violence in the North, the reverse is the case in the South. Regional variation is also observed in the influence of political participation and the degree of the effect of party affiliation and social group membership.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Gender Issues, and Violence
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

4. Mapping state capacity in Africa: Professionalism and reach

Author:
Matthias Krönke, Robert Mattes, and Vinothan Naidoo
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Whether depicted as bloated, extractive, or remote from the lives of ordinary citizens, the African state is widely seen to lack the necessary capacity to provide for the physical and material security of its citizens or to command legitimacy. Yet scholars have rarely attempted to assess the performance of the African state through the prism of the lived experiences of those whom the state is meant to serve – its citizens. Most studies rely on data supplied by national statistics agencies or the judgments of expert observers. And while scholars acknowledge that the quality of the African state is likely shaped by geographic and ethnic differences within countries, few have measured how state capacity varies at the sub-national level. In this paper, we address this situation by using survey research measures of respondents’ proximity to state services and actual experiences with civil servants to measure two distinct dimensions of the state salient to the African context: its reach, or physical presence at the grassroots across the breadth of a country, and its professionalism, or ability to deliver public services in a proficient and ethical manner. The results reveal new perspectives on which states excel on either or both dimensions. They also illustrate how widely state performance varies at the sub-national level. Finally, we use survey data to assess the performance of the state, and show that it is the degree of professionalism, and sometimes reach, that enables the state to provide security and welfare, satisfy demands, and secure popular legitimacy. But in contrast to usual expectations, the size of the state at senior levels has no impact.
Topic:
Nationalism, State Formation, State Building, Professionalism, and Subnationalism
Political Geography:
Africa

5. Footing the bill? Less legitimacy, more avoidance mark African views on taxation

Author:
Thomas Isbell
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Taxation is a key fiscal tool for domestic resource mobilization. In many African countries, however, weak tax-administration systems limit the ways in which governments can finance their development agendas and provide essential services such as health care, education, and infrastructure (Drummond, Daal, Srivastava, & Oliveira, 2012). The importance of raising resources through taxation has been heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic. Governments globally have confronted a sudden drop in tax revenue as many economic sectors have slowed amid lockdowns. Especially in developing countries, this shock has significantly curtailed governments’ ability to fund access to vital health, financial, and other services and assistance to those most affected by the pandemic (Gaspar, Hanif, Pazarbasioglu, & Saint-Amans, 2020). The reduction in tax revenue during the pandemic is likely to compound itself over time and limit how quickly developing economies can bounce back as governments lack the fiscal resources to stimulate growth. Even without a pandemic, tax revenues are relatively low across Africa. In 2019, 30 African countries averaged tax revenues totaling 16.6% of gross domestic product – half the 33.8% collected by member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/AUC/ATAF, 2021). In addition to capacity limitations of government tax agencies, low tax revenues can be related to macroeconomic factors such as large agricultural and informal sectors, which are typically hard to tax (Di John, 2006; Mansour & Keen, 2009; Coulibaly & Gandhi, 2018; Moore, Prichard, & Fjeldstad, 2018). One current debate concerns how to tax highly digitalized businesses – which operate in African countries without necessarily having an easily taxable physical presence – in a way that is fair and doesn’t impede the growth of start-up companies (African Tax Administration Forum, 2020). But low tax revenues can also reflect micro-level factors such as citizens’ limited willingness to pay taxes (“tax morale”), a lack of knowledge about what they owe and what their taxes are used for, and their perceptions of corruption in the tax administration (OECD, 2019). If citizens regard paying taxes as a fiscal exchange or contractual relationship (Moore, 2004), these factors can affect the perceived legitimacy of taxation as a whole (D’Arcy, 2011). Beyond short- and medium-term fiscal problems, this can also have a more fundamental impact on the legitimacy of governments and political systems. The ability to raise revenue through taxes is an important marker of state capacity and political legitimacy (Brautigam, Fjeldstad, & Moore, 2008), and may contribute to government responsiveness and accountability as taxpayers demand a return on their taxes (Moore et al., 2018). How do Africans see taxation? Afrobarometer survey data collected in 34 African countries in 2019/2021 show that a majority of Africans endorse their government’s right to collect taxes. But popular support for taxation has weakened over the past decade while perceptions that people often avoid paying their taxes have increased sharply. Moreover, many Africans question the fairness of their country’s tax burden, and only half think their government is using tax revenue for the well-being of its citizens. While a majority would pay higher taxes to support young people and national development, most say they find it difficult to get information about tax requirements and uses, and many see tax officials as corrupt and untrustworthy. Such perceptions may play a role in how willingly citizens support – and comply with – their government’s tax administration.
Topic:
Political stability, Tax Systems, Legitimacy, and State Funding
Political Geography:
Africa

6. Broad support for multiparty elections, little faith in electoral institutions: Uganda in comparative perspective

Author:
Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In the run-up to Uganda’s 2021 election, in which President Yoweri Museveni defeated Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, aka Bobi Wine, to claim a sixth term, violence reached unprecedented levels. More than 50 people were killed as security forces broke up opposition party gatherings, and several opposition members were arbitrarily detained (Arinaitwe, 2021). Although Election Day, 14 January, was relatively peaceful, more than 17.5 million Ugandans experienced a multiday Internet blackout, making social media platforms and news websites inaccessible at a time when they were in high demand (BBC, 2021; Moffat & Bennett, 2021). Election observers from the East African Community (EAC) noted malfunctioning biometric voter-verification machines and delays in the delivery of voting materials, among other issues, but joined domestic observers from the Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda in labeling the election largely free and fair. The Electoral Commission (EC) ultimately declared Museveni the winner with 58% of the vote – a comfortable lead over Bobi Wine (35%) and his fellow challengers (Moffat & Bennett, 2021; Yiga, 2021). Wine initially filed a court challenge in which he complained of soldiers stuffing ballot boxes, casting ballots for people, and chasing voters away from polling stations, but he later withdrew the case (Muhumuza, 2021). Court challenges after elections are commonplace in Uganda; since the country’s adoption of the fourth constitution in 1995, the outcome of every presidential race except the 2011 poll has been contested in court. Yet the courts have never overturned the results, even when they have acknowledged irregularities (Atuhaire, 2021). Beyond Museveni’s victory, what are the implications of the 2021 election for a country that returned to multiparty competition just 15 years ago? Should Ugandans be enthusiastic about a strong opposition showing as a sign of a healthy democracy at work, or will the prospect of enduring National Resistance Movement rule lead to disillusionment with democracy and the institutions that are meant to safeguard it – the EC and the courts? This policy paper aims to place the events of the 2021 election in perspective by examining public opinion data from Uganda over the past two decades. Despite a decade-long slide in Ugandans’ satisfaction with democracy, this analysis supports previous findings that more and more citizens have become “committed democrats” and view multiparty elections as tools for holding non-performing leaders accountable (Isbell & Kibirige, 2017; Kakumba, 2020; Kibirige, 2018). However, this investigation also points to decreasing trust in institutions that are meant to enforce the most basic of democratic processes – free and fair elections. Importantly, this negative trend cuts across the partisan divide. The analysis also shows that EC performance – both in executing its technical tasks and in refereeing fairly between competing parties – plays a crucial role in citizens’ evaluations of election quality. While public debate about reforming the EC is not new (Kibirige, 2016), the events of the 2021 election may provide impetus for intensifying efforts to increase transparency and improve communication on the part of the commission in order to enhance citizens’ satisfaction with the electoral process.
Topic:
Elections, Multi Party System, Partisanship, and Electoral Systems
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

7. Only game in town? Inequality and demand for democracy in Africa – a micro perspective

Author:
Thomas Isbell
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In this paper, the author explores whether perceived inequality is associated with demand for democracy among Africans. Past research has diverged on whether macro-level inequality should increase or decrease support for democracy, with some arguing that people might see democracy as a solution to inequality, and others that people might see it as a cause. I advance this literature by using a perceptual measure of inequality from Afrobarometer: how people feel their living situation compares to others’ in their country. I find that perceived equality is significantly associated with greater demand for democracy, while perceptions of relative deprivation and relative advantage are both associated with lower democratic demand. These effects are largely significant above and beyond the effect of absolute poverty and known predictors of support for democracy, such as free and fair elections and level of education.
Topic:
Education, Elections, Democracy, Inequality, and Social Order
Political Geography:
Africa

8. Measuring the impact of self-censorship on political party support in Afrobarometer data using machine learning

Author:
Paul Friesen
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Measures of political party support are viewed suspiciously in hybrid and authoritarian regimes where the two core indicators of political support – elections and public opinion polling – cannot be readily trusted. More accurately, the degree of measurement error is unknown, though scholars presume support for incumbent leaders and parties is exaggerated. This paper scrutinizes the degree to which political opinions on Afrobarometer surveys can be trusted by re-estimating voting preferences for 34 African countries. First, a range of demographic and interview metadata are regressed upon vote choice to see if they systematically influence vote-preference responses. Next, key markers of potential self-censorship are identified and used to create pools of “clean” and “polluted” data. Clean data are used to train a machine learning model to predict voting intentions, and then all data with self-censorship markers are recalculated. The results show that ruling party support is broadly similar in most countries but exaggerated by more than 10 percentage points in Sudan and Uganda and by between 5 and 10 points in Burundi, Tanzania, Togo, and Zimbabwe. Declines in ruling party support due to self-censorship are concurrent with increases in both non-responses and opposition party support.
Topic:
Politics, Censorship, Party System, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Africa

9. Population density and governance in Africa

Author:
Pranish Desai
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Across Africa, denser populations are associated with less confidence in institutions and the rule of law. What does that mean for the world’s fastest-urbanising continent?
Topic:
Governance, Population, Urbanization, and Rule of Law
Political Geography:
Africa

10. Declining poverty level in Ghana: Exploring the role of migrants’ remittances

Author:
Daniel Armah-Attoh
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Ghana has a long history of citizens migrating to other countries. Many of these migrants send remittances to relations and acquaintances back home, often to help recipients experiencing poverty and a lack of employment and economic opportunities. Empirical studies have established the poverty-alleviation impact of remittances in Africa, including Ghana. This study uses pooled Afrobarometer survey data collected between 2002 and 2017 to assess the relationship between migrants’ remittances and lived poverty in Ghana. Multiple statistical approaches suggest that remittances have a negative and statistically significant impact on lived poverty. We therefore recommend that the government institute policy measures to encourage the use of formal channels for such transfers to enable the country to harness the full development potential, including the poverty-reduction benefits, of migrants’ remittances.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Poverty, Migrants, and Cost of Living
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

11. Broad support for multiparty elections, little faith in electoral institutions: Uganda in comparative perspective

Author:
Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In the run-up to Uganda’s 2021 election, in which President Yoweri Museveni defeated Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, aka Bobi Wine, to claim a sixth term, violence reached unprecedented levels. More than 50 people were killed as security forces broke up opposition party gatherings, and several opposition members were arbitrarily detained (Arinaitwe, 2021). Although Election Day, 14 January, was relatively peaceful, more than 17.5 million Ugandans experienced a multiday Internet blackout, making social media platforms and news websites inaccessible at a time when they were in high demand (BBC, 2021; Moffat & Bennett, 2021). Election observers from the East African Community (EAC) noted malfunctioning biometric voter-verification machines and delays in the delivery of voting materials, among other issues, but joined domestic observers from the Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda in labeling the election largely free and fair. The Electoral Commission (EC) ultimately declared Museveni the winner with 58% of the vote – a comfortable lead over Bobi Wine (35%) and his fellow challengers (Moffat & Bennett, 2021; Yiga, 2021). Wine initially filed a court challenge in which he complained of soldiers stuffing ballot boxes, casting ballots for people, and chasing voters away from polling stations, but he later withdrew the case (Muhumuza, 2021). Court challenges after elections are commonplace in Uganda; since the country’s adoption of the fourth constitution in 1995, the outcome of every presidential race except the 2011 poll has been contested in court. Yet the courts have never overturned the results, even when they have acknowledged irregularities (Atuhaire, 2021). Beyond Museveni’s victory, what are the implications of the 2021 election for a country that returned to multiparty competition just 15 years ago? Should Ugandans be enthusiastic about a strong opposition showing as a sign of a healthy democracy at work, or will the prospect of enduring National Resistance Movement rule lead to disillusionment with democracy and the institutions that are meant to safeguard it – the EC and the courts? This policy paper aims to place the events of the 2021 election in perspective by examining public opinion data from Uganda over the past two decades. Despite a decade-long slide in Ugandans’ satisfaction with democracy, this analysis supports previous findings that more and more citizens have become “committed democrats” and view multiparty elections as tools for holding non-performing leaders accountable (Isbell & Kibirige, 2017; Kakumba, 2020; Kibirige, 2018). However, this investigation also points to decreasing trust in institutions that are meant to enforce the most basic of democratic processes – free and fair elections. Importantly, this negative trend cuts across the partisan divide. The analysis also shows that EC performance – both in executing its technical tasks and in refereeing fairly between competing parties – plays a crucial role in citizens’ evaluations of election quality. While public debate about reforming the EC is not new (Kibirige, 2016), the events of the 2021 election may provide impetus for intensifying efforts to increase transparency and improve communication on the part of the commission in order to enhance citizens’ satisfaction with the electoral process.
Topic:
Elections, Party System, Multi Party System, and Electoral Systems
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

12. Rising concern, falling performance: Health-sector challenges evident before and after onset of COVID-19 pandemic

Author:
Carolyn Logan and Tosin Salau
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
As Africa and the world begin to regroup now that the worst ravages of the COVID-19 pandemic appear to be past, it is an opportune time to take stock of the state of health care systems on the continent. The pandemic is not over – South Africa is just coming out of its fifth wave of infection (Al Jazeera, 2022), and there may be more to come (Landman, Irfan, & Resnick, 2022). In the meantime, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (2022) and national governments continue to scale up their vaccination campaigns. But the war in Ukraine and global economic deterioration have finally supplanted COVID-19 at the top of the news cycle. In the early stages of the pandemic, many assessments warned of the possibly extreme vulnerability of Africans to the pandemic based in part on the many challenges already facing health care systems across much of the continent (Mattes, Logan, Gyimah-Boadi, & Ellison, 2020). While the direst predictions did not come to pass in most countries – South Africa being a notable exception – the pandemic has highlighted gaps in health systems amid the recognition that the next global health crisis could hit harder if improvements and preparations are not made. Taking a longer-term view, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) also highlight the need to strengthen health systems (United Nations, 2018). SDG#3 focuses on good health and well-being. But Afrobarometer’s SDG Scorecards, based on our most recent data from 34 countries surveyed in Round 8 (2019/2021), show that from the perspective of citizens, only a handful of countries have been making significant progress toward achieving this SDG (Afrobarometer, 2021). Instead, a growing number of Africans report going without medical care, and the share who cite health as one of their country’s most important problems is also on the rise. Even among those who do get care, increasing proportions report finding it difficult, and having to pay bribes, to obtain the medical services they need. Not surprisingly, citizens are also increasingly critical of their governments’ performance in this sector: For the first time in two decades of Afrobarometer polling, a majority of respondents say their governments are performing badly on improving basic health services. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the challenges wrought by the pandemic were not the cause of these increasingly negative reviews: The downward trends were already under way before COVID-19 entered the picture, and in fact, in some cases the trends appear to be somewhat less negative since the onset of the pandemic.
Topic:
Health, Inequality, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa

13. Unresponsive and corrupt? Ugandan MPs hold key to how citizens perceive them

Author:
Matthias Krönke and Ronald Makanga Kakumba
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Uganda’s legislature is made up of 556 members of Parliament (MPs) who are meant to represent and serve their constituents and oversee the government’s actions. Since President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) party came to power in 1986 and appointed all members of Parliament, the country’s legislature has changed in several important ways (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009). First, today all MPs are either directly elected via a first-past-the-post system or indirectly elected via special electoral colleges. Second, the number of parliamentarians has almost doubled over 25 years, from 295 in the 6th Parliament (1996-2001) to 556 in the current 11th Parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1996; Parliament of Uganda, 2022).1 This drastic increase can be attributed to the continued creation of new constituencies and the allocation of parliamentary seats for special-interest groups. Proponents of this development say it reflects citizens’ demands, but critics describe it as part of a political strategy to protect and grow the ruling party’s seat share in Parliament by increasing the number of constituencies in NRM strongholds (Nakatudde, 2020; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). This debate has now entered a new phase with the recent ruling by the country’s Constitutional Court that Parliament and the Electoral Commission violated articles 51 and 63 of the Constitution by creating new constituencies that do not meet the population quota, based on data from the 2002 and 2014 census counts. The upshot of this ruling are proposals to downsize Uganda’s Parliament and redraw constituency boundaries (Barigaba, 2022). Third, the operating costs of the growing Parliament (MP and staff salaries, allowances, etc.) have increased drastically over the past two decades. Today Ugandan MPs’ salaries (35 million Uganda shillings, or about USD 9,700, per month) surpass those of most MPs elsewhere in Africa and in the European Union (BusinessTech, 2017; Olukya, 2021; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). The cost of running Uganda’s 11th Parliament was expected to increase by more than 50 billion Ugandan shillings (USD 14.1 million), a substantial increase compared to the previous Parliament (Mufumba, 2021). Fourth, the share of MPs who return to Parliament after their first term in office continues to decrease. While about 50% of MPs did not return for a second term in the 6th (1996-2001) and 7th (2001-2006) Parliaments, this rate has increased to 53% (2006-2011), 55% (2011-2016), and 58% (2016-2021) in subsequent Parliaments. Most recently, of the 457 MPs in the 10th Parliament, 319 were not voted back to the 11th Parliament (2021-2026), while 31 did not contest or chose to run for other offices, and only 107 MPs returned (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009; Forum for Women in Democracy, 2016; Independent, 2021). How do these changes affect 1) how citizens relate to their elected representatives and 2) how MPs address the needs of ordinary citizens? More broadly, are citizens being served by their MPs? To answer these questions, this policy paper begins by clarifying the foundations of the citizen-MP relationship and outlining the four key roles that MPs are generally expected to fulfil. The subsequent sections assess their performance in these roles against citizen expectations and other indicators. We find that Ugandans are becoming increasingly aware of their role in holding their MPs accountable. Most citizens are dissatisfied with how their MPs are doing their jobs, perceive them as corrupt, and say MPs don’t listen to constituents’ concerns. Residents of the Central region and Kampala are particularly critical of their MPs’ performance, probably due at least in part to high constituent-to-MP ratios in those areas. Citizens’ assessments of MP performance are associated with MPs’ perceived responsiveness and corruption as well as whether citizens have had contact with their MPs. In contrast, citizens’ demographic characteristics and views about democracy do not seem to drive their views of their elected representatives. There are two clear policy implications of these findings. First, at the institutional level, it is important to even out the citizen-to-MP ratios across the country. This is in line with the recent constitutional court ruling to base the creation of constituencies on census data. The second policy implication of our findings is that MPs have it in their own hands to change how citizens view their performance by improving on how they engage with them.
Topic:
Corruption, Politics, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

14. Profile and determinants of lived poverty in Benin

Author:
Romaric Samson and Richard Houessou
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, launched in 2015, outlines global aspirations and priorities through the end of this decade. Prominently, the first two Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) call for ending poverty “in all its forms everywhere” and for “zero hunger” (United Nations, 2021a). The proportion of the world’s population living in extreme poverty decreased from 36% in 1990 to 16% in 2010 and to 10% in 2015, but the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have reversed this trend (Sumner, Hoy, & Ortiz-Juarez, 2020). Benin has had one of the fastest-growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years (Adegoke, 2019), with per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging 3.6% between 2017 and 2019 (World Bank, 2020). But the most recent household survey led by the Institut National de la Statistique et de l’Analyse Economique (2018) estimated that 38.5% of citizens still live in poverty. Are GDP gains translating into better lives for ordinary Beninese? According to Afrobarometer survey findings, “lived poverty” – the experience of going without basic life necessities – has worsened significantly over the past decade in Benin. More than three out of four Beninese face moderate or high levels of lived poverty. Many of these citizens continue to have limited access to the electricity grid, water and sanitation services, and other essential development infrastructure. Most importantly, our analysis shows they often lack the education and employment needed to break the poverty cycle.
Topic:
Education, Poverty, Infrastructure, Inequality, and Job Creation
Political Geography:
Africa and Benin

15. Does sensitivity bias lead respondents to misreport their level of trust in political parties? An investigation into Afrobarometer’s survey results and methodology

Author:
Loubna Marfouk, Martin Sarvas, Jack Wippell, and Jintao Zhu
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
This paper explores the presence of politically sourced sensitivity bias, which leads respondents to report alternative answers to their true beliefs, in Afrobarometer’s survey results. To this end, we run a set of regressions on Afrobarometer Round 7 data to explore mechanisms through which the perceived sponsor of the survey is associated with response patterns related to trust in political parties. Questions regarding individuals’ trust levels in political parties are prone to sensitivity bias insofar as political concerns can lead respondents to favour a certain response for strategic reasons. Moreover, if respondents believe that answers will be shared with the perceived sponsor of the interview, they are likely to tailor their answers to what they judge is the preferred answer of their perceived survey sponsor. We find a number of statistically significant results that suggest some sensitivity bias is present in the survey responses. In particular, we show that there are statistically significant differences in responses for self-reported trust in both opposition and ruling parties when the respondent perceives the government to be the survey sponsor compared to when they perceive the sponsor to be Afrobarometer. We also explore how these responses vary by country- specific characteristics, such as regime type. Reducing respondents’ variation in perception of the survey sponsor might alleviate biases throughout Afrobarometer’s interviews, and a set of methodological changes might mitigate the effects of this sensitivity bias in future surveys. While other studies have focused on potential bias from interviewer effects, our research suggests a new avenue for research, in Africa and beyond, on respondent perceptions of sponsorship.
Topic:
Governance, Research, Political Parties, and Survey
Political Geography:
Africa

16. Partisanship in a young democracy: Evidence from Ghana

Author:
Alexander Stoecker
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
While past studies have put forward many reasons why partisanship in young African democracies should be considered weak and meaningless, this paper casts doubt on this notion by presenting evidence of strong and stable patterns of partisanship among ordinary citizens. Based on survey data from Ghana, I exploit the variation introduced by the political turnovers of 2008 and 2016 to compare perceptions and attitudes of party supporters when their preferred party is in power and when it is not. The results indicate a pronounced partisan divide, suggesting that partisanship is meaningful and prompts motivated reasoning among citizens. On the one hand this can be seen as evidence for a stable party landscape and thus a more mature democracy, but on the other hand partisan polarization may also obstruct effective governance. Furthermore, the analysis of attitudes toward democratic principles uncovers a worrying double standard that could negatively affect the consolidation of democracy. A simple heterogeneity analysis reveals that while partisan identities seem to exist alongside ethnic identities, the latter still strongly determine the strength of party attachment in Ghana. Future research on political behaviour needs to acknowledge the presence of these partisan motives and continue to investigate the impact of partisanship on the further development of democratic institutions in African democracies.
Topic:
Democracy, Ethnicity, Political Parties, Identity, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

17. Tax Disobedience in Côte d’Ivoire

Author:
Joseph Kone
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Since the end of its civil war in 2011 and the installation of President Alassane Dramane Ouattara, Côte d’Ivoire has seen one of the highest rates of economic growth in Africa, sometimes referred to as a new “Ivoirian miracle” (Dionne & Bamba, 2017). As the economy has grown and the state has rebuilt capacity, tax revenues have increased steadily, growing by 37% between 2013 and 2017. In many African states, «import and export taxes constitute the backbone of tax regimes. Revenues are supplemented by indirect taxes, in the form of excise and sales taxes» (D’Arcy, 2011). In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the government relies heavily on taxes on the export of cocoa and other agricultural products, in addition to taxes on industrial and commercial profits, income, telecommunications, petroleum products, imports, as well as a value-added tax (Ministère du Budget et du Portefeuille de l’Etat, 2020). Even in states with high levels of coercive capacity, citizens’ willingness to pay taxes is a significant determinant of revenues collected. This willingness becomes even more important in contexts of relatively low state capacity, such as has existed in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire. In fact, a substantial – and growing – proportion of Ivoirians question the state’s right to collect taxes, a fact that could present a significant challenge to the government’s ability to collect revenues in order to rebuild essential state services and avoid excessive debt. This paper focuses on a particular form of tax non-compliance: tax disobedience, or individuals’ refusal to pay taxes and fees as a form of protest. Specifically, it examines several individual-level factors that might be associated with tax disobedience, including lack of a cash income, assessments of public services and elected representatives, accessibility of information, and effective connections with the Ivoirian nation. Our analyses of data from the Afrobarometer Round 7 survey (2017) suggest that some of the conventional wisdom on tax compliance is not supported in the case of tax disobedience in Côte d’Ivoire. While we find, as expected, that individuals who think state performance is improving in delivering key services are less likely to express a willingness to engage in tax disobedience, we find no such link with lived poverty; poorer Ivoirians are no more or less likely than their wealthier counterparts to endorse tax disobedience. Surprisingly, assessments of elected representatives and of corruption in the tax system are not significantly associated with tax disobedience, either. Perceived access to government information and identification with the Ivoirian nation do show associations with tax disobedience, but these links run counter to our expectations: Citizens who think they could access information held by public bodies are significantly more likely to say they engaged or would engage in tax disobedience, as are people who identify more closely with the nation than with their ethnic group. These analyses suggest the need for more research on a crucial question facing African states: Who pays taxes, and who doesn’t?
Topic:
Civil Society, Tax Systems, Revenue Management, and Tax Evasion
Political Geography:
Africa and Côte d'Ivoire

18. Who gets Involved? Insights on Civic Engagement in Africa and Implications for Fostering Volunteerism

Author:
Carolyn Logan, Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny, and Kangwook Han
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set ambitious targets for countries and societies to improve lives and livelihoods around the world. While the expectations of meeting these goals largely fall on governments, it is widely recognized that joint efforts by citizens and their governments will be needed to achieve the best outcomes. Citizen action takes place in many forms and forums, including organizing and working together on shared goals, providing mutual support and assistance, campaigning or advocating for shared needs, and engaging with governments, making demands on them, and holding them to account. While some citizens may become involved in a formal capacity, such as through paid employment in nongovernmental advocacy or service organizations and through employment with governments or other service providers, large numbers will – and must – be engaged in a voluntary capacity. Understanding the nature of this voluntary engagement is a key goal of this analysis. Advocates of volunteerism in Africa have been plagued by a lack of data on who engages in voluntary service, how much they contribute, in what formats, and what the outcomes are. Only a handful of governments have collected data on this topic. Yet our ability to foster and build support for volunteerism is partly dependent on how well we understand the ways people are already engaging every day in these critical but uncompensated contributions in pursuit of the public good. Afrobarometer data can help to fill this void. Although Afrobarometer has not collected data with the explicit aim of studying volunteerism, for more than 20 years it has captured extensive, nationally representative data on respondents’ levels of political and civic participation (much of which can be classed as volunteerism) across seven rounds of surveys in 38 countries. This includes membership in religious and civic organizations and participation in individual and collective efforts to engage with leaders and to voice community needs. In particular, in addition to membership in associations, Afrobarometer tracks the contact of respondents with political and community leaders, their attendance at community meetings, and their efforts to join with others to address issues or express their views. These kinds of civic engagement are the cornerstone of volunteerism to solve problems and improve lives. Understanding who engages, under what circumstances, and why provides a foundation on which to more effectively promote civic engagement and volunteerism in pursuit of the SDGs and other development objectives. This paper explores Afrobarometer data on civic engagement with four main goals: specify how Afrobarometer indicators of civic engagement link to core understandings of volunteerism and its various typologies; map profiles and patterns of the people who engage in volunteerism, especially at the country level; model voluntary civic engagement to identify the key factors and contexts that facilitate or inhibit it at both the individual and country levels; and use these profiles and models to identify entry points for activists who want to foster or support voluntary civic engagement. Our analysis identifies several factors that shape voluntary civic engagement, from socio- demographic ones such as education and wealth to citizens’ socio-political engagement, their personal sense of efficacy, and their overall trust in their governments. Country contexts are important, as we see wide cross-country differences in levels of volunteerism. Among other aspects, wealthier countries, on average, report less volunteerism, while democracies report more. We have found evidence that confronting unmet needs – whether one’s own or those of others – is a major motivating factor of voluntary engagement. These findings suggest a number of opportunities and entry points for increasing citizen engagement. The paper is organized in four parts. Part A begins with a discussion of knowledge on volunteerism and participation, highlighting the lack of evidence and data sources on Africa and how civic engagement intersects with volunteerism. Part B develops descriptive profiles of the participants in voluntary civic engagement. Part C explores key driving factors at the individual and country levels. The final section presents recommendations for acting on these findings.
Topic:
Development, Sustainable Development Goals, Sustainability, and Civic Engagement
Political Geography:
Africa

19. How does exposure to conflict events shape social trust? A spatiotemporal approach

Author:
Jacob S. Lewis and Sedef A. Topal
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
This article examines how proximate exposure to violent conflict events affects levels of social trust. We argue that since exposure to conflict heightens perceptions of threat, individuals who were proximately exposed to conflict events should exhibit lower levels of generalized and out-group social trust than individuals not subject to such exposure. We also argue that individuals subject to exposure to conflict should show higher levels of in-group social trust due to existential concerns that increase their desire to find security within their group. Using geocoded survey data from more than 25,000 respondents in 16 African countries surveyed in 2005 and from the Armed Conflict Location Event Database, we draw spatiotemporal buffers around each respondent. We find that exposure to violent conflict events reduces all forms of social trust across all models. Such findings run counter to arguments suggesting that proximate exposure to violent conflict increases in-group social trust.
Topic:
Civil Society, Conflict, Social Order, and Trust
Political Geography:
Africa

20. Curbing intolerance of persons in same-sex relationships in Ghana: The important role of education

Author:
Daniel Armah-Attoh
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
This paper describes high levels of intolerance in Ghana toward persons in same-sex relationships, explores factors driving this intolerance, and makes some policy recommendations for increasing tolerance. Using 2014 Afrobarometer survey data, the descriptive analysis reveals that large majorities of Ghanaians reject persons in same-sex relationships as neighbours, co-workers, supervisors, and members of their religious group; would report them to the police; and would support criminalizing same-sex activity. Regression analysis shows that religion, religiosity, age, and rural residence are associated with higher intolerance, while education and mediated social contact measured by social media and Internet use are associated with reduced intolerance. Among these drivers of intolerance and tolerance, we argue that education is the main factor that lends itself to meaningful remedial policy interventions and recommend a number of formal and informal education and sensitization measures aimed at reducing Ghanaians’ intolerance of people of different sexual orientation or identity.
Topic:
Education, Gender Issues, Repression, Sexuality, and Tolerance
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana