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1. Remittances and corruption perceptions in Africa

Author:
Alex Yeandle and David Doyle
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The relationship between remittances and corruption is contested. For some authors, external income endows individuals with financial buffers, which undermine these individuals’ incentive to hold governments to account and allow rent-seeking politicians to invest fewer resources in public goods. For others, remittance payments undermine clientelist networks and increase individual-level political engagement and accountability. For others still, remittances diffuse social norms, since senders are likely to live in large cities or wealthier countries where corruption is less tolerated. However, despite being rooted in individual-level assumptions, many of the conflicting results in the extant literature have an empirical focus at the aggregate level. In this paper we offer a corrective, explaining variation in individual-level perceptions of corruption among remittance recipients through a new mechanism. With survey data from 34 African countries, we show that recipients are endowed with greater cash income, which is used to bribe officials in the hope of securing preferential access to basic services. This act of paying bribes, coupled with the fact that access does not appear to improve, fuels perceptions that the government is corrupt.
Topic:
Corruption, Governance, Leadership, Accountability, and Bribery
Political Geography:
Africa

2. Keeping tabs? Perceptions of relative deprivation and political trust in Africa

Author:
Thomas Isbell
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
What are the implications of economic inequality for trust in government and state institutions? Political trust performs important functions in representative political systems, facilitating the efficient functioning of government, simplifying complex political processes, and reducing monitoring costs for ordinary people. The existing literature has shown that macroeconomic performance (including levels of inequality) and evaluations shape political trust. This paper addresses two gaps in the literature by focusing on the role of individual perceptions and subjective experiences of inequality and by studying cases in Africa. Using Afrobarometer survey data collected from more than 40,000 respondents in 34 African countries between late 2016 and mid-2018, I use multi-level modelling to demonstrate that perceptions of relative deprivation are significantly associated with less trust in representative government institutions and, more weakly, with less trust in state institutions. The effect of perceptions of relative deprivation remains significant when controlling for macroeconomic conditions and performance evaluations. In effect size, trust in representative government institutions is at least comparable to frequently cited covariates of trust such as location, level of education, and government economic performance, suggesting that perceived relative deprivation is indeed an important covariate of such trust. Feeling relatively advantaged is also significantly associated with greater trust in representative government institutions. This may reflect strong neo-patrimonial ties between citizens and political agents. In demonstrating that individual-level economic considerations affect political trust in Africa, we challenge the conventional wisdom that only macroeconomic factors affect trust.
Topic:
Politics, Governance, Institutions, and Trust
Political Geography:
Africa

3. Explaining the experience of political violence in Nigeria

Author:
Tunde A. Alabi
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Violence has been part of Nigeria’s politics since before political independence. While there have been attempts to understand why political violence happens in the country, little emphasis has been placed on explanatory factors for political-violence victimisation. This study investigates the influence of socio-demographic characteristics, presence of security apparatus, partisanship, political participation, and social group membership on the experience of political violence in Nigeria and examines how the influence of these factors varies between Northern and Southern Nigeria – two regions with major social and cultural differences. The study analyses data from the seventh round of the Afrobarometer survey, which were collected in 2017 from 1,568 adults across the 36 states and Federal Capital Territory of Nigeria. Multiple linear regression models were fitted. Our analysis finds that about one in four persons has experienced at least one form of political violence. Living in the South, being young, being poor, living in an area with no police presence, being partisan, participating in politics, and being active in social groups increase the likelihood of political-violence victimisation. While women were more likely than men to experience political violence in the North, the reverse is the case in the South. Regional variation is also observed in the influence of political participation and the degree of the effect of party affiliation and social group membership.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Gender Issues, and Violence
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

4. Only game in town? Inequality and demand for democracy in Africa – a micro perspective

Author:
Thomas Isbell
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In this paper, the author explores whether perceived inequality is associated with demand for democracy among Africans. Past research has diverged on whether macro-level inequality should increase or decrease support for democracy, with some arguing that people might see democracy as a solution to inequality, and others that people might see it as a cause. I advance this literature by using a perceptual measure of inequality from Afrobarometer: how people feel their living situation compares to others’ in their country. I find that perceived equality is significantly associated with greater demand for democracy, while perceptions of relative deprivation and relative advantage are both associated with lower democratic demand. These effects are largely significant above and beyond the effect of absolute poverty and known predictors of support for democracy, such as free and fair elections and level of education.
Topic:
Education, Elections, Democracy, Inequality, and Social Order
Political Geography:
Africa

5. Measuring the impact of self-censorship on political party support in Afrobarometer data using machine learning

Author:
Paul Friesen
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Measures of political party support are viewed suspiciously in hybrid and authoritarian regimes where the two core indicators of political support – elections and public opinion polling – cannot be readily trusted. More accurately, the degree of measurement error is unknown, though scholars presume support for incumbent leaders and parties is exaggerated. This paper scrutinizes the degree to which political opinions on Afrobarometer surveys can be trusted by re-estimating voting preferences for 34 African countries. First, a range of demographic and interview metadata are regressed upon vote choice to see if they systematically influence vote-preference responses. Next, key markers of potential self-censorship are identified and used to create pools of “clean” and “polluted” data. Clean data are used to train a machine learning model to predict voting intentions, and then all data with self-censorship markers are recalculated. The results show that ruling party support is broadly similar in most countries but exaggerated by more than 10 percentage points in Sudan and Uganda and by between 5 and 10 points in Burundi, Tanzania, Togo, and Zimbabwe. Declines in ruling party support due to self-censorship are concurrent with increases in both non-responses and opposition party support.
Topic:
Politics, Censorship, Party System, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Africa

6. Population density and governance in Africa

Author:
Pranish Desai
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Across Africa, denser populations are associated with less confidence in institutions and the rule of law. What does that mean for the world’s fastest-urbanising continent?
Topic:
Governance, Population, Urbanization, and Rule of Law
Political Geography:
Africa

7. Declining poverty level in Ghana: Exploring the role of migrants’ remittances

Author:
Daniel Armah-Attoh
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Ghana has a long history of citizens migrating to other countries. Many of these migrants send remittances to relations and acquaintances back home, often to help recipients experiencing poverty and a lack of employment and economic opportunities. Empirical studies have established the poverty-alleviation impact of remittances in Africa, including Ghana. This study uses pooled Afrobarometer survey data collected between 2002 and 2017 to assess the relationship between migrants’ remittances and lived poverty in Ghana. Multiple statistical approaches suggest that remittances have a negative and statistically significant impact on lived poverty. We therefore recommend that the government institute policy measures to encourage the use of formal channels for such transfers to enable the country to harness the full development potential, including the poverty-reduction benefits, of migrants’ remittances.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Poverty, Migrants, and Cost of Living
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

8. Broad support for multiparty elections, little faith in electoral institutions: Uganda in comparative perspective

Author:
Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In the run-up to Uganda’s 2021 election, in which President Yoweri Museveni defeated Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, aka Bobi Wine, to claim a sixth term, violence reached unprecedented levels. More than 50 people were killed as security forces broke up opposition party gatherings, and several opposition members were arbitrarily detained (Arinaitwe, 2021). Although Election Day, 14 January, was relatively peaceful, more than 17.5 million Ugandans experienced a multiday Internet blackout, making social media platforms and news websites inaccessible at a time when they were in high demand (BBC, 2021; Moffat & Bennett, 2021). Election observers from the East African Community (EAC) noted malfunctioning biometric voter-verification machines and delays in the delivery of voting materials, among other issues, but joined domestic observers from the Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda in labeling the election largely free and fair. The Electoral Commission (EC) ultimately declared Museveni the winner with 58% of the vote – a comfortable lead over Bobi Wine (35%) and his fellow challengers (Moffat & Bennett, 2021; Yiga, 2021). Wine initially filed a court challenge in which he complained of soldiers stuffing ballot boxes, casting ballots for people, and chasing voters away from polling stations, but he later withdrew the case (Muhumuza, 2021). Court challenges after elections are commonplace in Uganda; since the country’s adoption of the fourth constitution in 1995, the outcome of every presidential race except the 2011 poll has been contested in court. Yet the courts have never overturned the results, even when they have acknowledged irregularities (Atuhaire, 2021). Beyond Museveni’s victory, what are the implications of the 2021 election for a country that returned to multiparty competition just 15 years ago? Should Ugandans be enthusiastic about a strong opposition showing as a sign of a healthy democracy at work, or will the prospect of enduring National Resistance Movement rule lead to disillusionment with democracy and the institutions that are meant to safeguard it – the EC and the courts? This policy paper aims to place the events of the 2021 election in perspective by examining public opinion data from Uganda over the past two decades. Despite a decade-long slide in Ugandans’ satisfaction with democracy, this analysis supports previous findings that more and more citizens have become “committed democrats” and view multiparty elections as tools for holding non-performing leaders accountable (Isbell & Kibirige, 2017; Kakumba, 2020; Kibirige, 2018). However, this investigation also points to decreasing trust in institutions that are meant to enforce the most basic of democratic processes – free and fair elections. Importantly, this negative trend cuts across the partisan divide. The analysis also shows that EC performance – both in executing its technical tasks and in refereeing fairly between competing parties – plays a crucial role in citizens’ evaluations of election quality. While public debate about reforming the EC is not new (Kibirige, 2016), the events of the 2021 election may provide impetus for intensifying efforts to increase transparency and improve communication on the part of the commission in order to enhance citizens’ satisfaction with the electoral process.
Topic:
Elections, Party System, Multi Party System, and Electoral Systems
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

9. Rising concern, falling performance: Health-sector challenges evident before and after onset of COVID-19 pandemic

Author:
Carolyn Logan and Tosin Salau
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
As Africa and the world begin to regroup now that the worst ravages of the COVID-19 pandemic appear to be past, it is an opportune time to take stock of the state of health care systems on the continent. The pandemic is not over – South Africa is just coming out of its fifth wave of infection (Al Jazeera, 2022), and there may be more to come (Landman, Irfan, & Resnick, 2022). In the meantime, the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention (2022) and national governments continue to scale up their vaccination campaigns. But the war in Ukraine and global economic deterioration have finally supplanted COVID-19 at the top of the news cycle. In the early stages of the pandemic, many assessments warned of the possibly extreme vulnerability of Africans to the pandemic based in part on the many challenges already facing health care systems across much of the continent (Mattes, Logan, Gyimah-Boadi, & Ellison, 2020). While the direst predictions did not come to pass in most countries – South Africa being a notable exception – the pandemic has highlighted gaps in health systems amid the recognition that the next global health crisis could hit harder if improvements and preparations are not made. Taking a longer-term view, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) also highlight the need to strengthen health systems (United Nations, 2018). SDG#3 focuses on good health and well-being. But Afrobarometer’s SDG Scorecards, based on our most recent data from 34 countries surveyed in Round 8 (2019/2021), show that from the perspective of citizens, only a handful of countries have been making significant progress toward achieving this SDG (Afrobarometer, 2021). Instead, a growing number of Africans report going without medical care, and the share who cite health as one of their country’s most important problems is also on the rise. Even among those who do get care, increasing proportions report finding it difficult, and having to pay bribes, to obtain the medical services they need. Not surprisingly, citizens are also increasingly critical of their governments’ performance in this sector: For the first time in two decades of Afrobarometer polling, a majority of respondents say their governments are performing badly on improving basic health services. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the challenges wrought by the pandemic were not the cause of these increasingly negative reviews: The downward trends were already under way before COVID-19 entered the picture, and in fact, in some cases the trends appear to be somewhat less negative since the onset of the pandemic.
Topic:
Health, Inequality, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa

10. Unresponsive and corrupt? Ugandan MPs hold key to how citizens perceive them

Author:
Matthias Krönke and Ronald Makanga Kakumba
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Uganda’s legislature is made up of 556 members of Parliament (MPs) who are meant to represent and serve their constituents and oversee the government’s actions. Since President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) party came to power in 1986 and appointed all members of Parliament, the country’s legislature has changed in several important ways (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009). First, today all MPs are either directly elected via a first-past-the-post system or indirectly elected via special electoral colleges. Second, the number of parliamentarians has almost doubled over 25 years, from 295 in the 6th Parliament (1996-2001) to 556 in the current 11th Parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1996; Parliament of Uganda, 2022).1 This drastic increase can be attributed to the continued creation of new constituencies and the allocation of parliamentary seats for special-interest groups. Proponents of this development say it reflects citizens’ demands, but critics describe it as part of a political strategy to protect and grow the ruling party’s seat share in Parliament by increasing the number of constituencies in NRM strongholds (Nakatudde, 2020; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). This debate has now entered a new phase with the recent ruling by the country’s Constitutional Court that Parliament and the Electoral Commission violated articles 51 and 63 of the Constitution by creating new constituencies that do not meet the population quota, based on data from the 2002 and 2014 census counts. The upshot of this ruling are proposals to downsize Uganda’s Parliament and redraw constituency boundaries (Barigaba, 2022). Third, the operating costs of the growing Parliament (MP and staff salaries, allowances, etc.) have increased drastically over the past two decades. Today Ugandan MPs’ salaries (35 million Uganda shillings, or about USD 9,700, per month) surpass those of most MPs elsewhere in Africa and in the European Union (BusinessTech, 2017; Olukya, 2021; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). The cost of running Uganda’s 11th Parliament was expected to increase by more than 50 billion Ugandan shillings (USD 14.1 million), a substantial increase compared to the previous Parliament (Mufumba, 2021). Fourth, the share of MPs who return to Parliament after their first term in office continues to decrease. While about 50% of MPs did not return for a second term in the 6th (1996-2001) and 7th (2001-2006) Parliaments, this rate has increased to 53% (2006-2011), 55% (2011-2016), and 58% (2016-2021) in subsequent Parliaments. Most recently, of the 457 MPs in the 10th Parliament, 319 were not voted back to the 11th Parliament (2021-2026), while 31 did not contest or chose to run for other offices, and only 107 MPs returned (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009; Forum for Women in Democracy, 2016; Independent, 2021). How do these changes affect 1) how citizens relate to their elected representatives and 2) how MPs address the needs of ordinary citizens? More broadly, are citizens being served by their MPs? To answer these questions, this policy paper begins by clarifying the foundations of the citizen-MP relationship and outlining the four key roles that MPs are generally expected to fulfil. The subsequent sections assess their performance in these roles against citizen expectations and other indicators. We find that Ugandans are becoming increasingly aware of their role in holding their MPs accountable. Most citizens are dissatisfied with how their MPs are doing their jobs, perceive them as corrupt, and say MPs don’t listen to constituents’ concerns. Residents of the Central region and Kampala are particularly critical of their MPs’ performance, probably due at least in part to high constituent-to-MP ratios in those areas. Citizens’ assessments of MP performance are associated with MPs’ perceived responsiveness and corruption as well as whether citizens have had contact with their MPs. In contrast, citizens’ demographic characteristics and views about democracy do not seem to drive their views of their elected representatives. There are two clear policy implications of these findings. First, at the institutional level, it is important to even out the citizen-to-MP ratios across the country. This is in line with the recent constitutional court ruling to base the creation of constituencies on census data. The second policy implication of our findings is that MPs have it in their own hands to change how citizens view their performance by improving on how they engage with them.
Topic:
Corruption, Politics, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

11. Profile and determinants of lived poverty in Benin

Author:
Romaric Samson and Richard Houessou
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, launched in 2015, outlines global aspirations and priorities through the end of this decade. Prominently, the first two Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) call for ending poverty “in all its forms everywhere” and for “zero hunger” (United Nations, 2021a). The proportion of the world’s population living in extreme poverty decreased from 36% in 1990 to 16% in 2010 and to 10% in 2015, but the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have reversed this trend (Sumner, Hoy, & Ortiz-Juarez, 2020). Benin has had one of the fastest-growing economies in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years (Adegoke, 2019), with per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging 3.6% between 2017 and 2019 (World Bank, 2020). But the most recent household survey led by the Institut National de la Statistique et de l’Analyse Economique (2018) estimated that 38.5% of citizens still live in poverty. Are GDP gains translating into better lives for ordinary Beninese? According to Afrobarometer survey findings, “lived poverty” – the experience of going without basic life necessities – has worsened significantly over the past decade in Benin. More than three out of four Beninese face moderate or high levels of lived poverty. Many of these citizens continue to have limited access to the electricity grid, water and sanitation services, and other essential development infrastructure. Most importantly, our analysis shows they often lack the education and employment needed to break the poverty cycle.
Topic:
Education, Poverty, Infrastructure, Inequality, and Job Creation
Political Geography:
Africa and Benin

12. Mapping state capacity in Africa: Professionalism and reach

Author:
Matthias Krönke, Robert Mattes, and Vinothan Naidoo
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Whether depicted as bloated, extractive, or remote from the lives of ordinary citizens, the African state is widely seen to lack the necessary capacity to provide for the physical and material security of its citizens or to command legitimacy. Yet scholars have rarely attempted to assess the performance of the African state through the prism of the lived experiences of those whom the state is meant to serve – its citizens. Most studies rely on data supplied by national statistics agencies or the judgments of expert observers. And while scholars acknowledge that the quality of the African state is likely shaped by geographic and ethnic differences within countries, few have measured how state capacity varies at the sub-national level. In this paper, we address this situation by using survey research measures of respondents’ proximity to state services and actual experiences with civil servants to measure two distinct dimensions of the state salient to the African context: its reach, or physical presence at the grassroots across the breadth of a country, and its professionalism, or ability to deliver public services in a proficient and ethical manner. The results reveal new perspectives on which states excel on either or both dimensions. They also illustrate how widely state performance varies at the sub-national level. Finally, we use survey data to assess the performance of the state, and show that it is the degree of professionalism, and sometimes reach, that enables the state to provide security and welfare, satisfy demands, and secure popular legitimacy. But in contrast to usual expectations, the size of the state at senior levels has no impact.
Topic:
Nationalism, State Formation, State Building, Professionalism, and Subnationalism
Political Geography:
Africa

13. Footing the bill? Less legitimacy, more avoidance mark African views on taxation

Author:
Thomas Isbell
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Taxation is a key fiscal tool for domestic resource mobilization. In many African countries, however, weak tax-administration systems limit the ways in which governments can finance their development agendas and provide essential services such as health care, education, and infrastructure (Drummond, Daal, Srivastava, & Oliveira, 2012). The importance of raising resources through taxation has been heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic. Governments globally have confronted a sudden drop in tax revenue as many economic sectors have slowed amid lockdowns. Especially in developing countries, this shock has significantly curtailed governments’ ability to fund access to vital health, financial, and other services and assistance to those most affected by the pandemic (Gaspar, Hanif, Pazarbasioglu, & Saint-Amans, 2020). The reduction in tax revenue during the pandemic is likely to compound itself over time and limit how quickly developing economies can bounce back as governments lack the fiscal resources to stimulate growth. Even without a pandemic, tax revenues are relatively low across Africa. In 2019, 30 African countries averaged tax revenues totaling 16.6% of gross domestic product – half the 33.8% collected by member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/AUC/ATAF, 2021). In addition to capacity limitations of government tax agencies, low tax revenues can be related to macroeconomic factors such as large agricultural and informal sectors, which are typically hard to tax (Di John, 2006; Mansour & Keen, 2009; Coulibaly & Gandhi, 2018; Moore, Prichard, & Fjeldstad, 2018). One current debate concerns how to tax highly digitalized businesses – which operate in African countries without necessarily having an easily taxable physical presence – in a way that is fair and doesn’t impede the growth of start-up companies (African Tax Administration Forum, 2020). But low tax revenues can also reflect micro-level factors such as citizens’ limited willingness to pay taxes (“tax morale”), a lack of knowledge about what they owe and what their taxes are used for, and their perceptions of corruption in the tax administration (OECD, 2019). If citizens regard paying taxes as a fiscal exchange or contractual relationship (Moore, 2004), these factors can affect the perceived legitimacy of taxation as a whole (D’Arcy, 2011). Beyond short- and medium-term fiscal problems, this can also have a more fundamental impact on the legitimacy of governments and political systems. The ability to raise revenue through taxes is an important marker of state capacity and political legitimacy (Brautigam, Fjeldstad, & Moore, 2008), and may contribute to government responsiveness and accountability as taxpayers demand a return on their taxes (Moore et al., 2018). How do Africans see taxation? Afrobarometer survey data collected in 34 African countries in 2019/2021 show that a majority of Africans endorse their government’s right to collect taxes. But popular support for taxation has weakened over the past decade while perceptions that people often avoid paying their taxes have increased sharply. Moreover, many Africans question the fairness of their country’s tax burden, and only half think their government is using tax revenue for the well-being of its citizens. While a majority would pay higher taxes to support young people and national development, most say they find it difficult to get information about tax requirements and uses, and many see tax officials as corrupt and untrustworthy. Such perceptions may play a role in how willingly citizens support – and comply with – their government’s tax administration.
Topic:
Political stability, Tax Systems, Legitimacy, and State Funding
Political Geography:
Africa

14. Broad support for multiparty elections, little faith in electoral institutions: Uganda in comparative perspective

Author:
Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In the run-up to Uganda’s 2021 election, in which President Yoweri Museveni defeated Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, aka Bobi Wine, to claim a sixth term, violence reached unprecedented levels. More than 50 people were killed as security forces broke up opposition party gatherings, and several opposition members were arbitrarily detained (Arinaitwe, 2021). Although Election Day, 14 January, was relatively peaceful, more than 17.5 million Ugandans experienced a multiday Internet blackout, making social media platforms and news websites inaccessible at a time when they were in high demand (BBC, 2021; Moffat & Bennett, 2021). Election observers from the East African Community (EAC) noted malfunctioning biometric voter-verification machines and delays in the delivery of voting materials, among other issues, but joined domestic observers from the Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda in labeling the election largely free and fair. The Electoral Commission (EC) ultimately declared Museveni the winner with 58% of the vote – a comfortable lead over Bobi Wine (35%) and his fellow challengers (Moffat & Bennett, 2021; Yiga, 2021). Wine initially filed a court challenge in which he complained of soldiers stuffing ballot boxes, casting ballots for people, and chasing voters away from polling stations, but he later withdrew the case (Muhumuza, 2021). Court challenges after elections are commonplace in Uganda; since the country’s adoption of the fourth constitution in 1995, the outcome of every presidential race except the 2011 poll has been contested in court. Yet the courts have never overturned the results, even when they have acknowledged irregularities (Atuhaire, 2021). Beyond Museveni’s victory, what are the implications of the 2021 election for a country that returned to multiparty competition just 15 years ago? Should Ugandans be enthusiastic about a strong opposition showing as a sign of a healthy democracy at work, or will the prospect of enduring National Resistance Movement rule lead to disillusionment with democracy and the institutions that are meant to safeguard it – the EC and the courts? This policy paper aims to place the events of the 2021 election in perspective by examining public opinion data from Uganda over the past two decades. Despite a decade-long slide in Ugandans’ satisfaction with democracy, this analysis supports previous findings that more and more citizens have become “committed democrats” and view multiparty elections as tools for holding non-performing leaders accountable (Isbell & Kibirige, 2017; Kakumba, 2020; Kibirige, 2018). However, this investigation also points to decreasing trust in institutions that are meant to enforce the most basic of democratic processes – free and fair elections. Importantly, this negative trend cuts across the partisan divide. The analysis also shows that EC performance – both in executing its technical tasks and in refereeing fairly between competing parties – plays a crucial role in citizens’ evaluations of election quality. While public debate about reforming the EC is not new (Kibirige, 2016), the events of the 2021 election may provide impetus for intensifying efforts to increase transparency and improve communication on the part of the commission in order to enhance citizens’ satisfaction with the electoral process.
Topic:
Elections, Multi Party System, Partisanship, and Electoral Systems
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

15. Does sensitivity bias lead respondents to misreport their level of trust in political parties? An investigation into Afrobarometer’s survey results and methodology

Author:
Loubna Marfouk, Martin Sarvas, Jack Wippell, and Jintao Zhu
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
This paper explores the presence of politically sourced sensitivity bias, which leads respondents to report alternative answers to their true beliefs, in Afrobarometer’s survey results. To this end, we run a set of regressions on Afrobarometer Round 7 data to explore mechanisms through which the perceived sponsor of the survey is associated with response patterns related to trust in political parties. Questions regarding individuals’ trust levels in political parties are prone to sensitivity bias insofar as political concerns can lead respondents to favour a certain response for strategic reasons. Moreover, if respondents believe that answers will be shared with the perceived sponsor of the interview, they are likely to tailor their answers to what they judge is the preferred answer of their perceived survey sponsor. We find a number of statistically significant results that suggest some sensitivity bias is present in the survey responses. In particular, we show that there are statistically significant differences in responses for self-reported trust in both opposition and ruling parties when the respondent perceives the government to be the survey sponsor compared to when they perceive the sponsor to be Afrobarometer. We also explore how these responses vary by country- specific characteristics, such as regime type. Reducing respondents’ variation in perception of the survey sponsor might alleviate biases throughout Afrobarometer’s interviews, and a set of methodological changes might mitigate the effects of this sensitivity bias in future surveys. While other studies have focused on potential bias from interviewer effects, our research suggests a new avenue for research, in Africa and beyond, on respondent perceptions of sponsorship.
Topic:
Governance, Research, Political Parties, and Survey
Political Geography:
Africa

16. Partisanship in a young democracy: Evidence from Ghana

Author:
Alexander Stoecker
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
While past studies have put forward many reasons why partisanship in young African democracies should be considered weak and meaningless, this paper casts doubt on this notion by presenting evidence of strong and stable patterns of partisanship among ordinary citizens. Based on survey data from Ghana, I exploit the variation introduced by the political turnovers of 2008 and 2016 to compare perceptions and attitudes of party supporters when their preferred party is in power and when it is not. The results indicate a pronounced partisan divide, suggesting that partisanship is meaningful and prompts motivated reasoning among citizens. On the one hand this can be seen as evidence for a stable party landscape and thus a more mature democracy, but on the other hand partisan polarization may also obstruct effective governance. Furthermore, the analysis of attitudes toward democratic principles uncovers a worrying double standard that could negatively affect the consolidation of democracy. A simple heterogeneity analysis reveals that while partisan identities seem to exist alongside ethnic identities, the latter still strongly determine the strength of party attachment in Ghana. Future research on political behaviour needs to acknowledge the presence of these partisan motives and continue to investigate the impact of partisanship on the further development of democratic institutions in African democracies.
Topic:
Democracy, Ethnicity, Political Parties, Identity, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

17. Tax Disobedience in Côte d’Ivoire

Author:
Joseph Kone
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Since the end of its civil war in 2011 and the installation of President Alassane Dramane Ouattara, Côte d’Ivoire has seen one of the highest rates of economic growth in Africa, sometimes referred to as a new “Ivoirian miracle” (Dionne & Bamba, 2017). As the economy has grown and the state has rebuilt capacity, tax revenues have increased steadily, growing by 37% between 2013 and 2017. In many African states, «import and export taxes constitute the backbone of tax regimes. Revenues are supplemented by indirect taxes, in the form of excise and sales taxes» (D’Arcy, 2011). In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, the government relies heavily on taxes on the export of cocoa and other agricultural products, in addition to taxes on industrial and commercial profits, income, telecommunications, petroleum products, imports, as well as a value-added tax (Ministère du Budget et du Portefeuille de l’Etat, 2020). Even in states with high levels of coercive capacity, citizens’ willingness to pay taxes is a significant determinant of revenues collected. This willingness becomes even more important in contexts of relatively low state capacity, such as has existed in post-conflict Côte d’Ivoire. In fact, a substantial – and growing – proportion of Ivoirians question the state’s right to collect taxes, a fact that could present a significant challenge to the government’s ability to collect revenues in order to rebuild essential state services and avoid excessive debt. This paper focuses on a particular form of tax non-compliance: tax disobedience, or individuals’ refusal to pay taxes and fees as a form of protest. Specifically, it examines several individual-level factors that might be associated with tax disobedience, including lack of a cash income, assessments of public services and elected representatives, accessibility of information, and effective connections with the Ivoirian nation. Our analyses of data from the Afrobarometer Round 7 survey (2017) suggest that some of the conventional wisdom on tax compliance is not supported in the case of tax disobedience in Côte d’Ivoire. While we find, as expected, that individuals who think state performance is improving in delivering key services are less likely to express a willingness to engage in tax disobedience, we find no such link with lived poverty; poorer Ivoirians are no more or less likely than their wealthier counterparts to endorse tax disobedience. Surprisingly, assessments of elected representatives and of corruption in the tax system are not significantly associated with tax disobedience, either. Perceived access to government information and identification with the Ivoirian nation do show associations with tax disobedience, but these links run counter to our expectations: Citizens who think they could access information held by public bodies are significantly more likely to say they engaged or would engage in tax disobedience, as are people who identify more closely with the nation than with their ethnic group. These analyses suggest the need for more research on a crucial question facing African states: Who pays taxes, and who doesn’t?
Topic:
Civil Society, Tax Systems, Revenue Management, and Tax Evasion
Political Geography:
Africa and Côte d'Ivoire

18. Who gets Involved? Insights on Civic Engagement in Africa and Implications for Fostering Volunteerism

Author:
Carolyn Logan, Josephine Appiah-Nyamekye Sanny, and Kangwook Han
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set ambitious targets for countries and societies to improve lives and livelihoods around the world. While the expectations of meeting these goals largely fall on governments, it is widely recognized that joint efforts by citizens and their governments will be needed to achieve the best outcomes. Citizen action takes place in many forms and forums, including organizing and working together on shared goals, providing mutual support and assistance, campaigning or advocating for shared needs, and engaging with governments, making demands on them, and holding them to account. While some citizens may become involved in a formal capacity, such as through paid employment in nongovernmental advocacy or service organizations and through employment with governments or other service providers, large numbers will – and must – be engaged in a voluntary capacity. Understanding the nature of this voluntary engagement is a key goal of this analysis. Advocates of volunteerism in Africa have been plagued by a lack of data on who engages in voluntary service, how much they contribute, in what formats, and what the outcomes are. Only a handful of governments have collected data on this topic. Yet our ability to foster and build support for volunteerism is partly dependent on how well we understand the ways people are already engaging every day in these critical but uncompensated contributions in pursuit of the public good. Afrobarometer data can help to fill this void. Although Afrobarometer has not collected data with the explicit aim of studying volunteerism, for more than 20 years it has captured extensive, nationally representative data on respondents’ levels of political and civic participation (much of which can be classed as volunteerism) across seven rounds of surveys in 38 countries. This includes membership in religious and civic organizations and participation in individual and collective efforts to engage with leaders and to voice community needs. In particular, in addition to membership in associations, Afrobarometer tracks the contact of respondents with political and community leaders, their attendance at community meetings, and their efforts to join with others to address issues or express their views. These kinds of civic engagement are the cornerstone of volunteerism to solve problems and improve lives. Understanding who engages, under what circumstances, and why provides a foundation on which to more effectively promote civic engagement and volunteerism in pursuit of the SDGs and other development objectives. This paper explores Afrobarometer data on civic engagement with four main goals: specify how Afrobarometer indicators of civic engagement link to core understandings of volunteerism and its various typologies; map profiles and patterns of the people who engage in volunteerism, especially at the country level; model voluntary civic engagement to identify the key factors and contexts that facilitate or inhibit it at both the individual and country levels; and use these profiles and models to identify entry points for activists who want to foster or support voluntary civic engagement. Our analysis identifies several factors that shape voluntary civic engagement, from socio- demographic ones such as education and wealth to citizens’ socio-political engagement, their personal sense of efficacy, and their overall trust in their governments. Country contexts are important, as we see wide cross-country differences in levels of volunteerism. Among other aspects, wealthier countries, on average, report less volunteerism, while democracies report more. We have found evidence that confronting unmet needs – whether one’s own or those of others – is a major motivating factor of voluntary engagement. These findings suggest a number of opportunities and entry points for increasing citizen engagement. The paper is organized in four parts. Part A begins with a discussion of knowledge on volunteerism and participation, highlighting the lack of evidence and data sources on Africa and how civic engagement intersects with volunteerism. Part B develops descriptive profiles of the participants in voluntary civic engagement. Part C explores key driving factors at the individual and country levels. The final section presents recommendations for acting on these findings.
Topic:
Development, Sustainable Development Goals, Sustainability, and Civic Engagement
Political Geography:
Africa

19. How does exposure to conflict events shape social trust? A spatiotemporal approach

Author:
Jacob S. Lewis and Sedef A. Topal
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
This article examines how proximate exposure to violent conflict events affects levels of social trust. We argue that since exposure to conflict heightens perceptions of threat, individuals who were proximately exposed to conflict events should exhibit lower levels of generalized and out-group social trust than individuals not subject to such exposure. We also argue that individuals subject to exposure to conflict should show higher levels of in-group social trust due to existential concerns that increase their desire to find security within their group. Using geocoded survey data from more than 25,000 respondents in 16 African countries surveyed in 2005 and from the Armed Conflict Location Event Database, we draw spatiotemporal buffers around each respondent. We find that exposure to violent conflict events reduces all forms of social trust across all models. Such findings run counter to arguments suggesting that proximate exposure to violent conflict increases in-group social trust.
Topic:
Civil Society, Conflict, Social Order, and Trust
Political Geography:
Africa

20. Curbing intolerance of persons in same-sex relationships in Ghana: The important role of education

Author:
Daniel Armah-Attoh
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
This paper describes high levels of intolerance in Ghana toward persons in same-sex relationships, explores factors driving this intolerance, and makes some policy recommendations for increasing tolerance. Using 2014 Afrobarometer survey data, the descriptive analysis reveals that large majorities of Ghanaians reject persons in same-sex relationships as neighbours, co-workers, supervisors, and members of their religious group; would report them to the police; and would support criminalizing same-sex activity. Regression analysis shows that religion, religiosity, age, and rural residence are associated with higher intolerance, while education and mediated social contact measured by social media and Internet use are associated with reduced intolerance. Among these drivers of intolerance and tolerance, we argue that education is the main factor that lends itself to meaningful remedial policy interventions and recommend a number of formal and informal education and sensitization measures aimed at reducing Ghanaians’ intolerance of people of different sexual orientation or identity.
Topic:
Education, Gender Issues, Repression, Sexuality, and Tolerance
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

21. Party footprints in Africa: Measuring local party presence across the continent

Author:
Matthias Krönke, Sarah J. Lockwood, and Robert Mattes
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The conventional view holds that most of Africa’s political parties are organizationally weak, with little grassroots presence. Yet few studies are based on systematically collected data about more than a handful of parties or countries at any given point. In this paper, we focus on one crucial aspect of party organization – the local presence that enables political parties to engage with and mobilize voters – and use Afrobarometer data to develop the Party Presence Index, the first systematic, cross-national measure of local party presence in Africa. We then apply the index to a series of substantive questions, confirming its value and demonstrating its potential to add significantly to our understanding of grassroots party organization.
Topic:
Governance, Democracy, Local, Political Parties, and Community
Political Geography:
Africa

22. Willing to kill: Factors contributing to mob justice in Uganda

Author:
Ronald Makanga Kakumba
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Mob justice is a form of extrajudicial punishment or retribution in which a person suspected of wrongdoing is typically humiliated, beaten, and in many cases killed by vigilantes or a crowd. Mob action takes place in the absence of any form of fair trial in which the accused are given a chance to defend themselves; the mob simply takes the law into its own hands (Ng’walali & Kitinya, 2006). Mob justice is not only criminal but also amounts to a violation of human rights (Uganda Human Rights Commission, 2016). Over the past decade, Uganda has seen a significant rise in the number of cases of mob justice. According to the Uganda Police Force’s (2013-2019) annual crime reports, 746 deaths by mob action were reported and investigated in 2019, compared to 426 in 2013, a 75% increase. “Mob kills 42 in 7 weeks,” the Daily Monitor (2019) reported in March 2019, citing police figures – an average of six lynchings a week. Homicides by mob action in Uganda occur mainly in response to thefts, robberies, killings, and reports of witchcraft (Uganda Police Force, 2018). According to the 2015 Afrobarometer survey in Uganda, one in six Ugandan adults said they took part in mob justice during the preceding year or would do so if they “had the chance.” This suggests that mob justice is not just a fringe problem in Uganda but commands attention and requires collective action. Why would a substantial number of Ugandans resort to taking the law into their own hands as an alternative form of “justice”? Analysts have pointed to a number of factors that might contribute to a willingness to engage in mob justice. One is a lack of trust in the formal criminal justice system to administer fair and timely justice. A 2005 study in Uganda showed that mob actions were often motivated by widespread suspicion or misunderstanding of the justice system, especially concerning the procedure of police bail, under which suspected culprits can be temporarily released before the court process (Baker, 2005). A study in southern Nigeria also reported that a lack of trust in the police was one of the motivations for the alarming incidence of “jungle justice” (Obarisiagbon, 2018). Research has also shown that personal victimization by crime can have a lasting impact on attitudes toward the police, the courts, and the criminal justice system overall (Berthelot, McNeal, & Baldwin, 2018; Dull & Wint, 1997; Koenig, 1980; Sprott & Doob, 1997), as can negative personal experiences with the courts (Olson & Huth, 1998; Kanaabi, 2004). Amid Uganda’s surge in mob justice, Afrobarometer findings tell us that popular trust in the police and courts has been declining while citizens’ perceptions of corruption in these criminal justice institutions has been rising. Statistical analyses show that a lack of trust in the police is associated with a willingness to engage in mob justice, while perceived corruption undermines trust and thus indirectly contributes to a willingness to join others in mob actions. Further, our analysis finds that being a victim of crime (physical assault), encountering problems in the court system, finding it hard to obtain police assistance, and having to pay a bribe to police or court officials are factors that make people more likely to say they would take part in mob action against suspected criminals. Based on these findings, we offer recommendations to mitigate Uganda’s growing problem of mob justice.
Topic:
Human Rights, Courts, Police, Justice, and Bribery
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

23. Corruption Crossroads? Rising Perceptions of Graft Weaken Citizen Trust, Threaten Botswana’s Democratic Standing

Author:
Thomas Isbell and Batlang Seabo
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Corruption is widely considered one of the greatest impediments to sustainable development in African countries (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2016; Bratton & Gyimah-Boadi, 2016). Corruption hinders macro-economic growth by weakening governance structures and diluting the positive effects of investments. At the micro level, corruption can trap the poorest, who are least likely to have alternatives to state provision of services, in a downward spiral (Peiffer & Rose, 2014). Botswana has long been considered one of Africa’s least corrupt countries and top performers in democratic practice and good governance. But while Transparency International’s (2019) Corruption Perceptions Index continues to rank Botswana as best on the continent, other observers have questioned this reputation (Mogalakwe & Nyamnjoh, 2017; Good, 2017). Allegations have focused on, among other things, high-level corruption in military procurement contracts under former President Ian Khama, close ties between members of the ruling party and the agricultural sector, and charges that well-connected suspects are often cleared by the courts (Motlogelwa & Civillini, 2016; Konopo, 2017; Good, 2017; Norad, 2011; Sebudubudu 2014; Gasennelwe, 2018). Recent corruption scandals have reached the highest levels of government, including the alleged looting of the National Petroleum Fund (Kgalemang, 2019; Motshegwa, Mutonono, & Mikazhu, 2019), and are still before courts of law (Shuma, 2020). In this paper we use Afrobarometer survey data to explore citizens’ perceptions of corruption in Botswana. We find that far more people see corruption increasing than decreasing and that perceptions of corruption in the Presidency and Parliament have risen sharply over the past decade. Fewer Batswana approve of how the government is handling the anti-corruption fight, and while many believe ordinary people can help fight corruption, a majority say that people risk retaliation if they report corruption to the authorities. A correlation analysis suggests that perceptions of corruption, especially in the Presidency, are strongly associated with less popular trust in public institutions and less satisfaction with democracy.
Topic:
Corruption, Governance, Democracy, and Citizenship
Political Geography:
Africa and Botswana

24. PP67: COVID-19 in Africa - Vulnerabilities and Assets for an Effective Response

Author:
Robert Mattes, Carolyn Logan, E. Gyimah-Boadi, and George Ellison
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Not only did the COVID-19 disease arrive on Africa’s shores (and at its airports) later than in Asia, Europe, and North America (Loembé et al., 2020), but for months the numbers of infections and deaths also appeared to remain relatively low. As of early August, the continent had experienced more than 1 million confirmed cases and 23,000 deaths (Africa CDC, 2020), though these figures were increasing rapidly. At this point, the causes behind Africa’s comparatively low initial numbers are not completely clear. One reason may be that early and decisive responses on the part of many African governments prevented the virus from gaining an easy foothold (Beech, Rubin, Kurmanaev, & MacLean, 2020; Hirsch, 2020; Levinson, 2020; Moore, 2020; Loembé et al., 2020). Indeed, according to the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (2020), 46 African countries took some form of official action – in the form of new legislation or executive orders and decrees – restricting or banning travel and public gatherings, enforcing quarantines, or in some cases imposing full “lockdowns.” But Africa, somewhat paradoxically, may also have benefited from a range of structural factors, such as the continent’s relatively limited international exposure, its relatively low rates of intra- and inter-state air travel (Marbot, 2020), a generally hot and humid climate, relatively lower levels of population density and urbanization (De Waal, 2020; Marbot, 2020), and its substantially younger populations (Binding, 2020). It may have also profited from cultural factors, such as the fact that older people tend to remain with their families, rather than being institutionalized in retirement homes (Marbot, 2020), though this also has consequences for residential density, or that it has a more collectivist, less individualistic culture, which, according to recent research, may make COVID-19 interventions more effective (Frey, Presidente, & Chen, 2020). Yet most public health experts remain wary, and still expect significant further transmission of the virus across the continent, requiring drastic public health responses and interventions, especially where governments eased initial restrictions and lockdowns. Indeed, some officials have expressed concerns that Africa’s low numbers merely reflect very low rates of testing (Sly, 2020) and even, in some countries such as Tanzania, deliberate under-reporting (BBC, 2020). Some press reports have described instances where local reports of death rates bear little relation to official data (MacLean, 2020; York, 2020). These concerns appear well-founded given that community transmission is now present in all African countries and the number of infections increased by 50%, and deaths by 22%, in the last two weeks of July (World Health Organization, 2020). And officials at the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention have warned that Africa could well become the next epicenter of the pandemic (Loembé et al., 2020). If, as these events suggest, early interventions in African countries successfully erected a wall that kept the virus at bay, albeit temporarily, how well prepared are these countries if and when the virus penetrates their initial defenses? A wealth of Afrobarometer survey data suggests that Africans are especially vulnerable, in part due to lack of access to clean water and adequate health care (Gyimah-Boadi & Logan, 2020a; Logan, Howard, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2020). In this paper, we attempt to take the issue of vulnerability a step further by developing a more fine-grained approach, using insights from public health to examine different dimensions and components of vulnerability (Morrell, 2018). Specifically, we develop three inter-connected indices intended to capture the extent to which Africans might 1) run a heightened “risk of exposure to infection,” 2) face a heightened “susceptibility to illness” (once infected), and 3) face a “lack of resilience” (to recover once they become ill). In addition, a fourth index of “lockdown readiness” estimates the proportion of people who are more (or less) likely to be able to withstand the most severe forms of government health interventions, i.e. lockdowns or “shelter in place” orders, We then demonstrate how cross-country variations in the extent of exposure and susceptibility, and in the degree to which people are prepared for a lockdown, might help us better understand policy choices that African governments have made, and the extent to which these interventions were able to achieve desired reductions in mobility and contact. Finally, we briefly explore some of the soft assets that governments can bring to the table, such as legitimacy and trust, that may help increase compliance with restrictions on mobility, especially in countries we have identified as least able to tolerate lockdowns.
Topic:
Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa

25. Africa’s Digital Divide and the Promise of E-learning

Author:
Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
According to UNESCO (2020), approximately 1.2 billion students and youth worldwide are affected by school and university closures because of the COVID-19 pandemic. To adjust to these new circumstances, governments must develop innovative solutions to ensure inclusive learning opportunities during this period of unprecedented educational disruption. This is especially true in African countries, where despite recent progress traditional education has faced infrastructural challenges and struggled to develop the human resources necessary to address students’ educational needs (Krönke & Olan’g, 2020; United Nations, 2019; UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2016. This policy paper uses Afrobarometer survey data to look at digital infrastructure, the availability of digital devices at the household level, and digital literacy among African adults. While rates of digital literacy among children are likely to differ, it is important to understand these dynamics among adults for at least two reasons. First, adults are likely to shape children’s access to and experience with technology. Second, understanding current levels of access to devices and levels of digital literacy among adults provides a baseline against which future assessments can measure progress over time. Survey findings from Afrobarometer Round 7 (2016/2018) show a substantial digital divide both across and within countries, reflected in uneven access to resources such as electricity and unequal access to and use of smartphones and computers. The results suggest that government efforts to redress widespread inequalities need to be increased drastically to avoid the widening of an education gap among their citizens. The paper also discusses the potential benefits of providing smartphones and computers to those who currently do not have access to such devices.
Topic:
Education, Infrastructure, Inequality, Digital Economy, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Africa

26. Democratic Dividend: The Road to Quality Education in Africa

Author:
Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Education is a powerful tool to fight poverty, enable upward socioeconomic mobility, and empower people to live healthier lives. But while the global adult literacy rate continues to increase, from 81% in 2000 to 86% in 2018 (World Bank, 2019), the challenge of access to quality education remains particularly severe in Africa. Even before the COVID-19 crisis, globally one out of five children aged 6-17 years were not in school; more than half of these children live in sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, many African pupils attend schools that are inadequately equipped, creating a difficult learning environment. For example, more than half of the schools in sub-Saharan Africa do not have access to basic drinking water, handwashing facilities, the Internet, or computers (United Nations, 2019). COVID-19 may exacerbate these challenges as pupils lose school time, unequal access to online learning heightens inequalities, and health care and social-safety costs and economic losses put pressure on limited resources. Africans are aware of education challenges. Across 34 African countries surveyed by Afrobarometer between late 2016 and late 2018, one in five respondents (21%) cited education as one of the most important problems their governments should address, placing it among citizens’ top five priorities (Coulibaly, Silwé, & Logan, 2018). Not surprisingly, younger people placed substantially greater emphasis on education than their elders. At a global level, the United Nations (UN) has highlighted the importance of quality education by including it in its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDG 4 calls for governments to “ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.” To this end, the UN outlines specific targets to be achieved by 2030, including ensuring that “all youth and a substantial proportion of adults, both men and women, achieve literacy and numeracy.” An important step toward this goal is that by 2030, all girls and boys should be able to “complete free, equitable and quality primary and secondary education” (United Nations, 2019). Many African governments have made important commitments to universal education. Of the 34 countries surveyed by Afrobarometer in 2016/2018, 33 have made school attendance compulsory (for periods ranging from five to 11 years), and 33 provide free primary education. (See Appendix Table A.2 for details.) Many governments also commit substantial portions of their yearly budgets to improving education. For example, in Côte d’Ivoire, eSwatini, Ghana, Malawi, Senegal, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe, more than 25% of total government expenditures go to education (World Bank, 2020). Afrobarometer surveys point to slow but steady progress as fewer Africans go without formal education and more attend school beyond the primary grades. But in some countries, two-thirds of adults still have no formal schooling, and significant gender gaps continue to disadvantage girls and women. Overall, just a slim majority of Africans think their government is doing a good job on meeting educational needs. Factors that contribute to these evaluations include whether citizens find it easy to obtain school services and whether they think schools are transparent about their budgets and responsive to reports of teacher misconduct. More fundamentally, our analysis finds that more democratic countries are seen as better able to provide public education. Citizens are more likely to be satisfied with government performance on education if immediate avenues of transparency and accountability at the school level are embedded in a broader political system that encourages these qualities.
Topic:
Education, Poverty, Democracy, and Inequality
Political Geography:
Africa

27. Lived Poverty on the Rise: Decade of Living-Standard Gains Ends in Africa

Author:
Robert Mattes
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Economic destitution – whether measured as the frequency with which people go without basic necessities or as the proportion of people who live on less than $1.90 a day – declined steadily in Africa between 2005 and 2015. However, the findings of Afrobarometer Round 7 surveys, conducted in 34 African countries between late 2016 and late 2018, demonstrate that improvements in living standards have come to a halt and “lived poverty” is once again on the rise. To prevent squandering hard-won gains in Africans’ living standards, the data point to the necessity of a renewed commitment by citizens, governments, and international donors to defending democracy and expanding service-delivery infrastructure. Key findings Between 2005 and 2015, Afrobarometer surveys tracked a steady improvement in the living conditions of the average African. Measured as the frequency with which people go without a basket of basic necessities (food, clean water, health care, heating fuel, and cash income), “lived poverty” dropped in a sustained fashion over this period – a trend matched by consumption-based estimates of poverty by the World Bank. The most recent Afrobarometer surveys, however, suggest that Africa is in danger of squandering these gains in living standards. While the citizens of most African countries are still doing better than they were in 2005/2006, deprivation of basic necessities – captured by our Lived Poverty Index – has increased in about half of surveyed countries since 2015. The trend is similar for “severe lived poverty,” the extent to which people experience frequent shortages of basic necessities. Lived poverty varies widely across the continent. At one extreme, people rarely experience deprivation in Mauritius. At the other, the average person went without several basic necessities several times in the preceding year in Guinea and Gabon. In general, lived poverty is highest in Central and West Africa, and lowest in North Africa. Lived poverty also varies widely within societies. Reflecting the legacies of the “urban bias” of successive post-independence governments, rural residents continue to endure lived poverty far more frequently than those who live in suburbs and cities. A multilevel, multivariate regression analysis of more than 40,000 respondents across Africa reveals that people who live in urban areas, those who have higher levels of education, and those who have a job (especially in a middle-class occupation) are less likely to live in poverty, as are younger people and men. But besides personal characteristics, we locate even more important factors at the level of government and the state. First, Africans who live in countries with longer experiences of democratic government are less likely to live in poverty. Second, people who live in communities where the state has installed key development infrastructure such as paved roads, electricity grids, and piped-water systems are less likely to go without basic necessities. Indeed, the combined efforts of African governments and international donors in building development infrastructure, especially in rural areas, appears to have played a major role in bringing down levels of poverty – at least until recently.
Topic:
Poverty, Infrastructure, Inequality, and Local
Political Geography:
Africa

28. Traditional authority and state legitimacy: Evidence from Namibia

Author:
Vladimir Chlouba
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Do African traditional leaders weaken state legitimacy at the local level? Past scholarship raises the possibility that unelected chiefs might undermine trust in national-level institutions. Relying on an original map of areas governed by chiefs and survey data from Namibia, this study examines whether respondents governed by traditional leaders are less likely to trust state institutions. I find that compared to individuals not living under traditional authority, chiefdom residents are more likely to trust government institutions. To partially alleviate the concern that chiefdom residence is endogenous to trust in national-level institutions, I use a genetic matching strategy to compare relatively similar individuals. I further find that the association between chiefdom residence and trust in state institutions is considerably weaker and less statistically significant for individuals who do not share ethnicity with their chief. This evidence suggests that traditional leaders’ ability to complement state institutions at the local level is compromised by ethnic diversity.
Topic:
Government, Governance, Leadership, Fragile States, Emerging States, Legitimacy, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Africa and Namibia

29. Is there an anti-politics of electricity? Access to the grid and reduced political participation in Africa

Author:
Jennifer N. Brass, Kirk Harris, and Lauren M. MacLean
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Almost all African states face pressure to deliver improved public services to their citizens. In both emerging democracies and persistent authoritarian regimes, politics profoundly shapes how states distribute public goods such as roads, schools, health clinics, and electricity access (Briggs, 2014; Dixit & Londregan, 1996; Harding & Stasavage, 2014; Kramon & Posner, 2013; Min, 2015; Weingast, Shepsle, & Johnsen, 1981). But in addition to questions of how politics shapes distributive outcomes, scholars have recently turned to a new question: How does variation in public service provision subsequently shape political participation (Bodea & LeBas, 2016; Harding, 2015)? Here, the findings are less clear. Where some authors find that the receipt of public service provision stimulates participation (Bleck, 2015; Wantchekon, Klašnja, & Novta, 2015), others caution that service provision may actually undermine engagement or have no effect (Croke, Grossman, Larreguy, & Marshall, 2015; Kam & Palmer, 2008; Mattes & Mughogho, 2009). Most of this literature has focused on the political effects of the delivery of social welfare services, especially education. Meanwhile, the political effects of electricity provision have been largely overlooked. Electricity provision is important for political outcomes for several reasons. Historically, in some African countries, electricity provision was tightly linked to the independence struggle and to rights of citizenship (MacLean, Gore, Brass, & Baldwin, 2016). Yet despite these expectations, African countries continue to have the lowest rates of electrification in the world. Only about one-third of Africans have access to electricity (International Energy Agency, 2014), and only two-thirds live in a community with any grid access (Oyuke, Penar, & Howard, 2016), and these rates are much lower in rural areas in most countries (Leo, Morello, & Ramachandran, 2015).
Topic:
Education, Democracy, Public Policy, Public Sector, Electricity, and Public Health
Political Geography:
Africa

30. Gains and Gaps: Perceptions and Experiences of Gender in Africa

Author:
Carmen Alpin Lardies, Dominique Dryding, and Carolyn Logan
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Key findings Africans share at least some of the SDG ambitions to create more equal societies. Across 34 countries, substantial majorities support women’s right to run for political office (71%) and to own and inherit land (72%). They are less committed, however, to full economic equality: A much slimmer majority (53%) favour equal access to paying jobs for women, compared to 42% who believe men should have preference. And even a woman’s fundamental right to physical safety has less-than-universal support: More than one in four Africans (28%) – including 24% of women – still see wife-beating as justifiable. In Gabon and Liberia, seven in 10 citizens share this view. While most Africans say girls and boys now have equal access to education, significant gender gaps in educational achievement remain. Even among the youngest cohort, more women than men have no formal education, and more men than women have post-primary schooling. Large majorities also say that women have achieved equal access to jobs. But women are less likely to participate in the labour market (55% vs. 67% of men), and among those who do, women are more likely to be unemployed (52% vs. 39%). About one in eight women (12%) say they experienced discrimination based on their gender during the past year. One in three (32%) Liberian women report this experience. Women lag behind men in ownership of assets and are substantially less likely to have decision-making power over household resources. Women also trail men on indicators of digital access and connection. And the gap may be widening: Although women’s Internet use has doubled over the past five years, the gender gap in regular Internet use has increased. Africans are divided on the question of whether women are making progress; 49% say equal opportunities and treatment for women are better than a few years ago, but almost as many say they are the same (31%) or worse (19%). Nonetheless, almost two-thirds (64%) give their governments positive marks on promoting equal rights. There is, in short, some disconnect between popular satisfaction with equality performance and significant – and sometimes growing – gaps in actual achievement.
Topic:
Education, Gender Issues, Poverty, Inequality, Sustainable Development Goals, and Feminism
Political Geography:
Africa

31. Experience and Awareness of Climate Change in Africa

Author:
Edem E. Selormey, Marvis Zupork Dome, Lionel Osse, and Carolyn Logan
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Climate change is “the defining development challenge of our time,” and Africa the continent most vulnerable to its consequences, according to the African Union (2015) and the United Nations (UN Environment, 2019). Farmers in Uganda waiting endlessly for rain (URN, 2019), cyclone survivors in Mozambique and Zimbabwe digging out of the mud and burying their dead (Associated Press, 2019) – these images bring home what changing climate and increasingly extreme weather conditions may mean for everyday Africans. Long-term changes in temperatures and rainfall patterns are a particular menace to Africa, where agriculture forms the economic backbone of development priorities such as food security and poverty eradication (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2018). As an issue, “climate change” per se does not register among the “most important problems” that Africans surveyed by Afrobarometer want their governments to address (see Coulibaly, Silwé, & Logan, 2018). But concerns about the effects of climate change may be embedded in some of the other priorities identified, including water supply (cited by 24% of respondents), food shortages (18%), and agriculture (17%). And progress in addressing these priorities may be seriously impeded by a changing climate. African countries dominate the bottom ranks in the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) Index (2019), meaning they are the world’s countries most vulnerable to and least prepared for climate change. Despite the continent’s minuscule contribution to the greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change, most African countries have willingly signed on to international agreements to fight it, including the United Nations’ Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the 2016 Paris Agreement on Climate Change (United Nations, 2019). The Paris Agreement mobilizes worldwide action to limit further temperature increases and to strengthen the ability of countries to deal with the impacts of climate change, including a commitment from developed countries to allocate $100 billion by 2020 for climate adaptation and mitigation needs of developing countries (Munang & Mgendi, 2017; UN Climate Change, 2018). In March 2019, policymakers and key stakeholders from all 54 African countries gathered in Accra for Africa Climate Week 2019 to lay plans to be presented at the UN Climate Action Summit in New York in September (UN Climate Change, 2019). The United Nations has summed up its pressing demand for climate action in its Sustainable Development Goal No. 13: “Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts,” calling on countries to integrate climate-change measures into national policies and strategies, strengthen resilience to climate-related hazards and natural disasters, and build awareness and capacity for early warning and impact reduction (United Nations Development Programme, 2019). Many African governments have laid out their countries’ vulnerabilities in agriculture, water resources, food security, livelihoods, and other sectors and have incorporated climate-change mitigation in national plans (see, for example, Uganda’s Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, 2018, and Ministry of Water and Environment, 2015). But building climate resilience will require a committed and coordinated effort (Busby, Smith, White, & Strange, 2012), backed by significant resources and a population that understands and supports the need for prioritizing climate change. How do ordinary Africans see climate change? Does talk of urgent action align with their experiences and needs? Findings from Afrobarometer’s latest round of public-opinion surveys across Africa show a keen awareness of climate change in some countries – often backed by personal observation – but the opposite in others. Across the continent, among people who have heard of climate change, a large majority say it is making life worse and needs to be stopped. But four in 10 Africans are unfamiliar with the concept of climate change – even, in some cases, if they have personally observed detrimental changes in weather patterns. And only about three in 10 are fully “climate change literate,” combining awareness of climate change with basic knowledge about its causes and negative effects. Groups that are less familiar with climate change – and might be good targets for awareness-raising and advocacy in building a popular base for climate-change action – include people working in agriculture, rural residents, women, the poor, and the less-educated.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Environment, Infrastructure, and Governance
Political Geography:
Africa

32. Africans want Open Elections – Especially if they Bring Change

Author:
Michael Bratton and Sadhiska Bhoojedhur
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Observers now commonly assert that multiparty elections are institutionalized as a standard feature of African politics (Posner & Young, 2007; Bratton, 2013; Cheeseman, 2018; Bleck & van de Walle, 2019). By this they mean that competitive electoral contests are the most commonplace procedure for choosing and changing political leaders across the continent. As a result of a wave of regime transitions in the 1990s, the vast majority of African countries abandoned one-party systems and military rule in favour of democratic constitutions that guarantee – at least on paper – civil and political rights, civilian control of the military, and legislative and judicial oversight of the executive branch of government. Almost all countries have introduced a regular cycle of elections (usually every five years), and many have placed constitutional limits on the number of terms that African presidents can serve (usually two). Today, encouraged by the African Union’s African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, all political leaders feel compelled to pay at least token respect to a new set of continent-wide electoral standards. In short, elections are now embedded in the formal rules that govern politics on the continent. But the institutionalization of elections requires more than an international proclamation, an aspirational constitution, and a tightly drafted framework of statutes and regulations. It also requires political actors at all levels of the political system to grant value to open elections as the preferred method for selecting leaders and holding them accountable. In other words, politicians and citizens alike must make sincere commitments to hold elections dear and to offer vigorous protection if electoral procedures are ever threatened. Yet there is already evidence that some African presidents are all too ready to abandon presidential term limits (Dulani, 2011) – a reversal, for example, that Togo’s Parliament ratified in May 2019. And political leaders are too often tempted to manipulate election processes and outcomes in order to retain power (Cheeseman & Klaas, 2018) – as Joseph Kabila demonstrated in the December 2018 general election in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).1 Under these circumstances, much of the burden for protecting open and competitive elections falls to the ordinary citizens of Africa. The political commitments of the man and woman in the street represent the last line of defense should leaders take it upon themselves to violate widely accepted electoral norms. Accordingly, several key questions arise: Do Africans actually support elections? Do they regard African elections as free and fair? Do high-quality contests boost the value that citizens attach to elections? This Pan-Africa Profile offers affirmative answers to all these questions. Drawing from recent Afrobarometer survey data covering more than 30 countries across Africa’s main geographical regions, we find that Africans want open elections and, for the most part, think they are getting them. Importantly, popular support for elections is driven by the perceived freedom and fairness of the balloting process. Digging deeper, we find that the quality of elections – and thus popular support – is seen to hinge on whether elections bring about leadership alternation, which we define as a change not only of the top ruler but also of the ruling party. This “change effect” suggests that the political preferences of the general public are just as essential as formal political rules – if not more so – to the health of democracy in Africa.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Leadership, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Africa

33. Are Africans’ Freedoms Slipping Away?

Author:
Carolyn Logan and Peter Penar
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Protection of individual rights and liberties has been on both the African continental agenda and the global agenda for decades, shaped especially by the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. But the reality on the ground is often a far cry from the high standards set forth in these documents. In recent months, the world has watched as the governments of Algeria and Sudan have sought to stifle popular protests, often violently. And the past couple of years have witnessed a wide range of government attacks on civil liberties and individual freedoms. Cameroon shut down Internet service for months in the country’s anglophone regions, and Zimbabwe did the same in an effort to short-circuit opposition efforts to organize protests. Governments have responded with violence to protests in countries as diverse as Burundi, Senegal, Togo, and Zambia. Uganda now taxes social media use, while Tanzania requires expensive licenses for individuals who want to blog. In countries across the continent, government surveillance, restrictive media laws, and other freedom-limiting tactics appear to be on the rise. Freedom House’s 2019 Freedom in the World report was subtitled ”Democracy in Retreat,” and the Africa section appeared under the heading “Historic openings [in Angola, Ethiopia, and the Gambia] offset by creeping restrictions elsewhere” [Freedom House, 2019). How do African citizens perceive and interpret the state of political and civil liberties in their respective countries? This report takes the measure of popular demand for and government supply of basic individual rights and freedoms as captured in Afrobarometer Round 7 surveys, carried out in 34 countries between late 2016 and late 2018. It also looks at how attitudes, experiences, and perceptions have changed over the past decade. We uncover two troubling trends. First, consistent with the alarms sounded by Freedom House and others, citizens generally recognize that civic and political space is indeed closing as governments’ supply of freedom to citizens decreases. But the results also reveal a decline in popular demand for freedom, in particular the right to associate freely. Moreover, we find considerable willingness among citizens to accept government imposition of restrictions on individual freedoms in the name of protecting public security. In a context where violent extremists are perpetrating attacks in a growing number of countries, the public may acquiesce to governments’ increasing circumscription of individual rights and collective freedoms. Fear of insecurity, instability, and/or violence may be leading citizens of at least some African countries to conclude that freedoms come with costs as well as benefits, and that there may be such a thing as too much freedom.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Violent Extremism, Oppression, and Freedom
Political Geography:
Africa

34. Democracy in Africa: Demand, Supply, and the ‘Dissatisfied Democrat’

Author:
Robert Mattes
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The increasing threat to democracy from populist movements and authoritarian leaders occupies a prominent place in current political debate. Yet political scientists who study this question reach contrasting conclusions, often because they use different measures and standards of democracy. Some say the world is in a democratic recession, with countries experiencing recent declines in the quality of democracy outnumbering those where it has improved (Diamond, 2015; Lührmann, Mechkova, & Wilson, 2017; Economist, 2018; Freedom House, 2018). Others see no such decline (Levitsky, 2015) or trendless variation (Jiménez, 2017; Skaaning & Jiménez, 2017). In Africa, Freedom House has tracked a significant retreat in political rights, civil liberties, and the overall quality of democracy. The biggest shifts have occurred among countries previously rated as “partly free,” many of which have retreated to “not free” status. Analysts have observed that this is often the result of hybrid regimes using counter-terrorism legislation to shrink democratic spaces (Temin, 2017) or of governments responding to increased electoral competition by restricting opposition parties and critical civil society organizations (Cheeseman, 2019). On the other hand, the V-Dem Institute finds more positive than negative change in Africa (Lührmann et al., 2018). African public opinion seems to embody this sense of divergence. While Yasha Mounk (2018) has claimed to find a systematic decline in citizens’ attachment to democracy across most of the established democracies in North America and Western Europe, Africans’ responses to questions posed by Afrobarometer over the past decade present a more varied and complex picture. At the most general level, the picture seems relatively clear and simple: The typical African is strongly committed to democracy and opposed to authoritarian rule, and has remained so for more than a decade. However, this image of solid democratic commitment changes radically if we narrow our focus to only those people who consistently express pro-democratic preferences across several different survey questions – those whom Afrobarometer describes as “demanding democracy” (Bratton, Mattes, & Gyimah-Boadi, 2005). Under these more demanding criteria, fewer than half of all Africans qualify as committed democrats. And levels of commitment vary sharply depending on a person’s demographic category and level of political engagement. The picture becomes even more complex when we look at specific countries or take a longer-term view. In some countries, publics are strongly committed to democracy, while in others people are largely indifferent. Similarly, some societies are developing more favourable views of democracy over time, while others are moving in the opposite direction. These trends in individual countries may matter even more than trends on the continent as a whole. The same kind of complexity emerges when we examine people’s evaluations of democracy. A slight majority of the Africans we interviewed say their country is a democracy, and somewhat fewer people are satisfied with the way democracy works – two indicators that Afrobarometer combines to measure the perceived “supply of democracy.” Overall, Africans say they get less democracy than they want. But in some countries, the perceived supply of democracy is greater than demand. And while this supply is increasing in some countries, it is declining in others. What does this mix of results mean for the survival of Africa’s multiparty regimes and the deepening of democracy? Of course, a great deal will depend on factors other than what citizens think, such as the degree to which democratic values are embraced by a country’s leaders and elites, as well as the extent to which countervailing institutions (legislature, courts) constrain the executive. But we argue that popular demands also have the power to drive countries toward democracy, and that this is most likely under certain conditions of high, but unmet, popular demand. In particular, this report concludes by highlighting the specific importance of citizens who are not only deeply committed to democracy but who also adopt a critical perspective toward their country’s current leaders and institutions – in other words, those citizens who demand democracy but do not think they are getting it. We describe these citizens as “dissatisfied democrats.” To the extent that citizens’ commitment to democracy matters for the survival and quality of democracy, evidence suggests that it is these dissatisfied democrats who matter most. While fewer than one in six Africans qualify as dissatisfied democrats in our most recent round of surveys, they make up much larger proportions in some countries in which electoral processes are deeply flawed and opposition forces are harassed, suggesting a continuing struggle between the forces of democracy and autocracy. However, dissatisfied democrats are in especially short supply in other places where the space for opposition has recently narrowed, offering little evidence that further restrictions will meet popular resistance.
Topic:
Governance, Public Opinion, Elections, Democracy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Africa

35. Do electoral systems affect how citizens hold their government accountable? Evidence from Africa

Author:
Sarah J. Lockwood and Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
This paper asks whether a country’s choice of electoral system affects the methods citizens use to try to hold their government accountable. A large body of literature suggests that electoral system type has an impact on voting behaviour, but little work has been done on its effects on other strategies for democratic accountability, such as contacting an elected representative and protesting. Using data from 36 African countries, we find that the type of electoral system has a significant relationship with these forms of participation. Citizens in proportional representation (PR) systems are significantly more likely to protest than those in majoritarian ones, while those in majoritarian systems are more likely to contact their elected representatives. We argue that this is because the connection between citizens and representatives in majoritarian systems is clearer, closer, and more responsive, making contact an effective strategy and providing an efficient "safety valve" when citizens want to hold their government to account. The lack of a similar connection in most PR systems, in contrast, leads citizens to turn to protest with greater regularity.
Topic:
Government, Elections, Democracy, and Accountability
Political Geography:
Africa

36. Police-citizen interaction in Africa: An exploration of factors that influence victims’ reporting of crimes

Author:
Davin O'Regan
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
While personal insecurity in Africa is typically associated with civil wars, crime is actually a far more common threat to the continent’s citizens. Rates of homicide, sexual assault, and property crime in Africa are often far higher than global averages. Despite such threats, many Africans do not report crimes to the police. According to surveys conducted in 32 African countries in 2011, 2012, and 2013, 56% of respondents who had experienced a crime within the previous 12 months did not report it to the police. Common explanations for such inhibited reporting of crimes include a general lack of trust in the police, the politicization of police forces, citizens’ inability to easily access the police, or low community cohesion where victims reside. Using multilevel logistic regression techniques, this study tests these explanations. Findings suggest that neither trust in police nor politicization of police forces displays significant influence on citizens’ likelihood of reporting crimes. Likewise, community cohesion bears no consistent relationship with higher rates of reporting, while access to police does appear positively associated with the likelihood of reporting victimizations. Contrary to findings in many developed countries, women in Africa appear to be less likely than men to report crimes to the police.
Topic:
Violence and Police
Political Geography:
Africa

37. Electricity provision and tax mobilization in Africa

Author:
Moussa Blimpo, Justice Tei Mensah, K. Ochieng’ Opalo, and Ruifan Shi
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In this paper, we provide evidence on how the provision of social infrastructure such as reliable electricity can be leveraged to increase taxation in developing countries, particularly sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). First, using comprehensive data from the latest round of the Afrobarometer survey, we estimate, via the instrumental variable approach, the effect of access and reliability of electricity on tax compliance attitudes of citizens in 36 SSA countries. Evidence from the paper shows a significant positive effect of electrification on tax compliance attitudes with potentially strong externalities. Also, we find that reliability of supply is crucial in explaining the impact of electricity access on attitudes toward taxes. Second, we provide suggestive evidence on national identity as one channel driving this impact. Access to social amenities such as electricity induces a sense of national identity among citizens, thereby incentivizing them to contribute, through taxes, toward the functioning of the state.
Topic:
Nationalism, Identities, Tax Systems, and Electricity
Political Geography:
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa

38. Bounded Autonomy: What Limits Zimbabweans’ Trust in their Courts and Electoral Commission?

Author:
Matthias Krönke
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
After the Constitutional Court upheld the election results of 30 July 2018, Zimbabwe’s leading opposition party ended its online public response with the following message to newly confirmed President Emmerson Mnangagwa: “You can rig the elections. You can capture ZEC [Zimbabwe Electoral Commission]. You can capture [the] judiciary. But you will never capture the people. Their will shall prevail. The people shall govern!” (Movement for Democratic Change, 2018). While some might dismiss it as partisan rhetoric, the MDC statement points to critical issues for Zimbabwe’s democracy – the autonomy, and perceived autonomy, of the country’s courts and electoral commission. This policy paper analyzes public trust in these two institutions. Though intended to act as independent custodians of the Constitution and the electoral process, both the judiciary and the electoral commission are frequently accused of being beholden to political leaders. This year’s election is not the first to be accompanied by allegations of vote rigging, intimidation, and politically tainted court decisions. Allegations of bias are frequently leveled against judges from the High Court and Supreme Court, even between election cycles. Yet previous analysis of Afrobarometer data has shown that Zimbabwe’s courts are among the most trusted on the continent (Logan, 2017). And trust in the ZEC has doubled since 2010. How do these seemingly contradictory views fit together? Our analysis of public opinion data suggests that citizens trust these two institutions within bounds. For court cases involving only ordinary citizens and technical electoral issues such as the rollout of the biometric voter registration (BVR), the judiciary and the ZEC enjoy substantial public confidence. But faced with politically sensitive issues, they no longer find broad popular support. Afrobarometer survey data show clear differences in trust levels among citizens over time and along party lines. Public confidence in the judiciary is heavily dependent on whether it is perceived to hold the president and the powerful elite that surrounds him to account. Similarly, trust in the electoral commission depends less on its ability to handle managerial tasks in preparation for Election Day and more on its ability to ensure an accurate count of ballots and the resolution of post-election conflicts.
Topic:
Corruption, Elections, Democracy, Courts, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Africa and Zimbabwe

39. Heal the Beloved Country: Zimbabwe’s Polarized Electorate

Author:
Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
For a moment, Zimbabwe’s July 30, 2018, elections seemed to promise relief from a traumatic political past. An aging autocrat had been deposed and his successor intoned pledges of “a new dispensation.” A dormant opposition movement began to reawaken to opportunities for open political campaigning. At home and abroad, Zimbabwe’s well-wishers allowed themselves a cautious hope that change was finally afoot. But change was not to be.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Elections, Transparency, and Polarization
Political Geography:
Africa and Zimbabwe

40. Local Governance in Benin: A Guarantee of Sustainable Development?

Author:
Romaric Samson and Richard Houessou
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Faced with the disappointing performance of centralized systems, many African states opted for decentralization in the 1990s in a bid to ensure that their citizens receive quality services (Anago, 2009). In theory, decentralization involves withdrawing some powers from the central state and transferring them to elected bodies at the local level. This introduced the concept of local governance, whose practical implementation supposes that all actors understand the institutional framework within which they function as well as their roles, responsibilities, and room for maneuver. In Benin, since the installation of the first communal and municipal councils in February 2003, decentralization has become one of the pillars of development, making better governance in local matters a fundamental element of the process. Municipal councils have taken on a number of responsibilities once left to the central state, such as maintaining local marketplaces and community hygiene, issuing bicycle licenses, and collecting some taxes. In order to manage and monitor financial resources allocated to local bodies, the central state established the Communal Development Support Fund (Fond d'Appui au Développement des Communes) in 2008. Despite good intentions and political decisions in favor of the decentralization process, good governance in our communities faces significant hurdles. Local populations express dissatisfaction with local councillors, and the transfer of powers and financial resources from the central state to local bodies is still not completely effective. Fifteen years after the first steps toward local governance in our municipalities, what lessons should be learned? How do Beninese citizens assess this governance process, and what roles do they play in its implementation? Has decentralization impacted the most vulnerable, i.e. the poorest? What are the interactions between local councillors and their constituents? Afrobarometer data from Benin make it possible to examine citizen perceptions of local governance. Our analyses reveal that popular assessments of local government performance are largely negative and haver worsened over time. We find a link between the level of popular trust in the municipal council and the perceived quality of local governance, as well as between communal development and perceptions of the local authority's activities.
Topic:
Development, Governance, Local, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Africa and Benin

41. Slowly growing or stunted? How Delivery of Electoral, Political, and Economic Goods Impacts Support for Democracy in Uganda

Author:
Francis Kibirige
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
After nearly a decade of growth, popular demand for democracy in Africa has shown signs of weakening (Mattes & Bratton, 2016; Lührmann et al., 2017; Cheeseman, 2017)). In Uganda, recent Afrobarometer survey data show that although citizens’ preference for democracy consistently outstrips their perception of how much democracy they’re actually getting, satisfaction with the way their democracy works is on a decade-long slide. In survey responses, Ugandans’ preference for democracy fluctuates around election years, increasing before and decreasing after general elections. At the same time, the disparity between popular preference for and satisfaction with democracy, defined in this paper as the “democracy satisfaction gap,” is growing, from 5 percentage points in 2000 to 34 percentage points in 2017. These patterns pose a number of questions, including what causes popular preference for democracy to fluctuate around election years and whether indeed Ugandans understand and appreciate democracy. Survey data suggest that Ugandans have grown in their knowledge of democracy with the passage of time (Mattes, Kibirige, & Sentamu, 2010). Similarly, the proportion of Ugandans who are “committed democrats” – meaning they prefer democracy over any other form of government and consistently reject authoritarian rule – has increased sharply, although women, less educated citizens, and rural residents lag behind in this group. Our analysis suggests that a preference for democracy is stronger among citizens who perceive the quality of Uganda’s elections as poor, those who are dissatisfied with the government’s delivery of political or economic goods, those who believe strongly in democratic values, and those who are more cognitively engaged in civic and political life.
Topic:
Civil Society, Economics, Governance, Elections, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

42. Viewing society from space: Image-based sociocultural prediction models

Author:
John M. Irvine, Richard J. Wood, and Payden McBee
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Applying new analytic methods to imagery data offers the potential to dramatically expand the information available for human geography. Satellite imagery can yield detailed local information about physical infrastructure, which we exploit for analysis of local socioeconomic conditions. Combining automated processing of satellite imagery with advanced modeling techniques provides a method for inferring measures of well-being, governance, and related sociocultural attributes from satellite imagery. This research represents a new approach to human geography by explicitly analyzing the relationship between observable physical attributes and societal characteristics and institutions of the region. Through analysis of commercial satellite imagery and Afrobarometer survey data, we have developed and demonstrated models for selected countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Botswana, Kenya, Zimbabwe). The findings show the potential for predicting people’s attitudes about the economy, security, leadership, social involvement, and related questions, based only on imagery-derived information. The approach pursued here builds on earlier work in Afghanistan. Models for predicting economic attributes (presence of key infrastructure, attitudes about the economy, perceptions of crime, and outlook toward the future) all exhibit statistically significant performance. Although these results are encouraging, several avenues for advancement and improvement are proposed. Initial analysis of new methods for image processing and feature extraction have identified several avenues for promising enhancements.
Topic:
Sociology and Geography
Political Geography:
Kenya, Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana

43. One Team, one Nation: Football, Ethnic Identity, and Conflict in Africa

Author:
Emillio Depetris-Chauvin and Ruben Durante
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Do collective experiences that prime sentiments of national unity reduce interethnic tensions and conflict? We examine this question by looking at the impact of national football teams’ victories in sub-Saharan Africa. Combining individual survey data with information on official matches played between 2000 and 2015, we find that individuals interviewed in the days after a victory of their country’s national team are less likely to report a strong sense of ethnic identity and more likely to trust people of other ethnicities than those interviewed just before. The effect is sizeable and robust and is not explained by generic euphoria or optimism. Crucially, national victories do not only affect attitudes but also reduce violence. Indeed, using plausibly exogenous variation from close qualifications to the Africa Cup of Nations, we find that countries that (barely) qualified experience significantly less conflict in the following six months than countries that (barely) did not. Our findings indicate that, even where ethnic cleavages have deep historical roots, patriotic shocks can reduce interethnic tensions and have a tangible impact on conflict.
Topic:
Nationalism, Sports, Community, Identity, and Unity
Political Geography:
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa

44. The Autocratic Trust Bias: Politically Sensitive Survey Items and Self-censorship

Author:
Marcus Tannenberg
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Because of a perceived risk of repressive action, some survey questions are likely sensitive in more autocratic countries while less so in more democratic countries. Yet survey data on potentially sensitive topics are frequently used in comparative research despite concerns about comparability. In a novel approach to examining the comparability of politically sensitive questions, I employ a multilevel analysis with more than 140,000 respondents in 36 African countries to test for systematic bias when survey respondents believe (fear) that the government, rather than an independent research institute, has commissioned the survey. The findings indicate that fear of the government induces a substantial and significant bias on questions regarding the citizen-state relationship in more autocratic countries, but not in more democratic countries. Moreover, respondents who think the government commissioned the survey do not answer differently on innocuous, apolitical questions than respondents who believe the survey to be independent, regardless of regime type. This has practical implications for the comparative use of survey data.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Research, Domestic Politics, and Survey
Political Geography:
Africa

45. Wartime Educational Loss and Attitudes toward Democratic Institutions

Author:
Shelley Liu
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
How does civil war affect society and citizen interaction with politics? Civilians who live through warfare face numerous challenges that can have permanent effects on society even after peace is achieved. This project uses the Liberian civil wars as a case study to examine the impact of war through one channel – disruptions in education for an entire generation of children. The paper shows that negative effects of war on education and economic outcomes clash with citizen expectations for post-war democracy, leading to negative consequences for the democratization process. Specifically, educational deficiencies in this particular generation of young adults decrease job prospects, breeding resentment against the promises of democracy. This extends to the political sphere, such that those who lost out on educational opportunities due to war exhibit lower engagement, less desire to engage with democratic processes, and a greater rejection of democracy altogether.
Topic:
Civil Society, Civil War, Education, War, Children, and Youth
Political Geography:
Africa and Liberia

46. Disease, Disaster, and Disengagement: Ebola and Political Participation in Sierra Leone

Author:
Benjamin Crisman
Publication Date:
08-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
How do widespread public health crises affect political behavior? This article examines the impact of the 2014 West African Ebola outbreak on political participation in Sierra Leone. How do widespread public health crises affect individual attitudes and political behavior? Infectious diseases are ubiquitous in many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and the intensity and frequency of outbreaks are increasing (Smith et al., 2014) and expected to continue to increase in the face of climate change (Altizer, Ostfeld, Johnson, Kutz, & Harvell, 2013), rising antibacterial resistance (Jones et al., 2008), and deforestation (Wolfe, Daszak, Kilpatrick, & Burke, 2005). In the case of Ebola virus disease (EVD), these outbreaks are becoming more deadly (Diehl et al., 2016). While the negative consequences of persistent disease burden on economic outcomes is well known, as in the case of malaria (Sachs & Malaney, 2002) or HIV/AIDS (Whiteside, 2002), the consequences of disease crises on political development is less clear. In this article, I explore the relationship between Ebola exposure in the West African Ebola outbreak and political participation using individual responses from Afrobarometer Round 6 (2015) survey data in Sierra Leone.
Topic:
Ebola, Public Health, Pandemic, and Participation
Political Geography:
Africa and West Africa

47. Explaining South African Xenophobia

Author:
Christopher Claasssen
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
South Africa now has the unfortunate reputation as one of the more hostile destinations in the world for African migrants. Widespread attacks targeting foreigners took place in May 2008, killing 62 people and making international headlines. Another wave of violence occurred in April 2015, leading to an outcry across Africa and the recall of the Nigerian ambassador. These are not attacks caused by small bands of provocateurs or criminals; both qualitative and quantitative evidence suggests widespread participation in, and support for, the violence in the affected communities (Claassen, 2014). Indeed, a number of commentators have remarked on the elevated levels of xenophobia observed in South Africa (see, for example, Mattes, Taylor, McDonald, Poore, & Richmond, 1999), with African nationals, in particular, facing everyday hostility and violence (Everatt, 2010). Thus, rather than a case of rare and sporadic attacks disturbing otherwise peaceful relations between locals and African immigrants, South African xenophobia appears to take the form of widespread antipathy and intolerance punctuated by acts of hostility and violence. South African xenophobia has national and regional political consequences. The violence that took place in 2008 and 2015, as well as the hate crimes that occur with everyday regularity, present a pressing human rights concern. Furthermore, as Landau (2011, 2012) has noted, such levels of intergroup hostility are a symptom of a deep social and political malaise. Finally, as the sharp international reaction to the 2015 attacks indicates, South African xenophobia now constrains the country’s international relations, particularly within Africa. This paper investigates the determinants of South African xenophobia. Despite a great deal of reflection, commentary, and research by government, civil society, and scholars, we have a poor understanding of the factors that influence and shape hostility toward African immigrants. The problem is not a scarcity of explanations, but an overabundance. With up to a dozen explanations proffered by experts, we have little idea what actually causes hostility toward immigrants. Moreover, the laundry list of possibilities gives little clue whether some causal factors are contingent on others, as is often the case in social processes.
Topic:
Migration, Border Control, Violence, Xenophobia, and Racism
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

48. 800 languages and counting: Lessons from Survey Research Across a Linguistically Diverse Continent

Author:
Carolyn Logan
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Using data on more than 800 home languages identified during Afrobarometer Round 5 (2011/2013) surveys in 35 countries, as well as information on multilingualism gathered in 20 countries in Round 4 (2008/2009), this paper explores linguistic diversity and multilingualism at the individual level, within communities, and across countries. Afrobarometer data offer a unique perspective on the distribution of languages and language capabilities from the viewpoint of the users of language rather than those who study it. The paper also identifies some of the challenges encountered in collecting public opinion data in linguistically diverse environments. The findings reveal that even in many rural zones, many Africans are living within ethnically and linguistically diverse communities, and preliminary analysis suggests this may have important implications for social and political attitudes. The data have untapped potential for understanding language evolution and for studying language both as a product and as a variable driving attitudes and outcomes.
Topic:
Research, Language, Survey, and Identity
Political Geography:
Africa

49. Public Trust in Elections: The Role of Media Freedom and Election Management Autonomy

Author:
Nicholas Kerr and Anna Lührmann
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
As multiparty elections have become a global norm, scholars and policy experts regard public trust in elections as vital for regime legitimacy. However, very few cross-national studies have examined the consequences of electoral manipulation, including the manipulation of election administration and the media, on citizens’ trust in elections. This paper addresses this gap by exploring how autonomy of election management bodies (EMBs) and media freedom individually and conjointly shape citizens’ trust in elections. Citizens are more likely to express confidence in elections when EMBs display de facto autonomy and less likely to do so when mass media disseminate information independent of government control. Additionally, we suggest that EMB autonomy may not have a positive effect on public trust in elections if media freedom is low. Empirical findings based on recent survey data on public trust in elections in 47 countries and expert data on de facto EMB autonomy and media freedom support our hypotheses.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Elections, Democracy, and Media
Political Geography:
Africa

50. Tax Compliance Africans Affirm Civic Duty but Lack Trust in Tax Department

Author:
Thomas Isbell
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In any economy, balancing expenditures, revenues, and debts is a delicate and often politicized task. Competing interests and priorities buffet those tasked with planning a viable and stable national budget. For any state, taxes raised from individuals and businesses are a central plinth supporting the provision of services, the maintenance of infrastructure, the employment of civil servants, and the smooth functioning of the state. In many African countries, however, tax evasion leaves states with major holes in their budgetary pockets. A 2015 report by the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa cites tax abuse as an important contributor (along with laundering of criminal proceeds, corruption, and market abuse) to an estimated $30 billion to $60 billion per year that African governments lose to illicit financial flows, hampering growth through state investment, improvements in education and health services, and lower debt commitments abroad (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2015a, 2015b; Guardian, 2015). The 2016 leaks of the “Panama Papers” exposing tax evasion and fraud among many African and world leaders and their families further underlined the magnitude of the burden that tax evasion places on the continent (Kuo, 2016; Copley, 2016). Moreover, low tax compliance weakens the state’s ability to invest and develop. In 2005, only 15% of gross domestic product (GDP) in developing countries derived from taxes, compared to 35% in developed countries (Fuest & Riedel, 2009). In some of the poorest countries, this proportion was 12%. Cobham (2005) estimates that low tax compliance in developing countries costs around $285 billion per year. For many Africans, however, not paying taxes may be less a matter of choice than of insufficient efficacy. As Aiko and Logan (2014) report, majorities of Africans say it is difficult to find out what taxes they’re supposed to pay and how their government uses tax revenues, and many see tax officials as corrupt. Ali, Fjeldstad, & Sjursen (2013) have found that not understanding how taxes are used is negatively correlated with tax compliance. They also point out that many Africans pay private or non-state providers for services that would commonly be provided by the state, which might also tend to depress tax compliance. This paper examines the views and experiences of ordinary Africans related to tax compliance. Afrobarometer survey data indicate that a strong majority of Africans see paying taxes as a civic duty that is important to a country’s development and should be fulfilled regardless of whether one is dissatisfied with government services. But low levels of public trust and high levels of perceived corruption in the tax department dampen citizens’ support for tax compliance.
Topic:
Civil Society, Governance, Tax Systems, Bureaucracy, and Tax Evasion
Political Geography:
Africa

51. Public service delivery in South Africa: Councillors and Citizens Critical Links in Overcoming Persistent Inequities

Author:
Sibusiso Nkomo
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The August 2016 local government elections in South Africa sent an earthquake through the political class when the African National Congress (ANC) lost power in three major cities of the country. Coalition governments led by the Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) took over the economic powerhouse, Johannesburg; the administrative capital and seat of the Presidency, Pretoria; and the biggest city in the Eastern Cape and the country’s vehicle-manufacturing hub, Nelson Mandela Bay. Additionally, the DA grew its share of the vote to more than two-thirds in Cape Town, the home of Parliament. In Ekurhuleni and other cities, the ANC created coalitions and barely clung to power. These elections can be seen as a milestone, indicating for the first time since 1994 that the ANC could lose power anywhere in the country. They also point to continuing perceptions of political and systemic weaknesses – including a lack of qualified staff, capacity, professionalism, and accountability (Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 2009) – at the local level of government, which deals most directly with citizens, is the coalface of service delivery, and thus may be most directly affected by public dissatisfaction with public services (Mungai, 2015; Institute for Security Studies, 2009). Since 1994, South Africa’s democratic governments have extended basic service provision to poorer areas of many cities, towns, and rural areas. For the first time, many citizens have enjoyed electricity and sewage systems that had previously been reserved for whites-only suburbs. According to the 2016 Statistics South Africa General Household Survey, electricity mains now reach 84% of the population. Water access is at 88%; 81% have access to improved sanitation; and only 4% are without a toilet facility. About two-thirds (65%) have their refuse removed once a week, compared to half or less before 1994 (Statistics South Africa, 2017). Nonetheless, numerous demonstrations and protests, often violent, have highlighted popular perceptions that local governments have not kept campaign promises of good service delivery – most fundamentally, Nelson Mandela’s 1994 promise of “a better life for all.” Although services may be reaching people who never had them, is the quality of services inadequate to satisfy their recipients? Do service-delivery deficits reflect and perpetuate the apartheid-era spatial design of most towns, retarding racial and class integration and equality? This paper explores public opinion on basic services provision at the local government level in South Africa. Building on Bratton (2012), which focused on local councillors’ responsiveness to constituents’ needs, I explore other factors that may influence public perceptions of local service delivery, including contact with local councillors and councillors’ job performance and trustworthiness. I also examine which actions, if any, citizens take when they see problems in their municipality.
Topic:
Governance, Public Opinion, Inequality, and Bureaucracy
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

52. Efficacy for Fighting Corruption: Evidence from 36 African Countries

Author:
Thomas Isbell
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Corruption is a major obstacle to economic growth, human development, and poverty reduction (Mauro, 1995, 2004; Asiedu, 2006). The practice of demanding or expecting monetary or other benefits in exchange for preferential treatment has plagued the global South, and high-profile revelations of corruption in politics and business have shed light on the magnitude of the problem (Baker, 2016; McCool, 2015). The poor are most vulnerable to both the immediate effects of having to pay bribes or do favours and the longer-term impacts of hampered growth and weakened investment power (Hosken, 2017; Baker, 2016). Recent research by Peiffer and Rose (2014) and Justesen and Bjørnskov (2014) notes that poor citizens faced with official corruption have fewer means to seek out services from alternative providers and are thus forced to “play the game.” In recent years, headlines have pointed toward a stronger stance against corruption in Africa. In South Africa, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and other countries, scandals and government responses have placed corruption at center stage. In Nigeria, President Muhammadu Buhari’s winning ticket in 2015 included zero tolerance for corruption, and he has taken several steps to try to fight what he calls the “hydra-headed monster” (Maclean, 2016; Gaffey, 2016). In Tanzania, President John Magafuli won the 2015 election after a campaign denouncing corruption and misconduct among civil servants (Muvunyi, 2016). No doubt strong and committed leadership is necessary if meaningful progress is to be made in fighting corruption. But as with any attempt to change the status quo, it is equally important that the policy be accepted, “lived,” and enforced by ordinary citizens. To what extent do ordinary Africans feel they can combat corruption? What informs whether citizens believe they can play a role? Findings from Afrobarometer Round 6 (2014/2015) surveys suggest that education and material security contribute to building efficacy among ordinary citizens for the fight against corruption. But leadership also matters: Perceptions that elected leaders or officials are corrupt make citizens less likely to think they can make a difference.
Topic:
Corruption, Governance, Leadership, Transparency, and Bureaucracy
Political Geography:
Africa

53. Ambitious SDG Goal Confronts Challenging Realities: Access to Justice is still Elusive for Many Africans

Author:
Carolyn Logan
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Access to justice for all citizens has long been recognized as a cornerstone of democracy, good governance, and effective and equitable development. Its centrality has recently been highlighted in the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal 16 (SDG16), which calls for all societies to “promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels” (United Nations, 2016). The United Nations Development Programme (2004) has even described access to justice as a basic human right. Access to justice is described broadly as the ability of citizens to “seek and obtain remedies” (American Bar Association, 2012, i) and to “prevent the abuse of their rights and obtain remedies when such rights are abused” (United States Agency for International Development, 2010, 12). Providing access to justice requires meeting several conditions. It requires a legal framework that protects citizens’ rights and that is known and comprehensible to ordinary people. It requires that court costs are reasonable and that legal counsel is both available and affordable. And it requires that citizens are confident that laws will be fairly and effectively applied. In short, it requires the existence of a remedy, citizens with the legal empowerment and capacity to seek a remedy, and a court system with the capacity and will to provide an effective remedy (International Commission of Jurists, 2009). These conditions are often evaluated through expert assessments. However, the perspectives of ordinary citizens – including both the public at large and actual users of the legal system – can shed critical light on the extent to which people enjoy access to justice. Do ordinary citizens use the legal system to resolve disputes, or do they avoid it? Do they have confidence in court decisions, and in their own ability to secure just outcomes? Can they obtain the legal advice they need, and afford to pursue a case? And when they do go to court, what are their experiences? Are women, the poor, or marginalized groups treated differently than men or wealthy elites?
Topic:
Development, Inequality, Sustainable Development Goals, Justice, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Africa

54. Still no Alternative? Popular Views of the Opposition in Southern Africa’s One-Party Dominant Regimes

Author:
Rorisang Lekalake
Publication Date:
02-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Following decades of authoritarian rule, multiparty democracy re-emerged in a “wave” of democratization in sub-Saharan Africa during the early 1990s. Twenty-nine countries in the region held founding elections – first competitive elections after an authoritarian period – between 1989 and 1994, of which 16 led to full democratic transitions (Bratton, 1997). Notable successes include Namibia (1989), Cape Verde (1991), Ghana (1992), and South Africa (1994), which a generation later are ranked among Africa’s politically “free” countries (Freedom House, 2016). While this period was initially classified as part of Huntington’s (1991) “third wave” of democratization, some political scientists consider it part of a distinct “fourth wave” of general regime change because most of these political openings did not result in full democratic transitions (see McFaul, 2002). Today, African political regimes vary widely, from the liberal democracies cited above to repressive autocracies (Diamond, 2015). Given the importance of party competition to a healthy democracy, a major criticism of African political regimes concerns their relatively few electoral alternations. Although the number of political alternations in sub-Saharan Africa increased from three in 1961-1989 to 39 in 1990-2012, the latter number represents only 23% of election results during this period (Carbone, 2013). Even among multiparty democracies, many African countries have yet to experience a single peaceful alternation of power.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Political Parties, Opposition, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Africa

55. Indirect Colonial Rule and the Political Salience of Ethnicity

Author:
Lachlan McNamee
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
This paper identifies indirect colonial rule as an important determinant of whether ethnicity becomes politically salient in the post-colonial context. We first demonstrate the existence of a cross-national relationship between indirect colonial rule and the salience of ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa. We then identify the effect of indirect colonial rule through a within-country natural experiment in Namibia. Northern Namibia was indirectly ruled by German and later South African authorities, whereas southern Namibia experienced direct rule. Whether a locality in the border zone was directly or indirectly ruled was shaped by the spatial extent of direct German colonial rule at the time of an 1897 rinderpest epidemic. Exploiting this plausibly exogenous assignment to treatment in the border zone, we show that in indirectly ruled areas, today’s party system is more ethnically divided, ethnic parties do substantially better than non-ethnic parties at securing electoral support, and individuals are more likely to identify with their ethnic group than in directly ruled areas. We explore potential causal mechanisms and find evidence for the importance of the legacy of institutionalized ethnic divisions in indirectly ruled areas of Namibia.
Topic:
Post Colonialism, Ethnicity, Colonialism, and Identity
Political Geography:
Africa, Namibia, and Sub-Saharan Africa

56. Violent Extremism in Africa: Citizen Perspectives from the Sahel Epicenter and Periphery

Author:
Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Sibusiso Nkomo
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The Sahel is one of Africa’s most fragile regions and suffers from multiple longstanding and overlapping challenges, including entrenched poverty, underdevelopment, climate risks, and food insecurity. These chronic vulnerabilities have been exacerbated in recent years by the spread of a byzantine network of extremist and armed groups that have instrumentalized simmering local grievances and inter-community tensions to spread across the region’s porous borders. The fall of the Libyan regime in 2011 and the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali were the genesis of ongoing instability in the region. Over the past decade, extremist and armed groups have continued to both entrench themselves in northern Mali and expand their operational footprint into Burkina Faso and Niger.2 Collectively, these three countries now constitute the core of the Sahel crisis (Cooke, Sanderson, Johnson, & Hubner, 2016). A variety of bilateral and multilateral military operations in Mali and across the wider Sahel region have been unsuccessful in stemming the violence, and since 2015, the number of terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger has risen year on year (ACLED, 2019). The deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger has generated increasing concern among bordering West African states about the possibility of further regional spillover of conflict into their respective territories (United Nations, 2020a). This paper looks at the impact that violent extremist activity has had on citizens in the Sahel epicenter countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger as well as the periphery countries of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, the Gambia, and Togo. Using Afrobarometer Round 7 survey data collected in 34 African countries between late 2016 and late 2018, it examines citizens’ perceptions of how governments are handling the violence and looks at potential vulnerability factors that may expose West African states to the spread of violent extremist activity, including governance performance, trust in institutions, civil liberties, and ethnic and religious tensions or marginalization. The security situation across the Sahel region is highly fluid. Burkina Faso, for example, has seen a rapid deterioration in security since fieldwork for the Round 7 survey was conducted, which would not be captured in the data presented below. However, the findings do provide an important snapshot of public opinion on a range of issues relevant to building more effective counter-terrorism policy.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Poverty, Food, and Violent Extremism
Political Geography:
Africa, Sahel, Northern Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso

57. Are Africans Willing to Pay Higher Taxes or user Fees for Better Health Care?

Author:
Thomas Isbell
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In many parts of Africa, access to and quality of medical services remain poor (Deaton & Tortora, 2015; KPMG, 2012; Lowell, Conway, Keesmaat, McKenna, & Richardson, 2010; Streefland, 2005). While economic growth in recent decades has fostered improved health care on the continent, weak funding, brain drain of trained professionals, and ongoing battles with diseases such as TB, HIV, diarrheal diseases, and malaria as well as recurring epidemics such as Ebola continue to put immense pressure on medical systems in many countries (Ighobor, 2015; McKay, 2015; Chothia, 2014). Struggling medical systems confront governments and citizens with difficult choices: Needed investment in the medical sector must compete with other priorities, and increasing health spending by cutting other programs may not be a popular or even feasible solution. One alternative may be to raise taxes or user fees in order to increase available funding. In its Round 6 surveys, Afrobarometer asked citizens in 36 African countries whether they would support or oppose paying higher taxes or user fees in order to increase government spending on public health care. This paper describes citizens’ responses and analyzes whether they are correlated with demographic factors, access to health services, and perceptions of health care, government performance, and official corruption.
Topic:
Civil Society, Health Care Policy, Tax Systems, and Public Health
Political Geography:
Africa

58. Do Africans Still Want Democracy?

Author:
Robert Mattes and Michael Bratton
Publication Date:
11-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Judging by media headlines, democracy appears to be under stress everywhere from leaders like Vladimir Putin in Russia, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, and Yoweri Museveni in Uganda. Yet social scientists know there is often a mismatch between what can be gleaned from news reports or social media and real, underlying trends. To take just one example, media attention to wars in Syria and Iraq suggests rising conflict around the world. Yet compared to previous centuries and especially since the end of the Cold War, both international and civil conflicts are at record lows (Human Security Report Project, 2014). A similar contrast exists between media-fueled perceptions and actual trends in global poverty. The common wisdom suggests worsening living conditions on an overpopulated planet, whereas evidence-based indicators demonstrate that, between 1990 and 2010, the global rate of extreme poverty was cut in half (Economist, 2013). Might the same type of discrepancies exist with regard to democracy? Especially in Africa, where many presidents cling to power (as in Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe), manipulate elections (as in Burundi, Gabon, and Zambia), or ignore institutions of public accountability (as in South Africa), one might reasonably conclude that democracy in Africa is only a façade erected to please a credulous audience in the rest of the world. Yet this viewpoint would miss the fact that more than half of all Africans today live in functioning multi-party electoral democracies that are demonstrably freer than the military or one-party regimes that previously dominated the continent. At the same time, the post-1990 gains that African countries registered in terms of civil liberties and political rights peaked in 2006, at least according to expert judgments offered by Freedom House.
Topic:
Governance, Public Opinion, Democracy, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Africa

59. Election Quality, Public Trust are Central Issues for Africa’s Upcoming Contests

Author:
Peter Penar, Rose Aiko, Thomas Bentley, and Kangwook Han
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Nothing kindles democracy’s energies, anxieties, hopes, and frustrations like an election. The quality of an election can spell the difference between a cooking fire and an explosion. If a successful election can calm and focus a nation (e.g. Namibia 2015), a disputed election can tear it apart (e.g. Burundi 2015, Côte d'Ivoire 2010, Kenya 2008). With at least 25 African countries conducting national elections in 2016-2017,1 great attention is focused on electoral management bodies – typically national electoral commissions – as crucial players in electoral processes and in shaping public perceptions of how well democracy is working. Poor electoral management can enable election fraud and, even if it doesn’t swing an election, produce political alienation, public mistrust, protest, and violence. In 2016, we have already seen examples of unrest in Kenya, where opposition calls for electoral commission reforms using the hashtag #IEBCMustFall have sparked demonstrations and a violent reaction from security forces; in the Republic of the Congo, where election malpractices led to violent protests; and in Gabon, where bloody clashes erupted after President Ali Bongo claimed a widely disputed re-election victory. In Ghana, pre-election anxieties are high amid questions about the electoral commission’s revision of the voter roll for December’s election. Against the backdrop of history’s examples – in Africa and elsewhere – of tampering with voter rolls, suppression of competition and voter turnout, ballot stuffing, vote-buying, multiple voting, and manipulation of results, free and fair elections, agreed to in the African Union’s Charter on Good Governance and Elections, depend on competent election management supported by citizen sensitization efforts to build public confidence. Using 2014/2015 Afrobarometer data from 36 African countries, this analysis examines public perceptions of electoral management institutions and the quality of elections. Overall, public trust in national electoral commissions is moderate at best. Although a majority of citizens say their most recent elections were mostly free and fair, citizens express serious concerns about the fairness of vote counts, corruption during elections, and the safety of voters during campaigns and at the polls. Citizens’ views of electoral commission performance and election quality generally mirror the opinions of country experts found in international assessments. More broadly, many citizens say elections are not working well as mechanisms to ensure that people’s views are represented and that voters can hold non-performing leaders accountable. Few countries have achieved improvement in the perceived performance of elections over the past decade.
Topic:
Corruption, Public Opinion, Elections, and Election watch
Political Geography:
Africa

60. Does Less Engaged Mean Less Empowered? Political Participation Lags Among African Youth, Especially Women

Author:
Rorisang Lekalake and E. Gyimah-Boadi
Publication Date:
08-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
African Youth Charter outlines young citizens’ rights and responsibilities, affirming that “youth are partners, assets and a prerequisite for sustainable development and for the peace and prosperity of Africa” (African Union, 2006, p. 2). Article 11 of the charter gives every young citizen “the right to participate in all spheres of society” and mandates that states encourage youth activism and ensure gender equity in political representation and participation (p. 6). Among responsibilities, the charter cites full participation in civic duties such as voting in elections and volunteering. The African Union (AU) Assembly declared 2009-2018 the “African Youth Decade” and released an action plan to promote youth empowerment and development throughout the continent, including by raising young citizens’ representation and participation in political processes (African Union, 2011). The latest results from Afrobarometer surveys in 36 countries reveal a wide gap between the aspirations set forth in the AU policy framework and the reality of youth political engagement in Africa today. The data show that African governments and development partners have considerable work to do to achieve the goal of increased civic and political participation among youth, particularly young women. African youth (aged 18-35) report lower rates of political engagement than their elders across a variety of indicators, including voting in national elections. Young citizens are also less likely to engage in civic activities such as attending community meetings and joining others to raise an issue. While these findings are consistent with research on age differences in voter turnout in advanced democracies (e.g. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1999; Norris, 2002), the survey further finds that youth engagement levels have declined over time despite the introduction of regional and national youth empowerment policies. Young women’s political engagement lags behind that of their male peers across all the indicators under consideration, although these differences are smaller for voting levels and attendance at demonstrations or protest marches. The findings on gender-based disparities in engagement levels are consistent with results from the previous round of the Afrobarometer surveys (2011/2013), which show that African women are generally less likely than men to participate in political processes, despite widespread support for gender equality across Africa (see Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 8, available at http://bit.ly/2aFrCnA). The persistence of gender gaps even among youth is a measure of the extent to which significantly more initiatives are required to empower young women and boost their participation – particularly in West African countries, which report the largest gaps on most indicators. Women make up less than one-quarter (23%) of parliamentary representatives in sub-Saharan Africa (average for single or lower house) and have even lower representation in Arab states (18%) (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2016). Boosting their representation to meet the AU’s target of gender parity likely requires raising engagement among young women at lower levels of the political process. Greater civic education for all youth, and particularly young women, may be one strategy for moving toward the AU aspiration of an empowered young citizenry that acts as an agent for prosperity, peace, and development on the continent.
Topic:
Gender Issues, Politics, Youth, Engagement, Participation, and Civic Engagement
Political Geography:
Africa

61. Evaluating Botswana’s Performance on National Vision 2016

Author:
Rorisang Lekalake
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
On 30 September 2016, Botswana will mark its 50th year of independence from the United Kingdom, a significant occasion for both celebration and reflection. An important part of this reflection has focused on Botswana’s transition from National Vision 2016, the blueprint that has guided the country’s development for the past two decades, to National Vision 2036, in tandem with the global move from the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals to Sustainable Development Goals (Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 2016a). A presidential task force is leading national consultations on National Vision 2036, a first draft of which is due for presentation, debate, and approval during the 2016 parliamentary winter session (Botswana Press Agency, 2016)). A final document is expected to replace Vision 2016 in September. In monitoring progress toward Vision 2016’s four long-term goals (sustained development, rapid economic growth, economic independence, and social justice) and seven development “pillars,” the Vision 2016 Council has generally relied on a variety of regional and international indicators of objective data, such as per capita gross national income (GNI) or the Human Development Index (HDI) on the economic front and indicators of governance and democracy from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation and Freedom House on the political front (Vision 2016 Council, 2016). In addition, the council conducted a public opinion survey in 2010 to gain an understanding of ordinary citizens’ evaluations of the document itself and of the country’s progress on its development indicators. This paper aims to complement that study by providing updated analysis from the latest Afrobarometer survey (2014) in Botswana, in addition to longitudinal data and supplementary insights from the Afrobarometer questionnaire’s broader focus. What are Batswana’s evaluations of the progress made toward each of the National Vision 2016 development pillars? Which areas should the government prioritize moving forward into a post-2016 development agenda? The analysis applies the Vision 2016 Council survey’s benchmarks to Afrobarometer findings to evaluate success or failure on all seven pillars: an educated, informed nation; a prosperous, productive, and innovative nation; a compassionate and caring nation; a safe and secure nation; an open, democratic, and accountable nation; a moral and tolerant nation; and a united and proud nation. Positive evaluations by 67% or more of citizens constitute “good” performance, 50%-66% is “average,” 34%-49% is “poor,” and less than 33% is “critical” (Vision 2016 Council, 2010, p. 6.). Overall, the results show that the country has done fairly well in a number of areas, particularly in improving access to education and maintaining social cohesion, but continues to struggle to distribute national wealth among all of its citizens. Consequently, political leaders and ordinary Batswana will continue to face many of the same economic challenges identified in 1997 as the country moves into the next phase of national development.
Topic:
Development, Education, Governance, Public Opinion, Democracy, and Social Justice
Political Geography:
Africa and Botswana

62. Violent Extremism in Africa: Public Opinion from the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn

Author:
Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Over the past two decades, the threat posed by violent extremist groups that espouse fundamentalist religious narratives has grown substantially across Africa (Hallowanger, 2014). The colonial era and the undemocratic rule that characterized many post-independence governments generated anti-Western and jihadist movements across the Middle East and the wider Islamic world (Moore, 2016). These movements advocate conservative religious rule as a cure for modern societies’ social ills. By the 1990s, these ideologies had begun to spread to Africa, where porous borders, poor security apparatuses, weak governance, corruption, ethnic divisions, and high youth unemployment created conditions under which violent extremist groups thrived (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2014). In Nigeria and Somalia, for example, violent extremist organisations began as ethnically homogenous movements with purely domestic concerns – the overthrow of their respective governments. Over time they have evolved toward more ambitious political goals and established an active presence in neighbouring states. These groups generally favour border regions due to lower levels of government presence and security, which facilitate illicit networks and vulnerable border communities. Such a situation challenges not only the internal stability of many countries, but also the stability of the broader region. Moreover, links between national and international jihadist groups have increased over the past decade. In 2012, al Shabaab declared allegiance to al Qaeda, but there has been recent infighting over whether to shift this allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In early 2015, the Nigerian group Boko Haram publicly declared allegiance to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Guardian, 2015). These international networks not only help these groups with material and operational support, but also build their credibility within the broader jihadist movement, thereby facilitating international recruitment (CNN, 2015). Security-led approaches have largely failed to contain the geographic footprint of violent extremists in sub-Saharan Africa. This has prompted the emergence of more development-oriented approaches, such as countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) initiatives, which seek to address root political and socioeconomic causes of extremism (Zeiger & Aly, 2015). In the past two years, both the United States and the European Union have officially outlined their approaches to CVE.1 Several initiatives have also emerged on the African continent, including Nigeria’s Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism (NACTEST). These development-oriented approaches place emphasis on the environments in which violent extremism thrives. Public opinion research offers insight into violent extremism’s impact on ordinary citizens by presenting their perceptions, attitudes, and policy preferences. It also allows researchers to identify areas and populations in which possible drivers of extremism, such as low levels of social cohesion or high levels of distrust toward the state, are present.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Violent Extremism, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Sahel, Lake Chad Basin, and Horn of Africa

63. Despite Gains, Barriers Keep Health Care High on Africa’s Priority List

Author:
Daniel Armah-Attoh, Edem E. Selormey, and Richard Houessou
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Access to health care gained the spotlight on national and international development agendas when the 1978 Alma Ata Declaration outlined a strategy for achieving universal access to primary health care by the year 2000 (World Health Organization, 1978). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set targets for improving health-care delivery by 2015, and the United Nations’ new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which took effect in January 2016, extend and supplement those with ambitious targets aimed at ensuring healthy lives for all. Despite significant gains under these initiatives, Africans fully support health care’s continued prominence on development agendas: In Afrobarometer surveys across 36 African countries in 2014/2015, citizens rank health as the second-most-important problem (after unemployment) that their governments need to address, as well as the No. 2 priority (after education) requiring additional government investment. While the proportion of Africans going without needed health care has decreased over the past decade, citizens’ perceptions highlight some of the challenges that still stand between current reality and “health for all,”
Topic:
Development, World Health Organization, Governance, and Health Care Policy
Political Geography:
Africa

64. Botswana's Democratic Consolidation: What Will it Take?

Author:
Rorisang Lekalake
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Botswana is Africa’s oldest continuous democracy, having enjoyed decades of peaceful multipartyism since independence in 1966. However, this success is tempered by growing concerns that the country’s remarkable stability has come at the cost of further political development. Significant weaknesses in Botswana’s democracy include low civic participation, relatively weak opposition and civil society sectors, and a lack of incumbent turnover in 11 consecutive free and fair elections. Despite these challenges, Botswana has maintained its reputation as an African success story due to the scale, pace, and endurance of its socioeconomic and political development, particularly given setbacks elsewhere in the region. Democracy is one of Botswana’s four founding principles and is a pillar of its National Vision 2016, which has driven development plans since 1997 (Presidential Task Group, 1997).1 The Vision 2016 Council’s evaluation of the country’s progress on this front is largely positive, citing high rankings on international benchmarks relative to other African countries (Botswana Vision 2016 Council, 2015). Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), for example, ranks Botswana as the least corrupt country in sub-Saharan Africa, while Freedom House has classified the country as “free” since 1973. In recent years, however, the country’s CPI score has declined (Transparency International, 2015), and in 2009, Freedom House downgraded Botswana’s political rights rating as a result of “decreased transparency and accountability in the executive branch under President Seretse Khama Ian Khama’s administration” (Freedom House, 2015a).
Topic:
Corruption, Development, Governance, Democracy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Africa and Botswana

65. Africa’s Growth Dividend? Lived Poverty Drops Across Much of the Continent

Author:
Robert Mattes, Boniface Dulani, and E. Gyimah-Boadi
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Though Africa has recorded high levels of economic growth over the past decade, previous Afrobarometer surveys of citizens found little evidence that this growth had reduced levels of poverty in any consistent way (Dulani, Mattes, & Logan, 2013). However, new data from Afrobarometer Round 6, collected across 35 African countries, suggest a very different picture. While “lived poverty” remains pervasive across much of the continent, especially in Central and West Africa, we now see evidence that the decade of economic growth seems to have finally delivered broad-based reductions in poverty. “Lived poverty” (an index that measures the frequency with which people experience shortages of basic necessities) retreated across a broad range of countries. In the roughly three-year period between Round 5 (2011/2013) and Round 6 (2014/2015) surveys, our data suggest that “lived poverty” fell in 22 of 33 countries surveyed in both rounds. However, these changes show no systematic relation to recent rates of economic growth. While growing economies are undoubtedly important, what appears to be more important in improving the lives of ordinary people is the extent to which national governments and their donor partners put in place the type of development infrastructure that enables people to build better lives.
Topic:
Poverty, Infrastructure, Inequality, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
Africa

66. Does Personal Experience of Bribery Explain Protest Participation in Africa?

Author:
Moletsane Monyake
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Protests, boycotts, and online petitions targeting alleged corruption are fast becoming commonplace in many of the world’s most corrupt nations. In addition to the mass uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 and the Color Revolutions in Ukraine, a series of anti-corruption protests have emerged in Nigeria, Moldova, and India and forced Guatemala's president, Otto Pérez Molina, to resign following allegations of fraud, conspiracy, and bribery (Luhnow, 2015). In 2009, thousands of Indonesians took to the streets to oppose attempts by corrupt elements in government and business to frustrate the work of Indonesia’s anti-corruption agency (Beyerle, 2014). In 2015, more than a million Brazilians demonstrated against systemic corruption. While earlier protests centered on a wide range of socioeconomic grievances, media reports indicate that the recent protests in Brazil were specifically inspired by allegations of corruption, especially in the presidency (see, for example, Magalhaes & Jelmayer, 2015). Indeed, it would seem, as Transparency International co-founder Frank Vogl, observed, “… that ordinary citizens, even in some of the most corrupt nations … and some of the most dangerous for anti-corruption activists, can organize and secure justice” (Vogl, 2012, p. 193). Nevertheless, recent academic analyses of different forms of anti-corruption collective action seem to take for granted the motives of the individuals who participate in these endeavours, focusing more on the strategies and tactics of the civil-society organizations that mobilize against corruption (see Beyerle, 2014; Landell-Mills, 2013). Furthermore, the fact that Landell-Mills, Beyerle, and others restrict their analysis to instances of “successful” anti-corruption civic engagement constrains variation on the dependent variable. For that reason, their research offers a limited account of why anti-corruption collective action does not occur in societies that often share similar attributes with those in which such initiatives seem to thrive. Attempts at more systematic comparisons also focus almost exclusively on institutional factors underlying the successes or failures of anti-corruption civic engagement, offering no explanation about variations in individual-level participation. While Verdenicci and Hough (2015) underscore the role of state institutions in the “success” of civilian-led anti-corruption initiatives in India, and their apparent failure in China, they do not explain why participation rates differ in the former. In essence, the overemphasis on the institutional context seems to play down the role of individual-level factors in explaining anti-corruption civic engagement, particularly the effect of perceptions and experiences of corruption.
Topic:
Corruption, Social Movement, Protests, Participation, and Bribery
Political Geography:
Africa

67. Ethiopians’ Views of Democratic Government: Fear, Ignorance, or Unique Understanding of Democracy?

Author:
Robert Mattes and Mulu Teka
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
As part of Afrobarometer's Round 5 surveys in 35 African countries, its partner ABCON PLC Consulting House interviewed 2,400 adult Ethiopians in August 2013. Analysis of the collected data raised significant questions about the comparability of Ethiopia results with those from other surveyed countries, particularly with regard to attitudes toward democracy. These questions are laid out and explored in this working paper. In light of these questions, Afrobarometer has not included Ethiopia results in multi-country analyses. We advise caution in any attempt to compare responses to democracy-related questions from Ethiopia with those from other African countries. Analysts are advised to use the Ethiopia data set only in a stand-alone setting or to limit their comparative analysis to items that are not focused on democracy.
Topic:
Development, Government, Public Opinion, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Africa and Ethiopia

68. Liberation Technology: Mobile Phones and Political Mobilization in Africa

Author:
Marco Manacorda and Andrea Tesei
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Can digital information and communication technology (ICT) foster mass political mobilization? We use a novel geo-referenced dataset for the entire African continent between 1998 and 2012 on the coverage of mobile phone signal together with geo-referenced data from multiple sources on the occurrence of protests and on individual participation in protests to bring this argument to empirical scrutiny. We find that mobile phones are instrumental to mass mobilization during economic downturns, when reasons for grievance emerge and the cost of participation falls. Estimated effects are if anything larger once we use an instrumental variable approach that relies on differential trends in coverage across areas with different incidence of lightning strikes. The results are in line with insights from a network model with imperfect information and strategic complementarities in protest provision. Mobile phones make individuals more responsive to both changes in economic conditions – a mechanism that we ascribe to enhanced information – and to their neighbours’ participation – a mechanism that we ascribe to enhanced coordination. Empirically both effects are at play, highlighting the channels through which digital ICT can alleviate the collective action problem.
Topic:
Politics, Science and Technology, Innovation, Emerging Technology, and Mobilization
Political Geography:
Africa

69. Language, Education, and Citizenship in Africa

Author:
Ericka A. Albaugh
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
African states are known for their linguistic diversity. Few have spread a single official language widely through their education systems. The preservation of many local languages seems a benefit in terms of minority rights, but some fear that fragmentation may inhibit national cohesion and democratic participation. This article examines language competence of individuals in 10 states in Africa, highlighting distinctions in types of education systems. It also assesses their attitudes about citizenship and democracy, using Afrobarometer survey data. It shows that immersion systems appear much more effective in spreading a standard language, but that national sentiment has very little to do with proficiency in this official language. It also reveals that citizens armed with literacy in local languages tend to be more participatory, more demanding of greater accountability in government, and more critical of authoritarian rule. While virtually all states in Africa have chosen a European language as the official language of education, proficiency in these languages within states across the continent remains low. Certainly there is variation, but very few states have managed to spread a standard language through education. The benefit is that many local languages have been preserved; the question is what this means for citizenship and democracy. This article will do three things: First, it will investigate proficiency in European languages across the continent and highlight the factors that make individuals more likely to speak these official languages. Second, it will ask how language proficiency and type of education may influence citizens’ national sentiments compared to their ethnic attachments. Finally, it will ask how these factors relate to individuals’ political participation and democratic attitudes. Unsurprisingly, higher levels of education are associated with greater proficiency in European languages. Assessing different types of education, the study finds that individuals schooled in immersion vs. initial mother-tongue medium settings are more likely to learn European languages. And yet, proficiency in an official language has an ambivalent connection to individuals’ sentiments toward their ethnic group and nation. National sentiment is strong within mother-tongue systems as well as immersion systems. In mother-tongue settings, however, citizens maintain attachments to their ethnic identity while at the same time declaring loyalty to the nation, whereas citizens in immersion settings more readily drop the ethnic attachment. Finally, mother-tongue settings appear to provide some advantages when it comes to political participation and support for democracy. This may be due to networking opportunities in language associations as well as the confidence and creativity that students acquire in mother-tongue classrooms.
Topic:
Education, Citizenship, Ethnicity, Diversity, and Language
Political Geography:
Africa

70. Are Policy Reforms Enough to Improve Satisfaction with Health Care? Evidence from Benin

Author:
Richard Houessou
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In 2009, the government of Benin embarked on a series of policy initiatives to increase public access to health services, especially for pregnant women, children under age 5, and the poor. While health coverage rates remained steady, attendance at health services increased sharply, and at first, public satisfaction with the government’s performance in improving basic health services increased as well. However, by 2014, public approval of the government’s efforts had dropped sharply. What explains this decrease in public satisfaction, despite the policy reforms? This paper uses Afrobarometer survey findings and other data to examine mechanisms that might contribute to dissatisfaction at the grass roots with how government is handling health services. Its finding that citizens’ negative experiences while visiting public clinics or hospitals are the main factor driving down public assessments of government performance in this area should alert policy makers that they must put in place more than policy reforms in order to satisfy public demand for high-quality basic health services.
Topic:
Health, Governance, Health Care Policy, and Social Services
Political Geography:
Africa and Benin

71. The Viability of Political Opposition in Africa: Popular Views

Author:
Michael Bratton and Carolyn Logan
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
How competitive are African political regimes? Why do opposition parties often struggle to gain a foothold? In many countries, an incumbent ruling party dominates the political arena, essentially reducing elections to a one-horse race and limiting day-to-day governance to a closed shop. In these countries it is unclear whether opposition political parties are sufficiently viable – either alone or in electoral alliance – to amass enough votes to win and exercise political office. This paper addresses the question of opposition viability from the perspective of ordinary African citizens. Do citizens desire real choices at the ballot box? Do they differentiate ruling and opposition parties, and if so, how? And how do they perceive the role of the political opposition in the long periods between elections? Do they wish opposition parties to play the classic democratic role of holding rulers accountable? And what explains the perceived viability of political opposition?
Topic:
Corruption, Democracy, Opposition, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Africa

72. MDC-T defeat in Zimbabwe: Was it only due to Intimidation?

Author:
Stephen Ndoma
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In the relatively peaceful harmonized elections of July 2013, Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe overwhelmingly defeated challenger Morgan Tsvangirai, 61% to 34%. Mugabe’s party, the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), also won 158 of the country’s 210 parliamentary seats, giving it more than a two-thirds majority in the lower House of Assembly, as well as a large majority of local council seats. Some parts of Zimbabwean society and the international community were shocked by the outcome, given the strong performance of Tsvangirai and his Movement for Democratic Change–Tsvangirai (MDC-T) in previous elections. In fact, Tsvangirai had outpolled Mugabe in the first round of the March 2008 presidential elections before withdrawing from a runoff that he described as a “violent sham” that endangered his supporters. The inconclusive 2008 elections led to the power-sharing Government of National Unity (GNU), established in February 2009, under which Mugabe retained the presidency while Tsvangirai became prime minister. The GNU was expected to steer Zimbabwe through its transition and eventually be terminated after the holding of free, fair, and credible elections. Following voters’ overwhelming endorsement of a new Constitution in March 2013, the results of the July 2013 elections left many observers shaking their heads in disbelief. The MDC-T charged electoral chicanery and described the outcome as “heavily manipulated” and “illegitimate.” One of the reasons for the ZANU-PF victory most frequently cited by the MDC-T and some civil society organisations is that the use of political intimidation and violence in election campaigns has worked against the MDC-T’s march toward State House. What accounts for the resurgence of the ZANU-PF and the dismal performance of the MDC-T? Is fear of political violence the only salient factor in the MDC-T’s loss in the watershed elections? Using data from Afrobarometer surveys in Zimbabwe, this paper argues that fear of political violence, though real, is not the most important explanatory variable accounting for the opposition’s defeat. Instead, most voters were casting their ballots on the basis of their changing evaluations of the principals, Tsvangirai and Mugabe.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Transition, Rigged Elections, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Africa and Zimbabwe

73. Trust in Political Institutions in Senegal: Why Did it Drop?

Author:
Ibrahima Sall
Publication Date:
08-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The 2000 presidential elections were a turning point in the political trajectory of Senegal. After four decades of single-party and limited multi-party rule, the country’s first true political alternation handed power to Abdoulaye Wade and ushered Senegal into the ranks of stable democracies in Africa. President Wade won re-election, with a comfortable majority, in 2007. Just one year later, however, public opinion survey results showed that citizens’ trust in Senegal’s president, Parliament, and local government had dropped dramatically. While trust levels rebounded in later surveys, 2008 serves as a case study of key factors that can undermine public trust in political institutions – an element of crucial importance for the consolidation of democracy. Drawing on data from Afrobarometer surveys, this analysis examines whether trust in political institutions is related to government performance, the economy and lived poverty, perceived corruption, interpersonal trust, and exposure to the news media.
Topic:
Governance, Public Opinion, Leadership, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Africa and Senegal

74. Gender equality in Burundi: Why does support not extend to women's right to inherit land?

Author:
Alain Ndikumana
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
With 27,834 km² of surface area and a population of 10.5 million, Burundi’s population density is seven times that of Tanzania and second only to Rwanda’s on the African mainland (World Bank, 2014). Its population grows at an annual rate of 2.4%, and more than 90% of the population lives primarily on agriculture. These factors make land a vital and scarce resource in Burundi, leading to frequent conflicts and particular complications in questions of inheritance (Kazoviyo & Gahungu, 2011). The situation is even more problematic for women and girls, who traditionally inherit nothing from their fathers. In Burundi, women’s right to inherit land faces the triple barriers of demography, tradition, and the law. Promoting gender equality and especially women’s right to inherit land is a major focus of women’s-rights activists. Although Burundi has signed and incorporated in its constitution most international instruments promoting gender equality, women’s succession rights do not yet have full legal protection. Since 2004, government legislation on women’s inheritance laws awaits consideration by the National Assembly. “But problems related to the scarcity of land and overpopulation seem to veil the face of leaders who end up believing that a law on female succession would be a problem rather than a solution” (Kazoviyo & Gahungu, 2011, p. 1). Even if the proposed law is passed, evidence suggests that gender inequality in access to and control over land will remain a problem. Burundi’s legislation is based on international agreements and laws enacted by the government. However, there are shortcomings in the regulation of natural resources and the management of land because Burundi has no national land code. In the absence of national texts, local customary rules based on a patriarchal system govern family land and women‘s access to and inheritance of land. This system recognizes women as usufructuaries (i.e. entitled to use land that belongs to another) but not as heirs. Such social norms are so entrenched among the local population that most women in rural communities view ownership of material assets, such as land, as being exclusive to men (Carpano, 2011). Without a concerted education effort and diligent implementation of new land laws, many women may not know their legal rights, implementation may be gender-biased, and law enforcement may be grossly inadequate or prejudiced against women. In Kenya, for example, laws allow women to own land, yet nearly all land is registered in the names of male elders (Odeny, 2013). A project in Rwanda, implemented by the Rwanda Initiative for Sustainable Development, showed the effectiveness of awareness-raising activities at public and government levels regarding land rights and land registration. Rwanda’s Organic Land Law, which governs land management and administration, states that “women, married or not, should not be excluded from the process of land access, land acquisition and land control, and female descendants should not be excluded from the process of family land inheritance” (Republic of Rwanda, 2004). Both men and women were informed about their rights under the law and about the benefits of registration in terms of security of rights and livelihoods (Carpano, 2011). The National Land Centre estimates that between 2008 and June 2010, 1 million out of 8 million parcels of land in the country had been registered. Afrobarometer’s first survey in Burundi, in 2012, provides insights regarding public attitudes toward gender equality. Findings show that majorities of Burundians support women’s rights in general but reject land inheritance by women. This paper examines factors that might contribute to these apparently contradictory views and offers recommendations on how to promote dialogue, sensitization, partnerships, and capacity development in support of women’s land rights in Burundi.
Topic:
Gender Issues, Feminism, Land, Property, and Equality
Political Geography:
Africa and Burundi

75. The quality of public services: An intrinsic factor in Ghanaian evaluations of government performance

Author:
Daniel Armah-Attoh
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The provision of public goods and services is an important aspect of socioeconomic development. Access to basic services such as clean water and sanitation, health care, schooling, and transportation enhances citizens’ well-being. Access to roads and telecommunications systems lowers transaction costs, leading to improvements in trade and economic activities (Xu, 2013). In spite of the importance of public services to individuals and nations, the World Bank’s World Development Report (2004) found large variations in the quality and quantity of public goods and services across developing countries and within countries. In most African countries, including Ghana, providing public services is a huge challenge for the state, which is traditionally seen as solely responsible for the production and distribution of these services. In practice, given scarce resources and management challenges, the state alone often cannot provide these services at levels that match rapid population growth, development, and urbanization. In Ghana, attempts at adopting a public-private partnership approach for the delivery of some public services has met with apprehension by citizens who fear the consequences of profit-seeking private-sector entities producing or distributing these essential public goods. With the government left to play the primary provider role, citizens continue to have difficulties accessing vital public services because of a lack of service facilities or inadequate service quantity or quality. Quality has been an important focus of management models used by service providers in developed countries since the 1980s. Notable among these are the total quality management (TQM) and new public management (NPM) approaches (Mwita, 2000). These consumer-oriented models approach public service quality from the perspectives of the technical professional, the manager, and the client (Ovretveit, 1992; Curry & Herbert, 1998; Kadir, Abdullah, & Agus, 2000). Similarly, Joss & Kogan (1995) distinguish among technical, systemic, and generic (or interpersonal) aspects of quality, while Grönroos (1982) distinguishes technical from functional quality, the latter having to do with the way services are offered and received. Underlying these approaches is the idea that an essential part of public service quality is clients' evaluation of the level of service received, which is often founded on perceptions formed during service encounters (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, & Berry, 1988; Bitner, Booms, & Tetreault, 1990; Johnston, 1995). Recent Afrobarometer survey data from Ghana shows widespread public dissatisfaction with public services. The survey did not ask specifically about service quality, but analysis of the data points to the importance of service quality in citizens’ negative evaluations of government service delivery performance. This paper examines the hypothesis that the quality of public services is an intrinsic factor – and therefore an important indicator to monitor – in Ghanaians’ assessment of government service-delivery performance.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, Leadership, Social Services, and Public Service
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

76. Ghana's Oil Revenue Management: Convergence of Popular Opinion, the Law, and Practice

Author:
Daniel Armah-Attoh
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Ghana’s efforts to explore and develop the country’s oil potential, spearheaded by the Ghana National Petroleum Company (GNPC), culminated in the 2007 discovery of oil in commercial quantities offshore at Cape Three Points in the Western region. Three years later, production commenced at the Jubilee Field. Public expectations, already high, were further fuelled by politicians who portrayed oil revenues as a panacea and made their management a campaign issue (McCaskie, 2008). The New Patriotic Party (NPP) promised to use oil revenues to propel Ghana to accelerated economic growth and development and to improve socioeconomic conditions. The National Democratic Congress (NDC) matched that promise and raised the ante by vowing to use some of the oil revenues to create a fund for the development of the region where the resource is located, which played well with traditional leaders in the oil region. Estimates of 600 million barrels of oil in the Jubilee Field (Civil Society Platform, 2011) and more than 900 million more in untapped wells nearby mark Ghana as a potential member of the league of leading oil producers on the African continent. As in Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, the Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea, this promises spectacular revenues while also threatening the "resource curse" or "Dutch disease" due to mismanagement or dissipation of oil revenues through corrupt government practices (Le Billon, 2005; Basedau, 2005).
Topic:
Economics, Energy Policy, Oil, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

77. A Window on Policy Priorities: Evidence From the Citizens of 34 African Countries

Author:
Marvis Zupork Dome
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The post-2015 sustainable development discourse has emphasized the need for a more inclusive and participatory policy framework projecting the voices of the people in policy-making and implementation processes. Some commentators have argued that while the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have achieved some poverty reduction, the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) should be better designed to enhance the living standards of the people. Yet not much has been done to create the necessary space for citizens’ voices to be heard. This paper argues for a more rigorous insistence on listening to citizens’ voices as part of the development policy process. It begins this listening through an analysis of the most urgent policy priorities of Africans, as expressed in Afrobarometer survey data from 34 African countries. Analyses of differences by region, income level, and human development level provide useful insights for the development discourse going forward.
Topic:
Civil Society, Development, Public Opinion, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Africa

78. Contesting and Turning over Power: Implications for Consolidation of Democracy in Lesotho

Author:
Libuseng Malephane
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Since its transition to electoral democracy in 1993, Lesotho has experienced a series of upheavals related to the electoral process. Election results were vehemently contested in 1998, when the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) won all but one of the country’s constituencies under a first-past-the-post electoral system, and a military intervention by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was required to restore order. A mixed member proportional (MMP) model introduced in the run-up to the 2002 general elections resulted in more parties being represented in Parliament. The MMP model also led to the formation of informal coalitions as political parties endeavoured to maintain or increase their seats in Parliament in the 2007 elections (Kapa, 2007). Using a two-ballot system, with one ballot for constituency and another for the proportional-representation (PR) component, the elections preserved the ruling LCD’s large majority in Parliament and precipitated another protracted dispute between the ruling and opposition parties over the allocation of PR seats.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Political Parties, Transition, Parliamentarism, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Africa and Lesotho

79. Support for the Formation of a Federation of East African States: Citizens’ Attitudes in Kenya and Tanzania

Author:
Samuel Balongo
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Political leaders in the five countries of the East African Community (EAC) – Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi – have made concerted efforts to promote the benefits of an East African Federation (EAF). The signing of regional integration treaties is covered extensively in national and regional media. Yet many citizens in the two largest member states are not convinced that integration will lead to promised benefits for their countries. In Afrobarometer public-opinion surveys in 2011-2012, citizens of Kenya and Tanzania were asked about the likely impact of an integrated EAF on the availability of jobs, managing conflict, controlling corruption, strengthening democracy, and controlling prices. On none of these five issues did a majority of Tanzanians say that an EAF would have a positive impact, and on only two issues – availability of jobs and controlling prices – did a majority of Kenyans expect improvement through an EAF.
Topic:
Governance, State Formation, State Building, Federalism, and Bureaucracy
Political Geography:
Kenya, Africa, and Tanzania

80. The Effect of Exposure to Political Institutions and Economic Events on Demand for Democracy in Africa

Author:
Jakson Alves de Aquino
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In a democratic political regime, politicians and ordinary citizens must accept elections as the legitimate means of choosing who will govern. Losers must patiently wait until the next election to have an opportunity to elect a leader according to their preferences, and winners must restrain themselves from changing the rules to increase their power. Political systems are considered consolidated democracies when elections are free and fair, alternations of power happen according to the results of elections and are accepted by all main contenders, and the general public sees the system as the best way of organizing the political life. The establishment and survival of democracy depend on both politicians and ordinary citizens being committed to it. Understanding why people have (or do not have) a favourable view of democracy, that is, why they demand democracy, is important to an evaluation of the prospects for democratic stability. Usually, national-level variables have been added to multi-level regression models of survey data. In this paper, I contribute to the investigation of why people demand democracy by adding to the usual explanations new individual-level variables related to individual exposure to political institutions and economic conditions. My two main questions are: Does exposure to democracy increase the legitimacy of democracy? Is people’s demand for democracy influenced by the past economic performance of their countries? People live in a constant process of socialization, learning from their individual experiences and from their social environments. People exposed for a longer time to democratic institutions learn how the system works, accept its procedures, and as a result demand democracy more than less exposed people.
Topic:
Politics, Democracy, Economic Growth, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Africa

81. Does Clientelism help Tanzanian MPs Establish Long-Term Electoral Support?

Author:
Machiko Tsubura
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Tanzanian Members of Parliament (MPs) and political analysts describe the primary roles of MPs with a variety of phrases: benefactors, providers, executors, social workers, saviours, multi-faceted donors, even “walking ATMs". Indeed, in Tanzania, where a majority of citizens are poor and the government lacks resources and capacity to provide sufficient social services, MPs provide various kinds of financial and material assistance to their constituents to support their lives and cultivate their electoral support. This type of exchange builds clientelistic relationships between MPs and voters, which is common in developing countries. In Tanzania, clientelism in electoral politics was highly restricted during the one-party socialist period between the mid-1960s and the 1980s but became prominent following the transition to multiparty democracy in the early 1990s. In 2000, it was enhanced in part by the legalisation of election incentives known as takrima (meaning “hospitality”). The legalisation of takrima raised public expectations that MPs wouldsupply tangible goods and contributed to the expansion of clientelistic relationships between MPs and voters. After having been used widely in the elections of 2000 and 2005, takrima was banned in 2006, and it has been an illegal practice since then. Against this unique background, this paper uses Afrobarometer survey results to examine how election incentives and electoral clientelism affected public views on MPs in Tanzania after the prohibition of takrima in 2006. A central question is whether clientelism helps MPs gain long-term electoral support. To address this question, I employed an innovative approach by adding data on levels of electoral competitiveness and MPs’ engagement with parliamentary discussions to Afrobarometer data sets to create original variables. A regression analysis of these data demonstrates that Tanzanians who had been offered election incentives in the elections of 2010 and had clientelistic views on the roles of MPs were less likely to approve of the performance of MPs. This suggests that clientelism is not necessarily a sustainable tool for MPs to establish long-term electoral support in Tanzania.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Voting, and Partisanship
Political Geography:
Africa and Tanzania

82. Who’s asking? Interviewer Coethnicity Effects in African Survey Data

Author:
Claire L. Adida, Karen E. Ferree, Daniel Posner, and Amanda Lea Robinson
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Face-to-face interviews constitute a social interaction between interviewer and respondent, yet research employing African survey data typically fails to account for the effect of shared ethnicity on survey responses. We find that respondents give systematically different answers to coethnic and non-coethnic interviewers across surveys in 14 African countries, but with significant variation in the degree of bias across question types and countries, with the largest effects for explicitly ethnic questions and in countries where ethnicity is salient. In South Africa, we show further variation across interviewer-respondent dyad type: Coracial effects are larger than coethnic effects – a pattern consistent with the salience of racial legacies in South Africa – and differences in the direction, size, and significance of these effects concord with dyad-specific social desirability. Our findings have practical implications for consumers of African survey data and underscore the context dependence of the social interaction that constitutes the survey experience.
Topic:
Race, Public Opinion, Ethnicity, Interview, and Survey
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

83. Political Risks Facing African Democracies: Evidence from Afrobarometer

Author:
Michael Bratton and E. Gyimah-Boadi
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Where are African countries headed politically? How resilient are Africa’s governments, regimes, and states? What are the characteristics of political risk? This paper is motivated by a desire to discover whether it is possible to identify early-warning indicators of risk to African political systems. We suggest that Afrobarometer survey data may be used to systematically track trends in mass political support – such as approval for incumbent governments, satisfaction with political regime performance, and the popular legitimacy of state institutions. Where trends in dimensions of popular disapproval turn sharply upward, we infer increasing political risk. The paper is anchored empirically with 15 years’ worth of public opinion data for selected African countries and offers interpretations of what these observations might mean. The analysis is both retrospective – connecting empirical trends to known episodes of instability in Mali, Kenya, and Zimbabwe – and prospective – raising red flags for countries like Ghana, among others, once considered stable but currently facing new political strains.
Topic:
Development, Politics, Public Opinion, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Africa

84. Deliberate Disengagement: How Education Decreases Political Participation in Electoral Authoritarian Regimes

Author:
Kevin Croke, Guy Grossman, Horacio Larreguy, and John Marshall
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
A large literature examining advanced and consolidating democracies suggests that education increases political participation. However, in electoral authoritarian regimes, educated voters may instead deliberately disengage. If education increases critical capacities, political awareness, and support for democracy, educated citizens may believe that participation is futile or legitimates autocrats. We test this argument in Zimbabwe – a paradigmatic electoral authoritarian regime – by exploiting cross-cohort variation in access to education following a major educational reform. We find that education decreases political participation, substantially reducing the likelihood that better-educated citizens vote, contact politicians, or attend community meetings. Consistent with deliberate disengagement, education’s negative effect on participation dissipated following 2008’s more competitive election, which (temporarily) initiated unprecedented power sharing.
Topic:
Education, Politics, Governance, Authoritarianism, Protests, and Participation
Political Geography:
Africa

85. On the Primacy of Weak Public Service Provision in rural Africa: Malians Redefine ‘State Breakdown’ Amidst 2012 Political Crisis

Author:
Jaimie Bleck and Kristin Michelitch
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In 2012, Mali faced a dual state breakdown disrupting nearly 20 years of democratization – a coup and a secessionist insurgency. This paper provides the perspectives of rural Malians living on the border of state- and rebel-controlled territory. Our main finding is that villagers defined “the crisis” as one of unmet need for public services and infrastructure. State breakdown matters less where the state is not present in the first place. Rather than the state, villagers were largely reliant on local traditional authorities. The salience of villagers’ concerns about public services and infrastructure, as well as general basic needs insecurity, are echoed in cross-national Afrobarometer data (2012-2013) on public service provision across rural and urban citizens. In nearly all sub-Saharan African countries, the urban-rural gap is large, absolute levels of rural provision are low, and countries are inconsistent in provision across indicators. We conclude by drawing implications of weak state public service and infrastructure provision for citizenship in rural areas.
Topic:
Fragile/Failed State, Governance, Social Services, Political Crisis, and Public Service
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali

86. The Face of African Infrastructure: Service Availability and Citizens’ Demands

Author:
Benjamin Leo, Robert Morello, and Vijaya Ramachandran
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
The need for infrastructure improvements is a top-tier economic, political, and social issue in nearly every African country. Although the academic and policy literature is extensive in terms of estimating the impact of infrastructure deficits on economic and social indicators, very few studies have examined citizen demands for infrastructure. In this paper, we draw upon survey data to move beyond top-line estimates of national infrastructure access rates toward a more nuanced understanding of service availability and citizen demands at the regional, national, and sub-national levels. We find a predictable pattern of infrastructure services across income levels – lower-income countries have fewer services. The survey data also allows us to observe the sequencing of infrastructure services. On the demand side, survey respondents are most concerned with jobs and income-related issues, as well as with the availability of infrastructure, specifically transportation and sanitation. These priorities transcend demographic factors, including gender and location (urban/rural).
Topic:
Infrastructure, Social Services, Public Service, and Social Spending
Political Geography:
Africa

87. Do men and women have different policy preferences, and if so, why?

Author:
Jessica Gottileb, Guy Grossman, and Amanda Lea Robinson
Publication Date:
02-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Gender quotas to increase women’s representation are often motivated by the assumption that men and women have different policy preferences. In Africa – where gender quotas have been particularly widespread – we find that gender differences in preferences are quite small on average, but vary significantly across both policy domains and countries. We propose a theoretical framework for differentiating policy domains where preference divergence indicates increased gender parity from those where it signifies growing inequality. We then demonstrate that favourable gender gaps increase with female labour-force participation, while unfavourable gaps are more likely where women are most vulnerable. We show that these gender gaps in preferences are related to gender gaps in both political participation and representation.
Topic:
Gender Issues, Labor Issues, Representation, and Participation
Political Geography:
Africa

88. Are South Africa’s Youth Really a ‘Ticking Time Momb’?

Author:
Robert Mattes and Samantha Richmond
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
This paper reviews longitudinal survey data on South Africa’s political culture produced by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (1994-1998) and Afrobarometer (2000-2011) and finds that while there are real problems with democratic citizenship in South Africa, these problems are largely not peculiar to young people. Compared to other age cohorts, the youth (aged 18-25 years) of South Africa have the same conception of the role of citizen and are no more likely to endorse political violence or to hold negative views and intentions toward immigrants. They have slightly lower levels of cognitive engagement and cognitive sophistication than some other age cohorts and are less likely to engage in political processes. They also exhibit low levels of support for democracy – a problem they share with their elders.
Topic:
Immigration, Democracy, Citizenship, Youth, and Borders
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

89. Who says elections in Ghana are ‘free and fair’?

Author:
Sharon Parku
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Since 2000, elections in Ghana have been lauded by observers both internally and externally as being “free and fair.” The losing political party, however, has consistently contested the election results. After the 2004 presidential election, three key opposition National Democratic Congress (NDC) members challenged the results announced by the Electoral Commission (EC), suing the EC to publish detailed data from the election. Similarly, at the end of the closely contested 2008 presidential election and the subsequent run-off, leading NDC members accused the EC of trying to manipulate results, and their frustrated supporters invaded the EC head office in Accra. When the NDC was eventually declared the winner, the incumbent New Patriotic Party (NPP) accused the NDC of rigging the election. Again in the aftermath of the 2012 presidential election, the opposition NPP accused the winner – John Dramani Mahama and the NDC – of rigging the election, boycotted the inauguration of the president, and asked the Supreme Court to overturn the official results declared by the EC.
Topic:
Corruption, Elections, Democracy, Election watch, and Rigged Elections
Political Geography:
Africa and Ghana

90. Women and Democracy in Zimbabwe

Author:
Tony Reeler
Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Women are mostly marginalised in African political processes, but they have one key area of equality with their menfolk, and that is in voting: The ballot does not discriminate, even if the results of the balloting frequently do not meet the expectations of the voter. Though not the democracy, elections are an important component of democracy, and even though studies indicate that African citizens have been losing faith in the value of elections, elections offer the only peaceful path for attaining and consolidating democracy (Moehler, 2005; Moehler and Lindberg, 2007; Logan and Cho, 2009; Logan, 2008a). But in the largely patriarchal societies that make up most African countries, do women have the same voice and level of participation as their menfolk?
Topic:
Gender Issues, Elections, Democracy, and Feminism
Political Geography:
Africa and Zimbabwe

91. Malian Democracy Recovering - Military Rule Still Admired

Author:
Boniface Dulani
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Democracy, in the famous words of the British politician Winston Churchill, “is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” After experiencing a twin crisis of separatist rebellion and a military coup in 2012, there were serious concerns about the future prospects of democracy in Mali. Would the short, but brutal, experience of authoritarian rule and a separatist struggle make the return to democracy possible in the short to medium term? Would the country rediscover its position as one of Africa’s promising democracies?
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Coup, and Military Government
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali

92. Demand for Democracy is Rising in Africa, but most Political Leaders Fail to Deliver

Author:
Michael Bratton and Richard Houessou
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Africans express growing attachment to democracy according to citizen attitude surveys conducted by the Afrobarometer in 34 countries1. Seven out of ten Africans prefer democracy to other political regimes, and the proportion of deeply committed democrats (that is, those who also reject authoritarian alternatives) has risen steadily over the past decade. These insights run counter to an emerging view that the impetus for democratization on the African continent has stalled. Influential analysts have suggested recently that “political reform left Africa ‘too democratic’ given the level of income… [and] that the continent has begun to regress to its expected level… by becoming less democratic.” Others have pointed to a global trend of “democratic retreat” that is driven in Africa by China’s economic expansion and the Western security response to spreading Islamic jihad.
Topic:
Civil Society, Authoritarianism, Democracy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Africa

93. Popular Perceptions of the Causes and Consequences of the Conflict in Mali

Author:
Massa Coulibaly
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In the December 2012 Afrobarometer survey, Malians highlighted the primary causes of the serious sociopolitical crisis that their country was going through, as lack of patriotism on the part of the leaders and weakness of the State. At that time, most Malians had lost trust in the political class and in politicians. One year later (December 2013), however, a follow-up Afrobarometer survey revealed that foreign terrorists and corruption are rather the two primary causes of the Northern conflict and occupation. The change in perceptions on this question in the space of a year is explained by the change in the nature and scale of the crisis. The crisis went from the occupation of two-thirds of the territory to war via the intensified radicalism in the occupants’ management of the occupied areas and their many acts of banning and punishment. Next, the change in perceptions is also explained by the peaceful organization of presidential and legislative elections with record participation rates of Malian citizens since the advent of democracy in 1992, more than 50% in the presidential ones and a little less than 50% in the legislative ones. These elections deemed free and honest explain in turn that the need to resort to violence for a good cause is perceived by close to one out of five Malians versus close to one out of three Malians one year prior. One of the major challenges of the governance in Mali is still maintaining and deepening confidence between Malians and their ruling class. To do so, measuring the populations’ perceptions helps to track the will of the people and ensure that policies serve this will and not the reverse.
Topic:
Nationalism, Governance, Elections, Democracy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali

94. Mali’s Public Mood Reflects Newfound Hope

Author:
Michael Bratton and Peter Penar
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In an Afrobarometer survey in December 2012, three quarters of adult Malians were worried that the country was moving in “the wrong direction.” At that time, at the depths of a profound national crisis, most Malians thought the future looked bleak. A year later, however, a follow-up survey reveals newfound hope in the future. By December 2013, two thirds of all Malians now consider that that the country is headed in the “right direction.” What explains this remarkable turnaround in the public mood? The upswing in the country’s collective frame of mind within the space of a single year is traced to several positive developments. These include an improved security situation, the restoration of a freely elected government, and rising confidence in economic recovery.
Topic:
Security, Development, Public Opinion, Internal Displacement, and Economic Recovery
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali

95. Africa's Willing Taxpayers Thwarted by Opaque Tax systems, Corruption

Author:
Rose Aiko and Carolyn Logan
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Afrobarometer survey data, covering 29 countries in sub-Saharan Africa reveal widespread citizen commitment to the principle of taxation and to taking responsibility – by paying their taxes – for national development. But taxation systems across the continent remain opaque to large majorities. Most find it difficult to know what they owe, and the public is even more in the dark when it comes to understanding how tax revenues are actually used by governments. Moreover, perceived corruption among tax authorities remains significant, and evidence suggests these perceptions undermine public commitment to the integrity of the tax system and increase the likelihood of non-compliance.
Topic:
Corruption, Governance, Tax Systems, and Bureaucracy
Political Geography:
Africa

96. South Africa’s Emerging Black Middle Class: A Harbinger of Political Change?

Author:
Robert Mattes
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
South Africa has seen a significant increase in the size of its black middle class in the post-apartheid period, but the attitudinal consequences of indicators of the middle class, as of 2011, are inconsistent and modest in size. While members of the middle class are no more likely to hold democratic values than other black South Africans, they are more likely to want government to secure higher-order, rather than basic, survival needs. They are less likely to identify with the governing African National Congress, to turn out to vote, or to voice their concerns by contacting officials or joining collective action. At the same time, intra-class racial differences between middle-class black respondents, on one hand, and middle-class white, coloured, and Indian respondents, on the other, are still substantial.
Topic:
Race, Inequality, Diversity, Class, and Middle Class
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

97. Does the African Middle Class Defend Democracy?

Author:
Nic Cheeseman
Publication Date:
12-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Barrington Moore’s famous line “no bourgeoisie, no democracy” is one of the most quoted claims in political science. But has the rise of the African middle class promoted democratic consolidation? This paper uses the case of Kenya to investigate the attitudes and behaviours of the middle class. Analysis of Afrobarometer survey data reveals that the middle class is more likely to support the opposition and hold pro-democratic attitudes. This suggests Moore’s claim holds, at least for some African countries, and that contemporary demographic changes will improve the prospects for democratic consolidation. However, qualitative evidence from the Kenyan 2013 general election raises important questions about the resilience of these attitudes. The middle class may be more inclined to democratic attitudes than their less well-off counterparts, but class continues to intersect with ethnicity, and its political salience is likely to wax and wane as a result.
Topic:
Democracy, Class, Participation, and Middle Class
Political Geography:
Africa

98. What Drives Quality of Schools in Africa? Disentangling Social Capital and Ethnic Divisions

Author:
Guillaume Hollard and Omar Sene
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Because of limited governmental resources in Africa, communities are often left in charge of managing their own schools. Two theories of African community’s ability to engage in collective action and improve quality of schools have emerged. While cross-country evidence underlines ethnic divisions as a key limit to collective action in Africa, field work suggests that social capital (i.e. the community’s ability to engage in collective action or establish shared norms) is the main driver of the quality of local public goods. In this paper, we use Afrobarometer data to test the role of social capital and ethnic divisions in determining the quality of schools. We capture social capital by the average level of trust and ethnic divisions via an index of ethnic fractionalization. We skirt reverse causality problems between trust and quality of public goods by using historical information on the settlement patterns of ethnic groups in Sub-Saharan Africa. This yields measures of ethnic inherited trust which we use as an instrument for trust. To address concerns about endogenous residential sorting, we instrument ethnic fractionalization by the initial population density of ethnic historical homelands. We find that a one percent increase in the local level of trust increases the quality of local public goods by 0.2 to 1.14 percent. After controlling trust we discover ethnic fragmentation plays only a marginal role.
Topic:
Education, Ethnicity, Youth, Social Capital, and Students
Political Geography:
Africa

99. Another Resource Curse? The Impact of Remittances on Political Participation

Author:
Kim Yi Dionne, Kris L. Imman, and Gabriella R. Montinola
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
International remittances have grown dramatically over the past few decades. Existing scholarship on the impact of remittances has focused on their socioeconomic effects. This article focuses instead on the political impact of remittances, and in particular, its effect on political participation. Recent work on Mexico suggests that remittances may be a resource curse. They insulate recipients from local economic conditions, weaken the link between government performance and individual well-being, and reduce incentives to participate in politics. The resource model of participation, however, suggests that since remittances increase incomes, they should increase political engagement. To our knowledge, we provide the first cross-country, individual-level analysis on remittances’ effect on political participation. We employ data from 27,713 individuals across 20 sub-Saharan African countries. We find that remittance recipients are less likely to vote but more likely to participate in politics by contacting government officials directly as well as joining demonstrations and protest marches. Our work thus shows that remittances may not necessarily demobilize citizens, as previous work on Mexico suggests.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, Citizenship, Voting, and Participation
Political Geography:
Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa