29531. The Time Inconsistency of Long Constitutions: Evidence from the World
- Author:
- George Tsebelis
- Publication Date:
- 01-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Kellogg Institute for International Studies
- Abstract:
- This paper analyzes the mechanisms that establish time consistency of constitutions. It explains why shorter and more locked constitutions are more likely to be time consistent (change less), whereas long constitutions are more time inconsistent (change more, despite locking). Empirical evidence from all the democratic countries in the world indicates that the length and locking of constitutions are not independent criteria and that their combination leads to less time consistency. To address this interrelationship, I develop a measure of time inconsistency (a combination of locking and amendment rate) and show that it is connected with the length of constitutions. I show how time inconsistency is incompatible with theories of “constitutional amendment culture” (Ginsburg and Melton 2015), not only at the theoretical level but also empirically. Finally, I demonstrate that the empirical findings of Tsebelis and Nardi (2016) that length of constitutions is related to lower per capita income and higher corruption are not only in agreement with time inconsistency arguments but are corroborated beyond OECD countries to all democracies.
- Topic:
- International Organization
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus