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1. Recycling Regime, Environment, and Exclusion of Electronic Scrap Workers in Delhi

Author:
Gayatri Jai Singh Rathore
Publication Date:
11-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)
Abstract:
In recent years, the Indian e-waste sector has undergone a process of formalisation through the implementation of E-waste Management Rules (2016), leading to the creation of what I call recycling regime. The upper and middle classes, along with NGOs and industry actors, are frontrunners in thinking about e-waste policies. They were prompted by a twofold motive: the desire for a “world-class”, clean, and pollution-free city; and seizing business opportunities by extracting value from e-waste. Rather than replacing the State, they co-opted the State so that it would legislate to safeguard the environment, and address toxicity and health problems associated with e-waste. Recycling regime relies on formalisation processes embedded in multiple technologies – technicity, capital-intensive facilities, certifications, authorisations, and licences – that work together to exclude the “informal” sector from the e-waste governance system. Recycling technologies act as “technologies of domination” that further contribute to sidelining the “informal” labour of scrap workers or e-kabadis, who as Muslims already find themselves on the margins of society. However, the recycling regime fails to safeguard the environment in the end as e-waste trickles down back to the informal sector via authorised actors.
Topic:
Civil Society, Economics, Environment, Globalization, Health, Markets, Poverty, Governance, Law, Urbanization, Emerging States, and Norms
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

2. Untangling the Transatlantic Knot: Germany, France, and the United States

Author:
Gesine Weber and Jacob Ross
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
France’s and Germany’s reactions to Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine reveal their significantly different relationships with the United States. Their interpretations regarding the European security architecture are almost diametrically opposed. While Berlin concluded that European security must be constructed transatlantically, Paris saw confirmation of its interpretation that Europeans must be able to address security challenges independently of Washington. Donald Trump’s reelection constitutes a challenge for the two countries because both need to fundamentally rethink their respective relationships with the United States and Europe-US relations more generally. The scope of the US withdrawal from European security remains to be seen, but it will be similarly challenging for Paris and Berlin.
Topic:
NATO, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

3. China: From Systemic Rival to Systemic Threat

Author:
Andrew Small and Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
For the United States and Europe, dealing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a challenge of such wide-ranging nature that it will cut across almost the entire transatlantic agenda of the incoming Trump administration. From addressing Beijing’s role as the “decisive enabler” for Russia’s war of aggression to rethinking the way that US-EU trade and technology ties need to be organized, China policy no longer occupies a separate silo but conditions every element of the security and economic landscape. Under the Biden administration, Europe and the United States undertook an unprecedented effort not only to coordinate their approaches to the PRC itself, but also to advance on other fronts where the China challenge was the main motivating factor, such as EU-US efforts to negotiate agreements on steel, aluminum, and critical minerals. The two sides’ analysis has grown much closer, and in some areas, this translated into tangible results—whether conveying common red lines to Beijing on the delivery of lethal aid to Moscow and the use of force against Taiwan or tightening controls on advanced semiconductor equipment exports. Overall, however, progress still fell short of the high stakes. Some EU member states treated the Biden administration’s partner-friendly approach as a holiday from difficult strategic choices on China rather than an optimal window in which to make them. EU-level efforts to build more effective approaches on economic security, trade defense, and cyber security were often slow-rolled or undercut by major capitals. There were also areas in which the Biden administration allowed domestic political considerations to undermine efforts to build a common strategic economic approach among US partners—particularly the use of national security tools against US allies, whether the blocking of Nippon’s takeover of US Steel or the initial retention (and suspension rather than lifting) of Section 232 tariffs against the EU. While the two sides are certainly more closely aligned and better coordinated, moving in the right direction is no longer enough. If Europe and the United States are unable to achieve results in several critical areas in the next few years, it will come at a growing cost to their security and economic interests, as well as to the broader transatlantic relationship. Success, on the other hand, would put a new set of foundations under it. Three issues are likely to loom over the agenda for the incoming Trump administration: the threat of the “Second China Shock” to US and European industry; Beijing’s deepening coordination with Russia and other authoritarian states; and intensifying PRC pressure on Taiwan.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

4. Strengthening Peace and Security in West Africa: A Conversation with Anthony Antem

Author:
Denis Foretia
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
As regional and global challenges related to peace and security continue to evolve, collaboration and knowledge-sharing remain critical to fostering sustainable solutions. The ReCAP Final Regional Conference, taking place in Dakar, Senegal, from February 10-11 2025, brings together experts, practitioners, and researchers from across West Africa and the Lake Chad Basin to reflect on lessons learned in conflict prevention, peacebuilding, and the fight against violent extremism. In this insightful conversation, Anthony Antem (AA), Head of the Conflict Prevention Unit at the Nkafu Policy Institute, discusses the peace and security landscape in West Africa and the Lake Chad Basin. He highlights Nkafu’s contributions to the ReCAP project, shares expectations for the conference, and reflects on the importance of regional collaboration in fostering sustainable peace. The discussion is led by Ayukmba Nkonghonyor (AN), Senior Communications Manager at the Denis and Lenora Foretia Foundation.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Peace, Interview, Countering Violent Extremism, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Africa and West Africa

5. Advancing Gender, Climate, and Security in the UN Security Council: A Blueprint for Action

Author:
Jess Keller
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
In this policy brief, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security presents recommendations for advancing gender, climate, and security in the UN Security Council and opportunities for Member States and other relevant stakeholders to drive progress on these interconnected challenges. Despite growing recognition of how climate change multiplies risk and poses a threat to international peace and security, efforts to make climate change a standing item on the Security Council’s agenda have failed. Climate change disproportionately impacts women and threatens their security, yet frameworks like the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Agenda have been slow to integrate climate considerations into thematic resolutions and National Action Plans (NAPs) on WPS. The international community must rapidly scale-up efforts to bridge these policy gaps and holistically address challenges at the nexus of gender, climate, and security. This policy brief explores best practices and offers specific recommendations for the Security Council, Member States, and international actors to integrate gender-responsive climate considerations into global peace and security efforts. The report, authored by Jess Keller, was made possible with support from the Embassy of Denmark in Washington, D.C.
Topic:
Climate Change, Women, Peace, UN Security Council, and Gender
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. Factsheet: Elon Musk

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Elon Musk is a billionaire entrepreneur and the CEO or top executive of multiple high-profile companies, including X (formerly Twitter), Tesla and SpaceX. He has a documented history of amplifying anti-Muslim tropes, supporting individuals and organizations that promote Islamophobia, and making statements that minimize or dismiss concerns about anti-Muslim racism. His actions and influence have contributed to the normalization of Islamophobic rhetoric in public discourse. In 2024, U.S. President Donald Trump appointed Musk to lead the newly-created Department of Government Efficiency.
Topic:
Islamophobia, Far Right, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, Billionaires, and Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

7. Factsheet: Alice Weidel

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Alice Weidel is the co-chairwoman of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), a far-right political party in Germany and the first far-right nationalist party to enter the German parliament since World War II. Under the leadership of Weidel, the party has become the second strongest force following the national elections in February 2025. Weidel has a long history of anti-Muslim statements and support for discriminatory policies targeting Muslims. She argues that Islam is incompatible with the German constitution and European values, and is also connected to several anti-Muslim actors.
Topic:
Islamophobia, Far Right, Alternative for Germany (AfD), and Alice Weidel
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

8. Factsheet: Pete Hegseth

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Pete Hegseth is a former Fox News political commentator, author, and former Army National Guard officer who served in Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He has tattoos that are associated with white nationalism and has a history of making Islamophobic statements. Hegseth has also been accused of sexual assault and has had several incidences of alleged sexist behavior. In 2025, Hegseth was confirmed as the next Secretary of Defense in the Trump administration.
Topic:
Islamophobia, Far Right, Donald Trump, Military, Pete Hegseth, and White Nationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

9. Factsheet: Tomio Okamura

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Tomio Okamura is a far-right Czech politician who founded the anti-elitist and anti-Muslim party, Freedom and Direct Democracy (Svoboda a přímá demokracie, SPD). He has made comments that promote anti-Muslim tropes and demonize Muslims and actively advocates for the Czech Republic to exit from the European Union. Following the 2024 European Parliament elections, Okamura joined the right-wing group, Europe of Sovereign Nations, which includes several political parties that support discriminatory policies targeting Muslims.
Topic:
Discrimination, Islamophobia, Far Right, Political Parties, and Tomio Okamura
Political Geography:
Europe and Czech Republic

10. Factsheet: Randy Fine

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Randy Fine is an American Republican politician and currently serves as a Senator for the Florida state government. Before joining politics, he served as a gambling industry executive. Fine has been described as an “unhinged bigot,” “controversial,” “divisive,” and “abrasive.” He has a history of making anti-Muslim, anti-Palestinian, and racist comments, and has threatened two Muslim women members of Congress. In 2024, Fine announced he would be running for the US Congress and was endorsed by President Donald Trump.
Topic:
Politics, Islamophobia, Republican Party, and Randy Fine
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

11. Factsheet: Tom Trento

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Tom Trento is an American conservative activist who has a history of making anti-Muslim statements, including promoting a narrative that constructs Islam as a major threat to America. He is the founder and executive director of The United West, described by the Southern Poverty Law Center as an organization “stoking anti-Muslim hate for over a decade.”
Topic:
Conservatism, Islamophobia, Activism, Right-Wing Politics, and Tom Trento
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

12. Factsheet: Jordan Bardella

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Jordan Bardella is the party chairman of the French far-right National Rally (Rassemblement National) and also the leader of Patriots for Europe (PfE) for the legislative period of 2024 – 2029. In 2024, he ran for the office of the French Prime Minister. Bardella wants to “curb immigration” and warns “against Islamization.”
Topic:
Immigration, Islamophobia, Political Parties, National Rally (Rassemblement National), and Jordan Bardella
Political Geography:
Europe and France

13. Factsheet: Mario Kunasek

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
IMPACT: Mario Kunasek is a member of the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and is the current Governor of Styria. From December 2017 to May 2019, he was the Austrian Defense Minister under a coalition government of the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and his own FPÖ. Kunasek has a long history of tying Muslims to terrorism, fearmongering about “radical Islam” and “Islamism,” and supporting anti-Muslim policies.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Islamophobia, Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), and Mario Kunasek
Political Geography:
Europe and Austria

14. Perils of the U.S. Defense Budget: Silver Lining or Dark Abyss?

Author:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
“Don’t tell me what you value. Show me your budget and I’ll tell you what you value.” When President Biden said this in 2022, the world was in a different state. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was struggling in the face of a surprisingly determined Ukrainian military. The Middle East had its unique but expected challenges, including Iran’s nuclear program. And President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was seeking an unprecedented third term as Communist Party chief. Barely two years later, Ukraine is at best in a stalemate with Russia and, at worst, is faltering. Houthi militants, with materiel support from Tehran, have on a near-weekly basis attacked US and Western ships in the Red Sea. An emboldened Xi is becoming more assertive in the South China Sea, and the PRC has lobbed ballistic missiles over Taiwan for the first time. If the US defense budget in 2022 valued a set of national security priorities—funding Ukraine, countering the PRC, supporting NATO—those priorities are coming under threat in this year’s defense budget.
Topic:
Security, Budget, Geopolitics, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

15. Prospects for EU-Türkiye Foreign Policy Cooperation at a Time of Geopolitical Turbulence

Author:
Ian Lesser, Kadri Tastan, Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı, and Paul T. Levin
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Over more than six decades, the relationship between Türkiye and the EU has undergone a profound transformation. Just 20 years ago, Türkiye had real aspirations to join the EU. Today, that prospect is a distant memory, and political relations between the two parties are at an all-time low. Despite the prevailing challenges and areas of divergent interests, Türkiye-EU relations continue to exert a significant influence on domestic and foreign policies across much of Europe, particularly with regard to trade, border management, and migration. While the United States may view ties with Türkiye as discretionary at times, for both Türkiye and the EU, engagement remains unavoidable. Furthermore, against a backdrop of geopolitical turmoil and regional instability, the imperative for robust dialogue and collaboration between the EU and Türkiye has never been more pressing. With Türkiye‘s accession process stalled and geopolitical tensions on the rise, the need to reinvigorate and strengthen diplomatic ties has become increasingly evident. From the enduring conflicts in Syria and Iraq to the evolving dynamics surrounding Russia‘s aggression towards Ukraine, the prevailing geopolitical context necessitates a coordinated approach between the two parties. This political report examines the potential for collaboration between Türkiye and the EU, defining the essential preconditions for such cooperation and elucidating its mutual benefits. It also assesses the obstacles that stand in the way of such cooperation and proposes a framework for foreign policy dialogue between Türkiye and the EU, incorporating the views of Türkiye, the EU, and the United States.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Middle East

16. Japan’s Approach to the Global South

Author:
Tobias Harris
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, in a January 2023 speech in Washington, DC, stressed that if the G7 countries and their developed-world peers neglect the “Global South”, “we will find ourselves in the minority and unable to resolve mounting policy issues.” These remarks set the stage for a major theme of Japan’s G7 presidency that year, during which Tokyo continued to highlight the importance of more “humility” to strengthen relations between the group’s members and the “Global South”. The G7 leaders’ communiqué at their May 2023 Hiroshima summit did not refer explicitly to the Global South—the United States and other nations did not necessarily share Japan’s preference for the term, which risks treating as monolithic an enormously diverse array of countries—but the document stressed the importance of addressing the needs of middle- and low-income states, including a commitment to “continued efforts to scale up official development assistance (ODA)” and to adopting “innovative financing mechanisms”. This emphasis on outreach to the developing countries assumed greater urgency following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when they were often reluctant to support Western efforts to isolate and punish the Kremlin for its aggression. Japan’s approach to the “Global South” is not merely rhetorical. The Kishida government inherited a long-standing approach to developing nations, particularly those in Asia, that seeks to leverage Japanese ODA and public and private investment. The approach has two goals: to promote growth and strengthen economic ties with developing countries, and to foster trust and political credibility that can be translated into influence. The strategy is shaped by Japan’s national interests but seeks to address developing countries’ economic needs without drawing them into an anti-Beijing bloc. The approach has worked well in Southeast Asia, where, thanks to decades of efforts by successive governments, Japan is viewed particularly favorably. Tokyo now appears increasingly determined to pursue the same strategy in other parts of the “Global South”, including South Asia, the Pacific island states, and, to a lesser extent, Africa and Latin America. As Japan’s G7 peers seek to undertake their own initiatives to improve relations with the “Global South”, the key principles and successes of the country’s policies are worth examining.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Democracy, Business, Global South, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

17. Refugees and Return: Resolving Ukraine's Human Capital Crisis

Author:
Markus Ziener and Dariia Mykhailyshyna
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Ukraine is facing a human capital crisis of enormous proportions. Here, Dariia Mykhailyshyna of the Center for Economic Strategy in Kyiv presents the findings of three waves of surveys among Ukrainian refugees about their intentions to return to Ukraine or remain in their host countries. The report contains some recommendations for encouraging Ukrainians to return. Millions of its citizens fled the country after Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. To share best practices and generate possible solutions, the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), along with its partners—the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), hosted a conference titled “Toward a Skilled Workforce: Rebuilding Ukraine’s Human Capital” in Berlin on April 25–26, 2024. To set the stage, Dariia Mykhailyshyna of the Center for Economic Strategy in Kyiv presented the findings of three waves of surveys among Ukrainian refugees. Those findings, as well as some recommendations, are detailed in this report.
Topic:
Reconstruction, European Union, Refugees, and Human Capital
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

18. Rebuild, Decarbonize, and Integrate: Ukraine, the EU, and the Road to a Net-Zero Energy Sector

Author:
Jacob Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
More than half of Ukraine’s power production capacity has been damaged by Russia since February 2022. Reconstruction is already underway, but to meet EU accession requirements, Ukraine will have to rapidly decarbonize as it rebuilds. As the frontline situation points to a longer war than was projected early on, uncertainties about Ukraine’s long-term economic path and prospects have inevitably increased. At the same time, noticeable political progress has been made given the EU’s agreement to start negotiations for full Ukrainian membership. This step provides the fighting Ukrainian people with a long-term perspective and a destination point as a prosperous, democratic, European market economy. Anchoring Ukraine’s economic future in the EU will have transformative implications for the country’s economy, not least its energy sector. That sector, which is still exposed to Russian military attacks, is now compelled to assimilate into the rapidly decarbonizing EU. More than half of Ukraine’s power production capacity has been damaged by Russia since February 2022 or is situated on territory now controlled by Russia. The Net Zero World Initiative (2023) estimated that 43% of nuclear, 68% of coal-fired, and 33% of combined heat and power generation was lost to the war as of mid-2023. Despite continuing attacks, more than two gigawatts (GW) of electricity production capacity were restored during 2023. Reconstruction of the Ukrainian energy sector is already underway despite the war. With it, the country’s energy transformation has begun. Yet, in March 2024, Russia returned to large- scale saturation missile attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including its large hydropower plants and thermal power stations, inflicting further long-term damage. Putin seeks to exploit the apparent drop in Ukrainian air defense efficiency as Western supplies of air interceptor missiles have grown scarcer. Military risk consequently continues to cloud the outlook for Ukraine’s energy production. It also reduces the interest of foreign and domestic investors in committing resources to the sector. Uncertainty plagues the prospects for Western public support for Ukraine, too. Despite the recent passage of a funding package, future US funding will remain hostage to domestic politics. In Europe, various veto players—led by Hungary—as well as other internal divisions pose an ongoing political challenge to the EU’s financial support for Kyiv. The scarcity of public and private investment funding sources for Ukraine stands in stark contrast to the level of ambition for the energy- sector transition inherent in Ukraine’s EU accession process. One of the major energy- sector challenges facing Ukraine will be the expectation in Brussels that Ukraine will either enter fully into the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) or implement an ETS-aligned national carbon-pricing system of similar ambition. It will not be possible for the Ukrainian economy to be granted a prolonged transition period here, and—for instance—enjoy free carbon-emission credits for affected industries, when these same industries will have been partially or fully phased out in the rest of the EU at the time of Ukraine’s EU accession. While the EU ETS price is currently adjusting to the new post-2022 energy shock demand level (for example, prices have declined so far in 2024 to around €60–65/ton), the ETS auction price forward curve slopes upward. This indicates that carbon market participants continue to believe that EU carbon prices will rise during Ukraine’s EU accession process. Adapting the economy to the EU’s carbon price level will require urgent action on the part of the Ukrainian government as it prepares the long-term National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) that will lay out the country’s energy strategy for the rest of the 2020s. Certainly, Ukraine’s Environmental Protection Minister, Ruslan Strilets, displayed the necessary ambition when he spoke after the UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai in late 2023. He reiterated earlier government statements from 2021 and committed Ukraine to launching a pilot emissions trading system in 2025 with a full launch in 2026. This would enable Ukraine’s entry into the ETS, and thus avoid negative effects of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for Ukrainian exports. This is a timetable that necessitates immediate and sizable climate investments in Ukraine. Ukraine has further committed itself in recent months to a significant scaling up of its already large nuclear power-generation capacity. The Ukrainian government has signed memoranda of understanding aiming at the construction of up to nine new power units using Westinghouse AP1000 technology. Just as the accelerated introduction of carbon pricing in Ukraine will be costly, construction of new nuclear power units, even if located at one of Ukraine’s existing nuclear plant facilities, will require large sums of capital investment upfront. The issue of upfront costs will similarly weigh on the broader issue of reconstruction of Ukraine, as more energy- efficient buildings will only gradually earn back the higher building and materials costs through lower long-term energy consumption. Ukraine must be applauded for aiming to seize the opportunity to rebuild its energy sector and integrate it with the EU as quickly as possible. This follows the recommendations of several expert groups, including GMF’s earlier (2023) report on this issue, which called for rapid Ukrainian adoption of carbon pricing and highlighted the need to phase in EU-level building codes expeditiously. This paper will focus on the implications for both Ukraine and the EU of the Ukrainian government’s recent energy-sector choices. What do these plans require institutionally and financially to succeed, and how will they alter not only the Ukrainian but the entire EU energy sector in the process?
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Decarbonization, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

19. Rethinking Industrial Policy for Central and Eastern Europe

Author:
Michal Hrubý
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is increasingly important in the EU’s manufacturing landscape. The region’s export-oriented economies became an integral part of it through foreign direct investment—supported primarily by EU funding, including Cohesion Policy programs for regional and industrial development, and by national state spending. With its competitiveness at stake, the EU now focuses on industrial policy for cutting-edge technologies with high capital intensity. Many of its new regulations loosen state aid rules to allow generous support by governments to attract investors, which poses a problem for member states with less fiscal room to do so, including the CEE countries. This report discusses the opportunities and challenges for CEE countries to build manufacturing with potential to grow and to increase domestic value-added. It examines two case studies in the region: batteries and semiconductors, and their position in the value chains in Czechia and Hungary. Hungary has become one of the EU’s leading battery industry hubs and plays a key role in the drive toward self- sufficiency in this field. Its success came principally through government spending on investment promotion. Key issues have arisen regarding the environmental sustainability of new investments, the decision to attract cheap foreign labor without any appropriate long-term labor policy, and the lack of knowledge spillover from multinational companies to small and medium domestic ones to improve their value-chain position. New large investments announced by Chinese companies also raise geopolitical and security issues. With its broad innovation and R&D strategy and record low unemployment, Czechia did not make attracting large investments a priority before the COVID-19 pandemic. This has changed and its semiconductor industry is well- placed to draw in new investments in the micro- and nanoelectronics value chain. Czechia has started to support the industry through state aid for a handful of domestic and foreign companies, due to its strategic importance, its high value-added in production output, and the opportunity for stimulating R&D and high-skill employment. These case studies reveal key takeaways for Central and Eastern Europe. First, industrial policy based on state aid in small open economies are costly and will not generate long-term benefits if it is oriented solely at production tasks as in the past. Investment must bring innovation and R&D. Second, CEE countries should make financing innovation and R&D the priority, not subsidizing new manufacturing projects. They should rationalize their policy objectives and update and stick to their national strategies. Third, tight budgets and financial consolidation put pressure on selecting projects for state aid. Governments should not provide this aid without a solid cost-benefit analysis of the investments. Fourth, the CEE countries should consolidate the too broad innovation priorities within their national strategies and analyze their long-term growth potential. Fifth, industrial policy must be accompanied by appropriate labor and education policies to support the green and digital transition.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

20. Democratic Russian Civil Society Outside Russia? A Window of Opportunity for Support

Author:
Nicolas Bouchet
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Russia has large sources of wealth and military power and is controlled by an autocratic, kleptocratic regime willing to devote these to aggression toward its neighbors, most violently in Ukraine. It is in the interest of Europe and the United States to support Russians who can help the country become more peaceful and democratic, alongside anti-regime measures. Repression has made supporting democratic actors in Russia extremely difficult but not impossible. That goal must now be complemented. Around 1 million people have left Russia since it invaded Ukraine in 2022. This opens a window of opportunity for unimpeded access to a large number of Russians to aid the spread of democratic ideas; raising the prospect of a democratic civil society developing outside the country. Europe and the United States need a strategy to support the democratic potential of the recent emigrants. Their largest concentrations are in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Western Balkans as well as Israel, Türkiye, the EU and the United States. The bulk of the emigrants are young adults who are richer, more educated, and more politically interested or active than the average citizen in Russia. For most, the motivations for leaving mixed political, economic, and lifestyle factors, and for many also unwillingness to be drafted into the military. The majority have democratic, anti-regime, and antiwar views. The emigrants include long-standing and newly civically and politically active individuals. A large share continue engagement abroad in diverse organizations and initiatives. Their activities focus on rebuilding civil society organizations (CSOs) and media abroad, supporting democratic actors and spreading independent information in Russia, and antiwar initiatives. They provide help to new emigrants and aim to build up their communities. These activities are carried out from one or more host countries, building transnational networks. There are new grassroots actions and initiatives by emigrants who had less or no direct experience of activism in Russia. Emigrant groups mostly operate through horizontal, fluid networks. Many of these are small and informal, but there are larger, more structured ones. Emigrant communities also offer a space for critical debate about the need for democratic change and the link between this and Russia’s colonial/imperial heritage and aggression. The recent emigrants’ activities face many challenges, including those in operating networks reliant on online resources; in connecting digital and non-digital activism; and in planning beyond the short term without sufficient resources. They are hampered by reliance on small (often part-time) core teams and volunteers. Many activists experience financial precarity, employment insecurity, and burnout. Security is a major concern due to the risk of infiltration, destabilization, and cyber and physical attacks by Russia’s security apparatus. The situation for emigrants has become more restrictive or less safe in some host countries. Individuals and organizations that oppose the Russian regime are also affected by restrictive international measures against it, such as ones against money laundering and the monetization of online content, or the denial of access to financial, professional, and commercial services. As Russians have realized that emigration will be for a longer term, the phase of settling in a host country became more prominent than the earlier exit phase. For many, this includes the need to move from the first host country, with those more politically active more likely to look for one with a safer, more enabling environment. This will largely mean seeking to move to an EU or other Western country. The non-EU countries easiest for Russians to access are also the ones where their prospects are more uncertain, whereas the EU countries are harder to access but offer more certain prospects. Russia in the 1990s showed how an unpredicted democratic opening can fail to lead to lasting or deep change. Today, alongside aiding political and nongovernmental actors, democracy-support providers should also try to help Russian society evolve in a democratic direction. The new emigrant activities are seeds for a democratic civil society abroad that is closely connected to, and supportive of, the one in Russia. Three principles should underpin a strategy to support the democratic potential of the recent Russian emigration: shifting emphasis to the settling phase of emigration, prioritizing connectivity within the emigration, and helping weave a civil society abroad. To foster the development of a democratic civil society among Russian emigrants, assistance musttarget the building of a wider community that can be more effective and serve as a model in Russia. For this, the landscape of Russians outside Russia can be seen as four concentric circles, based on their degree of direct political activity: the political opposition in exile; the civil society sector of democracy, human rights, and media organizations; the community of emigrants since 2022, and in particular the new grassroots actors and initiatives emerging within it; and the older, multigeneration Russian diaspora. A democracy support strategy for Russian emigrants should not be open-ended but time-bound, with a pragmatic approach in an uncertain environment. It can be assessed in 2030, when President Vladimir Putin’s current term as president is due to end, which could be a time of political turbulence. The strategy can be initially implemented within the next 12–24 months, with annual review of support offered to civil society, especially at the grassroots, with the potential to grow and to reach out to the apolitical emigrants. Support should consist of mostly small, short-term assistance to actors and initiatives that would have until 2030 to show that they have impact and longer-term potential. It is crucial to support the widest range of diverse, dispersed actors of different sizes so that they can keep operating. The focus should not be only on formal organizations but also on more bounded initiatives and projects. Part of the assistance should focus on enabling politically and civically active emigrants to connect physically and virtually across locations, and to focus on flexible networking suited to their mobility challenges. Funders need to think widely in terms of locations and formats for delivering support. Using different, sometimes unconventional, ways of engaging emigrant actors is a necessity. Support should not rely only on usual formats, not least since new ones for activities are emerging from within the emigrant landscape. Such support is also key for encouraging and amplifying the critical thinking in the emigrant landscape as well as connections to new antiwar and anti-imperialist initiatives—a prerequisite for any democratic progress in Russia. Connections are what make a society more than a collection of groups. For the development of a democratic civil society outside Russia, support should be directed not only within the individual circles of the emigration but also at connections between them. The primary focus should be on relations between the second (established CSOs) and third (new grassroots actors) circles to prevent the diverse civically and politically active emigrants and groups being in silos. Contacts with recent emigrants could also eventually encourage changes in attitudes within the older diaspora toward the Russian regime or democratic civic engagement in general.
Topic:
Civil Society, Democracy, Refugees, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

21. Next-Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser, Joshua Stone, Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, and Francesca Ghiretti
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The papers in this compendium were written by 11 members of the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) delegation: Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, Francesca Ghiretti, Heather Hwalek, Leland Lazarus, Lauren Racusin, Friso Stevens, Joshua Stone, Brian Volsky, Theresa Winter, Adrienne Wu. Transatlantic attention to Taiwan has surged in recent years for several reasons. First, Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to increased concern in the United States and Europe that Beijing’s growing military capabilities and declining confidence in its ability to achieve peaceful reunification will soon lead the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to attempt a takeover of Taiwan by force. The cost of such a war would carry a price tag of around $10 trillion, equal to about 10% of global GDP, according to Bloomberg Economics, far higher than the economic impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. The devastating impact of a Taiwan Strait conflict has provided a wake-up call for leaders in Europe who now echo the Biden administration’s warnings to PRC leader Xi Jinping to refrain from using violence to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In addition, Taiwan is now a regular agenda item in the US-EU Consultations on the Indo-Pacific and the US-EU Dialogue on China. Second, intensifying US-China strategic competition has increasingly focused on technology with chips at the center. Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced ones. A single company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), manufactures most of those chips. Recognition of Taiwan’s dominant role in the semiconductor supply chain has provided another reason to bolster deterrence. It has also sparked interest in “friendshoring” and “onshoring” semiconductor manufacturing. TSMC plans to start production at its first fab in Arizona in 2025 and will break ground on another in Dresden at the end of 2024 with an estimated completion date of 2027. Recognizing the rising geopolitical risks and their own strategic dependencies, the United States and the EU have made building resilient supply chains a priority, especially in semiconductors. In its 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy, Brussels explicitly committed the EU to engaging with Taiwan in creating resilient supply chains. Third, rising concern in the United States and Europe about election interference and disinformation have sparked interest in learning from Taiwan’s experience in combatting such threats. In the run-up to the January 13, 2024, presidential and legislative elections, PRC attempts to interfere in Taiwan’s politics surged to unprecedented levels through economic coercion, direct political meddling, displays of military force, and manipulation of social media. As the United States and many European countries prepare for their own national elections this year, they are engaging with experts from Taiwan to better understand PRC tactics and the tools that Taiwan successfully employed to counter PRC interference. Fourth, the United States and Europe increasingly recognize that Taiwan’s vibrant and successful democracy is under threat from an authoritarian regime. Taiwan has received high marks for protecting political rights and holding free and fair elections. Taiwan’s democratic achievements are even more impressive when set against the backdrop of a deterioration in freedom worldwide. Like other industrialized democracies, Taiwan faces a multitude of challenges that are especially difficult to address in the face of PRC efforts that prevent Taiwan’s government and its people from interacting with the world. Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations also hampers the world’s ability to develop effective solutions to myriad problems. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals from the United States to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. In 2022, TUPP was expanded to include young professionals from Europe in support of GMF’s mission of promoting transatlantic cooperation. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, DC, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The 2024 TUPP cohort traveled to Taiwan in February for an intense week of meetings and activities. Each participant gained insights into Taiwan and its role in their respective fields. This year’s delegation comprised five Americans and five Europeans. Over time, TUPP seeks to create a body of global experts with firsthand knowledge of Taiwan who support sustaining and expanding its international ties. I am grateful to the Henry Luce Foundation, the Global Taiwan Institute, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy for their support of this goal. The contributions here, written by the entire 2024 TUPP delegation, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate continued transatlantic and global interest in Taiwan and its future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Poland, Germany, Latin America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

22. The End of Russia’s “Unipolar Moment” in the South Caucasus

Author:
Irakli Sirbiladze
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has exposed Russia’s weaknesses and ended its “unipolar moment” in the South Caucasus. This has affected the calculations of the three states in a region where Moscow traditionally had the upper hand over local and competing outside actors. Prior to the war, Russia had been able sustain its security, political, and economic leverage over Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, yet the extent of its influence varied over time and depending on the leadership in each country. Moscow was Armenia’s key ally, bringing the country into its security, political, and economic space. Russia also enjoyed close political and business ties with Azerbaijan, underpinned by shared authoritarianism. Baku joined the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) but stayed out of Russian-led security institutions. Moscow’s role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict gave it particular security leverage over Baku and Yerevan. Russia’s leverage with Georgia has fluctuated. The country joined the CIS but not other Russian-led organizations. Political ties started to erode in the early 2000s, especially following the 2003 Rose Revolution. The 2008 war weakened Russia’s leverage as Georgia left the CIS and cut diplomatic ties. Economic relations have improved since 2012 even as Tbilisi continued to seek EU and NATO membership. The war in Ukraine has weakened Russia’s sway over the region, accelerating what had started with the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War as Moscow sided with Azerbaijan rather than its treaty ally Armenia. This led to growing difference with Yerevan and convergence with Baku. Armenia is now looking for alternative security partners and engaging with the EU and the United States. Azerbaijan is taking advantage of Moscow’s focus on Ukraine to fully achieve its objectives, including the early departure of Russian peacekeepers from its territory. Georgia receiving EU candidate status could have reduced Russia’s leverage but its ruling party’s antidemocratic and anti-West turn keeps favoring Moscow’s influence. Western economic sanctions have further undermined Russia’s hold over the South Caucasus states: it needs them more to connect and trade with Asian markets. The new geo-economic reality favors the three countries and Moscow can now hardly use economic tools against them. Russia’s waning influence has made it one among other players in the South Caucasus. It can no longer ignore the role of China, the EU, Iran, Türkiye, and the United States there. The emerging geopolitical and geo-economic plurality in the region has made Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia more daring and transactional in their engagement with all outside powers. This has implications for the three countries in terms of peace and security, democracy, and geopolitical orientation. Azerbaijan is likely to remain undemocratic and to keep engaging with all powers transactionally to maintain national and regime security. Armenia finds itself in a complicated state of insecurity that affects democratization and makes multi-alignment its default foreign policy orientation. Georgia, whose democratic decline is the result of its own politics, is likely to sustain its multi-aligned and transactional foreign policy posture if the current government stays in power, while an opposition victory in the coming elections might turn the country back to democracy and a West-oriented foreign policy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Unipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, South Caucasus, and Black Sea

23. Disinformation in the City: Response Playbook

Author:
Jessica (Ika) Trijsburg and Paul Costello
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As actors responsible for decisions and policies that shape people’s daily lives, and as those most aware of community fault lines that are fertile ground for disinformation, city officials are well positioned to respond. Yet, research, analysis, and policymaking related to disinformation have remained at the national and international levels. GMF, the Melbourne Centre for Cities, and other partners have developed a response playbook to help inform and guide city policies and practices to counter disinformation and ultimately to strengthen democracy. In cities, disinformation sometimes manifests itself in physical events, including protests and disruptions. It also has individual impacts for political, institutional, and community leaders and staff. Disinformation affects the functioning of city administrations and elected bodies, impacting governance and policymaking. It also impacts communities, reducing mutual trust and increasing division and polarization. Disinformation commonly exploits existing social fault lines and polarization. In cities, the fault lines targeted by disinformation center around First Nations, migrants, cultural diversity, gender and sexual diversity, health and wellbeing, sustainability and climate issues, and urban planning. Understanding how disinformation spreads, and how to respond effectively, is critical for city governments. Current knowledge, however, is focused mainly on the national and international realms and not readily accessible and translatable for urban governance needs. This is why GMF Cities, in response to needs expressed by many city governments, developed this playbook in collaboration with a core interdisciplinary research team from the Australian National University, Monash University, Deakin University, and Victoria University, led by the Melbourne Centre for Cities at the University of Melbourne. The playbook was developed with representatives from cities, media, the tech sector, civil society, and academia. The process began with an in-depth survey to understand the current experiences of participating cities and responses to disinformation they employed. The findings informed a series of workshops with 40 participants who together created the content of and recommendations in the playbook. The full draft was reviewed by the participants before it was submitted to other cities, city networks, disinformation experts, and other levels of government for pressure testing.
Topic:
Democracy, Cities, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

24. Protecting Undersea Infrastructure in the North American Arctic

Author:
Heather A Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristine Berzina, and Frida Rintakumpu
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In response to recent incidents damaging undersea energy infrastructure and communication cables in the Baltic Sea and High North, NATO countries have intensified their focus on critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) protection on the national, bilateral, and multilateral levels. Allies in the North American Arctic can build on important NATO initiatives but, given distances and the unique operating environment in this theater, the responsibility for protecting CUI assets in territorial waters will fall primarily to the United States, Canada, and the Kingdom of Denmark. CUI in the North American Arctic is currently limited. But climate change, the green energy transition, and greater reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) will increase the demand and opportunity to expand communication cables and energy infrastructure in the region. At the same time, increased traffic and resource exploration heighten the vulnerability of these assets, especially to deliberate attack from Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Both powers rely on dual-use assets that increase plausible deniability, and they continue to develop undersea warfare capabilities. To enhance resilience and protect CUI in the North American Arctic, the United States and its NATO allies are strongly encouraged to: • urgently upgrade US as well as NATO allies’ situational awareness and presence in the air, space, and undersea domain, cooperating closely with the private sector • prioritize and upgrade the role of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) to conduct CUI threat assessments and identify assets that are especially vulnerable due to their strategic importance, location, complicated ownership structure, or symbolic value • expand US and NATO response options to counter hybrid threats and deter CUI attacks; consider establishing an additional maritime high-readiness force • increase NATO’s presence to protect and defend nearby assets during and after Russian and PRC naval maneuvers • build on NATO’s Digital Oceans Initiative to enhance and integrate unmanned systems and AI information processing tools into exercises and operations • identify counterparts in other national governments to ensure quick and seamless information sharing following CUI incidents • deepen public-private cooperation as well as government oversight over privately owned CUI to incentivize the private sector’s CUI resilience (e.g. fortifying cables, integrating monitoring capabilities, and ensuring adequate repair capabilities) • clarify responsibilities of CUI protection and defense across the civil, military, and private sectors, including the transition of responsibilities from the Department of Homeland Security to the Department of Defense in crisis situations • train and exercise crisis decision-making processes with the involvement of all relevant actors (including the private sector and state and local authorities) on the national, bilateral (Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark), minilateral, and multilateral levels • clarify and enhance legal frameworks to respond to CUI incidents in territorial and international waters, and share best practices across all sectors • use pro-active strategic communication to outline legal and military authority in responding to CUI incidents, attributing attacks, and enhancing deterrence against future threats.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Infrastructure, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, North America, Arctic, United States of America, and Baltic Sea

25. Time Is Almost Up

Author:
Martin Quencez and Gesine Weber
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The transatlantic partnership has long neglected structural weaknesses. Unless corrected, they could soon doom it. Download PDF 2025 will open a new chapter for the transatlantic relationship. The outcome of the US presidential election will accelerate ongoing changes in the country’s approach to Europe, while a rapidly shifting security environment will compel the partners to reform their alliance. The next year presents an important opportunity to do this, especially as the terms of the European Commission and the US president coincidentally align. When Joe Biden was elected four years ago, many European leaders expressed the hope that, in the president’s words, “the US is back” in the transatlantic relationship. The change of administration in Washington could have constituted an opportunity for the transatlantic partners to “seize the Biden moment”, but critical reforms never took place. Instead, the Democrat’s election relieved many European governments, prompting a continued reliance on muddling through critical challenges rather than developing European responses to them. The US administration, for its part, did not sufficiently pressure Europeans to play a greater role in world affairs. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced Europeans and the EU to respond with costly and unprecedented measures, but these policies remain to this day largely disconnected from a broader political discourse of the war as an “existential” threat to the future of the European project. Europe’s avoidance of such big-picture issues has negative implications for its ties to the United States. The current transatlantic relationship suffers from four major challenges that, unless tackled in the next four years, could lead, at best, to its dysfunction and, at worst, to its implosion. These challenges are: security-related structural problems, intra-alliance competition and policy toward China, a European gamble on time, and a widening power gap between the United States and Europe. Transatlantic Security Reform: Ukraine Has Muted The Debate The swift, coordinated, and strong reaction of the United States and Europe to the war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the most significant moment of transatlantic unity in recent years. US military and strategic leadership, and Biden’s personal involvement in overcoming Congressional resistance to supporting Ukraine, will constitute the cornerstones of his legacy in Europe. The continent has also done its part, providing significant military and humanitarian support—at times even surpassing that from the United States. All this has brought the transatlantic partners closer together while bolstering public approval of NATO. Sustaining unity on Ukraine, although an outstanding diplomatic and political success, has, however, overshadowed a more complex picture of the transatlantic relationship. The war’s outbreak put American security guarantees for Europe in the spotlight, but more contentious policy issues have been neglected. Prioritizing Ukraine over other aspects of the transatlantic relationship was justified, but it prevented the allies from preparing for potential future crises. This is unsustainable and dangerous. Persistent security-related structural problems may seem paradoxical. After all, 23 of the 32 NATO allies finally invested, as pledged a decade earlier, at least 2% of GDP in defense in 2024. The EU has also stepped up its efforts in this area. Nevertheless, two underlying problems fester. First, Europe’s chronic capability shortage means the United States still contributes more than 65% of the NATO allies’ total defense spending and 38% of their military personnel. NATO’s so-called European pillar remains underdeveloped, and Europe cannot defend itself on its own. Second, European and transatlantic security suffers from a lack of imagination. The Biden administration has demonstrated that it can defend the European security order, and Europeans have unquestionably overcome many political taboos to support Ukraine, but policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have been unable, or unwilling, to develop a vision for a needed new security order. A post-Cold War approach to alliance management has led the Biden administration and many European allies to preserve a form of status quo while the world undergoes considerable change. At the same time, there remains in certain political circles a desire to recreate the prewar relationship with Moscow, especially as a chronic lack of political leadership in key Western capitals impedes the development of an ambitious strategic agenda. Transatlantic leaders have repeatedly and rightly stated that Ukrainians will decide when they stop fighting, but this stance hides the lack of transatlantic consensus on a postwar European order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

26. TikTok Tactics: 2024 US Candidates Dance Around Security Risks

Author:
Lindsay Gorman, Caitlin Goldenberg, and Isabella Nieminen
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Despite TikTok’s ongoing national security risks, 2024 candidates in US House, Senate, gubernatorial, and secretary of state races continue to use the platform to reach voters. Since its emergence onto the social media scene in 2016, viral video app TikTok has exploded in popularity, dominating the screentime of a reported one billion monthly active users worldwide today. This year, the app’s user base has made it an all-but-unavoidable tool for US presidential and vice-presidential candidates, who have used TikTok to make their bids to voters. Yet researchers and lawmakers’ initial national security concerns surrounding the potential for malign influence due to TikTok’s ownership ties to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have only become louder as additional voices in Washington and beyond have joined the chorus. To address these concerns, in 2024 Congress passed and President Biden signed House Resolution (HR) 7521 to force TikTok to divest from its PRC-based parent company ByteDance or face a ban in the United States. This was mere months before the president’s campaign joined the platform itself. As election day fast approaches, a wide swath of federal and state candidates are seeking to leverage TikTok’s popularity with GenZ users. In October 2022, the Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) produced a report documenting how US midterm candidates employed TikTok to reach voters and boost campaign visibility. This year, ahead of the 2024 US general elections in November, ASD and the GMF Technology Program researched the question of whether TikTok use among US Senate, House, gubernatorial, and secretary of state candidates has increased, and how candidates have continued to harness TikTok in campaigns. After two years, Democrats still outweigh Republicans on TikTok use, TikTok’s sluggishness in verifying candidate accounts has worsened, and political TikTok styles are beginning to mature.
Topic:
National Security, Social Media, Domestic Policy, and TikTok
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

27. Pivotal Powers 2024: Innovative Engagement Strategies for Global Governance, Security, and Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Sharinee Jagtiani, Kristina Kausch, Garima Mohan, Martin Quencez, Rachel Tausendfreund, and Gesine Weber
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
States outside the transatlantic alliance have gained leverage in international affairs in recent years and, with that, the potential to significantly reshape the global order. Engagement with these "pivotal powers", which include Brazil, Indonesia, India, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye, is of paramount importance for Europe and the United States. "Pivotal Powers 2024: Innovative Engagement Strategies for Global Governance, Security, and Artificial Intelligence" offers tactics for enhancing Western cooperation on global challenges with these countries. This report builds on GMF reports from 2012 and 2023.
Topic:
Security, Governance, European Union, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Africa, Turkey, Middle East, India, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

28. Turkey’s Anti-PKK Operation and “Development Road” in Iraq Are Two Sides of the Same Coin

Author:
Idris Okuducu
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Turkey's intertwining of its mega project and its anti-PKK operation improves the chances of success for both elements. But this interconnection can be a double-edged sword—if one element fails, it may potentially hinder the success of the other. Turkey’s recently announced comprehensive military operation against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI)—which will be launched this summer, potentially in coordination with Baghdad—is not just about security. Ankara’s offensive will be part of a wider strategy, which heavily features the proposed “Development Road” connecting Turkey and Iraq, to strengthen economic and political relations with Iraq’s central government. These efforts will counter growing Iranian hegemony in the region, particularly in the face of the looming U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, but Turkey will likely need to secure Iranian aquiescence to the two plans in order for either to be successful.
Topic:
Development, Infrastructure, Military Affairs, PKK, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

29. Coordination Framework Militias Pass New Anti-LGBTQ Legislation

Author:
Michael Knights and Amir al-Kaabi
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Although they avoided embarrassing Prime Minister Sudani during his recent Washington visit, they passed abhorrent new legislation as soon as he was back home. On April 27, Iraq’s parliament passed an amendment to the Anti-Prostitution Law that includes anti-LGBTQ provisions prohibiting “sexual deviation” and “changing a person's biological sex.” These trends fit into the accelerating pattern of persecution since the Sudani government was installed by the Shia militia-led Coordination Framework (CF) in October 2022. Although the parliament's decision was not purely a CF action, the lion’s share of its support came from CF and muqawama (resistance) partners, while the measure was boycotted by most Kurdish and Sunni politicians. Importantly, the idea of amending the law—whose title distracts from its primary focus on outlawing LGBTQ communities—was championed by CF factions such as the Badr Organization, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), and the U.S.-designated terrorist movement Kataib Hezbollah via its parliamentary bloc the Hoquq Movement. The new amendment calls for punishing anyone who engages in homosexuality with a minimum jail sentence of ten years, and anyone who "promotes homosexuality" with a minimum sentence of seven years.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, LGBT+, and Legislation
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

30. Promoting E-Invoicing Interoperability in ASEAN: Overcoming Barriers to Trade Digitalisation

Author:
Mahirah Mahusin and Hilmy Prilliadi
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Electronic invoicing (e-invoicing) is a vital component of paperless trading, delivering substantial cost savings and efficiency gains for businesses. The ASEAN e-invoicing market has experienced notable growth, spurred by initiatives from tax authorities, public procurement agencies, and business digitalisation programmes. However, adoption across the region still faces significant challenges. To address these barriers, ASEAN has introduced initiatives to foster interoperability, develop common standards, and support regional integration. By prioritising standardisation, offering government support, and encouraging private sector adoption through financial incentives and capacity-building efforts, ASEAN can accelerate trade digitalisation and enhance economic integration across the region.
Topic:
Trade, ASEAN, Supply Chains, Digitalization, and Electronic Invoicing
Political Geography:
Asia

31. Securing Regional Solar Supply Chains: Determinants and Preparedness of the Northeastern Region of India and ASEAN

Author:
Prabir De, Komal Biswal, and Venkatachalam Anbumozhi
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Renewable energy contributes to the acceleration of the energy transition, supports global environmental mitigation, and helps meet sustainable development goals. Energy connectivity of India’s Northeastern Region (NER) with neighbouring countries particularly ASEAN assumes critical importance for accelerating economic integration. NER can play a three-dimensional role as power producer, exporter, and transit provider provided a quadrangular approach to build energy linkages and promote integration is consciously put in place. To understand whether the NER states are capable enough to take forward the solar supply chain development and bolster the ASEAN-India engagements in solar energy sector, this study has designed a state-level index of solar supply chain development by factoring in seven parameters, namely, (i) economic situations, (ii) environmental factors, (iii) spread of connectivity, (iv) financial enabling conditions, (v) mobility, (vi) human development, and (vi) social cohesion, which directly or indirectly influence the solar supply chain development in India. The results show that a clean and decent environment is must for development of solar supply chain. In addition, the study suggests that there is a need to improve the solar supply chain capability in the NER to enhance the economic growth. Leveraging policy support and reinvigorating existing institutions and creating new ones are imperatives for predicting the solar supply chain in the NER. This indexing may help track the trends, allowing for more informed decision-making in securing regional solar supply chain.
Topic:
Renewable Energy, ASEAN, Solar Power, Supply Chains, and Energy
Political Geography:
India and Asia

32. Urban Amenities and Trade Resilience During the Covid-19 Pandemic in Malaysia

Author:
Cassey Lee
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
The main objective of this study is to empirically examine the role played by amenities in supporting growth and trade in Malaysia during the pandemic and post-pandemic recovery phases. The manufacturing sector has been an important factor in mitigating the negative impact of the pandemic. It has also been a positive driver of the country’s economic recovery. Transport, health and ICT-related amenities supported production, consumption, and trade activities during the pandemic and post-pandemic recovery periods.
Topic:
Trade, Cities, Resilience, COVID-19, and Amenities
Political Geography:
Malaysia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

33. Impacts of Trade Diversion from China in the United States Market on Wages in a Third Country: Evidence from Thailand

Author:
Kazunobu Hayakawa and Sasatra Sudsawasd
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Since the latter half of the 2010s, China’s exports to the United States (US) have gradually decreased due to the US-China trade war and other factors, such as lockdown measures in China to combat COVID-19. This decrease has resulted in increasing exports from third countries, including Thailand, to the US market by substituting China’s exports, i.e. trade diversion. Against this backdrop, this study empirically investigates how the changes in exports to the US driven by the change in China’s exports to the US affect wages in Thailand. Especially, we examine the heterogeneous effects according to workers’ characteristics. To this end, we conduct regression analyses using individual-level quarterly data from the first quarter of 2017 to the second quarter of 2023. Our main finding is that the wage gap between low- and middle-skilled workers decreased, whilst the gap between middle- and high-skilled workers increased. Namely, the increased exports to the US caused ‘wage polarisation’ in Thailand. We also find that the increase in exports to the US contributed to expanding the wage gap by age but narrowing it by gender.
Topic:
Markets, Trade Wars, Exports, and Wages
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Thailand, and United States of America

34. Does Economic Policy Uncertainty Impact Firm GVC Participation? Microdata Evidence from India

Author:
Ketan Reddy, Subash Sasidharan, and Shandre Mugan Thangavelu
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
In this study, we examine the implications of economic policy uncertainty on global value chain (GVC) participation and the integration of Indian manufacturing firms using firm-level data. Using panel data from 2004 to 2021, we find that economic policy uncertainty (EPU) impedes GVC participation and firm integration. Further, we find that the impact of EPU on GVC participation operates through the financial constraint channel with highly leveraged and low-liquidity firms. Using survival analysis, we also highlight that higher EPU results in higher exit from GVCs and reduces entry into GVCs.
Topic:
Economic Policy, Manufacturing, Global Value Chains, and Microdata
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, and Asia

35. Policy Recommendation to Achieve a Carbon-Neutral Economy: The Case of Corporate Governance and Carbon Performance in Malaysia’s Smart Cities

Author:
Siti Indati Mustapa, Noor Raida Abd Rahman, Amar Hisham Jaaffar, Nor Salwati Othman, and Syarifah Mardhiah Syed Salim
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This study explores the role of corporate governance in carbon-intensive and non-carbon-intensive companies within Malaysian smart cities. The paper aims to understand the challenges and impacts of corporate governance on carbon and financial performance. In the first stage, carbon emissions data from 51 Bursa Malaysia-listed companies were analysed, revealing that corporate governance had no significant impact on carbon and financial performance. However, variations were noted in carbon-intensive industries. Liquidity emerged as a key factor positively affecting carbon performance, while firm size and market-to-book value were the main drivers of financial performance. In the second stage, a survey of 256 firms highlighted a high level of awareness regarding the significance of carbon reporting practices. Challenges included complexity regarding carbon reporting and knowledge limitations. The study advocates for the centralisation of carbon accounting standards, sharing best practices, and fostering of global collaboration to bolster effective climate action. These findings offer empirical evidence crucial for informing policymakers, companies, investors, and regulators alike. Future research could expand with larger samples, explore digital technology’s role in smart cities, and compare carbon reporting practices globally.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economy, Smart Cities, Carbon Emissions, Corporate Governance, and Energy
Political Geography:
Malaysia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

36. City Amenities and Internal Migration: Evidence from Chinese Cities

Author:
Karma Wangdi and Shandre Mugan Thangavelu
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This paper provides new empirical evidence of city amenities’ role in China’s internal migration using a unique city-level dataset. The results highlight the positive effects of city amenities such as education, public facilities, transportation, environment, and climate conditions in attracting migrant workers to cities. In our study, migrant workers are more likely to move to cities with better education, more public facilities, higher coverage of urban pensions, and a cooler climate with more precipitation. Moreover, they prefer to migrate and live in cities with larger service agglomeration and employment, higher average wages, more job opportunities, and lower house prices
Topic:
Development, Labor Issues, Cities, Internal Migration, and Amenities
Political Geography:
China and Asia

37. Urban Amenities and Regional Performance: Case Study of Indonesia

Author:
Titik Anas, Widdi Mugijayani, Estiana Cahyawati, and Muhammad Ridho
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the importance of urban amenities to economic development using Indonesia as a case study. Indonesia has rich micro-level data on urban amenities, which we group in this paper into 12 categories, namely education, health, religious, and shopping facilities; accommodations; banks; historical sites; recreation sites; restaurants; public transportation stations; modern shopping facilities; and gas stations. Using panel data of 2007 and 2014, we test how urban amenities affect regional development, proxied by employment and population growth. We show that education and shopping facilities significantly affect the growth of employment and population. We also found that the effect of the availability of education facilities is stronger in the regions with industrial parks.
Topic:
Development, Globalization, Services, Productivity, and Amenities
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

38. Carbon Capture Storage and Utilisation (CCUS) Development in Thailand

Author:
Twarath Sutabutr
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Thailand is a developing country with a growing economy, which has led to increased energy consumption and carbon emissions. To tackle this issue, the Royal Thai Government has implemented several policies and initiatives to reduce the country’s carbon footprint and promote sustainable development. Carbon capture utilisation and storage (CCUS) has just become one of Thailand’s policies to help push a low-carbon agenda and to enable net-zero emissions in 2065. The Thailand National Committee on Climate Change Policy approved the establishment of the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Steering Committee, which initiated the technology applications for the country’s first CCUS. The committee’s mission is to accelerate the actions that can mitigate climate impacts by applying CCUS technology in the energy and industry sectors, leveraging the knowledge and experiences in the petroleum exploration and production industry. This first CCUS pilot project, originally initiated by a team in the PTT Group, is the Thailand CCUS HUB Project. This paper summarises the conceptual design and actions required to start implementing the project.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Carbon Emissions, and Carbon Capture
Political Geography:
Asia, Thailand, and Southeast Asia

39. Regional Amenities, Services Offshoring, and Skilled Employment in the Republic of Korea

Author:
Ju Hyun Pyun
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This study empirically examines the effect of services offshoring and regional amenities on the composition of skilled employment for services firms. Analysing Korean firm-level data spanning from 2006 to 2019, we find that services offshoring, characterised by the import of services intermediate inputs, correlates with an increase in the proportion of skilled workers within firms. Additionally, the effects of this shift are nuanced based on different skill levels: services offshoring leads to an increase in the share of permanent headquarters workers to total workers. However, it does not affect the share of high-end skilled workers, such as headquarters’ share of management and research and development (R&D) workers. Moreover, regional amenities promote the positive effect of services offshoring on permanent headquarters workers’ shares. Lastly, the positive effect of offshoring on demand for high-end skilled workers in headquarters is significantly greater for firms with higher R&D intensity.
Topic:
Employment, Human Capital, Services, Skilled Labor, Research and Development, and Offshoring
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

40. Structural Transformation and Economic Resilience: The Case of Malaysia

Author:
Cassey Lee
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Exports have been a critical source for the resilience of the Malaysian economy during the COVID-19 pandemic and post-pandemic period. Long-term structural change in intersectoral production networks could have reduced this resilience. Stronger domestic intersectoral linkages and declining participation in backward global value chain participation are likely to reduce the impact of positive export shocks on the country’s economy. The services sector has become increasing important over time. Consumption in the services sector is clearly an important driver of growth. A positive export shock is enhanced by higher domestic intersectoral linkages in the services sector but not in manufacturing.
Topic:
Economy, Exports, Macroeconomics, Services, Resilience, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Malaysia, Asia, and Southeast Asia

41. Have Dynamic Spillovers and the Connectedness of Trade Policy Uncertainty Changed During the COVID-19 Pandemic and Sino–US Trade Frictions?

Author:
Chien-Chiang Lee and Farzan Yahya
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
In this paper, we examine the spillover and connectedness between the trade policy uncertainty (TPU) of the United States (US), China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea) under global geopolitical risk (GPR), infectious disease equity market volatility (EMVID), and GPR from North Korea (GPRNK) using a relatively novel time-varying parameter vector autoregression (TVP-VAR) approach. Additionally, method of moments quantile regression is utilised to estimate the asymmetric effect of GPR, GPRNK, and EMVID on TPU. Our findings suggest that there is a high total and directional spillover amongst underlying variables during Sino–US trade friction that further elevated during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic period. The US is a net receiver of spillover from the TPU of all economies, while the Chinese TPU receives spillover from EMVID. The results further confirm that both the TPU of China (TPUCN) and the TPU of the US (TPUUS) are vulnerable to EMVID, but the effect is stronger for Chinese TPU in the higher quantiles. Although Japanese TPU is less vulnerable to GPR and EMVID, it is significantly exposed to GPRNK. Korean trade shows resiliency and immunity to pandemic-induced volatility and GPRNK.
Topic:
Trade Wars, Trade Policy, COVID-19, and Spillovers
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

42. The Effect of COVID-19 on Firms’ Behaviour: The Case of Japan

Author:
Yuting Chen and Bin Ni
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
Since the onset of the coronavirus disease (COVID‐19) pandemic, social distancing practices and government‐mandated lockdowns have become the norm. These have cut off interaction amongst people, firms, and society, triggering an even larger decline in economic activity. In this study, we apply annual Japanese foreign affiliate data to quantify how COVID-19 has affected firms’ behaviour in various aspects. The estimation results show that both the revenue and purchasing behaviour of Japanese foreign affiliates were affected during COVID-19. This negative impact is mainly through the channel of stringent regulations imposed by host countries where affiliates are located. The general result we can derive from these findings is that COVID-19 negatively affects Japanese firms engaged in overseas activities. This leaves us with the question of when external shocks such as COVID-19 stand in the way of firms’ overseas activities, and what role the government should play to achieve a balance between safety and economic revival.
Topic:
Trade, COVID-19, Performance Evaluation, and Firms
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

43. COVID-19 and Firm Response: Evidence from China

Author:
Dongmin Kong, Chen Liu, and Mengxu Xiong
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This paper explores the effects of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic on firm response. Using a novel COVID-19 sentiment index, our estimation shows that the pandemic significantly reduced the overseas revenue and profits of firms listed on the Chinese A-share market. Moreover, we observe that an increase in loans, and a drop in debt financing cost and trade credit, were prominent during the pandemic. We contend that reduced cash flows, which damaged firm operations; government support, which provided more financing channels; and increased default risks, which placed barriers on trade credit, are the plausible mechanisms through which the COVID-19 pandemic affects firm performance. Profit contraction was more pronounced for firms with a lower ratio of domestic content in exports and state-owned enterprises, while external financing was easier for firms subject to stringent financial constraints despite their lowered trade credit.
Topic:
Trade, COVID-19, and Firms
Political Geography:
China and Asia

44. Quantitative Analysis of Optimal Investment Scale and Timing for Flood Control Measures by Multi-Regional Economic Growth Model: Case Studies in Viet Nam

Author:
Hiroaki Ishiwata, Masashi Sakamoto, Makoto Ikeda, and Venkatachalam Anbumozhi
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This study aims to develop and utilise a multi-regional economic growth model that can take into account flood damage and investment in disaster risk reduction, and, through case studies in Viet Nam, quantitatively analyse the long-term effects of investment in disaster risk reduction on the national and local economy, as well as the optimal scale and timing of investments in flood protection, to gain a better overview of these factors. The results indicate that additional investment in disaster risk reduction could stimulate economic growth, and that the optimal range of the disaster risk reduction budget rate was around 0.3% to 0.5% of GDP, assuming a constant budget rate throughout the total 25-year calculation period. In the case of a variable disaster risk reduction budget rate, we observed that a variable budget rate that gradually reduces the disaster risk reduction budget rate from a higher level than the current rate could further promote economic growth than if the budget rate were fixed. In both cases, we verified that with excessive investment in disaster risk reduction, the high tax burden had the risk of reducing investment in production capital and lead to stagnating economic growth. By region, the long-term effects of investment in disaster risk reduction were most seen in the Central region, where the rate of flood damage is the highest.
Topic:
Economic Growth, Investment, Flood, and De-Risking
Political Geography:
Asia, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia

45. Agricultural Production as a Coping Strategy during the Covid-19 Pandemic? Evidence from Rural Viet Nam

Author:
Hai-Anh Dang and Cuong Viet Nguyen
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
We examine the Covid-19 pandemic-induced negative effects on household welfare in rural Viet Nam. Analysing recent Viet Nam Household Living Standard Surveys spanning 2016–2021, we find robust evidence that lockdown measures resulted in a 3.9% reduction in per capita income and a 2.6 percentage-point increase in the headcount poverty rate of rural households. It also had severe effects on rural households’ wages and self-employed non-farm income, but rural households appeared to have relied on farm income to cope with the lockdowns. Each additional month under lockdown reduced wage income and non-farm income by 2.8% and 6.3% respectively but increased crop income by 9.5%, livestock income by 7.1%, and other farm income by 12.2%.
Topic:
Agriculture, Rural, COVID-19, and Production
Political Geography:
Asia, Vietnam, and Southeast Asia

46. The Role of Community-Based Associations in Social Protection: Jordan as a Case Study

Author:
Mohammed Bani Amer
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
In Jordan, the contributory and non-contributory social protection systems are some of the most important tools of the state and society for promoting social cohesion and addressing the risks that people face in their lives, such as sickness, death, old age, disability, and unemployment. The legislative structure in Jordan attempts to organize the work of all parties concerned with social protection through social security laws and national relief funds, in addition to regulating the roles, objectives, competencies, scope, and governance of charitable associations, which are one of the tools of civil society, to enhance the country’s social protection and strengthen its resilience to risks. This paper discusses the role of cooperatives and community-based associations in Jordan in strengthening the social protection system, examining the positive aspects and challenges through research questions based on the following key questions: Are these associations effective, efficient, and able to fulfill their vision, mission, and goals, or are they ineffective and suffering from issues and challenges that make their role marginal and ineffective? Does the existence of these associations and their encouragement by the state harm the official social protection system, and encourage people to evade the official social protection system and contribution payments given the existence of other forms of protection; and does this result in the state abdicating its responsibilities to these other entities, regardless of whether they create or reproduce negative phenomena and dynamics? This paper emphasizes that reaching a scientific judgment on the NGO sector, in general, requires a comprehensive study of a representative sample of all sectors and types of these associations, taking into account their size, the scope of their work, sources and amount of funding, work strategies, outreach, and other factors. This paper uses the methodology of qualitative analysis and addresses this issue by defining its scope to include two associations: Tkiyet Um Ali, one of the most important associations in Jordan, is based in the capital Amman and has several activities directly related to strengthening the social protection system in Jordan extending to all governorates; and the Arhaba Charitable Society, located in the outskirts of Irbid governorate in northern Jordan, with a specific geographical scope. These two associations will help us to build perceptions and scientific judgments to enable judging the NGO sector and its effectiveness in promoting and contributing to social protection.
Topic:
Civil Society, Community Initiatives, and Social Protection
Political Geography:
Middle East and Jordan

47. Reflecting On Post-Electoral Disputes: A Need To Promote Living Together And The Authority Of The State In Cameroon

Author:
Kuba Abouem Perpétue
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The “years of embers” of 1990 marked the return to a multi-party system in Cameroon (Cameroon-tribune 2017), putting an end to the single-party system instituted in 1966, with the symbolic transformation of the Cameroonian Union (CU) into the Cameroonian National Union (CNU). Two major currents triggered this movement. These were upheavals on the international scene and their effects on national politics. In 1989, the fall of the Berlin Wall symbolized the end of the Cold War, perceived as the triumph of the West and “the end of history” (Fukuyama, 1992). Against this backdrop, the French President François Mitterand gave a speech at La Baule that marked the beginning of the “third wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1991). On June 20, 1990, at the 16th France/Africa Conference, France decided to make access to Development Aid conditional on the establishment of democracy, in a sort of “Democracy against Aid”. Popular demands and tensions erupted, jeopardizing security and peace. This break with the past, marked by what was seen at the time as an easing of East-West antagonisms and tensions, which had the opposite effect on the African continent. Despite its perverse effects, however, respect for democratic freedoms was reaffirmed by the African Union in 2007 in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance.
Topic:
Democratization, Elections, and State
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

48. Political Alliances in Francophone Africa: Lessons from the Senegalese Sonko-Faye Model

Author:
Pouomegne Kamdem Prunelle Franchessa
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Over the past ten years, the political landscape of Senegal has undergone a remarkable evolution marked by the unexpected rise of Ousmane Sonko and the emergence of Bassirou Diomaye Faye as key figures on the political scene (1). As these two individuals navigate the complex dynamics of power (2), alliances, and conflicts, questions arise about the future direction of Senegalese governance. Political alliances, as defined by Giovanni Sartori in Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis, refer to the strategic cooperation between members or factions of the same political party or between different political parties, aimed at consolidating power, influencing decisions, and achieving shared objectives (3). The objective of this article is to analyze the dynamics and implications of this political rise, focusing on the partnership between Ousmane Sonko and Bassirou Diomaye Faye, particularly their ability to mobilize voters, structure an alternative discourse, and influence a political trend. By examining their collaborative efforts and the challenges they have faced, the aim is to shed light on the mechanisms of their success and draw lessons for electoral processes in Francophone African countries. This article uses a qualitative research approach, drawing on a comprehensive review of literature, political analyses, and media reports to examine the trajectories of Sonko and Faye. Through content analysis and thematic synthesis, the article seeks to identify key themes, challenges, and opportunities in their political partnership. Its structure highlights a brief history of Sonko and Faye’s political ascent, followed by an exploration of their partnership and the challenges they have faced. It then presents an analysis of their relationship and its implications for the Senegalese political system. Finally, the article concludes with practical recommendations to strengthen the legitimacy and effectiveness of elections in Senegal and the broader Francophone African region.
Topic:
Governance, Elections, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Africa and Senegal

49. The Role of Civil Society During Elections In Cameroon

Author:
Guy Beaudry Jengu Jengu
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
In 2024, 19 African countries are organizing elections (1). More than half of these elections will take place during the last quarter of the year. In French-speaking African countries, more or less violent post-electoral crises (2) are quite common, and similar patterns observed. On one hand, the democratic openings of the 1990s either transformed single-party systems into ruling parties or brought former military personnel to power. On the other hand, the political landscape lacks robust policy platforms and ideological depth (3), and the vibrancy of civil society has rarely persisted past the 2000s. Yet, Cameroon currently has more than 50,000 entities claiming represent civil society (4). It is this civil society that is the focus of this analysis. First, the question of defining African civil society must be addressed, as its conceptualization outside of African democratic contexts and its ubiquitous usage in media make it a somewhat identifiable yet difficult to precisely define phenomenon (5). For the purposes of this work, civil society refers to an “autonomous associative sector, independent from the state” (6). Following Hegel, we distinguish it from political society, recognizing its intermediary position between prominent political actors and families (7). How does civil society deploy itself in Cameroon during the electoral period? The electoral period is divided into three distinct periods: before the election, on the day of the election, and after the election. More than 30 years after the advent of pluralist elections and multipartyism, this work aims to analyze the political, institutional and social logics that inform the practices of civil society during these moments, based on the events of the last presidential election. The objective is to uncover the actual repertoire of action employed by civil society actors during electoral periods in Cameroon, in order to identify ways to promote civic and citizen-oriented behaviors.
Topic:
Civil Society, Politics, and Elections
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

50. Electoral Fraud and the Weakening Of Cameroonian Democracy

Author:
Joseph Thierry Okala Ebode
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The resurgence of democracy in Cameroon, mirroring trends across Francophone sub-Saharan Africa in the 1990s, was characterized by electoral system reforms and the introduction of multiparty elections (1). However, the outcomes of these reforms and subsequent elections have often fallen short of expectations. The March 1992 multiparty legislative elections saw opposition parties secure a majority (92 out of 180 seats), yet they were unable to assume power. Since then, despite numerous presidential and local elections, the country has seen neither a transfer of power at the highest levels of government nor the local-level changes citizens have long desired. This aspiration for political alternation continues to be thwarted by a system that consistently reinstates the same leadership. Paradoxically, despite a proliferation of political parties (2), the influence and significance of the opposition continue to wane. This diminishing role of the opposition, coupled with growing democratic disillusionment (3), can be largely attributed to electoral fraud (4). Electoral fraud encompasses any illegal actions aimed at favoring particular candidates or party lists at the expense of others. This raises a critical question: How does electoral fraud, an illegal practice, lead to the disengagement of members of the opposing political landscape, the general public, and particularly the youth, from the political process? To address this, our analysis will focus on two main areas: first, examining fraudulent practices that operate within legal loopholes, and second, investigating overtly illegal fraudulent activities.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Domestic Politics, and Fraud
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon