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41. This Warming Planet Should Learn How to Talk About Migration

Author:
Alejandro Martin Rodriguez
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The places where people can live—with or without dignity—are changing. Extreme heat, droughts, floods, coastal erosion, and sea level rise, among other climate impacts, are reducing the area of the human climate niche, that is, the part of the world most suited for human life. Regardless of how much societies reduce their carbon dioxide emissions today, the locked-in effects of climate change will continue to impact them for decades, if not centuries. In this context, the World Bank estimates that more than 200 million people globally could be forced to leave their homes by 2050. Governments all over the world must design and deliver effective policy responses to the risks associated with this large-scale movement of people. However, policymakers are limited in their options by the prevalence of misinformed narratives on migration (see box 1) that can make the sensible policy paths seem unattainable.
Topic:
Climate Change, Migration, Mobility, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Global Focus

42. Getting Debt Sustainability Analysis Right: Eight Reforms for the Framework for Low-Income Countries

Author:
C. Randall Henning
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Assessing the sustainability of developing countries’ debt is an essential task of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, but it is also a controversial one. The two institutions are currently reviewing the debt sustainability framework for low-income countries (abbreviated as LIC-DSF). This paper provides a primer on the framework’s basic elements, an overview of critiques from a variety of perspectives, and analysis of selected issues, including the endogeneity of analysis of sustainability, analysis of debtors’ institutional strength, analysis of domestic political conditions, role and exercise of staff judgment, and collaboration between the World Bank and the IMF. The paper recommends eight improvements, including streamlining the institutional indicators, better separating economic analysis from political judgment, adopting certain procedures for applying judgment, and selectively introducing climate considerations.
Topic:
Debt, World Bank, Sustainability, IMF, and Global Economy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

43. Duterte’s Populist Foreign Policy as Illiberal Defiance: Consequences and Prospects

Author:
Aries A. Arugay
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Barely two months into his presidency of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte attended the 2016 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit in Vientiane, Laos. The former mayor of Davao City had just swept the presidential election to become the first executive from outside of the Manila-based political establishment. Rather than reading a scripted speech, he launched into an impromptu tirade about colonial atrocities by the United States. Duterte went on to defend his violent war on drugs and rebut the criticisms of his equally violent purge of suspected criminals.1 The world was shocked by the bad manners exhibited by Duterte, especially his insult to then U.S. president Barack Obama.2 This was the beginning of the shift in Philippine foreign policy toward a more populist, illiberal, and revisionist posture—one that would last until Duterte’s presidency ended in 2022. This essay advances two core arguments about how Duterte’s right-wing populism shaped Philippine foreign policy. First, Duterte’s foreign policy was not motivated by an ideology, so much as by a performance anchored in symbolic defiance, personalized diplomacy, and selective norm rejection.3 Second, Duterte’s populist revisionism ultimately collided with entrenched structural constraints, including the country’s enduring security dependence on the United States, institutional resistance within the bureaucracy, and the democratic political succession that brought the nonpopulist President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to power. Taken together, these constraints exposed the limits of populist foreign policy in a small and militarily vulnerable state situated on the front lines of the U.S.-China rivalry. Since Duterte was elected, there has been widespread recognition that populism’s impact goes beyond national borders. In Europe, for instance, populists tended not to touch traditional foreign policy and security issues until the 2015 refugee crisis. The wave of populism that followed was marked by a contempt for the cosmopolitan European outlook that had long underpinned support for the European Union, liberal migration policies, and Europe’s reliance on the United States for its security.4 Populists on both the left and right are often skeptical of multilateral institutions because they restrain state power. Venezuela’s former president Hugo Chávez, for example, attempted to form alternative regional institutions in the Americas to counter U.S. hegemony.5 The revisionist impulse inherent in populism inclines its leaders toward foreign policy adventurism, even though abrupt shifts are uncommon given the durability of national strategic interests. Populist leaders also often exhibit a high risk tolerance—especially personalist leaders in command of highly concentrated state power.6 Moreover, they often see foreign policy as a means of weakening their political opponents and consolidating power at home. They also crave international recognition, which they pursue through “megaphone diplomacy” that foregrounds their personality and charisma.7 The burden of managing foreign relations is bearable for the populist up to the point that strategic reality intervenes, imposing itself in ways that leave scant room for performance. Populist politics, therefore, are unable to resist the water’s edge. This essay proceeds by tracing the right-wing populist currents in Philippine foreign policy under Duterte through three major international issues: disputes with China in the South China Sea, the attempted abrogation of the Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States, and the country’s withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC). Respectively, each of these issues foregrounds one of the foundations of Philippine foreign policy that Duterte attempted to undermine: international law, the Philippines’ alliance with the United States, and human rights. The essay goes on to analyze how these foreign policy stances resonated with the revisionist orientations of countries that Duterte sought inspiration from—namely China and Russia. These revisionist narratives were reinforced in the Philippines through domestic disinformation networks that learned strategies from Russia and China.8 Finally, the essay highlights the implications of Duterte’s populist policies under the Marcos Jr. administration and examines the prospects of their revival in the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Populism, and Illiberalism
Political Geography:
Asia and Philippines

44. The French Far Right’s Foreign Policy: Big Ambitions, Uncertain Direction

Author:
Catherine Fieschi
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
France occupies a singular position in Europe when it comes to right-wing populist and far-right politics. The country is home to one of the oldest and most electorally successful far-right and populist traditions in Western Europe—from its pre–Second World War thinkers such as Charles Maurras and groups such as Action Française to the tax revolt movement of Pierre Poujade in the 1950s and now the political party known as the Rassemblement National (National Rally)—yet no right-wing populist or far-right party has captured the presidency since the Second World War. At the same time, in France of all European countries, such a takeover would have the most immediate and consequential foreign policy effects, given the extraordinary concentration of diplomatic and military authority vested in the French presidency itself. The case of the National Rally offers a useful window into the intersection of populism, foreign policy, and strong presidentialism. Specifically, it highlights the difficulties populist leaders encounter in building alliances, both globally and within Europe, and helps explain why populists may end up hedging on key foreign policy positions. The possibility of a Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella presidency, moreover, underscores a broader risk: that right-wing populism in middle powers could erode the very international order that has enabled middle powers to attain and sustain their influence. The differences between the National Rally’s two leaders—Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella—are also emblematic of a broader divide among right-wing populists in Europe: On the one side, there are those who aim to reshape Europe from within by steering EU institutions in a conservative-national direction. Hungary’s ousted Viktor Orbán and Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni loosely embody this side, which in France is represented by Jordan Bardella. On the other side, there are those who reject the EU’s supranational constraints altogether. Matteo Salvini, Italy’s deputy prime minister, represents the latter, which in France is closer to Le Pen. What makes France distinctive is that this divide exists within a single party and between its two potential presidential candidates for 2027—with Le Pen retaining the loyalty of much of the party’s cadre, but with Bardella, despite internal resistance, also commanding broad electoral support.1 In France, the question of who will campaign for the presidency will therefore be critical.2 Le Pen—and her “brand”—remains the party’s strongest electoral asset and would likely have a better chance of winning a presidential election than Bardella. Yet her instincts remain more confrontational toward Europe and multilateral institutions. By contrast, while Bardella is more market-friendly and potentially less disruptive internationally, he remains—despite his popularity with voters—untested in the uniquely demanding environment of French presidential campaigning.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Populism, Domestic Politics, and Far Right
Political Geography:
Europe and France

45. Ecological Statecraft in the Midst of War: Water, Regeneration, and the Future of Gulf Security

Author:
Olivia Lazard and Ali Bin Shahid
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The 2026 U.S.-Iran war is radiating through the Gulf’s energy systems, maritime routes, supply chains, food corridors, financial flows, and regional diplomacy—and its effects will be long-lasting. In energy markets, the war is accelerating demand toward more autonomous sources like renewables. On food, the world is bracing for a compound crisis: a convergence of disrupted fertilizer supply chains, inflationary pressures, and El Niño–induced crop failures. These are cascading trends that will demand sustained attention for years to come. But one long-tail effect has already slipped out of view. The war has crossed a dangerous threshold: Infrastructure essential to civilian survival, including desalination facilities, has been directly targeted. Water infrastructure is emerging as a strategic target in kinetic warfare against a background of structural scarcity. This marks a qualitative shift in the Gulf’s security landscape. In a region defined by extreme aridity, collapsing groundwater reserves, and deep structural dependence on manufactured water, desalination infrastructure is not merely a technical utility; it is part of the region’s survival architecture. Millions depend on a relatively concentrated set of energy-intensive coastal plants for drinking water, industry, and urban continuity. The exposure of this infrastructure reveals that ecological fragility and military escalation are no longer parallel crises: They are becoming fused within a single battle space.
Topic:
Security, Infrastructure, Ecology, Statecraft, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

46. How much does democracy cost in Lithuania? An analysis of the cost of a parliamentary mandate based on the example of Lithuanian political parties in the 2020 and 2024 parliamentary elections

Author:
Martinas Malużinas
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The aim of this article is to analyze the sources, possibilities of obtaining, and the total amount of funds spent by political parties on election campaigns within the Lithuanian political system. This work is based on quantitative analysis, which enables the assessment of the income and expenses of individual political parties during the 2020 and 2024 parliamentary election campaigns. The methodology is based on a case study and systemic analysis, allowing for a detailed examination of the Lithuanian party system, in which the functioning political parties follow the cartel party model according to the concept of Katz and Mair (1995). The analysis of party income and campaign expenditures for the 2020-2024 parliamentary elections showed that Lithuanian political parties are dependent on various sources of funding: donations from individuals and legal entities, membership fees, and state budget funds. Moreover, the analysis showed that the expenditures of political parties and their candidates on the election campaign in 2020 (in euros) averaged approximately 430,095 EUR per party. The cost of obtaining one parliamentary seat for a political party in the 2020 elections (in euros) averaged 106,557 EUR per member of parliament. Lithuanian political parties rely on various sources of funding: donations from individuals and legal entities, membership fees, and funds from the state budget.
Topic:
Elections, Democracy, Political Parties, and Financial Resources
Political Geography:
Europe and Lithuania

47. “Greening” the Maghreb or Exploiting It?

Author:
Yasmine Zarhloule
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The European Union-led green transition is turning the Maghreb—Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia—into an energy frontier, hosting megaprojects and wind, solar, and hydrogen corridors. Will going green, which presents an opportunity and a trap, generate development in the Maghreb or will it reproduce new forms of extraction? Building domestic capabilities that deliver tangible gains is crucial for stability and resilience under climate stress. Otherwise, energy exports may help Europe, but only deepen domestic burdens.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, European Union, Extractive Industries, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Algeria, North Africa, Morocco, and Tunisia

48. Leveraging Remittances for Economic Transformation inECCAS Countries

Author:
Salim Ahmed Vessah
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Remittances are increasingly becoming a strategic yet underutilized lever for economictransformation in the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). Across Sub-Saharan Africa, remittance inflows reached a record USD 54 billion in 2023. Within ECCAS, theDemocratic Republic of Congo (approximately USD 1.4 billion) and Cameroon (about USD 375million) were the main recipients, while other member states received comparatively modestamounts. Although these flows do not collectively reach USD 5 billion at the regional level, theyalready surpass foreign direct investment or official development assistance in specific countriesand play a stabilizing role in household welfare. However, their developmental potential remainslargely untapped due to limited financial inclusion, high transfer costs, and the absence ofeffective institutional mechanisms to channel remittances toward productive investment and economic structural transformation. At the same time, ECCAS economies continue to grapple with persistent challenges : low industrialproductivity, weak competitiveness, fragile regulatory systems, insufficient infrastructure, and poorgovernance quality. These weaknesses are compounded by high levels of financial exclusion,limited access to affordable credit, and rising unemployment especially among young people andvulnerable populations. Combined, these constraints hinder progress toward the SustainableDevelopment Goals (SDGs) and the aspirations of the African Union’s Agenda 2063 . In thiscontext, better mobilization and strategic use of remittances constitute a viable and largelyuntapped alternative to support economic transformation and resilience.
Topic:
Economic Transformation, Remittances, and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
Political Geography:
Africa

49. Improving access to electricity for greater energy justice inEconomic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

Author:
Salim Ahmed Vessah
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
ECCAS’s growth is constrained by a deep electrification deficit that undermines energy justice,human development, and inclusive structural transformation. Despite its immense energypotential, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) remains one of the leastelectrified sub-regions in Africa. , access to electricity was estimated at just 56.7%, far below thesub-Saharan African average of 72%. This persistent energy deficit fuels domestic energyinsecurity, as millions of poor and vulnerable households still rely on traditional and polluting fuelsfor cooking and heating. The consequences are profound: weakened social services, health risks,reduced productivity, and slowed economic diversification. The impacts span multiple sectors. Inrural areas, health centers lack reliable power for vaccine refrigeration, emergency care, oressential equipment. Households using biomass-based fuels face heightened risks of respiratorydiseases, disproportionately affecting women and children. In education, limited lighting andinadequate digital infrastructure reduce study hours and widen the learning gap. More broadly, unreliable electricity remains a major constraint on industrialization, agro-processing, and private-sector development, weakening the region’s competitiveness and slowing progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals .
Topic:
Development, Industrialization, Energy, Sustainable Development, and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
Political Geography:
Africa

50. From International Fragmentation to Industrial Cohesion:The Missing Link in AfCFTA Implementation

Author:
Salim Ahmed Vessah, Stephane Atangana, and Larissa Ntoubia
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
As global geo-economic fragmentation accelerates, African economies face rising external shocksfrom supply chain reconfiguration, protectionism, and volatile capital flows. The AfricanContinental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) offers a strategic pathway to build regional resilience,expand industrial capacity, and strengthen economic sovereignty. Yet, despite early trade growth,intra-African trade remains limited, constrained by persistent non-tariff barriers, regulatoryfragmentation, weak logistics infrastructure, and insufficient productive capacity. Without deeperdomestic and regional reforms, AfCFTA risks delivering trade diversion rather than sustainedindustrial transformation. This brief argues that Africa’s central challenge is not market accessalone, but the absence of industrial cohesion that enables firms to scale, integrate into regionalvalue chains, and compete globally. It proposes a reform agenda focused on accelerated NTBremoval, targeted industrial value-chain development, regulatory convergence, digital tradeintegration, and coordinated continental trade diplomacy. Translating AfCFTA from legal ambitioninto economic performance is essential for inclusive growth, resilience, and long-termcompetitiveness in a fragmenting global economy.
Topic:
Resilience, Fragmentation, Geoeconomics, African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and Global Economy
Political Geography:
Africa