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31. Climate change and child abuse

Author:
Abreham Adera
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Climate shocks strain household resources, increase stress, and weaken protective structures, all of which may elevate the risk of child abuse. Yet little is known about how climate change affects children, particularly in the Global South. This paper addresses this gap by examining the relationship between drought exposure and attitudes toward child beating in sub-Saharan Africa. We combine individual-level data from the Afrobarometer survey with geocoded drought data from the Geocoded Disasters Dataset (GDIS). We use a spatiotemporal analysis that exploits differences in when and where the Afrobarometer surveys were conducted and when and where droughts occurred. We find that individuals living in drought-affected areas are more likely to justify physically disciplining children. These effects are persistent, potentially with no pattern of decay over time. Mediation analysis of causal pathways suggests that drought increases food insecurity, which raises the risk of intimate partner violence (IPV), and that IPV, in turn, significantly heightens the likelihood of child abuse. These findings highlight the broader social consequences of climate-related shocks and suggest that interventions targeting household stress and IPV norms may help mitigate the impact of drought on child welfare
Topic:
Climate Change, Intimate Partner Violence, Drought, and Child Abuse
Political Geography:
Africa

32. China's 2026-2030 Five-Year Plan: Continuing the Economic Model and Increasing Self-Reliance

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
The latest five-year plan, adopted in March this year by the Chinese parliament, identifies industrial modernisation and the pursuit of technological independence as key to China’s economic development. It mentions increased consumption and improved social conditions, but these are not priorities. The development of modern industries is intended to increase the competitiveness of Chinese companies relative to entities from developed countries, including Poland. The direction outlined by the plan is another argument for strengthening the protection of the EU single market and supporting an active EU industrial policy.
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Economic Development, Modernization, Industry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Poland

33. The EU and Australia strengthen trade and security partnership

Author:
Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
On 24 March, during a visit to Australia, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Prime Minister Anthony Albanese announced the conclusion of negotiations on a free trade agreement and the establishment of a Security and Defence Partnership. These agreements are intended to help both sides diversify their trade, reducing dependence on China, whilst increasing resilience to US political and economic pressure. It also presents an opportunity for Poland to intensify its cooperation with Australia.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Free Trade, Trade, and European Commission
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Poland, and Australia

34. International Echoes of El Salvador's Public Security Model

Author:
Barbara Midziak and Bartłomiej Znojek
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
El Salvador President Nayib Bukele’s success in improving domestic security results from implementing draconian measures (including mass arrests and a state of emergency that has lasted for four years) and from the dismantling of democratic mechanisms. While Honduras and Ecuador, for example, encountered limitations in copying that approach, the Salvadoran counter-crime model won strong endorsement from US President Donald Trump. This support, however, may foster a revival of authoritarian tendencies in Latin America, as his administration rewards authorities that cooperate closely with advancing US interests, regardless of whether or not they adhere to the rule of law.
Topic:
Crime, Authoritarianism, Democracy, Rule of Law, Donald Trump, Public Security, and Nayib Bukele
Political Geography:
Central America, El Salvador, Honduras, and Ecuador

35. Lee Jae-myung's Inter-Korean Policy

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
Abstract:
South Korea’s attempts to improve relations with North Korea have been unsuccessful. Although this is mainly due to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) reluctance to resume contacts with the Republic of Korea (ROK), an additional problem has been caused by the inconsistent actions of President Lee Jae-myung’s administration, which has been in office since June last year. The administration’s goal of ‘peaceful coexistence’ effectively means accepting reunification as unlikely, a prospect that is losing support in South Korean society. To avoid an escalation of tensions on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea could seek to cooperate with countries that regularly engage with the DPRK, such as Poland.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Poland

36. Law and Politics of Israel and the United States’ Attacks on Iran with Maryam Jamshidi (Episode 54)

Author:
Sahar Aziz and Maryam Jamshidi
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:
Join host Professor Sahar Aziz (https://www.law.rutgers.edu/bio/sa1356) in her conversation with Professor Maryam Jamshidi (https://www.colorado.edu/law/node/125...) about the political and legal implications of Israel and the United States' unprovoked military attacks against Iran on February 28, 2026. As Israeli Benjamin Netanyahu publicly admitted, the Israeli government has been preparing for a war to topple the Iranian regime for over 30 years. (https://www.lemonde.fr/en/internation...) Knowing they do not possess sufficient military capacity to do it alone, Israel unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the United States to start a war of aggression against Iran under the Bush, Obama and Biden administrations. The reasons for restraint by past US administration were often the same. Iran posed no direct threat or conducted an imminent attack toward the US that legally justified an offensive war of aggression. The risk of a global economic downfall and the exorbitant price tag of a major war far outweighed the benefits of removing a hostile government. And perhaps most importantly from a military perspective, the United States had no exit strategy. Indeed, these were the same reasons that led to the Democratic Party winning the White House in 2008 after expensive and endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after 2001. Republican politicians campaigned on an America First platform in the 2021 elections by explicitly rejecting wars of choice in the Middle East that cost American lives and treasure. And yet, Republican President Donald Trump violated that promise to his constituents and granted Israel its 30-year dream to start an offensive war on Iran despite no credible evidence of an imminent threat by Iran. The result has been predictably catastrophic for the Middle East and the global economy. The war has engulfed the Gulf states, the Strait of Hormuz is closed to the 20% of global supply of oil and natural gas, energy prices are skyrocketing across the world, Tehran is being bombarded daily by Israel, over 1300 Iranians have been killed thus far, and the war is costing American taxpayers $1 billion per day.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Aggression, and Global Economy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

37. A Tight Spot: Challenges Facing the Russian Oil Sector Through 2035

Author:
Sergey Vakulenko
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the war in Iran and closure of the Strait of Hormuz, oil prices have soared into triple digits, a state of affairs which will make life easier for Russia’s state finances and oil industry. The duration of this unexpected crisis is, of course, unknowable as of this writing, but the reversal of fortune has also brought to the fore several lingering questions about the outlook for the Russian oil sector that are all too often overlooked. Russian oil production grew steadily in the wake of the post-Soviet trough from 1996 until 2016, when it joined forces with other leading oil producing countries and created an arrangement that is now known as OPEC+. Production levels following the creation of OPEC+ have not followed a simple linear path, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and other headwinds facing the global economy.1 Russia tracked its quota reasonably closely, except for 2022, when it had troubles placing its volumes in the market, while rearranging its export flows from Europe to Asia as a result of the European embargo imposed for the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Notably, Russian production has been declining since late 2025, and the gap between quota and actual output has widened. This has happened against a backdrop of extremely low official prices for Russian crude, which had been approaching the lows of past crisis years: 2009 ($41.27/bbl in January), 2016 ($40.20 annual average), and 2020 ($40.17 annual average). Is the production decline linked to the fact that a significant proportion of Russian fields have become uneconomic at $40/bbl? In other words, has Russia’s upstream breakeven threshold been reached under economic conditions caused by the war in Ukraine, and if so, where exactly is this threshold? And what are the long-term prospects for Russian oil production under these circumstances? It is worth noting upfront that the production decline in December 2025 through January 2026 was almost certainly driven by exceptional circumstances rather than a deep systemic crisis. In all likelihood, the production dip was caused by the shutdown of Lukoil’s cluster of offshore fields in the Caspian Sea following Ukrainian drone strikes on three production platforms. Taken together, these three platforms accounted for more than 200,000 barrels per day: a figure that broadly matches the observed production shortfall. Nevertheless, the questions that this decline has prompted are worth exploring. In the near term, the abrupt rise of oil prices caused by the Iran war, some of which might persist after the end of hostilities, will bring a windfall both to the Russian oil companies and the state. Some of the windfall might translate into increased drilling expenditure and an associated production spike. But it would not change the long-term outlook and fundamentals of the Russian oil industry. The focus of this paper, therefore, is on the factors shaping the long-term trends, including: the oil revenue split between the Russian state and Russian oil companies; the cost of oil production in Russia, both operating costs and the cost of sustaining production levels; and the technical capabilities of Russia’s oil industry relative to its global peers. Both the current state and possible future trajectories of the Russian oil industry are path-dependent. Therefore, this paper will also examine the circumstances that shaped it. The central conclusion is that Russian oil production will soon begin to decline—slowly but steadily—and that this decline will be relatively insensitive to oil prices, which are likely to decrease as the world transitions to a low-carbon energy system. Russian output is remarkably resilient to significant price reductions; the country has the geological resources, technology, equipment, and expertise to sustain or even increase production. But the decline is driven by state policy, the investment climate, and OPEC+ constraints.
Topic:
Economics, Oil, Governance, Trade, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

38. Are Long-Term NATO–South Korea Defense Ties Possible? Transitioning From an Arms Exporter to a Trusted Defense Partner

Author:
Chung Min Lee
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
This study focuses on how the Republic of Korea (ROK), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and Europe are forging closer defense and security ties and whether such a partnership can be sustained into the future. South Korea has demonstrated that it is capable of exporting and investing in European and NATO security; according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), South Korea supplied 6.5 percent of arms imports to European NATO states (NATO-Europe) in 2024, a similar level to France.1 Conversely, Europe accounted for about 10 percent of South Korea’s arms imports in the period 2020–2024 while the United States dominated with 86 percent of all arms sales to South Korea.2 Based on SIPRI data, South Korea ranked tenth in global arms sales at the end of 2024.3 The main challenge for South Korea rests on rethinking its longer-term approach to strengthening defense ties with NATO along three main pathways: Ensuring greater interoperability with NATO weapons systems by deepening its alignment with the NATO Standardization Agreement through various measures such as the Mutual Recognition for Military Airworthiness (July 2024) agreement and becoming a member of NATO’s Science & Technology Organization (March 2025) and vice versa, so that European systems can be readily adapted into Korean weapons platforms; Encouraging Korean defense firms to operate in Europe with European governments, militaries, and corporate partners to localize production in Europe, similar to the strong foothold Korean defense firms have established in Poland since 2022; and Integrating, to the extent possible, with NATO’s intelligence architecture, including enhanced cybersecurity and cyber defenses; greater intelligence sharing over emerging battle management environments (particularly after the Russia-Ukraine war comes to an end in the foreseeable future); and greater institutionalization of intelligence exchanges, including South Korean assessments of North Korea and China and NATO analyses of threats from Russia. South Korea aspires to become one of the top defense exporters by 2030. Based on its world-leading manufacturing capabilities in automobiles, shipbuilding, steel production, semiconductors, consumer electronics, and nuclear power plants, among other sectors, its ambitions are well within reach. South Korea supplies arms to three main regions—Europe, the Middle East (mainly Gulf states), and the Asia-Pacific. Key European and American defense companies have been leading providers of defense goods and services in the same regions since the end of World War II. Compared to their rivals, ROK defense firms offer definite advantages such as price competitiveness, rapid delivery schedules, and thorough maintenance, repairs, and overhauls (MROs) systems.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and South Korea

39. Beyond the Hype: Assessing Hyperscaler Nuclear Commitments Against U.S. Energy Realities

Author:
John Pendleton and Mackenzie Schuessler
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Electricity demand is rising rapidly, along with growing enthusiasm for nuclear power. In addition to climate concerns and the desire for secure energy, these needs are driven in large part by the planned expansion of data centers for artificial intelligence and cloud computing. The United States is home to the world’s largest data center market and the leading global cloud service providers, including Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Meta (Facebook), and Microsoft. These firms—or “hyperscalers”—design, build, and operate massive data center facilities that support skyrocketing AI demands, but require large amounts of firm, scalable, and always-available power. This puts new pressure on electricity grids already facing capacity, reliability, and affordability challenges. As technology companies pursue aggressive AI buildouts, they are seeking innovative ways to meet their energy demands. Nuclear power has thus entered the conversation as one of the few energy sources capable of delivering the kind of firm, high-density electricity that data centers need while simultaneously allowing companies to maintain public climate commitments.1 The entry of hyperscalers into a rapidly evolving nuclear energy market introduces new dynamics to what has been a highly regulated and slow-moving industry. Since 2024, a series of high-profile agreements have been announced between hyperscalers and nuclear utilities, vendors, and reactor designers. These deals signal enthusiasm for the sector, but it is still unclear whether big tech is willing to make big bets on nuclear power. This paper explores how large U.S. technology companies are approaching nuclear power in the context of their energy strategies to meet the escalating demands from AI. The first section describes the approaches hyperscalers are using to secure nuclear energy. To date, their efforts reflect their preference to be energy offtakers (customers) over direct nuclear ownership or project development. The second section then assesses why these approaches have remained cautious, considering factors such as priorities, timing, and costs. Additionally, it considers key entanglement risks that big tech will need to confront including potential reputational exposure, nonproliferation concerns, and management of long-term nuclear waste.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

40. AI and Democracy: Mapping the Intersections

Author:
Rachel George and Ian Klaus
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
AI poses substantial threats and opportunities for democracy in an important year ahead for global democracy. Despite the threats, AI technologies can also improve representative politics, citizen participation, and governance. AI influences democracy through multiple entry points, including elections, citizen deliberation, government services, and social cohesion, all of which are influenced by geopolitics and security. All of these domains, mapped in this paper, face threats related to influence, integrity, and bias, yet also present opportunities for targeted interventions. The current field of interventions at the intersection of AI and democracy is diverse, fragmented, and boutique. Not all AI interventions with the potential to influence democracy are framed as “democracy work,” demonstrating the imperative for democracy advocates to widen the rhetorical aperture and to continue to map, identify, and scale interventions. Diverse actors who are relevant to the connections between AI and democracy require tailored expertise and guardrails to maximize benefits and reduce harms. We present four prominent constellations of actors who operate at the AI–democracy intersection: policy-led, technology-enabled; politics-led, technology-enabled; civil society–led, technology-enabled; and technology-led, policy-deployed. Though each brings advantages, policy-led and technology-led interventions tend to have access to resources and innovation capacity in ways that enable more immediate and sizable impacts.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus