Search

Begin New Search Topic Fragile/Failed State Content Type Working Paper

1. Lebanon: The Tragic Story of the Arab World

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Lebanon is a failed state, and its misfortunes are characteristic of a broader regional malaise.
Topic:
Fragile/Failed State, Governance, Leadership, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

2. Syria’s dictator Bashar Assad faces renewed challenges at all levels

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Bashar Assad is not about to fall, But economic deterioration, regime infighting, sanctions and unrest are combining to place his regime under renewed, severe pressure
Topic:
Economics, Fragile/Failed State, Governance, Authoritarianism, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

3. A Safe Path for Democratic Decentralization in Syria

Author:
Bassma Kodmani
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Before the Syrian uprising morphed into a full-scale war, Syria was probably the most authoritarian regime in the Arab region, unequalled in the scale of its repressive practices except by the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. Authoritarianism is hardly compatible with decentralization. An authoritarian government’s key concern is to spread the tentacles of its surveillance apparatus across all regions in order to exert full control over the lives of the citizens. A process of decentralization – in which power is genuinely devolved – is practically impossible, therefore, in an authoritarian system of governance. Yet equating centralization with authoritarianism and decentralization with democracy is an assertion that deserves discussion. Some democracies have functioned in a highly centralized manner. Perhaps, one of the best-known examples is France (on which the Syrian state was modelled) that remained highly centralized since the early days of the state formation almost 1000 years ago. The French revolution of 1789 upheld freedom and equality and announced a democratic system. The very idea of decentralization was rejected at the time in the name of equality understood as uniformity. Yet even France found it necessary to engage in some form of decentralization. Since the early 1980s, it engaged in a process of decentralization, mainly for administrative and financial efficiency. Although it continued to consider identity politics as dangerous for the unity of the nation, it was forced to concede to one particular identity-driven demand, that of the Corsicans, by designing a special status for the island.1 And decentralized systems do not necessarily produce democratic or more representative systems. Mexico is a case in point. Although it was always a federation, its political system remained a one-party rule for some seventy years before it transitioned to democracy in the early 2000s. Decentralization and democracy are, therefore, not inherently inseparable. However, a centralized system, even if democratic, inevitably reduces and often denies the specific identity of certain groups within society. It might operate in a democratic manner when national identity is homogeneous, but the world is composed of states where homogeneity is an exception. In diverse societies such as those of the Middle Eastern countries, centralization together with the demagogic discourse of authoritarian regimes using national cohesion as a pretext and brandishing foreign interference as a permanent threat, have served to deny diversity and basic rights of both individual citizens and specific communities. Syrian society faces a historic challenge and possibly an existential one: it needs to craft a model of decentralization as part of a new social contract while its national institutions are all but failing and its regional environment challenges the integrity of its territory and its sovereignty. Given the uncertainty shrouding the future of Syria, the paper is organized in two parts. The first lays out the discussion about decentralization based on the current reality of the Syrian regime in a scenario in which it regains control after having lived through nine years of gradual foundering of state institutions. The second part considers options for a new decentralized order in a context of democratic political transition. This is not to say that the first option is viable while the second is an ideal order for a fictitious future. On the contrary, the paper shows that the destruction of state institutions is a reality and a consequence of the conflict, that violence and other forms of resistance will continue, and that peace cannot be brought to the country under the existing political system. The second option is, therefore, a necessity which Syrians will need to define with the support of the international community. The paper lays out the process with concrete steps for achieving democratic decentralization.
Topic:
Fragile/Failed State, Democracy, Decentralization, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Damascus

4. The Syrian State: A Two-Headed Monster is Emerging

Author:
Bassma Kodmani
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The Collapse of the Syrian state is largely a reality. Both Russia and Iran, Assad’s allies, know he is not the guarantor of the continuity of the state any more but continue to hold on to him to sign off on projects that consolidate their control. This paper argues that instead of a failed state, a two-headed system has emerged, with Iran and Russia each pushing for their own vision of the country.
Topic:
Imperialism, Fragile/Failed State, Authoritarianism, Military Intervention, and Repression
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and Damascus

5. Iraq After ISIS: The Other Half of Victory Dealing with the Civil Dimension

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The United States, its allies, and international organizations are just beginning to come to grips with the civil dimensions of "failed state" wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, the Sudans, Syria, and Yemen. In each case, it is clear that the civil dimension of the war will ultimately be as important as the military one. Any meaningful form of "victory" requires far more than defeating the current extremist threat in military terms, and reaching some temporary compromise between the major factions that divide the country. The current insurgent and other security threats exist largely because of the deep divisions within the state, the past and current failures of the government to deal with such internal divisions, and the chronic failure to meet the economic, security, and social needs of much of the nation's population. In practical terms, these failures make a given host government, other contending factions, and competing outside powers as much of a threat to each nation’s stability and future as Islamic extremists and other hostile forces. Regardless of the scale of any defeat of extremists, the other internal tensions and divisions with each country also threaten to make any such “victory” a prelude to new forms of civil war, and/or an enduring failure to cope with security, stability, recovery, and development. Any real form of victory requires a different approach to stability operations and civil-military affairs. In each case, the country the U.S. is seeking to aid failed to make the necessary economic progress and reforms to meet the needs of its people – and sharply growing population – long before the fighting began. The growth of these problems over a period of decades helped trigger the sectarian, ethnic, and other divisions that made such states vulnerable to extremism and civil conflict, and made it impossible for the government to respond effectively to crises and wars.
Topic:
Security, War, Fragile/Failed State, ISIS, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Africa, United States, Iraq, Middle East, Yemen, Syria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Sundan

6. Restoring the Eastern Mediterranean as a U.S. Strategic Anchor

Author:
Jon B. Alterman, Heather A Conley, and Donatienne Ray
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
U.S. strategy in the Eastern Mediterranean is long overdue for revision. Policies, priorities, and activities girded by U.S.-led alliance structures were developed to stabilize Europe and deter Soviet aggression at the dawn of the Cold War. Seventy years later, they are no longer fit for purpose. However, the region remains a linchpin for an array of vital U.S. interests. In the last decade alone, regional conflicts and state fragmentation have caused millions of migrants and internally displaced to flee their homes, creating one of the largest migration crises since World War II. The arrival of an unprecedented number of migrants has triggered political backlash and polarized domestic politics in Europe and in the Eastern Mediterranean. Many of the littoral states in the Eastern Mediterranean have faced destabilizing economic crises that have created deep political and strategic vulnerabilities. Significant natural gas deposits discovered off the coasts of Israel, Cyprus, and Egypt could boost regional economic prospects as a potential energy-producing region, but a divided Cyprus, historical animosities, as well as a lack of infrastructure connectivity hinder this regional economic potential.
Topic:
Imperialism, Military Strategy, Infrastructure, Fragile/Failed State, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, United States, Middle East, Israel, Egypt, Cyprus, and Mediterranean

7. Don’t Give Up Yet: There’s Still a Chance to Salvage Eastern Syria

Author:
Melissa Dalton
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton assemble their own senior Middle East teams, a number of U.S. interests hang in the balance in Syria: the enduring defeat of ISIS and al-Qaeda in the Levant; the vulnerability of neighboring Iraq to extremist disruption; the return of Syrian refugees; the mitigation of Iranian influence; the need to both compete and cooperate with Russia to end the civil war; and the security of regional partners and allies. U.S. values are also at stake: the conflict has precipitated a humanitarian catastrophe of epic proportions, with over 500,000 civilians dead and 12 million displaced. The U.S. ability to shape high-level outcomes in Syria is limited. Russia and Iran have outmaneuvered the United States there. With their backing, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is extending his control throughout Syrian territory—most recently via an offensive on southwestern Syria, previously the site of a “de-escalation zone” agreed between the United States, Russia, and Jordan, precipitating immense civilian displacement. Assad’s consolidation of extremists in Idlib amongst civilians raises the specter of another slaughter like Aleppo in 2016. The UN-backed Geneva process is moribund, though still worth supporting, while the United States has limited influence in the Astana and Sochi processes, which are also demonstrating limited returns. More broadly, Assad is already also brutally shaping the facts on the ground regarding “reconstruction” through forcible movement of populations, demographic engineering, constricting property rights, and predatory governance that favors loyalists. In his meeting with President Putin, President Trump reportedly discussed Syria, although there was no official joint summary of the summit. The discussion may have included options for drawing down U.S. forces in Syria in exchange for Russia convincing Iran to minimize its presence in Syria. However, Russia lacks the will and leverage over Iran to fulfill such a bargain. The national picture is bleak. Zooming into the Syrian map more closely, one subnational enclave currently outside of Assad’s control has taken some steps towards stability. Eastern Syria still offers leverage to salvage a marginally but meaningfully better outcome for U.S. interests and the Syrian population. In the weeks ahead, the United States should: take stock of the sources of leverage in eastern Syria; articulate its goal for translating these sources of leverage into a defined political endstate; develop this stated goal into a broader stabilization operational framework; and then execute “the art of deal” in developing a burden-sharing plan to support these objectives.
Topic:
Civil War, Fragile/Failed State, Al Qaeda, Refugees, ISIS, and Displacement
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Syria

8. Afghanistan’s Age of Transformation

Author:
Hamdullah Mohib
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Ambassadors Review
Abstract:
The Afghanistan of today would surprise most outsiders, even those who closely follow developments in the country. We are often wrongly branded as a failing state with a struggling government whose young people are fleeing en masse for Europe and whose military has lost control of the security situation. While anecdotal evidence can always be found to lend isolated support to such claims, this sweeping characterization offers a distorted picture of reality.
Topic:
Security, Fragile/Failed State, Governance, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Europe

9. Turkey at the Heart of the Storm

Author:
E. Fuat Keyman
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
More than two decades ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski alerted the world to a “global turmoil” steadily eroding the West’s ability to respond to major global challenges. Since then, the West has been gripped by multiple crises of globalization, manifested in myriad security, economic, humanitarian, and environmental challenges. The most recent additions to this litany include the dire refugee problem and the brutality of the Islamic State, or IS. Both the refugee crisis and IS have emerged from failed states, particularly Syria and Iraq, and are exacerbated by geopolitical power games, a lack of hegemonic leadership in the region, sectarianism, and the absence of inclusive and rules-based institutions of good governance. Yet while the crises interact and have similar root causes, they are driven by different actors with different intentions. While the European Union has focused on addressing the symptoms of the refugee crisis, the war against IS is driven by the United States, Russia, Iran, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf states, which are less affected by the refugee crisis. Only Turkey has a place at the heart of both crises. It is affected by the security and economic fallout of the current regional instability and will be a pivotal actor in any effective responses to the two crises. Western leaders—most crucially in Washington, D.C., and Ankara—should not think of Turkey as a buffer state used simply to manage the spillover from Syria and Iraq but rather as a proactive partner in any effort to address the root causes of these crises. But Turkey faces its own domestic and foreign challenges, which undermine its ability to respond to the turmoil. The Turkish government should take four steps to help improve its response
Topic:
Fragile/Failed State, European Union, Refugee Crisis, ISIS, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, and Saudi Arabia

10. Crumbling States: Security Sector Reform in Libya and Yemen

Author:
Yezid Sayigh
Publication Date:
06-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Already-weak states in Libya and Yemen crumbled as struggles for control over their security sectors became central to transitional politics after the popular uprisings of 2011. Instead of being reformed and upgraded to enhance the fragile legitimacy of interim governments, the security sectors collapsed by 2014. Libya and Yemen are now caught in a vicious circle: rebuilding effective central states and cohesive national identities requires a new consensus on the purpose and governance of security sectors, but reaching this agreement depends on resolving the deep political divisions and social fractures that led to civil war in both countries.
Topic:
Security, Fragile/Failed State, Governance, Sectarian violence, and Popular Revolt
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

11. Centrafrique : les racines de la violence

Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) is longterm and characterised by sporadic surges of violence against a backdrop of state disintegration, a survival economy and deep inter-ethnic cleavages. Armed groups (including the anti-balaka and the ex-Seleka) are fragmenting and becoming increasingly criminalised; intercommunal tensions have hampered efforts to promote CAR’s national unity and mend its social fabric. Unfortunately, the roadmap to end the crisis, which includes elections before the end of 2015, presents a short-term answer. To avoid pursuing a strategy that would merely postpone addressing critical challenges until after the polls, CAR’s transitional authorities and international partners should address them now by implementing a comprehensive disarmament policy, and reaffirming that Muslims belong within the nation. If this does not happen, the elections risk becoming a zero-sum game.
Topic:
Political Violence, Arms Control and Proliferation, Democratization, Ethnic Conflict, Political Economy, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:
Africa

12. Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa

Author:
Paul D. Williams
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
The number of UN peacekeepers is at a record high, with nearly 110,000 uniformed deployed "blue helmets" worldwide, most of them in Africa. But the status quo is "untenable," warns Paul D. Williams, author and associate professor of international affairs at George Washington University, in a new Council Special Report, Enhancing U.S. Support for Peace Operations in Africa. Unrealistic mandates, unsustainable supplies of personnel, hostile host governments, and mission creep have undermined peace operations, Williams writes. "Given the growing interest in fostering a stable and prosperous Africa, the United States should wield its political influence to address these challenges."
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Humanitarian Aid, War, Fragile/Failed State, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Africa

13. The Migration and Asylum Crisis as a Transformative Shock for Europe. Brief Thoughts on the Eve of the Next Summit

Author:
Pastore Ferruccio
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Never before was the lack of a single European government, or at least of a strong and effective European governance, as acutely felt as in these days. With wars and failed states in the neighbourhood, and an unstoppable exodus crossing Europe, the continent appears at once more interdependent and more fragmented than ever. A coherent model of governance, competent and cohesive, but above all empowered by a full democratic investiture, would be needed everyday, to cope with daily emergencies while painstakingly devising and developing a long-term strategy where such emergency responses would be framed. Instead, in spite of the remarkable efforts of creative leadership made by the Commission, we are “governed” (but the term sounds like a gross overstatement) by subsequent extraordinary summits, each summoned to remedy the failures of the previous one. What can thus be expected and what should be asked, in such dire circumstances, to the next of these ad hoc European Council meeting, scheduled on Wednesday 23 September?
Topic:
Migration, War, Fragile/Failed State, Governance, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe
Publication Identifier:
978-88-98650-58-3
Publication Identifier Type:
ISBN

14. Strategic Insights: Fragile States Cannot Be Fixed With State-Building

Author:
Dr. Robert D. Lamb
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The problem with the way the international community thinks about and responds to fragile states is not that we do not understand “fragility,” its causes, and its cures, but that we think of them as “states,” as coherent units of analysis. As a result of this strategic level mistake, efforts to build state capacity to contain violence and reduce poverty are at least as likely to destabilize the country as they are to help. The U.S. military should consider the destabilizing potential of its efforts to build capacity, train and equip security forces, and provide support to diplomacy and development when its partners and beneficiaries are officials of fragile states. State formation has always been an exceedingly bloody endeavor. Most stable countries worthy of the term “state” that are stable, including wealthy, Western, liberal, or democratic nation-states, came into being through complicated social processes, including war, ethnic cleansing, or genocide. That violence was followed by an institutionalization of the values and social priorities of the victors, combined with some degree of accommodation for the vanquished across and within the new state’s borders. State formation, in other words, has always been a matter of violent exclusion followed by pragmatic inclusion. In all successful states today, those processes have resulted in stable formal political systems, with a significant degree of internal consensus over how those systems should be governed. Today, a quarter of the world’s population, and half of the world’s poor people by some estimates, live in places commonly referred to as “fragile states,” beset by conflict, poverty traps, low social cohesion and, in many cases, cycles of violence and terror. These pathologies are not contained within the borders of fragile states, however. As it is ritually noted in most articles on state fragility, these are places that often generate dangerous spillovers: regional tensions, international terrorism, transnational organized crime, an inability to contain outbreaks of disease, and other problems generally associated with the term “instability.” But fragile states are not “states” in the same sense as those that are stable. They developed differently. They went through periods of tribal governance and warfare and, in some cases, territorial consolidation, as European states did, but then most were subjected to colonization by distant powers or severe domination by regional hegemons, in both cases with foreigners imposing borders and manipulating local politics, elevating one set of elites at the expense of populations with whom they did not share a tribal, ethnic, or national identity. When those foreign powers left (or reduced their footprint), the empowered elites either held on to power or were removed from power by their former subjects. In both cases, the internal fragmentation of views about governance—who should govern and how—remained and in all fragile states continues to be one of the most important determinants of fragility. The most common international responses to these pathologies tend to be exploitation by regional powers, containment by developed countries concerned about spillovers of violence, and capacity building of national institutions by international development agencies attempting to address the “root causes” of fragility by building state structures capable of governing the way “states” are supposed to govern. Looking at these two sets of countries—well governed, legitimate, and stable on one side, with poorly governed, illegitimate, and unstable on the other—it is understandable to conclude that, if only fragile states were more legitimate and better governed, they would also be more stable, peaceful, and prosperous. Post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization, poverty reduction, and other efforts to improve the quality of life for people living in fragile and conflict environments tend, therefore, to focus on building the legitimacy and capacity of state institutions, both military and civilian. Efforts to reduce the spillover of violence and terrorism likewise have key elements of state-building. When, however, has state-building ever worked? That is, when has foreign assistance to formal state institutions and civil society over an extended period of time, in places whose borders were drawn by, and whose elites were elevated by, foreign powers but where local populations do not agree with each other over basic questions of legitimate governance, ever resulted in the establishment of a stable state, one that is no longer “fragile” (in the usual definitions) or at significant risk of a return to violent politics? Consider the places often cited as state-building success stories. When I have asked proponents of state-building to name unambiguous successes, the responses most commonly include Germany and Japan after World War II, East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and sometimes Rwanda. But Germany and Japan were already states with highly developed bureaucracies that were largely left in place after their military forces were defeated. These were not cases of state-building but of state recovery and, in truth, they have little to teach us about how to stabilize fragile states. The borders of East Timor and Kosovo came into being as a result of wars; they are clear examples of state formation still in progress, and it is difficult to call Kosovo a success story when that country’s stability continues to depend so much on an international presence. Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Rwanda have made progress, but they have not been stable long enough to be considered stabilized, and certainly they continue to appear on lists of fragile states. Moreover, some post-conflict countries that have done things “right” according to the typical state-building script have dramatically regressed into violence—El Salvador is an excellent example—whereas some that have done things “wrong,” such as Laos, have managed to remain stable for more than 40 years. As a thought experiment, consider the following two possibilities. A fragile state is territorially fragmented along ethnic and sectarian lines, there are frequent civilian attacks between identity groups, the parliament and ministries are dominated by one group at the expense of the others and, as a consequence, there is constant low-level violence punctuated by periods of intense internal war and repression by the majority ethnic group, which nevertheless enjoys international recognition and assistance as “the” government and the “partner” whose “capacity” is to be built. Years of pouring resources into that government and its security forces serve only to strengthen one group at the expense of the others, providing counsel (and few incentives) to treat the other groups better while giving them the capacity to treat the other groups worse, thereby increasing the potential for conflict. Yet, even in such places, there are some stable, reasonably well-governed territories and communities that maintain a great degree of independence from the central government, with consensus on how they want to be governed, capable of collecting the resources they need to do so (in some cases democratically), and able to defend themselves against external aggression. Somaliland is an excellent example, but most fragile states have similar communities (large percentages of Afghans, for example, have reported that the conflict this past decade simply never affected their community). Such places look suspiciously like they are engaging in classic state formation, and doing so with neither support from their national governments nor recognition from the international community—whose support of their national governments often undermines local, successful state formation. I am not arguing that the international community should try to break up fragile states into more stable territories. Outsiders are not likely to be any more effective at redrawing the borders of fragile states today than the outsiders who drew the modern borders of those counties in the first place. But when a country falls apart in a civil war such that the state can no longer be said to be relevant in some areas of the country, or when the elites in control of national governing institutions fail to support or recognize the legitimacy of large segments of their own populations, due consideration should be given to those areas of the country that manage to stabilize on their own and govern the areas they control in ways that are more consistent with international norms than the central government is or had been. State-building is ineffective, and breaking up states is dangerous. International support to (if not recognition of) subnational state formation in fragile states is, therefore, among the more promising ways to think about how best to respond to fragile states. ***** The views expressed in this Strategic Insights article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This article is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Organizations interested in reprinting this or other SSI and USAWC Press articles should contact the Editor for Production via e-mail at SSI_Publishing@conus.army.mil. All organizations granted this right must include the following statement: “Reprinted with permission of the Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College.”
Topic:
Security, Democratization, Development, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:
El Salvador and United States of America

15. On the Primacy of Weak Public Service Provision in rural Africa: Malians Redefine ‘State Breakdown’ Amidst 2012 Political Crisis

Author:
Jaimie Bleck and Kristin Michelitch
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
In 2012, Mali faced a dual state breakdown disrupting nearly 20 years of democratization – a coup and a secessionist insurgency. This paper provides the perspectives of rural Malians living on the border of state- and rebel-controlled territory. Our main finding is that villagers defined “the crisis” as one of unmet need for public services and infrastructure. State breakdown matters less where the state is not present in the first place. Rather than the state, villagers were largely reliant on local traditional authorities. The salience of villagers’ concerns about public services and infrastructure, as well as general basic needs insecurity, are echoed in cross-national Afrobarometer data (2012-2013) on public service provision across rural and urban citizens. In nearly all sub-Saharan African countries, the urban-rural gap is large, absolute levels of rural provision are low, and countries are inconsistent in provision across indicators. We conclude by drawing implications of weak state public service and infrastructure provision for citizenship in rural areas.
Topic:
Fragile/Failed State, Governance, Social Services, Political Crisis, and Public Service
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali

16. Iraq in Crisis

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Sam Khazai
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As events in late December 2013 and early 2014 have made brutally clear, Iraq is a nation in crisis bordering on civil war. It is burdened by a long history of war, internal power struggles, and failed governance. Is also a nation whose failed leadership is now creating a steady increase in the sectarian divisions between Shi'ite and Sunni, and the ethnic divisions between Arab and Kurd.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Ethnic Conflict, Insurgency, Fragile/Failed State, Governance, and Sectarian violence
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Arabia

17. Stunted Growth: Why Don't African Firms Create More Jobs?

Author:
Vijaya Ramachandran, Leonardo Iacovone, and Martin Schmidt
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Many countries in Africa suffer high rates of underemployment or low rates of productive employment; many also anticipate large numbers of people to enter the workforce in the near future. This paper asks the question: Are African firms creating fewer jobs than those located elsewhere? And, if so, why? One reason may be that weak business environments slow the growth of firms and distort the allocation of resources away from better-performing firms, hence reducing their potential for job creation.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:
Africa and Israel

18. Foreign investments in Uganda's oil sector: linkages and issues for the local economy

Author:
Anne Mette Kjær
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The Ugandan economy resembles many other economies in sub-Saharan Africa in that it has a large subsistence sector, relies on a few primary commodities for export and depends on aid to finance its public services. Oil and minerals have so far not been important to the economy. However, this might change as an estimated 3.5 billion barrel oil reservoir has been discovered in Uganda's Western and Northwestern Albertine Graben. Minerals have also been found and are being sold off as concessions. If oil revenues start to be mobilized as currently planned (2016-17), significant changes in not only government finance but also in the governments' relationships with donors and in state–society relations are likely to occur. The consequences for local communities and the environment are also likely to be significant.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Oil, Natural Resources, Foreign Aid, Fragile/Failed State, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

19. Vertically Integrated Peace Building and Community Violence Reduction in Haiti

Author:
Timothy Donais and Geoff Burt
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
Gang-driven violence in the urban slums of Haiti's capital, Port-au-Prince, has been a preoccupation of international peace-building efforts for the past decade, yet continues to pose a serious threat to peace and stability in the country. These communities have, in recent years, been the site of an ongoing series of experiments, involving a range of different actors, aimed at reclaiming them from armed gangs; however, the isolated and fragmented nature of these interventions has reduced their cumulative impact. This paper makes a case for greater coherence and coordination between bottom-up community violence reduction efforts and top-down police reform, based on a broader argument around the importance of "vertically integrated peace building." Based on field interviews with community leaders as well as officials from both the UN and the Haitian government, this paper suggests that, in the public security realm as elsewhere, the careful integration of top-down and bottom-up efforts represents an important avenue for strengthening state-society relations, increasingly recognized as a crucial component of any sustainable peace-building process.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Peace Studies, Fragile/Failed State, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
United Nations and Caribbean

20. Making the Impossible Possible: An overview of governance programming in fragile contexts

Author:
Jo Rowlands
Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Oxfam works in many countries that are considered fragile – where governance is weak or authoritarian, where people face significant poverty and marginalization, and where the challenges of doing 'aid' work are huge.
Topic:
Civil Society, Development, Humanitarian Aid, Fragile/Failed State, and Governance