« Previous |
1 - 100 of 978
|
Next »
Number of results to display per page
Search Results
2. US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity
- Author:
- Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- The term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.1 At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.2 What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
3. The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization
- Author:
- Robert Murray
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Commercial opportunities in space-based technologies are expanding rapidly. From satellite communications and Earth observation to space tourism and asteroid mining, the potential for businesses to capitalize on these emerging technologies is vast and known as “NewSpace.”1 The NewSpace model is important for governments to understand because the dual-use nature of space, specifically its growing commercialization, will influence the types of space-based technologies that nations may leverage, and consequently, impact their national security paradigms. By capitalizing on the private sector’s agility and combining it with the essential research efforts and customer role played by the public sector, the NewSpace industry can play a critical function in addressing current and future national security challenges through public-private codevelopment. As the NewSpace industry expands, the role of government is evolving from being the primary developer and operator of space assets to facilitating their commercialization, while still prioritizing key advancements. US and allied governments can capitalize on this competitive landscape by strategically investing in areas that align with their national security objectives. However, it is crucial for them to first understand and adapt to their changing roles within this dynamic environment. Indeed, the benefits of the burgeoning NewSpace industry extend beyond the United States. International collaboration and competition in this area can lead to faster technological advancements and economic gains. The global NewSpace landscape is driving down costs, increasing access to space, and fostering innovation that can improve not only economic well-being, but also impact national security models. To that end, this memo will examine the broad state of the space market, discuss the industry drivers, and propose recommendations for US and allied policymakers as they consider future government investments in those enabling space-based activities that support wider national security ambitions.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Space, and Defense Industry
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America
4. Implications of the Incursions into U.S. and Canadian Airspace
- Author:
- Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- In the first half of February, a series of serious incidents happened in the airspace of the U.S. and Canada involving shootdowns of four objects, with at least one confirmed as a Chinese balloon, likely used for intelligence. The U.S. administration is conducting an investigation to explain the various platforms, the equipment onboard, and their mission. Because further incidents cannot be excluded, some changes in the rhetoric of the Chinese government should be expected, as well as a higher readiness of air defence networks of the powers.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Territory, and Airspace
- Political Geography:
- China, Canada, North America, and United States of America
5. Evolution, not Revolution: Japan Revises Security Policy
- Author:
- Oskar Pietrewicz
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- In December last year, the government of Kishida Fumio adopted three documents adapting Japan’s security policy to the deteriorating international situation. Its security and national defence strategies highlight challenges from China, Russia, and North Korea, as well as an increase in non-military threats. A third document specifies the need for a record increase in defence spending. Japan’s readiness to deepen cooperation with the U.S. and European countries and its criticism in its assessment of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine create the conditions for the further development of Japan’s cooperation with NATO and the Polish-Japanese dialogue on security.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Japan, China, Asia, and North Korea
6. Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Index 2021–22
- Author:
- Chi Fang and Jade Reidy
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
- Abstract:
- Military tensions are on the rise in Northeast Asia as the likes of China, North Korea, and the United States flex their combat capabilities—but this does not mean that war is imminent. This is an important insight from the latest Northeast Asia Defense Transparency Index (DTI) for the period spanning 2021 to 2022. Carried out every two years by the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, the DTI offers a detailed examination of how open or closed major regional states are in disclosing information on their defense postures, including defense budgets, publication of official annual defense reports, legislative oversight, and the nature of external military activities. The 2021–22 DTI found that there was only a marginal decline in the overall defense transparency level for Northeast Asia, with Japan showing a noteworthy improvement in its transparency performance. The concealment of defense activities is often an indicator that countries are quietly making preparations for military conflict and contributes to declining trust and confidence. The evidence from this DTI that defense transparency is relatively stable in Northeast Asia is cause for cautious optimism that the long peace that the region has enjoyed remains intact for now. Transparency though is just one indicator of the overall state of defense affairs, and the powerful underlying currents that are the main determinants of war and peace, such as threat perceptions and arms dynamics, all appear to be trending negatively.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, International Security, and Transparency
- Political Geography:
- China, North Korea, Northeast Asia, and United States of America
7. What would Europeans want a European defence union to look like?
- Author:
- Francesco Nicoli, Brian Burgoon, and David Van der Duin
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- While the Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a new momentum for EU defence integration, the political feasibility of such integration remains disputed, as it may entail both additional financial costs and a loss of sovereignty. Furthermore, design of defence integration is inherently multidimensional, differing in terms of scope and level, governance and sources of financing, among other dimensions. To determine the extent of public support for European security cooperation, we conducted the first conjoint experiment ever fielded on public support for alternative defence union designs. We carried out a pre-registered, randomised conjoint experiment on a highly representative sample of the French, German, Italian, Dutch and Spanish populations in November 2022. This multidimensional conjoint experiment allows us to determine the causal link between policy features of potential defence pacts, and public support or opposition to such policy. Our results show that policy packages receiving the most support require joint EU-level governance, joint purchases of military equipment through joint procurement, and repurposing of existing national expenditure as the preferred form of financing. All in all, our results show not only that there is considerable cross-border support for defence integration in Western Europe, but also that citizens in different Western European countries have generally aligned preferences regarding the actual design of such policy, indicating that a compromise policy is feasible and publicly supported. Furthermore, our results support ongoing research on the nature of European solidarity at times of crisis, suggesting that European citizens are willing to support the creation of joint institutions and policies to face issues of common concern, and therefore indicating that major crises open important windows of opportunity to re-shape EU-level policies and institutions.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Governance, European Union, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Europe
8. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. Analysis and implications for Austria
- Author:
- Loïc Simonet
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- Adopted at the Madrid Summit in June 2022, the long-overdue NATO’s new Strategic Concept provides a clear set of guidelines for the Atlantic Alliance in a mid-term perspective. The war in Ukraine has provided the Allies with a powerful catalyst to reconsider NATO’s identity, core missions, as well as their vision of Russia and China. NATO’s new deterrence and defence-centric approach has already entailed a major shift in our security architecture, especially on Europe’s eastern flank. Without undermining its historical neutrality, Austria might reinterpret it in light of NATO’s “reset” and use this opportunity to reinvigorate its partnership with the Alliance.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, and Balkans
9. NATO in the North: The emerging division of labour in Northern European security
- Author:
- Matti Pesu
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The Russian war of aggression has rendered Northern Europe an increasingly significant region for Euro-Atlantic security. A stable and secure Northern Europe is a critical precondition for a safe and stable Euro-Atlantic region. The alliance should treat Northern Europe as a strategic whole although the different subareas of Northern Europe have their distinctive security dynamics and concerns. NATO is currently improving its deterrence and defence posture. It is simultaneously shifting its military strategy from a model of deterrence by reinforcement to one of deterrence by denial. NATO’s evolving posture and strategy in Northern Europe should be underpinned by a more explicit division of labour. The regional allies and stakeholders can be divided into four categories in terms of their role in regional security: frontline nations, hubs, security providers and the ultimate security guarantor. The regional frontline nations include the Baltic states, Finland and Poland, which can also play a role as hubs and even security providers along with the United Kingdom and Germany. Denmark, Sweden and Norway are first and foremost hubs. The United States remains the ultimate security guarantor of the area.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Nordic Nations, Arctic, and Baltic Sea
10. The Greek Defence Sector: Turning the Page?
- Author:
- Antonis Kamaras
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- From the 1980s to the 2000s, Greece’s defence industry was mismanaged and failed to utilize Greece’s high defence expenditures to become innovative. The impact of Greece’s fiscal crisis and the subsequent expansion of the Turkish threat mean that both economics and geopolitics now favour an invigorated Greek defence sector. The first major weapons procurement programme since the end of Greece’s fiscal crisis has not meaningfully involved the Greek defence sector. Yet the sector’s future prospects have improved, assured by the need for the sector to be financially viable and internationally competitive and by the broader awareness of the defence sector as a building block in national defence. The EU’s growing role in Europe’s collective defence, driven by continent-wide geopolitical developments and industrial imperatives, will also boost the prospects of the Greek defence sector. Mutually reinforcing obstacles still hamper the Greek defence sector’s progress: (a) a polity which privileges distribution over capital investments in its fiscal choices, and (b) an officer corps which lacks the degree of autonomy to co-create novel defence solutions together with the Greek defence sector. Despite these obstacles, the ongoing Turkish threat engenders national insecurity within Greece to such an extent that it can drive the sustainable growth of the Greek defence sector.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Innovation, and Defense Industry
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Turkey, and Greece
11. Buying Time: Logistics for a New American Way of War
- Author:
- Chris Dougherty
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Discussions about defense strategy that focus on combat units and fail to account for logistics are irrelevant when it comes to understanding how well the United States can deter or defeat aggression by China or Russia. Planes, ships, and tanks are just weapons systems; making them combat capabilities requires getting them and their crews into the fight; supplying them with fuel, food, water, medical care, and munitions; and keeping them maintained. Logistics, more than the quantity of forces or the quality of technology, will determine the potential combat power available to the United States in future conflict scenarios with China or Russia. It will influence Chinese and Russian decisions about going to war, and when, where, and how to fight. It will bound the military courses of action available to U.S. commanders and delineate the strategic options available to presidents. Despite this critical role, the Department of Defense has systemically underinvested in logistics in terms of money, mental energy, physical assets, and personnel. Neglect of logistics arguably became most severe in the post–Cold War era. Pressure to save money through efficiency and misguided attempts to run the department like a “lean” business disproportionately impacted logistics. Maximizing the ratio of combat “tooth” to logistical “tail” saved money, but at the cost of leaving U.S. armed forces with a logistical system that is stretched thin supporting peacetime operations and wholly unsuited to the demands of warfare with China or Russia. Recognizing U.S. dependence on strained logistics networks, China and Russia have developed means to attack these networks, including long-range missiles and cyberattacks. Barring changes to U.S. logistics and sustainment concepts, such attacks present a grave threat to the department’s ability to uphold U.S. security commitments in East Asia or eastern Europe.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Logistics
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
12. Charting a Transatlantic Approach to Russia: A Working Paper of the Transatlantic Forum on Russia
- Author:
- Andrea Kendall-Taylor
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Although the United States and Europe are not directly engaged in the war with Russia in Ukraine, Moscow clearly sees itself as being at war with the West. The United States and Europe, therefore, must be prepared for a period of what is likely to be prolonged confrontation with Russia, with the war for Ukraine at the center of that confrontation. Successfully navigating this period of sustained confrontation requires continued cohesion and coordination between the United States and Europe to ensure they share a common picture of the challenge that Russia poses and the necessary response. Russia’s war in Ukraine has precipitated rapid and major changes in Europe and broader ripple effects that are altering political dynamics much farther afield. Because of the war in Ukraine, Russia itself is changing in still unknowable ways. Russian President Vladimir Putin is taking the country in a more authoritarian direction, Russian society is shifting, and the Russian military’s degradation in Ukraine means that the nature of the Russian threat is evolving. Russia’s war, therefore, requires the allies to re-examine long-held assumptions and understandings about Russia and its intentions and capacity, and it is those updated assessments that should guide the transatlantic partners’ future policy approach toward Moscow. There is no going back to the way things were with Russia prior to its invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Western allies must build on ongoing efforts to constrict and constrain the Kremlin’s ability to sustain aggression in Ukraine and more broadly beyond Russia’s borders. It also will require the development of a long-term and sustainable approach to restoring peace and stability to Europe, increasing resilience to the Kremlin’s tools and tactics, and planting the seeds for a less confrontational relationship with a future Russia. In many ways, such an approach will resemble the containment strategy first set out in the 1940s, a strategy designed to apply steady and forceful counterpressure to a regime whose paranoia and insecurities represented a clear danger to the West, just as the Putin regime does today. Each of the transatlantic allies’ preferred policy approaches will reflect their own proximity to and history with Russia, as well as current political realities within their own borders. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus within the alliance that the unprecedented cohesion and coordination among allies in the wake of Russia’s invasion must hold. To that end, this working paper provides a starting point for the development of a transatlantic approach to Russia. It articulates expectations for relations with Russia that should guide the allies’ approach, outlines the broad objectives that a transatlantic Russia policy should seek to accomplish, and in some cases more specific near-term actions the allies can take. The analysis reflects two years of dialogue that CNAS has conducted through its Transatlantic Forum on Russia (TFR). It brings together and builds on previous work facilitated by the Forum, including policy papers, op-eds, articles, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, “What Comes Next for U.S. Policy Toward Russia,” and other cited publications.1 The paper aims to provide fodder for policymakers and experts on both side of the Atlantic to debate and refine through continued dialogue, including through the future work of the TFR.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Dialogue, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
13. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: One Year On
- Author:
- LSE Ideas
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- This Strategic Update summarises a roundtable discussion held at LSE IDEAS in July 2023. Contributors to the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Stuart Austin, Professor Gordon Barrass, Professor Christopher Coker, Tom McKane, Hugh Sandeman, Susan Scholefield, and Peter Watkins. None of the content of the Strategic Update is attributable to any one individual. One year on from NATO’s Madrid 2022 summit, this Strategic Update address the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept and its implications for the future, especially regarding Russia’s war on Ukraine. The paper addresses the misalignment between preparations for defence and the real state of its armed forces, the UK’s symbolic support for Ukraine versus its capability, the concepts of resilience and deterrence, and finally the future of NATO’s relationship with Russia.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
14. Countering United Front Work: Taiwan’s Political Warfare System
- Author:
- Mariah Thornton
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- This strategic update introduces the challenges posed by China’s united front work, which has significantly expanded due to unprecedented institutional elevation and support under Xi Jinping. Mariah argues that Taiwan—a country that has effectively resisted China’s united front activities for several decades—can serve as an instructive case for other democratic countries in institutionalising counter-interference operations. The briefing initially explores the origins of Taiwan’s political warfare system, its evolution from the martial law era to democratisation in the 1990s, and how this history informs the institution’s modern structure and operations. The information presented in this report was compiled during a period of fieldwork in Taiwan from late September to early November 2022, in which she interviewed dozens of political warfare officers as well as Taiwanese defence and security experts–a majority of whom have chosen to remain anonymous. In the conclusion, Mariah offers broad policy recommendations based on these findings that may be applicable to other countries experiencing united front work activities and or seeking to institutionalise counter-interference operations.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Public Opinion, Propaganda, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and Asia
15. The EU and the Transformed Nuclear Context since the War in Ukraine
- Author:
- Clara Portela
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022 has entirely transformed the European security landscape, bringing war to the European Union’s doorstep. Importantly, the war features a nuclear dimension that manifests itself in consequential ways, including Moscow’s nuclear sabre-rattling and its denunciation of the last surviving nuclear arms control treaty. This unleashed intriguing reactions, like a surprisingly tough resort to sanctions by the EU, or the shrinking of neutrality on the continent. However, while support for nuclear deterrence has increased in some NATO countries, support for arms control remains strong too. Meanwhile, nuclear disarmament advocates have not shifted their stance as a result of the crisis.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, European Union, Nonproliferation, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
16. Assessing U.S. Options for the Future of the ICBM Force
- Author:
- Toby Dalton, Megan Dubois, Natalie Montoya, Ankit Panda, and George Perkovich
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Our task was to consider the relative risks and benefits of options for the future U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Our task was not to assess whether the United States should deploy ICBMs at all or change its nuclear strategy and doctrine. In our work, we engaged former officials from Democratic and Republican administrations, nuclear policy specialists from universities and defense and arms control think tanks, and senior military officers, as well as other representatives of combatant commands and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The current policy, established following a 2014 Analysis of Alternatives (AOA), is to replace the Minuteman III system with a new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) system, now named the LGM-35A Sentinel. Some observers, including members of Congress, have urged reassessing whether deterrence and other requirements could be met more cost-effectively by extending the life of the current Minuteman III missiles and their supporting infrastructure. Department of Defense (DOD) officials note that upgrades that otherwise would have been necessary to sustain the Minuteman III system to 2043 were not undertaken once the decision was made in 2015 to proceed with GBSD. Therefore, they insist, there is no realistic option today to pursue a life extension program for Minuteman III missiles beyond 2030, when they are due to be replaced by GBSD. Although we received considerable data from DOD officials on these topics, the iterative process through which we received information, the unclassified nature of our study, and the limited time available for investigating DOD conclusions left us unable to assess the DOD’s position regarding the technical and cost feasibility of an extended Minuteman III alternative to GBSD. To strengthen public confidence in its decisionmaking on the future ICBM, we believe the DOD should commission an independent, classified technical study (with an unclassified version) to address outstanding questions relating to the options and timelines in the 2014 Analysis of Alternatives, cost estimates, procurement decisions, and adversary threats to future silo-based ICBMs. One of the most salient issues that surfaced in our study is the projected medium-term increase in the vulnerability of silo-based ICBMs to attack by precision conventional weapons. A non-nuclear attack on U.S. nuclear-armed ICBMs would confront the president with the choice of initiating in response what could be a large-scale nuclear attack on adversary homelands (either by launching U.S. ICBMs before they were destroyed or by using other nuclear forces). This threat is likely to materialize well before the notional GBSD service life expiration in 2075. We believe this issue deserves more debate, as it may raise questions about the declining strategic value of a long-term commitment to silo-based nuclear-armed ICBMs inherent in the decision to proceed with GBSD. Our discussions and research also explored issues that senior leaders, including the president, should consider regarding any silo-based ICBM system that the United States would deploy, today and in the future. These include allocating forces to simultaneously deter Russia (possibly in the absence of nuclear arms control, if occurring after the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, expires in 2026) and a more nuclear-capable China from escalating regional conflicts; confronting possible risks posed by ICBMs overflying Russia to target China; building allies’ confidence in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence; mitigating risks of launch under attack scenarios; and facilitating the negotiation of verifiable nuclear arms control agreements with Russia and China. Consideration of these challenges and issues will be especially important in fashioning the Employment Guidance that will follow from the Nuclear Posture Review.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and ICBM
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
17. Global South Perspectives on a Global Ban on Nuclear Weapons: A Comparative Approach
- Author:
- Leonardo Bandarra, Miriam Prys-Hansen, Jo-Ansie van Wyk, Layla Dawood, Monica Herz, Nir Hassid, Harsh V. Pant, and Shounak Set
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- German Institute of Global and Area Studies
- Abstract:
- Banning nuclear weapons is an aspiration at the core of most disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives. It gained new momentum with the "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons." The negotiation of that treaty, and its subsequent approval and entry into force, sheds light on the complexities and dissent surrounding diverse regional perspectives on the appropriate means and timing regarding the elimination of nuclear weapons and establishing a related global norm. Scholars from different academic backgrounds and epistemological standpoints jointly discuss these perspectives through lenses from Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South Asia. We seek to discuss how regional issues may shape global non-proliferation and disarmament politics, with a focus on the nuclearweapon-ban norm. This debate also reveals the broad trends and patterns organising and driving the current shifts in the global nuclear order, such as interrelations between regional and global institutions as well as domestic politics and decision-making.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Global South
18. Europe after Putin’s War: EU Foreign and Defence Policy in the new European security architecture
- Author:
- George Pagoulatos and Spyros Blavoukos
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a game changer for Europe and the global system and a call for the EU to emerge as a coherent security actor. Any EU discussion about an autonomous EU military capacity becomes irrelevant in the face of a systemic global security challenge, such as Russia, which cannot be dealt with through the existing or envisaged EU military instruments. Faced with a security challenge on a global scale, NATO remains the only game in town. The EU ambition of developing its strategic autonomy becomes practically meaningful only within the transatlantic alliance. EU member-states should take advantage of the existing clauses that enable significant steps to be taken towards foreign and security integration. The existing Treaty framework provides legal space for significant advances in the field of foreign and security integration, even though all relevant Treaty Articles contain strong ‘brakes’ which enable member-states to retain control of the process. Enhanced cooperation in EU foreign and security policy remains an important way forward, even though there are significant safety clauses. The ‘mutual defence’ or ‘mutual assistance’ clause (Article 42(7) of TEU) and the ‘solidarity clause’ (Article 222 of TFEU) are the closest things the EU has to security guarantees. Adding teeth to 42(7) should be an EU priority. Supporting EU ‘coalitions of the willing’ (Article 44 of TEU) also provides the opportunity for swifter military action under the EU aegis. The modality of cooperation between such coalitions and the EU rapid deployment capacity, which is also envisaged in the Strategic Compass and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), has still to be worked out. Transition to qualified majority voting (QMV) in EU foreign policy decision-making presents both advantages and disadvantages, both from the standpoint of the EU and of the dissenting member states. The EU cannot become a credible global power if it cannot reach collective decisions on EU foreign and security policy. Moving towards QMV would address structural weaknesses and serve the objective of European sovereignty. However, smaller member-states need a strong and explicit reassurance that they can always use the existing emergency brakes when they consider an issue which is to be decided on by QMV to be a matter of national security. Transition to QMV should be the result of the gradual forging of a common foreign policy understanding on the major security challenges facing the EU. Human rights issues and sanctions are a good place to start when building momentum towards QMV. In the meanwhile, the current reform effort should be focused on investing in the institutional framework of EU foreign and security policy and making good use of existing instruments.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe
19. They melted down our tanks, we are creating the strongest power in the region – militarist narratives serving the purpose of state capturing
- Author:
- Luka Steric
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- In this publication, BCSP researcher Luka Šterić analyzes how are the militarist narratives used for the legitimising in public the capturing of the state. Defence system capturing is done in various ways. The authorities are using the procurement of armament from different parties to achieve foreign policy goals in order to reduce the external pressure on the authoritarian regime. Insisting on military neutrality and foreign policy balancing, Serbia is trying to keep access to both the Eastern and Western armament markets. Also, through non-transparent contracts, individuals and companies close to the government opulently profit at the expense of the military industry, as well as through exporting weapons oftentimes conducted in contravention of both domestic and international law and norms. However, the focus of this analysis shall be on the militarist narratives constructed by the authorities to legitimise in public the capturing of the state and its defence system. In this publication, we shall present three major militarist narratives used by the authorities to capture the state: the narrative of the personal power of the “commander-in-chief“, the narrative of non-transparent armament in order to defend the country from the external enemy and the narrative of discrediting criticism and political opponents on topics of defence. The narrative of efficient personal power in the defence system has got a dual function. On the one hand, building the cult of a leader as the only guarantor of the state’s success, thus the Army’s success, justifies the non-constitutional concentration of power in the hands of the President. On the other hand, it normalises the military hierarchy as the most efficient model for civilian authorities’ structure, too, whereby the institutional and other mechanisms of government control are discredited. The narrative about the external enemy and the necessity of armament serves to justify the reduced transparency and scandals related to the defence system. The narrative about the inept and non-patriotic former government is used for settling the political accounts with political opponents, as well as for suppression of any criticism against the regime regarding the topics of defence.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
20. NATO’s Resilience: The first and last line of defence
- Author:
- Johnny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- Ahead of NATO’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, Hugh Sandeman and Jonny Hall confront the political challenges posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the alliance’s 2021 Strengthened Resilience Commitment, especially in creating collective standards when resilience remains the responsibility of individual member states. The authors find that resilience is a psychological mindset as well as a material factor, and NATO’s ‘whole-of-society’ approach should be framed within the concept of ‘deterrence by denial’ to potential threats. This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in January 2022 on ‘How can NATO define and develop practical objectives for enhancing the resilience of member states?’ Participants in the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Dr Tomas Ries, Susan Scholefield, Peter Watkins, Professor Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Professor Christopher Coker, and Tom McKane. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
21. Americans on War Powers, Authorization for Use of Military Force and Arms Sales: A National Survey of Registered Voters
- Author:
- Steven Kull
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- The question of when the United States should use military force is a profound question. There has been a long-running debate about the role of Congress and the President when it comes to making this decisions. The constitution gives Congress the power to fund the military and declare war, and declares the President as the Commander in Chief of the military. However, there are ambiguities about which branch of government has the power in a number of specific situations related to the use of force and the transfer of arms to another country. Currently there are a number of pieces of Congressional legislation that seek to give Congress greater power. One proposal seeks to give Congress greater influence over the use of military force outside of the framework of a declaration of war or in response to an attack on the US. Current law, grounded in the War Powers Act of 1973, requires that the President withdraw troops after 60 days unless Congress votes in favor of continuing it. However, since its passage, every President has considered this unconstitutional and many have not abided by it, keeping forces in place without Congressional approval. In order to stop such a military operation, Congress must gather a veto-proof majority, or bring the President to court. Neither has ever happened. A proposal that has been put forth in Congress is to ‘flip the script’ on this, and automatically cut off funding to such military operations after 60 days, unless Congress actively votes in favor of continuing the operation. (Based on H.R. 2108, H.R. 5410 and S. 2391) Another proposal deals with the termination of a Congressional authorization to use military force (AUMF). Shortly after the September 11 attacks Congress authorized the President to use military force against those responsible for the attacks, or who have aided those responsible. Since then all presidents have used this AUMF to justify various uses of force that some Members of Congress feel go beyond its original purpose. Currently there is a proposal to terminate this AUMF which requires an act of Congress. (Based on H.R. 255 and S. 2391) The last proposal seeks to give Congress greater authority over arms sales. Currently, all arms sales must be approved by the President, and Congress can only halt an arms sale with a majority vote, or more realistically a veto-proof majority. Members of Congress believe that it should be easier for Congress to halt an arms sale. They have introduced a proposal that would also ‘flip the script’ in this case by requiring that any arms sale over $14 million only proceed if Congress votes in favor. (Based on H.R. 5410 and S. 2391) To bring the American people a voice at the table of the current debate on these various pieces of legislation, the Program for Public Consultation (PPC) has conducted an in-depth on-line survey of 2,702 registered voters with a probability-based sample provided by Nielsen Scarborough.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Public Opinion, and Civil-Military Relations
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
22. What the First Week of Fighting in Ukraine Tells Us About a Potential Insurgency
- Author:
- Alec Worsnop
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- While the Russian advance in Ukraine has been slower than expected, its overwhelming conventional superiority gives it the upper hand. Despite the valiant resistance of many Ukrainians, Russia will probably conquer all or a portion of the country. However, the first week of the conflict has provided some useful information about the prospects for an insurgent campaign in the wake of a Russian occupation.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
23. The New Wave of Defensive Trade Policy Measures in the European Union: Design, Structure, and Trade Effects
- Author:
- Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Vanika Sharma, and Renata Zilli
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
- Abstract:
- This study undertakes a comprehensive review of proposed and adopted defensive trade policy instruments in the EU, with the purpose of better understanding their design, functioning, and implications. The study covers eight policy instruments at different stages of development. These are: Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), International Procurement Instrument (IPI), Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), Foreign Subsidy Instrument (FSI), Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence (DD), Level Playing Field Provisions in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (LPF), Enforcement Regulation (ER), and the Deforestation Initiative (DI). It is understandable that the EU seeks both redressive and retaliatory measures in its trade policy. However, these measures would have the total effect of Europe producing more for itself and being less dependent on imports. This is a significant policy shift, because in their totality the defensive trade policies make the EU more inward-looking. This can lead to major negative consequences. An extensive distortion of trade and markets would reduce the gains from trade and prompt a reallocation of European resources. Notably, the EU is a larger supplier of goods and services than it is a buyer, and an inward-looking policy that leads to retaliation from EU’s trading partners can harm its exports and trade surplus. There are also potential strategic consequences that could follow, and their importance has increased considerable as a result of the Russian war against Ukraine. Under these measures, the EU could introduce new trade frictions with friends and allies, and with countries that the EU seeks closer cooperation with to provide for a safer geopolitical environment. For each of these defensive measures, the study takes an extensive look at the objectives of the instruments, their legality, proportionality, and subsidiarity, the working of the instruments and the division of labour between institutions, as well as their enforceability in conjunction with existing multilateral and bilateral rules affecting the EU. It also attempts to capture the impact and potential for retaliation for the EU and its partners as a result of the implementation of the instruments. The study highlights the areas where the instruments lack clarity, particularly in the implementation of the instrument, the division of labour between the EU and EU member states, and the compliance of the instruments with WTO rules and bilateral FTA provisions. The instruments share some general characteristics. Many of the instruments have been created as retaliatory measures against coercion and unfair trade practices by partner countries. Very often, the partner countries most affected by the instruments are also the same. The United States, China, Russia, the UK, and Turkey are likely to be on the receiving end of the instruments due to the significant volumes of trade and economic interdependence with the EU, but also because they either do not follow the same trade rules as the EU, or the EU wants to maintain with them the current level of competitiveness. Most instruments also use restrictions to the EU market as the main policy lever. The objective is not just about creating an equal playing field but also ensuring that the rest of the world follows EU rules. Particularly, the EU aims at regulating non-EU companies directly and unilaterally through EU policies, which increases the risk of retaliation against the EU. At the same time, there are also important areas of departure in the specifics of each instrument, as illustrated by the varying objectives, measures, compatibility with international obligation, affected sectors, and whether the measures apply automatically or at the discretion of the EU.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Political Economy, European Union, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Europe
24. Policy Paper: Considerations of condemnation and balance of Palestine’s position on the war in Ukraine
- Author:
- Palthink
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- In classic wars, we waited for the military result, and then we formed a political response. In new wars, there is not a final resolution; there is only the stronger party imposing its conditions. Additionally, there is also geographical control, regime projection, or behavior modification goals. Russia is seeking to maintain its national security and enhance its regional and international position. It has a deep fear that NATO will expand, bringing weapons to its border with Ukraine. Now that the first shock of the war has receded, the world realizes that the war will not exceed Ukraine’s borders. Russia has given indications that it will limit itself to the minimum that preserves its national security by preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. Global concern about the consequences of war is high. People are wondering if it will continue or stop. Additionally, sanctions have been announced. In this context, developing and poor countries are affected by conflict because they depend on foreign aid. Their positions on the war will determine where they are positioned, and how the political, economic and security consequences will affect them. Trying to show a neutral position would not endear them to the great powers. On the face of it, it may seem to be a war fought on Ukrainian lands only, but it is a world war of influence. The survival of developing nations depends on the strength of the international community and the extent to which it supports these nations in the light of political realism, not because of their strength and resources. Many places cannot survive without traditional international support.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Palestine
25. The Implications of the Ukraine War for Israel
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- For Israel, this is evidence that its self-reliance doctrine must be nourished with no illusions about foreign support in times of crisis. Moreover, Turkey probably sees NATO more positively since it borders Russia, pushing Ankara toward the West.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel
26. Vienna: A return to Ben-Gurion’s WW2 Dual Strategy?
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- It is time to revive the spirit of Ben-Gurion’s famous dictum from the days of WWII regarding the stance toward the British: “We will fight the war as if there were no White Paper, and we will fight the White Paper as if there were no war.” This makes sense concerning Israel’s dilemma towards the US in the context of the renewal of the JCPOA.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Israel
27. Ukraine could have Repercussions for Syrian Regime, Israel
- Author:
- Marta Furlan
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The movement of Syrian fighters to Ukraine will significantly impact Syria’s internal dynamics, and Israel needs to monitor the situation closely.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Israel
28. Japan and the War in Ukraine
- Author:
- Eyal Ben-Ari
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Two weeks after the war began, Japan announced that its new National Security Strategy scheduled to be published this year would recategorize Russia from “partner” to “security challenge,” thus placing it alongside China and North Korea.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Japan, China, Europe, and Asia
29. Israel Must Adjust its Ukraine Policy
- Author:
- Daniel Rakov
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The difficulties of the Russian military on the battlefield increase the possibility that in the coming weeks, Moscow will expand the fighting as part of preparations for a long-term military campaign.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Israel
30. A New Global Order? Israel’s Relations with China and Russia in Light of the War in Ukraine
- Author:
- Tuvia Gering and Daniel Rakov
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Despite their mutual support throughout the first hundred days of the war, Russia and China continue to have competing interests. Whereas Israel needs to be more responsive to Washington’s concerns about its two global competitors, it must also be mindful of populist calls to destabilize relations with Moscow and Beijing.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Israel
31. Latest Killings in Iran May Indicate a Notable Shift in Israeli Strategy
- Author:
- Jonathan Spyer
- Publication Date:
- 06-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- A notable change of the rules of engagement has taken place, in which the totality of Iranian actions will now be opposed, also on Iranian soil. The strike on the UAV fleet at Kermanshah and the assassination of Colonel Khodai in Tehran were the first manifestations of this new approach.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, and Israel
32. The US Defense Establishment’s Role in Shaping American Regional Strategy
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Israel offers the US military and, even more so, the intelligence community critical support. For example, the US Army has gained through the acquisition of the Iron Dome missile defense system, tank technology such as reactive armor, solutions to the challenge of terrorist improvised explosive devices, mine-clearing devices, and much more. In turn, the US defense establishment –specifically CENTCOM, now that Israel is in its area of responsibility – increasingly reflects Israeli perspectives in Washington policy debates. This has recently been the case on Iran.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America
33. British Pugwash Note on the Absence of Sole Purpose in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept
- Author:
- Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
- Abstract:
- In June 2022 NATO members adopted an updated Strategic Concept (the preceding Concept having been adopted in 2010). There was reason to hope that in the updated Concept NATO members would envisage using nuclear weapons only in response to their first use by a nuclear-armed adversary. That reason lay in remarks made by President Biden when he was Barack Obama’s Vice-President. Notably in January 2017 he said: “Given our non-nuclear capacities and the nature of today´s threats, it is hard to envision a plausible scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary or would make sense; deterring, and, if necessary, retaliating against a nuclear attack should be the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal”. The adoption of Sole Purpose would be a useful nuclear risk reduction measure. Leaving open the option of using nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack on NATO entails the risk of nuclear escalation if the attacker is nuclear armed; and nuclear escalation entails the risk of global nuclear annihilation.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Europe and North America
34. Russia’s threat against the Jewish Agency is a Bargaining Measure
- Author:
- Daniel Rakov
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Israel should prepare for a prolonged crisis. The Russians might want to delay or accelerate the legal process to exploit the elections period. The verdict will not constitute the final word. The government is advised to navigate the crisis behind the scenes: publicity might accelerate escalation.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Israel, and North America
35. Egypt as the Cornerstone of the New Regional Security Architecture
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The stability and orientation of the region’s most populous country, Egypt, remain crucial components of the newly emerging regional security architecture and its new strategic alignments.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and Regional Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Middle East, Egypt, and MENA
36. Ukraine War Distracts US from China, Legitimizes Nuclear Bombs
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is distracting the US from the Chinese threat and erodes the nuclear taboo.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, Rivalry, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America
37. How to respond to nuclear blackmail
- Author:
- Yagil Henkin and Alexander Grinberg
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Reliable deterrence is a vital interest of the West, and developing a strategy for reliable deterrence without escalation is also essential. The West could prevent escalation if it manages it carefully and with determination and credibility.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
38. It is in America’s Interest to End the War in Ukraine
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Continuing the war harms the West and endangers its battle to attain other critical strategic objectives.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America
39. Early Warning in the Taiwan Strait
- Author:
- Mark Stokes and Eric Lee
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Project 2049 Institute
- Abstract:
- Shows of force from China’s People’s Liberation Army exist on a continuum from peace to war and can be characterized as coercive or annihilative. In this report, Executive Director Mark Stokes and Associate Director of Programs Eric Lee examine kinetic and non-kinetic threats posed to Taiwan by the People’s Liberation Army. The authors explore the history of Taiwan’s early warning infrastructure and radar order of battle. They then assess how these capabilities support Taiwan’s air sovereignty missions of surveillance and control around its territories. They conclude by suggesting ways the United States can bolster Taiwan’s early warning capabilities.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Sovereignty, Surveillance, and Army
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America
40. U.S. Coast Guard Academy Cultural Competence Assessment
- Author:
- David Chu
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The National Academy of Public Administration
- Abstract:
- The United States Coast Guard (USCG) is widely recognized for its six major operational missions: maritime law enforcement, maritime response, maritime prevention, marine transportation system management, maritime security operations, and defense operations. Since 1876, the U.S. Coast Guard Academy (the Academy) has served as the one location where USCG officers receive their training. The Academy is an accredited military college granting Bachelor of Science degrees in one of nine engineering or professional majors. Graduates earn a commission as an Ensign in the Coast Guard. The impetus for this report is found in the Coast Guard Academy Improvement Act, part of the National Defense Authorization Act of the fiscal year 2021. This legislation called for the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to assess the current state of cultural competence (including diversity, equity, and inclusion) of the Coast Guard Academy’s cadets, faculty, and staff. Cultural competence is defined as the ability to understand, appreciate, and interact with people from cultures and belief systems different from one’s own. It encourages the acknowledgment and acceptance of differences in appearance, behavior, and culture. This assessment by a Panel of NAPA Fellows provides actionable recommendations that, when implemented as an integrated whole, will serve to further develop a healthy environment of cultural competence at this critical institution. As a congressionally chartered, independent, non-partisan, and non-profit organization with over 950 distinguished Fellows, NAPA has a unique ability to bring nationally recognized public administration experts together to help government agencies address challenges. I am deeply appreciative of the work of the five NAPA Fellows who served on this Panel and commend the Study Team that contributed valuable insights and expertise throughout the project. We are grateful for the constructive engagement of many USCG and Academy personnel and cadets who provided important observations and context to inform this report. We also thank representatives of the other federal military service academies for their active contributions to this research. Finally, this report has benefited substantially from input offered by many researchers and practitioners in the field of cultural competence, diversity, equity, and inclusion. I trust that this report will be regarded as an encouragement to leaders at the Coast Guard Academy, as it commends many good practices that are already in practice. It should also serve as an actionable guide to putting necessary policy, procedural, and structural elements in place to further develop cultural competence for all. Doing so will further advance the USCG’s compelling mission.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Maritime
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
41. A Call to Action: The Federal Government’s Role in Building a Cybersecurity Workforce for the Nation
- Author:
- Daniel Chenok and Karen S. Evans
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The National Academy of Public Administration
- Abstract:
- Cybersecurity is a significant concern for governments, businesses, universities, service providers, and citizens throughout the country. Ransomware attacks and other cyber intrusions are featured in the news almost daily, and there is a growing demand for cybersecurity workers who can protect the electronic systems that enable so many aspects of our lives and our economy. In recognition of these vulnerabilities, the Academy identified as one of its twelve Grand Challenges in Public Administration the need to Ensure Data Security and Privacy Rights of Individuals. Yet only recently has the federal government begun to bring together key federal and nonfederal actors to address cybersecurity workforce problems. As part of the FY 2021 Consolidated Appropriations Act, Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security to contract with the National Academy of Public Administration (or a similar organization) to review the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) programs (primarily housed within the Cybersecurity Defense Education and Training [CDET] branch) to build a national cybersecurity workforce. The task was to assess the excellence, scalability, and diversity of select CISA/CDET workforce-development programs and to consider alternative models for building a cyber workforce. Our study Panel of Academy Fellows also looked at additional efforts across the government aimed at ensuring the nation’s cybersecurity workforce needs are being met. The Academy’s Study Team staff performed the research and analysis to inform Panel member analysis and recommendations. I deeply appreciate our Panel members, who provided valuable guidance and introductions to federal and nonfederal leaders in the cybersecurity workforce development field. The views expressed in this report are those of the Panel. In addition, I would like to acknowledge the time and contributions as subject matter experts of Academy Fellows Franklin Reeder, Director Emeritus and Founding Chair, Center for Internet Security, and Ronald Sanders, Staff Director, The Florida Center for Cybersecurity at the University of South Florida. Both went above and beyond to provide information, context, contacts, and other guidance to the Study Team and Panel. Last, but far from least, I appreciate the constructive engagement with CISA leaders and experts— including those in CDET—along with current and former federal officials and numerous private sector leaders in related federal, academic, and private sector fields who contributed to the development of this report. The Panel’s report presents findings and recommendations that support the development of an effective cybersecurity workforce for the government and for the nation. The report acknowledges that this can be done only through strong, ongoing national coordination and leadership reaching across federal agencies and the larger economy. I hope these recommendations help build a more robust and resilient cybersecurity workforce to better support the nation’s long-term security posture and capabilities.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Labor Issues, Cybersecurity, and Leadership
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
42. To What Extent is Israel Prepared for the Growing Threat of UAVs?
- Author:
- Eden Kaduri, Liran Antebi, and Meir Elran
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- The threat of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has recently figured in the headlines, following UAVs launched by Hezbollah in July 2022 aimed at the Israel natural gas platform in the Karish field, reports of a Hamas project to develop UAVs, a UAV attack against the American al-Tanf base in Syria, and reports that Russia has purchased Iranian UAVs. Such an arsenal in hostile hands constitutes a mounting threat to Israel. Assuming that UAVs, especially offensive ones, will join any high-trajectory fire against Israel, new thinking about the ways of dealing with the threat in the spheres of doctrine, development, and operations is needed. Technological and operational solutions for both the more conventional threat and a scenario of massive UAV attacks in combination with high-trajectory barrages are required. Inter alia, there should be greater reliance on lasers as a cheap solution with much higher output than the current solutions. In addition, preparations should be made for handling extreme scenarios, however unlikely.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Drones
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Israel
43. Tehran Heightens the Pressure as it Strives to Thwart a Regional Air Defense System
- Author:
- Tamir Hayman and Sima Shine
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- The heightened discussion of a “regional air defense alliance” was met by increased Iranian activity to block any such measure, including explicit threats that in turn prompted rejection of the idea by senior Gulf figures. It appears that at this stage, relations between Israel and the Gulf states that remain below the radar are preferable to grandiose public statements that do match the reality on the ground
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Missile Defense, Air Force, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
44. Resolving the Gas Dispute with Lebanon: First Exhaust Diplomatic Efforts
- Author:
- Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Hezbollah’s launch of UAVs at the Karish gas field was a cognitive action directed at Israel and the Lebanese, and sparked much public criticism in the Lebanese political establishment, which is eager to reach an arrangement on the gas issue. At this stage, Israel is right not to react to the UAVs militarily, and should continue to try to exhaust the diplomatic route with its northern neighbor to demarcate the maritime border, while recognizing that the Shiite organization will attempt again to challenge the balance of deterrence
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Hezbollah
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Lebanon
45. Hezbollah Challenges Israel: Time to Rethink the Policy of Restraint
- Author:
- Udi Dekel
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Israel is deterred, and as long as it does not respond to Hezbollah’s launch of UAVS at the drilling rig in the Karish gas field, Nasrallah, backed by Iran, will continue to test the limits of Israel’s restraint. Sometimes it is necessary to play different, surprising cards in order to return to previous rules of the game. Therefore, Israel should respond in the air campaign and attack the Hezbollah-operated air defense systems in Lebanon, even at the risk of escalation, which at the present time is likely to be limited
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Violence, and Hezbollah
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Israel
46. The Ukrainian Civil Front – An Interim Assessment
- Author:
- Meir Elran, Uri Bar-Yosef, and Zvi Magen
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Most of Ukraine’s civilian population demonstrates a high degree of steadfastness during the war, rallying around the flag – and around the president. Nonetheless, the challenge to Ukrainian national resilience remains high, given the huge waves of migration, the losses in the hinterland, and the severe damage to national infrastructure and the local economy – which could have decisive effects on Ukraine’s ability to recover from the war
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
47. Intelligence and the War in Ukraine: The Limited Power of Public Disclosure
- Author:
- Ofek Reimer
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Months before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West began to disclose intelligence material on Putin’s plans – thereby using a policy tool that brings with it both advantages and risks. What did the intelligence disclosures achieve, and what might Israel learn from this experience?
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Intelligence, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
48. Is Ukraine Poised to Join NATO and the European Union?
- Author:
- Oden Eran and Shimon Stein
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there are more and more voices in the West calling for Kiev’s acceptance into NATO and the European Union. However, this is not the time for rapid measures. Now that Putin has backed himself int a corner, the United States and Europe, in parallel with the harsh sanctions imposed on Russia and the assistance to Ukraine, must leave Moscow a way out
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, and North America
49. A Rising and Falling Alarm: A Strategy for a Joint Exercise in the Home Front Command
- Author:
- Liron Donnell
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- The incoming chief of staff of the Home Front Command responds to an article by INSS researcher Meir Elran. She contends that contrary to the claim that the national home front exercise held this past November realized only part of its potential, the exercise in fact met all of its goals and saw many solid achievements. Moreover, the criticism of the event addressed issues that cannot be resolved in a single exercise
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Israel
50. Hezbollah's Efforts to Restore its Domestic Standing: The Israeli Card
- Author:
- Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- The launch of a drone into Israeli territory this past February was yet another offensive cognitive activity by Hezbollah, intended to mask its deteriorating situation – in the domestic arena, stemming from the growing criticism of the organization in advance of the coming elections, scheduled for May, and vis-à-vis Israel, given its difficulty to maintain the “deterrence equation” that it defined. Jerusalem should expect additional acts of this sort, while preparing for a future situation in which the attacks become a security threat
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Hezbollah
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
51. Blocking the Gateways to Nuclear Disorder in the Middle East
- Author:
- John Spacapan
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- This study will explain how the United States and like-minded states can still stop, or at least significantly slow down, the bomb’s spread in the Middle East. The historical record as well as the current intentions of potential proliferators in the region suggests this is possible, but Washington will need to start planning now. The three case countries of this monograph – Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia – are all taking aggressive steps toward nuclearization.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Middle East
52. Keeping Secrets
- Author:
- Henry Sokolski
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- With Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, Americans have had a ringside seat at one of the most unusual of presidential shows: President Joe Biden publicly divulging some of our nation’s most protected, secret insights on what Vladimir Putin and his military might be planning. Some have criticized this; most think it has prevented Putin from controlling the war’s narrative. If we are lucky, it could be part of a more important movement toward liberalizing the use and sharing of intelligence. America and its allies could finally be progressing from a vision of war first theorized a hundred years ago. That violent and indiscriminate vision was fully realized with the city-busting aerial attacks of World War II. Ever since, we have believed that being able to decimate a nation’s military, industrial, and demographic capital promises deterrence in peace and quick victories in war. Today, this vision is being slowly supplanted with weaponry and tactics that can target terror precisely, in order to disable nations without decimating them.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Classification, and Secrecy
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
53. Sign of the Times: How the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review Affects Relations with Africa
- Author:
- Zainab Usman and Jonathan Glennie
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- In March 2021, the British government published a vision document: “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.”1 Previously, the government had issued documents on security, defense, development, or foreign policy, but this integrated review bundled together all aspects of policy related to a vision of a so-called Global Britain. This newly integrated approach to policymaking mirrors a strategic consolidation within the UK government, specifically the merger of the Department for International Development (DFID) with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to become a new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). While the review is framed as a necessary response to a changing global landscape, domestic political considerations around the British exit from the European Union (Brexit) weigh heavily. The review also points to the current UK government’s inclination to prize geopolitical competition over a previous emphasis on global cooperation. Steep cuts to the UK’s generous foreign aid budget as well as the abolition of DFID have already drawn significant academic, policy, and media attention. Yet these actions are part of a broader UK strategy to redefine the country’s relations to the rest of the world, with significant implications beyond the controversial foreign aid cuts for poor countries, including those in Africa. The review will shape relations with a continent that has deep historical ties from the colonial era, a large diasporic presence, and long-standing economic relations with the UK. This analysis draws out the implications of the UK’s 2021 integrated review for African countries and recommends next steps for African and other international stakeholders to navigate the UK’s overhauled external relations strategy.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Development, and Integration
- Political Geography:
- Africa and United Kingdom
54. The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Military Defence and Security
- Author:
- Daniel Araya and Meg King
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for International Governance Innovation
- Abstract:
- The twenty-first century is now being shaped by a multipolar system characterized by techno-nationalism and a post-Bretton Woods order. In the face of a rapidly evolving digital era, international cooperation will be critical to ensuring peace and security. Information sharing, expert conferences and multilateral dialogue can help the world’s nation-states and their militaries develop a better understanding of one another’s capabilities and intentions. As a global middle power, Canada could be a major partner in driving this effort. This paper explores the development of military-specific capabilities in the context of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning. Building on Canadian defence policy, the paper outlines the military applications of AI and the resources needed to manage next-generation military operations, including multilateral engagement and technology governance.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Artificial Intelligence
- Political Geography:
- Canada and North America
55. Space Traffic Management: Time for Action
- Author:
- Mir Sadat and Julia Siegel
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- Outer space has long been characterized as “contested, congested, and competitive.” More than four thousand eight hundred active satellites currently orbit Earth, representing over forty nations, and nearly twenty-five thousand satellites are projected to join by 2030. Moreover, spacefaring entities are testing the limits of space exploration: Visionary space companies are aiming to launch space tourism programs and send humans to space within the decade, and governments and militaries are increasing activity in cislunar space—the sphere formed by the Earth-Moon radius—to leverage advantageous orbital regions. As humanity expands its frontiers deeper into the galaxy, the threats to US and allied space capabilities will continue to increase. Yet, despite the proliferation of space activity, the ability of international and national bodies to track and regulate space objects—often referred to as space traffic management (STM)—reflects a past era wherein few actors conducted limited operations in space. The current state of STM can be more aptly described as space situational awareness (SSA), or the mere knowledge of objects in orbit. Global actors (including national governments, corporations, and international organizations) track space objects and notify satellite operators when the probability of collision is notable. While collision avoidance maneuvers are standard when there is a one in ten thousand chance of collision, it is ultimately up to the operators to determine whether and when they will move. The limits of this decentralized approach to SSA were illustrated in September 2019 when a European Space Agency satellite veered off path to avoid a Starlink satellite whose operator missed an email notification signaling a high probability of collision.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, National Security, and Space
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America
56. North Korea Continues to Develop Its Nuclear Forces
- Author:
- Oskar Pietrewicz
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- North Korea is conducting further missile tests to check new types of weapons and increase the credibility of its nuclear deterrence. The adoption of a new nuclear doctrine that allows pre-emptive nuclear strikes also serves this purpose. North Korea is taking advantage of the period of tension between the U.S., Russia, and China, which prevent the UN Security Council from adopting further sanctions. In this situation, the U.S. and its allies should strengthen defence and deterrence capabilities against North Korea and set achievable goals to reduce the risk of escalation of tensions before possible negotiations.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Asia and North Korea
57. Inside China’s Techno-Security State
- Author:
- Tai Ming Cheung
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
- Abstract:
- Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has significantly elevated the importance of national security and technological innovation in the country’s overall priorities. He has invested considerable time, effort, and political capital to establish an expansive techno-security state based upon his strategic and ideological vision. This brief examines the five major methods Xi’s administration has undertaken to develop its techno-security state: developing a national security state, innovation-driven development, military strengthening, military-civilian fusion, and economic securitization.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Industrial Policy, International Security, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific
58. North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 6
- Author:
- John Coyne and Grace Stanhope
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 6, is a series of articles published in The Strategist over the last six months, building on previous volumes by identifying critical intersections of national security, nation-building and Australia’s north. This issue, like previous volumes, includes a wide range of articles sourced from a diverse pool of expert contributors writing on topics as varied as maritime law enforcement, equatorial space launch, renewable energy infrastructure, rare earths and critical minerals, agriculture, Industry 4.0, advanced manufacturing, fuel and water security, and defence force posturing. It also features a foreword by the Honourable Madeleine King MP, Minister for Northern Australia. Minister King writes, “Northern Australia promises boundless opportunity and potential. It is the doorway to our region and key to our future prosperity.” The 24 articles propose concrete, real-world actions for policy-makers to facilitate the development, prosperity and security of Australia’s north. The authors share a sense that those things that make the north unique – its vast space, low population density, specific geography, and harsh investment environment – are characteristics that can be leveraged, not disadvantages.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, Infrastructure, Law Enforcement, Space, and Renewable Energy
- Political Geography:
- Australia and Asia-Pacific
59. US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue: Responding to Increased Chinese Aggressiveness
- Author:
- Jeffrey Ordaniel
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Pacific Forum
- Abstract:
- Taiwan is already under attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) politically, economically, psychologically, and militarily—the latter through more aggressive Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gray zone military operations short of actual direct conflict. This multidimensional threat requires a multidimensional response in ways that complement and enhance military deterrence. PRC behavior represents a global problem that demands a global response. PRC pressure on Taiwan has increased considerably over the past year, even before Beijing used the visit by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi as an excuse to further ramp up pressure. The August 2022 PLA military exercise around Taiwan appears aimed at further creating a “new normal” that could reduce warning times should Beijing invade. However, such PRC actions are not “normal.” They are unilateral, destabilizing, and, in some instances, illegal changes to the status quo. Such Chinese pressure tactics, combined with the “wake up call” provided by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, have sensitized the citizens and governments of Taiwan, the United States, and the international community to the growing possibility—if not probability—of a PRC invasion and have increased public perceptions about the need and willingness to defend Taiwan democracy. The PRC’s nuclear build-up is also a great cause of concern. This concern is driven not by the threat of nuclear war (given US nuclear superiority) but by the possibility of nuclear blackmail aimed at discouraging Washington from getting involved in a Taiwan confrontation. Taiwanese are concerned about crisis escalation (especially to the nuclear level) but worry more about the PRC deterring the United States. The United States, working closely with allies and other like-minded states, should be more proactive and less reactive in responding to increased PRC aggressive behavior. With the US Department of Defense (DoD) in the lead, the US Government needs to better assess Chinese strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis Taiwan with an eye toward countering strengths and exploiting weaknesses, while also examining ways to broaden the challenge along multiple fronts in cooperation with various allies and partners. Think tanks can and should supplement this analysis. While continued strong support for Ukraine is important to demonstrate Western resolve and prevent more Russian territorial gains, the PRC remains the “pacing threat” and thus should remain the focus of US national security policy and defense procurement strategy.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Deterrence, Dialogue, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America
60. Takeaways From a Time of Increased Friction: South Korea-Japan Security Cooperation From 2015 to Present
- Author:
- Naoko Aoki
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- South Korea and Japan share common challenges and liberal democratic values but have been unable to build a close security relationship, due mainly to their political differences. This paper examines the two countries’ defense cooperation in the bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral arenas over the past six years to explore how the external security environment, as well as bilateral political problems, have affected their joint activities. The paper’s analysis shows that defense cooperation between South Korea and Japan is not always a binary choice between full cooperation or no cooperation. The two countries not only weigh external threats and bilateral problems, but also ponder such factors as U.S. encouragement to adjust the scope of their cooperation. The paper also shows that while the main constraint for security cooperation between South Korea and Japan is their historical animosity, in recent years, frictions involving the countries’ armed forces have become a new reason for limiting cooperation. As a result, grassroots military-to-military exchanges between the two countries, which in the past continued despite political problems, have largely stopped since late 2018. The paper concludes by proposing that South Korea and Japan work to restore routine bilateral working-level exchanges. It also recommends that the United States continue to urge the two countries to cooperate, and that multilateral exercises be employed as forums for cooperation between the two armed forces, as that is an area that is least impacted by bilateral problems.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- Japan, Asia, and South Korea
61. Takeaways From a Time of Increased Friction: South Korea-Japan Security Cooperation From 2015 to Present
- Author:
- Naoko Aoki
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
- Abstract:
- South Korea and Japan share common challenges and liberal democratic values but have been unable to build a close security relationship, due mainly to their political differences. This paper examines the two countries’ defense cooperation in the bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral arenas over the past six years to explore how the external security environment, as well as bilateral political problems, have affected their joint activities. The paper’s analysis shows that defense cooperation between South Korea and Japan is not always a binary choice between full cooperation or no cooperation. The two countries not only weigh external threats and bilateral problems, but also ponder such factors as U.S. encouragement to adjust the scope of their cooperation. The paper also shows that while the main constraint for security cooperation between South Korea and Japan is their historical animosity, in recent years, frictions involving the countries’ armed forces have become a new reason for limiting cooperation. As a result, grassroots military-to-military exchanges between the two countries, which in the past continued despite political problems, have largely stopped since late 2018. The paper concludes by proposing that South Korea and Japan work to restore routine bilateral working-level exchanges. It also recommends that the United States continue to urge the two countries to cooperate, and that multilateral exercises be employed as forums for cooperation between the two armed forces, as that is an area that is least impacted by bilateral problems.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- Japan, Asia, South Korea, and North Korea
62. The ‘Magnificent Seven’ of European Defence Integration
- Author:
- Spyros Blavoukos and Panos Politis-Lamprou
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- Defence cooperation in the EU is growing, reflecting the European citizens’ view of the EU as a security enhancer. This policy paper takes stock of current developments and analyses the positions of seven EU member-states on defence integration (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, Portugal, and Greece). The ‘Magnificent Seven’ are key players in this process, not least because of their large defence budgets and their engagement in the existing forms of cooperation. We examine the defence budget of the seven countries and their breakdown, as well as their participation in Battlegroups, EU military operations and missions, and PESCO projects. The analysis provides significant insights on the national defence priorities. The seven countries form overlapping clusters, according to their political status and aspirations in the European integration process, their economic condition, their geographical location, and their relations with the US and NATO. All of them are facing significant dilemmas and engage in subtle balancing acts, which explains the slow and arduous path of European defence integration.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, and Regional Integration
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Greece, France, Poland, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Portugal
63. The Central Asian Perspective on Turkey: Does Family Come First?
- Author:
- Oğul Tuna
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
- Abstract:
- In our latest issue of Turkeyscope, Oğul Tuna discusses the changing role of Turkey in Central Asia in recent years. This essay argues that ethnolinguistic links have helped improve relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but each Central Asian state has its own calculations that factor into separate diplomatic, cultural, and defense deals with Turkey.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Culture, Ethnicity, and Language
- Political Geography:
- Central Asia and Turkey
64. Unlocking European Defence. In Search of the Long Overdue Paradigm Shift
- Author:
- Arnout Molenaar
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- The European Union’s range of new EU security and defence initiatives are ground-breaking, but they can only deliver on their potential if member states shift the paradigm towards truly thinking, acting and working together as Europeans, based on a strategic consensus regarding the future of European defence in the changing global context. The new Strategic Compass, to be adopted by the Council in early 2022, provides a framework to develop such a shared vision. It should help to operationalise the EU’s strategic autonomy in concrete terms, in mutual reinforcement and coherence with NATO, while seizing the opportunity to strike a new transatlantic bargain with the Biden Administration. In this context, the Union should agree on concrete steps forward to become a more active security provider abroad, reinforce its resilience and protection at home, enhance its operational readiness for different scenarios, and develop new capabilities through deeper cooperation while stepping up its cooperation with partners.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe
65. National Security Policy Recommendations for Israel’s 36th Government
- Author:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Eleven policy prescriptions for Israel’s new government, reflecting the insights of JISS fellows who jointly surveyed the challenges Israel’s leaders are facing and crafted these diplomatic and defense policy emphases.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Israel
66. There is No Clear-Cut Solution for Gaza
- Author:
- Yaakov Amidror
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- There are plenty of nice plans for Gaza, but none that will change the core truth: Hamas will continue to seek Israel’s destruction, and Israel will continue to defend itself.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
67. Neither a Conscript Army nor an All-Volunteer Force: An Emergent IDF Model
- Author:
- Eyal Ben-Ari
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The IDF has chosen to enjoy the advantages of both a volunteer military and a conscript “people’s army,” by piecemeal combination of elements of both
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Army
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Israel
68. Opportunities for Danish stabilisation policy to engage with climate- and livelihood-related conflict: New approaches to fragility in the Horn of Africa and Sahel
- Author:
- Peer Schouten
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- The Horn of Africa and the Sahel are among the most fragile regions in the world: poor, lacking basic infrastructure and state presence across much of their respective territories, and both form hotbeds of conflict and political instability compounded by climate change. This DIIS Working Paper focuses on identifying evolving notions of fragility that could strengthen Danish stabilisation efforts in the Horn and Sahel. It foregrounds notions of fragility that move away from a focus on strong state institutions towards the adaptive capacities of populations in the hinterlands of the Horn and the Sahel to deal with conflict and climate variability. The paper gives an overview of this rapidly evolving field and distils key insights, challenges and future options by exploring the question, how can we support people in the Sahel and Horn to re-establish their responsibility for their respective territories and the management of their natural resources? The paper addresses this question by exploring the implications of recent climate change and livelihoods research on how we approach fragility and, by extension, stabilisation. On the basis of such research, the Working Paper advocates a move away from a sector-based understanding of fragility towards a way of working that is more in line with contextual realities, alongside the ‘comprehensive approach’ to stabilisation that Denmark promotes. The key message is that, programmatically, Danish stabilisation efforts across both regions could benefit from a more explicit focus on supporting the variability that dominant livelihood strategies require and that need to be considered if sustainable security and development outcomes are to be achieved. Failing to do this will only serve to marginalise key communities and may drive them further into the arms of radical groups.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Democratization, Development, Environment, Radicalization, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, and Justice
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Europe, Denmark, and Horn of Africa
69. ASEAN Matters for America/America Matters for ASEAN
- Author:
- East-West Center
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- East-West Center
- Abstract:
- This project maps the trade, investment, employment, business, diplomacy, security, education, tourism, and people-to-people connections between the United States and the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the national, state, and local levels. Part of the Asia Matters for America initiative, this publication, the one-page connections summaries for states, and the AsiaMattersforAmerica.org website are resources for understanding the robust and dynamic US-ASEAN relationship.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Agriculture, Diplomacy, Health, and Infrastructure
- Political Geography:
- Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America
70. Europe’s Missile Defence and Italy: Capabilities and Cooperation
- Author:
- Alessandro Marrone and Karolina Muti
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- Europe’s missile defence is structurally linked to NATO deterrence and defence architecture, and it has to face both a worsened international security environment and an accelerating, worldwide technological innovation. Russia and China are heavily investing in new hypersonic systems which dramatically decrease the time needed to reach the target by flying mostly within the atmosphere. The US remains a global leader in the development and deployment of missile defence capabilities, including the Aegis systems which represent the cornerstone of NATO integrate air and missile defence covering the Old Continent. European countries are increasingly collaborating within the EU framework on the related capability development, primarily via the TWISTER project under the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSCo). Being exposed to missile threats from Middle East and North Africa and participating to allied nuclear sharing, Italy has a primary interest in upgrading its military capabilities through PeSCo, maintaining them fully integrated within NATO, and involving the national defence industry in cutting-edge procurement programmes.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Science and Technology, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, France, Poland, Germany, Italy, North America, and United States of America
71. Cyber Defence in NATO Countries: Comparing Models
- Author:
- Alessandro Marrone and Ester Sabatino
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- In 2016 NATO recognised cyber as a domain comparable to the air, land and sea ones, in consideration of the growing number of cyberattacks and of their negative impact on the cyberspace, as well as on the “real world”. Both NATO and its member states have launched initiatives to better tackle the cyber challenge both operationally and in terms of capability development. Nevertheless, among major NATO’s members a common approach to cyber defence is still missing, thus generating a division among countries that pursue a more active defence – US, UK and France – and those that prefer a more defensive approach – Germany and Spain.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, and Cybersecurity
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, Spain, and United States of America
72. The Growing Threat Facing Israel from Iraq
- Author:
- Jonathan Spyer
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Iraq is already part of the northern crescent of threats facing Israel. The US presence, broader policy regarding Iran makes Israeli action in Iraq more complicated than in Syria.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Iraq, Middle East, and Israel
73. Egyptian Mediation between Israel and Hamas Can Be Useful
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 06-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- For the first time in 13 years, an Israeli foreign minister (Gabi Ashkenazi, a former Chief of Staff of the IDF) has visited Egypt for talks with his Egyptian counterpart (Sameh Shukri). At the same time, the head of Egyptian Intelligence, Abbas Kamel, landed in Israel to discuss the situation regarding Gaza with Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Gantz. Both visits are parts of a bid by President ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi to take the lead in stabilizing the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel and managing the next steps in the broader Israeli-Palestinian context. Egypt has already benefitted from this. The initiative broke the ice between Sisi and the Biden Administration. Israel, stands to gain, as well. Unlike their predecessors, Sisi and Shukri have welcomed the Abraham Accords. Israel and Egypt have common interests in the eastern Mediterranean. And the Egyptians, for their own reasons, do not trust Hamas. Still, Israel is entitled to insist that as mediators, the Egyptians should keep Jerusalem off the table. It would be dangerous for many in the region were Hamas to gain a strategic foothold there. Israel also should insist on a swift release of its citizens held by Hamas and the return of the bodies of dead soldiers held since 2014. Additionally, it would be useful for the Egyptian government to curb the coarse anti-Israeli and often antisemitic discourse in its state-owned media and the Egyptian public domain, which acts to constrain Cairo’s options.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Hamas
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Middle East, Israel, and Egypt
74. Who Won the 2021 Gaza War?
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Since war is about inflicting pain and sustaining pain, Israel clearly can be declared the winner of the recent confrontation.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
75. Iran and Hamas’s Jerusalem/Gaza offensive against Israel
- Author:
- Jonathan Spyer
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- As ever, Iran prefers to avoid direct involvement. But without its backing, support and expertise, the latest Hamas offensive against Israel would have been inconceivable.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Hamas
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
76. A Deterring Blow is Needed
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- IDF strikes on Gaza’s terrorists should be intense and aimed at causing severe damage to the intermediate level of command, infrastructure and weapons.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza
77. Israel’s Protracted Political Crisis Harms National Security
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- The power of the IDF, the potency of Israeli deterrence, the health of Israeli society, and the stability of Israel’s newest peace agreements with Arab counties – all are impacted negatively by continuing electoral indecision.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Religion, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Israel Defense Forces (IDF)
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Israel
78. The Concept of “Forward Defence”: How Has the Syrian Crisis Shaped the Evolution of Iran’s Military Strategy?
- Author:
- Hamidreza Azizi
- Publication Date:
- 02-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
- Abstract:
- Over the past decade, Iranian officials have repeatedly referred to “forward defence” or “offensive defence” as the foundation of Iran’s military strategy. While the concept implies the inclusion of offensive aspects into Iran’s military strategy, which used to have an overwhelmingly defensive nature, it is also increasingly used to justify Iran’s military presence beyond its borders. This paper begins with a historical overview of the evolution of Iran’s military strategy, especially since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, showing how the concept of “deterrence” has become the cornerstone of its strategic military planning. It also discusses the crucial concept of “strategic depth”. Understanding these basic concepts is essential to be able to analyse the forward defence strategy, its main elements, and the domestic, regional, and international factors contributing to its formation. The paper also explores how the Syrian crisis has affected Iran’s military strategy in both conceptual and instrumental terms, leading to the formation and consolidation of the forward defence. Conceptually, Iran has justified its direct military presence far from its borders as necessary for confronting threats at their source before they reach Iranian territory. From an instrumental point of view, Iran’s involvement in the Syrian crisis has led to the development of Iran’s regional network of non-state allies and proxies, while adding a new layer to Iran’s deterrence vis-à-vis Israel. The main argument is that forward defence is not a new military doctrine but an evolved and updated form of “deterrence”. The paper also identifies Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programmes, its support for non-state actors across the region, and its focus on developing cyberwar capabilities as the main elements of its forward defence strategy, rooted in its perception that it is located in an increasingly insecure regional environment. Finally, the paper suggests that, for the United States to reach an agreement with Iran on these missile and regional issues, Washington and its regional allies must make reciprocal concessions to alleviate Iran’s sense of threat to its security and survival. In this case, Iran might be ready to make concessions on its allied and proxy militias in Yemen and Syria, although the more complex security and political situations in Iraq and Lebanon leave Tehran with comparably less leverage. While Iran is not expected to agree on considerably limiting its missile programme, an agreement on the range of its ballistic missiles could be achievable.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Missile Defense, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Iran and Middle East
79. The EU’s Defense Ambitions: Understanding the Emergence of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Complex
- Author:
- Raluca Csernatoni
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Is the European Union (EU) about to rise as a defense technological actor on the world stage? According to conventional wisdom, attempts at greater European integration in security and defense were not likely to amount to much, given that such policy fields have long been considered the reserved domain of the EU member states or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This working paper goes beyond this traditional state-centered approach by looking at past and recent institutional efforts to consolidate European security and cooperation on defense industry and technology. Such efforts have continued despite the disruptions caused by the coronavirus pandemic, owing to the bloc’s willingness to become a stronger security and defense actor on the global stage. The timing of this shift was facilitated by a set of circumstances that triggered a new European defense momentum. Contributing factors include the geopolitical pressures of Brexit, an unreliable transatlantic partner in the United States, concerns within European defense industries regarding dwindling national defense budgets and fierce global technological competition in high technology areas, and the European Commission’s growing supranational role in security and defense. This impetus was also facilitated by the privileged relationship between various EU institutions, European defense industrial actors, transnational interest and lobby groups, and organized expert bodies. In this respect, the defense industry and high-level expert and interest groups have occupied a central position in shaping EU policy processes, funding priorities, and security and defense research programs. Such a rapprochement between EU institutional structures and the European defense industry has allowed for the emergence of a so-called European defense technological and industrial complex (EDTIC). This European defense industrial ecosystem encompasses a wider variety of transnational actors beyond the political, military, and industrial groups typically present in national military-industrial complexes. It presents a dense, multilevel network of EU institutions and agencies; security and industrial stakeholders; national public authorities; and interest and expert groups, all of which both compete and cooperate to shape and set policy agendas. However, this rapprochement is also characterized by the absence of strong democratic control mechanisms and little political and public accountability concerning the surge in and direction of the European defense technological and industrial integration process. These transformations have the potential to make the union a more capable and strategically autonomous global defense technological actor. At the same time, they challenge existing EU democratic governance structures and processes. The EU’s security and defense policies remain tough areas for parliamentary scrutiny and democratic oversight. The EU’s policymaking institutional machinery has been finely tuned to mediate power, keep things as technical and bureaucratic as possible, and to create package deals for certain defense industrial interests and member states’ political agendas. Yet, for real European integration in the field of security and defense, more political and democratic trust is needed across the continent.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Europe
80. Structural Shifts and Regional Security: A View from Israel
- Author:
- Ehud Eiran
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- Israel is still holding to its traditional security maxim. Based on a perception of a hostile region, Israel’s response includes early warning, deterrence and swift – including pre-emptive – military action, coupled with an alliance with a global power, the US. Israel is adjusting these maxims to a changing reality. Overlapping interests – and perhaps the prospect of an even more open conflict with Iran – led to limited relationships between Israel and some Gulf states. These, however, will be constrained until Israel makes progress on the Palestine issue. Israel aligned with Greece and Cyprus around energy and security, which may lead to conflict with Turkey. Russia’s deployment in Syria placed new constraints on Israeli freedom of action there. The US’s retrenchment from the Middle East is not having a direct effect on Israel, while the Trump administration’s support for Israel’s territorial designs in the West Bank may make it easier for Israel to permanently expand there, thus sowing the seeds for future instability in Israel/Palestine. The EU could try and balance against such developments, but, as seen from Israel, is too divided to have a significant impact. Paper produced in the framework of the FEPS-IAI project “Fostering a New Security Architecture in the Middle East”, April 2020.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Gas, and Hezbollah
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Greece, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, United States of America, and Mediterranean
81. Israel-Egypt Cooperation in 2019: Strategic Warming, Civilian Coolness?
- Author:
- Haim Koren
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
- Abstract:
- Since President Abdel Fatah a-Sisi’s rise to power in 2014, Israeli-Egyptian ties have been marked by defense-strategic cooperation. This is based on the shared perception of Iran and radical Islamist terror organizations as a threat, and the common interest in managing the Palestinian issue, in general, and specifically the Gaza arena. In the inherent tension between ideology and national interests, Egypt continues to strive for an agreement between Israel and the Palestinians (Fatah, Hamas and the other Palestinian factions) and seeks to bring about internal Palestinian reconciliation beforehand (between the leaderships in Ramallah and Gaza). Its role as a key mediator between Hamas and Israel is crucial, and is in line with Egypt’s international standing as an important regional leader.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Gaza, and Egypt
82. Australia as a Rising Middle Power
- Author:
- Malcolm Davis
- Publication Date:
- 04-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
- Abstract:
- This paper examines the key drivers shaping Australia’s role as a middle power in an era of intensifying US-China strategic competition. These drivers include the influence of strategic geography; its historical legacy in international affairs; the impact of its economic relationships with states in the Indo-Pacific region; the changing demands of defence policy, including the potential offered by rapid technological change; and, the impact of climate change, resource constraints and demographic factors. The paper considers three possible scenarios that will shape Australia’s middle power policy choices – a US-China strategic equilibrium; a “China crash” scenario that promotes a more nationalist and assertive Chinese foreign policy; and a third “major power conflict” scenario where competition extends into military conflict. The paper concludes that Australia cannot maintain a delicate balance between its strategic alliance with the US and trading relationship with China. It argues there is a need for Australia to adopt a deeper strategic alliance with the US while promoting closer ties with its partners in the Indo-Pacific and supporting the growth of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific region to counterbalance growing Chinese power. Australia needs to embrace an Indo-Pacific step up, and as a middle power, reduce the prospect of a Sino-centric regional order emerging.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nationalism, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, Asia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific
83. Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation: What history suggests about future scenarios
- Author:
- Charly Salonius-Pasternak
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden has a history that far predates the most recent ‘reignition’ of 2014, and is now deeper than at any time in the past. In 2020, Sweden and Finland can contribute to each other’s defence in an integrated and planned fashion; but any plans are best viewed as being supplementary to national preparations. While the security interests of Finland and Sweden have overlapped historically, cooperation has often been limited due to a combination of domestic drivers and foreign pressures, as well as the nature of the international security system. Yet these same variables are currently permitting even deeper cooperation. Four future paths of cooperation are identifiable, with the most likely being a continuation of bilateral deepening, with added trilateral cooperation with Norway and the United States.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Finland, Sweden, and Scandinavia
84. The deepening Finnish-Swedish security and defence relationship: From operative cooperation to ‘strategic interoperability’?
- Author:
- Matti Pesu and Tuomas Iso-Markku
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation has taken significant steps. Currently, the two countries engage in operative planning, which constitutes a significant part of their new cooperation agenda. Although interoperability between the Finnish and Swedish armed forces is crucial for the bilateral defence relationship, the countries should be ‘interoperable’ at the strategic level as well. Neither Finland’s and Sweden’s strategic cultures nor their decision-making systems or legislation are entirely similar. However, military non-alignment, similar threat perceptions and a shared assessment of their security environment facilitate their cooperation. In view of the future, questions remain about the two countries’ readiness to enter mutual defence commitments. There is also a need to ensure that their basic messages concerning the bilateral defence relationship are aligned. Over the longer term, the idea that one’s neighbour is worth defending should be entrenched in the strategic cultures of both states. This requires active nurturing of the already close relations between their national security communities.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Finland, Sweden, and Scandinavia
85. Finnish foreign policy during EU membership: Unlocking the EU’s security potential
- Author:
- Matti Pesu, Tuomas Iso-Markku, and Juha Jokela
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- This FIIA Finnish Foreign Policy Paper looks at the evolution of Finnish foreign and security policy during the country’s 25 years as an EU member. The paper aims to trace how – and with what kind of consequences – Finnish foreign and security policy has interacted with EU foreign policy during the membership period. More specifically, the study examines the interlinkage between Finnish and EU foreign policy in relation to three different topics: the policy towards and relations with Russia, security and defence, and Finland’s broadening international agenda. The paper argues that the Finnish policy vis-à-vis the three domains is marked by different patterns of continuity and change. However, the rise of a protective agenda in the Finnish policy towards Russia, Finland’s increased boldness in advancing the EU’s security and defence dimension, and the recent emphasis on the Union’s role as a bulwark against geo-economic threats all indicate that the EU’s role in enhancing Finnish security has become a top priority. Indeed, Finland is currently endeavouring to unlock the EU’s potential as a security community.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Finland, and Scandinavia
86. Government reports on Finnish foreign and security policy: Relevant but not without problems
- Author:
- Henri Vanhanen
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Finnish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- The government reports on foreign and security policy have become a well-established and recognized practice in which the Government of Finland issues a report generally once during the parliamentary term. The reports can be regarded as comprehensive and strategic documents, whose purpose is to signal the strategic directions of Finland’s present and future policy for both domestic and foreign readers. Regardless of the government reports’ institutionalized role in Finnish foreign and security policy practices, they are not without problems. The main issue with the current report process is linked to the quickly changing operational environment. Thus, a more frequent process such as an annual announcement on foreign and security policy to support the government reports should be considered. It is relevant to ask whether the current tradition of producing reports is the most effective way to outline or signal Finland’s overall foreign and security policy. In order to address the issues of the reporting process, alternative methods to support and evaluate Finland’s foreign and security policy should be considered.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Finland, and Scandinavia
87. Trump, the Middle East, and North Africa: Just Leave Things to the Proxies?
- Author:
- Sven Biscop
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- When Trump says that he wants NATO to take more responsibility in the Middle East, what he means is that he wants the European allies to do more. He is campaigning for re- election and has promised to bring the boys (and girls) home for Christmas. And of course, in Iraq American troops are less than welcome these days, after the targeted assassination of Iranian General Soleimani near Baghdad airport (3 January 2020). In late 2019, Trump had already withdrawn most troops from Syria, and now the peace agreement with the Taliban (29 February 2020) will allow him to draw down the US military presence in Afghanistan too. And the US is considering pulling its troops out of the Sahel as well. What does this mean for Europe?
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Assassination
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and North America
88. Will a European Security Council Bring Strategic Relevance?
- Author:
- Jo Coelmont
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- Europe is looking to be a global player rather than just a global playground. To achieve this, it needs a security council. This is essential for gaining strategic relevance. Europe needs to have recourse not only to international fora but also to a series of instruments of hard and soft power. Swift decision making at the appropriate level is of paramount importance. Such a security council should meet a number of requirements: it must be representative, be able to both achieve unity of vision and undertake action smoothly, and keep going until the desired end-state has been achieved. Several proposals have been made as to the composition of such a body. I will look into the four most discussed options. Are we spoilt for choice?
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North Atlantic, and North America
89. Exploring Armed Groups in Libya:
- Author:
- Emadeddin Badi
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
- Abstract:
- Libya’s security sector has become virtually unrecognizable from what it was a decade ago owing to the transformations brought about since the 2011 revolution. This evolution has implications on any attempts to usher in short-term and interim security arrangements as well as longer-term security sector reform (SSR) efforts. The paper explores the impact of different dimensions of these transformations on security provision in the Libyan landscape. In doing so, it aims to highlight the implications this has on attempts to reform the country’s hybrid security sector, and more broadly, how SSR doctrine can be informed by its findings.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Governance, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Africa and Libya
90. Biowar next? Security implications of the coronavirus
- Author:
- Karsten Friis
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- What are the possible short-, medium- and long-term implications of the coronavirus for global security and defence? In this Strategic Update, Karsten Friis investigates the pandemic's potential consequences for the world, its armed forces, the integration of Europe, US-China relations, as well as the concept and practice of 'war' more broadly. Although much remains uncertain, the disruptions which are beginning to emerge demand a reckoning with a changed world -- and world order.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, War, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and United States of America
91. Dealing with Russia: Towards a Coherent Belgian Policy
- Author:
- Alexander Mattelaer and Laura Vansina
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- Belgo-Russian relations are mired in paradox. For several years, the relationship between the Russian Federation on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the other has been characterized by mistrust. As a founding member of these multilateral organisations, Belgium has been a full part of the decision-making process that has formulated a hardening stance towards the Russian Federation. Yet on a bilateral level, Belgium has pragmatically upheld what is left of commercial cooperation and cultural exchanges. In order to deal with this paradox, Belgium should formulate a more coherent approach towards Russia that focuses on upholding the European order and security whilst maintaining dialogue and engaging the Russian Federation. This requires the new Belgian government to engage in a delicate balancing act that can be articulated in the forthcoming National Security Strategy, in the Belgian positions in the EU and NATO, and in the bilateral relationship with Moscow. This Egmont Paper aspires to provide both analytical background and novel ideas which can be used to such a purpose. When analysing Russian foreign policy, it can only be acknowledged that the annex- ation of Crimea in 2014 fundamentally challenged the rules-based international order. Yet to understand Russian behaviour, it is imperative to reach back in time to the late 1990s and early 2000s. Ever since, Russia’s main goal on the international stage has been the re-establishment of its Great Power status. To this end, it has sought to consolidate security buffers in the form of geographical and psychological depth. Most notably, it involved the promotion of the ‘Russian World’ (Russkiy Mir), the conduct of operations in the grey zone between war and peace, and a fair dose of strategic opportunism. Whilst perhaps understandable, this assertive foreign policy has negatively affected Belgian interests in a variety of ways. Belgo-Russian relations constitute a true kaleidoscope ranging from cooperation to conflict. Bilateral trade has largely recovered from the 2014-2015 shock resulting from the sanctions regime – even if the trade balance remains a negative one. Cultural and academic exchanges continue, in line with the little-known 1993 Belgo- Russian Treaty on Understanding and Cooperation. Yet politically, conflict has been on the increase. Russia has been actively challenging and contesting the multilateral framework that Belgium holds dear. In addition, Belgium has become the target of Russian disinformation and other grey zone operations. As it is unlikely that Russia will tone down its assertive foreign policy anytime soon, Belgium would do well to articulate a more coherent approach. This needs to clarify Belgian policy priorities, communicate Belgian positions towards the Russian government, and educate the domestic audience about the evolving relationship with the Russian Federation.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Belgium
92. Belgium Should Not Change Strategy on Her Contribution to NATO's Nuclear Role Sharing
- Author:
- Didier Audenaert
- Publication Date:
- 12-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- In this policy brief, the author focusses on NATO’s nuclear dimension. He highlights key challenges in the European security environment and explains essential charac- teristics of NATO’s deterrence and collective defence, and its contribution to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. He then briefly describes the contributions of NATO’s nuclear states (and in particular France’s) to collective security and defence. All Allies (except France) participate in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), NATO’s senior body on nuclear matters. NATO’s nuclear role sharing is at the heart of this policy brief: US nuclear weapons carried by European dual-capable aircraft (DCA). The author argues emphatically as to why American nuclear weapons should be kept on European soil and the current DCA countries should maintain the status quo. Tangible recommendations follow on in terms of Belgian’s foreign security policy and defence, many of which are also highly likely to apply to other DCA countries.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Belgium, and North America
93. China Global Security Tracker, No.6
- Author:
- Helena Legarda
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- China hits back after NATO calls it a security challenge, dormant Chinese hacking group resumes attacks, and more.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Diplomacy
- Political Geography:
- United States, China, Europe, North Atlantic, Beijing, Asia, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka
94. European defence policy in an era of renewed great-power competition
- Author:
- Douglas Barrie, Lucie béraud-Sudreau, Henry Boyd, Nick Childs, Bastain Giegerich, James Hackett, and Meia Nouwens
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- In 2019, European governments’ combined defence spending, when measured in constant 2015 US dollar terms, surpassed the level reached in 2009, before the financial and economic crisis led to a series of significant defence-spending cuts. However, a different strategic paradigm – one that Europe is struggling to adjust to and which is once more a concern for European governments – has re-appeared in this past decade: great-power competition. Russia attempted to change international borders in Europe through the use of force in 2014 by annexing Crimea and continues to support an armed insurgency in eastern Ukraine. Moscow’s challenge to Euro-Atlantic security exists in multiple dimensions: as both a conventional military and also a hybrid-warfare issue, with Russia working to dislocate existing societal alignments and disrupt political processes in Western states. The poisoning of a former Russian intelligence officer (and of his daughter) in the United Kingdom, attributed by the British government to Russia, underlines further how much the character of conflict has changed. How to manage the challenge Russia poses without simply reverting to Cold War logic remains a worrying problem for governments in NATO and the European Union member states. Meanwhile, European security establishments are beginning to recognise the growing political, economic and military influence of a rising China. Although less of an immediate challenge, China’s growth in these areas has possible profound consequences in the long run. Indeed, in December 2019, NATO declared: ‘We recognise that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.’2 For the United States, China has already become the pacing military threat. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, released in June 2019, opens with the assertion that ‘the Indo-Pacific is the Department of Defense’s priority theater’. In other words, the European theatre is not. European analysts and officials have begun to wonder whether the US might begin to see Europe through an Asian lens, seeking to generate European commitments to the Indo-Pacific region, or at the very least getting Europeans to take on greater responsibility for their own security and thereby freeing up US resources. Although there will be some elements of the US military presence in Europe that are indispensable to US military action in other regions of the world, that might not be enough to sustain Washington’s firm commitment to European security in the future, regardless of who occupies the White House. Significantly, not even the US has the capability to fight two major wars simultaneously any more, meaning binary choices regarding focus are inevitable. As some observers have argued, Europeans need to urgently assess what Washington’s choices in this regard – and their implications for Europe – might look like. Considering both how to deter Russia and what a European contribution to containing China might entail represents a major challenge for Western European nations, which have relegated defence to a secondary position, as almost a discretionary activity. European states partially demobilised in the 1990s and early 2000s, intellectually and in terms of their force structures, in response to the end of the Cold War. For example, according to IISS data, in 1990 West Germany alone was thought to be able to field 215 combat battalions and the UK 94. Today it is a fraction of that. However, security challenges relating to regional instability, crisis management and transnational terrorism – which all dominated the previous two decades – have not disappeared. On the contrary, all these still demand attention and the investment of European resources. While there is a growing recognition among Europe’s analytical community, and some governments, that things cannot simply continue as before in terms of regional security and defence, coherence and resolve among core actors in the Euro-Atlantic sphere have weakened. The US administration has intensified its call for better transatlantic burden sharing, at the same time displaying a cavalier attitude to the collective-defence commitment enshrined in NATO. France’s President Emmanuel Macron has also expressed severe doubts about the viability of NATO’s collective-defence mission. In addition, the British decision to leave the European Union in 2020 implies that the EU has lost one of its most militarily experienced and one of its most capable member states. There is a tendency among many observers and some politicians to argue that European NATO and EU member states need to clarify the political dimension of their defence ambition, via-à-vis greater strategic autonomy, before resolving the problem of how to meet this ambition militarily, at what cost and in what time frame. Indeed, at times, the debate about European strategic autonomy seems to focus more on the degree of independence from the US that its various proponents would like to achieve and less on the military requirement that autonomy is meant to respond to. It is now widely accepted across Europe that Europeans need ‘to do more’ for their own security and defence. Most of the intellectual energy allocated to this aspiration is spent on achieving better coordination – and even a level of integration – among European armed forces. This is useful, but only if it is directed at building capability to provide for the defence of Europe. The existing military capabilities of the European NATO member states fall short when compared to the force requirements generated by the political–military level of ambition as defined by NATO, or for that matter the EU.5 However, this should not be an excuse to lower the level of ambition, nor should the assumption that Europeans are unable to defend themselves be declared an inevitability. Defence output is the result of political, financial and military choices by governments. To think systematically about the challenge of providing capabilities that can meet Europe’s emerging military requirements, The International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hanns Seidel Foundation convened a group of thinkers and practitioners from Germany and the UK. The group took seriously the US assertion that Europe needs to be able to provide for its own defence. If Europeans can achieve this, they will be valuable partners to the US in upholding and strengthening the liberal international order on which Euro-Atlantic prosperity and security depend. Meeting twice in 2019, the group discussed threat assessments, debated European capability gaps and scoped potential approaches to addressing them. The following pages draw on the group’s deliberations but do not represent a consensus position.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Military Spending
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America
95. Tunisia’s Wake-Up Call: How Security Challenges From Libya Are Shaping Defense Reforms
- Author:
- Frederic M. Wehrey
- Publication Date:
- 03-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The escalation and spillover of Libya's conflict has posed mounting security challenges for Tunisia and exposed shortfalls in the country's defense transformation, in the areas of capability gaps, interagency coordination, intelligence sharing, strategic planning, and in the military's relationship with foreign security patrons.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Libya, North Africa, and Tunisia
96. The Visegrád Four and the Security of NATO’s “Eastern Flank”
- Author:
- Eoin Micheál McNamara
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute of International Relations Prague
- Abstract:
- Eoin Micheál McNamara in his Policy Paper called The Visegrád Four and the Security of NATO’s “Eastern Flank” expresses the argument that there is considerable scope for the V4 states to improve their contribution to NATO’s collective defence posture. Based on this fact, he argues the different strategic positions of each V4 member within the NATO membership related to Russian influence.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
- Political Geography:
- Russia and Europe
97. Talking Points for the Top National Security Issues of 2020
- Author:
- Mieke Eoyang
- Publication Date:
- 05-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Third Way
- Abstract:
- In 2020, candidates and elected officials will face questions on national security and foreign policy issues. In this memo, we provide short talking points on these issues that acknowledge the concerns of Americans, critique current approaches and policies, and present a vision for the future: 1. Global Health Security, 2. China & COVID-19, 3. China Trade War, 4. Russia, 5. Terrorism, 6. Domestic Extremism, 7. Iran, 8. Election Security, 9. Saudi Arabia & Yemen, 10. Syria, 11. Alliances, 12. North Korea, 13. Cyberthreats, 14. Venezuela, 15. Afghanistan, 16. Forever War, 17. Border Security, 18. Defense Spending, 19. Impeachment, 20. Climate Change, 21. Corruption
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Elections
- Political Geography:
- United States, North America, and Global Focus
98. Alliance capabilities at 70: achieving agility for an uncertain future
- Author:
- Camille Grand and Matthew Gillis
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- The credibility of any alliance depends on its ability to deliver deterrence and defence for the safety and secu- rity of its members. Without capability, any alliance is deprived of credibility and exists only on paper. De- spite a rocky history – up to and including the current debate on burden-sharing – capability lies at the heart of NATO’s success. There is good cause to draw opti- mism from the Alliance’s accomplishments throughout its 70 years in providing a framework for developing effective and interoperable capabilities. However, the future promises serious challenges for NATO’s capabilities, driven primarily by new and dis- ruptive technology offering both opportunities and threats in defence applications. Moreover, develop- ments in these areas are, in some cases, being led by potential adversaries, while also simultaneously mov- ing at a pace that requires a constant effort to adapt on the part of the Alliance. On the occasion of NATO’s 70th anniversary, the future outlook requires a serious conversation about NATO’s adaptability to embrace transformation and develop an agile footing to ensure its future relevance.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North Atlantic, and North America
99. It’s that time of the decade again: some considerations for NATO’s eighth Strategic Concept
- Author:
- Jeffrey H. Michaels
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- In the Declaration that emerged from the Decem- ber 2019 London Leaders Meeting, NATO Secre- tary General Jens Stoltenberg was tasked to present Foreign Ministers with “a forward-looking reflection process under his auspices, drawing on relevant exper- tise, to further strengthen NATO’s political dimension including consultation”. This new tasking has been largely attributed to French President Emmanuel Ma- cron’s remark the previous month that the Alliance was suffering from “brain death”. Speaking at a press conference alongside Stoltenberg, Macron elaborated on his comment, complaining the Alliance was overly focused on “cost-sharing or burden-sharing” whereas too little attention was being placed on major policy issues such as “peace in Europe, the post-INF, the re- lationship with Russia, the issue of Turkey, who is the enemy?”3
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Turkey, and North America
100. The case for NATO’s global partnership with India
- Author:
- Abdurrahman Utku Hacioglu
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- India is a country rarely discussed in any of NA- TO’s operational activities, regional dialogues, or global partnerships. This rarity, however, is likely to change because of shifting political and economic trends, emerging threats from outside NATO’s tradi- tional Euro-Atlantic area, and the necessity to adapt to changing circumstances. Taking account of the emerging multi-polarity in the Asia-Pacific and the US resistance to change, India will become a key country to counter-balance China’s and Russia’s growing influ- ence, to project stability and strengthen security in the Asia-Pacific region in the near future. NATO should take advantage of the opportunity, consider India as a key strategic partner, and include India within NA- TO’s growing strategic partnership framework as a “Partner Across the Globe”.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
- Political Geography:
- Russia, North Atlantic, India, Asia, and North America