Number of results to display per page
Search Results
82. European Democracy Support Annual Review 2024
- Author:
- Richard Youngs, Kinga Brudzinska, Zselyke Csaky, Ricardo Farinha, and Ken Godfrey
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- In 2024, a series of elections reinforced EU concerns about the fragility of European democracies. This, coupled with intensifying conflict dynamics and authoritarian trends worldwide, led the EU to focus on protecting democracy at home at the expense of supporting it globally.
- Topic:
- Civil Society, Authoritarianism, Reform, European Union, Democracy, and Democratic Backsliding
- Political Geography:
- Europe
83. International Crimes Accountability Matters in Post-Assad Syria
- Author:
- Federica D'Alessandra
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Syria’s civil war has already changed the global accountability landscape. It could now set the course for the future of post-regime transitions.
- Topic:
- Syrian War, Accountability, International Crime, and Bashar al-Assad
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Syria
84. Assessing National Information Ecosystems
- Author:
- Alicia Wanless, Samantha Lai, and John Hicks
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Often driven by misunderstanding, fears abound over how new technologies will change an information ecosystem.1 They might, and they might not. Either way, it’s extremely difficult to know what those changes will be without first understanding what an ecosystem was like before the introduction of those new technologies. In other words, to know how a system has changed, one must first know what constitutes the system and its prior state. This paper proffers factors that can constitute baselines for assessing national information ecosystems that can be measured across decades, geographies, and cultures. Assessing these factors over time and comparing them among countries can foster understanding of the impacts of new regulations, conflicts, and technologies. Perhaps more importantly, such an approach offers an objective analysis of information ecosystems, which is much needed in these politically charged times. The framework can also be used to identify existing gaps in knowledge, guiding policymakers and researchers on funding and research priorities to establish baselines of national information ecosystems. As those baselines are established and maintained, comparative analysis between ecosystems can generate insights on policy interventions to redress threats within them.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology and Information Technology
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus
85. Regional deprivation, individual prospects, and political resentment
- Author:
- Giovanni Facchini, Anja Neundorf, Sergi Pardos-Prado, and Cecilia Testa
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
- Abstract:
- Regional economic conditions affect livelihoods and the geography of political resentment. Yet, individuals do not equally partake in their region’s economic fortunes, and their perceptions of relative deprivation need not be the same. Grievances are likely to be shaped not only by income disparities but also by how personal prospects are tied to regional conditions. We argue that the interaction between subjective individual and regional relative deprivation crucially affects perceptions of shared experience and systemic unfairness. Through a large-scale survey experiment in Britain, we provide causal evidence that poor individuals in poor regions express more political resentment due to diminished personal financial prospects and social status. In contrast, political attitudes among poor and wealthy individuals are indistinguishable in affluent regions. Our findings reveal how reference groups affect subjective perceptions of relative deprivation and highlight the importance of egocentric mechanisms, whereby the local economy shapes expectations of individual prospects.
- Topic:
- Economic Inequality, Regional Economy, Social Status, and Political Resentment
- Political Geography:
- Britain and Europe
86. Europe’s next watershed – how liberal Europe should react to Trump 2.0
- Author:
- Fabian Zuleeg
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- The return of Donald Trump to the White House and his “America first” doctrine inevitably poses a fundamental challenge for the EU. Trump’s second presidency represents a new watershed moment: the policies of the next US administration are not just likely to put Europe at a global disadvantage, they will threaten its core objectives of prosperity, sustainability, security, and democracy. This is why European countries will have to act decisively to safeguard the bloc’s unity and strengthen its autonomy in a changed world. Assuming that a second Trump administration will resemble the first would be a serious error. Trump has become more extreme in his policy positions, while facing fewer constraints and operating in a more favourable international environment. As a result, preparing for a worst-case scenario may be a wise approach. Trump’s adversarial, zero-sum approach to international trade is likely to undermine the structures and processes of multilateral economic governance. Measures such as tariffs also threaten the EU’s growth and competitiveness and risk deepening divisions within the bloc. Global progress towards greater sustainability is certain to suffer. A disengagement on behalf of the US from its leadership role in environmental and climate governance will be a significant setback in these efforts. Should the US turn away from its climate goals, this would send a strong signal to other countries that these objectives are no longer a priority. On security, any potential benefit that a Trump presidency might produce in terms of strengthening EU unity is strongly undermined by his stance on Ukraine, which is set to increase the threat facing Europe from Russia. A US-imposed ceasefire would be no guarantee of lasting peace or security for Ukraine or for Europe. In response, the EU and its members will have to take a much bolder and more proactive role, sharply increasing Europe’s own military capabilities and spending. Policies that signal a tolerance for the use of open and covert force, in violation of international law, will also have profound consequences for global security. Far-right and anti-democratic forces within Europe are likely to be emboldened by an incoming Trump government. His actions to exploit Europe’s political divides are set to put significant pressure on European integration – a project Trump will have no qualms in undermining. The entrenchment and normalisation of Trump’s style of populistic, divisive politics and ‘us against them’ rhetoric risks eroding democratic debate more broadly. His amplification of falsehoods and disinformation will undermine public trust in the US and beyond, and could also boost political figures adopting similar strategies in Europe. There is strong potential for Trump’s anti-establishment narrative to gain further ground in Europe, and Europe’s illiberal, regressive and new-nativist forces will no doubt seek to harness this to increase their power. Should they be successful, there is a very real risk of the EU becoming hollowed-out and ineffectual. In this context, achieving consensus and acting with unity will be a greater challenge than ever for the EU27. Those within the EU who are prepared to take the necessary steps to rise to the challenge posed by Trump may have to explore unconventional forms of cooperation to act effectively. Moving forward in this way poses its own legal and political risks. But with European democracy at stake, it may be the only path to achieving the necessary level of ambition and unity to mount a strong response to Trump 2.0.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Donald Trump, Sustainability, and Democratic Backsliding
- Political Geography:
- Europe
87. Building Economic Security into Europe’s Clean Energy Agenda: Eight Recommendations for Europe’s Net-Zero Course Correction
- Author:
- Pawel Swieboda, Georg Riekeles, and Simon Dekeyrel
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- A European consensus may still exist on the end goal of climate neutrality, yet there is no such consensus on the political, economic and social choices required to reach it. Each possible pathway carries a distinct set of costs and trade-offs across the energy trilemma of sustainability, affordability and security. An excessively benign reading of the international environment, political and economic negligence and a lack of sufficient action on key parameters of the trilemma have put Europe on a decarbonisation trajectory of high prices and low security. This has become increasingly untenable. The long-term reliance on Russian natural gas was a fateful symptom of this predicament but is not a stand-alone example. Europe’s situation is currently aggravated by a series of equations that do not compute, with targets being set not matched by the required efforts and investments across core areas of Europe’s ambitions, such as wind, hydrogen, nuclear, net-zero manufacturing and energy efficiency. Europe is, consequently, on paths towards endpoints that are inconsistent with the EU’s Fit for 55 and 2040 climate scenarios. All too often, the EU’s energy choices have been an outcome of inner-EU compromises, rather than a reflection of the long-term strategic approach. All this is happening in a stormy international environment, with President Trump abandoning international cooperation and climate ambitions while China’s overcapacities are taking global economic relations to the brink. Consequences are bound to be dire. Unless yearly energy system investments can be significantly ramped up, suggestions that Europe can no longer pursue its 2050 net-zero objective at the expense of cost competitiveness and economic security will only get stronger. Europe should not abandon its net-zero ambitions, but a significant course correction is required. Building on the former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s call for a joint approach to decarbonisation and competitiveness and adding an economic security perspective, this paper proposes eight recommendations for Europe’s net-zero course correction. We argue that the best course of action for Europe is to gain ‘escape velocity’ on the green transition: prioritising cost-effective investments in clean industry and energy infrastructure, which are essential to enable a transition to clean energy. While the competitiveness debate tends to focus on the more immediate ways of activating growth, economic security encompasses a broader, forward looking framework that emphasises resilience. This includes managing risks, reducing dependencies, and preparing for potential disruptions. Staying on track toward achieving net-zero emissions by 2050 must remain Europe’s overarching objective, coupled with a parallel goal of optimising economic value-creation and reducing the cost, uncertainty and risks of the energy transition. EIGHT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EUROPE’S NET-ZERO COURSE CORRECTION Prioritise and coordinate large-scale investments to achieve ‘escape velocity’ in the energy transition. Set realistic targets and priorities using foresight and analysis recognising the interdependencies between policy levers at EU and national levels. Double down on electrification through proactive technology-neutral supply policies, grid investment, strategic industrial policy and enabling frameworks. Elaborate and implement a dedicated ‘masterplan for energy system flexibility, grid investment and energy storage’. Anchor the Clean Industrial Deal on an ‘economic security yardstick’ involving strategic funding for European ecosystems, enabling infrastructure and necessary shielding. Factor in nuclear power investments as an essential component in Europe’s net-zero scenario. Strengthen single market coordination, price differentiation and investment incentives while expanding long-term contractual solutions. Develop a comprehensive energy system risk management approach.
- Topic:
- Renewable Energy, Carbon Emissions, Economic Security, and Net Zero
- Political Geography:
- Europe
88. How to Spend It: European defence for the age of mass precision
- Author:
- Chris Kremidas-Courtney
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- Europe urgently needs to redefine its defence strategy in response to the United States’ growing disengagement from its transatlantic allies. The suspension of US military assistance to Ukraine and calls for increased European self-reliance have forced policymakers to rapidly reassess how to sustain collective security. The European Union’s ReArm EU plan seeks to mobilise €800 billion in national defence spending to meet these challenges, but investments must be made wisely to prepare for future warfare. Modern warfare has entered into an era of mass precision, where forces can achieve the effects of massed firepower through distributed, AI-enabled, and highly accurate weapons systems. Ukraine’s innovative use of drone swarms and precision strikes against Russian forces has demonstrated this shift. China and the US are also leveraging mass precision to reshape the battlefield, making traditional mass-based warfare increasingly obsolete. However, while armoured vehicles, fighter jets, and ships require new protections, they remain essential when integrated into networked, distributed operations. To prepare for this new strategic reality, Europe must: Invest in mass precision and distributed operations – Prioritise drone warfare, deep-strike capabilities, and networked operations. Accelerate investment in the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) programme to develop long-range cruise missiles. Build a European command-and-control (C2) system – Reduce reliance on NATO’s US-centric C2 infrastructure. Strengthen Europe’s intelligence capabilities and decision support – Expand European satellite and cyber capabilities and expand analytical capacities. Strengthen air and missile defence – Accelerate the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) and deploy cost effective countermeasures such as more cost effective laser-based systems. Build a European military logistics system – Ensure the ability to sustain forces and ensure rapid troop and equipment mobility within Europe. Train and exercise European forces at scale – Conduct large-scale joint exercises to build readiness. Buy Ukrainian – Integrate Ukrainian defence firms into EU supply chains. Buy European – Reduce dependence on US arms while leveraging UK, Norwegian, Canadian and Turkish defence industries. Build a European nuclear umbrella – France and the UK should explore extended deterrence options to protect all European allies in case of further US withdrawal. Build a European blue-water navy – Strengthen and expand European naval capabilities to protect vital sea lanes in addition to supporting territorial defence. Winning the next war, not the last one Europe can no longer afford slow, bureaucratic and fragmented defence spending—it must accelerate, integrate and innovate in order to defend itself in the event that the United States is unable or unwilling to do so. We don’t just need bigger budgets—we need a better strategy. The future of warfare is mass precision and distributed operations, enabled by AI, and supported by capabilities that enable decision, cyber and information dominance. If Europe invests wisely, it can be a technologically advanced, resilient and autonomous military power while remaining a robust pillar of NATO’s collective security. The hour of Europe is now.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, European Union, Weapons, Disengagement, and Defense Spending
- Political Geography:
- Europe and United States of America
89. The e-commerce challenge: Is importing low-value consignments going to become more cumbersome in the EU and the US?
- Author:
- Anna Jerzewska
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- In the last few months, terms such as e-commerce and de minimis (threshold below which imported goods are not subject to tariffs) have made headlines both in the EU and in the US. The rapid growth of e-commerce exacerbated problems with this exemption both in the US and in the EU. The first problem is lack of control. Only a percentage of commercial goods are subject to physical border checks, and for e-commerce goods this number is even smaller. Then there is the issue of endangering the level-playing field. De minimis benefits consumers and businesses that rely on it, but harms domestic manufacturers and retail outlets that import in bulk (and thus are subject to full customs and product standards and safety requirements). But can the challenges around the rapid growth of e-commerce be solved by the removal of de minimis? And what would be the consequences of removing the exemption? The paper summarises recent attempts and proposals of removing de minimis in the EU and the US and the challenges faced by both administrations. In both cases, e-commerce is still under discussion and it’s not clear what the final solution will look like. However, there are already noticeable differences in approach.
- Topic:
- European Union, Trade, Imports, and E-Commerce
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, and United States of America
90. A feminist analysis of Australia’s International Gender Equality Strategy
- Author:
- Australian Feminist Foreign Policy Coalition (AFFPC)
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Women's Development Agency (IWDA)
- Abstract:
- AFFPC’s submission on the International Gender Equality Strategy centred around a call for Australia to take an explicitly feminist approach and made a series of recommendations for how such an approach could be brought to life through practical steps. In this Issues Paper, we have evaluated the extent to which the strategy has responded to our recommendations. Despite appearing to fail at the first hurdle—the strategy does not take an explicitly feminist approach nor even use the word feminist—there remains some promising signals. Of the 21 recommendations made by the AFFPC in our submission on how the strategy could take a feminist approach in practice, two have been mostly integrated, 8 integrated in part, and 11 not integrated in a meaningful way or at all. The most glaring gap is the lack of an explicit acknowledgement that gender equality requires equality and rights for gender diverse, trans, nonbinary and intersex people, with the strategy instead walking back from its 2016 recognition of the same and using the language “gender equality means equality for all people.” This is backed up by a default to binary language of “women and girls” or “men and boys” whenever specific gender identities are named, although there is a text box recognising LGBTQIA+ rights as a priority.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Feminism, LGBT+, and Gender Equality
- Political Geography:
- Australia and Australia/Pacific