Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Rejection of the Trump plan outright, denunciation of any steps towards its implementation, and adherence to the failed Oslo-era paradigm for peace – is certain to condemn all sides to continued conflict.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, Leadership, Conflict, and Peace
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Now that IRGC leadership in Iran’s space effort is out in the open, it can be expected that its homemade, long-range rockets with a global reach will be revealed soon, as well.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Space, and Strategic Interests
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The virus crisis will lead to protectionism, skepticism of international institutions, narrow immigration policies, and other signposts of nationalism; thereby rolling-back policies that characterized the liberal and globalist democratic order.
Topic:
Nationalism, State Building, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
In the meantime, it doesn’t seem as though Iran – the driving force behind most of the friction in the Middle East – is changing its plans or abandoning its dreams, whether in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq or even Yemen.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Strategic Interests
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
There are four factors to consider when weighing action against the coronavirus: public health, preservation of the economy, civil rights, and the international and regional context. National decision-making must take all four of these elements into account, with emphases shifting over the course of time as circumstances change.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Strategic Interests
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Overall, Israeli society has remained resilient in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, and there are reasons to rate highly key aspects of the government’s response.
Topic:
Governance, Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The use of special measures to stop the virus is necessary, even though this impinges on individual privacy rights, if the data is deleted after a short time.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Privacy, Surveillance, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Even amidst the ongoing crisis, it is critical to adjust government decision-making structures and operational management procedures to “emergency” mode, in order to ensure optimal outcome.
Topic:
Governance, Leadership, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The spread of so lethal a virus on so wide a scale in so globalized an economy is unprecedented. Its impact is expected to be more ruinous than that of the 2008-2009 financial crisis.
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The resilence of Israeli society at a time of national emergency (the corona pandemic) has direct strategic and security implications. Despite the huge budgetary challenge, it is vital to maintain investment in advanced IDF military capabilities, because a nuclear confrontation with Iran is still possible.
Topic:
Security, Pandemic, Resilience, COVID-19, and Strategic Interests
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
We have five years of experience to compare to the competing assessments of 2015. Now we know that Netanyahu’s gloomy forecast has proven to be the more prescient.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Governance, Leadership, and Conflict
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
PIJ is an important part of the Iranian strategy for fighting Israel. The regime in Tehran makes use of charities and other civilian organizations, such as money changers, to transfer funds to its allies in Gaza.
Topic:
Terrorism, Military Strategy, Conflict, and State Sponsored Terrorism
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Europe ought to press the Palestinians to negotiate with Israel for a demilitarized state on a territory similar in size to the pre-1967 West Bank and Gaza Strip and whose economy will be rebuilt and boosted by a $50 billion investment.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Peace, and Strategic Interests
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel should act to implement the Trump Plan and reap its early rewards, because it transforms the Mideast peace paradigm. Most importantly, the plan reflects, and can serve as a platform for, Israeli consensus on the Palestinian issue.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, Leadership, and Peace
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Even if the Palestinians reject Trump’s peace plan, it still serves their long-term interests. False, undeliverable expectations – based on the assumption that “everybody knows” what Israel will be forced to concede – eventually need to give way to a more realistic paradigm, which in turn may lead to a better life for both sides.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, Leadership, and Peace
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Everything short of a military confrontation needs to be done, though, to deter Erdogan from establishing a barrier diagonally across the Mediterranean, barring Cyprus, Egypt and Israel from connecting their gas infrastructure to Greece and hence to Europe.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Greece, and Mediterranean
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
It is convenient for Amman to have Israel retain security control over the Jordan Valley. And this is a rare opportunity to advance and potentially realize Israel’s security needs for a cemented border in the east with the support of the world’s top superpower.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Conflict, and Peace
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The new government is the product of escalating popular protests under way since October 15. The protests are in response to Lebanon’s dire economic state.
Topic:
Economics, Military Strategy, Governance, Conflict, and Hezbollah
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Trilateral cooperation among Israel, Greece and Cyprus to build a natural gas subsea pipeline is setting the stage for more tensions with Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Natural Resources, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Greece, Cyprus, and Mediterranean
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The Jewish state’s relationship with the U.S. is stronger for resting on an informal basis; replacing it with a formal alliance would do no good and only anger the world’s other major power.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Conflict, Peace, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North America, and United States of America
May 3 rd, Russia’s COVID-19 infection rate resembled that of the United Kingdom. This situation has the potential to significantly impact the country’s financial situation, influencing the country’s foreign policy toward the Middle East. By the beginning of the lock-down period, the most optimistic forecasts for 2020 predicted a fall in the Russian economy by 4-6% of GDP.1 However, after four weeks of confinement, a decline of 6-8% was considered to be the most positive scenario, provided that it is possible to avoid a second wave for the epidemic in the autumn as predicted by the Higher School of Economics forecast.
The Russian situation is complicated by the fact that the outbreak of COVID-19 coincided with the dramatic decline in oil and gas prices. The federal budget’s breakeven price for 2020 was set at $42.4 per barrel.3 However, prices by the end of March and the beginning of April went significantly lower. This means that Russia may not be able to match the predicted government spending for 2020. Moreover, its leadership may not be able to spend money as generously to advance projects serving the country’s foreign policy.
Moscow, short on revenue, will unlikely take foreign policy and domestic political adventures. Foreign policy projects, primarily those that require significant budgetary expenditures in the Middle East and specifically in Syria, will be frozen. A passive Russian international engagement is expected to dominate until the end of 2020. The exception to this policy will be when a response is unavoidable. Domestic policy is likely to be just as reactive. The baseline will likely be to maintain the current state of affairs and absorb any shocks to stability given the scarcity of financial resources.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Intervention
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has pursued a careful policy towards the Syrian conflict based on keeping Syrian state institutions intact and simultaneously supporting Syrian people’s aspirations. In order to maintain this balance, Abu Dhabi has relied in part on a legacy of pragmatic relations with Damascus since the 1990s. This legacy allowed Abu Dhabi to resume its diplomatic ties with Damascus with the aim of drawing it closer to its Arab neighbours when Iran’s influence over the country’s decision-making increased. In order to keep its engagement constructive, the UAE has utilised humanitarian aid since 2011 to support the Syrian people in refugee camps outside the country and within Syria especially amid the COVID-19 pandemic. The UAE however faces challenges from regional and international actors involved in the Syrian conflict.
Measures taken by the administration and the population against COVID-19 in Idlib have been insufficient. Although local health authorities were aware of dangers, they lacked the capacity to influence political and military decision-makers. Therefore, COVID-19 did not have a considerable impact on the daily life of the population and training of military groups. People still convened in open spaces and held closed meetings; markets were crowded and without adequate protection measures; mosques were crowded during the month of Ramadan and celebrations were performed as usual. As escalation and new political/social dynamics now dominate Idlib’s current agenda after the Moscow agreement, the COVID-19 pandemic is not a priority for the actors on the ground. This contribution aims to examine the activities of HTS in the context of the pandemicflict.
Measures taken by the administration and the population against COVID-19 in Idlib have been insufficient. Although local health authorities were aware of dangers, they lacked the capacity to influence political and military decision-makers. Therefore, COVID-19 did not have a considerable impact on the daily life of the population and training of military groups. People still convened in open spaces and held closed meetings; markets were crowded and without adequate protection measures; mosques were crowded during the month of Ramadan and celebrations were performed as usual. As escalation and new political/social dynamics now dominate Idlib’s current agenda after the Moscow agreement, the COVID-19 pandemic is not a priority for the actors on the ground. This contribution aims to examine the activities of HTS in the context of the pandemicflict.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Pandemic, and COVID-19
The safe zones in the northern part of Syria have been established following three operations in the region, namely: the Euphrates Shield in 2016, the Olive Branch in 2018, and the Peace Spring in 2019. Before the outbreak of pandemic, the healthcare capacity was semisufficient with urgent cases being treated in Turkey and with frequent hospital transfers being conducted. In terms of livelihood opportunities, humanitarian aid was predominantly channelled through Turkey with limited involvement of Western and international organisations. Trade with the outside world was limited due to the sanctions imposed on Syria. The infrastructural investment in the region was predominantly made by the Turkish state and NGOs in the form of renovations and building of schools, hospitals, as well as water and energy supply. As of May 28th, 2020, there are no confirmed cases of COVID-19 in both regions yet living conditions have deteriorated due to the conditions in Turkey, Syria and rest of the world.
As a consequence of the attractiveness of the use of drones – for obvious reasons of cost and pilot safety – the international market in armed drones is booming, creating risks of widespread proliferation, especially to non-state actors or states known for their lack of respect for the laws of warfare.This paper analyses these proliferation risks and formulates recommendations on how to mitigate them.
Starting in the late 20th century, the growth of guided-missile technologyled the international community to draw up political and legal rules in order to control the export of such sensitive equipment – subsequently including UAVs – to countries where the risk of uncontrolled and/or illicit proliferation and use is the highest. The first such attempt was the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which was established in 1987 to harmonise policies for the export of missiles and related technology and has been gradually extended to cover UAVs. The second regime was a voluntary transparency measure, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA),
established in 1991, to which UN member states are encouraged to report their exports and imports of conventional arms, including UAVs. The third was the Wassenaar Arrangement, launched in 1996 as a multilateral export control regime for conventional and dual-use goods and technologies, to which UAVs were added. The most recent initiative is the ATT, which entered into force in 2014 and regulates transfers of conventional arms, including certain categories of UAVs. As we will see in section 2, however, these regimes are far from being universal and all have limitations that make it difficult to impose constraints on UAV exports.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Drones
Northeast Syria (NES) is fragmented under the control of different powers that are all seeking to gain the support of the local Arab tribes. Those seeking to upset the status quo include the Assad regime and its allies (Russia and Iran), Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies, and ISIS —all seeking disruption with different motivations, yet working side by side. Those seeking to maintain the status quo include the U.S.-led Coalition, the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Often, earning the support and alliance of the tribes is a transactional process whereby the tribes seek direct financial support and community investment, employment opportunities, military support, and autonomy to run their own affairs. Currently, most local tribal groups are calculating that a tenuous U.S.-protected order in northeast Syria provides better security and provisions than the alternatives from the Assad regime and its allies, or by Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies. However, ISIS remains a threat to all the powers involved in northeast Syria, and it is the major spoiler seeking to create the conditions for a return to the old order which was established under ISIS’s territorial Caliphate from 2014-2019.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America
In autumn 2017, the Council of the Syrian Islamic Scholars devised an initiative to unite all groups of the Syrian moderate opposition into the Syrian National Army (SNA), which was supposed to become FSA 2.0. At that time, 80% of the Syrian opposition factions, including Ahrar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Islam, as well as the majority of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) armed groups were prepared to join the SNA. It was the first time since 2012 that the FSA had managed to bring all opposition forces under its banner, and the creation of a unified military network with a common structure and command gained a new impetus. However, the SNA project was five years too late and, by the time the rebels began to merge into this new unified army, the Syrian opposition had already lost the war.
Moderate Syrian opposition includes some natives from Russia’s North Caucasus, although they are a minority. Caucasian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) natives were, in large part, members of the Islamic State (IS) or in some way linked to the forces formally led by Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) and later by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Those who went to Syria and Iraq to fight can be roughly divided into two generations. The first one includes Caucasus Emirate members who responded to the call of Salafi sheikhs from Arab-Islamic centres. Natives of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, and Turkmenistan (migrant workers, for the most part) were mainly recruited for jihad in Russia or within various diasporas across Europe.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Alliance, Conflict, and Opposition
Turkey represents a multi-layered challenge for the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean, where it is simultaneously an ally and an antagonist. Its status as a partly European and partly Middle Eastern state confounds a US policy process that has stark divisions between the two regions. Turkey’s maritime activities stymie a policy process that is overwhelmingly terrestrial in its orientation. Turkey is also seeking to become more deeply involved in a region in which the United States has important stakes but where it is seeking to reduce its footprint. Most importantly, though, the United States lacks both a strategy and a policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean, providing opportunities for a proactive Turkey to act while the United States and its allies react. While a strategy would not by itself resolve growing US tensions with Turkey, it would provide opportunities for greater policy coordination across the US government, and with allies as well.
The US–Turkey alliance was a bulwark of US global strategy for decades, but tensions have been growing lately. Turkey’s Kemalist heritage, its massive conventional army, and its wariness of the Soviet Union just to its north served US strategy in the half-century after World War II. However, in the last two decades, all three pillars of the relationship have been shaken. Turkey’s simultaneous embrace of a muscular nationalism, politicians’ marginalisation of the military, and the country exploring a new modus vivendi with Russia all render Turkey a troubling and confounding partner.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Leadership, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, North America, and United States of America
In recent years, France and Turkey have been on opposing sides relating to Middle East concerns. The countries’ disagreements over situations in Syria, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, and lately the Caucasus, have escalated significantly, generating fears of a proxy conflict with direct military confrontation between the two North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members. Attempting to rally widespread European support, France assertively challenges the Turkish “neo-Ottoman” ambitions; while Paris is anxious of Ankara’s acts outside of Paris’s expectations for a historically narrowly defined Turkish national interests. In the medium-term, the two countries appear to be testing each other to redefine their respective zones of influence, adapting their foreign policy objectives in the turbulent dynamics of the post-Arab Spring era. This power competition resonates domestically, as both the French and the Turkish public are receptive to the developing negative narratives of “the other.”
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict