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Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Content Type Working Paper Publication Year within 5 Years Publication Year within 3 Years

1. The EU and the Transformed Nuclear Context since the War in Ukraine

Author:
Clara Portela
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022 has entirely transformed the European security landscape, bringing war to the European Union’s doorstep. Importantly, the war features a nuclear dimension that manifests itself in consequential ways, including Moscow’s nuclear sabre-rattling and its denunciation of the last surviving nuclear arms control treaty. This unleashed intriguing reactions, like a surprisingly tough resort to sanctions by the EU, or the shrinking of neutrality on the continent. However, while support for nuclear deterrence has increased in some NATO countries, support for arms control remains strong too. Meanwhile, nuclear disarmament advocates have not shifted their stance as a result of the crisis.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, European Union, Nonproliferation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. Blockchain Technology: An Innovative Policy Tool for Enhancing Conventional Arms Control and Verification

Author:
Nicolo Miotto
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Blockchain represents an unprecedented opportunity for enhancing conventional arms control (CAC) and verification. Based on the principles of transparency, verifiability, and predictability, this state-of-the-art technology could build confidence and facilitate the implementation of arms control mechanisms. Blockchain-based so-called “smart contracts” have advantageous practical implications for CAC. They could improve the verification of countries’ compliance with their CAC obligations by enhancing monitoring procedures and could strengthen arms export controls by improving treaty signatories’ ability to monitor weapons and ammunition supply chains. Reinforcing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) framework for conventional ammunition control with a permissioned blockchain would provide greater confidentiality and improve monitoring and data verifiability, thus strengthening the OSCE’s CAC regimes.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Blockchain
Political Geography:
Europe

3. Revisiting ‘Minimal Nuclear Deterrence’: Laying the Ground for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament

Author:
Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The prospects for nuclear arms control appear dim following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Instead of continued reliance on nuclear deterrence, the resulting new awareness of nuclear risks should inform bold nuclear disarmament measures in the long term. Drawing on previous debates on ‘minimal nuclear deterrence’, this paper argues that nuclear deterrence is possible at low numbers, and hence reliance on nuclear deterrence is not an obstacle to significant progress in nuclear disarmament. In particular, there is scope for reducing the vast Russian and United States nuclear arsenals, which risk planetary-scale destruction and stand in the way of multilateral nuclear disarmament. At the same time, recent military-technological evolution has raised the bar for minimal nuclear deterrence by questioning the survivability of nuclear forces. In addition to making recommendations on how to address such strategic challenges, the paper addresses some conceptual dilemmas traditionally associated with minimal nuclear deterrence.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Disarmament, Multilateralism, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Multidomain Deterrence and Strategic Stability in China

Author:
Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Over the past few years, China has displayed a wide range of advances in military capabilities and infrastructure, including its test of a hypersonic glide vehicle coupled with a fractional orbital bombardment system and evidence of new intercontinental ballistic missile silos. While China and the United States remain at political odds, there are indications that China’s strategies in space, cyberspace and nuclear domains are increasingly converging with those of the USA, as well as Russia. A key question is whether this strategic convergence is a stabilizing or destabilizing phenomenon. To answer the question, this paper explores the current state of Chinese discussions on multidomain deterrence and strategic stability, with a focus on active defence and proactive defence. It then examines how these concepts are manifesting themselves in China’s postural and technological indicators, including pre-mating of nuclear warheads to delivery platforms, expanded nuclear arsenal size, possible shifts towards launch on warning, integration of dual-capable systems, and advances in machine learning and autonomy. It concludes with a discussion of what these trends mean for future strategic stability talks.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China and Asia

5. Global South Perspectives on a Global Ban on Nuclear Weapons: A Comparative Approach

Author:
Leonardo Bandarra, Miriam Prys-Hansen, Jo-Ansie van Wyk, Layla Dawood, Monica Herz, Nir Hassid, Harsh V. Pant, and Shounak Set
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Abstract:
Banning nuclear weapons is an aspiration at the core of most disarmament and non-proliferation initiatives. It gained new momentum with the "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons." The negotiation of that treaty, and its subsequent approval and entry into force, sheds light on the complexities and dissent surrounding diverse regional perspectives on the appropriate means and timing regarding the elimination of nuclear weapons and establishing a related global norm. Scholars from different academic backgrounds and epistemological standpoints jointly discuss these perspectives through lenses from Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South Asia. We seek to discuss how regional issues may shape global non-proliferation and disarmament politics, with a focus on the nuclearweapon-ban norm. This debate also reveals the broad trends and patterns organising and driving the current shifts in the global nuclear order, such as interrelations between regional and global institutions as well as domestic politics and decision-making.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global South

6. Everything Counts: Building a Control Regime for Nonstrategic Nuclear Warheads in Europe

Author:
Miles A. Pomper, William Alberque, Marshall L. Brown Jr., William M. Moon, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration insisted in arms control talks with Russia that a follow-on agreement to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) should cover all nuclear weapons and that such an agreement should focus on the nuclear warheads themselves. This would represent a significant change from previous agreements, which focused on delivery vehicles, such as missiles. The United States has been particularly interested in potential limits on nonstrategic nuclear warheads (NSNW). Such weapons have never been subject to an arms control agreement. Because Russia possesses an advantage in the number of such weapons, the US Senate has insisted that negotiators include them in a future agreement, making their inclusion necessary if such an accord is to win Senate approval and ultimately be ratified by Washington. In the wake of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine conflict, such demands can only be expected to grow if and when US and Russian negotiators return to the negotiating table.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

7. Stalemate in Talks with Iran on a Return to the Nuclear Agreement

Author:
Sima Shine and Eldad Shavit
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The talks in Vienna between the United States and Iran ended with the text of the agreement almost complete. Conclusion of the deal rests on political decisions in Washington and Tehran, mostly concerning the Iranian demand to remove the Revolutionary Guards from the State Department’s list of terror organizations. At this stage the chances of finalizing the deal are equal to the chances of the talks collapsing. How should Israel act at this sensitive time?
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

8. Will Russia Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine?

Author:
Helit Barel
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
One month into the war in Ukraine, the nuclear threat remains. Will Russia’s President decide to use nuclear weapons on the battlefield, and thereby shatter the 77 years of nuclear deterrence? From a rational perspective, there is little likelihood of this occurring, but thus far Putin has not succeeded in realizing his goals in the Ukrainian theater – and Russia has a large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

9. Blocking the Gateways to Nuclear Disorder in the Middle East

Author:
John Spacapan
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
This study will explain how the United States and like-minded states can still stop, or at least significantly slow down, the bomb’s spread in the Middle East. The historical record as well as the current intentions of potential proliferators in the region suggests this is possible, but Washington will need to start planning now. The three case countries of this monograph – Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia – are all taking aggressive steps toward nuclearization.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Middle East

10. Arresting Nuclear Adventurism: China, Article VI, and the NPT

Author:
Henry Sokolski and Andrea Beck
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Given the current crisis in Ukraine, it’s tempting to consider focusing on Chinese compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to be an academic indulgence. Giving into this inclination, however, would be a mistake. As dangerous as Russia currently is, China will be more threatening in the long run. As we are learning with Russia’s violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, enforcing binding understandings is critical lest violators run roughshod over law and good order. This is true with Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. It is no less so with China’s nuclear weapons buildup and its repeated refusal to join in good faith negotiations to limit its nuclear weapons activities, which is required by Article VI of the NPT. This buildup and refusal clearly flies in the face of China’s legal NPT obligations. The question is what might bring Beijing back into compliance. To get the answers, NPEC held a battery of workshops last fall, followed by a week-long diplomatic simulation. The game participants included U.S., Japanese, and Australian former and current officials and staff as well as outside experts. The group concluded that Beijing is unlikely to comply willingly with the NPT anytime soon, but that U.S. and international security would still be best served by spotlighting Beijing’s nuclear adventurism and suggesting diplomatic off-ramps to arrest its nuclear buildup.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Peace, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

11. Rising from the Ashes: The Future of Arms Control

Author:
Victor Mizin and Yue Yuan
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
This paper employs a comparative approach to provide an initial comprehensive analysis of the political interactions, contemporary nuclear policies, and military strategies and capabilities of China, Russia, and the United States in the context of the unstable international security landscape. At a time when the global arms control regime is teetering on the brink of disintegration, the authors aim to offer practical and feasible policy recommendations for remodeling the arms control regime from the Chinese and Russian perspectives. The authors stress the need to revive “traditional” arms control and advocate the search for ways to control emerging military technologies. This paper endeavors to present a two-pronged vision proposed by representatives of two major global players.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

12. Restoring and Improving Nuclear Forensics to Support Attribution and Deterrence

Author:
Steve Fetter
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Nuclear forensics is the analysis of nuclear materials, devices, emissions, and signals to determine the origin and history of those nuclear materials and devices. At the request of the Secretary of Energy, and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security, Restoring and Improving Nuclear Forensics to Support Attribution and Deterrence evaluates the U.S. government's nuclear forensics capabilities. A 2010 National Academies report, Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk, characterized the precarious state of the national technical nuclear forensics (NTNF) program at that time: NTNF relied almost entirely on staff dedicated to and residual funding from other related programs. This summary report addresses the current state of U.S. NTNF capabilities relative to the National Academies evaluation in 2010 and recommends ways to improve the NTNF program through improvements in policy, operations, and research and development efforts.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

13. President Biden Has Five Options for Future Negotiations with Iran

Author:
Pat Shilo and Todd Rosenblum
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
President Biden has announced plans to re-engage with Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal. In this paper, we briefly outline the five most likely pathways ahead, each of which has strengths and challenges: Return to the JCPOA as it was. Return to the JCPOA plus new commitments that address other security concerns with Iran. Restore the JCPOA as it was plus a set of confidence-building measures to address other security concerns. Formally link a requirement for Iran to address our other concerns as a pre-condition for further talks. Return to the pre-JCPOA Middle East, where US and allies work to rollback Iran’s nuclear program and actively deter its regional actions by confrontation, punishment, and isolating measures. Each path carries risk and opportunity for restoring American leadership in the world, and congressional Democrats should remember the perfect deal does not exist. Members of Congress would be wise to measure the next deal against the status quo ante: an unconstrained, belligerent Iran again racing to a bomb.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, Denuclearization, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

14. Taking Stock of the Arms Trade Treaty: Universalization

Author:
Rachel Stohl
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The rate at which states are joining the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) has naturally slowed. Universalization efforts have been carried out through a variety of different frameworks, both within the ATT regime—including the Working Group on Treaty Universalization (WGTU), a sponsorship programme and the Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF)—and by the United Nations, regional organizations and civil society. Universalization of the ATT contributes to the development of standards and norms in the international arms trade. If a party flouts the treaty’s require­ments, it undermines the treaty and makes universal­ization less meaningful. Thus, universalization means both expanding the number of states parties and ensuring that they live up to their obligations. This is one of a series of five papers that are being produced as part of a wider project aimed at taking stock of specific aspects of the ATT—its scope, the application of the risk-assessment criteria, its processes and forums, universalization efforts, and international assistance to support ATT implementation.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, Arms Trade, and Risk
Political Geography:
Global Focus

15. Taking Stock of the Arms Trade Treaty: Scope

Author:
Paul Holtom
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The scope of the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) refers to the conventional arms, ammunition/munitions, and parts and components that are covered by the treaty. ATT stakeholders are providing guidance and assistance for states parties to implement provisions on scope contained in Articles 2–5 of the Treaty. ATT Article 17(4) provides for the Conference of States Parties (CSP) to review the treaty’s scope to take into account relevant technological developments in the field of conventional arms. Now is an opportune moment to explore mechanisms to review the scope of the Treaty to keep it in line with, at least, the coverage of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA). This is one of a series of five papers that are being produced as part of a wider project aimed at taking stock of specific aspects of the ATT—its scope, the application of the risk-assessment criteria, its processes and forums, universalization efforts, and international assistance to support ATT implementation.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Arms Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16. Taking Stock of the Arms Trade Treaty: Processes and Forums

Author:
Roberto Dondisch
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) has a number of attached processes and forums that are aimed at enabling and promoting both the effective implementation of the treaty by states parties and its further universalization. In order to operate effectively these processes and forums need to be designed and operated in ways that reflect the ATT’s unique status as a trade treaty with a core humanitarian objective. The ATT states parties must consider the current support architecture and the challenges that it faces. These include effectively transitioning from a negotiation to an implementation framework; avoiding inherent risks to the treaty’s objective; implementing the risk-mitigation clause; maintaining the balance between exporters and importers; preserving transparency; and implementing possible good practice options. This is one of a series of five papers that are being produced as part of a wider project aimed at taking stock of specific aspects of the ATT—its scope, the application of the risk-assessment criteria, its processes and forums, universalization efforts, and international assistance to support ATT implementation.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Arms Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus

17. Taking Stock of the Arms Trade Treaty: International Assistance to Support Implementation

Author:
Giovanna Maletta and Sibylle Bauer
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The provision of international assistance is key to achieving the effective implementation of the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Assistance instruments include the ATT’s own Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF), mechanisms established by the United Nations and the European Union (EU), and efforts by other international and regional organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The donors, implementers and ATT states parties should reflect on the role played by the assistance instruments in improving implementation of the treaty. To strengthen the role of international assistance in supporting implementation of the ATT, the ATT Secretariat and ATT-related processes and assistance programmes should enhance the sustainability and effectiveness of assistance efforts and further improve coordination. This is one of a series of five papers that are being produced as part of a wider project aimed at taking stock of specific aspects of the ATT—its scope, the application of the risk-assessment criteria, its processes and forums, universalization efforts, and international assistance to support ATT implementation.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Arms Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus

18. Reviewing NATO’s Non-proliferation and Disarmament Policy

Author:
Katarzyna Kubiak
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The global treaty-based nuclear order is running out of steam. The problems facing it are progressively building up, while problem-solving is losing momentum. The search for a “golden key” to address disarmament and non-proliferation in a way fit for the 21st century prompts decision-makers to look for novel approaches. NATO needs to actively shape this newly emerging space. Acting today from within a tight policy and institutional “corset”, the Alliance should strengthen its non-proliferation and disarmament portfolio, and harness its consultative and coordination strengths for agenda-setting, norm-shaping and awareness-raising within the international community.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and Global Focus

19. What is Iran’s Real Goal in Nuclear Talks with the US?

Author:
Alexander Grinberg
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Sanctions relief, nothing else. Iran has no intention of forsaking its nuclear and missile programs nor its proxy wars across the region.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Denuclearization, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

20. No Agreement is Better than Another Bad Agreement with Iran

Author:
Yaakov Amidror
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel-US dialogue is necessary about Iran’s nuclear program, since a good agreement with Iran is a clear Israeli interest. But Israel must be prepared with a military option against Iran, as a last resort.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Peace
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

21. Iran Raises the Stakes for Biden

Author:
Alexander Grinberg
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Giving Iran unearned incentives in advance of negotiations only will bring about more Iranian provocation.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America