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2. Turkey’s Rift with Sweden and Finland
- Author:
- Hay Ertan Cohen Yanarocak
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Turkey’s relations with Sweden and Finland are at a crossroads, and it behooves all three countries to proceed with sensitivity to protect their national interests
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Turkey, Finland, and Sweden
3. The Egyptian Financial Crisis: Implications for the region, and for Israel too
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Egypt continues to play an active role in regional affairs, including the Aqaba emergency meeting on the Palestinian situation (February 26) and the ongoing effort to prevent escalation in Gaza. At the same time, Cairo is in the middle of a significant financial crisis. The effects of the war in Ukraine – specifically, grain shortages – brought the Egyptian pound to more than 30 to the dollar, up from 20 in November and 15 in early 2022, facilitated by deliberate government action in response to demands by the IMF. Inflation still soars, and so does youth unemployment. All this could destabilize a nation of 105 million on our border, with dire consequences.
- Topic:
- Financial Crisis, Conflict, Fiscal Policy, and Financial Stability
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Middle East, Israel, Egypt, and MENA
4. Integrating Cyber Into Warfighting: Some Early Takeaways From the Ukraine Conflict
- Author:
- Ariel Levite
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- It is too early to draw definitive conclusions about cyber warfare in the lead-up to and the execution of the Ukraine war. Data are lacking, and the outcome of the conflict remains uncertain. Yet through monitoring and analysis of a single year in the first major war into which cyber has been extensively woven, we do know enough to be able to generate some tentative, high-level, generic propositions on the nature of cyber conflict. These propositions draw on wide-ranging press reporting and extrapolate from several superb pieces recently published by my colleagues Jon Bateman, Nick Beecroft, and Gavin Wilde, as well as Microsoft’s recent report on the cyber dynamics of the conflict.1 However, we must still tread cautiously. Our propositions draw on highly imperfect empirical knowledge of a single historical case that is still unfolding.2 Current and future antagonists are also constantly learning from their own and others’ analyses and enhancing their performance, which can render current assessments obsolete.3 For this and other reasons it is quite possible that some of the cyber dynamics unfolding in and around Ukraine may play out differently later in Ukraine as well as in other, future confrontations. As we have observed over millennia, the balance between offense and defense can shift over time; this dynamic may well play out in cyberspace as well. It is also important to note at the outset that widespread assessments disparaging the utility and expediency of Russian cyber operations in the Ukrainian conflict (and projections regarding future conflicts) are presently limited by far more than a lack of comprehensive and reliable empirical data. We also lack insights into the metrics and criteria that each of the protagonists uses to assess the success and failure of cyber’s overall performance in the conflict, and we have only fragmentary evidence of the role each party expected cyber operations to perform. Moreover, even if we had such information, Ukraine-specific answers might not apply elsewhere because the expectations for cyber and the metrics for assessing its performance may vary not only over time and between protagonists but also from one conflict to another. In this context it is important to underscore that some specific factors that possibly helped diminish the efficacy of Russia’s offensive cyber operations in Ukraine may not apply elsewhere. Three in particular deserve to be noted here: Russia’s unique approach toward cyber warfare; the level of external support that Ukraine received before and during the war from some leading national and multinational cyber powers; and the sophistication and battle-tested experience of Ukraine’s cyber warriors.4 Nevertheless, even if some of the cyber characteristics of the Ukraine conflict ultimately turn out to be sui generis, they are instructive given the novelty of the field and the involvement of major powers in the conflict. Hence, there is considerable value in advancing these propositions to focus attention on certain questions and facets of cyber conflict, facilitating their review and reassessment as more comprehensive and reliable information becomes available and developments on the battlefield evolve. But the reader should consider the interim observations and propositions offered here as hypotheses employed as a heuristic to encourage debate and invite feedback. All the propositions offered below pertain to our core conception of what cyber warfare is about. Some of the propositions we advance are novel; others reaffirm or refine tentative assertions made before the war. Taken together they suggest a more subdued view of the utility and impact of cyber warfare than was generally found in prewar speculations. More importantly, the Ukraine war reveals that nations diverge significantly in the role and aims they assign to offensive cyber operations as well as the institutional setup and operational modalities they use for conducting them. Most glaringly, the U.S. perspective and approach (emulated in whole or in part by several other Western nations) differs deeply from that of Russia, which makes it reasonable to expect similar divergence across similar regimes. We group our propositions under three temporal headings: the prewar period (starting in 2014);5 the war itself (beginning on February 24, 2022); and finally, the postwar period, after kinetic hostilities eventually die down. Obviously, we cannot know when this last phase will begin; nevertheless, analysis of trends that were manifest in the two earlier phases of the conflict provides a tentative basis for predictions as to what might be expected down the road. This broad scope is driven by two considerations. First, it is designed to underscore the considerable relevance of cyber operations across various phases and types of conflicts. And second, it highlights continuity as well as change between cyber action in peacetime, in wartime, and in grey area situations, as well as during the transitions between these states of confrontation.
- Topic:
- Cybersecurity, Conflict, Non-Traditional Threats, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America
5. Australia’s Response to the China Threat: The Case for Engagement
- Author:
- David S. G. Goodman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
- Abstract:
- The dominance of the China Threat discourse in Australia’s public affairs suggests poor prospects for any continued Australia-China relations, let alone positive interactions of mutual benefit. An exploration of alternative ways to approach Australia’s relationship with China may though prove not only more constructive but also better future-proofed. The first step is to recognize that while China certainly poses challenges to Australia the perception of threat is more relevant to the USA. The second is the recognition of differences and the development of ways to mediate those differences. And the third is to build on the complementarities for the benefit of both Australia and China, not just through economic but also through social interactions. As Europe discovered in the 1950s, the development of mutual understanding of other peoples, their cultures, and their social and economic systems is a precursor not simply to respect and the avoidance of unwarranted prejudice, but to cooperation for a wider public good.
- Topic:
- Security, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and Australia
6. Taliban Victory Serves as a Model for Palestinian Terror Groups
- Author:
- Marta Furlan
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- World powers and Israel should refuse to recognize the Taliban regime. This would give hope to Middle Eastern terrorist groups like Hamas that they could also gain recognition under the right conditions. Upon returning to government, the Taliban have been implementing a system of civilian administration based on their Islamist ideological background. The consequences for women and minorities have been horrifying. The same can be said about Afghanistan’s economy, which can no longer provide for its starving population. The Taliban began house searches around Kabul recently, drawing criticism from Western diplomats about rights abuses. The Taliban claim that the operations are to find “kidnappers, professional thieves and crime groups,” however, seven residents told Reuters that the searches were spreading fear and appeared indiscriminate. In terms of security, the Afghan-Pakistani border and the Afghan-Iranian border have traditionally been porous, with illicit goods, illegal immigrants, and terrorists linked to al-Qaida and the Islamic State-Khorasan Province moving undetected from one country to another. Similarly, the borders shared by Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan with Afghanistan remain characterized by volatility, which exposes those countries to the risk of exportation of terrorism from Afghanistan. Though Afghanistan’s neighbors have engaged in efforts to increase border security by erecting fences, conducting anti-terrorism exercises in the border areas, and relocating troops to border areas, the potential security threats originating from Afghanistan remain a source of great concern for the region and beyond. Nevertheless, for Islamists across the border in Pakistan and elsewhere in the Muslim world, the Taliban’s victory – and ability to hold onto power in Afghanistan – serves as a model they seek to follow. This should cause worry for Israel due to the encouragement this provides to radical Islamist armed groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) that a return to the armed struggle is the only path to defeat Israel.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Taliban, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Palestine
7. The EU is Reluctantly Getting Tougher with Putin
- Author:
- Emmanuel Navon
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Europeans surely remember what happens when you let an autocrat get away with grabbing territories hoping that the last bite will be the last one
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
8. Understanding the Russia-Iran-Israel Triangle
- Author:
- Daniel Rakov
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- As Tehran invests efforts to improve relations with Russia, Israel will have to maintain a dialogue with Moscow to safeguard its military and diplomatic freedom of action.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Stability
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Israel
9. The Ukraine Standoff as a Harbinger of Broader Shifts in the Global Order
- Author:
- Daniel Rakov
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Global powers might find it more challenging to reach a consensus on the Middle East than before. This makes it more critical for Israel to get separate understandings or develop new partnerships both globally and regionally.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and Israel
10. A US failure in Ukraine Crisis could lead to a conflagration in Middle East, Asia
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- China could learn that US determination is melting away, and its threats can be ignored. An attack on Taiwan could follow.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America