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Begin New Search Topic Brexit Content Type Working Paper Publication Year within 25 Years

1. Post-Brexit EU–UK cooperation on migration and asylum: How to live apart, together

Author:
Alberto-Horst Neidhardt
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU has created a policy, legal and operational vacuum in migration and asylum matters which undermines the interests of both sides. There is no more binding framework which defines responsibility for asylum seekers and facilitates transfers between the EU and the UK. Brexit also made it harder to devise and implement effective anti-smuggling strategies with European partners. Despite these gaps, a post-Brexit cooperation agreement is not on the horizon, with structural reforms pursued by each side reflecting conflicting priorities and a growing political disconnect. Following the 2020 proposals of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, EU member states are still negotiating a mandatory responsibility-sharing mechanism. Meanwhile, in April 2022, the UK overhauled its asylum and immigration law, undercutting safeguards for asylum seekers reaching the country irregularly. The same month, the UK government signed a deal with Rwanda to deport all asylum seekers arriving via the Channel – a move even the European Commission has criticised. Recent post-Brexit tensions over other policy areas, most prominently the Northern Ireland Protocol, have reduced mutual trust to a historic minimum. This makes an ambitious and comprehensive agreement over asylum and migration matters an unlikely prospect for the time being. Yet, as neighbours, the EU and the UK will continue to depend on each other to pursue their respective policy objectives in migration and asylum. So, despite living separately and facing numerous unresolved tensions, the EU and the UK can and should pursue a post-Brexit cooperation framework in these matters. Otherwise, they will both be worse off. As a first step, the two sides should focus on rebuilding trust. This can be achieved by pursuing less contentious goals within immediate reach, such as enhanced anti-smuggling efforts, while also diffusing political tensions across the board. Once an atmosphere of sincere cooperation is restored, as a second step, the EU and the UK should define a broader and more ambitious partnership. Safe and legal channels from the EU to the UK should be re-established. At the same time, equitable solutions for facilitating the return of third-country nationals from the UK to the EU, in full respect of procedural safeguards, should also be found. Although reciprocity would have to be at the heart of this new arrangement, the EU and the UK should go beyond a transactional approach, particularly by strengthening protection pathways and burden-sharing solutions, including with third countries, in line with their international commitments. The European Commission should take the lead in the negotiation of a post-Brexit EU–UK cooperation framework. This would allow the EU to speak with one voice and pursue clear and coherent objectives across the different policy areas concerned. The newly established EU–UK Parliamentary Partnership Assembly should also be involved in the negotiations, helping to democratise the process and achieve a more balanced relationship in the interests of both sides.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Migration, European Union, Brexit, and Asylum
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

2. Post-Brexit imports, supply chains, and the effect on consumer prices

Author:
Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, Josh de Lyon, Luisa Opitz, and Dilan Yang
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
This report documents the decrease in imports and shows how the patterns of imports vary across sectors following the UK’s departure from the Single Market and Customs Unit at the end of 2020. The authors, Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, Josh De Lyon, Luisa Opitz, and Dilan Yang, focus on comparisons between imports from the EU and imports from non-EU countries. Some products, such as fats, oils, and waxes, experienced a sizeable decrease in trade volumes with EU countries compared to those of non-EU countries in January 2021. Other products, such as minerals, experienced minimal deviation in imports from the EU versus non-EU. We also document that the timing of import changes varies across products: in some cases, the deviation occurs pre-TCA, and there is some evidence of stockpiling; in other cases, the changes only occur post-TCA, and can be either short term or persistent. The fall in imports from the EU will affect the UK economy through its impact on supply chains. Two-thirds of international trade is in products used as inputs to production. We show that imports from the EU fell for products that are used as inputs to production in many industries in the UK. For some sectors such as agriculture, fishing, and car manufacturing, there is evidence that imported inputs began to be sourced from non-EU countries pre-TCA. For others, including vegetable oil, animal fats, prepared animal feeds, and pharmaceuticals, the adjustments occurred post-TCA. Evidence suggests that increased access to intermediate inputs can boost productivity, so a reversal is likely to cause a fall in productivity. Imports also provide cheaper goods to consumers, as well as a wider variety of choice. Focussing on food products, we show that the drop in imports after Brexit caused an increase in prices. Products that were more heavily reliant on imports from the EU increased in price following the election of Boris Johnson in 2019, pre-TCA and then increased further post-TCA. This report therefore shows that changes in imports of goods from the EU have affected UK firms’ supply chains. Part of this change is driven by the adjustment costs incurred as part of the new trading relationship and is likely to be short term, but another part is likely to reflect a long-term increase in the cost of inputs from the EU, which make up a sizable contribution of total imports. This could have a knock-on effect for consumers who will face higher prices, and for workers whose jobs will be affected by adjustments in the supply chain.
Topic:
European Union, Brexit, Trade, Imports, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

3. Mapping banking centres globally since 1970

Author:
Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Brexit and the rise of China as a leading international economic power have revived discussions about the geography of banking centres. This paper analyses the geographical evolution of banking centres since the 1970s, based on a database constructed from a ranking of the top banks in the world created by The Banker magazine, a UK-based monthly publication specialised in international financial affairs. We describe both how the database was created and the ways in which it can be used to inform policy on money and capital markets. We address why the data can be used to proxy the size of International Financial Centres (IFCs) and the methodological limitations it may present. We find that banking consolidations and the evolution of the legal framework are more central to the changing geography of banking centres than economic and financial crises. We also highlight that, despite major shifts in global economic power, leading banking centres are hard to replace.
Topic:
Economy, Brexit, History, Fiscal Policy, and Banking
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Dealing with the Neighbours: The case for an affiliate membership of the European Union and a new Security Council

Author:
Andrew Duff
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Brexit is proving to be even more troublesome than expected, giving rise to a gradual softening of British public opinion towards the EU. Any future UK government is likely to want to renegotiate parts of the separation deal that Boris Johnson struck with the EU. Reconciliation between Britain and Europe will take time and need careful calibration, however. The EU should prepare for this constructively and use the opportunity of a British renegotiation to review all its other association agreements - none of which are without defect. The question of governance lies at the heart of the problems which impair the EU’s relations with its neighbours. The EEA and Swiss arrangements are in any case due for overhaul and upgrading. The EU’s traditional enlargement policy to the east and south has foundered, and it would be better if this were admitted openly. Not only are candidate countries unable to meet the demands of membership, but the EU itself is too weak to take on the burden of new members. Instead, a new category of affiliate membership should be written into the EU treaties. Affiliation should allow the EU to develop close economic and cultural partnerships with its neighbours in a democratic fashion. Affiliate states would enjoy greater access to the EU institutions than is permitted under any of the current association agreements. Affiliate membership would also be available as an option for any current EU member state which, like the UK, chose not to adhere to the goal of an ever closer union. Such differentiated integration of the wider Europe will require the EU to build stronger federal government at the centre. The new structure should also be underpinned by the establishment of a European Security Council combining EU member and affiliate states with NATO — including Canada and the US — in regular strategic and operational decisions to protect Western security. The French presidency in the first half of 2022 should take the necessary first steps. The Conference on the Future of Europe might consider these proposals.
Topic:
Security, Governance, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

5. Europe after the Brits

Author:
Andrew Duff
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Andrew Duff argues that the loss of the United Kingdom should prompt serious reflection about the constitutional direction of the European Union. The secession of a member state changes the context of European integration. Brexit leaves the EU weaker, smaller and poorer — but it can and should also spur reform. The EU should aim to have major changes in place by 2029, including treaty revision. The reforms should include: (i) a renegotiation of the Brexit deal leading to a new class of affiliate membership; (ii) completion of the constitutional framework for a fiscal union; (iii) a European Parliament fully legitimated by election from transnational lists; and (iv) a ‘European Security Council’ of defence ministers to span the divide between the EU and NATO. The Conference on the Future of Europe may prove to be a useful democratic experiment. But it is not designed to address the important constitutional challenges that the Union faces. Duff therefore proposes creating an expert reflection group to stimulate the full implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon as well as prepare the way for the next Convention which must be called to amend the EU treaties. More immediately, the reflection group should make proposals to settle the controversial matter of how to elect the new President of the European Commission in 2024.
Topic:
Politics, Reform, European Union, Brexit, and Institutions
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

6. After Brexit: Could bilateral agreements facilitate the free movement of persons?

Author:
Diego Acosta
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
Some of the millions of EU nationals in the UK and British nationals in the EU are already suffering from Brexit’s drastic curtailment of the right to free movement. How can migration now be governed and facilitated between the two parties? Although an EU-wide agreement with the UK that ensures free movement remains the ideal solution, it is currently unrealistic. This calls for an evaluation of possible alternatives. Bilateral agreements should be explored and examined as a possible alternative to an EU-wide agreement with the UK to facilitate and govern cross-border mobility. Various bilateral free movement agreements across Europe show that their use is not only legal but also habitual. They offer flexibility when it comes to the rights of entry, residency and work, as well as other important rights. And they could also be used as a foundation upon which to build an agreement between the EU as a whole and the UK, if not to facilitate the rebuilding of mutual trust. Migration law expert Diego Acosta makes a further case for Spain being the first possible candidate for a post-Brexit bilateral free movement agreement concluded between an EU member state and the UK. Spain is the most important EU destination for British emigrants, and British migrants residing in Spain constitute the latter’s third-largest non-national population. In turn, the UK is the most important migrant destination for Spanish nationals worldwide, who represent the fifth-largest migrant group from the EU. He offers concrete suggestions as to what a bilateral treaty between Spain and the UK could include. In addition, governments of EU member states that have important reciprocal migration flows with the UK, as well as the UK government, should consider the following recommendations when exploring the possibility of adopting bilateral agreements on migration: The negotiating parties should place the rights and interests of both short-term and long-term British and European nationals residing in each other’s territory at the centre stage. In negotiating a possible treaty, both the respective EU member state (e.g. Spain) and the UK should take the pre-Brexit status quo as the departing point. The status of mobile nationals could be improved beyond that enjoyed by EU citizens pre-Brexit. For example, political rights could be extended beyond the municipal level. Certain categories of individuals (e.g. retirees, young workers) could benefit from special provisions which also depart from the pre-Brexit situation.
Topic:
Migration, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Brexit, Diversity, and Mobility
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

7. Gauging the Gravity of the Situation: The Use and Abuse of Expertise in Estimating the Economic Costs of Brexit

Author:
Christoph Semken and Colin Hay
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
HM Treasury’s estimation of the economic consequences of Brexit – using standard macroeconomic models – during the EU referendum campaign represents a remarkable intervention in a highly politicized public debate. It raises a series of questions about the use of economic expertise. Through a detailed theoretical and empirical critique of the Treasury’s methodology – and a reassessment of the likely effects of Brexit in light of this – we cast doubt on the utility of their approach, highlighting methodological issues, unrealistic assumptions, and misrepresentations of established facts. In the process we seek to identify some of the wider implications for the use and potential abuse of economic expertise in highly charged political contexts, such as the EU referendum debate.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Brexit, and Methodology
Political Geography:
Britain and Europe

8. The Brexit referendum and the rise in hate crime; conforming to the new norm

Author:
Facundo Albornoz, Jake Bradley, and Silvia Sonderegger
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:
We show that the sharp increase in hate crime following the Brexit referendum was more pronounced in more pro-remain areas. This is consistent with a model where behavior is dictated by the desire to conform to imperfectly observed social norms in addition to following individual preferences, and where the referendum revealed that society’s real preferences over immigration were less positive than previously thought. For identification, we exploit the feature that the referendum revealed new information overnight in a context where other determinants of attitudes remained constant. The data can be replicated with a sensible parameterization of the model.
Topic:
Immigration, Public Opinion, Brexit, and Discrimination
Political Geography:
Britain and United Kingdom

9. Resilience or Relocation? Expectations and Reality in the City of London since the Brexit Referendum.

Author:
Manolis Kalaitzake
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
The fate of British finance following the Brexit referendum revolves around the “resilience or relocation” debate: will the City of London continue to thrive as the world’s leading financial centre or will the bulk of its activity move to rival hubs after departure from EU trading arrangements? Despite extensive commentary, there remains no systematic analysis of this question since the Leave vote. This paper addresses that lacuna by evaluating the empirical evidence concerning jobs, investments, and share of key trading markets (between June 2016 and May 2020). Contrary to widely held expectations, the evidence suggests that the City has been remarkably resilient. Brexit has had no significant impact on jobs and London has consolidated its position as the chief location for financial FDI, FinTech funding, and attracting new firms. Most unexpectedly, the City has increased its dominance in major infrastructure markets such as (euro-denominated) clearing, derivatives, and foreign exchange – although it has lost out in the handling of European repurchase agreements. Based upon this evidence, the paper argues that the UK’s negotiating position is stronger than typically recognised, and outlines the competitive ramifications for both the UK and EU financial sector.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, Brexit, Urban, and Local
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

10. EU sanctions and Brexit: Losing the hard edge of European foreign policy?

Author:
Juha Jokela and Ilari Aula
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The EU needs to assume more responsibility in defending its interests and security. Brexit will constitute an additional challenge for the EU in this respect, and has led to calls to strengthen the efficiency of the the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including EU sanctions, which currently form one of the toughest and most increasingly used tools in the EU’s foreign policy toolbox. The UK has been the most active and influential member state in formulating the EU’s sanctions policy. The EU could largely replace the technical expertise provided by the UK, yet the level of ambition of the EU’s sanctions policy is likely to decrease. Even though the UK has taken measures to maintain the sanctions regimes it agreed to as an EU member state, an independent UK sanctions policy could result in divergence. The envisaged coordination mechanisms between EU and UK sanctions policies can mitigate some of the negative implications of Brexit, but they cannot replace the UK’s EU membership.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Sanctions, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

11. The implications of a no-deal Brexit for the EU

Author:
Jannike Wachowiak
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
As the end of the transition period nears, the EU must prepare for a fundamentally different and more conflictual relationship with the UK. Whatever the outcome of the Brexit negotiations, there will be profound economic, political and geopolitical implications for the EU. While the EU as a whole might be better placed than the UK to absorb the economic shock of a no-deal, the fallout within the EU will be uneven, resulting in winners and losers. The asymmetrical impact and differential capacity and willingness of national governments to mitigate the shock could exacerbate regional disparities and unbalance the EU’s internal level playing field. As such, it might become more difficult to maintain the same level of EU unity post-no-deal.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
Britain and Europe

12. Britain's No-Deal Debacle? The Costs at Home and Likely Setbacks Abroad

Author:
John Ryan
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
For much of the past four years, and increasingly in the past few months, the United Kingdom has drifted in the direction of a No-Deal Brexit. In this Strategic Update, John Ryan explores the economic and political consequences for the United Kingdom of such a situation, as well as the domestic factors in Ireland and the United States that may provide unanticipated problems for the Johnson government.
Topic:
Economics, Government, Politics, Brexit, and Trade
Political Geography:
Britain, United Kingdom, Europe, Ireland, and United States of America

13. Resilience or Relocation? Expectations and Reality in the City of London since the Brexit Referendum

Author:
Manolis Kalaitzake
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
The fate of British finance following the Brexit referendum revolves around the “resilience or relocation” debate: will the City of London continue to thrive as the world’s leading financial centre, or will the bulk of its activity move to rival hubs after departure from EU trading arrangements? Despite extensive commentary, there remains no systematic analysis of this question since the Leave vote. This paper addresses that lacuna by evaluating the empirical evidence concerning jobs, investments, and share of key trading markets (between June 2016 and May 2020). Contrary to widely held expectations, the evidence suggests that the City has been remarkably resilient. Brexit has had no significant impact on jobs and London has consolidated its position as the chief location for financial FDI, FinTech funding, and attracting new firms. Most unexpectedly, the City has increased its dominance in major infrastructure markets such as (euro-denominated) clearing, derivatives, and foreign exchange – although it has lost out in the handling of European repurchase agreements. Based upon this evidence, the paper argues that the UK’s negotiating position is stronger than typically recognised, and outlines the competitive ramifications for both the UK and EU financial sector.
Topic:
European Union, Brexit, Resilience, Financial Services, and Relocation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and London

14. Brexit: Everyone Loses, but Britain Loses the Most

Author:
Maria C. Latorre, Zoryana Olekseyuk, Hidemichi Yonezawa, and Sherman Robinson
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
This paper examines 12 economic simulation models that estimate the impact of Brexit (Britain’s exit from the European Union). Most of the studies find adverse effects for the United Kingdom (UK) and the EU-27. The UK’s GDP losses from a hard Brexit (reversion to World Trade Organization rules due to a lack of UK-EU agreement) range from –1.2 to –4.5 percent in most of the models analyzed. A soft Brexit (e.g., Norway arrangement, which seems in line with the nonbinding text of the political declaration of November 14, 2018, on the future EU-UK relationship) has about half the negative impact of a hard Brexit. Only two of the models derive gains for the UK after Brexit because they are based on unrealistic assumptions. The authors analyze more deeply a computable general equilibrium model that includes productivity and firm selection effects within manufacturing sectors and operations of foreign multinationals in services. Based on this latest model, they explain the likely economic impact of Brexit on a wide range of macroeconomic variables, namely GDP, wages, private consumption, capital remuneration, aggregate exports, aggregate imports, and the consumer price index.
Topic:
Economics, World Trade Organization, Brexit, and Multinational Corporations
Political Geography:
Britain, Europe, and European Union

15. The economic impact of Boris Johnson’s Brexit proposals

Author:
Anand Menon
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
The Prime Minister has set out a means of escaping the Brexit stalemate, but his new Brexit proposals have, as yet, not managed to overcome the impasse. What, though, would the plan mean for the UK economy? That is the question we seek to answer in what follows. As ever, we have been lucky enough to be able to draw on the skills and expertise of some of the leading experts in the field. The bulk of the work was done by Hanwei Huang, Jonathan Portes and Thomas Sampson, with contributions from Matt Bevington and Jill Rutter. Hanwei and Thomas used the LSE’s Centre for Economic Performance trade model to carry out the modelling. We hope you find the report interesting and informative. Brexit is clearly about more than economics, but the economic impact of leaving the EU nevertheless merits careful scrutiny.
Topic:
Economics, Politics, European Union, Brexit, and Boris Johnson
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

16. Brexit and Renewables in Scotland

Author:
Nicola McEwen, Aileen McHarg, Fiona Munro, Paul Cairney, Karen Turner, and Antonios Katris
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
This briefing paper considers the extent to which renewables in Scotland are shaped by the policy responsibilities and decisions of multiple governments: the Scottish government, the UK government and the EU. The paper explores the significance of EU membership in shaping Scottish renewables and considers the likely effects of the UK’s exit from the EU. Despite limited constitutional power, promoting renewables has been a key priority for successive Scottish governments, central to both its environmental and economic policies. While the main policy drivers rest with the UK government, stakeholders in Scotland place importance on the EU regulatory framework, EU funding and finance, multinational cooperation and long-term strategic thinking in supporting the development of renewables in Scotland. The briefing identifies varying levels of concern among key stakeholders with regard to the impact that Brexit may have on renewables in Scotland. Many expect policy continuity, irrespective of the UK-EU relationship. Others are fearful of the uncertainty surrounding access to the EU internal market, access to project funding, access to labour and expertise, and added costs and delays in supply chains in an industry heavily reliant on kit from the EU. The biggest impact of Brexit to date has been the dominance of the issue on the political agenda, leaving little space for policy development in other areas, including energy. In addition to the regulatory, financial and trade challenges it may generate, Brexit has also reignited the debate on Scotland’s constitutional future, creating further uncertainties for the future of renewables.
Topic:
Government, European Union, Constitution, Brexit, and Renewable Energy
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Scotland

17. The Border into Brexit: perspectives from local communities in the central border region of Ireland/Northern Ireland

Author:
Katy Hayward
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
These are the findings of a project on the impacts of Brexit and the possible implications of a ‘No Deal’ scenario on the Central Border Region of Ireland/Northern Ireland. This research has been conducted by a small team at Queen’s University Belfast (led by Dr. Katy Hayward & Dr. Milena Komarova), in conjunction with the Irish Central Border Area Network (ICBAN), the cross-border partnership of eight local authorities in the area known as the Central Border Region. The report looks at: ‘The Border into Brexit’ project; The impact of Brexit on those living in the Central Border Region; A hard border; Leave supporters in the region; A No Deal Brexit; The revised Protocol in the Withdrawal Agreement.
Topic:
European Union, Brexit, and Borders
Political Geography:
Europe, Ireland, Northern Ireland, and UK

18. The 2019 European elections: New political constellations

Author:
Tuomas Iso-Markku and Marco Siddi
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Three main factors will determine the shape of the next European Parliament (EP): the outcome of the elections, the organisation of national parties into supranational political groups, and developments in the Brexit process. Everything points towards some significant changes – and a considerable degree of uncertainty – in the new EP. The EP’s centre-right and centre-left groups are expected to lose their combined majority for the first time since 1979, whereas far-right parties and liberal democrats will likely increase their representation. The EP’s mainstream groups will therefore need new allies to achieve majorities, which could boost the influence of the smaller groups. The choice of the next Commission President will be the first major test for the new EP. While most political groups have designated candidates, it is unclear whether the Spitzenkandidaten system will be followed. If and when it takes place, Brexit will have an impact on the size of the EP, reducing it from 751 to 705 seats, as well as on the composition of the political groups that include British parliamentarians.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, Brexit, and European Parliament
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

19. Finland’s 2019 presidency of the Council of the European Union: European and domestic determinants

Author:
Tuomas Iso-Markku and Juha Jokela
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Finnish presidency of the Council of the EU faces a sensitive political climate, marked by divisions between the member states. However, some of the EU’s recent crises have also given the Union a renewed sense of purpose: striking the right balance between ambition and realism will therefore be a key challenge for Finland. During its presidency, Finland will have little legislative work, but can help in setting the EU’s priorities for the next five years, advancing the negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework and managing the Brexit process. The rise of the Eurosceptic Finns Party in the late 2000s had a crucial impact on Finland’s EU policy. This was reflected in harder and, at times, obstructive positions on EU issues. However, recently a new consensus on EU affairs seems to have emerged among the other parties. Antti Rinne’s new government is striving for a stronger EU with a presidency programme that resonates with the strategic agenda of the European Council, but also corresponds with the more limited role of post-Lisbon Treaty presidencies.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, Finance, and Brexit
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

20. Europe in 2019: A Critical and Transitional Year

Author:
Rachel Lutz Ellehuus, Ricklef Beutin, and Quentin Lopinot
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
For European countries and institutions as well as for transatlantic relations, 2019 will be a pivotal year. With several important leadership, policy, and structural transitions taking place in capitals and Brussels, there will be instability and uncertainty but from this could stem more positive dynamics. While the twists and turns of events remain unpredictable, what follows is a quick take on some of the most significant events on the European and transatlantic security and defense calendar for 2019 and the important stakes that are at play.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, Brexit, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

21. International Development Cooperation After Brexit

Author:
Mikaela Gavas
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
Mikaela Gavas submitted written evidence to the United Kingdom's House of Lords EU External Affairs Sub-Committee on January 31, 2019. In her evidence Gavas answered questions about the future of UK-EU development cooperation after Brexit.
Topic:
Development, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

22. L’ambivalence de la politique d’armement britannique vis-à-vis de l’Europe (The Ambivalence of British Arms Policy Towards Europe)

Author:
Samuel B. H. Faure
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales
Abstract:
Published in the context of Brexit, this research paper analyses the ‘double relationship’ between Britain and Europe: being ‘in’ by taking part in co-operation with other European states, and at the same time being ‘out’ by staying away from or even leaving multilateral programmes in Europe. This dilemma is worked on from the case of defence procurement policy. How does the British government decide to be both ‘in’ and ‘out’ of Europe by participating in the A400M military transport aircraft programme and withdrawing from the EuroMale UAV programme? Based on exclusive data, the decision in favour of the A400M (‘in’) is explained by the action of political, administrative and industrial actors who perceive the A400M as a ‘truck’ rather than a ‘race car’. As for the British State’s decision not to participate in the EuroMale programme (‘out’), it is conditioned by a weakening of the political will of political actors, and at the same time by a strengthening of conflicting relations between French and British administrations and industries. In doing so, this research contributes to the literature on the acquisition of armaments in strategic studies, and to the literature on differentiated integration in European studies.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Political Economy, European Union, Brexit, Conflict, and Europeanization
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, France, Western Europe, and European Union

23. The Global Impact of Brexit Uncertainty

Author:
Tarek A. Hassan, Laurence van Lent, Stephan Hollander, and Ahmed Tahoun
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
Using tools from computational linguistics, we construct new measures of the impact of Brexit on listed firms in the United States and around the world: the share of discussions in quarterly earnings conference calls on costs, benefits, and risks associated with the UK’s intention to leave the EU. Using this approach, we identify which firms expect to gain or lose from Brexit and which are most affected by Brexit uncertainty. We then estimate the effects of these different kinds of Brexit exposure on firm-level outcomes. We find that concerns about Brexit-related uncertainty extend far beyond British or even European firms. US and international firms most exposed to Brexit uncertainty have lost a substantial fraction of their market value and have reduced hiring and investment. In addition to Brexit uncertainty (the second moment), we find that international firms overwhelmingly expect negative direct effects of Brexit (the first moment), should it come to pass. Most prominently, firms expect difficulties resulting from regulatory divergence, reduced labor mobility, trade access, and the costs of adjusting their operations post-Brexit. Consistent with the predictions of canonical theory, this negative sentiment is recognized and priced in stock markets but has not yet had significant effects on firm actions.
Topic:
Economics, Political Economy, Regional Cooperation, Brexit, Global Political Economy, and Economic Policy
Political Geography:
Britain, United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and European Union

24. Great Britain and the European Union Beyond Brexit

Author:
Ana Muhar Blanquart
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
Brexit is a term coined of the words “British exit”, referring to the United Kingdom leaving the European Union. First used in 2012 by the founder of the British Influence think-tank Peter Wilding, it became the most frequently used political term in 2016, the year when the British electorate chose to leave the European Union and thus change the political landscape of the United Kingdom and the European Union.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, England, North Ireland, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales

25. Elections that will shape the EU more than ever befor

Author:
Augustin Palokaj
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
European elections this year, to take place on 23-26 May, are considered to be one of the most important in the history of the European Union. This might sound exaggerated or at least something that has been heard before. But there are many reasons why this time things are different. The EU is at the crossroads, performance, record low unemployment and fewer member states find themselves in economic difficulties or excessive deficit. Trust in the EU and support for membership is increasing among citizens in most member states. However, the general picture remains mixed and any flaw is widely exploited by with mixed picture on the state of the union: divided more than ever on core issues such as common values, solidarity, migration, free movement and the rule of law. On the positive side, however, there is a pretty good economic eurosceptic forces. Many challenges will have to be addressed urgently, starting immediately after the European elections. The results, which will most probably confirm a decline in support for traditional mainstream parties, will affect the election of a new President of the European Commission, a new President of the European Council and other key figures in EU institutions. This time it will not be easy, since many national leaders have questioned the automatic respect for the principle of “Spitzenkandidat” (the lead candidate put forward by the political group able to create a majority in the European Parliament, that becomes the President of the European Commission) and will try to return this power to elect the Commission’s President to the heads of states and governments, with the Parliament expected to rubber-stamp their choice. The Parliament could fight back and this may create a politically motivated power struggle between two major EU institutions.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Elections, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
Europe and Brussels

26. Britain's Uncertain Brexit March

Author:
Marko Attila Hoare
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The popular vote of the UK on 23 June 2016 to leave the EU has been politically an earthquake for the first and a shock to the second. Retrospectively, the outcome was likely, given the structural factors both within Britain and between Britain and the EU. Yet these same factors have obstructed a clear British post- referendum strategy for secession: Britain Britain’s relationship to Europe is traditionally ambiguous. Britain’s identity - of a Protestant island-state formed in 1707 from the Anglo- Scottish union - was cemented during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in wars against the Catholic powers of continental Europe. It was successively reinforced by Napoleon’s anti-British Continental System; does not know what kind of Brexit it wants, or whether it wants one at all. This briefing will examine the causes of the Brexit revolution and the reasons for its uncertain execution, before considering the likely outcome.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Geopolitics, Europe Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, England, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales

27. Endorsing Brexit or Preparing for ‘No Deal’? A Belgian Perspective

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
What are we to make of the Withdrawal Agreement and the Political Declaration outlining the future relationship between the EU and the UK? This European Policy Brief explores the current state of the Brexit debate from a Belgian perspective. While the Brexit deal deserves to be welcomed, domestic politics continue to act as a bottleneck. Whether or not the Withdrawal Agreement obtains parliamentary approval, Belgian authorities would do well to stay alert and prepare for multiple potential outcomes.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Belgium

28. 10 Things to Watch for on Brexit

Author:
Ken Gude
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
On December 11, British Parliament will vote on Prime Minister Theresa May’s deal to leave the European Union (EU)—commonly known as Brexit. As of now, it seems clear that she is nowhere close to having the votes to pass it.1 The vote comes after a contentious referendum campaign in the United Kingdom and two years of difficult negotiations with the EU, which saw Prime Minister May and Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, formally agree on a Brexit withdrawal agreement on November 25.2 The deal would establish a transition period at least through the end of 2020, during which the United Kingdom would be formally outside the EU but still abiding by its rules and regulations.3 During this transition period, U.K. and EU leadership will negotiate the final terms of the future economic and trading relationship that will see the United Kingdom leave the EU single market and formal customs union yet likely remain in close alignment with the EU on many customs rules.4 If the United Kingdom does remain close to EU customs rules, it would limit the scope of any free trade deals the nation wants with non-EU countries that diverge from EU customs requirements.5 Furthermore, it would allow the United Kingdom to place new limits on the previously free movement of EU nationals into the nation.6 May’s Conservative Party is in the unenviable position of not having enough members of Parliament (MPs) to form an overall majority and, in order to form a government, it relies on an agreement with 10 MPs from the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to vote with them on important legislation.7 Yet the DUP opposes the withdrawal deal, as do many of May’s own Tory MPs.8 And then there is Britain’s main opposition, the Labour Party, which is against the deal, as is the third-largest party in Parliament, the Scottish National Party (SNP).9 The reality is that there still is no political consensus in the United Kingdom between the mutually exclusive positions of those who want a hard Brexit and a sharp break from the EU, a soft Brexit that maintains close alignment with the EU, and no Brexit at all.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Social Movement, European Union, Brexit, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

29. European Strategic Autonomy and Brexit

Author:
Peter Round, Bastain Giegerich, and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The United Kingdom is among the few European Union member states with full-spectrum military and defence-industrial capabilities. Through Brexit, the EU could lose 20% of its military and 40% of its defence-industrial capabilities, and thereby its influence and credibility as a security actor. The pertinent question is how to arrange the UK’s future participation in European defence.  Decision-making on defence matters in the international arena requires skilled diplomacy and the momentum to carry plans through the scrutiny of multiple parliaments. The EU risks inaction through inertia without the UK’s soft powers, placing strategic decision-making at risk. The Union needs the UK’s military enablers, but only until it can deliver its own. In addition, with the UK’s ‘special relationship’ with the United States suffering, London’s influence is on the wane.  More autonomy for the EU is possible within a framework of political partners that reaches beyond the EU, incorporating actors such as the UK, and also Norway.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and North America

30. Fostering a Defense-Industrial Base for Europe: The Impact of Brexit

Author:
Torben Schütz and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The European defence technological industrial base (DTIB) represents a core element of European defence and deterrence – it is a strategic asset. Strong defence industries multiply the deterrent effect of the armed forces. However, national industries in most countries cannot offer the full range of supplies needed by national armed forces. Despite the fragmentary nature of its industries, Europe collectively has most of the range of defence-industrial capabilities, enabling, at least notionally, security of supply for EU and NATO partners. The UK’s share of defence-related turnover among European companies is almost 40%. The UK also makes defence-industrial contributions to many multi- national projects. While Brexit does not remove the UK’s defence-industrial base from the wider European environment, it will complicate its involvement. The EU’s growing role in defence-industrial matters, through regulation and financial resources, is shaping the wider European DTIB. At the same time, the Union’s ambition as a security actor creates an obligation to ensure that European partners outside the EU can contribute as effectively as possible to European defence and deterrence. In order to do this: The UK, EU institutions and EU governments should work toward as close a common understanding as possible that safeguarding a sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is in the strategic interests of all political partners in Europe. The UK and its EU partners should establish politically and structurally significant flagship armament projects. Such projects would support a shared objective, namely to consolidate the still fragmented European DTIB, and in the process make it more competitive. A European Defence Industrial Review should be launched to help identify key industrial branches and companies that are of structural relevance to the European DTIB, and therefore to European defence and deterrence. For future regulations related to the defence industry, the EU should take a ‘systemic view’, i.e. also take into account how a regulation affects European partners and contributors outside the EU.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and London

31. Opportunities for Defense-Industrial Collaboration after Brexit

Author:
Douglas Barrie
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The United Kingdom should seek to continue to support defence-technology cooperation with the European Union and partner states across all military domains. Avoiding, or at least minimising, the second-order effects of Brexit on wider defence cooperation with European partners will be easier if the UK is directly involved in the EU’s defence-technology initiatives. Specific opportunities present themselves across the military domains: Pursue cooperation in the air domain with regard to future combat- aircraft technology. While collaboration at the platform level is unlikely in the near term, exploring common R&D in key systems, such as radar, propulsion, avionics, sensors and weapons, is achievable. In the land domain, explore partnership with France and Germany on participating in the development of a next-generation main battle tank. Collaboration on applicable technologies at the component and sub- system levels should also be encouraged. This could include armour and armament R&D, and laser weapons. In the maritime domain, support cooperation in the air-defence arena, including the use of laser weapons for ship self-defence, and the use of naval vessels for ballistic-missile defence. In the space domain, examine potential cooperation on next-generation communication satellite requirements, and wider collaboration on geospatial intelligence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Brexit, Maritime, and Space
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, London, Germany, and Brussels

32. UK Participation in the EDA and the new EU defense package in the context of Brexit

Author:
Lucie béraud-Sudreau
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
To continue United Kingdom participation in European Union defence cooperation:  The UK, the European Commission and EU member states should strive to avoid near-term decisions that would shut out the UK from future participation in EU defence policies.  Pursue agreement on the nature of a ‘third-state’ position as applied to the UK, ensuring the goals of Brussels and London are met.  Identify ways for London to show its commitment to supporting the EU’s defence ambitions, signalling clearly a change from previous opposition.  Brussels and London need to agree the key preconditions that will under- pin any deal over the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).  The UK should aim to ensure a single point of entry through the European Defence Agency for defence cooperation with the EU, in the absence of a Commission directorate-general for security and defence. Reach agreement on an overarching financial contribution covering access to the EDA, the EDF and PESCO, while London also commits to contributing funding to specific projects it wishes to take part in.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Brussels

33. The UK’s potential role in enabling EU–NATO cooperation after Brexit

Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The United Kingdom, having expressed interest in a strong EU–UK security partnership and having indicated that, if anything, its commitment to NATO will be even stronger after Brexit, has an opportunity to be a leader and facilitator in the context of EU–NATO cooperation in meeting emerging threats. Several of the priority areas and action items defined by these two organisations, following a declaration to enhance their cooperation at NATO’s 2016 Warsaw Summit, play to the UK’s strengths: To increase the level of cooperation between the EU and NATO, and in order to implement the cooperation agenda, the UK should invest both financially and in terms of personnel, via voluntary national contributions to NATO. The UK taking on a leadership role in the area of inter-organisational cooperation would signal to EU partners that stronger support for NATO is not intended to weaken EU initiatives; it is an opportunity to stress the complementary nature of EU and NATO capabilities. Given its limited resources, the UK could, in effect, use engagement in EU–NATO cooperation to hedge its bets on both organisations. Stronger support for NATO can directly benefit the EU’s security and defence initiatives, while making sure that cooperation results in added value in both multinational frameworks, rather than fostering institutional competition.
Topic:
NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Brussels

34. Could the EU deliver on its military ambitions after Brexit?

Author:
Douglas Barrie, Ben Barry, Henry Boyd, Marie-Louise Chagnaud, Nick Childs, Bastain Giegerich, Christain Möelling, and Torben Schutz
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
he ability of the European Union to act in defence, today and in the future, is an important reference point in the debate about EU strategic autonomy in the context of Brexit. The EU has set itself a military level of ambition. Under the heading of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), EU member states want to be able to conduct a range of military operations. Together with the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), this study assesses to what extent the EU is able to fulfil this level of ambition, today and with an outlook towards 2030. The IISS and DGAP have developed policy-compliant scenarios to assess where possible capability shortfalls lie. Our findings benchmark existing and future EU member state capabilities against the force requirements the EU level of ambition generates.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Germany

35. Spitzenkandidaten and shifting electorates: Towards the 2019 European Parliament elections

Author:
Milan Igrutinović
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
European political parties are preparing themselves for the European Parliament elections in May 2019. With the UK formally leaving the EU at the end of March, the number of MEP seats for the election will decrease from 751 to 705, with a wider range of Brexit issues that will have to be dealt in the run-up. Also, Jean-Claude Juncker will not run again and that will leave the position at the head of the European Commission open for a new candidate. During the mandate of the current Commission sweeping changes occurred across the EU and, maybe more importantly, outside of it. The migrant crisis that exploded in late 2015 has shifted the way politics is debated in the EU and in the member states. The advent of ISIS in the Middle East and North Africa and the number of terrorist attacks in Europe have highlighted the security nexus between internal EU security and its neighbourhood. Russia has remained a strategic challenge and with it the security of Eastern Europe remains in question. The election of Donald Trump in the US and uncertainty of Transatlantic relations and global trade rules that came with him have become a new and important factor in international politics. Brexit has shown that the “ever closer Union” slogan rings hollow and that the process of EU expansion is reversible. A string of national elections has shown how deep and complex political issues in Europe really are, and how centre-left parties are under pressure with diminishing vote share. On top of that, political debates about the internal EU reform are yet to offer any tangible result.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, Brexit, Election watch, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

36. Consensus for Action: Towards a More Effective EU Sanctions Policy

Author:
Tom Keatinge and Emil Dall
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Sanctions are a key tool of foreign policy but have taken on greater salience over the last 20 years as governments have reached for leverage in negotiations but foregone the use of force. During this period, the alignment of the design and implementation of sanctions by the European Union and the United States has, on the whole, been an article of faith as the transatlantic allies have pursued mutual foreign policy objectives. Yet despite the consistency of objectives, the bureaucratic structures, technical mechanisms, and processes by which the European Union and the United States design and implement sanctions differ significantly. These differences—always present—have been amplified by the current stresses in transatlantic relations and may be further exacerbated when the United Kingdom leaves the European Union in March 2019. The reasons behind these differences are myriad and touch upon both structural matters (such as the construction of the European Union and the manner in which its member states can enact policy) and more philosophical matters, as the focus on due process and human rights in EU sanctions policy demonstrates. But given the importance of transatlantic ties and cooperation in managing the sorts of problems that sanctions are usually developed to address, it is important for both the United States and the European Union to work through these differences. Toward that goal, this paper provides a European perspective on US sanctions activity, where there are differences in approach, in particular EU attitudes toward secondary sanctions put in place by the United States, and it explains the complications that may result from the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. The paper concludes with recommendations for how the European Union can address the challenges it faces in achieving an effective sanctions policy. In short, it recommends the following: The European Union should work through its structural issues to create a more decisive and effective EU sanctions policy. The implementation and enforcement of sanctions at the member state level must be improved, and a formal EU-level sanctions body is needed to independently monitor compliance with sanctions across the European Union. A clear mechanism for ensuring the coordination and effectiveness of EU-UK post-Brexit sanctions policy must be established. The global centrality of both the European Union’s economy and the United Kingdom’s financial sector combine to present a powerful sanctions force and must thus be closely coordinated to ensure maximum effectiveness. The European Union should directly address the matter of human rights exemptions by incorporating it as a key consideration of the EU-level sanctions body identified in the first recommendation. The European Union should establish a clear channel for human rights exemptions throughout the lifetime of sanctions regimes. The European Union should consider its options to address the ability of non-EU actors to abuse EU-originating supply chains and financial services, which represents a considerable sanctions implementation vulnerability. Finally, though US-EU misalignment on sanctions is growing, policy makers must stay seized of the necessity to maintain and improve communications and coordination to prevent current schisms from having serious long-term effects on international security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Sanctions, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, and Europe

37. “Not Laughing Now”: Nigel Farage, European Identity, and Euroscepticism in the EU

Author:
Baronia Nitisha
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of European Studies (IES), UC Berkeley
Abstract:
Due to economic, political, and cultural disparities between member states, the European Union (EU) has been unable to form a pan-European political and cultural identity. This has resulted in a long-term vote capturing opportunity for far-right political parties, which have brought Euroscepticism to the EU’s doorstep through election to the European Parliament (EP). Furthermore, because of their ability to emphasize these deeply rooted economic, political, and cultural disparities, far-right eurosceptic Members of European Parliament (MEPs) exacerbate Euroscepticism in a self-sustaining cycle that both internally and externally threatens EU legitimacy and, if left unaddressed, the very future of European integration.
Topic:
International Affairs and Brexit
Political Geography:
Europe

38. The challenges facing the ‘new’ Spain

Author:
William Chislett
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Elcano Royal Institute
Abstract:
Although some Spaniards joke that the country has got along fine with a caretaker government for 315 days, this year has been a lost one. There are some pressing issues that need to be tackled now that there is finally a functioning government. But the new Popular Party (PP) government no longer has an absolute majority. As a minority administration it will have to negotiate its laws and reforms in a deeply fragmented parliament, the result of the upending of the PP and the Socialist Party (PSOE) by two new parties, the far left Unidos Podemos (UP) and the centrist Ciudadanos (C’s). The government has a lot on its plate, including the following: (a) belatedly approving the budget for 2017 and meeting the EU’s threshold for the deficit (3% of GDP) in 2018 (a target imposed by Brussels that the PP persistently missed); (b) deciding what to do about the push for independence in Catalonia (the region’s government says it will hold a referendum on the issue in September 2017 regardless of whether the central government approves it or not); (c) cleaning up corruption in the political class; (d) making the judiciary more independent; (e) possibly deepening the labour market reforms in a bid to reduce the still very high unemployment rate (18.9%); (f) reforming an education system whose early school-leaving rate of 20% is close to double the EU average; (g) bolstering the ailing pension system hit by a sharp fall in the number of social security contributors and a rapidly ageing population; and (h) making its voice heard more in the post-Brexit debate.
Topic:
International Relations and Brexit
Political Geography:
Spain and European Union

39. Programming Brexit: How will the UK’s IT sector fare?

Author:
Mikkel Barslund and Matthias Busse
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
The British economy has always been able to rely on a continuous inflow of high-skilled workers from the rest of the EU and the UK is currently home to over three million EU citizens and. As a result of the UK’s decision to leave the European Union, however, the image of the UK in the eyes of foreign workers may have become tarnished. By using LinkedIn data, the authors of this study analyse the movements of IT professionals between the EU and the UK and thereby illustrate what is at stake for the UK, as exemplified by this particular ‘shortage sector’. LinkedIn data show that on an annual basis the UK gains over 6,000 IT experts more than it loses to the EU. Moreover, these mobile IT professionals tend to be much more qualified than domestic IT experts are. This reliance on the EU for IT recruitment – one in ten new hires comes from the EU – suggests that even if the UK is not aiming to restrict high-skilled immigration, curbing overall immigration could have unintended negative consequences for its capability to attract talented EU nationals in the future. The UK government should perhaps bear this in mind during negotiations with the EU27.
Topic:
Science and Technology and Brexit
Political Geography:
Europe

40. Reality bites: the Brexit negotiations seen from the other side of the Channel

Author:
Fabian Zuleeg
Publication Date:
07-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
The Brexit negotiations continued this week with the UK government still insisting that the endpoint be an exit from the EU, including its Customs Union and the Single Market. But back in Britain, the turmoil is obvious, with different members of government taking diverging views, suggesting, at times, that a soft Brexit or a transition arrangement might be possible, even if it means concessions on the role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the exit payment, the rights of EU citizens and even (temporarily) continued freedom of movement of EU citizens.
Topic:
Europe Union and Brexit
Political Geography:
Europe

41. A Singapore on the Thames? Post-Brexit Deregulation in the UK

Author:
Anastasia Nesvetailova, Ronen Palan, Stefano Pagliari, John Grahl, Richard Murphy, Izabella Kaminska, and Thomas Christiansen
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
City Political Economy Research Centre (CITYPERC), University of London
Abstract:
The so-called 'Singapore on the Thames' scenarios for post-Brexit UK tend to envisage a country that has abandoned the red tape of EU regulations, likely adopted a unilateral free trade approach and introduced a low taxation regime for the corporate sector. Technically, it is possible to make Britain into a low corporate tax jurisdiction. However, while the abolition of corporation tax would create an entirely tax-free environment for foreign shareholders in UK companies, this measure would end up increasing taxes on UK privately owned businesses. In the financial sector post-Brexit, the deregulated fintech industry is likely to evolve along the historical path of the unregulated Eurodollar markets, creating additional risks for financial stability, transparency and the reputation of the UK. In reality, two sets of political-economic factors will influence the UK's economic strategy post-Brexit: domestic alliances and the international policy context.
Topic:
Regulation, Brexit, and Deregulation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

42. Brexit and the Shifting Pillars of NATO

Author:
Julian Lindley-French
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Will Britain’s departure from the EU lead to the creation of an Anglosphere and a Eurosphere within NATO? Unfortunately, there are a range of challenges to such a formulation. First, if the EU continues to drive a hard post-Brexit relationship with the British, it may be increasingly difficult for any government in London to convince the British people that other Europeans are worth defending. Second, would the United States, Canada and others entertain such an idea? Third, France is not going to abandon its strategic relationship with Britain – Brexit or no Brexit. Fourth, there will be a Brexit deal and Britain will remain a key factor in European defence. Fifth, “events, dear boy, events!” However, Brexit or no Brexit, NATO’s pillars are shifting. The United States will demand more of its allies if Washington is to maintain a credible security and defence guarantee for Europe. The changing nature of conflict will tend to emphasize intelligence and power projection, both of which play to Britain’s residual strengths. Canada? It is hard for an outsider to discern Canadian defence policy, other than bumbling along in strategic suburbia with the desire to be seen as the good neighbour. This is a mistake. NATO’s shifting pillars will have profound implications for Canadian security and defence policy. A formal Anglosphere and Eurosphere within NATO? Most likely not. A U.S.-sphere and German-sphere? Quite possibly, but don’t mention it in polite company. Canada? Who knows?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Brexit, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Britain, Europe, Canada, and North America

43. Presidential election in Serbia: A boost or setback for EU accession?

Author:
Krševan Antun Dujmović
Publication Date:
03-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
As Serbia braces itself for the presidential election on 2nd April 2017, the international community �inds itself puzzled with the prospect of future political orientation of this Balkan country. The biggest republic of ex-Yugoslavia, Serbia still bears the burden of the wars in the nineties, unde�ined relations with Kosovo and NATO bombing of 1999, due to which the country is still somewhat cautious toward Euro-Atlantic integration and the United States. It seems that Serbia seeks to join the European Union (EU), and at the same time to foment its relation with its traditional ally, the Russian Federation. In that respect, the current trends of foreign policy in Serbia are also visible in other Balkan countries, namely Macedonia and Montenegro, which like Serbia have strong links to their big Orthodox patron in the East, while striving to make progress on the path to the EU. This dichotomy between pro-European and pro-Russian forces in Serbia was exacerbated to a new level with Brexit and stalemate in the EU enlargement process, growing Russian in�luence in the region and expectations in Serbia that the newly inaugurated US president Donald Trump will bring a thaw in relations with Russia and allow a regionally more dominant Serbia, while curbing ambitions of Kosovar Albanians. This dichotomy has created a division in the country torn between its Western and Eastern ambitions that is visible in many aspects of Serbian society, candidates bare hallmark, or in Obradović, the leader of the Serbian Movement Dveri (Srpski pokret Dveri) is a clear example of a pro-Russian politician in Serbia, while independent candidate SašaJanković represents the voice of a civil and pro-European Serbia. The rest of the presidential candidates are positioned on a wide spectrum dividing Obradović and Janković, thus contributing to the rather short but at the same time very electri�ied presidential campaign.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Elections, Europe Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

44. Federal election in Germany: Continuation of CDU’s dominance at the helm of Europe’s biggest power?

Author:
Krševan Antun Dujmović
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
Over the course of past twelve months, Europe was holding its breath in a couple of nerve wrecking moments that were to decide the destiny of the European Union (EU). Indeed, in June last year the British cast their votes for the unimaginable and decided that the United Kingdom (UK) should leave the EU. Shockwaves battered the woozy continent sprawling from over the other side of the English Channel, and it was the President of the European Parliament, incumbent German SPD leader Martin Schulz who exclaimed in the wake of the Brexit vote that the UK should exit the EU as quickly as possible. Just four months later Europe experienced another shockwave, this time propelled from the other side of the Atlantic, as the Americans voted for Donald Trump, who was in support of Brexit during his campaign, advocating overtly against the European integration and even renouncing the fundament of Trans-Atlantic integration - NATO. The beginning of 2017 set a murky atmosphere as the EU started to brace itself for another big test in France. The victory of Emmanuel Macron in May meant that the EU would survive, albeit crippled as the Britons lead by Theresa May continued relentlessly their divorce with Europe by triggering the Article 50 in March. With the British already one foot out, and the French �irmly in the Union, the attention of the European public is shifting more to Germany which will hold the federal election on September 24th this year. After the disappointing break away decision in Britain, some Europeans seem to invoke a renewed Franco-German axis as the power engine of European integration. Since the great economic depression swept Europe like a contagion in 2008, Germany has been the best performing European economy, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel was perceived as the “savior of Europe”. Due to these facts, it is no wonder that all of Europe eagerly expects the outcome of the German federal election which will largely determine the fate of the continent.
Topic:
Elections, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
Britain, Europe, France, Germany, and Western Europe

45. Europe Today and What's Next

Author:
Hannes Androsch
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
In many places it is forgotten that Europe, especially the EU, is a veritable success story, as this continent has never before experienced a period such as the past seven decades of democracy, peace and prosperity. Faced with the current challenges, especially the refugee crisis, there has been an increasing tendency among European governments to take unilateral action. This approach cannot be successful, however, as European governments attempt to implement policy prescriptions of the past to solve problems of the present. In fact, we need not less but more Europe—but also a reformed Europe: a European Union with one voice for external policy (common foreign, security and defense policy and asylum and migration policy) and the capacity to overcome its internal turmoil (common economic, budget, and tax policies, and a minimum of a transfer union). We also need a European Union that makes the benefits of globalization available to all people. The European Union is currently experiencing one of its worst crises in its history. Old fault lines that have run through the continent for centuries, once considered overcome, have become prominent once again; new challenges have arisen, especially in the wake of globalization, climate change and new technological developments (the Digital Revolution). The world has seemingly become ungovernable. The proclaimed 1989 “end of history” (Fukuyama) is certainly over, and history has a firm grip on Europe. This, at least since the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis in 2007/08, no longer deniable fact is reflected in the still unresolved crisis in Greece (“Grexit”), the associated Euro Crisis, the British referendum on exit from the EU (“Brexit”), and in the renaissance of geopolitics. The annexation of Crimea by Russia undertaken in violation of international law, the war in eastern Ukraine, as well as state disintegration in Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Syria have made it clear that, from the Caucasus to the Balkans and from Pakistan/Afghanistan via the Middle East to North Africa, extends a “Ring of Fire,”—a term used by former Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew to describe the geopolitical challenges of Europe more than twenty years ago. These long concealed —or ignored—distortions are now breaking out again in the form of “wars of succession,” leaving behind territories plagued by unrest, civil wars, and failed states, and resulting in terrorism and refugee waves now reaching the center of Europe. The resulting “crisis mode,” within which the European Union has been operating for several years now, reached its climax with the result of the referendum conducted in June, determining Britain’s exit from the European Union (Brexit). Aside from the medium and long-term economic implications for the country, Brexit was an earthquake with unforeseeable consequences especially on the political level. Scotland is once again discussing its potential separation from the United Kingdom, the fragile peace funded by the EU in Northern Ireland is threatened by collapse, and in a considerable number of other EU countries—mainly France and the Netherlands—populist and nationalist parties are interpreting Brexit as a signal to seek their salvation in national initiatives.
Topic:
Security, Global Recession, European Union, Refugee Crisis, Brexit, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, and Syria

46. Background to Brexit: One-Size-Fits-All Monetary Policy and the Eurozone Crisis

Author:
Amanda Pearson
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
After months of vitriolic campaigns, on June 23 voters began to emerge from polling stations throughout the United Kingdom having cast their ballots in a nationwide referendum on European Union (EU) membership. The possibility of a British exit, or “Brexit,” has shined a spotlight on the institutional, political, and economic woes of the EU and the eurozone. But for political economist Jeffry Frieden, Stanfield Professor of International Peace at Harvard University, this moment in British political life is merely the latest expression of domestic political unrest in a host of European countries. Elections loom throughout Europe: in Spain three days after the UK referendum, in France and Germany next year. In a final irony, Britain is due to take the rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in July 2017. What does the future look like for a European Union tethered to a single market and a single currency? From the economic woes of the eurozone, to the political debates brought about by the refugee crisis, tension among EU member states has brought into question the very nature and future of European integration generally, and of monetary integration specifically.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Europe Union, Brexit, and Eurozone
Political Geography:
Europe

47. Background to Brexit: Populism, Nationalism, and the Politics of Resentment

Author:
Bart Bonikowski
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Harvard sociologist Bart Bonikowski explains why Brexit has two important lessons for political analysis on both sides of the Atlantic
Topic:
Nationalism, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Brexit, and Populism
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

48. The Year of Our Discontent: A Snapshot From Berlin

Author:
Gary Soroka
Publication Date:
10-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The European Union faces enormous challenges, including flows of refugees, economic stagnation, terrorism, xenophobia, anti-Muslim bigotry and the rise of the far right, the Brexit. Strong leadership is needed but it is in short supply. Germany is the most capable, but it too has domestic problems that are preoccupying the political class, not least the prospect of a federal election next year. Despite all this, the country has shouldered its growing responsibilities in recent years with a new confidence and no one should underestimate what they can achieve.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, Elections, European Union, Brexit, and Xenophobia
Political Geography:
Europe

49. Brexit and its discontents

Author:
Janko Bekić
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
In the weeks following June 23rd, the day of the historic Brexit vote, it seemed as if the United Kingdom was on the brink of dissolution. Exasperated by the prospect of Scotland being dragged out of the European Union against the clearly expressed will of its population (62 percent voted “remain”), Scottish First Minister and leader of the Scottish National Party Nicola Sturgeon announced the preparation of a second independence referendum, which – if successful – would sever Scotland’s ties with the UK, and keep it in the EU. Emboldened by SNP’s move, Sinn Fein’s deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland Martin McGuinness called for a border poll on the uni�ication of Ireland. His line of reasoning was the same as Sturgeon’s: the majority of voters in Northern Ireland voted “remain” (56 percent) and would not be forced out of the EU by English and Welsh “leave” voters. Less than two years after the original Scottish independence referendum Downing Street was faced with a new wave of secessionism and separatism. It was generally accepted that the surprising result of the plebiscite on UK’s EU membership might persuade a portion of the “no” voters from the September 2014 Scottish independence referendum to change their minds and tip the scales in favour of secession. Namely, a considerable number of Scottish “no” voters in 2014 opted for the continuation of the union with England precisely out of fear that an independent Scotland would have to exit the EU and renegotiate its admission into the club. SNP’s rationale after June 23rd was that these people would now naturally join the pro-independence camp and help it pass the 50 percent hurdle. However, polling conducted by YouGov during the summer showed that 50 percent of Scots opposed a new referendum on independence, while only 37 percent supported it. If a new referendum was to be held nevertheless, 54 percent would vote against independence and 46 percent in favour – a shift of only one percent point compared to the original referendum which ended with the result 55 percent to 45 percent.
Topic:
Europe Union, Brexit, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, England, North Ireland, Scotland, and Wales