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2. The Egyptian Financial Crisis: Implications for the region, and for Israel too
- Author:
- Eran Lerman
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Egypt continues to play an active role in regional affairs, including the Aqaba emergency meeting on the Palestinian situation (February 26) and the ongoing effort to prevent escalation in Gaza. At the same time, Cairo is in the middle of a significant financial crisis. The effects of the war in Ukraine – specifically, grain shortages – brought the Egyptian pound to more than 30 to the dollar, up from 20 in November and 15 in early 2022, facilitated by deliberate government action in response to demands by the IMF. Inflation still soars, and so does youth unemployment. All this could destabilize a nation of 105 million on our border, with dire consequences.
- Topic:
- Financial Crisis, Conflict, Fiscal Policy, and Financial Stability
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Middle East, Israel, Egypt, and MENA
3. Integrating Cyber Into Warfighting: Some Early Takeaways From the Ukraine Conflict
- Author:
- Ariel Levite
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- It is too early to draw definitive conclusions about cyber warfare in the lead-up to and the execution of the Ukraine war. Data are lacking, and the outcome of the conflict remains uncertain. Yet through monitoring and analysis of a single year in the first major war into which cyber has been extensively woven, we do know enough to be able to generate some tentative, high-level, generic propositions on the nature of cyber conflict. These propositions draw on wide-ranging press reporting and extrapolate from several superb pieces recently published by my colleagues Jon Bateman, Nick Beecroft, and Gavin Wilde, as well as Microsoft’s recent report on the cyber dynamics of the conflict.1 However, we must still tread cautiously. Our propositions draw on highly imperfect empirical knowledge of a single historical case that is still unfolding.2 Current and future antagonists are also constantly learning from their own and others’ analyses and enhancing their performance, which can render current assessments obsolete.3 For this and other reasons it is quite possible that some of the cyber dynamics unfolding in and around Ukraine may play out differently later in Ukraine as well as in other, future confrontations. As we have observed over millennia, the balance between offense and defense can shift over time; this dynamic may well play out in cyberspace as well. It is also important to note at the outset that widespread assessments disparaging the utility and expediency of Russian cyber operations in the Ukrainian conflict (and projections regarding future conflicts) are presently limited by far more than a lack of comprehensive and reliable empirical data. We also lack insights into the metrics and criteria that each of the protagonists uses to assess the success and failure of cyber’s overall performance in the conflict, and we have only fragmentary evidence of the role each party expected cyber operations to perform. Moreover, even if we had such information, Ukraine-specific answers might not apply elsewhere because the expectations for cyber and the metrics for assessing its performance may vary not only over time and between protagonists but also from one conflict to another. In this context it is important to underscore that some specific factors that possibly helped diminish the efficacy of Russia’s offensive cyber operations in Ukraine may not apply elsewhere. Three in particular deserve to be noted here: Russia’s unique approach toward cyber warfare; the level of external support that Ukraine received before and during the war from some leading national and multinational cyber powers; and the sophistication and battle-tested experience of Ukraine’s cyber warriors.4 Nevertheless, even if some of the cyber characteristics of the Ukraine conflict ultimately turn out to be sui generis, they are instructive given the novelty of the field and the involvement of major powers in the conflict. Hence, there is considerable value in advancing these propositions to focus attention on certain questions and facets of cyber conflict, facilitating their review and reassessment as more comprehensive and reliable information becomes available and developments on the battlefield evolve. But the reader should consider the interim observations and propositions offered here as hypotheses employed as a heuristic to encourage debate and invite feedback. All the propositions offered below pertain to our core conception of what cyber warfare is about. Some of the propositions we advance are novel; others reaffirm or refine tentative assertions made before the war. Taken together they suggest a more subdued view of the utility and impact of cyber warfare than was generally found in prewar speculations. More importantly, the Ukraine war reveals that nations diverge significantly in the role and aims they assign to offensive cyber operations as well as the institutional setup and operational modalities they use for conducting them. Most glaringly, the U.S. perspective and approach (emulated in whole or in part by several other Western nations) differs deeply from that of Russia, which makes it reasonable to expect similar divergence across similar regimes. We group our propositions under three temporal headings: the prewar period (starting in 2014);5 the war itself (beginning on February 24, 2022); and finally, the postwar period, after kinetic hostilities eventually die down. Obviously, we cannot know when this last phase will begin; nevertheless, analysis of trends that were manifest in the two earlier phases of the conflict provides a tentative basis for predictions as to what might be expected down the road. This broad scope is driven by two considerations. First, it is designed to underscore the considerable relevance of cyber operations across various phases and types of conflicts. And second, it highlights continuity as well as change between cyber action in peacetime, in wartime, and in grey area situations, as well as during the transitions between these states of confrontation.
- Topic:
- Cybersecurity, Conflict, Non-Traditional Threats, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America
4. Can Israel mediate an end to the Ukraine war?
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Israel is well positioned to again become a go-between between Russia and Ukraine, an effort that could further elevate its international status
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Conflict, Peace, and Mediation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Israel
5. Forced migration, aid effectiveness, and the humanitarian–development nexus: The case of Germany’s P4P programme
- Author:
- Stefan Leiderer and Helge Roxin
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- United Nations University
- Abstract:
- Bridging the gap between humanitarian assistance and development cooperation has been a contentious issue in academia and development practice for decades. Drawing on an evaluation of Germany’s ‘Partnership for Prospects’ initiative, this paper argues that, whilst the supplement of ‘peacebuilding’ to the nexus (humanitarian–development–peacebuilding [HDP] nexus) brought an important context factor into the discussion in an environment of conflict, it is only of marginal help in a context of forced migration to neighbouring countries of a given conflict. For the context of host countries of refugees in a protracted crisis, it is more relevant that host countries show ownership and reliability in their policies to create long-term perspectives for refugees. These policies in turn need to be embedded in reliable rules (polity) and negotiation processes (politics) in host countries. Consequently, the paper suggests that a ‘HD–Triple-P’ nexus would take the necessary political dimension into account more adequately. However, it might also mark the boundary as to what development politics can achieve.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Development, Humanitarian Aid, International Cooperation, Refugees, Conflict, and Forced Migration
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Germany
6. The violent legacy of fascism: Neofascist political violence in Italy, 1969–88
- Author:
- Stefano Costalli, Daniele Guariso, Patricia Justino, and Andrea Ruggeri
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- United Nations University
- Abstract:
- We still have limited knowledge about the long-term effects of fascism on European democracies. European countries experienced cycles of violence between the 1960s and 1980s. Can such violence be explained by legacies of mobilization during fascism? We study whether and how the Italian fascist experience of the 1920s affected political violence during the 1970s and 1980s. We created an original dataset of conflictual events at a subnational level in Italy. Using zero-inflated negative binomial regressions, we find that local membership of the fascist party in 1922—before the institutionalization of the fascist regime—predicts neofascist political violence at the provincial level more than 40 years later. New windows of opportunity facilitate the resurfacing of local fascist legacies: in the months when a new Minister of Interior is appointed, we observe higher levels of neofascist violence in provinces where the early presence of the fascist party was stronger.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, History, Fascism, Conflict, and Violence
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Italy
7. Armed groups’ modes of local engagement and post-conflict (in)stability: Insights from the Ethiopian and Somali civil wars
- Author:
- Marine Gassier
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- United Nations University
- Abstract:
- What distinguishes post-war governments that succeed in establishing a stable political order and prevent recurring conflict from those that do not? This comparative study considers the specific threats that typically lead to the collapse of the post-conflict political order to offer new hypotheses on the conditions that affect post-war governments’ ability to sustainably restore stability. The threats considered include (i) fragmentation of the main actors in the conflict, (ii) inadequate demobilization, and (iii) enduring dependence of the post-war government on local brokers. Post-war regimes are more vulnerable to such risks after wars in which the dominant armed groups have established themselves by co-opting local power structures and drawing on existing socio-political networks, as this process redistributes power from the central to the local level. Empirically, this paper uses a novel dataset documenting the practices through which rebel groups may alter local power structures to highlight the connection between this wartime process of transformation and patterns of conflict recurrence. In addition, it contrasts the transition of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front from rebellion to government in Ethiopia in the 1990s with the trajectory of the armed movements in Somalia that also overthrew the incumbent military regime but then failed to establish a viable state.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Armed Forces, Conflict, Post-Conflict, and Instability
- Political Geography:
- Africa, Ethiopia, and Somalia
8. Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine
- Author:
- Roman Osadchuk and Andy Carvin
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- In the lead-up to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin and its proxies perpetrated information operations to justify military action against Ukraine, mask its operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the war. DOWNLOAD PDF Once the war began in earnest, Russia expanded its strategy with an additional emphasis on undermining Ukraine’s ability to resist in hopes of forcing the country to surrender or enter negotiations on Russia’s terms. This strategic expansion included efforts to maintain control of information and support for the war effort at home, undercut Ukrainian resistance, derail support for Ukrainian resistance among allies and partners, especially in the immediate region, and engage in aggressive information operations internationally to shape public opinion about Russia’s war of aggression, including in Africa and Latin America. Building upon daily monitoring by the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), this report synthesizes Kremlin attempts to undermine Ukraine by targeting local, regional, and global audiences over the course of 2022 since the start of the war on February 24 of that year.
- Topic:
- Media, News Analysis, Conflict, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
9. Putin’s war in Ukraine: How to get out of it?
- Author:
- Loïc Simonet
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- The largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II has entered its 300th day without a clear outcome. “Moscow cannot afford to lose in Ukraine, and it will use every means available to avoid defeat” (Mearsheimer, 2022). I believe that Russia’s hasty withdrawal from northeastern Ukraine and its humiliating defeat in Kherson are by no means signaling the last stretch of the war. As I write these lines, missiles and drones target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, destructing half of Ukraine’s power grid and depriving millions of civilians of electricity, water and heat. So where is this war going?
- Topic:
- War, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
10. Prison Hunger Strikes in Palestine: A Strategic Perspective
- Author:
- Malaka Mohammed Shwaikh and Rebecca Gould
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC)
- Abstract:
- This publication is the first major transnational examination of prison hunger strikes. While focusing on Palestine, the research is enriched by extensive interviews and conversations with South African, Kurdish, Irish, and British ex-prisoners and hunger strikers. This study reveals in unprecedented detail how prison hunger strikes achieve monumental feats of resistance through the weaponization of lives. How do prison hunger strikers achieve demands? How do they stay connected with the outside world in a space that is designed to cut them off from that world? And why would a prisoner put their lives at risk by refusing to eat or, at times, drink? This research shows that sometimes prisoners’ need for dignity (karamah) and freedom (hurriya) trump their hunger pangs and thirst. Prison Hunger Strikes in Palestine evaluates the process of hunger striking, including the repressive actions prisoners encounter, and the negotiation process. It analyzes differences and similarities between individual and collective strikes, and evaluates the role and impact of solidarity actions from outside the prison walls. The work’s critical and grassroots understanding of prison hunger strikes fully centers the voices of hunger strikers. The analysis results in actionable takeaways that will be as useful to prison activists as they will be to their allies around the world.
- Topic:
- Prisons/Penal Systems, Hunger, Conflict, Repression, and Activim
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, and Palestine