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1. The Polish Economy 2023 and Beyond: How to Mend Home Loans

Author:
Andrzej Reich, Dariusz Filar, and Michal Polasik
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:
The subject of this publication, reflecting the discussion held between experts on 30 March 2023, is that of housing loans in Poland. The publication focuses primarily on discussing the state of mortgages (at the end of the first quarter of 2023). This state is the effect of (a) legislation, (b) institutional solutions, (c) past processes in the financing of housing loans, and recently also (d) the high level of inflation dampening both lending by the banks and the level of interest among bank customers. The publication's second purpose is to present recommendations which, once put into effect, could rectify today’s lamentable situation. All of the proposals presented in this publication lead to one general recommendation: the answer to the current shortcomings lies not in isolated, single changes; what is essential is a new system for the market. This new system should be (a) flexible, (b) free of legal risk while at the same time (c) better protected against market risk, and (d) it should also contain a more comprehensive range of products; on this market (e) the state, as the regulator, should intervene ex-ante and not only ex-post (as has been the case in Poland for the last 20 years), while (f) customers should have the essential minimum of financial knowledge, first and foremost regarding awareness of the risk related to, which by their very nature are long-term loans.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Interest Rates, Risk, Mortgages, Banking, Loans, and Financial Education
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland

2. The Pathway to an Effective ETS and Power Market Interaction: The Case of the Korean ETS

Author:
Alistair Ritchie
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
The power sector is one of the most important areas to cover in any emissions trading system (ETS), due to the scale and abatement potential of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in that sector. However, some critical challenges need to be overcome before an ETS can fulfil its emissions-reduction potential by driving fuel switching away from coal and toward renewables and low-carbon fuels. This is one of the most important topics for ETS development in Asia given the tight controls on power markets. The case of the Korean ETS (K-ETS) provides valuable insights for the pathway to an effective interaction between an ETS and the power market to support power sector decarbonization, based on recent developments and potential next steps. The Pathway to an Effective ETS and Power Market Interaction: The Case of the Korean ETS describes the details of recent developments in Korea's power market and the emission trading system to address insufficient emission reductions in the power sector, key future developments required, and learning points for ETSs in other Asian jurisdictions.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Markets, Carbon Emissions, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

3. In Support of Market-Driven Standards

Author:
Matthias Bauer, Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The EU published its new Standardisation Strategy in 2022. The strategy contains some good ideas to improve the way European standards are set. However, in its attempt to gain more control over technical standards, the EU risks killing the goose that lays the golden egg. The primary motivation behind the strategy is the belief that the process governing the way CEN, CENELEC, and ETSI – the three European Standardisation Organisations – take decisions over EU standards favours non-EU multinationals. To address this perceived imbalance, EU National Standardisation Bodies will have the exclusive power to accept standardisation requests, and adopt, revise and withdraw European technical standards. These changes are particularly significant for ETSI, Europe’s Standardisation Body in charge of telecommunication standards and one of Europe’s most successful organisations. ETSI is a prime example of EU normative power since it hosts companies from more than 60 countries, while retaining a large membership of EU firms. The regulatory changes included in the strategy are not risk-free. There could be unintended consequences that may undermine a standardisation system that has delivered significant economic benefits for the EU and the world. First, giving more responsibility to EU’s National Standardisation Organisations will turn a European discussion into 30 (EU and EEA) national debates. As a consequence, small companies will not be able to contribute to each and every one of the National Standardisation Organisations, diluting their contribution, while multinational companies, with the resources needed to cooperate with a larger number of bodies, will benefit from an expanding role in the EU standard setting process. Second, if standards are fragmented along national borders and companies must multiply their efforts to take part in several Standardisation Development Organisations, there will be less resources for Research and Development spending. Finally, if each and every National Standardisation Organisation needs to have a position with regards to the acceptance of a standardisation request, or adoption, revision and withdrawal of European technical standards, the time period required to adopt a technical standard may be extended rather than shortened, which is the exact opposite of what the European Commission wants to achieve. The regulatory changes included in the EU Standardisation Strategy are akin to cracking a nut with a sledgehammer. If the European Commission is concerned about the influence of non-EU companies in European Standardisation Bodies, it does not need to overhaul their governance systems. Supporting greater participation of European firms in the European standard system will ease EU’s concerns without the downside risks associated with changing the rules of the game that govern Europe’s Standardisation Bodies. The success of the European standardisation system, which is market-driven and based on consensus, has had significant economic benefits in the development of specific industries, like the European Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Technical standards in ICT have shaped a European industry that is not only dynamic and international but also enjoys some of the highest levels of wages and Research and Development spending. Moreover, if technical standards are not developed through an open, consensus-based, and industry-led voluntary process, they will be developed in different ways. For instance, governments and private companies can develop standards by themselves. Both solutions are inferior to the current market-driven approach that governs European standards. However, the European market-driven approach to set standards is voluntary, and its success and continuation must not be assumed. European policymakers should be worried about tinkering with a European standardisation system which has produced economic specialisation and innovation to the benefits of EU firms and consumers.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Regulation, Economy, and Standardization
Political Geography:
Europe

4. What is Wrong with Europe’s Shattered Single Market? – Lessons from Policy Fragmentation and Misdirected Approaches to EU Competition Policy

Author:
Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
What is wrong with Europe’s Single Market? The brief answer to that question is that it does not really exist – it is unsingle. The Single Market is in many ways a political illusion. It exists only nominally. Any company doing business in Europe faces significant barriers to cross-border exchanges within the EU, and it is these barriers that hamper companies’ ability to scale and compete internationally on the back of innovation and economic integration. We outline that Brussels and national governments need to beat the drum for eliminating policy fragmentation in Europe’s internal market and at the same time change course in competition policy to sufficiently support investments in innovation, business growth, and the adoption of advanced technologies across industries. Major economic indicators show that Europe is caught in a protracted corporate and technology crisis. The EU has for a very long time now been tailing US corporate and innovation leadership. At the same time, competition with technology-intensive imports from China is getting increasingly intense. Europe’s underperformance is rooted in a legally fragmented internal market which is disincentivising business growth and innovation. On top of that, an outdated approach to competition policy is discouraging businesses from adopting innovation and scaling across national borders, risking that EU companies continue to lose clout and international competitiveness. 30 years have passed since the formal establishment of Europe’s Single Market. Data reveals that regulatory convergence has reversed or come to a halt in most policy areas. Recent policies for technologies and digital business models, which are key sources of cross-industry competitiveness, created new layers of regulation and legal uncertainty in EU and Member State law. Overall, EU policies have not significantly helped European companies, large and small, to do business in another Member State or use advanced technology-enabled services. EU competition policy does not live up to its promise to “enable the proper functioning of the EU’s internal market”. Europe’s competition policy is still fragmented along national borders and largely ignorant to dynamic effects of competition, especially investments in innovation. Due to mixed legal competences, competition rules are often enforced differently by Member States’ national authorities and can be appropriated to support protectionist industrial policy ambitions. The recently enacted Digital Market Act (DMA) demonstrates that the European Commission and Member State authorities favour protection and discretionary enforcement over innovation and economic disruption, without providing solid evidence of abusive business behaviour and consumer harm. With the DMA, the EU introduced legislation with serious ambiguities in objectives, concepts, and rules, and explicitly allows national Member States to regulate competition at their own discretion. A recent attempt by Germany’s competition authority, the Bundeskartellamt, to enforce its own rulebook for large digital companies (Section 19a of the German Competition Act) risks creating a patchwork of competition rules for large providers of advanced digital services across the EU. Local adopters of advanced digital services, particularly small businesses, that use advanced technology services to compete in their markets would be confronted with less choice and quality. Recently imposed policies under the umbrella of European Strategic Autonomy will hardly help policymakers in their ambition to achieve “innovation and technology leadership”. The paramount task for the EU and national governments is to eliminate policy fragmentation in Europe’s internal market, accompanied by an approach to competition policy that embraces investments in innovation and business growth while accounting for the substantial value created through the adoption of innovative technologies and disruptive business models across industries in the EU.
Topic:
Markets, European Union, Economy, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Pro- and anti-competitive provisions in the proposed European Union Data Act

Author:
Bertin Martens
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The proposed European Union Data Act gives users access and portability rights to the data generated by their use of tangible digital products and devices. This pro-competitive measure weakens the de-facto monopolistic control product manufacturers have over product data. However, the Data Act would also grant manufacturers a de-jure right to monopolistic pricing of data transfers to third-party service providers, restoring their control over data markets. Other anti-competitive provisions include restrictions on the use of data for competition purposes and a prohibition on transfering data to platforms identified as gatekeepers under the EU Digital Markets Act. Unnecessarily fuzzy definitions of products and data that fall under the Data Act would create uncertainty in implementation and incoherence with other EU data regulations. The Data Act should be simplified by dropping anti-competitive provisions and granting users and third-parties selected by users free access to all data generated by the use of a product or a service. This would increase competition in data-driven services and prevent users paying twice for their data. It would not disincentivise producers from investing in data-driven products and services. A further step could be the creation of a level playing field between producers and users in data-access rights. This can be achieved by introducing the principle of mutual exhaustion of data rights at point of sale. This would put all data co-generating parties in a position to generate economies of scale and scope in data aggregation, or data-driven externalities, to maximise innovation.
Topic:
Markets, Governance, European Union, and Digital Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

6. Phased European Union electricity market reform

Author:
Georg Zachmann and Conall Heussaff
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In an environment of record-breaking electricity prices driven by a gas supply shock and below-average electricity generation, reforming the design of the European electricity market is seen as a means to delink consumer costs from volatility in short-term power markets. Electricity markets should meet three objectives: fairness, optimal investment and optimal operation. The current market design has achieved these objectives to varying degrees. Faced with the unprecedented shock, the electricity system has operated well, but electricity markets have struggled to achieve fair outcomes and investments have not been driven by market-based cashflows. Further complicating market reform, the power system is being changed radically by decarbonisation. The electricity system is becoming more decentralised and digitalised, with an active demand side. These transformations will have consequences for the optimal electricity market design in the later stages of the energy transition. Reform proposals have focused on increasing the share of long-term contracts in the remuneration of generation technologies. Different long-term contracting regimes have structural implications for the functioning of electricity markets, especially in relation to the roles of the state and the market, and the responsibilities of national governments and European Union institutions. A phased approach should be taken to EU electricity market design reform. In the near-term, reform should seek to protect consumers and drive investment. An assessment should also be made of what market design will best meet the fairness, investment and operational objectives in a decarbonised system, and what the conceptual role of electricity markets should be during the transition. This process should start as soon as possible so well thought-through proposals are available when the next European Commission takes office.
Topic:
Markets, Reform, European Union, Electricity, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

7. Exchange Rate Pass-Around

Author:
Matthieu Crozet, Julian Hinz, and Federico Trionfetti
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
In January 2015, The Swiss Franc (CHF) appreciated unexpectedly against the Euro by approximately 15%. We document a new fact: French firms that exported to both the Swiss market and the Eurozone also exhibited a sudden change in their export prices to the Eurozone. We coin this the “exchange rate pass-around” effect. We rationalise this fact with a simple model based on the endogenous decision of some firms to give up pricing-to-market and opt for single-pricing to all markets. An important implication of this finding is that single-pricing may be one of the causes of the incomplete pass-through. This mechanism has so far remained unexplored in the literature, which may have led to overestimating the importance of other factors. Based on monthly French export data, our empirical analysis confirms the existence of the pass-around. Firms directly affected by the CHF exchange rate shock increased their prices in neighboring markets by 0.8% compared to other exporters. The effect was stronger for firms with lower ex-ante price heterogeneity across markets and for firms with smaller trade costs to Switzerland. However, the effect was short-lived. As time passed, exporters tended to decouple the prices they set on the Swiss market from those for the Eurozone, and the pass-around effect faded.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Markets, Monetary Policy, European Union, and Exchange Rate Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

8. India’s Regulatory Shift: An Examination of Five Agencies of the Post- Liberalisation Era

Author:
Arkaja Singh
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Policy Research, India
Abstract:
This paper explores the design of Indian regulatory agencies established post-liberalisation from an administrative perspective. Regulatory agencies were set up to replace state inefficiencies, and to discipline profligate state agencies, even as much as they were a response to state-market reorganisations and the challenge of privatization. Regulation provided an opportunity for upper levels of the Indian bureaucratic state to recast their power, with the idea that it would provide a framework for economic rationality, independence and technical specialization to take centre-stage. In actual practice however, the design of each of the regulatory agencies is shaped largely by pre-existing legal frameworks and institutions, and the agencies have remained quite tied in with their counterpart departments and on retired bureaucrats. However, in spite of these limitations, these agencies have some common features imbued by legislative mandate and organisational design which are unique in the context of the Indian state. They have focus and stability, a degree of functional independence, and most importantly, a concentration of power, which enables them to think through and implement complex policy transitions from multi-year and context-specific perspectives. The paper builds on learnings from a series of conversations with regulatory agency chairpersons in order to identify what regulatory governance is, in terms of the powers and mandate of the regulatory agencies and what makes them distinctive from the rest of public administration.
Topic:
Markets, Governance, Regulation, Bureaucracy, and Liberalization
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

9. China’s Changing COVID-19 Policies: Market and Public Health

Author:
Zhun Xu
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:
After the outbreak of COVID-19 in early 2020, China took fast and decisive measures to successfully contain the spread of the virus within its borders. While the rest of the world saw huge human and social costs in the pandemic, the Chinese mainland for about two years was largely free from COVID. The zero-COVID model, however, met great challenges by early 2022. Despite some efforts to save the zero-COVID model, in November 2022, the Chinese government abruptly abandoned its signature COVID controls during the pandemic and switched to the opposite. This article reviews the evolution of the Chinese COVID policies and places the dramatic turns in the context of the changing Chinese political economy. The findings show that the shifting class interests and actions were an important force behind China’s retreat from zero- COVID.
Topic:
Markets, Political Economy, Public Health, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia