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2. Forging a Path Forward on US Nuclear Waste Management: Options for Policy Makers
- Author:
- Matt Bowen
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- Nuclear power is considered in many countries a critical facet to maintaining reliable access to electricity during a global transition to low-carbon energy sources. One challenge to its potential in the United States, however, is the current standstill regarding a disposal pathway for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from commercial reactors. This impasse has a negative bearing on nuclear energy’s ability to supply more zero-carbon electricity and may cost US taxpayers tens of billions of dollars in government liability for failing to meet contractual obligations to take possession of the waste from utilities. Despite the scientific community assessing that commercial SNF and other high-level radioactive waste (HLW), such as from defense activities, can be safely isolated in deep underground repositories, US efforts to license and operate one have flatlined. The original plan for siting at least two repositories for such waste was abandoned first by DOE and then by Congress. Yucca Mountain in Nevada was designated in law as the nation’s sole potential disposal site by Congress in 1987, fomenting the state’s opposition to the project. As a result of that opposition, Congress has not funded the project since 2010. Still, progress has been made over the last few decades in nuclear waste disposal programs in countries such as Finland, Sweden, and Canada. And the United States has seen the successful opening and operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico to dispose of generally less radioactive but long-lived transuranic nuclear waste from defense activities. Such programs offer insights for how the United States can try to resolve the challenges with commercial nuclear waste disposal and potentially alleviate one obstacle to wider adoption of nuclear energy to decarbonize the US economy. This report, part of wider work on nuclear energy at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, explains how the United States reached its current stalemate over nuclear waste disposal. It then examines productive approaches in other countries and a few domestic ones that could guide US policy makers through options for improving the prospects of SNF and HLW disposal going forward
- Topic:
- Energy Policy, Nuclear Power, and Nuclear Waste
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
3. Can Negotiations and Diplomacy Break the US–Iran Impasse?
- Author:
- Anahita Motazed Rad
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- As the Biden and Rouhani administrations’ position to renew diplomatic efforts on the Iranian nuclear file with European support, they face more challenges than their predecessors did in 2015, when the Iranian nuclear deal, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), was originally signed. Today, domestic, regional and international confrontations have increased; hardliners and conservatives in Tehran and Washington, on the one hand, and in Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the other, are now more aligned and coordinated against a diplomatic success than they were in 2015.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Nuclear Power, and Negotiation
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
4. Toward Accountable Nuclear Deterrents: How Much is Too Much?
- Author:
- George Perkovich
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- For decades, policy debates in nuclear-armed states and alliances have centered on the question, “How much is enough?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are enough to credibly deter given adversaries? This paper argues that the more urgent question today is, “How much is too much?” What size and type of arsenal, and what doctrine, are too likely to produce humanitarian and environmental catastrophe that would be strategically and legally indefensible? Two international initiatives could help answer this question. One would involve nuclear-armed states, perhaps with others, commissioning suitable scientific experts to conduct new studies on the probable climatic and environmental consequences of nuclear war. Such studies would benefit from recent advances in modeling, data, and computing power. They should explore what changes in numbers, yields, and targets of nuclear weapons would significantly reduce the probability of nuclear winter. If some nuclear arsenals and operational plans are especially likely to threaten the global environment and food supply, nuclear-armed states as well as non-nuclear-weapon states would benefit from actions to physically reduce such risks. The paper suggests possible modalities for international debate on these issues. The second initiative would query all nuclear-armed states whether they plan to adhere to international humanitarian law in deciding if and when to detonate nuclear weapons, and if so, how their arsenals and operational plans affirm their intentions (or not). The United Kingdom and the United States have committed, in the words of the 2018 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, to “adhere to the law of armed conflict” in any “initiation and conduct of nuclear operations.” But other nuclear-armed states have been more reticent, and the practical meaning of such declarations needs to be clarified through international discussion. The two proposed initiatives would help states and civil society experts to better reconcile the (perceived) need for nuclear deterrence with the strategic, legal, and physical imperatives of reducing the probability that a war escalates to catastrophic proportions. The concern is not only for the well-being of belligerent populations, but also for those in nations not involved in the posited conflict. Traditional security studies and the policies of some nuclear-armed states have ignored these imperatives. Accountable deterrents—in terms of international law and human survival—would be those that met the security and moral needs of all nations, not just one or two. These purposes may be too modest for states and activists that prefer the immediate prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons. Conversely, advocates of escalation dominance in the United States and Russia—and perhaps in Pakistan and India—will find the force reductions and doctrinal changes implied by them too demanding. Yet, the positions of both of these polarized groups are unrealistic and/or unacceptable to a plurality of attentive states and experts. To blunt efforts to stifle further analysis and debate of these issues, the appendix of this paper heuristically rebuts leading arguments against accountable deterrents. Middle powers and civil society have successfully put new issues on the global agenda and created political pressure on major powers to change policies. Yet, cooperation from at least one major nuclear power is necessary to achieve the changes in nuclear deterrent postures and policies explored here. In today’s circumstances, China may be the pivotal player. The conclusion suggests ways in which China could extend the traditional restraint in its nuclear force posture and doctrine into a new approach to nuclear arms control and disarmament with the United States and Russia that could win the support of middle powers and international civil society. If the looming breakdown in the global nuclear order is to be averted, and the dangers of nuclear war to be lessened, new ideas and political coalitions need to gain ascendance. The initiatives proposed here intended to stimulate the sort of analysis and debate from which such ideas and coalitions can emerge.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Environment, Nuclear Power, Weapons, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- Pakistan, Russia, China, India, Global Focus, and United States of America
5. The NPT turns 50: Will it get to 60?
- Author:
- Henry Sokolski
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
- Abstract:
- In the next decade, it is all too likely that the past success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons among the world’s nations will be reversed. Three trends make more proliferation likely. First is the decay of nuclear taboos. Second, and arguably worse, is renewed vertical proliferation—the increase in size and sophistication of nuclear arsenals by states that already have them. Third, the technical information to fuel nuclear breakouts and ramp-ups is more available now than in the past. These trends toward increased proliferation are not yet facts. The author describes three steps the international community could take to save the NPT: making further withdrawals from the NPT unattractive; clamping down on the uneconomical stockpiling and civilian use of nuclear weapons materials (plutonium and highly enriched uranium); and giving real meaning to efforts to limit the threats that existing nuclear weapons pose.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, North Korea, Global Focus, and United States of America
6. An Effect-Centric Approach to Assessing the Risks of Cyber Attacks Against the Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Power Plants
- Author:
- Nancy Gallagher, Charles Harry, and Jor-Shan Choi
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- Cyberattacks against the digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are of grave security concern. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires all NPPs to protect critical digital assets that support safety, security, and emergency preparedness functions against cyberattacks.1 Other standards bodies like the International Society of Automation (ISA) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) have also developed standards that address cybersecurity for industrial control systems (ICS) including DI&C.2 Due to concerns for security, relevant stakeholders such as regulators, plant operators, information technology (IT) and operation technology (OT) staff, and equipment suppliers are sometimes reluctant to reveal in technical detail about vulnerabilities posed by DI&C systems. Yet, because some types of cyberattacks against an NPP may cause core damage or significant release of radioactivity, harming the plant, the public and the industry, the safety implications of potential cyberattacks should be evaluated. This divide between security and safety is a challenge for stakeholders focused in cyber security for NPPs. To bridge this security and safety divide, this study proposes and demonstrates a methodology for assessing and addressing the safety consequences of cyber events that disrupt one or more parts of the DI&C systems at NPPs. The methodology builds on the “effect-centric” cyber risk assessment framework developed by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). It is used to analyze two historical cyberattacks and one hypothetical attack scenario. As the focus is on plant safety, these assessment, evaluation, and analysis can be candidly and openly discussed with the goal of finding the best defense to thwart the specific cyberattack.
- Topic:
- Security, Governance, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, and Regulation
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
7. Increasing Nuclear Threats through Strategic Missile Defense
- Author:
- Greg Thielmann
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- Growing concerns about third-country nuclear threats led the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty’s constraints on the size and scope of ballistic missile defense arsenals in 2002. Inaccurate and alarmist projections of “rogue state” ICBM threats were critical in winning support for the decision to withdraw from the treaty and to sustain the multi-billion dollar annual price tag for developing, deploying, and expanding strategic missile defenses. But 18 years after Washington abandoned the treaty, North Korea is the only rogue state that could pose a near-term nuclear threat against the American homeland—and U.S. missile defense interceptors and radars have not even delivered high confidence of being able to protect against this threat. Meanwhile, the absence of limits on U.S. strategic missile defenses and prudent, worst-case concerns in Moscow and Beijing about their future expansion are fueling resistance to additional nuclear arms reductions and stability measures. The end result is that the exponential threats posed by Russia and China are getting worse and the chances of a disastrous nuclear arms race are increasing. This analysis argues that the nuclear threat confronting the United States is multilateral, three-dimensional, and interrelated. Unless the United States acknowledges the role of missile defenses in this complicated reality, it will not be able to realize the full benefits that arms control offers.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
8. Coming out and breaking out: The US, Iran and Europe go nuclear
- Author:
- Erwin van Veen
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
- Abstract:
- On the eve of the US elections, the nuclear deal (JCPOA) stands on the edge of the precipice. The US strategy of ‘maximum pressure’ has not (yet) achieved its implicit objective of 'regime change' but tanked Iran’s economy, caused its government to dig in and increased regional instability. The geopolitical consequences of US sanctions, EU prevarication and Iran’s deep presence throughout the Middle East have been equally profound. At the global level, they include nudging Iran towards China/Russia, the US alienating its European ‘partners’ and encouraging them to develop greater strategic autonomy. At the regional level, US sanctions risk creating an alternative economic regional order, ensuring Yemen remains a protracted war and making a regional security initiative more necessary, but less likely. It is not yet too late to turn the tide. The focus should now be on reducing regional tensions and especially the stress that sanctions have put on Iran’s population and government. Radical action looks more inviting when one stands against the wall, but the Middle East does not need more conflict than it already has. To do so, the EU should first support Iran with a large-scale Covid-19 humanitarian economy recovery package. As such measures are already sanctions-exempt, they will create few new tensions. An economic initiative should follow that grants preferential access to the EU’s internal market for industrial and agricultural goods from the entire Middle East (for Iran via an upgraded INSTEX). Such interventions will not resolve existing security dilemmas but can show there is an alternative to confrontation.
- Topic:
- Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Elections, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Yemen, and United States of America
9. Why the United States Should Remain Engaged on Nuclear Power: Climate Change and Air Pollution
- Author:
- Matt Bowen
- Publication Date:
- 06-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- Nuclear energy has shown much promise and faced considerable challenges since its origins in the mid-20th century. While the United States drove the early charge for safe nuclear power around the globe, its leadership has waned in recent decades. US reactors now under construction—following no orders for such plants in the United States for several decades—have gone well over planned budgets and schedules. And while the United States was once the leading international supplier of reactors, other countries have since stepped forward to fill that role. Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, as part of its wider work on nuclear energy, is examining the impact of potential American disengagement from nuclear power’s development and where opportunities exist to step back in and shape its future. The program also will assess the US nuclear waste management program and efforts to collaborate with other countries on advanced reactor development, as well as options for improvement on both fronts. This effort will begin with a two-part commentary on some of the benefits the United States might derive from increasing its engagement on nuclear power. The first in the series, this piece, explores the important role nuclear energy can play in lowering greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst potential outcomes of climate change. The second piece will examine the geopolitical and national security implications of the United States and its traditional allies effectively ceding the international nuclear energy marketplace to the Chinese and Russians. The nuclear program’s ultimate goal is to inform readers—policy makers, industry leaders, academics, and others—with objective, research-based analysis. It will strive in the months and years ahead to contribute constructively to a necessary dialogue on the future of nuclear power.
- Topic:
- Environment, Nuclear Power, Pollution, Air Pollution, and Nuclear Energy
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
10. Why the United States Should Remain Engaged on Nuclear Power: Geopolitical and National Security Considerations
- Author:
- Matt Bowen
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
- Abstract:
- Nuclear energy has shown much promise and faced considerable challenges since its origins in the mid-20th century. While the United States drove the early charge for safe nuclear power around the globe, its leadership has waned in recent decades. US reactors now under construction—following no orders for such plants in the United States for several decades—have gone well over planned budgets and schedules. And while the United States was once the leading international supplier of reactors, other countries have since stepped forward to fill that role. Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy, as part of its wider work on nuclear energy, is examining the impact of potential American disengagement from nuclear power’s development and where opportunities exist to step back in and shape its future. The program also will assess the US nuclear waste management program and efforts to collaborate with other countries on advanced reactor development as well as options for improvement on both fronts. This effort includes a two-part commentary on some of the benefits the United States might derive from increasing its engagement on nuclear power. The first in the series explored the important role nuclear energy can play in lowering air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions to avoid the worst potential outcomes of climate change. The second part of the series, this piece, examines the geopolitical and national security implications of the United States and its traditional allies effectively ceding the international nuclear energy marketplace to the Chinese and Russians. The nuclear program’s ultimate goal is to inform readers—policy makers, industry leaders, academics, and others—with objective, research-based analysis. It will strive in the months and years ahead to contribute constructively to a necessary dialogue on the future of nuclear power.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, National Security, and Nuclear Power
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
11. Future Scenarios: What To Expect From a Nuclear North Korea
- Author:
- Daniel R. Russel
- Publication Date:
- 04-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- After decades of broken promises and failed diplomatic efforts, North Korea has become a nuclear power. Kim Jong Un’s charm offensive over the past year, as seen in summit meetings with U.S. President Donald Trump and other leaders, has enabled him to shed his pariah status without shedding his nuclear weapons. While Kim has frozen testing, he continues to expand the country’s nuclear arsenal, defy and evade Security Council resolutions, and is now getting support from China in his call for sanctions relief. In the wake of the failed February 2019 Hanoi Summit, North Korea is warning of a return to testing by year’s end. But even if Kim were to reverse course and agree to freeze his entire nuclear and missile program, North Korea’s capacity to threaten the U.S. and its allies with a formidable arsenal would be undiminished. What’s worse, Kim seems to be turning to a powerful new weapon of mass destruction to gain leverage. Asia Society Policy Institute (ASPI) Vice President for International Security and Diplomacy Daniel Russel asserts in this ASPI issue paper that North Korea’s next weapon of choice is likely to be cyber: a high-impact, low-cost, and low-risk digital-age weapon that North Korea already can and does use to steal money, hack secrets, and terrorize nations. In the 5G era, developed nations such as the United States are particularly vulnerable. North Korean cyber-attacks have already succeeded in crippling critical overseas infrastructure and stealing hundreds of millions of dollars, reducing the efficacy of international sanctions. Future Scenarios: What to Expect from a Nuclear North Korea details the consequences of North Korea’s slow but steady trajectory toward acceptance as a nuclear power. The report highlights the urgency of focusing U.S. national security efforts against the threat from North Korea’s rapidly growing cyber warfare capability. Russel writes that the combined threat from North Korea’s nuclear and cyber programs can only be reduced through “coercive containment” — a multi-pronged strategy of diplomacy, defense, deterrence, and denial that will require substantial cooperation among key international players.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Diplomacy, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, Donald Trump, and Kim Jong-un
- Political Geography:
- Asia, North Korea, and United States of America