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Begin New Search Topic Nuclear Weapons Political Geography United States of America Content Type Working Paper Publication Year within 5 Years Publication Year within 3 Years

1. US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity

Author:
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.1 At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.2 What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. Rising from the Ashes: The Future of Arms Control

Author:
Victor Mizin and Yue Yuan
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
This paper employs a comparative approach to provide an initial comprehensive analysis of the political interactions, contemporary nuclear policies, and military strategies and capabilities of China, Russia, and the United States in the context of the unstable international security landscape. At a time when the global arms control regime is teetering on the brink of disintegration, the authors aim to offer practical and feasible policy recommendations for remodeling the arms control regime from the Chinese and Russian perspectives. The authors stress the need to revive “traditional” arms control and advocate the search for ways to control emerging military technologies. This paper endeavors to present a two-pronged vision proposed by representatives of two major global players.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

3. Assessing U.S. Options for the Future of the ICBM Force

Author:
Toby Dalton, Megan Dubois, Natalie Montoya, Ankit Panda, and George Perkovich
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Our task was to consider the relative risks and benefits of options for the future U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Our task was not to assess whether the United States should deploy ICBMs at all or change its nuclear strategy and doctrine. In our work, we engaged former officials from Democratic and Republican administrations, nuclear policy specialists from universities and defense and arms control think tanks, and senior military officers, as well as other representatives of combatant commands and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The current policy, established following a 2014 Analysis of Alternatives (AOA), is to replace the Minuteman III system with a new Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD) system, now named the LGM-35A Sentinel. Some observers, including members of Congress, have urged reassessing whether deterrence and other requirements could be met more cost-effectively by extending the life of the current Minuteman III missiles and their supporting infrastructure. Department of Defense (DOD) officials note that upgrades that otherwise would have been necessary to sustain the Minuteman III system to 2043 were not undertaken once the decision was made in 2015 to proceed with GBSD. Therefore, they insist, there is no realistic option today to pursue a life extension program for Minuteman III missiles beyond 2030, when they are due to be replaced by GBSD. Although we received considerable data from DOD officials on these topics, the iterative process through which we received information, the unclassified nature of our study, and the limited time available for investigating DOD conclusions left us unable to assess the DOD’s position regarding the technical and cost feasibility of an extended Minuteman III alternative to GBSD. To strengthen public confidence in its decisionmaking on the future ICBM, we believe the DOD should commission an independent, classified technical study (with an unclassified version) to address outstanding questions relating to the options and timelines in the 2014 Analysis of Alternatives, cost estimates, procurement decisions, and adversary threats to future silo-based ICBMs. One of the most salient issues that surfaced in our study is the projected medium-term increase in the vulnerability of silo-based ICBMs to attack by precision conventional weapons. A non-nuclear attack on U.S. nuclear-armed ICBMs would confront the president with the choice of initiating in response what could be a large-scale nuclear attack on adversary homelands (either by launching U.S. ICBMs before they were destroyed or by using other nuclear forces). This threat is likely to materialize well before the notional GBSD service life expiration in 2075. We believe this issue deserves more debate, as it may raise questions about the declining strategic value of a long-term commitment to silo-based nuclear-armed ICBMs inherent in the decision to proceed with GBSD. Our discussions and research also explored issues that senior leaders, including the president, should consider regarding any silo-based ICBM system that the United States would deploy, today and in the future. These include allocating forces to simultaneously deter Russia (possibly in the absence of nuclear arms control, if occurring after the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, expires in 2026) and a more nuclear-capable China from escalating regional conflicts; confronting possible risks posed by ICBMs overflying Russia to target China; building allies’ confidence in U.S. extended nuclear deterrence; mitigating risks of launch under attack scenarios; and facilitating the negotiation of verifiable nuclear arms control agreements with Russia and China. Consideration of these challenges and issues will be especially important in fashioning the Employment Guidance that will follow from the Nuclear Posture Review.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, and ICBM
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

4. Engaging China on Strategic Stability and Mutual Vulnerability

Author:
George Perkovich
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The United States and Chinese governments, for the foreseeable future, will have the resources to keep each other’s societies vulnerable to nuclear mass destruction. If these governments are not self-destructive, they will want to keep their competition from escalating into armed conflict that could lead to nuclear war. The constructs of strategic stability and mutual vulnerability can help significantly if both governments embrace them and interpret them similarly or even if the leaders of the two countries accurately understand how they differ in their perspectives on them. Unfortunately, to date, on these issues the United States and China are like a quarrelling married couple who tried therapy for one or two appointments, found it dissatisfying, and then alternated in making excuses for not trying again, perhaps with a different therapist or format. Each says they have tried and the other doesn’t listen or understand. Both suspect that the other isn’t saying what they really feel or want; what they really feel is hostility and distrust and what they really want is to get richer and more powerful without being hassled or attacked. It would be easier if they could just go their separate ways, but the property and wealth they depend on will be lost (or at least severely diminished) if they split up or do each other harm. This paper suggests that U.S. and allied interests require persistence in inviting China to dialogue on strategic stability; to demonstrate goodwill, the United States should acknowledge mutual vulnerability as a fact and necessary policy. The need for both moves is reflected in the fact that neither government has defined what it might mean by stability or mutual vulnerability. To help test intentions and prompt harder thinking, the paper plays the role of therapist and offers definitions of both concepts—strategic stability and mutual vulnerability—so that the two sides can critique them more freely and without recrimination. These definitions are broader and deeper than usual, reflecting the growing problem of managing escalation of conventional conflict to nuclear war, the scenario that drives U.S. and Chinese concerns and military posturing. Further, broader definitions are necessary to comprehend the dangers stemming from the entanglement of conventional, cyber, and nuclear weapons and command and control systems. The paper then sketches four benefits of declaring mutual vulnerability, contrary to opponents of the idea, before discussing steps that the United States and China could subsequently take to reflect and build each other’s confidence in such a policy. Finally, if perceived U.S. requirements in the future will be greater than the arsenal needed to deter or defeat Russia or China alone, how will Russia and China be persuaded not to try to build up to balance the additional U.S. force? In other words, if the United States is in two separate but interacting arms races (and deterrence relationships), how could each opponent (China and Russia) be persuaded to negotiate limits on their arsenal lower than the total the United States would insist on possessing to deter two nuclear opponents? Answers to these questions will affect strategic stability and mutual vulnerability of all parties but will take a long time to develop. To begin the process, the paper suggests asking Chinese leaders whether their silence on Putin’s nuclear first-use threats means that China has changed its own policy on nuclear use or that it never took a no-first-use policy seriously in the first place. Is China concerned that the capabilities that the United States and its allies may develop to strengthen defenses against Russia could be used against China too, and if so, might arms control be a wiser approach? Ultimately, the paper suggests that if China and the United States can sustain a process of serious dialogue, they will keep their relationship from worsening even if they cannot formally restrain their competition. And if dialogue leads one to ask the other for deeds to demonstrate goodwill, the paper has suggested some such deeds that could be undertaken with no security hazard and only slight political risk. No one should have the illusion that happiness is in this couple’s future. All this work would be to allow a nonviolent cohabitation that is better than the alternative of destitute divorce or murder-suicide.
Topic:
Government, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Stability, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

5. The Iranian Nuclear Program Advances, with only a Slim Chance of Restoring Nuclear Agreement

Author:
Sima Shine and Ephraim Asculai
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Although the nuclear talks in Vienna were renewed over a year ago, a return to the deal is not on the horizon, and the regime of the ayatollahs has increased the pace of its violations of the deal, which will make it even harder for the parties to reach understandings. The coming weeks will be critical, and at this point the world powers, as well as Israel, must prepare for a reality where there is no agreement, accompanied by troubling Iranian progress on its nuclear program
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power, Peace, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

6. "Systemic Risks": A Conversation on Nuclear Technology and Deterrence with Dr. Vipin Narang

Author:
Dylan Land
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
Fletcher Security Review (FSR): What do you perceive as the greatest threat to global nuclear security? Where do you see the greatest potential for the outbreak of nuclear war? ​ Vipin Narang (VN): Rather than focusing on regions, I see three trends which I think we should be concerned about. One is the return of a great power arms race, and a lot of this was exacerbated in the Trump administration. Even as we head into the Biden administration—which extended the New START Treaty with Russia for five years—Russia and China are modernizing their nuclear forces at breakneck speed. They are worried primarily about U.S. missile defenses, which at this point are unconstrained. The United States has a variety of missile defense systems at the regional level which work pretty well, as well as the national missile defense system, which doesn’t…yet. You will often hear that the national missile defense system does not work very well and that is true—the success rate is around 60 percent in simulated tests. It may be difficult to ever get it to work perfectly or even well, but it is the prospect that the United States might get it to work that really drives modernization efforts in Russia and China..... ​
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Risk, Deterrence, and Interview
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Global Focus, and United States of America

7. Iran talks are likely going nowhere

Author:
Alexander Grinberg
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Iran uses uranium enrichment as leverage on the EU and US to get concessions.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Conflict, Uranium, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

8. Israel, the US, and the Iranian Nuclear project – back to basics

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
It is not in America’s interest for Israel to be perceived as an obedient lap dog. On the contrary, keeping Israel’s options open, or even enhancing them, will ultimately prove to be of value to the US.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Alliance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

9. The Nuclear Talks in Vienna: Biden’s Legacy at Stake

Author:
Eytan Gilboa
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
From Tehran’s perspective, the goals are lifting the sanctions and securing immunity from military attacks.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

10. Israel Must Actively Oppose US Return to the JCPOA

Author:
Efraim Inbar and Omer Dostri
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Even if Israel’s ability to influence US decision-making is limited, it is a serious mistake to downplay Israel’s opposition to the dangerous nuclear accord.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

11. What is Iran’s Real Goal in Nuclear Talks with the US?

Author:
Alexander Grinberg
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Sanctions relief, nothing else. Iran has no intention of forsaking its nuclear and missile programs nor its proxy wars across the region.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Denuclearization, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

12. Strategic Implications of the Damage at the Natanz Enrichment Facility

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The US should be appreciative of any significant delay in Iran’s breakout timetable towards a nuclear weapon. The time gained can and should be used to negotiate a “longer, stronger” agreement.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

13. No Agreement is Better than Another Bad Agreement with Iran

Author:
Yaakov Amidror
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel-US dialogue is necessary about Iran’s nuclear program, since a good agreement with Iran is a clear Israeli interest. But Israel must be prepared with a military option against Iran, as a last resort.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Peace
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

14. After Soleimani: Maintain the Pressure on Iran’s Nuclear Project

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
A firm stand at this critical juncture may prove to be of use as part of the effort to bring Iran back to the nuclear negotiating table on terms more acceptable to the US and to Trump’s regional allies, including Israel.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Denuclearization, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

15. Restoring and Improving Nuclear Forensics to Support Attribution and Deterrence

Author:
Steve Fetter
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Nuclear forensics is the analysis of nuclear materials, devices, emissions, and signals to determine the origin and history of those nuclear materials and devices. At the request of the Secretary of Energy, and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security, Restoring and Improving Nuclear Forensics to Support Attribution and Deterrence evaluates the U.S. government's nuclear forensics capabilities. A 2010 National Academies report, Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk, characterized the precarious state of the national technical nuclear forensics (NTNF) program at that time: NTNF relied almost entirely on staff dedicated to and residual funding from other related programs. This summary report addresses the current state of U.S. NTNF capabilities relative to the National Academies evaluation in 2010 and recommends ways to improve the NTNF program through improvements in policy, operations, and research and development efforts.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

16. President Biden Has Five Options for Future Negotiations with Iran

Author:
Pat Shilo and Todd Rosenblum
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
President Biden has announced plans to re-engage with Iran on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal. In this paper, we briefly outline the five most likely pathways ahead, each of which has strengths and challenges: Return to the JCPOA as it was. Return to the JCPOA plus new commitments that address other security concerns with Iran. Restore the JCPOA as it was plus a set of confidence-building measures to address other security concerns. Formally link a requirement for Iran to address our other concerns as a pre-condition for further talks. Return to the pre-JCPOA Middle East, where US and allies work to rollback Iran’s nuclear program and actively deter its regional actions by confrontation, punishment, and isolating measures. Each path carries risk and opportunity for restoring American leadership in the world, and congressional Democrats should remember the perfect deal does not exist. Members of Congress would be wise to measure the next deal against the status quo ante: an unconstrained, belligerent Iran again racing to a bomb.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, Denuclearization, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

17. Reinvigorating South Asian Nuclear Transparency and Confidence-building Measures

Author:
Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This SIPRI Insights paper explores a series of nuclear transparency and confidence-building measures (CBMs) proposed by military, nuclear, political and regional experts from China, India, Pakistan, Russia and the United States to address nuclear challenges in South Asia. It categorizes these bilateral, trilateral and multilateral measures into doctrinal dialogues and joint threat assessment exercises; communication lines, pre-notification and de-alerting; and development and employment of strategic technologies. The paper then provides a spectrum of viability across which it identifies proposals with the greatest potential, moderate potential and the least potential for reinvigorating nuclear transparency measures and CBMs in South Asia.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, and United States of America