Political Geography: United States of America / Content Type: Working Paper / Publication Year: within 3 Years

1. Untangling the Transatlantic Knot: Germany, France, and the United States

Author:: Gesine Weber and Jacob Ross
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: France’s and Germany’s reactions to Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine reveal their significantly different relationships with the United States. Their interpretations regarding the European security architecture are almost diametrically opposed. While Berlin concluded that European security must be constructed transatlantically, Paris saw confirmation of its interpretation that Europeans must be able to address security challenges independently of Washington. Donald Trump’s reelection constitutes a challenge for the two countries because both need to fundamentally rethink their respective relationships with the United States and Europe-US relations more generally. The scope of the US withdrawal from European security remains to be seen, but it will be similarly challenging for Paris and Berlin.
Topic:: NATO, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

2. Factsheet: Elon Musk

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Elon Musk is a billionaire entrepreneur and the CEO or top executive of multiple high-profile companies, including X (formerly Twitter), Tesla and SpaceX. He has a documented history of amplifying anti-Muslim tropes, supporting individuals and organizations that promote Islamophobia, and making statements that minimize or dismiss concerns about anti-Muslim racism. His actions and influence have contributed to the normalization of Islamophobic rhetoric in public discourse. In 2024, U.S. President Donald Trump appointed Musk to lead the newly-created Department of Government Efficiency.
Topic:: Islamophobia, Far Right, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, Billionaires, and Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

3. Factsheet: Tom Trento

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Tom Trento is an American conservative activist who has a history of making anti-Muslim statements, including promoting a narrative that constructs Islam as a major threat to America. He is the founder and executive director of The United West, described by the Southern Poverty Law Center as an organization “stoking anti-Muslim hate for over a decade.”
Topic:: Conservatism, Islamophobia, Activism, Right-Wing Politics, and Tom Trento
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

4. Factsheet: Pete Hegseth

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Pete Hegseth is a former Fox News political commentator, author, and former Army National Guard officer who served in Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He has tattoos that are associated with white nationalism and has a history of making Islamophobic statements. Hegseth has also been accused of sexual assault and has had several incidences of alleged sexist behavior. In 2025, Hegseth was confirmed as the next Secretary of Defense in the Trump administration.
Topic:: Islamophobia, Far Right, Donald Trump, Military, Pete Hegseth, and White Nationalism
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

5. Factsheet: Randy Fine

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Randy Fine is an American Republican politician and currently serves as a Senator for the Florida state government. Before joining politics, he served as a gambling industry executive. Fine has been described as an “unhinged bigot,” “controversial,” “divisive,” and “abrasive.” He has a history of making anti-Muslim, anti-Palestinian, and racist comments, and has threatened two Muslim women members of Congress. In 2024, Fine announced he would be running for the US Congress and was endorsed by President Donald Trump.
Topic:: Politics, Islamophobia, Republican Party, and Randy Fine
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

6. Public Debt and the Income Share of the Top 1% in the US, 1960-2019

Author:: Aggela Papadopoulou
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: City Political Economy Research Centre (CITYPERC), University of London
Abstract:: This study theorizes the relationship between sovereign debt and income inequality and shows that increases in public indebtedness are robustly associated with increases in the income share of the top one percent in the US since the 1960s. First, the paper outlines the mechanisms through which public debt is linked to the top one percent income share, via interest payments and capital gains from bond trading. Subsequently, it scrutinizes the evolution of public debt and the income share of the top one percent in the US, in parallel with the historical development of political and economic institutions. Building on the historical analysis, it demonstrates econometrically that interest payments and total returns on domestic and foreign public debt are positively associated with the income share of the top one percent in the US for the period 1960 to 2019.
Topic:: Income Inequality, Public Debt, and Top One Percent
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

7. Black Intergenerational Mobility, Libertarian Capitalism, and Authoritarian Government, 1877–1941: A Case Study

Author:: Patrick L. Mason
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: There are persistent multigenerational Black-white gaps in occupational attainment. These racial differences in intergenerational mobility are not caused by differences in family values and behavior (Mason, 2007). For three decades, I have gathered evidence on my family’s intergenerational transition from enslavement to present social and economic circumstances. Charles and Susan Rollins were 32 and 29 years-old, respectively, as enslavement ended in 1865. During Reconstruction, they accumulated wealth, established a successful dairy and other farming, helped found a church and religious organizations, helped found multiple civic organizations, served on boards affiliated with the local university and high school, were elected to County and State public office, had savings and bank accounts for the entire family, and were leaders among an extensive social network. Jim Crow in the South and anti-black racism in the north stymied upward mobility for the Rollins family for the three generations after Charles and Susan, despite the fact that their descendants obtained greater education than their ancestors, displayed a willingness to relocate 100s of miles away from their home, possessed a culture of achievement (hard work, future orientation, married couple families, etc.), were blessed with exceptional social capital, and, perhaps, the relative advantage of being mulattoes.
Topic:: History, Authoritarianism, Capital, Libertarianism, and Social Mobility
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

8. Fracking or No Fracking? How a Green Transition Can Work for Workers

Author:: Robert Pollin and Jeannette Wicks-Lim
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: Throughout the 2024 U.S. Presidential campaign, the only climate-related issue to achieve prominence was the question of whether to ban fracking operations in the United States. Donald Trump is a long-time climate denier, and therefore had no qualms in supporting fracking and all other techniques for extracting fossil fuels from the ground. By contrast, Kamala Harris had supported a nationwide ban on fracking during her 2019 presidential campaign. This was due to the severe negative environmental and public health impacts of this natural gas extraction technique and because burning natural gas to produce energy generates CO2 emissions that cause climate change. But Harris opposed a fracking ban in 2024 on the assumption that the ban would impose major costs to the economy of Pennsylvania, which has the second-largest fracking operations among U.S. states, after Texas only. Such negative economic outcomes in Pennsylvania would indeed result if fracking were banned in the U.S. and no large-scale alternative economic activities were introduced into Pennsylvania’s economy. But banning fracking must be understood as one component of a much larger program to advance a viable climate stabilization program, in Pennsylvania, and everywhere else. We find that building a clean energy-dominant infrastructure in Pennsylvania—focused on investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy sources—will generate approximately 160,000 jobs in the state. Meanwhile, phasing down fracking and all other fossil fuel activities by 50 percent between 2026 – 35 will entail job losses in the range of 1,700 per year within the state. We argue that these 1,700 displaced fossil fuel workers should receive just transition policies that include pension, employment and income guarantees, in addition to, as needed, retraining and relocation support. We estimate that such a just transition program for these workers will cost in the range of $240 million per year. This amounts to about 0.02 percent of Pennsylvania’s current GDP. Thus, we show how, between 2026 – 2035, Pennsylvania could phase out 50 percent of all its fossil fuel production activities—including fracking operations—while also providing generous support for workers to transition out of their fossil fuel industry jobs and into activities that both raise public health and environmental standards in the state and contribute toward a viable global climate stabilization project.
Topic:: Climate Change, Elections, Green Transition, and Fracking
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

9. Employment in Child Care and Early Education in the U.S. 2000-2021

Author:: Aritra Basu and Nancy Folbre
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: Accurate assessment of trends in the availability and affordability of childcare services in the U.S. hinges on accurate assessment of a paid labor force that is difficult to precisely measure, because it spans a wide range of informal and formal institutional arrangements. This paper calls attention to these measurement problems and traces significant changes in the composition of child care and early education employment from 2000 to 2021 based on data from the American Community Survey (ACS). It shows that employment in the Child Day Care Services industry has become an increasingly poor measure of the number of those employed in Child Care and Preschool/Kindergarten occupations, due to increased provision in both Private Household Services and Elementary and Secondary Education industries. Comparisons of worker characteristics and median annual earnings across occupations and industries highlight the effects of institutional context, including differences in the composition of demand for paid care services. Consideration of these issues points to the need for specific improvements in labor force survey design.
Topic:: Labor Issues, Employment, Survey, and Child Care
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

10. Trump Takes on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Author:: Michał Wojnarowicz
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Donald Trump’s actions and announcements to date regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are reversing the decisions of previous administrations and strengthening Benjamin Netanyahu’s political position. At the same time, they threaten the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The deliberately ambiguous statements about the resolution of the crisis seem gauged to increase pressure on regional states and European partners.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

11. China Building Up BRICS as Important Foreign Policy Tool

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: BRICS is useful for China in its rivalry with the U.S., mainly as a tool to influence developing countries. It is also an important element of strategic cooperation with Russia and a platform for dialogue with India. China does not care about BRICS integration, instead it wants to consolidate the group’s participants to further China’s goals.. The EU’s response to this should include effective support for developing countries and a subjective approach to their demands for global governance.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, BRICS, Rivalry, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

12. The U.S. Pursues Increasingly Aggressive Policy towards Latin America

Author:: Bartłomiej Znojek
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Donald Trump’s administration is seeking to rebuild U.S. influence in Latin America. It is trying to convince the countries of the region that cooperation with the United States will bring development and increased security to the Americas. For the time being, however, this approach mainly serves U.S. security interests, in particular combating irregular migration, organised crime and drug trafficking, and reducing China’s influence. The current administration’s threats, inconsistent positions, and expansionist drive will deepen the distrust of the U.S. and antagonise important Latin American partners.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Migration, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Drug Trafficking
Political Geography:: Latin America and United States of America

13. U.S. Interest in Greenland Reflects the Ongoing Competition in the Arctic

Author:: Kinga Dudzińska and Paweł Markiewicz
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: President Donald Trump has repeatedly suggested his intention to attach Greenland to the U.S., a move that has met with opposition from the Greenlandic and Danish governments. The pressure from the U.S. is one manifestation of its aspirations to strengthen its position in the North Atlantic, both because of the strategic importance of the island and the growing international rivalries in the Arctic. The situation will require greater EU and NATO involvement in the High North, as well as consideration of this perspective by countries outside the region, such as Poland.
Topic:: NATO, European Union, Donald Trump, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Greenland, Arctic, and United States of America

14. Trump’s assault on foreign aid: implications for international development cooperation

Author:: Sebastian Haug, Anna Novoselova, and Stephan Klingebiel
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: The United States of America has long been a leading force in international development cooperation, both politically and financially. However, the first weeks of the second Trump administration have called the traditional role of US foreign aid fundamentally into question. From a 90-day funding freeze to the withdrawal from United Nations (UN) bodies and the dismantling of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), measures taken by Trump and his team are not only having palpable repercussions on a wide range of humanitarian and development programmes, but they also point to more far-reaching implications. Against this backdrop, this paper presents the contours and discusses the global consequences of Trump’s assault on US foreign aid, as of late February 2025. We outline the extant role of the United States as a donor in Section 2 and review the changes announced – and/or implemented – by the current US government in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the implications of US funding cuts for bilateral cooperation, while Section 5 focuses on repercussions on multilateral development work. Section 6 outlines three scenarios on how the ongoing changes in the United States might affect the field of international development. We discuss the possible ramifications of (a) a revamped US approach to foreign aid centring on crude national interests, (b) a US retreat that is at least partially offset by other providers and (c) a US retreat without other providers stepping in. Section 7 concludes by discussing the implications for dealing with the second Trump administration. We outline four recommendations that address stakeholders across the – increasingly outdated – donor–recipient divide: (1) refining development cooperation approaches, (2) strengthening the multilateral development system, (3) promoting Southern self-reliance and (4) fostering alliances beyond a Trump-led US government.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Foreign Aid, International Development, Donald Trump, and USAID
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

15. Forecasting Nuclear Escalation Risks: Cloudy With a Chance of Fallout

Author:: Jamie Kwong, Anna Bartoux, and James M. Acton
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Forecasting—that is, estimating the probability of specified events’ occurring—can contribute to efforts to better understand and address the challenge of managing escalation.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Forecast, Escalation, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America

16. What the White House and Congress Can Do to Prevent Global Mass Atrocities

Author:: Federica D'Alessandra
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The Unites States has long recognized that preventing and responding to mass atrocities is both a moral responsibility and in its national security interest. Commitment to atrocity prevention and response has long enjoyed broad bipartisan support, and the U.S. government has long been a global leader on the issue. In 2011, the United States was the first country to establish an interagency body dedicated to atrocity prevention. Ever since, each Republican and Democratic administration—with the support of Congress—has taken additional, important steps toward implementing this objective. In 2019, under President Donald Trump, the United States was the first country to enact federal legislation addressing global mass atrocities. The Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act mandates the White House to report annually to Congress on government-led atrocity prevention efforts. Under the act, the second Trump administration will again be required to report to Congress by mid-2025, raising the question: What is in store for the atrocity prevention agenda under Trump 2.0? This paper reviews the atrocity prevention track record of the first Trump administration and other relevant action taken so far in this second term to parse out what efforts to sustain and uphold U.S. atrocity prevention obligations could look like under Trump’s second White House. This paper highlights how a number of steps the administration has already taken, including but not limited to the recently announced reorganization of the U.S. Department of State and the effective dissolution of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), unless promptly addressed, will raise dire challenges for the readiness and capacity of the State Department and other relevant agencies tasked with operationalizing U.S. commitments to this end. Accordingly, this paper advances a number of actionable recommendations that both the White House and the U.S. Congress should urgently consider to ensure the administration stands ready and capable to fulfill its obligations under the Elie Wiesel Act and other relevant legislation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

17. Geothermal Energy and U.S. Competitive Advantage: Drill, Baby, Drill

Author:: Robert W. Sweeney and Noah Gordon
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The United States and the rest of the world sit at the intersection of potentially destabilizing trends. Great power competition, climate change, intensifying geopolitical uncertainty, the economy’s potential deglobalization, and the potential massive increase in energy demands arising from artificial intelligence (AI) are creating challenges for U.S. national energy policy. A foremost concern is the vulnerability of energy supply chains to interference from or control by a hostile power. In this dynamic context, U.S. energy policy has evolved significantly in terms of markets, supplies, regulation, and legislation. The country’s success in using fracking technology and exploiting abundant shale reserves have made it the world’s largest producer of hydrocarbons and a major exporter, especially of natural gas.1 Further, as national and international concerns about climate change have grown, U.S. energy policy has become more aligned with transitioning to renewable sources. So far, the focus of clean energy additions has been on wind, solar, and nuclear power. Beginning in the mid-2000s, the United States issued legislation and policies raising renewable energy to the level of industrial policy. Among those were the Energy Policy Act (2005), the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009), the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) (2021), the CHIPS and Science Act (2022), and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) (2022). However, geothermal energy—which uses the heat of the earth’s crust for power—has been largely left out of U.S. industrial policy. This is despite the facts that utilizing this source of renewable energy requires some of the same technologies that have made the United States the world’s top oil and gas producer and that geothermal has the potential to provide clean, dispatchable power that does not rely on weather conditions. With U.S. clean firm power demand expected to increase by approximately 700–900 gigawatts by 2050,2 the United States needs to dramatically increase capacity while reducing or eliminating net carbon output and insulating its energy supply from dependence on international supply chains. The question for the country now is: how should public and private resources be directed to provide the United States with an energy system optimized for the current national and international environment? This paper argues that recent advances in geothermal power have made it the technology with superior characteristics for future U.S. energy system development. With its comparative advantages, geothermal power merits an urgent, intense, and dedicated reorientation of U.S. industrial policy, legislation, and resources.
Topic:: Development, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, and Geothermal Power
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

18. China Decoupling Beyond the United States: Comparing Germany, Japan, and India

Author:: Joshua Sullivan and Jon Bateman
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Key U.S. partners are moving toward less technological integration with China. But their specific paths diverge significantly based on domestic circumstances and varied relationships with Beijing.
Topic:: International Relations, Science and Technology, Economy, Regional Integration, and Decoupling
Political Geography:: Japan, China, India, Asia, Germany, and United States of America

19. How to Spend It: European defence for the age of mass precision

Author:: Chris Kremidas-Courtney
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: Europe urgently needs to redefine its defence strategy in response to the United States’ growing disengagement from its transatlantic allies. The suspension of US military assistance to Ukraine and calls for increased European self-reliance have forced policymakers to rapidly reassess how to sustain collective security. The European Union’s ReArm EU plan seeks to mobilise €800 billion in national defence spending to meet these challenges, but investments must be made wisely to prepare for future warfare. Modern warfare has entered into an era of mass precision, where forces can achieve the effects of massed firepower through distributed, AI-enabled, and highly accurate weapons systems. Ukraine’s innovative use of drone swarms and precision strikes against Russian forces has demonstrated this shift. China and the US are also leveraging mass precision to reshape the battlefield, making traditional mass-based warfare increasingly obsolete. However, while armoured vehicles, fighter jets, and ships require new protections, they remain essential when integrated into networked, distributed operations. To prepare for this new strategic reality, Europe must: Invest in mass precision and distributed operations – Prioritise drone warfare, deep-strike capabilities, and networked operations. Accelerate investment in the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) programme to develop long-range cruise missiles. Build a European command-and-control (C2) system – Reduce reliance on NATO’s US-centric C2 infrastructure. Strengthen Europe’s intelligence capabilities and decision support – Expand European satellite and cyber capabilities and expand analytical capacities. Strengthen air and missile defence – Accelerate the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) and deploy cost effective countermeasures such as more cost effective laser-based systems. Build a European military logistics system – Ensure the ability to sustain forces and ensure rapid troop and equipment mobility within Europe. Train and exercise European forces at scale – Conduct large-scale joint exercises to build readiness. Buy Ukrainian – Integrate Ukrainian defence firms into EU supply chains. Buy European – Reduce dependence on US arms while leveraging UK, Norwegian, Canadian and Turkish defence industries. Build a European nuclear umbrella – France and the UK should explore extended deterrence options to protect all European allies in case of further US withdrawal. Build a European blue-water navy – Strengthen and expand European naval capabilities to protect vital sea lanes in addition to supporting territorial defence. Winning the next war, not the last one Europe can no longer afford slow, bureaucratic and fragmented defence spending—it must accelerate, integrate and innovate in order to defend itself in the event that the United States is unable or unwilling to do so. We don’t just need bigger budgets—we need a better strategy. The future of warfare is mass precision and distributed operations, enabled by AI, and supported by capabilities that enable decision, cyber and information dominance. If Europe invests wisely, it can be a technologically advanced, resilient and autonomous military power while remaining a robust pillar of NATO’s collective security. The hour of Europe is now.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Weapons, Disengagement, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

20. The e-commerce challenge: Is importing low-value consignments going to become more cumbersome in the EU and the US?

Author:: Anna Jerzewska
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: In the last few months, terms such as e-commerce and de minimis (threshold below which imported goods are not subject to tariffs) have made headlines both in the EU and in the US. The rapid growth of e-commerce exacerbated problems with this exemption both in the US and in the EU. The first problem is lack of control. Only a percentage of commercial goods are subject to physical border checks, and for e-commerce goods this number is even smaller. Then there is the issue of endangering the level-playing field. De minimis benefits consumers and businesses that rely on it, but harms domestic manufacturers and retail outlets that import in bulk (and thus are subject to full customs and product standards and safety requirements). But can the challenges around the rapid growth of e-commerce be solved by the removal of de minimis? And what would be the consequences of removing the exemption? The paper summarises recent attempts and proposals of removing de minimis in the EU and the US and the challenges faced by both administrations. In both cases, e-commerce is still under discussion and it’s not clear what the final solution will look like. However, there are already noticeable differences in approach.
Topic:: European Union, Trade, Imports, and E-Commerce
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

21. The Effects of US-China Cooperation on Fentanyl Markets and Overdose Deaths

Author:: Marcus Noland, Julieta Contreras, and Lucas Rengifo-Keller
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: Drug overdose is the leading cause of death among Americans aged 15–44, exceeding heart disease, cancer, suicide, vehicular accidents, and COVID-19 in 2023. Most drug deaths are associated with fentanyl. This paper uses data on illicit drug prices to estimate reduced-form price equations of fentanyl, oxycodone, and alprazolam based on supply and demand, including hedonic characteristics. The results are used to estimate the relationship between fentanyl prices and overdoses. They suggest that the Chinese embargo on fentanyl shipments to the United States beginning in May 2019 raised street prices for a limited period, reducing fentanyl overdose deaths in the United States by roughly one-quarter over a three- to five-month period after the announcement.
Topic:: Bilateral Relations, Drugs, Opioid Crisis, Cooperation, and Fentanyl
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

22. Radical novelties in critical technologies and spillovers: how do China, the US and the EU fare?

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Critical technologies including artificial intelligence, semiconductors and quantum computing are attracting attention because of their indispensable nature and their role in national security strategies. We compare China, the United States and the European Union in these technologies and their subfields. We use large language models (LLMs) to identify which patents in these technologies can be considered most groundbreaking (not patented before) and worth replicating. These are ‘radical novelties.’ We find that the US clearly dominates quantum. Chinese and EU progress is similar. The US does slightly better than China in AI with clear dominance in generative AI, but China stands out in some important subfields, such as aerial vehicle technology. China dominates in a larger number of semiconductor fields but not in the highest value added, which is related to design. In a second step we assess how quickly radical novelties in these three technologies are transferred from one economic area to another and within each economic area. We find that the fastest transmission overall is for AI. The EU is by far the slowest in replicating radical novelties from the US and China, while the US and China tend to replicate European novel patents relatively quickly. Radical novelties are also replicated quickly between China and the US which is surprising given US controls on exports of critical technologies to China. Our findings are concerning for Europe because it does not produce enough critical patents in these technologies and because it is slower in replicating patents from the US and China.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

23. Which companies are ahead in frontier innovation on critical technologies? Comparing China, the European Union and the United States

Author:: Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: Competition in critical technologies is attracting increasing attention not only because of the foundational nature of these technologies for other types of innovation, but also because of their role in the United States national security strategy. In this paper, we look into which entities in China, the European Union and the US innovate at the technology frontier in the three most important critical technologies – artificial intelligence, quantum computing and semiconductors – based on identification of the most radical novel patents in these technologies and their subsectors. Working with these pathbreaking patents, we look into the origin of the companies that file the largest numbers of them. US innovators dominate the innovation frontier for quantum computing and, to a lesser extent, AI, with Chinese innovators doing better in semiconductors. European innovators lag in all, but perform relatively better in quantum computing, in which they rank similarly to Chinese innovators. Furthermore, the innovation ecosystem is quite different across geographies. In the US, tech companies top the rankings of critical novelties and are highly concentrated: as many as three companies are in the top rankings of all of the three critical technologies. Frontier innovators in the field in which the EU competes most equally – quantum – are mostly research centres and not companies. China lies somewhat in between in all three domains.
Topic:: Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Semiconductors, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

24. How can Europe’s nuclear deterrence trilemma be resolved?

Author:: Andrea Gilli and Francesco Nicoli
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: The United States under President Donald Trump has adopted an ambiguous position on European security. Although no immediate risk of abandonment is apparent, European countries are rethinking their defence strategies in case the US declines to support them, or provides only partial support, in a crisis. This discussion is particularly sensitive in relation to nuclear weapons, the ultimate deterrent, for which European countries depend extensively on the United States. We argue that a possible future US withdrawal from European nuclear security will force European countries to face a policy trilemma. If they stick to the existing policy framework of no proliferation and no joint deterrence, they expose themselves to nuclear blackmail, should the US withdraw its external guarantee. If they want to protect themselves from nuclear blackmail, they must choose how to provide nuclear security: either collective nuclear security, which would compromise some national sovereignty, or independent provision by individual countries, leading to nuclear proliferation in Europe. Having established that uncontrolled proliferation is an inferior outcome to some form of joint deterrence, we identify four main alternatives: an extension of the Franco-British nuclear deterrent; an extension complemented by a jointly financed expansion of existing deterrence; the absorption of the French (and perhaps British) nuclear arsenals into a European arsenal; and the construction of a separate European submarine deterrent (with Europe using French or British technology or developing new technology). We also discuss briefly forms of non-nuclear deterrence, which however would likely be a complementary rather than a substitute for a nuclear deterrent. We compare these options using a set of parameters: strategic autonomy and credibility, changes to treaties (including non-proliferation), costs, capabilities and readiness. Our analysis shows that all options have advantages and disadvantages, but some are politically, financially and militarily more feasible.
Topic:: Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Industrial Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Macroeconomics, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

25. Evolving Partnerships: U.S. Alliances and the Pacific Islands

Author:: Grace Price
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:: Pacific Island countries (PICs) have long attracted development and security assistance from the region’s traditional partner states—the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. However, the Pacific has received renewed attention from them as China actively vies for influence. Despite increased engagement, the PICs are still turning to China in pursuit of their development and security needs. This report will map out efforts the United States, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are taking to increase influence, obstacles that are hindering effective cooperation in the Pacific, and recommendations for improving their collective engagement with the PICs.
Topic:: Security, Development, Partnerships, and Alliance
Political Geography:: North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

26. Charting a Path in the Uncharted Domain

Author:: Jennifer Hong Whetsell
Publication Date:: 12-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:: The Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea) is rising as a prominent player in the space domain. The size of its space program makes its current position as an emerging space power even more impressive and promising. The United States, one of South Korea's closest political and defense allies, and South Korea share a considerable history in space cooperation since the late 1980s. Despite the long history of collaboration between the United States and South Korea, fundamental differences have slowed their progress toward a deeper and more meaningful cooperation in this domain. As space becomes an integral aspect of national security and a coveted frontier for scientific endeavor and exploration, the two capitals have much to gain through enhanced cooperation. “Charting a Path in the Uncharted Domain” examines the landscape of South Korea’s space ecosystem and provides a broad overview of its accomplishments and challenges in the space domain. It then highlights significant milestones of space cooperation between Washington and Seoul and analyzes the cooperative landscape, noting areas of differences and opportunities for enhanced cooperation. The paper then presents recommendations for U.S. and ROK policymakers to help overcome those barriers and strengthen their cooperation in the space domain.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Space
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

27. Sanctuaries, Islands, and Deserts: A Typology of Regionalized Abortion Policy

Author:: Payton Gannon and Danielle Pullan
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:: This paper elaborates a typology of regionalized abortion policy based on a comparative case study of Italy and the United States. Italy originally legalized abortion in 1978 and has seen little effort to modify the law since. Contrastingly, the United States’ abortion landscape has been in near constant flux since 1974, when, in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to abortion. This became even more unstable in 2022 when the Supreme Court overruled Roe in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health and held there is no constitutional right to abortion. Despite their differences in national abortion policy, both Italy and the US have regionalized the implementation of their abortion policies. Italy’s law is national, but implementation is interpreted differently at the regional level. Since Dobbs, US states have proposed and passed many laws about abortion, creating even greater regional variation than before. We propose a typology of regionalized abortion access: “Sanctuaries” where abortion is most protected and available; “Islands” with liberal policies that are surrounded by more restrictive territories; and “Deserts” with minimal abortion access. Through qualitative analysis of policies, political activities, and firsthand accounts by abortion providers and advocates working in places of each type, we then highlight the long-term implications of each of these components of the typology, analyzing the ways that they impact abortion providers and patients.
Topic:: Human Rights, Health Care Policy, Abortion, and Regionalization
Political Geography:: Europe, Italy, North America, and United States of America

28. EU-Taiwan Relations: Navigating PRC Pressure, U.S.-China Competition, and Trump’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Simona Grano
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: This paper first explores the growing relationship between the European Union and Taiwan by focusing on recent interactions. It then discusses the broader geopolitical implications of Trump’s “America First” policy and how the U.S.-China competition impacts the EU’s ability to strategically balance the China-Taiwan dynamic. The paper demonstrates how a number of variables, including Europe’s strategic interests in the region, the U.S. position on China, and the U.S.-EU relationship under the second Trump administration, will influence ties between the EU and Taiwan. The shift in EU-Taiwan ties has gone largely unnoticed. The EU has started paying more attention to Taiwan’s security, shifting away from its former focus on China for its importance in trade and investment. This shift is partly due to supply chain and security concerns and partly due to growing political apprehension about China’s long-term goals. In the coming years, Europe will be influenced by the Trump administration when deciding how to handle Taiwan. The EU will have to find a balance between the need for steady access to vital technology and U.S.-EU relations. At the same time, the EU and the United States seem to have entered a critical phase in their bilateral relationship, especially concerning the war in Ukraine and Washington’s warming relationship with Moscow. This indeterminate situation may also impact the EU’s relationship with both Taiwan and China, the consequences of which will take several months to fully gauge.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

29. China’s Views on Escalation and Crisis Management and Implications for the United States

Author:: Lyle Morris
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Asia Society
Abstract:: China lacks experience dealing with military crises and has attempted to compensate by investing considerable intellectual capital to develop theories and strategies for managing escalation with potential adversaries. China’s military strategists believe that if a crisis breaks out, it can be “controlled,” and escalation can be “managed” by applying scientific principles and advanced military technology. People’s Liberation Army strategists have developed a conceptual framework for managing crises called “effective control” (youxiao kongzhi) — a flexible, graduated tool designed to guide political and military action during times of tension. Due to an overreliance on theoretical underpinnings, China believes it can control all facets of military escalation. This could make China’s leaders overconfident in their ability to prevail in a conflict and increase the risk of escalation in a military confrontation between China and the United States. The writings of Chinese military strategists omit how China’s behavior may be perceived — or misperceived — by an adversary. Absent is an acknowledgment that China’s actions, such as in space or cyberspace, may be viewed as provocative and grounds for the tit-for-tat escalation that Beijing seeks to avoid. Further research is necessary to explore the actions that China’s military may employ to manage escalation and how adversaries may interpret them.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, Escalation, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

30. British public opinion on foreign policy: President Trump, Ukraine, China, Defence spending and AUKUS

Author:: Sophia Gaston
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:: Results snapshot President Trump Britons support an open and engaged foreign policy role for the United Kingdom. In light of the re-election of President Donald Trump, 40% believe Britain should continue to maintain its current active level of engagement in world affairs, and 23% believe it should play a larger role. Just 16% of Britons support a less active United Kingdom on the world stage. When asked what Britain’s response should be if the United States withdraws its financial and military support from Ukraine, 57% of Britons would endorse the UK either maintaining (35%) or increasing (22%) its contributions to Ukraine. One-fifth would prefer that the UK reduces its contributions to Ukraine. UK–China relations Just a quarter (26%) of Britons support the UK Government’s efforts to increase engagement with China in the pursuit of economic growth and stabilised diplomatic relations. In comparison, 45% of Britons would either prefer to return to the more restricted level of engagement under the previous government (25%) or for the government to reduce its relations with Beijing even further (20%). A large majority of Britons (69%) are concerned about the increasing degree of cooperation between Russia and China. Conservative and Labour voters share similarly high levels of concern, and Britons over 50 years of age are especially troubled about the trend of adversary alignment. Defence and security When asked whether the UK will need to spend more on defence to keep up with current and future global security challenges, a clear two-thirds (64%) of the British people agree. Twenty-nine per cent of Britons strongly agree that defence spending should increase. Just 12% disagree that the UK will need to spend more. The majority of Britons believe that collaboration with allies on defence and security projects like AUKUS will help to make the UK safer (55%) and that partnerships like AUKUS focusing on developing cutting-edge technologies with Britain’s allies will help to make the UK more competitive towards countries like China (59%). Britons are somewhat less persuaded that AUKUS will succeed as a deterrent against Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific, although the largest group of respondents (44%) agree that it will.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Alliance, AUKUS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, United Kingdom, Ukraine, Australia, and United States of America

31. Hegemony and International Alignment

Author:: Fernando Broner, Alberto Martin, Josefin Meyer, Christoph Trebesch, and Jiaxian Zhou Wu
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This article explores the interplay between economic hegemony and political alignment. Using theoretical and empirical insights from Broner et al. (2024), we posit that hegemonic states, such as the U.S., foster political alignment, which enhances globalization. We use UN voting data to proxy for international alignment and show that hegemons induce alignment. This data has shortcomings, however. UN voting only covers the post-WWII period, refers to a narrow set of issues, and displays little time variation. As for military alliances, they were not widely used before the mid-20th century. We propose an alternative measure of alignment based on international treaties.
Topic:: Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Political Economy, Treaties and Agreements, Hegemony, Multipolarity, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

32. Jordan and the October 7th War: Between National Interests and Palestinian Solidarity

Author:: Ronen Yitzhak
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In the latest issue of Tel Aviv Notes, Ronen Yitzhak examines the effects of the October 7 war on the politics and stability of Jordan.
Topic:: Politics, Bilateral Relations, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and United States of America

33. Management practices, competition, and multi-product firms in developing countries

Author:: Victor Gimenez-Perales and Alina Mulyukova
Publication Date:: 09-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: We study how liberalization and competition affect firms’ output and product scope depending on management practices. In a model of multi-product firms, we show that firms with better management practices specialize in fewer products with lower marginal costs. The model predicts that, under increased competition, firms with better management practices are less adversely affected by competition, especially in heterogeneous sectors. Evidence from India’s de-reservation policy supports these predictions. Our simulations estimate a 0.29% welfare gain in India from the policy. The same policy could increase welfare by 0.39% in an environment with better management practices, such as the US, highlighting the management practices’ role in liberalization outcomes.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Business, Innovation, Management, and Liberalization
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, and United States of America

34. Sovereign vs. Corporate Debt and Default: More Similar Than You Think

Author:: Gita Gopinath, Josefin Meyer, Carmen Reinhart, and Christoph Trebesch
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Theory suggests that corporate and sovereign bonds are fundamentally different, also because sovereign debt has no bankruptcy mechanism and is hard to enforce. We show empirically that the two assets are more similar than you think, at least when it comes to high-yield bonds over the past 20 years. We use rich new data to compare high-yield US corporate (“junk”) bonds to high-yield emerging market sovereign bonds 2002-2021. Investor experiences in these two asset classes were surprisingly aligned, with (i) similar average excess returns, (ii) similar average risk-return patterns (Sharpe ratios), (iii) similar default frequency, and (iv) comparable haircuts. A notable difference is that the average default duration is higher for sovereigns. Moreover, the two markets co-move differently with domestic and global factors. US “junk” bond yields are more closely linked to US market conditions such as US stock returns, US stock price volatility (VIX), or US monetary policy.
Topic:: Economics, Sovereign Debt, Sovereign Default, and Corporate Bonds
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

35. Spatial distribution of housing liquidity

Author:: Francisco Amaral, Mark Toth, and Jonas Zdrzalek
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper examines the relationship between location, liquidity, and prices in housing markets. We construct spatial datasets for German and U.S. cities and show that liquidity and prices decline with distance to the city center. To rationalize these results, we build a structural model with spatial search frictions. We argue that location preferences concentrate buyers in central areas, making markets tighter, more liquid, and driving up prices. Counterfactuals show that suppressing search frictions raises welfare and prices, especially in peripheral areas. Our findings highlight the importance of demand-side preferences and search frictions for understanding liquidity and asset prices.
Topic:: Economics, Financial Markets, Cities, Housing, Real Estate, Liquidity, and Assets
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

36. Turkey and Israel – Cooperation through Gritted Teeth

Author:: Joseph Epstein
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:: In the shadow of Israel's Operation "Rising Lion" against Iran, the latest edition of Turkeyscope features Joseph Epstein's analysis of recent developments in Israeli-Turkish relations. Azerbaijan's mediation, pragmatic signals from Syria's new leadership, and strong U.S. encouragement are helping both nations identify mutual interests.
Topic:: International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Syrian War, and Mediation
Political Geography:: Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Syria, and United States of America

37. Power and Financial Interdependence

Author:: Brad Setser
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: The link between financial self-reliance and geopolitical power has long been debated. The unbalanced Sino-American trade relationship has created asymmetric financial ties which generate potential sources of leverage for both parties and will not quickly disappear. Absent a clarifying major crisis, it will be difficult to definitively determine which party has greater leverage. Many in the United States (US) are concerned about indebtedness to its primary strategic rival, and the risks posed by a sudden Chinese withdrawal from US financial markets. US policymakers actively sought to encourage China’s top leadership not to withdraw financing from the market for US Agency securities in the run-up to the global financial crisis. Yet China also sees risks in this unbalanced financial relationship. Chinese policymakers have expressed concern about the domestic political consequences of losses on either their Treasury or Agency holdings and actively have sought to diversify China’s reserves – including by substituting the risk of lending to developing economies for the visibility associated with large holdings of Treasuries in US custodians. China increasingly worries that its dollar holdings and the dollar’s global role increase its vulnerability to potential financial sanctions. Both parties thus worry about the possibility that financial interdependence can be weaponized yet find it hard to extricate themselves from the inevitability of financial interdependence absent a clean break from an entrenched pattern of trade imbalances.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, Bilateral Relations, Finance, and Interdependence
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

38. The Future of Nuclear Proliferation after the War in Ukraine

Author:: Nicholas L. Miller
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: In the context of deep changes to the international security environment, especially the war in Ukraine, the risks of nuclear proliferation seem quite high, especially in the Middle East and East Asia. Four categories of factors have been identified that might trigger an escalation. Firstly, changes in the international security environment, including heightened competition among major powers, could increase pressure for proliferation in regions like Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Secondly, the declining ability of the United States to enforce non-proliferation regimes may lead allies to seek nuclear capabilities due to concerns over U.S. reliability. Thirdly, failures by nuclear powers to uphold disarmament commitments and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons could undermine non-proliferation norms. Lastly, the war in Ukraine highlights the potential use of nuclear threats in conflicts, reinforcing the perception of nuclear weapons as crucial for national security. While there are reasons to anticipate growing proliferation risks, historical precedent suggests that these risks can be managed. Concerns over U.S. reliability and disarmament failures have been addressed through coercion and reassurance in the past. Additionally, the impact of conventional wars supported by nuclear deterrence has been contained. While some risk factors are novel, such as the decline of the U.S. nuclear industry and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, their decisive impact remains uncertain. The implications for the Middle East and East Asia vary. Allies like Japan and South Korea may be convinced to remain non-nuclear due to U.S. security assurances, while adversaries like Iran could be incentivized to pursue nuclear capabilities amid declining effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it may pressure Saudi Arabia to follow suit, potentially leading to regional proliferation dynamics. Thus, great powers and the international community need to step in to manage proliferation triggers by maintaining a focus on nonproliferation in their statecraft.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, International Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

39. Climate action: Implications for factor market reallocation

Author:: Robert Z. Lawrence
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: This paper considers climate policies, not from the perspective of their environmental impacts, but rather their likely effects on labor and investments. While the aggregate impact of the green transition on jobs and investment may be modest, it will require significant reallocation of labor and capital within and across industries. Although the green transition brings new opportunities for employment and investment in renewable technologies, many workers and communities tied to the fossil fuel industry may not benefit from these advances due to skills mismatch and geographic constraints. Both the United States and the European Union acknowledge the importance of achieving “climate justice” and “leaving no one behind” in their decarbonization efforts. However, current policies and resources in the United States may fall short, with inadequate assistance reaching too many communities and a narrow focus on green jobs. In Europe, while the Just Transition Fund complements existing programs, effective implementation of place-based policies remains challenging due to the need for specific, localized responses.
Topic:: Climate Change, Environment, Labor Issues, European Union, and Energy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

40. The effect of lawful crossing on unlawful crossing at the US southwest border

Author:: Michael A. Clemens
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:: An increasing number of migrants attempt to cross the US Southwest border without obtaining a visa or any other prior authorization. 2.5 million migrants did so in 2023. In recent years, responding to this influx, US officials have expanded lawful channels for a limited number of these migrants to cross the border, but only at official ports of entry. These expanded lawful channels were intended to divert migrants away from crossing between ports of entry, by foot or across rivers, thereby reducing unlawful crossings. On the other hand, some have argued that expanding lawful entry would encourage more migrants to cross unlawfully. This study seeks to shed light on that debate by assessing the net effect of lawful channels on unlawful crossings. It considers almost 11 million migrants (men, women, and children) encountered at the border crossing the border without prior permission or authorization. Using statistical methods designed to distinguish causation from simple correlation, it finds that a policy of expanding lawful channels to cross the border by 10 percent in a given month causes a net reduction of about 3 percent in unlawful crossings several months later. Fluctuations in the constraints on lawful crossings can explain roughly 9 percent of the month-to-month variation in unlawful crossings. The data thus suggest that policies expanding access to lawful crossing can serve as a partial but substantial deterrent to unlawful crossing and that expanding access can serve as an important tool for more secure and regulated borders.
Topic:: Security, Migration, and Borders
Political Geography:: North America, Mexico, and United States of America

41. The Evolving Landscape of U.S. Economic Security: The Confluence of Trade, Technology, and National Security

Author:: Andrea Viski
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper examines the current evolution of U.S. economic security discourse to demonstrate the implications, challenges, and shortcomings of U.S. economic security tools and the catalyzing impact of technology. While component economic security considerations are broad and encompass issues from natural disaster planning to cybersecurity, this paper focuses specifically on the impact of trade and technology in the economic security context. It discusses the main influences and features of U.S. economic security policy as it relates to trade, technology, and the security of the supply chain. The paper includes sections on evolving notions of the dual-use concept; the need to manage and respond to technology flows with more effective strategies, and new foreign policy efforts and tools to strengthen economic security. The paper focuses on the trends forging the path for the United States to define economic security so closely with national security, and in exploring these trends, it delineates how the United States has implemented policies and adopted, reoriented, or created new policy tools designed to strengthen economic security. The paper also explores why the rapid evolution of emerging technologies has played such a defining role. Finally, the paper examines the effectiveness of the U.S. approach to economic security and its challenges and offers insights into how it can be strengthened in the future
Topic:: National Security, Science and Technology, Trade, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

42. Is Economic Security National Security? Defining South Korea’s Economic Security for Future Industries

Author:: June Park
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper explores how South Korea defines “economic security.” Amidst geopolitical turbulence, the framing of this concept by governments and policy circles around the globe is reflective of the changes in the global economy post-pandemic and the ongoing war in Ukraine, two critical junctures that have revealed the geo-economic impact of weaponized interdependence. While the Biden administration has laid out U.S. policy intent to combine national security with economic security, specifically on future industries of dual-use nature ranging from chips to EVs, batteries, and generative AI, countries that are on the receiving end of policy implementation are formulating their response to the shifting geoeconomics. This paper unravels South Korea’s framing of economic security and policy response by analyzing legislation on future industries that is critical to the country’s economic growth and standing and the concerted efforts by the state bureaucracy and industry in shaping the concept. The paper draws specifically upon semiconductors in addition to other future industries that are central to the South Korean economy and related legislation in the South Korean National Assembly. It argues that South Korea’s policy response and framing of its economic security has more to do with the protection of industries for the future amid geopolitical turbulence and the reshuffling of global supply chains than traditional security issues related to the U.S.-ROK alliance. Moreover, public anxiety on the pressures toward U.S.-driven trilateral cooperation reveals concerns on a possible backlash from China and the lagging potential of Japan in future industries.
Topic:: National Security, Geopolitics, Industry, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

43. South Korea: Caught in the Crosshairs of U.S.−China Competition Over Semiconductors

Author:: Paul Triolo
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper explores how countries with advanced semiconductor industries are caught in the middle of the growing U.S.-China competition in technology that is focused on advanced computing. Among them, South Korea and its national champions, Samsung and SK Hynix, have arguably incurred some of the most significant pressure. This paper explores how those firms have billions of dollars of sunk investment in China-based facilities producing cutting-edge memory, and the future of these facilities remains in doubt after a series of U.S. export control measures unleashed by the U.S. Commerce Department starting in October 2022. South Korean companies are also players in other parts of the global semiconductor supply chain, including semiconductor manufacturing tools, and China remains an important market for both components and electronic devices. This paper argues that each country caught between the United States and China in technology competition faces difficult trade-offs in determining how best to support its leading companies while navigating changing and often what is viewed as arbitrary decisions coming from Washington that have already significantly disrupted global supply chains. Finally, at the same time as U.S. export controls are having a major impact on the ability of South Korean companies to retain business operations and market access in China, major front-end manufacturers, particularly Samsung, are also looking to expand their operations in the United States and benefit from U.S. CHIPS Act funding. This paper argues that all of the above dynamics put South Korea in one of the more complex positions as the industry faces continued restructuring, buffeted by both export controls and industrial policies.
Topic:: Supply Chains, Economic Security, Semiconductors, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

44. Economic Security and U.S.-China Competition: The View from North Korea

Author:: Rachel Minyoung Lee
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This paper argues that while North Korea does not discuss “economic security” in domestic contexts or have an established definition of the term, it thoroughly understands that the economy and national security are inseparable. North Korea is essentially unaffected by the typical economic issues that many major economies are grappling with in relation to economic security, but like other countries, it has closely tracked economic security developments and deepening U.S.-China strategic competition for potential political fallout and what opportunities and challenges that may generate. The paper shows that U.S.-China strategic competition has offered unique opportunities to North Korea, including China’s cover against fresh and existing sanctions against North Korea, and economic assistance. Moreover, deteriorating U.S.-China ties provide Pyongyang extra space to consider and put into motion alternative foreign and economic policy paths, namely, shifting away from its three-decade policy of nonalignment with China and normalization of relations with the United States. Also, China appears to be a factor in North Korea’s shift to a more conservative economic policy. Despite the opportunities presented by the U.S.-China divide, however, North Korea is wary of the risks of dependence on China and has tried to build economic resilience at home, for example by launching a national campaign on domestic production and recycling. North Korea’s somewhat cooler handling of China and its proportionately warm treatment of Russia since the Armistice Day celebrations in July is a clear example of North Korea’s China dilemma. This is where North Korea’s recent strengthening of ties with Russia comes into the picture. The paper contends that it is hard to conclude at this point whether North Korea’s moves are aimed at short-term, tactical gains or are part of a longer-term, strategic calculus, but we can be certain of this: it has just as much to gain or lose as any other country affected by economic security and U.S.-China strategic competition, though not in the same ways as other countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

45. Illusion or Reality: A Recontextualized Perspective of ‘the American Dream’ in Imbolo Mbue’s Behold the Dreamers

Author:: Elizabeth Adesunmbo Omotayo
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Ìrìnkèrindò: a Journal of African Migration
Abstract:: ‘The American Dream’ motif is one that has been deployed in productions of American literary icons for centuries with different outcomes for the characters portrayed. Despite a plethora of fiction being devoted to the motif from African migrants’ perspective, not many studies have explored the actualization of the Dream by characters in such texts. In Behold the Dreamers (2016), Imbolo Mbue presents the lived experiences of new African diasporans. This study looks at the outcomes of the quest for ‘the Dream’ by Mbue’s characters, through a mimetic reading of her novel and based on Harold Bloom’s notion of ‘Party of Hope’ and ‘the American Nightmare’ as exemplified in the treatments of the Dream motif by several writers. Mbue, while presenting the paradoxical notions of illusion and reality of the Dream, also portrays struggles by both citizens and migrants, to achieve the tangible and intangible of its ideals. Findings reveal that essentialization and discrimination inhibit the attainment of the Dream by many African migrants; that the attainment of college education is a huge factor in the realization of the tangible of its ideals, while the attainment of the intangible seems illusory for many migrants. The conclusion is that several factors prevent the realization of the Dream by many contemporary African migrants.
Topic:: Migration, Immigration, Literary Analysis, American Dream, and Motif
Political Geography:: Africa and United States of America

46. Global supply chains: lessons from a decade of disruption

Author:: Luca Léry Moffat and Niclas Poitiers
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: This paper explores both the character and impact of three recent shocks to global supply chains: the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the US-China trade war. These were large shocks which have had significant impacts on domestic and international supply chains, but these impacts have differed in their longevity, economic impact and policy responses. We show that supply chains were remarkably resilient against shocks of such magnitude. However, this resilience was also achieved thanks to the equally remarkable size and scope of policy responses and global supply chain reorganisation. We recommend that pre-emptive policies may be justified to shield households and industry from future shocks. Given the entangled nature of these shocks and that their effects continue to reverberate, we emphasise the need for extensive future research to understand the nature of these shocks and the effectiveness of policy responses.
Topic:: Global Markets, Trade Wars, Trade, COVID-19, Supply Chains, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: China, Global Focus, and United States of America

47. Triffin Reloaded: The Matrix of Contradictions around Global Quasi-State Money

Author:: Herman Mark Schwartz
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:: What explains the US dollar’s role in the global economy and the tensions affecting its likely persistence? Most analyses start from Triffin’s dilemma, which accurately captured specific but partial tensions of a global monetary system based on essentially fixed exchange rates, gold backing for its core currency, and relatively robust capital controls. Triffin’s approach, and those based on it, struggles to explain the tensions in a system with floating exchange rates and fiat money, because Triffin and successors assume a commodity theory of money, a loanable funds model for credit creation, and the “triple coincidence” of monetary, legal, and economic zones. Approaching the question from different premises – chartalist money, endogenous credit creation, and interlocked global balance sheets – enables us to see four factors behind the antinomies or dilemmas that structure the dynamics and durability of US dollar centrality. Those four factors are adequate credit creation and thus global aggregate demand growth, current account deficits for the core, domestic legitimacy in major economies, and the dollar’s status as global quasi-state money.
Topic:: Debt, Money, Currency, Power, Financial Systems, Geoeconomics, and Reserves
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

48. The State of EU-US Digital and Energy Cooperation

Author:: Federica Marconi, Wolfgang Münchau, and Irene Paviotti
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In a time of rapid technological advancements and changing energy paradigms, the European Union and the United States are trying to coordinate their efforts to navigate the complexities of an ever-evolving landscape. Transatlantic dialogues and cooperative endeavours are key mechanisms for mitigating tensions and fostering a common assessment of the opportunities and risks arising from these advancements. Critical in this regard are the problems of governance emanating from technological development and its consequences in the digital sphere as well as the delicate balance between security, competitiveness and environmental targets in the energy dimension.
Topic:: Climate Change, International Cooperation, Political Economy, Governance, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, Digital Policy, and Energy
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

49. Transatlantic Tech Bridge: Digital Infrastructure and Subsea Cables, a US Perspective

Author:: Julia Tréhu and Megan Roberts
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The importance of digital infrastructure for global communication and connectivity is only growing. Within this varied sector, subsea cables play a central role in ensuring seamless internet traffic globally. What are the US’s strategic and economic interests in digital infrastructure, particularly subsea cables? Within the context of larger economic and geopolitical competition, US policy is multifaceted, from aiming to secure the physical security of infrastructure and guarding against espionage and technology leakage, to boosting economic competitiveness and supporting domestic firms. Overall, digital infrastructure, and undersea cables in particular, are a key element of a larger US strategy of outcompeting China. Although evaluations among allies of the relative threat posed by China and Chinese-owned digital infrastructure vary, broadly shared goals of resiliency, security, and increased connectivity mean there are potential areas for deeper EU-US cooperation, including partnerships with third countries, that align with their respective strategic visions and represent a solid base for further transatlantic coordination.
Topic:: International Political Economy, Infrastructure, Governance, Transatlantic Relations, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

50. Transatlantic Cooperation on Semiconductors: A US Perspective

Author:: Julia Tréhu
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Semiconductors are essential for the global economy, but recent supply chain disruptions and geopolitical tensions have highlighted new risks, leading to new policy approaches. US semiconductor strategy centres around three objectives. First, the funding provided through the CHIPS and Science Act is part of a larger push to strengthen domestic industry and manufacturing. Second, the US seeks to deny strategic adversaries of key technology through export controls. And third, it aims to secure the supply chains for critical technologies. The European and American semiconductor sectors are already tightly intertwined, and further coordination has occurred through forums like the Trade and Technology Council. But challenges remain, including the risk of a subsidy race. Further transatlantic cooperation on key aspects of these new industrial policies can ensure the realisation of shared objectives for a more resilient semiconductor sector.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Economic Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Industry, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

51. Freedom of Association as a Key Aspect of Human Capital Management

Author:: Lenore Palladino
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: Employee freedom of association— the right of workers to form and join organizations of their own choosing— is a fundamental human right that has been consistently disrespected by large U.S. employers (Economic Policy Institute 2019; International Labour Organization 2022). Freedom of association requires employers to refrain from discouraging employees’ right to organize but is routinely violated without meaningful penalty. In over forty percent of union election campaigns, employers face charges for violating employees’ right to organize—which does not include cases where no charges are filed (Economic Policy Institute 2019). The recent wave of well-known companies like Amazon and Starbucks blatantly engaging in practices to discourage their workers from forming unions has seen new challenges from the Biden National Labor Relations Board, but labor law in the United States does not adequately protect the right to freedom of association, and a change in political leadership could give companies carte blanche to override workers' rights (Clean Slate 2022). Companies can choose to establish corporate policies to respect employee freedom of association rights and can engage in behavior demonstrating their commitment to respecting this fundamental human right as part of their approach to Human Capital Management. This article focuses on two aspects of freedom of association as an aspect of Human Capital Management. The first is to examine what kinds of corporate policies exist to clarify corporate standards of conduct when employees are engaged in organizing activity. What kinds of policies focus on compliance with the minimal standards in U.S. labor law, and what policies comply with international norms as enshrined in ILO Conventions 87 and 98? The second prong of the article looks at negative ramifications for corporate value when companies do not respect workers' freedom of association and such behavior becomes public. What is the effect on customer attitudes, how is management behavior becoming increasingly visible, and what ramifications might this have for institutional investors?
Topic:: Political Economy, Employment, Human Capital, Labor Rights, Business Management, and Freedom of Association
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

52. Factsheet: Hindu Swayamsewak Sangh (HSS)

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Hindu Swayamsewak Sangh (HSS) is a right-wing Hindu non-profit organization registered in New Jersey. On its website, the group states its mission is “to organize a diverse and vibrant Hindu American society that can collectively address its challenges and contribute to the welfare of the world.” As of November 2023, HSS claims it has 220 Shakhas (branches) nationwide. HSS’s website venerates the early ideologues of Hindu nationalism, including those who praised Nazi Germany. Additionally, HSS has hosted prominent figures from the RSS, an Indian right-wing, Hindu nationalist, paramilitary volunteer organization.
Topic:: Far Right, Hindu Nationalism, and Hindu Swayamsewak Sangh (HSS)
Political Geography:: India, North America, and United States of America

53. Operationalizing the Chain of Harm: Co-design Workshop Guidance

Author:: Lisa Reppell and Matt Bailey
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
Abstract:: The methodological notes below provide guidance for the implementation of the International Foundation for Electoral System's (IFES's) Chain of Harm to enhance the responsiveness of information integrity programming to the needs and unique circumstances of traditionally marginalized communities. Organizations within the democratic, rights, and governance (DRG) community of practice will be able to consult these notes to replicate, build, and design programming. By following the recommendations outlined in this resource, organizations can plan and execute primary source research on information integrity issues, effectively facilitate program design workshops with relevant local partners, and implement and track new, research-based program interventions. This resource builds on and complements the methodology outlined in IFES's publication, The Chain of Harm: Designing Evidence-based, Locally Led Information Integrity Programming. It begins by describing how to collect the primary research that serves as the foundation of programming through surveys and focus group discussions. Guidance for practitioners to facilitate the Co-design Workshop follows before turning to best practices for program implementation and monitoring and evaluation. As the Chain of Harm centers the perspectives of traditionally marginalized groups, accessibility guidance is included in line with this ethos. This practical use guide is derived from IFES data collected during two pilot implementations of the Chain of Harm in Iraq and Guyana between 2021 and 2023 with support from the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. In both countries, IFES' Center for Applied Research and Learning implemented the approach in close collaboration with local partners. While these methodological notes may often reference collaborations between international and local partners, a local organization implementing directly may also leverage such an approach.
Topic:: Elections, Democracy, and Information Integrity
Political Geography:: Iraq, Guyana, and United States of America

54. The New Cold War Is Sending Tremors through Northeast Asia

Author:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research
Abstract:: This dossier looks at how the US-led New Cold War against China is destabilising Northeast Asia, focusing on the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Strait, and Japan.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Destabilization, and Post-Cold War
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

55. Competing Values Will Shape US-China AI Race

Author:: Valerie Shen and Jim Kessler
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Third Way
Abstract:: President Biden’s AI executive order reflects a set of values recognizable to all Americans: Privacy, equal treatment and civil rights; free speech and expression; the rule of law; opportunity and free market capitalism; pluralism; and advancement of global leadership as the beacon of a free world. President Xi Jinping’s government has also issued AI regulations with values recognizable to China: Collectivism and obedience to authority; social harmony and homogeneity; market authoritarianism and rule of state; and digital world hegemony to restore China’s rightful place as the Middle Kingdom. The United States and China may share similar broad goals for “winning” AI along the lines of leading innovation and advancement, spurring broad-based economic growth and prosperity, achieving domestic social stability, and becoming the clear global influencer for the rest of the world—but they define those goals and seek to achieve those ends through very different values. Those values embedded in our respective AI policies and underlying technology carry high-stakes, long-term national and economic security implications as US and Chinese companies compete directly to become dominant in emerging global markets. They also share similar fears that reflect each country’s values. China worries that AI could cause social unrest if information to a sheltered population is too real and unfiltered. America fears that AI could cause social unrest if information Americans receive is too fake. And that massive disinformation and algorithms that rile the population could threaten our democratic system. Why do these value differences matter when it comes to the AI race? Below, we outline six contrasting values that we believe will be the most determinative in how the US-China AI competition plays out. We argue that understanding our different values-based approaches illuminates our respective advantages and disadvantages in this competition. It assesses who is currently set up to “win” across key metrics and determines how to lean into our democratic advantages or mitigate some practical disadvantages compared with the PRC, this will ultimately win the AI marathon.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

56. Asset Price Changes, External Wealth and Global Welfare

Author:: Timothy Meyer
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: U.S. equity outperformance and sustained dollar appreciation have led to large valuation gains for the rest of the world on the U.S. external position. The author constructs their global distribution, carefully accounting for the role of tax havens. Valuation gains are concentrated and large in developed countries, while developing countries have been mostly bypassed. To assess the welfare implications of these capital gains, the author adopts a sufficient statistics approach. In contrast to the large wealth changes, most countries so far did not benefit much in welfare terms. This is because they did not rebalance their portfolios and realize their gains, while they were further hurt by rising import prices from the strong dollar.
Topic:: Globalization, Financial Markets, Currency, Valuation, and Foreign Assets
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

57. Mild Deglobalization: Foreign Investment Screening and Cross-Border Investment

Author:: Vera Z. Eichenauer and Feicheng Wang
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: Openness to foreign investments is associated with risks. To mitigate these risks, many high-income countries have strengthened the control of foreign investments over the last decade in an increasing number of sectors considered critical. Investment screening distorts the market for cross-border investments in controlled sectors, which might lead to unintended economic effects. This is the first cross-country panel study to examine the economic effects of investment screening mechanisms. We combine deal-level data on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A) for the period 2007–2022 with information on sectoral investment screening. Using a staggered triple difference design, we estimate a reduction of 11.7 to 16.0 percent in the number of M&A in a newly screened sector. The effects are driven by minority acquisitions and deals involving a foreign government or state-owned enterprises or US firms as investors. There is no reduction in the number of deals within the EU/EFTA, most of which are not subject to screening. The findings call policymakers’ attention to weighing the benefits of national security and the economic costs of introducing investment screening.
Topic:: Globalization, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Foreign Direct Investment, Investment, Geoeconomics, Global Capital Allocation, and Deglobalization
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

58. Mapping Fragility – Functions of Wealth and Social Classes in US Household Finance

Author:: Orsola Costantini and Carlo D'Ippoliti
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: Which households are more exposed to financial risk and to what extent is their debt systemically relevant? To provide an answer, we advance a new classification of the population, adapted from Fessler and Schürz (2017), based on the type of wealth families own and their sources of income. Then, we investigate data from eleven waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), a triennial survey run by the U.S. Federal Reserve, to explore the association of different debt configurations and motives to get into debt with our class distinctions. Our new approach allows us to assess competing hypotheses about debt and financial vulnerability that have so far been analyzed separately in disconnected strands of literature. The results of our study reinforce and qualify the controversial hypothesis that relative poverty and inequality of income and access to services have been important factors explaining household indebtedness and its relationship with economic growth over time.
Topic:: Debt, Poverty, Inequality, Finance, Fragility, and Income Distribution
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

59. Labor Market Volatility and Worker Financial Wellbeing: An Occupational and Gender Perspective

Author:: Julie Yixia Cai
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: One emerging but underexplored factor that is likely to contribute to group racial earnings disparity is unstable work schedules. This is often detrimental for hourly workers when volatility is frequent, involuntary, or unanticipated. Using data from 2005-2022 monthly Current Population Survey and its panel design, this study follows a group of hourly workers across a four-month period to assess whether labor market volatility relates to their financial well-being, focusing on low-wage care and service occupations as well as female workers and workers of color. The findings are threefold: In general, during economic expansion periods, nonwhite workers often benefit more in terms of wage growth compared to their white counterparts. Second, net of other characteristics, on average, greater volatility is associated with lower earnings, and this is mostly driven by those holding jobs in low-wage service sectors and healthcare support roles. Last, the earnings consequences of volatility vary significantly by the type of low-wage jobs a worker holds and their gender and race, but this is only true when volatility happens in a job. Specifically, when working within the same employment spell, female workers, particularly those of color and those working in low-wage service and care jobs, earn significantly less when facing greater volatility than their male counterparts or those working in non-service, non-care occupations.
Topic:: Economics, Inequality, Finance, Labor Market, and Gender
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

60. Considering Returns on Federal Investment in the Negotiated “Maximum Fair Price” of Drugs Under the Inflation Reduction Act: an Analysis

Author:: Edward W. Zhou, Paula G. da Silva, Debbie Quijada, and Fred D. Ledley
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 contained landmark provisions authorizing government to negotiate a “maximum fair price” for selected Medicare Part D drugs considering the manufacturer’s research and development costs, federal support for discovery and development, the extent to which the drugs address unmet medical needs, and other factors. This working paper describes federal investment in the discovery and development of the ten drugs selected for price negotiation in the first year of the IRA as well as the health value created through Medicare Part D spending on these drugs. We identified $11.7 billion in NIH funding for basic or applied research leading to approval of these drugs with median investment costs of $895.4 million/drug. This early public investment provided a median cost savings to industry of $1,485 million/drug, comparable to reported levels of investment by industry. From 2017-2021, Medicare Part D spent $126.4 billion (median $10.7 billion) for these products before rebates. Excluding two products for diabetes, Medicare Part D spending was $97.4 billion and the total health value created was 650,940 QALYs or $67.7 billion (WTP/QALY=$104K) representing a negative residual health value of -$29.7 billion (before rebates). We argue that a negotiated fair price should provide returns on both private and public investments in these products commensurate with the scale and risk of these investments, with the principal return on public sector investments being the residual health value (net price) accruing to those using the product. These empirical data provide a cost basis for negotiating a fair price that rewards early government investments in innovation and provides social value for the public.
Topic:: Economics, Health, Public Health, Pharmaceuticals, and Public Investment
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

61. Tilting at Windmills: Bernanke and Blanchard’s Obsession with the Wage-Price Spiral

Author:: Servaas Storm
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: Bernanke and Blanchard (2023) use a simple dynamic New Keynesian model of wage-price determination to explain the sharp acceleration in U.S. inflation during 2021-2023. They claim their model closely tracks the pandemic-era inflation and they confidently conclude that “… we don’t think that the recent experience justifies throwing out existing models of wage-price dynamics.” This paper argues that this confidence is misplaced. The Bernanke and Blanchard is another failed attempt to salvage establishment macroeconomics after the massive onslaught of adverse inflationary circumstances with which it could evidently not contend. It misrepresents American economic reality, hides distributional issues from view, de-politicizes (monetary and fiscal) policy-making, and sets monetary policymakers up to deliver significantly more monetary tightening than can be justified on the basis of more realistic model analyses.
Topic:: Economics, Monetary Policy, Inflation, Macroeconomics, and Wages
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

62. The Diffusion of New Technologies

Author:: Aakash Kalyani, Nicholas Bloom, Marcela Carvalho, Tarek A. Hassan, Josh Lerner, and Ahmed Tahoun
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: We identify phrases associated with novel technologies using textual analysis of patents, job postings, and earnings calls, enabling us to identify four stylized facts on the diffusion of jobs relating to new technologies. First, the development of economically impactful new technologies is geographically highly concentrated, more so even than overall patenting: 56% of the most economically impactful technologies come from just two U.S. locations, Silicon Valley and the Northeast Corridor. Second, as the technologies mature and the number of related jobs grows, hiring spreads geographically. But this process is very slow, taking around 50 years to disperse fully. Third, while initial hiring in new technologies is highly skill-biased, over time the mean skill level in new positions declines, drawing in an increasing number of lower-skilled workers. Finally, the geographic spread of hiring is slowest for higher-skilled positions, with the locations where new technologies were pioneered remaining the focus for the technology’s high-skill jobs for decades.
Topic:: Development, Economics, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Labor Market
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

63. Implications of the Inflation Reduction Act for the Biotechnology Industry

Author:: Cody Hyman, Henry Dao, Gregory Vaughan, and Fred D. Ledley
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: The Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 contains landmark provisions authorizing the government to negotiate the price of selected drugs covered by Medicare Part D. The biopharmaceutical industry has criticized these provisions as a threat to innovation arguing that reducing future revenues could disincentivize equity investment in biotechnology. This research examines the sensitivity of private and public equity investment in the biotechnology industry to drug price indices and market conditions from 2000-2022. The analysis shows that equity financing and valuation in the biotechnology industry were strongly associated with equity market conditions but not indices of either producer or consumer drug prices. These results do not support claims of an association between changing drug prices and the availability of equity capital to emerging biotechnology companies, which currently sponsor the majority of all clinical trials. These results add to evidence that the IRA may not have a negative impact on pharmaceutical innovation.
Topic:: Economics, Health, Inflation, Innovation, Biotechnology, Public Investment, and Inflation Reduction Act
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

64. Scale and Scope in Early American Business History: The “Fortune 500” of 1812

Author:: Richard Sylla and Robert E. Wright
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: Fortune magazine began publishing annual rankings of U.S. corporations by revenue in 1955. Ever since, scholars and forecasters have analyzed changes in the Fortune 500 to help inform their judgments about industry concentration and the relative importance of different sectors of the economy. Unfortunately, earlier data are scarce, especially before the Civil War. Through extensive research we have created a sort of historical “Fortune 500” going back to 1812, ranked by corporate capitalization, which we share here. Numerous insights can be drawn from this dataset, including the historical dominance of the banking and finance sectors and the early importance of manufacturing. Perhaps the larger significance of being able to come up with a Fortune 500 for 1812, though, is the fact that even with a population of only about 7.5 million, U.S. already had more business corporations than any other country, and possibly more than all other countries put together, securing its role as the world’s first “corporation nation.” The ease of incorporating businesses released a lot of entrepreneurial energy that helped to build an ever-expanding economy and by the end of the 19th century, the U.S. would be the world’s largest national economy with tens of thousands of corporations.
Topic:: Economics, History, Business, and Industry
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

65. Tesla as a Global Competitor: Strategic Control in the EV Transition

Author:: Matt Hopkins and William Lazonick
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: In this paper, we assess the implications of Elon Musk’s strategic control over Tesla, the pioneering company that has become central to the electric vehicle transition. We document how, as Tesla’s CEO for 16 years, Musk has exercised strategic control to direct the transformation of the company from an uncertain startup to a global leader. Now that Tesla is profitable corporate predators (aka hedge-fund activists) may challenge Musk’s strategic control—a possibility of which the CEO is well aware. To retain his control over Tesla as a publicly listed company, Musk depends on holding a sufficient proportion of Tesla’s shares outstanding to possess the voting power to fend off predatory value extractors. In addition to accumulating Tesla shares by investing $291.2 million at early stages of the company’s evolution, Musk has relied upon massive stock-option grants from the Tesla board, under the guise of “compensation”, in 2009, 2012, and 2018, to boost his shareholding and, with it, his voting power. Hence the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in January 2024 to rescind Musk’s 2018 stock-option package—by far the largest ever granted to a corporate executive—poses a threat to Musk’s strategic control at Tesla. As the “Technoking” of Tesla strategizes to maintain his control over the company’s decision-making, anyone concerned with the role that Tesla will play in the evolving EV transition should be asking how CEO Musk might use, or abuse, his powerful position.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Economic Competition, Electric Vehicles, Tesla, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

66. Setting Pharmaceutical Drug Prices: What the Medicare Negotiators Need to Know About Innovation and Financialization

Author:: Öner Tulum and William Lazonick
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: Mandated by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, the U.S. government through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is negotiating with pharmaceutical companies over the “maximum fair price” of ten drugs in wide use by Medicare patients. Over the next few years, the number of drugs whose prices are subject to negotiations will increase. The pharmaceutical companies contend that a “fair” price would be a “value-based price” that enables the companies’ shareholders to capture the value that the drug creates for society. Invoking the dominant “maximizing shareholder value” ideology, the argument for value-based pricing assumes that it is only a pharmaceutical company’s shareholders who make the risky investments that fund drug innovation. Pharmaceutical executives and their lobbyists warn that a lowering of drug prices will reduce investments in new drugs. The purpose of this paper is to enable CMS negotiators to respond to these arguments by showing a) why drug-price regulation is required, given the relation between scale economies in supplying drugs and price inelasticity of drug demand; b) how the pharmaceutical companies with which they are negotiating prices are, in general, not using their profits from unregulated drug prices to fund drug innovation but rather to fund distributions to shareholders in the form of cash dividends and stock buybacks; c) that publicly listed pharmaceutical companies do not typically rely upon investment by shareholders to fund drug innovation; and d) that investment in drug innovation entails “collective and cumulative learning” in foundational and translational research that is both antecedent and external to the investments in clinical research that a pharmaceutical company may make to bring a safe and effective drug to market.
Topic:: Economics, Health, Finance, Innovation, Pharmaceuticals, and Medicare
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

67. Good Policy or Good Luck? Why Inflation Fell Without a Recession

Author:: Thomas Ferguson and Servaas Storm
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:: This paper analyzes claims that the Federal Reserve is principally responsible for the decline of inflation in the U.S. We compare several different quantitative approaches. These show that at most the Fed could plausibly claim credit for somewhere between twenty and forty percent of the decline. The paper then examines claims by central bankers and their supporters that a steadfast Fed commitment to keeping inflationary expectations anchored played a key role in the process. The paper shows that it did not. The Fed’s own surveys show that low-income Americans did not believe assurances from the Fed or anyone else that inflation was anchored. Instead, what does explain much of the decline is the simple fact that most workers nowadays cannot protect themselves by bargaining for higher wages. The paper then takes up the obvious question of why steep rises in interest rates have not so far led to big rises in unemployment. We show that recent arguments by Benigno and Eggertson that shifts in vacancy rates can explain this are inconsistent with the evidence. The biggest factor in accounting for the strength in the economy is the continuing importance of the wealth effect in sustaining consumption by the affluent. This arises, as we have emphasized in several papers, from the Fed’s quantitative easing policies. Absent sharp declines in wealth, the continuing importance of this factor is likely to feed service sector inflation in particular.
Topic:: Economics, Monetary Policy, Federal Reserve, Inflation, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

68. The Washington Summit: Burden-sharing

Author:: Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. In the third brief of the series, Tony Lawrence looks at the perennial question of burden-sharing. The Allies will probably not agree to raise the 2% of GDP spending guideline. But in any case, their focus on this metric hides the real picture of how responsibility for security is shared across the Alliance. The European Allies certainly need to step up in all areas, but they should also consider reframing the burden-sharing discussion.
Topic:: NATO, Defense Spending, Russia-Ukraine War, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:: Europe and United States of America

69. Nuclear Verification’s Holy Grail: Verifying Nuclear Warheads — a new approach

Author:: Miles Pomper, William Moon, Marshall Brown, Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress, Dan Zhukov, Dick Gullickson, and Yanliang Pan
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: This study is the culmination of four years of work to think through what would be required to track and monitor nuclear warheads in a verification process. It first began in 2021, shortly after President Joe Biden of the United States and President Vladimir Putin of Russia extended the New START Treaty until February 2026; the two presidents also announced the launch of bilateral strategic stability talks. This positive moment in the U.S.-Russian relationship, which became almost unimaginable after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, was the original impetus for the project. It also launched in the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, commonly known as the INF Treaty. The Russians had been violating the Treaty with the production and deployment of the 9M729 missile, also known in NATO parlance as the SSC-8. All NATO allies concurred with the withdrawal, which the United States completed in August 2019. The effort began with two strands of activity. The study team knew that when the United States and Russia decided to return to the negotiating table, the United States would place a high priority on seeking direct limits on warheads. Prior treaties had focused on controlling and eliminating missiles but had not focused directly on the warheads that armed them. It had long been a goal of the United States to seek direct limits on warheads, in order to more accurately constrain a Russian preponderance in warheads designated for theaterand shorter-range systems.1 However, if such an agreement were negotiated, the European allies would be ill-equipped to participate. On-site inspections under the INF Treaty had ended on May 31, 2001, so it had been twenty years since the allies had had to participate in verification activities. Most had lost expertise and institutional memory; some had never participated at all. “Raising the IQ” of the NATO allies about participating in arms control implementation was thus the first strand of activity. The second strand grew up around a conviction in the study team that the well-practiced verification techniques that had been exercised in INF and strategic arms control treaties since the 1980s could be augmented with new technology and innovative techniques. Thus emerged the emphasis on using cryptography to underpin a unique warhead tracking system. This work took advantage of some of the finest experts in the field of cryptography at Stanford University, and also the extensive experience gained during the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s many years of work to strengthen warhead protection, control and accounting in Russian Ministry of Defense nuclear warhead storage facilities. This work, which spanned a period of over fifteen years from 1995- 2013, provided the study team with a great depth of knowledge about the normal operating procedures in Russian military warhead facilities. This deep knowledge was vital to developing a concept for the tracking system, providing it with a realism and accuracy that otherwise would not have been possible. These two strands of work culminated in 2022 in a significant study, “Everything Counts: Building a Control Regime for Non-Strategic Nuclear Warheads in Europe.”2 However, the team realized that only one element of warhead verification had been touched—the broad outlines of a system for maintaining and exchanging information over the life of an agreement. Other verification elements such as on-site inspections and particular verification technologies had not been considered. They therefore resolved to expand the scope of work to imagine an entire closed system for nuclear warhead verification. With the cryptographic element as its foundation, the team reviewed the extensive experience of treaties, agreements and other activities such as exhibitions and joint experiments that had been built up over the many years of U.S.-Soviet and Russian cooperation on nuclear weapons control. From this, they created a comprehensive menu of measures that could be considered for a future warhead control regime, calibrating the measures according to the level of their intrusiveness.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Russia and United States of America

70. The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Posture and Arms Control in Today’s More Dangerous World

Author:: Miles Pomper, David Santoro, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: Since the late 1960s, NATO has sought to balance two objectives—maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent while supporting efforts to buttress strategic stability through arms control and advance nonproliferation and disarmament through the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty process. The success of this strategy was most evident in the dual-track strategy of deployments and negotiations that led to the signing and implementation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987. The end of the Cold War also led to substantial cuts in U.S. and Russian strategic systems. Since then, NATO Allies have regularly voiced their support for continuing to pursue these two objectives, including supporting the goal enunciated by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2009 “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”1 In the last decade, however, Russia’s malign behavior has undermined NATO arms control efforts to the point that it appears traditional arms control will be effectively dead when the New START agreement—already suspended by Russia—expires in 2026. Russian’s invasion of Ukraine, its repeated nuclear saber-rattling in that conflict, and the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons to Belarus has also forced the alliance to look to ways to enhance its deterrence, including its nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, the massive increase in China’s nuclear arsenal and its growing partnership with Russia, is generating additional pressure to increase U.S. nuclear forces as well as questions about the ability of the U.S. to provide extended deterrence simultaneously to Allies in Europe and Asia. Those doubts have been reinforced by political developments in the United States—and in the war in Ukraine—that have raised anxieties about a decoupling of European and U.S. deterrence and defense and led to fresh discussion of a potential “Eurodeterrent.” Meanwhile, developments in North Korea and Iran—and their increasingly close ties with Moscow—further threaten the viability of the already shaky nuclear and missile nonproliferation regimes and have eroded longstanding cooperation between Washington and Moscow to manage nuclear nonproliferation risks in third countries. In response to these developments, Allies and experts, such as the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission, have proposed various adaptations to the alliance’s nuclear posture, including to its nuclear sharing arrangements. This report examines these deterrence proposals, particularly considering how they support the alliance’s other longstanding objectives of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation. The paper begins with some background on US/NATO nuclear policy from the end of the Cold War to the further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. It then delves into changes in Russian nuclear doctrine, Moscow’s nuclear behavior during the Ukraine War, and the Kremlin’s views on future arms control. The report next discusses China’s nuclear modernization and views on arms control and the reaction among NATO and Asian Allies and the international community to these changes. It then discusses potential future U.S. and NATO posture options, including those already being undertaken by NATO or proposed by the US. Congressional Strategic Posture Commission and the State Department’s International Security Advisory Board. It concludes with an analysis of the potential impact of various options on arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation and offers some policy recommendations.
Topic:: NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

71. The Great Depression as a Savings Glut

Author:: Victor Degorce and Éric Monnet
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:: New data covering 23 countries reveal that banking crises of the Great Depression coincided with a sharp international increase in deposits at savings institutions and life insurance. Deposits fled from commercial banks to alternative forms of savings. This fuelled a credit crunch since other institutions did not replace bank lending. While asset prices fell, savings held in savings institutions and life insurance companies increased as a share of GDP and in real terms. These findings provide new explanations of the fall in credit and aggregate demand in the 1930s. They illustrate the need to consider nonbank financial institutions when studying banking crises.
Topic:: History, Great Depression, Banking Crisis, Savings, and Thrift
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

72. Perils of the U.S. Defense Budget: Silver Lining or Dark Abyss?

Author:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: “Don’t tell me what you value. Show me your budget and I’ll tell you what you value.” When President Biden said this in 2022, the world was in a different state. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was struggling in the face of a surprisingly determined Ukrainian military. The Middle East had its unique but expected challenges, including Iran’s nuclear program. And President Xi Jinping of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was seeking an unprecedented third term as Communist Party chief. Barely two years later, Ukraine is at best in a stalemate with Russia and, at worst, is faltering. Houthi militants, with materiel support from Tehran, have on a near-weekly basis attacked US and Western ships in the Red Sea. An emboldened Xi is becoming more assertive in the South China Sea, and the PRC has lobbed ballistic missiles over Taiwan for the first time. If the US defense budget in 2022 valued a set of national security priorities—funding Ukraine, countering the PRC, supporting NATO—those priorities are coming under threat in this year’s defense budget.
Topic:: Security, Budget, Geopolitics, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

73. Next-Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program

Author:: Bonnie S. Glaser, Joshua Stone, Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, and Francesca Ghiretti
Publication Date:: 08-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The papers in this compendium were written by 11 members of the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) delegation: Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, Francesca Ghiretti, Heather Hwalek, Leland Lazarus, Lauren Racusin, Friso Stevens, Joshua Stone, Brian Volsky, Theresa Winter, Adrienne Wu. Transatlantic attention to Taiwan has surged in recent years for several reasons. First, Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to increased concern in the United States and Europe that Beijing’s growing military capabilities and declining confidence in its ability to achieve peaceful reunification will soon lead the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to attempt a takeover of Taiwan by force. The cost of such a war would carry a price tag of around $10 trillion, equal to about 10% of global GDP, according to Bloomberg Economics, far higher than the economic impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. The devastating impact of a Taiwan Strait conflict has provided a wake-up call for leaders in Europe who now echo the Biden administration’s warnings to PRC leader Xi Jinping to refrain from using violence to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In addition, Taiwan is now a regular agenda item in the US-EU Consultations on the Indo-Pacific and the US-EU Dialogue on China. Second, intensifying US-China strategic competition has increasingly focused on technology with chips at the center. Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced ones. A single company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), manufactures most of those chips. Recognition of Taiwan’s dominant role in the semiconductor supply chain has provided another reason to bolster deterrence. It has also sparked interest in “friendshoring” and “onshoring” semiconductor manufacturing. TSMC plans to start production at its first fab in Arizona in 2025 and will break ground on another in Dresden at the end of 2024 with an estimated completion date of 2027. Recognizing the rising geopolitical risks and their own strategic dependencies, the United States and the EU have made building resilient supply chains a priority, especially in semiconductors. In its 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy, Brussels explicitly committed the EU to engaging with Taiwan in creating resilient supply chains. Third, rising concern in the United States and Europe about election interference and disinformation have sparked interest in learning from Taiwan’s experience in combatting such threats. In the run-up to the January 13, 2024, presidential and legislative elections, PRC attempts to interfere in Taiwan’s politics surged to unprecedented levels through economic coercion, direct political meddling, displays of military force, and manipulation of social media. As the United States and many European countries prepare for their own national elections this year, they are engaging with experts from Taiwan to better understand PRC tactics and the tools that Taiwan successfully employed to counter PRC interference. Fourth, the United States and Europe increasingly recognize that Taiwan’s vibrant and successful democracy is under threat from an authoritarian regime. Taiwan has received high marks for protecting political rights and holding free and fair elections. Taiwan’s democratic achievements are even more impressive when set against the backdrop of a deterioration in freedom worldwide. Like other industrialized democracies, Taiwan faces a multitude of challenges that are especially difficult to address in the face of PRC efforts that prevent Taiwan’s government and its people from interacting with the world. Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations also hampers the world’s ability to develop effective solutions to myriad problems. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals from the United States to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. In 2022, TUPP was expanded to include young professionals from Europe in support of GMF’s mission of promoting transatlantic cooperation. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, DC, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The 2024 TUPP cohort traveled to Taiwan in February for an intense week of meetings and activities. Each participant gained insights into Taiwan and its role in their respective fields. This year’s delegation comprised five Americans and five Europeans. Over time, TUPP seeks to create a body of global experts with firsthand knowledge of Taiwan who support sustaining and expanding its international ties. I am grateful to the Henry Luce Foundation, the Global Taiwan Institute, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy for their support of this goal. The contributions here, written by the entire 2024 TUPP delegation, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate continued transatlantic and global interest in Taiwan and its future.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Poland, Germany, Latin America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

74. Protecting Undersea Infrastructure in the North American Arctic

Author:: Heather A Conley, Sophie Arts, Kristine Berzina, and Frida Rintakumpu
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: In response to recent incidents damaging undersea energy infrastructure and communication cables in the Baltic Sea and High North, NATO countries have intensified their focus on critical undersea infrastructure (CUI) protection on the national, bilateral, and multilateral levels. Allies in the North American Arctic can build on important NATO initiatives but, given distances and the unique operating environment in this theater, the responsibility for protecting CUI assets in territorial waters will fall primarily to the United States, Canada, and the Kingdom of Denmark. CUI in the North American Arctic is currently limited. But climate change, the green energy transition, and greater reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) will increase the demand and opportunity to expand communication cables and energy infrastructure in the region. At the same time, increased traffic and resource exploration heighten the vulnerability of these assets, especially to deliberate attack from Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Both powers rely on dual-use assets that increase plausible deniability, and they continue to develop undersea warfare capabilities. To enhance resilience and protect CUI in the North American Arctic, the United States and its NATO allies are strongly encouraged to: • urgently upgrade US as well as NATO allies’ situational awareness and presence in the air, space, and undersea domain, cooperating closely with the private sector • prioritize and upgrade the role of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) to conduct CUI threat assessments and identify assets that are especially vulnerable due to their strategic importance, location, complicated ownership structure, or symbolic value • expand US and NATO response options to counter hybrid threats and deter CUI attacks; consider establishing an additional maritime high-readiness force • increase NATO’s presence to protect and defend nearby assets during and after Russian and PRC naval maneuvers • build on NATO’s Digital Oceans Initiative to enhance and integrate unmanned systems and AI information processing tools into exercises and operations • identify counterparts in other national governments to ensure quick and seamless information sharing following CUI incidents • deepen public-private cooperation as well as government oversight over privately owned CUI to incentivize the private sector’s CUI resilience (e.g. fortifying cables, integrating monitoring capabilities, and ensuring adequate repair capabilities) • clarify responsibilities of CUI protection and defense across the civil, military, and private sectors, including the transition of responsibilities from the Department of Homeland Security to the Department of Defense in crisis situations • train and exercise crisis decision-making processes with the involvement of all relevant actors (including the private sector and state and local authorities) on the national, bilateral (Canada and the Kingdom of Denmark), minilateral, and multilateral levels • clarify and enhance legal frameworks to respond to CUI incidents in territorial and international waters, and share best practices across all sectors • use pro-active strategic communication to outline legal and military authority in responding to CUI incidents, attributing attacks, and enhancing deterrence against future threats.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Infrastructure, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, North America, Arctic, United States of America, and Baltic Sea

75. Time Is Almost Up

Author:: Martin Quencez and Gesine Weber
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: The transatlantic partnership has long neglected structural weaknesses. Unless corrected, they could soon doom it. Download PDF 2025 will open a new chapter for the transatlantic relationship. The outcome of the US presidential election will accelerate ongoing changes in the country’s approach to Europe, while a rapidly shifting security environment will compel the partners to reform their alliance. The next year presents an important opportunity to do this, especially as the terms of the European Commission and the US president coincidentally align. When Joe Biden was elected four years ago, many European leaders expressed the hope that, in the president’s words, “the US is back” in the transatlantic relationship. The change of administration in Washington could have constituted an opportunity for the transatlantic partners to “seize the Biden moment”, but critical reforms never took place. Instead, the Democrat’s election relieved many European governments, prompting a continued reliance on muddling through critical challenges rather than developing European responses to them. The US administration, for its part, did not sufficiently pressure Europeans to play a greater role in world affairs. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced Europeans and the EU to respond with costly and unprecedented measures, but these policies remain to this day largely disconnected from a broader political discourse of the war as an “existential” threat to the future of the European project. Europe’s avoidance of such big-picture issues has negative implications for its ties to the United States. The current transatlantic relationship suffers from four major challenges that, unless tackled in the next four years, could lead, at best, to its dysfunction and, at worst, to its implosion. These challenges are: security-related structural problems, intra-alliance competition and policy toward China, a European gamble on time, and a widening power gap between the United States and Europe. Transatlantic Security Reform: Ukraine Has Muted The Debate The swift, coordinated, and strong reaction of the United States and Europe to the war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the most significant moment of transatlantic unity in recent years. US military and strategic leadership, and Biden’s personal involvement in overcoming Congressional resistance to supporting Ukraine, will constitute the cornerstones of his legacy in Europe. The continent has also done its part, providing significant military and humanitarian support—at times even surpassing that from the United States. All this has brought the transatlantic partners closer together while bolstering public approval of NATO. Sustaining unity on Ukraine, although an outstanding diplomatic and political success, has, however, overshadowed a more complex picture of the transatlantic relationship. The war’s outbreak put American security guarantees for Europe in the spotlight, but more contentious policy issues have been neglected. Prioritizing Ukraine over other aspects of the transatlantic relationship was justified, but it prevented the allies from preparing for potential future crises. This is unsustainable and dangerous. Persistent security-related structural problems may seem paradoxical. After all, 23 of the 32 NATO allies finally invested, as pledged a decade earlier, at least 2% of GDP in defense in 2024. The EU has also stepped up its efforts in this area. Nevertheless, two underlying problems fester. First, Europe’s chronic capability shortage means the United States still contributes more than 65% of the NATO allies’ total defense spending and 38% of their military personnel. NATO’s so-called European pillar remains underdeveloped, and Europe cannot defend itself on its own. Second, European and transatlantic security suffers from a lack of imagination. The Biden administration has demonstrated that it can defend the European security order, and Europeans have unquestionably overcome many political taboos to support Ukraine, but policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have been unable, or unwilling, to develop a vision for a needed new security order. A post-Cold War approach to alliance management has led the Biden administration and many European allies to preserve a form of status quo while the world undergoes considerable change. At the same time, there remains in certain political circles a desire to recreate the prewar relationship with Moscow, especially as a chronic lack of political leadership in key Western capitals impedes the development of an ambitious strategic agenda. Transatlantic leaders have repeatedly and rightly stated that Ukrainians will decide when they stop fighting, but this stance hides the lack of transatlantic consensus on a postwar European order.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

76. TikTok Tactics: 2024 US Candidates Dance Around Security Risks

Author:: Lindsay Gorman, Caitlin Goldenberg, and Isabella Nieminen
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Despite TikTok’s ongoing national security risks, 2024 candidates in US House, Senate, gubernatorial, and secretary of state races continue to use the platform to reach voters. Since its emergence onto the social media scene in 2016, viral video app TikTok has exploded in popularity, dominating the screentime of a reported one billion monthly active users worldwide today. This year, the app’s user base has made it an all-but-unavoidable tool for US presidential and vice-presidential candidates, who have used TikTok to make their bids to voters. Yet researchers and lawmakers’ initial national security concerns surrounding the potential for malign influence due to TikTok’s ownership ties to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have only become louder as additional voices in Washington and beyond have joined the chorus. To address these concerns, in 2024 Congress passed and President Biden signed House Resolution (HR) 7521 to force TikTok to divest from its PRC-based parent company ByteDance or face a ban in the United States. This was mere months before the president’s campaign joined the platform itself. As election day fast approaches, a wide swath of federal and state candidates are seeking to leverage TikTok’s popularity with GenZ users. In October 2022, the Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) produced a report documenting how US midterm candidates employed TikTok to reach voters and boost campaign visibility. This year, ahead of the 2024 US general elections in November, ASD and the GMF Technology Program researched the question of whether TikTok use among US Senate, House, gubernatorial, and secretary of state candidates has increased, and how candidates have continued to harness TikTok in campaigns. After two years, Democrats still outweigh Republicans on TikTok use, TikTok’s sluggishness in verifying candidate accounts has worsened, and political TikTok styles are beginning to mature.
Topic:: National Security, Social Media, Domestic Policy, and TikTok
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

77. Pivotal Powers 2024: Innovative Engagement Strategies for Global Governance, Security, and Artificial Intelligence

Author:: Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Sharinee Jagtiani, Kristina Kausch, Garima Mohan, Martin Quencez, Rachel Tausendfreund, and Gesine Weber
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: States outside the transatlantic alliance have gained leverage in international affairs in recent years and, with that, the potential to significantly reshape the global order. Engagement with these "pivotal powers", which include Brazil, Indonesia, India, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Türkiye, is of paramount importance for Europe and the United States. "Pivotal Powers 2024: Innovative Engagement Strategies for Global Governance, Security, and Artificial Intelligence" offers tactics for enhancing Western cooperation on global challenges with these countries. This report builds on GMF reports from 2012 and 2023.
Topic:: Security, Governance, European Union, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Africa, Turkey, Middle East, India, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

78. Impacts of Trade Diversion from China in the United States Market on Wages in a Third Country: Evidence from Thailand

Author:: Kazunobu Hayakawa and Sasatra Sudsawasd
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: Since the latter half of the 2010s, China’s exports to the United States (US) have gradually decreased due to the US-China trade war and other factors, such as lockdown measures in China to combat COVID-19. This decrease has resulted in increasing exports from third countries, including Thailand, to the US market by substituting China’s exports, i.e. trade diversion. Against this backdrop, this study empirically investigates how the changes in exports to the US driven by the change in China’s exports to the US affect wages in Thailand. Especially, we examine the heterogeneous effects according to workers’ characteristics. To this end, we conduct regression analyses using individual-level quarterly data from the first quarter of 2017 to the second quarter of 2023. Our main finding is that the wage gap between low- and middle-skilled workers decreased, whilst the gap between middle- and high-skilled workers increased. Namely, the increased exports to the US caused ‘wage polarisation’ in Thailand. We also find that the increase in exports to the US contributed to expanding the wage gap by age but narrowing it by gender.
Topic:: Markets, Trade Wars, Exports, and Wages
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Thailand, and United States of America

79. Have Dynamic Spillovers and the Connectedness of Trade Policy Uncertainty Changed During the COVID-19 Pandemic and Sino–US Trade Frictions?

Author:: Chien-Chiang Lee and Farzan Yahya
Publication Date:: 03-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:: In this paper, we examine the spillover and connectedness between the trade policy uncertainty (TPU) of the United States (US), China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea) under global geopolitical risk (GPR), infectious disease equity market volatility (EMVID), and GPR from North Korea (GPRNK) using a relatively novel time-varying parameter vector autoregression (TVP-VAR) approach. Additionally, method of moments quantile regression is utilised to estimate the asymmetric effect of GPR, GPRNK, and EMVID on TPU. Our findings suggest that there is a high total and directional spillover amongst underlying variables during Sino–US trade friction that further elevated during the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic period. The US is a net receiver of spillover from the TPU of all economies, while the Chinese TPU receives spillover from EMVID. The results further confirm that both the TPU of China (TPUCN) and the TPU of the US (TPUUS) are vulnerable to EMVID, but the effect is stronger for Chinese TPU in the higher quantiles. Although Japanese TPU is less vulnerable to GPR and EMVID, it is significantly exposed to GPRNK. Korean trade shows resiliency and immunity to pandemic-induced volatility and GPRNK.
Topic:: Trade Wars, Trade Policy, COVID-19, and Spillovers
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

80. Black Power and Palestine

Author:: Michael R. Fischbach
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:: MAAS alum Dr. Michael R. Fischbach discusses his groundbreaking research on divisions within the 1960s Black Freedom Struggle in America over the Israel-Palestine conflict and how Black Power activists supported the Palestinian struggle for liberation—planting the seeds for transcontinental solidarity that continues today.
Topic:: History, Solidarity, Activism, and Black Power
Political Geography:: Middle East, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

81. Teaching Israel-Palestine

Author:: Khaled Elgindy and Yousef Munayyer
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:: Two CCAS instructors reflect on their experiences of teaching Palestine in this historic moment.
Topic:: Higher Education, Academia, Teaching, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Palestine, and United States of America

82. Teaching in a Time of War

Author:: Nader Hashemi, Jonathan Lincoln, and Fida Adely
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:: Professors Nader Hashemi, Jonathan Lincoln, and Fida Adely, each of whom direct academic centers within Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service, reflect on what it means to educate and care for students in this present moment.*
Topic:: Higher Education, Academia, Teaching, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

83. Factsheet: Marco Rubio

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Marco Rubio is a US Senator from the state of Florida. He previously ran for President in 2016. He has a documented history of minimizing the issue of Islamophobia, promoting anti-Muslim tropes, and supporting discriminatory policies targeting Muslims. In 2024, President-elect Donald Trump nominated him to serve as Secretary of State.
Topic:: Elections, Islamophobia, Donald Trump, and Marco Rubio
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

84. Factsheet: Sebastian Gorka

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Sebastian Gorka is a political commentator who appears on Salem Radio Network and Newsmax. He previously worked for Fox News and served as the Deputy Assistant to President Donald Trump in 2017. In 2024, President-elect Trump picked Gorka to serve in his second administration as deputy assistant to the president and senior director for counterterrorism. Gorka supports religious profiling, has targeted Muslim civil rights and advocacy groups, and has publicly worn a medal affiliated with a Nazi-linked Hungarian group.
Topic:: Media, Islamophobia, Political Extremism, and Sebastian Gorka
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

85. Factsheet: Mike Huckabee

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Mike Huckabee is the former governor of Arkansas, a Baptist minister, political commentator, and ran to be the Republican presidential candidate in 2008 and 2016. He is a staunch supporter of Israel, has questioned Palestinian identity, supports settlements, and has a history of making anti-Palestinian and Islamophobic statements. In 2024, President-elect Donald Trump picked Huckabee to serve as the United States Ambassador to Israel.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Islamophobia, Donald Trump, and Mike Huckabee
Political Geography:: Palestine, North America, and United States of America

86. Factsheet: Ekal Vidyalaya Foundation

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Ekal Vidyalaya Foundation (Ekal-USA) is a Houston, Texas-based non-profit organization with over 70 chapters across multiple U.S. cities. It serves as the sister organization of Ekal Vidyalaya Foundation of India (Ekal-India), a Hindu nationalist group that operates single-teacher schools in India. Ekal-India has been accused of promoting hatred towards religious minorities.
Topic:: Islamophobia, Non-profits, Hindu Nationalism, and Ekal Vidyalaya Foundation (Ekal-USA)
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, and United States of America

87. Factsheet: Sadhvi Rithambara

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Sadhvi Rithambara is a senior leader in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and is the founder of Param Shakti Peeth, a “charitable organization” in India, which also has two sister organizations in the US, Param Shakti Peeth Of America Foundation and Param Shakti Peeth Of America East Coast (PSPA). Rithambara is a leading figure in the Hindu nationalist movement and her anti-Muslim speeches played a central role in the demolition of the Babri Mosque in the 90s. Leaders of PSP in the US are also affiliated with far-right Hindu nationalist organizations.
Topic:: Islamophobia, Far Right, Charity, Hindu Nationalism, and Sadhvi Rithambara
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, and United States of America

88. Factsheet: Elise Stefanik

Author:: Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:: Elise Stefanik is a Republican congresswoman from New York. Initially entering politics as a moderate, Stefanik has rebranded herself and become a staunch supporter and defender of President-elect Donald Trump. She has a history of propagating anti-Palestinian narratives, and has supported legislation targeting pro-Palestinian voices. She has also allied with organizations known for promoting Islamophobic and anti-Palestinian views, and has called for defunding entities like UNRWA, labeling it as a “terrorist front.” In 2024, President-elect Trump selected Stefanik to serve as the US Ambassador to the UN.
Topic:: Discrimination, Islamophobia, Far Right, Donald Trump, Republican Party, and Elise Stefanik
Political Geography:: New York, Palestine, North America, and United States of America

89. Artillery in Present and Future High-Intensity Operations

Author:: Elio Calcagno, Bryan Clark, Sam Cranny-Evans, Alessandro Marrone, Nicolò Murgia, and Eugenio Po
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The Ukraine war has highlighted among NATO allies the importance of planning for protracted, large-scale, and high-intensity conflicts. In this context, artillery capabilities have regained significance, with a clear emphasis on survivability, quality, quantity, range, but also on adequate munition stocks and production capacity. However, successful integration into a wider array of capabilities (including long range precision fires) and advanced Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities are crucial for an effective artillery force. Meanwhile, in the maritime domain, recent events in the Red Sea have shown how naval artillery is gaining a prominent role as a cost-effective solution to defence from drone and swarming threats.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Procurement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, United Kingdom, Ukraine, France, Italy, and United States of America

90. Asset Ownership, Rates of Return, and the U.S. Working Class

Author:: Leila Davis and Charalampos Konstantinidis
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: In this paper, we analyze the intersection of asset market participation and inter-class wealth inequality in the United States by showing that working-class households earn lower rates of return on their assets than non-working-class households. We, first, operationalize an empirical definition of working-class status using the Survey of Consumer Finances for 1989-2022. Using this classification, we, second, document that inter-class income and wealth inequality have risen since 1989. Third, we show that, with the exception of business assets, working-class households hold similar asset classes as non-working-class households and receive financial income. However, working-class households receive a 2.5 percentage point lower average rate of return than non-working-class households, conditional on observable demographic and economic differences across classes. This gap reflects differential returns on businesses and real estate. These results suggest that expanded asset market access in the U.S. has conferred unequal benefits by class status and widened inequalities along class lines.
Topic:: Markets, Inequality, Assets, and Working Class
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

91. U.S. Teachers, Overwork and Perceptions of Work-Time Reductions: Evidence from Massachusetts

Author:: Katherine Moos and Noé M. Wiener
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: This study is based on four focus group interviews with public school teachers in Massachusetts about reducing work hours as a means of improving their working conditions. Our analysis documents a common experience of overwork, expressed in the focus groups and measured by time-use diaries. Teachers reported long work hours and a significant “mental load”—both of which affect teachers’ quality of life, physical and mental health, relationships with their families, and desire to keep teaching. While participants were union members and therefore experienced with collective bargaining, most approached the issue of overwork as an individual problem that must be solved by setting and maintaining personal boundaries. Focus group participants differed in their assessment of a hypothetical policy proposal for a work-time reduction without a loss of pay for teachers or instructional time for students. While generally supportive of the goal, participants questioned whether contractual reductions would correspond to actual reductions in hours worked. Teachers expressed both eagerness to include work-time reductions in future contracts, as well as skepticism that their districts had the fiscal space or political will to achieve this goal. Discussions revealed that teachers’ professional identities as hard-working and caring “perfectionists” inhibited their policy imaginations with regard to using collective bargaining to win them additional leisure time.
Topic:: Education, Labor Issues, Teachers, and Work
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

92. Implicit Coordination in Sellers’ Inflation: How Cost Shocks Facilitate Price Hikes

Author:: Isabella Weber, Evan Wasner, Markus Lang, Benjamin Braun, and Jens van't Klooster
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: Supply shocks are now widely recognized as a driver of the recent inflation bout, but the role of firms’ pricing strategies in propagating input cost shocks remains contested. In this paper, we review the state of the academic debate over sellers’ inflation and assess whether, in line with this theory, economy-wide cost shocks have functioned as an implicit coordination mechanism for firms to hike prices. We use a dataset containing 138,962 corporate earnings call transcripts of 4,823 stock-market listed U.S. corporations from the period 2007-Q1 to 2022-Q2 to conduct sentiment analysis via both dictionary-based natural language processing and a large language model approach. We find that large input price shocks (as well as their co-occurrence with supply constraints) correlate with positive sentiments expressed in executives’ statements about cost increases. Qualitative analysis provides further insights into the reasoning behind executives’ optimism regarding their ability to turn an economy-wide cost shock into an opportunity to raise prices and protect or even increase profits.
Topic:: Economy, Inflation, Profit, and Corporations
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

93. Distributional Implications and Share Ownership of Record Oil and Gas Profits

Author:: Gregor Semienuk, Isabella M. Weber, Iain Weaver, Evan Wasner, Benjamin Braun, Philip B. Holden, Pablo Salas, Jean-Francois Mercure, and Neil R. Edwards
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: The 2022 oil and gas crisis resulted in record fossil-fuel profits globally that rehabilitated the oil and gas industry, obstruct the energy transition and contributed to inflation. We analyse the size and the distribution of financial beneficiaries of these unprecedented profits across countries and across wealth groups within the United States, using company income statements and comprehensive ownership data, to construct a global network of shareholdings with 397,619 nodes. We estimate that globally, net income in publicly listed oil and gas companies reached US$916 billion in 2022. The United States was the biggest beneficiary receiving US$301 billion in fossil fuel profits both from domestic extraction and through global shareholding, more than U.S. investments of US$267 billion in the low carbon economy that year. Analyzing the U.S. distribution including privately held US companies, 51% of profits went to the wealthiest 1%, predominantly through direct shareholdings and private company ownership. In contrast the bottom 50% only received 1%. The incremental fossil-fuel profits in 2022 over those in 2021 were enough to increase the disposable income of the wealthiest Americans several percent and compensate a substantial part of their purchasing power loss from inflation that year, thereby exacerbating inflation inequality. Record fossil-fuel profits also reinforce existing racial and ethnic inequalities and inequalities between groups with different educational attainments. Our results also show that only a small share of overall profits benefits institutions that serve the wider public such as pension funds. We discuss how windfall profits taxes could be used to both lower inequality and accelerate the energy transition as increasing geopolitical tensions and climate impacts portend continued volatility in oil and gas markets.
Topic:: Oil, Gas, Inflation, Fossil Fuels, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

94. The Economics of Eliminating Plastic Water Bottles in the United States

Author:: Emily Diaz-Loar
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: As of the most recent 2018 data, U.S. residents purchased more than 70 billion plastic water bottles. On average, this amounts to each U.S. resident buying 214 plastic water bottles during 2018. Virtually all these bottles are manufactured as fossil fuel-based products, and 86 percent are disposed of after only one use. Such fossil fuel-based single-use plastic bottles inflict a range of severe negative impacts on the environment and human health. They leach toxic chemicals into the soil, water and food supply, which in turn contribute to causing various types of cancers as well as infertility, in humans and other species. They also release tiny ‘microplastic’ particles, which have been found in, among other parts of the human body, the carotid artery tissues that supply blood to the brain. Recent research has found that people with microplastics in their carotid artery tissues were twice as likely to have a heart attack, stroke or die from any cause over the next three years than people who had none. Beyond this, plastic bottles litter beaches and roadways, clog water drains, strangle animals and contaminate habitats. It is clear that continuing, and expanding, the consumption of single-use fossil fuel-based plastic water bottles, in the U.S. and elsewhere, is unsustainable. In this study, I examine alternative approaches to phasing out their use. More specifically I consider six possible alternatives to single-use fossil fuel-based plastic water bottles within the U.S. economy. These include: recycling fossil-fuel based bottles; utilizing plants as the raw material for producing ‘bioplastic’ bottles; and producing bottles with materials other than plastics, including paperboard cartons; glass; aluminum; and stainless steel. Of these alternatives, I show that, in terms of both environmental impacts and production costs, the most viable substitutes for single-use fossil-fuel based plastic bottles are reusable bottles made from either aluminum or stainless steel. Overall, aluminum or stainless steel-based bottles can significantly reduce the environmental impacts of water bottles, in particular the chemical toxicity that results from their use. Substituting aluminum or stainless steel-based bottles can also dramatically reduce the levels of waste and raw material extraction associated with fossil fuel-based plastic bottles. Further, I estimate that the costs of producing bottles from either aluminum or stainless steel will fall by over 30 percent in a scenario in which they substitute for 90 percent of the fossil fuel-based single-use plastic bottles now being consumed in the U.S. Overall, my results demonstrate that there are realistic prospects to achieve major environmental and economic benefits through phasing out single-use plastic bottles and creating viable alternatives to their continued use.
Topic:: Economics, Pollution, and Plastic
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

95. Do Abortion Bans Affect Reproductive and Infant Health? Evidence from Texas’s 2021 Ban and its Impact on Health Disparities

Author:: Raymond Caraher
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: The overturning of Roe v. Wade led to a wave of abortion bans in state legislatures across the United States. This emergence of a restrictive reproductive health policy environment has the potential to affect a wide range of reproductive health outcomes. This paper uses Texas’s 2021 6- week ban on abortion as a case study to examine the causal effect of an abortion ban on reproductive health outcomes, specifically abortion rates, fertility rates, and infant health outcomes. It examines how these effects may be heterogeneous by group, especially focusing on how the effects of abortion bans on reproductive health may be concentrated in those who are already facing disparities in reproductive health outcomes such as Black women. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, the analysis finds that the ban decreased abortion rates by over 40 percent, and increased fertility rates by about 4 percent, with the largest increases for Black non-Hispanic women and for counties far from a state with less restrictive abortion laws. This paper then constructs a measure of unmet reproductive health needs after an abortion ban, and finds that the unmet needs after the Texas 6-week ban are largest in counties with higher proportions of Black non-Hispanic residents, as well as counties which are furthest away from states which did not ban abortion after the Dobbs decision. The analysis then examines the effect of the ban on infant health outcomes, specifically focusing on heterogeneity in the effect of the ban on birth weight and infant mortality. This paper finds that the ban led to increases in the probability of an infant being born with very low birth weight of about 7 percent, with Black non-Hispanic infants experiencing the largest increases in the likelihood of very low birth weight. Additionally, the analysis finds significant increases in the infant mortality rate of about 6 percent after the abortion ban, again with Black non-Hispanic infants experiencing the largest increases in mortality. Further, the ban increased infant mortality rates more in counties which are further away from states which did not ban abortion after the Dobbs decision. The results suggest that the effects of abortion bans tend to be especially concentrated in marginalized populations, as well as those who are least able to shift their fertility options away from in-state abortions after a ban. The analysis shows that the trend towards an increasing number abortion bans will further exacerbate disparities in reproductive health outcomes.
Topic:: Public Health, Reproductive Health, and Abortion
Political Geography:: Texas and United States of America

96. The Incidence, Costs, and Correlates of High-Cost, High-Risk Consumer Credit Among Black and Latino Households

Author:: Edwith Theogene and Christian E. Weller
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
Abstract:: Black and Latino households regularly have a lot less wealth than white households. Many people of color, mainly Black and Latino households, also often have to resort to more costly and risky debt than is the case for white households. We present data from FINRA’s nationally representative 2021 Financial Capability Survey on the distribution of various forms of household credit by race and ethnicity. The data show that incidences of high-cost, high-risk consumer credit is higher among Black and Latino households than among white households. Loan denials, credit market discrimination and credit steering all factors likely contributing to this greater incidence. Further, the costs associated with those forms of credit are also higher for Black and Latino households than they are for white households, even within the same types of credit. Finally, these forms of credit correlate with lower savings, especially among Black and Latino households. The results indicate that the more widespread incidence of consumer credit among Black and Latino households likely contributes to the persistence of the racial wealth gap.
Topic:: Race, Inequality, Discrimination, Credit, Wealth, and Consumer Credit
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

97. Digital legislation: convergence or divergence of models? A comparative look at the European Union, China and the United States

Author:: Aifang Ma
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: In 1964, when the Canadian pioneer of media studies, Marshall McLuhan, argued that media is an extension of man, he did not foresee that future media, at the beginning of the 21st century, would produce increasingly pernicious effects[1]. While media have indeed extended human capacities, they have also shown to be generators of complicated social and ethical problems. In the same year philosopher, Herbert Marcuse, who analysed relations between Man and Machine from a deeply pessimistic viewpoint. His predictions seem to be corroborated by what we are now experiencing: the easy life made possible by technological progress has progressively gnawed into the individual critical reasoning. Instead of imposing their control over technologies, human beings are increasingly at their mercy. The domination of technology over individuals is all the stronger, since it seems harmless and is pleasant to use. In this context, the regulation of digital technologies[2] is flourishing in autocracies and democracies alike. Its importance goes far beyond the need of authoritarian regimes to cut off the transmission of destabilising content. It is universal since digital technologies set common challenges to national governments: illegal collection of users’ personal data, precarious working conditions for gig workers, monopolistic practices of large platforms, threats to human dignity and domestic security. These problems are causing trouble to all governments around the world. This article aims to be pragmatic. Beyond differences in political regime, it studies the regulatory approaches of the three largest digital economies in the world: China, the United States, and the European Union. The three models can potentially hinder or stimulate the development of digital technologies without necessarily opposing each other.
Topic:: European Union, Media, Legislation, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

98. The European Union between the United States and China: should we choose between equidistance and following?

Author:: Philippe Etienne
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The competition between the world's two major powers structures all international relations and influences the choices made by all other countries. The latter fear the consequences of tensions between the two giants and, in the main, want to avoid having to choose. But the problem is not the same everywhere. To put it simply, China benefits in the "global South" from a certain hostility towards the West, while the United States can play on the fear aroused by the emergence of Chinese power, which no longer hesitates to resort to power relations, especially in Eastern Asia[1]. Against this backdrop, Europe is in a delicate situation. It must contend with its assimilation to the United States as being part of the “West” which is increasingly rejected. Although it shares much with its American ally, particularly the values of democracy and security arrangements, it does not always have the same interests as the United States and must preserve its room for manoeuvre if it is not to be dragged into decisions in which it has no part. Before examining how the European Union is facing up to this challenge, and how it should behave in the future, the driving forces and prospects of the Sino-American rivalry require exploration.
Topic:: International Relations, Globalization, European Union, Global South, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

99. Time to Reset the U.S. Trade Agenda

Author:: Peter Harrell
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The strongest argument for rebooting U.S. trade policy ultimately may not be geopolitics, nor even the economic argument that trade deals will help an already-strong U.S economy. Instead, the best argument is that trade is a key element of solving global challenges that affect us all, like the green energy transition and the risks of AI and the digital economy.
Topic:: Treaties and Agreements, Geopolitics, Digital Economy, Artificial Intelligence, Trade Policy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

100. Inevitable Fractures: The Ukraine War and the Global System

Author:: Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The divisions in contemporary geopolitics are an inevitable consequence of colliding ideas and interests against the backdrop of American primacy. The United States should accept their reality while advancing its own interests in a competitive strategic environment.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS