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11. How the War in Ukraine is Changing the Space Game

Author:
Guilhem Penent and Guillaume Schlumberger
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has become a showcase for the new commercial paradigm emerging in the space sector (New Space). As such, it seems to confirm the relevance of adaptation efforts led by the United States – more specifically the Pentagon – since the mid-2010s. Thus, it highlights ongoing transformations and announces potential disruptions in the exploitation of orbits, particularly in the fields of satellite connectivity and remote sensing. It also shapes future tensions, while the structuring of international relations around the two poles constituted by the United States and China raises questions about the consequences on the safe, sustainable, secure, and stable use of space. With these developments, Europe is faced with the challenge of remaining relevant.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Space, Satellite, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

12. Reshuffling Value Chains - South Korea as a Case Study

Author:
Françoise Nicolas
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Despite all the talks about the reshuffling of value-chains and the trend to a form of industrial “Desinicization” (or decoupling/disengagement from China), the example of South Korea does not vindicate such assertions. The expansion of Korean direct investment in neighboring countries such as China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) remains a reality and it has not changed in any fundamental way over the past two decades. South Korean companies’ decisions to locate in one country rather than another are still very much based on cost factors, even if security considerations are increasingly factored in. Similarly, reshoring, which has been high on the South Korean government’s agenda for a long time, remains a marginal phenomenon for South Korean companies, despite the incentives provided. Rather than the relocation of production (in the form of reshoring or nearshoring) South Korean companies have turned to more unexpected options, such as the development of complementarity-based partnerships or vertically-integrated production networks with commodity suppliers, as in the case of the production of rare earth-based magnets. Such a strategy is likely to become more popular in the future, as it nicely combines economic and security considerations. Without a doubt, due to the highly politicized nature of the technology involved, the semiconductor industry is the one undergoing the most significant changes. In a context of rising Sino-US rivalry, the US has ramped up pressures on China with far-reaching consequences, leading South Korean semiconductor companies (with the support of the government) to engage in a strategy combining relocation to the US and onshoring in South Korea. While the economic logic is likely to prevail in most sectors thus limiting the scope for supply chain reshuffling, the examples of the semiconductor and rare earth-based magnets suggest that important changes can still be expected in the future in industries that are deemed strategic.
Topic:
Foreign Direct Investment, Supply Chains, Value Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

13. No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security

Author:
Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
To the extent that any unified theory of Russian information warfare actually exists, its core tenet might well be that regime security has historically been indivisible from information warfare in Russian strategic thought. Rather than an aggressive or expansionist expression of Moscow’s foreign policy, the Kremlin’s so-called information war should primarily be viewed through a domestic and regime security prism—it’s as much a counterinsurgency as an expeditionary strategy, less an escalation than a projection. Analysts and decisionmakers should therefore avoid reflexively casting the United States and the West as Russia’s primary antagonists in its information war, as doing so risks reinforcing these insecurities and exaggerating Moscow’s degree of power in the information ecosystem.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

14. Four Contending U.S. Approaches to Multilateralism

Author:
Stewart Patrick
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The era of U.S. president Donald Trump exposed the shortcomings of a unilateralist and hypernationalist approach to the pursuit of U.S. global objectives. Although that orientation still commands support in some Republican quarters, a more compelling foreign policy debate for the United States has emerged: What form of multilateralism is currently best suited to advance U.S. national interests and international stability? This historical moment is defined by two countervailing trends, as described in the 2022 National Security Strategy issued by U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration. The first is a profusion of transnational challenges that can only be addressed, mitigated, or resolved through collective action, such as climate change and pandemic disease. The second is a resurgence of geopolitical competition that hinders that very cooperation.1 The imperative for collective action has never been greater, yet the world remains, as United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Antonio Guterres bemoans, “gridlocked in colossal global dysfunction.”2 Biden has turned the page on Trump’s “America First” foreign policy, but the debate over alternative approaches to intergovernmental cooperation has just begun.3 Within the U.S. foreign policy establishment, four distinct models vie for primacy—and the administration’s attention. The first is a charter conception of multilateralism, focused on the UN’s model of universal membership. The second is a club approach, which seeks to rally established democracies as the foundation for world order. The third is a concert model, which seeks comity and joint action among the world’s major powers. The fourth is a coalition approach, which would tailor ad hoc frameworks to each global contingency. Each of the so-called four Cs lays claim to a respective virtue: legitimacy, solidarity, capability, and flexibility.4 As the Biden administration begins its third year—and as internationalists continue to advocate for different modes of multilateralism to tackle a daunting global agenda—the time is ripe for the United States to take a more strategic and intentional approach to international cooperation. Each of the four Cs rests on specific assumptions, makes distinct causal and normative claims, and poses real-world trade-offs for the pursuit of U.S. preferences and prospects for effective collective action. To be able to weigh their relative merits in specific circumstances, policymakers first need to better understand their conceptual underpinnings and practical implications.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

15. Integrating Cyber Into Warfighting: Some Early Takeaways From the Ukraine Conflict

Author:
Ariel Levite
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
It is too early to draw definitive conclusions about cyber warfare in the lead-up to and the execution of the Ukraine war. Data are lacking, and the outcome of the conflict remains uncertain. Yet through monitoring and analysis of a single year in the first major war into which cyber has been extensively woven, we do know enough to be able to generate some tentative, high-level, generic propositions on the nature of cyber conflict. These propositions draw on wide-ranging press reporting and extrapolate from several superb pieces recently published by my colleagues Jon Bateman, Nick Beecroft, and Gavin Wilde, as well as Microsoft’s recent report on the cyber dynamics of the conflict.1 However, we must still tread cautiously. Our propositions draw on highly imperfect empirical knowledge of a single historical case that is still unfolding.2 Current and future antagonists are also constantly learning from their own and others’ analyses and enhancing their performance, which can render current assessments obsolete.3 For this and other reasons it is quite possible that some of the cyber dynamics unfolding in and around Ukraine may play out differently later in Ukraine as well as in other, future confrontations. As we have observed over millennia, the balance between offense and defense can shift over time; this dynamic may well play out in cyberspace as well. It is also important to note at the outset that widespread assessments disparaging the utility and expediency of Russian cyber operations in the Ukrainian conflict (and projections regarding future conflicts) are presently limited by far more than a lack of comprehensive and reliable empirical data. We also lack insights into the metrics and criteria that each of the protagonists uses to assess the success and failure of cyber’s overall performance in the conflict, and we have only fragmentary evidence of the role each party expected cyber operations to perform. Moreover, even if we had such information, Ukraine-specific answers might not apply elsewhere because the expectations for cyber and the metrics for assessing its performance may vary not only over time and between protagonists but also from one conflict to another. In this context it is important to underscore that some specific factors that possibly helped diminish the efficacy of Russia’s offensive cyber operations in Ukraine may not apply elsewhere. Three in particular deserve to be noted here: Russia’s unique approach toward cyber warfare; the level of external support that Ukraine received before and during the war from some leading national and multinational cyber powers; and the sophistication and battle-tested experience of Ukraine’s cyber warriors.4 Nevertheless, even if some of the cyber characteristics of the Ukraine conflict ultimately turn out to be sui generis, they are instructive given the novelty of the field and the involvement of major powers in the conflict. Hence, there is considerable value in advancing these propositions to focus attention on certain questions and facets of cyber conflict, facilitating their review and reassessment as more comprehensive and reliable information becomes available and developments on the battlefield evolve. But the reader should consider the interim observations and propositions offered here as hypotheses employed as a heuristic to encourage debate and invite feedback. All the propositions offered below pertain to our core conception of what cyber warfare is about. Some of the propositions we advance are novel; others reaffirm or refine tentative assertions made before the war. Taken together they suggest a more subdued view of the utility and impact of cyber warfare than was generally found in prewar speculations. More importantly, the Ukraine war reveals that nations diverge significantly in the role and aims they assign to offensive cyber operations as well as the institutional setup and operational modalities they use for conducting them. Most glaringly, the U.S. perspective and approach (emulated in whole or in part by several other Western nations) differs deeply from that of Russia, which makes it reasonable to expect similar divergence across similar regimes. We group our propositions under three temporal headings: the prewar period (starting in 2014);5 the war itself (beginning on February 24, 2022); and finally, the postwar period, after kinetic hostilities eventually die down. Obviously, we cannot know when this last phase will begin; nevertheless, analysis of trends that were manifest in the two earlier phases of the conflict provides a tentative basis for predictions as to what might be expected down the road. This broad scope is driven by two considerations. First, it is designed to underscore the considerable relevance of cyber operations across various phases and types of conflicts. And second, it highlights continuity as well as change between cyber action in peacetime, in wartime, and in grey area situations, as well as during the transitions between these states of confrontation.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Conflict, Non-Traditional Threats, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

16. Industrial policy for electric vehicle supply chains and the US-EU fight over the Inflation Reduction Act

Author:
Chad P. Bown
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
The Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) of 2022 provoked a transatlantic trade spat. After the law was passed, the Biden administration addressed some of the concerns raised by the European Union by writing controversial rules to implement the legislation. These regulations are expected to have complex effects that, in some instances, may offset the intended impact of other provisions in the original legislation. This paper examines how the law, its implementing regulations, policy decisions on leasing, as well as potential critical minerals agreements all have the potential to affect the electric vehicle (EV) supply chain. The EV case study showcases the political-economic complications involved in US and EU attempts to cooperate over clean energy transition policy to address the global externality of carbon dioxide emissions. EVs are but one example of the challenge facing partners with integrated supply chains and similar levels of economic development that share concerns about climate change, rising inequality, workers, other social issues, and democracy itself. The EV conflict laid bare the differing US and EU prioritization of these issues relative to economic efficiency, World Trade Organization rules, the approach to nonmarket economies, and national security vulnerabilities that arise from depending on an authoritarian regime such as China for import sourcing of critical inputs.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Supply Chains, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

17. US strategy and force posture for an era of nuclear tripolarity

Author:
Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The term “nuclear tripolarity” describes a world in which China has joined the United States and Russia as a leading nuclear power. As China modernizes its existing nuclear forces and deploys new weapons, it is on track to roughly double its deployed nuclear arsenal in the next few years—from approximately 350 to 700 deliverable warheads. The US Department of Defense projects that China will go further, expanding its arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035.1 At those force levels, China’s arsenal would be comparable to US and Russian deployed nuclear forces, currently capped at 1,550 by the New START Treaty.2 What are the consequences of emerging tripolarity for US nuclear strategy and force posture? If the United States retains its current approach to nuclear force planning, the growth of China’s arsenal (and the ongoing modernization of Russia’s nuclear weapons) will likely compel the United States to significantly increase its own arsenal. The easiest way to do so would be to upload one to two thousand additional warheads from US reserves onto existing delivery systems when the New START treaty expires in 2026. Unfortunately, a major increase in US forces would likely mark just another step in an intensifying arms competition among the three leading nuclear powers, since China and Russia would then feel pressure to respond.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. The NewSpace market: Capital, control, and commercialization

Author:
Robert Murray
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Commercial opportunities in space-based technologies are expanding rapidly. From satellite communications and Earth observation to space tourism and asteroid mining, the potential for businesses to capitalize on these emerging technologies is vast and known as “NewSpace.”1 The NewSpace model is important for governments to understand because the dual-use nature of space, specifically its growing commercialization, will influence the types of space-based technologies that nations may leverage, and consequently, impact their national security paradigms. By capitalizing on the private sector’s agility and combining it with the essential research efforts and customer role played by the public sector, the NewSpace industry can play a critical function in addressing current and future national security challenges through public-private codevelopment. As the NewSpace industry expands, the role of government is evolving from being the primary developer and operator of space assets to facilitating their commercialization, while still prioritizing key advancements. US and allied governments can capitalize on this competitive landscape by strategically investing in areas that align with their national security objectives. However, it is crucial for them to first understand and adapt to their changing roles within this dynamic environment. Indeed, the benefits of the burgeoning NewSpace industry extend beyond the United States. International collaboration and competition in this area can lead to faster technological advancements and economic gains. The global NewSpace landscape is driving down costs, increasing access to space, and fostering innovation that can improve not only economic well-being, but also impact national security models. To that end, this memo will examine the broad state of the space market, discuss the industry drivers, and propose recommendations for US and allied policymakers as they consider future government investments in those enabling space-based activities that support wider national security ambitions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Trade and Finance, National Security, Science and Technology, European Union, Space, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Canada, Asia, and United States of America

19. United States–China semiconductor standoff: A supply chain under stress

Author:
Jeremy Mark and Dexter Tiff Roberts
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In August 2022, the US Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, a law that approves subsidies and tax breaks to help jump-start the renewed production on American soil of advanced semiconductors.1 Just two months later, the Joe Biden administration issued wide-ranging restrictions on the export to China of chips and chip-making technology to undercut that country’s ability to manufacture the same class of integrated circuits.2 Taken together with a steady stream of Biden administration prohibitions on technology sales to key Chinese companies, the US initiatives represent a profound turn toward competition with China in the high-tech realm.3 They also highlight an effort to restructure the complex, multinational supply chains centered on East Asia that manufacture hundreds of billions of dollars of semiconductors a year. As such, the Biden administration has set in motion a process that could alter the business strategies—and fortunes—of homegrown and foreign-invested semiconductor companies based in China, world-leading chipmakers in Taiwan and South Korea, and suppliers around the world that provide the industry with the machinery and myriad inputs that fuel chip production. The Biden administration insists that its restrictions on sales to China are intended only to limit China’s ability to produce the cutting-edge chips that can feed into the development of weapons and other strategically important technologies—and not to cripple its semiconductor industry. But the current state of play of sanctions and support for US-based semiconductor production, including by Taiwanese and Korean chipmakers, is not the endpoint in this process. Rather, the momentum to constrain Beijing’s semiconductor program is likely to continue in the coming months, at the very least with additional restrictions on Chinese companies and government-linked entities, and unprecedented bureaucratic scrutiny of American venture-capital and equity-financing flows to China. That amounts to more bad news for corporate leaders in Asia, North America, and Europe who have spent the past generation building a globe-spanning semiconductor industry that has faced few barriers to expansion. As US restrictions mount, and sales of certain technologies to China flag, the once-unimaginable process of reorienting semiconductor supply chains will become an ever-present reality. The CHIPS and Science Act already is becoming an important factor in corporate strategy, providing incentives for Taiwanese, Korean, and American companies to make big bets on new factories in places like New York, Ohio, Texas, and Arizona—witness Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC’s) recent decision to build a second factory in Phoenix.4 This paper explores the potential implications of US semiconductor policy for the global semiconductor supply chains and the competition for primacy in an industry that is constantly changing the face of the global economy and one that has implications for global security in all its dimensions. It begins by examining the policies put in place by the Biden administration, and then discusses the changes taking place across the industry, with a focus on Asia.
Topic:
Economy, Business, Supply Chains, Semiconductors, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

20. West and China Compete for Tech Influence in Arab Persian Gulf States

Author:
Sara Nowacka
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
New technologies are an increasingly important element of the Sino-American rivalry in the Persian Gulf. China has become the preferred partner in this area due to, for example, the dominant role of government (vs. private) investment in the technology sector in both China and the Gulf states. The intensification of cooperation between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and China in the field of new technologies may increase the influence of authoritarian states in setting technological standards.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Investment, Rivalry, and Gulf Cooperation Council
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, United States of America, and Gulf Nations