Number of results to display per page
Search Results
2. The US's tougher stance on multilateral formats
- Author:
- Szymon Zaręba
- Publication Date:
- 03-2027
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
- Abstract:
- The administration of US President Donald Trump will seek to exert greater influence over processes within the UN, whilst reducing its involvement in the activities of several international organisations (IOs) which it considers less important. The reduction in funding for various formats will increase pressure on Poland and like-minded states to increase their contributions towards their maintenance.
- Topic:
- International Organization, United Nations, Multilateralism, and Donald Trump
- Political Geography:
- Poland, North America, and United States of America
3. The Ukraine War Prospect: How Peace Plans Might Work and Why They Will Fail
- Author:
- Carl Conetta
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- During 2025 multiple contending Ukraine peace and cease-fire proposals were put forward by the Trump administration and America’s European partners. This article examines how the leading official proposals fell short. And it presents two, simpler proposals better aligned with battlefield realities. The article also explores the evolution of US, Ukrainian, Russian, and West European public opinion on the war. The Russia-Ukraine war has been a disaster – not only for the two principal combatants, who together have suffered 300,000 deaths, but for the entire world. This fact drives the imperative to end this conflict forthwith via negotiated compromise. Yet, as the article shows, none of the official proposals embrace this imperative. Instead, all exhibit efforts to win advantage for one side or the other. They are instances of diplo-fare – war by means of diplomacy. As such, their aim may be rejection not agreement, with an eye toward painting one’s opponent as intransigent and, in this way, build support for continuing the fight – or, in the case of President Trump’s preference, establish a pretext for US withdrawal. The simplest proposals may be the most practicable but these must reflect current battlefield realities rather than attempting to “correct” or “re-balance” them. This principle guides the independent cease-fire options suggested in this article. Otherwise, the article explores the possibility that Europe’s so-called Coalition of the Willing will respond to any serious fracture of Kyiv’s effort – a distinct possibility – by establishing a new nuclearized Europe-vs-Russia “central front” inside Ukraine. (With an Appendix summarizing the official November and December peace proposal texts.)
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, European Union, Negotiation, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and NATO
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
4. Russia Leverages Venezuela to Expand Influence in Western Hemisphere
- Author:
- Sergey Sukhankin
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Moscow has condemned the U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro while avoiding substantive retaliation, demonstrating both symbolic solidarity and an unwillingness to jeopardize relations with Washington. The Kremlin’s relationship with Venezuela enables Moscow to project power beyond Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, access Venezuela’s oil reserves, and cultivate an alliance aligned with an anti-Western agenda. Russian energy firms have gained oil stakes and repayment-in-kind options for investments in Venezuela, while joint financial ventures and Venezuela’s crypto experiments have served as testing grounds for sanctions-evasion mechanisms later adapted by Russia. Arms transfers, military-industrial collaboration, and media partnerships through RT, Sputnik, and TeleSur expanded Russia’s military footprint and narrative reach in the Western Hemisphere, though the financial return on Russian investments remains limited and challenged by U.S. pushback.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Oil, Bilateral Relations, and Power Projection
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, South America, Venezuela, and United States of America
5. Irán entre protestas y geopolítica
- Author:
- Xavier Villar
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Fundación Alternativas
- Abstract:
- Análisis de las protestas en Irán surgidas en un contexto de fuerte inflación y depreciación del rial —que perdió cerca de la mitad de su valor frente al dólar en 2025— y que, tras iniciarse como una movilización de carácter económico encabezada por comerciantes y pequeños empresarios, derivaron rápidamente en expresiones de descontento político más amplio. Aunque las manifestaciones se han extendido a numerosas ciudades y han adquirido una notable visibilidad social, su escala y composición difieren de ciclos previos, como los de 2009 o 2019, y hasta ahora no se han producido deserciones significativas en las fuerzas de seguridad que permitan hablar de un cambio de régimen inminente. El artículo subraya además las dificultades para verificar cifras de víctimas debido al bloqueo informativo, matiza la idea de un rechazo político unánime al régimen y sitúa las protestas en un marco político-estratégico más amplio, marcado por la posición geográfica de Irán, sus recursos energéticos y la competencia internacional entre Estados Unidos y China.
- Topic:
- Regime Change, Sanctions, Economy, Protests, Inflation, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America
6. Law and Politics of Israel and the United States’ Attacks on Iran with Maryam Jamshidi (Episode 54)
- Author:
- Sahar Aziz and Maryam Jamshidi
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
- Abstract:
- Join host Professor Sahar Aziz (https://www.law.rutgers.edu/bio/sa1356) in her conversation with Professor Maryam Jamshidi (https://www.colorado.edu/law/node/125...) about the political and legal implications of Israel and the United States' unprovoked military attacks against Iran on February 28, 2026. As Israeli Benjamin Netanyahu publicly admitted, the Israeli government has been preparing for a war to topple the Iranian regime for over 30 years. (https://www.lemonde.fr/en/internation...) Knowing they do not possess sufficient military capacity to do it alone, Israel unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the United States to start a war of aggression against Iran under the Bush, Obama and Biden administrations. The reasons for restraint by past US administration were often the same. Iran posed no direct threat or conducted an imminent attack toward the US that legally justified an offensive war of aggression. The risk of a global economic downfall and the exorbitant price tag of a major war far outweighed the benefits of removing a hostile government. And perhaps most importantly from a military perspective, the United States had no exit strategy. Indeed, these were the same reasons that led to the Democratic Party winning the White House in 2008 after expensive and endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after 2001. Republican politicians campaigned on an America First platform in the 2021 elections by explicitly rejecting wars of choice in the Middle East that cost American lives and treasure. And yet, Republican President Donald Trump violated that promise to his constituents and granted Israel its 30-year dream to start an offensive war on Iran despite no credible evidence of an imminent threat by Iran. The result has been predictably catastrophic for the Middle East and the global economy. The war has engulfed the Gulf states, the Strait of Hormuz is closed to the 20% of global supply of oil and natural gas, energy prices are skyrocketing across the world, Tehran is being bombarded daily by Israel, over 1300 Iranians have been killed thus far, and the war is costing American taxpayers $1 billion per day.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Aggression, and Global Economy
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America
7. Beyond the Hype: Assessing Hyperscaler Nuclear Commitments Against U.S. Energy Realities
- Author:
- John Pendleton and Mackenzie Schuessler
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Electricity demand is rising rapidly, along with growing enthusiasm for nuclear power. In addition to climate concerns and the desire for secure energy, these needs are driven in large part by the planned expansion of data centers for artificial intelligence and cloud computing. The United States is home to the world’s largest data center market and the leading global cloud service providers, including Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Meta (Facebook), and Microsoft. These firms—or “hyperscalers”—design, build, and operate massive data center facilities that support skyrocketing AI demands, but require large amounts of firm, scalable, and always-available power. This puts new pressure on electricity grids already facing capacity, reliability, and affordability challenges. As technology companies pursue aggressive AI buildouts, they are seeking innovative ways to meet their energy demands. Nuclear power has thus entered the conversation as one of the few energy sources capable of delivering the kind of firm, high-density electricity that data centers need while simultaneously allowing companies to maintain public climate commitments.1 The entry of hyperscalers into a rapidly evolving nuclear energy market introduces new dynamics to what has been a highly regulated and slow-moving industry. Since 2024, a series of high-profile agreements have been announced between hyperscalers and nuclear utilities, vendors, and reactor designers. These deals signal enthusiasm for the sector, but it is still unclear whether big tech is willing to make big bets on nuclear power. This paper explores how large U.S. technology companies are approaching nuclear power in the context of their energy strategies to meet the escalating demands from AI. The first section describes the approaches hyperscalers are using to secure nuclear energy. To date, their efforts reflect their preference to be energy offtakers (customers) over direct nuclear ownership or project development. The second section then assesses why these approaches have remained cautious, considering factors such as priorities, timing, and costs. Additionally, it considers key entanglement risks that big tech will need to confront including potential reputational exposure, nonproliferation concerns, and management of long-term nuclear waste.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
8. Ecological Statecraft in the Midst of War: Water, Regeneration, and the Future of Gulf Security
- Author:
- Olivia Lazard and Ali Bin Shahid
- Publication Date:
- 05-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The 2026 U.S.-Iran war is radiating through the Gulf’s energy systems, maritime routes, supply chains, food corridors, financial flows, and regional diplomacy—and its effects will be long-lasting. In energy markets, the war is accelerating demand toward more autonomous sources like renewables. On food, the world is bracing for a compound crisis: a convergence of disrupted fertilizer supply chains, inflationary pressures, and El Niño–induced crop failures. These are cascading trends that will demand sustained attention for years to come. But one long-tail effect has already slipped out of view. The war has crossed a dangerous threshold: Infrastructure essential to civilian survival, including desalination facilities, has been directly targeted. Water infrastructure is emerging as a strategic target in kinetic warfare against a background of structural scarcity. This marks a qualitative shift in the Gulf’s security landscape. In a region defined by extreme aridity, collapsing groundwater reserves, and deep structural dependence on manufactured water, desalination infrastructure is not merely a technical utility; it is part of the region’s survival architecture. Millions depend on a relatively concentrated set of energy-intensive coastal plants for drinking water, industry, and urban continuity. The exposure of this infrastructure reveals that ecological fragility and military escalation are no longer parallel crises: They are becoming fused within a single battle space.
- Topic:
- Security, Infrastructure, Ecology, Statecraft, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
9. Compounded Vulnerability: Spatial Patterns of Energy Burden, Heat Exposure, and Pollution in New York City
- Author:
- Ximena Aristizabal and Paola Jaimes
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
- Abstract:
- Energy insecurity and climate risk increasingly intersect in urban areas, yet they are often treated as separate challenges. This paper examines how household energy affordability stress, extreme heat exposure, and ambient air pollution overlap across urban space, using New York City as a case study. We introduce the concept of compounded vulnerability to describe neighborhoods where high energy burden and high heat exposure coincide, potentially intensifying environmental and health risks. Drawing on tract-level energy burden estimates, satellite-derived surface temperature measures, and summer PM2.5 concentrations, we combine a place-based interpretation of urban infrastructure and historical disinvestment with a tract-level empirical analysis of co-located risks. We document spatial co-location of economic and environmental stressors: neighborhoods facing higher energy burden are, on average, hotter, and areas experiencing joint exposure to heat and energy stress are also situated in environments characterized by elevated summer pollution. These patterns point to a plausible urban mechanism through which climatic extremes interact with energy systems and the built environment, shaping unequal exposure during periods of peak stress.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Pollution, Vulnerability, Energy Security, and Heat
- Political Geography:
- New York, North America, and United States of America
10. Using Minerals and Energy to Rebuild the U.S.-South Africa Relationship
- Author:
- Gracelin Baskaran
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- The United States is quietly losing access to the minerals that underpin its defense systems, semiconductor manufacturing, and reindustrialization agenda—not through geopolitical confrontation, but through commercial neglect. South Africa is the dominant U.S. supplier of platinum group metals, chromium, manganese, and military-grade vanadium, and no allied nation comes close to matching its combination of mineral wealth, processing capacity, and technical expertise. Yet rising energy costs and crumbling infrastructure are pushing South Africa’s processing sector toward closure, and without intervention, that capacity will continue migrating to China by default. As political tensions between Washington and Pretoria have intensified, it is worth remembering what is actually at stake: a supply relationship built over more than a century that would be extraordinarily costly to lose and nearly impossible to replace.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Trade, Economic Security, Semiconductors, Energy, and Critical Minerals
- Political Geography:
- Africa, South Africa, North America, and United States of America
11. Avoiding a Long War - Objectives and Conditions for the US Attack on Iran
- Author:
- Mateusz Piotrowski
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
- Abstract:
- The American operation in Iran may be prolonged, lasting several months instead of the planned few weeks. The low public support of Americans for intervention and the economic effects of rising oil prices are unlikely to change the US administration’s stance. Difficulties in completely eliminating the threats posed by Iran may prompt Donald Trump to increase military involvement, including the use of special forces or the launch of a ground invasion.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Military Intervention, Armed Conflict, and Energy
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
12. When do voters stop caring? Estimating the shape of voters' utility functions
- Author:
- Aleksandra Conevska and Can Mutlu
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
- Abstract:
- In this paper, we address a longstanding puzzle over the functional form that better approximates voter utility from political choices. Though it has become the norm in the literature to represent voter utility with concave loss functions, for decades scholars have underscored this assumption’s potential shortcomings. Yet there exists little to no evidence to support one functional form assumption over another. We fill this gap by first identifying electoral settings where the different functional forms generate divergent predictions about voter behavior. We then assess which functional form better matches observed voter and abstention behavior using Cast Vote Record (CVR) data that captures the anonymized ballots of millions of voters in the 2020 U.S. general election. Our findings indicate that concave loss functions fail to predict voting and abstention behavior, and it is the reverse S-shaped loss functions, such as the Gaussian function, that better match voter behavior.
- Topic:
- Politics, Voting, and Voting Behavior
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus and United States of America
13. As US food aid retreats, can BRICS+ and biotechnology fill the world’s food security gap?
- Author:
- Cullen S. Hendrix
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
- Abstract:
- Cuts to agricultural development assistance and food aid by the United States and other advanced economies are creating a global vacuum just as climate change and conflict drive global hunger up. Many food-insecure developing economies with significant hunger lack the resources to self-finance agricultural research and development (R&D) and have had to depend increasingly on themselves—and one another—to meet rising food needs. Hendrix argues that the BRICS+ economies—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia—are well positioned to fill the world’s food security gap.
- Topic:
- Agriculture, Markets, Foreign Aid, BRICS, Food Assistance, and Biotechnology
- Political Geography:
- North America, Global Focus, and United States of America
14. Defence innovation and procurement reform: an empirical evaluation of the US Defense Innovation Unit
- Author:
- Ethan Kapstein, Javier Ospital, and Guntram B. Wolff
- Publication Date:
- 05-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- Battlefields are evolving rapidly, with new technologies reshaping military strategy and tactics. Many of the new technologies originate in firms outside the traditional defence sector, rather than with the existing prime contractors. In the United States, the Department of Defense (DoD) created the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) in 2015 to incentivise commercial tech companies to work on national security challenges. How successful has this new unit been in achieving its mission? We provide the first causal evaluation of the DIU’s effects on defence procurement. Using administrative procurement data and a firm-level panel covering 2017-2025, and employing propensity score matching, additional firm-level covariates and a staggered difference-in differences design, we find that the DIU has expanded both the extensive and intensive margins of defence contracting. We find not only a significant increase in the likelihood of receiving a DoD contract because of DIU treatment, but also in the size of the contract. Our findings show that defence innovation organisations can broaden and deepen the defence-supplier base. Governments updating their defence acquisition strategies in response to the lessons from recent conflicts can benefit from reforms that facilitate firm entry into procurement, overcoming the transaction cost and information asymmetry problems typical in defence markets.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Macroeconomics, and Innovation
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
15. Marriage as Insurance: Household Responses to Immigration Policy Uncertainty
- Author:
- Cristian Bonavida
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)
- Abstract:
- This paper examines whether marriage serves as a strategic response to immigration policy uncertainty. We study transitions into marriage among cohabiting binational couples—defined as unions between a U.S. citizen and a noncitizen partner—following the shift in immigration policy expectations during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign and the subsequent tightening of enforcement in 2017. Using ACS data from 2008 to 2019 and a difference-in-differences design, we compare marriage transitions among binational couples to those of homogeneous citizen couples. Immigration policy uncertainty increased marriage rates among binational couples by approximately 1.5–1.8 percentage points, or about 8-10 percent relative to pre-treatment levels. Event-study estimates show no differential pre-trends and indicate that the response began in 2016, prior to the formal reinstatement of Secure Communities. The effect is concentrated among likely unauthorized immigrants and individuals from targeted nationalities. The findings suggest that marriage functioned as a form of legal and economic insurance in response to heightened deportation risk.
- Topic:
- Economics, Marriage, Household, and Immigration Policy
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
16. 'Trade is in our Blood': Momentum Builds in Asia for Expanding Rules-based Economic Cooperation
- Author:
- Jane Mellsop
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- The trade world experienced unprecedented upheaval in 2025, but Asia still sees the rules-based trading system as the strongest foundation for its future. Trade is “in the blood” in Asia, and these countries continue to forge ahead with trade arrangements with multiple partners—so-called plurilateral trade arrangements—to further integrate their economies, provide certainty for businesses, promote innovation, and enhance economic growth. However, it has not been all smooth sailing, particularly at a time when evolving trade policy of the United States is demanding significant attention from all economies. Regional plurilateral agreements, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) with 12 parties and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with 15 parties, have brought benefits to their members; however, to remain relevant, they need to be updated to keep pace with emerging developments. For the CPTPP, this has not been easy given its broad membership with diverse interests that hampers progress toward consensus on ambitious upgrades. Expanding the membership of these agreements or even instituting novel dialogues with other trading blocs as the CPTPP has started with the EU and ASEAN, not only provides opportunities to access new markets and expand integration but also sends an important signal in support of rules-based trade at this critical time. Asia should not be complacent with the trade rules already in place. The region would benefit from harnessing the current moment when countries are focused on diversifying markets and suppliers to pursue new plurilateral cooperation and agreements in specific sectors, or to address specific trade challenges, such as critical minerals, an economic security framework, or green technology. The first two of these in particular are of interest to the current U.S. administration, though Asian countries would also need to consider how China might view any new arrangements. Importantly, countries are more willing now to consider formats other than legally binding comprehensive agreements to support greater economic integration with like-minded partners, such as agreed principles, guidelines, or concrete areas of cooperation to unlock trade and bring benefits to stakeholders, such as the new Future of Investment and Trade Partnership (FITP). While the current global trading context provides impetus for progressing plurilateral initiatives that deepen economic integration among partners, one challenge is the lack of an obvious leader in the region—country or person—to drive such initiatives forward. A group of like-minded countries, such as Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Singapore, could step up and lead the charge in support of increased plurilateral integration and the rules-based system. However, even with the best of intentions, countries will be constrained by their own limited resources for trade negotiations and implementation, while developing countries in particular need capacity building, including from high-quality investments, to make any trade deal successful. This report shares these insights and more from roundtable discussions and interviews with more than 60 experts from both inside and outside government from across Asia and the United States on how like-minded countries can preserve and enhance the rules-based trading system through plurilateral arrangements.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Trade, and Economic Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Asia and United States of America
17. Scam Offensives in Southeast Asia: Comparing Beijing's and Washington's Strategies and Assessing Opportunities for Coordination
- Author:
- Bryanna Entwhistle
- Publication Date:
- 08-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- Disrupting Asia’s cyber scam industry, which is valued at between $88.3 billion and $114.1 billion annually, presents a rare point of mutual interest for the United States and China. Both Chinese and American citizens are both primary targets of complex online fraud schemes run predominantly out of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. To identify where opportunities for cooperation on addressing the issue exist for the United States and China, this paper examines the nature of Beijing's crackdowns on cyber scam operations in Southeast Asia, when Beijing chooses to act, and how. It identifies three core factors driving Chinese action: domestic pressure, reputational damage, and national security concerns. Where these factors converge, as in Myanmar, Beijing has acted swiftly and forcefully. Where reputational pressure collides with countervailing strategic interests, as in Cambodia, Beijing's pressure has been delayed but has grown over time. And where none of the three factors materially apply, as in Laos, Beijing has yet to move against major actors. When Beijing does act, it leverages bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral frameworks to conduct joint operations and intelligence gathering with its Southeast Asian partners. Framed under China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), these mechanisms have broadened the country’s security relationships across the region—although partner states have not always welcomed Beijing's inroads. As Beijing conducted raids against scam centers in Myanmar, the industry began redirecting its targeting toward the West: American losses to China-linked criminal groups grew to $10 billion per year by 2024. Washington has responded with a cross-departmental campaign of sanctions, indictments, asset seizures, and takedowns of scam-enabling online infrastructure. Still, the U.S. response is hampered by limited operational capacity on the ground in Southeast Asia and the "whack-a-mole" nature of the industry. Concerns about China’s GSI expansion, intelligence sharing sensitivities, host-state political economies, and Beijing’s treatment of trafficked workers are substantial obstacles that stand in the way of U.S.-China cooperation on this issue. Still, bounded cooperation has the potential to serve the interests of both Beijing and Washington. There appears to be recognition of this on the ministerial level: FBI Director Kash Patel has traveled to Beijing twice in the past year to discuss expanding coordination on tackling cyber scams with China, alongside several other forms of transnational crime. In April, the United States, China, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates organized a joint raid on scam centers in Dubai; however, misaligned incentives and strategic distrust have thus far stood in the way of further law enforcement coordination between Beijing and Washington. In support of future law enforcement coordination between China and the United States that takes into account existing obstacles rather than ignoring them, this paper draws on an understanding of Beijing’s cyber scam offensive in Southeast Asia to propose the following recommendations for how Washington could pursue tactical and bounded coordination on the issue: Push for leader-to-leader engagement, drawing on lessons from the fentanyl negotiations; Utilize third countries to mediate and coordinate joint raids and intelligence sharing; Approach Beijing with intelligence-backed asks; Leverage existing channels to facilitate financial intelligence sharing; and Continue using sanctions and indictments to incentivize Beijing to recall key actors.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Law Enforcement, Fraud, Intelligence Sharing, and Scam Centers
- Political Geography:
- China, Cambodia, Southeast Asia, Laos, Myanmar, and United States of America
18. Beyond the Biotech Race — Right-Sizing U.S.-China Competition in a Human-Centered Industry
- Author:
- Jing Qian, Lizzi C. Lee, and Chris Li
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- U.S.-China biotech competition is often framed as a linear, zero-sum race at the technological frontier. A more accurate framework is asymmetric convergence. Biotechnology is not a single chokepoint technology like semiconductors but rather constitutes a multi-layered biomedical ecosystem spanning basic science, translational research, clinical trials, manufacturing, regulatory review, commercialization, data governance, and healthcare delivery. The United States and China are increasingly competing across the same ecosystem, but with different strengths at different layers of the value chain. The United States retains enduring structural advantages, but they require renewal. U.S. leadership remains strongest in foundational science, first-in-class discovery, academic medical centers, venture-backed translational research, deep capital markets, FDA credibility, global standard-setting, and the ability to attract and retain world-class scientific talent. These advantages have long made the United States the orchestrator of frontier biomedical innovation. But they are not self-sustaining. Funding instability, pressure on universities, uncertainty around regulatory capacity, and disruptive and overly restrictive immigration policies could weaken the talent and discovery engine that has historically powered American biotech leadership. China’s biotech rise is no longer simply a story of catch-up or imitation. China has become a systemic peer competitor in several operational domains, including research scale, clinical trial execution, biological manufacturing, asset formation, regional biotech clustering, and global out-licensing. Its strengths are most pronounced where biotechnology functions as an industrial and engineering system: scaling research output, executing trials quickly, mobilizing capital, integrating hospitals and manufacturing, and generating licensable assets at speed. China’s convergence is structural and likely to outlast any fixed policy window. Beijing’s progress is not merely the result of temporary subsidies or isolated breakthroughs. It reflects years of institutional adaptation, talent recruitment, regulatory reform, capital mobilization, data mercantilism, IP capture, and participation in global biomedical networks. Because these capabilities are embedded across multiple layers of the biotech value chain, they are unlikely to be reversed by any single policy tool or short-term action. Biotech should not be treated as exactly analogous to semiconductors. Export controls and “protect” and “restrict” measures may be necessary in specific areas involving sensitive data, dual-use capabilities, supply-chain vulnerabilities, or modalities of national security concern. But broad, undifferentiated restrictions in biotech risk weakening U.S. competitiveness, reducing visibility into global biomedical developments, disrupting supply chains, and slowing innovation in areas where patient outcomes are directly at stake. The United States needs an affirmative, layer-specific strategy. A more effective approach should distinguish among the different layers of the biotech ecosystem: preserve openness in basic science where it underpins U.S. leadership; apply targeted guardrails where national security risks are real; strengthen domestic capacity in biomanufacturing, translational research, and supply-chain resilience; lead in regulatory and data-governance standards; and maintain U.S. influence in global biomedical networks. Competition with China should be used as a catalyst to upgrade the U.S. biotech system. The central U.S. challenge is not only how to restrict China where risks are genuine, but how to compete from a position of renewed strength. This means reinvigorating NIH and NSF funding for basic science, improving translational efficiency, expanding biomanufacturing capacity, supporting clinical trial modernization, strengthening regulatory agility, and preserving America’s ability to attract global talent. Health and medicine remain among the few domains where bounded, de-risked cooperation is still strategically viable. Shared disease burdens, asymmetric capabilities, patient needs, and the humanitarian nature of biomedical innovation create conditions for narrow cooperation that few other sectors can match. Cancer, rare diseases, mental health, chronic illness, aging, pandemic preparedness, antimicrobial resistance, and ethical governance are systemic challenges that do not stop at national borders. A realistic cooperation agenda should be narrow, practical, and subject to clear guardrails. Potential areas include disease-specific clinical trial corridors, rare disease research, oncology pilots, mental health as a shared public health challenge, affordability and access, regulatory learning, and practical training in healthcare delivery and regulatory science. These channels should avoid unrestricted data sharing or sensitive technology transfer and instead focus on privacy protection standards, patient safety, implementation capacity, and measurable health outcomes. The central policy question is not whether the United States should compete with China in biotechnology. It must. The question is how to right-size that competition. A sound strategy should protect national security where risks are real, preserve U.S. scientific and industrial leadership where advantages remain decisive, invest in domestic capacity where vulnerabilities exist, and sustain carefully bounded cooperation where it serves American interests and improves human health.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Public Health, Strategic Competition, Medicine, Biotechnology, and Science and Technology
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
19. An Overview of U.S.-China Life Sciences Competition and Cooperation
- Author:
- Brendan Kelly and Craig Allen
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- After gaining attention in 2025, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and the broader life sciences sector are moving to the fore of U.S.-China economic and technology competition in 2026. The sector encapsulates all the myriad challenges and opportunities in the U.S.-China bilateral economic relationship, while also serving as a key test case for the Trump administration’s efforts to pursue a more balanced — and transactional — approach with China. Issues involved in the life sciences sector are wide-ranging: serious national security concerns (as biotechnology intersects with advanced AI tools) along with supply chain vulnerabilities, market access barriers for foreign products in China’s domestic market, cross-border data sharing challenges, increasing U.S.-China competition at the leading edge of technology, and growing concerns that the United States could lose its global share in a key sector it has traditionally dominated to Chinese firms benefitting from industrial policies and state support. Yet, despite these tensions, biopharma is one of the few areas in which U.S.-China linkages are growing. A surge of licensing deals over the past few years has cemented cooperation between U.S. pharmaceutical firms and Chinese biotechnology companies that are trialing Chinese-developed compounds in the U.S. market. At the same time, China has made rapid technological advances in the biotech sector, providing both new opportunities and a competitive threat for U.S. firms. Following intensifying U.S.-China competition and decoupling in semiconductors, the risk of a bifurcation of life sciences industry is nonetheless growing. In January 2025, the United States imposed its first export controls largely focused on China’s biotech threat. In December 2025, after two years of congressional deliberation, the BIOSECURE Act was passed into law, imposing phased-in restrictions intended to lessen supply chain reliance of U.S. biopharma firms on Chinese contract development and manufacturing organizations (CDMOs). On April 8, 2025, the Department of Justice announced data regulations that have materially tightened the rules governing the transfer of U.S.-origin clinical trial and genomic data to China. Finally, Members of Congress and advisory groups are also pushing to include the biotech sector in the U.S. outbound investment control regime. As with most U.S.-China economic issues, the commercial tensions also come back to China’s macro and trade imbalances — particularly its heavy focus on production and less on consumption, or in this case, the provision of healthcare to its own citizens. China’s imbalanced approach and discriminatory policies — seeking to expand access to global markets while limiting access for foreign firms in its own market — risk reinforcing decoupling if China does not reciprocate by extending the benefits of more open bilateral trade and investment. Often missing from discussions around biotechnology competition, however, is a focus on the obstacles to fairer competition for U.S. firms and products in the Chinese market. According to the U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC) 2025 Export Report, pharmaceuticals are the fourth largest U.S. export to China, growing rapidly until 2023 but declining since then. U.S. medical equipment exports to China also grew strongly, before stagnating the past few years. Together, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment account for roughly 10% of U.S. exports to China, with further potential if they were not held back by discriminatory measures and market access challenges. Notably, while most trade frictions focus on China’s surging exports, the European Union in 2025 completed a landmark investigation and found broad discrimination against foreign medical devices in China’s domestic market, leading the EU to limit China’s access to the EU’s procurement market in response. For U.S. stakeholders, the focus on supply chain vulnerability and heavy reliance on China is understandable — biotechnology’s dependence on complex global inputs and specialized manufacturing capacity makes reliance on China particularly acute, with recent disruptions in critical minerals supplies from China underscoring this risk. However, in seeking to win the “competition” in biotechnology, too little focus has been placed on finding the right balance for the United States to maximize benefits from commercial and scientific engagement with China in this field, while mitigating excessive supply chain reliance on China. With patient health outcomes — and potential access to future life-saving or life-improving drugs — at stake, finding the right balance in life sciences competition with China is more complex and arguably more pivotal than in other areas of advanced technology rivalry. This calls for a robust discussion in policy circles, publicly and bilaterally, to find the correct balance. Failure to do so risks damaging U.S. interests. At the same time, China similarly risks undermining its own interests — including China’s own access to global markets and technology — it does not allow more reciprocal sharing of the benefits of life sciences cooperation.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, National Security, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, Biotechnology, Economic Security, and Life Sciences
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
20. Russia–North Korea Military Cooperation in Response to China’s Tactical Ambiguity
- Author:
- Sungmin Cho
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- The alignment among China, North Korea, and Russia has emerged as one of the most consequential developments in contemporary international security. Russia and North Korea have significantly deepened their military cooperation, while China has adopted a more ambiguous stance toward these developments. North Korea has deployed at least 12,000 troops to support Russian forces in Ukraine and supplied large quantities of artillery rounds, rockets, and ballistic missiles, including ammunition of various calibers.1 When asked about these developments, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that Russia and North Korea “are two independent sovereign states, and how they develop their bilateral relations is a matter for themselves.”2 Some Western analysts interpret this position as evidence that Beijing is uneasy about Russia and North Korea’s deepening military ties and therefore refrains from openly endorsing closer military cooperation between the two — an indication of potential fissures within the China–North Korea–Russia triangle. This report offers a different interpretation. Rather than viewing China’s ambiguity as evidence of fragmentation, it argues that deepening Russia–North Korea military cooperation stems in part from their own distrust of Beijing in the first place. Available evidence suggests that Pyongyang may have regarded China’s economic support as insufficient, while Moscow likely viewed Beijing’s reluctance to provide direct military assistance — along with its parallel efforts to stabilize relations with the United States and its allies for economic reasons — with unease. From the perspectives of Russia and North Korea, the most reliable strategy for keeping China closely aligned is to first deepen their own bilateral cooperation. Doing so increases Beijing’s concern about potential exclusion from strategic coordination while also intensifying U.S. and allied military cooperation. Together, these dynamics may push China toward closer alignment with Moscow and Pyongyang. This dynamic represents a structural dilemma in China’s strategy. On the one hand, Beijing demonstrates strategic clarity in opposing Western pressure alongside Russia and North Korea. On the other hand, it maintains tactical ambiguity to avoid being drawn directly into the conflicts that Moscow and Pyongyang face with the West.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, International Security, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Ambiguity, and Military Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America