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2. The US's tougher stance on multilateral formats
- Author:
- Szymon Zaręba
- Publication Date:
- 03-2027
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
- Abstract:
- The administration of US President Donald Trump will seek to exert greater influence over processes within the UN, whilst reducing its involvement in the activities of several international organisations (IOs) which it considers less important. The reduction in funding for various formats will increase pressure on Poland and like-minded states to increase their contributions towards their maintenance.
- Topic:
- International Organization, United Nations, Multilateralism, and Donald Trump
- Political Geography:
- Poland, North America, and United States of America
3. The Ukraine War Prospect: How Peace Plans Might Work and Why They Will Fail
- Author:
- Carl Conetta
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Project on Defense Alternatives
- Abstract:
- During 2025 multiple contending Ukraine peace and cease-fire proposals were put forward by the Trump administration and America’s European partners. This article examines how the leading official proposals fell short. And it presents two, simpler proposals better aligned with battlefield realities. The article also explores the evolution of US, Ukrainian, Russian, and West European public opinion on the war. The Russia-Ukraine war has been a disaster – not only for the two principal combatants, who together have suffered 300,000 deaths, but for the entire world. This fact drives the imperative to end this conflict forthwith via negotiated compromise. Yet, as the article shows, none of the official proposals embrace this imperative. Instead, all exhibit efforts to win advantage for one side or the other. They are instances of diplo-fare – war by means of diplomacy. As such, their aim may be rejection not agreement, with an eye toward painting one’s opponent as intransigent and, in this way, build support for continuing the fight – or, in the case of President Trump’s preference, establish a pretext for US withdrawal. The simplest proposals may be the most practicable but these must reflect current battlefield realities rather than attempting to “correct” or “re-balance” them. This principle guides the independent cease-fire options suggested in this article. Otherwise, the article explores the possibility that Europe’s so-called Coalition of the Willing will respond to any serious fracture of Kyiv’s effort – a distinct possibility – by establishing a new nuclearized Europe-vs-Russia “central front” inside Ukraine. (With an Appendix summarizing the official November and December peace proposal texts.)
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, European Union, Negotiation, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and NATO
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
4. Russia Leverages Venezuela to Expand Influence in Western Hemisphere
- Author:
- Sergey Sukhankin
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- Moscow has condemned the U.S. capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro while avoiding substantive retaliation, demonstrating both symbolic solidarity and an unwillingness to jeopardize relations with Washington. The Kremlin’s relationship with Venezuela enables Moscow to project power beyond Cuba in the Western Hemisphere, access Venezuela’s oil reserves, and cultivate an alliance aligned with an anti-Western agenda. Russian energy firms have gained oil stakes and repayment-in-kind options for investments in Venezuela, while joint financial ventures and Venezuela’s crypto experiments have served as testing grounds for sanctions-evasion mechanisms later adapted by Russia. Arms transfers, military-industrial collaboration, and media partnerships through RT, Sputnik, and TeleSur expanded Russia’s military footprint and narrative reach in the Western Hemisphere, though the financial return on Russian investments remains limited and challenged by U.S. pushback.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Oil, Bilateral Relations, and Power Projection
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, South America, Venezuela, and United States of America
5. Irán entre protestas y geopolítica
- Author:
- Xavier Villar
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Fundación Alternativas
- Abstract:
- Análisis de las protestas en Irán surgidas en un contexto de fuerte inflación y depreciación del rial —que perdió cerca de la mitad de su valor frente al dólar en 2025— y que, tras iniciarse como una movilización de carácter económico encabezada por comerciantes y pequeños empresarios, derivaron rápidamente en expresiones de descontento político más amplio. Aunque las manifestaciones se han extendido a numerosas ciudades y han adquirido una notable visibilidad social, su escala y composición difieren de ciclos previos, como los de 2009 o 2019, y hasta ahora no se han producido deserciones significativas en las fuerzas de seguridad que permitan hablar de un cambio de régimen inminente. El artículo subraya además las dificultades para verificar cifras de víctimas debido al bloqueo informativo, matiza la idea de un rechazo político unánime al régimen y sitúa las protestas en un marco político-estratégico más amplio, marcado por la posición geográfica de Irán, sus recursos energéticos y la competencia internacional entre Estados Unidos y China.
- Topic:
- Regime Change, Sanctions, Economy, Protests, Inflation, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America
6. Law and Politics of Israel and the United States’ Attacks on Iran with Maryam Jamshidi (Episode 54)
- Author:
- Sahar Aziz and Maryam Jamshidi
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
- Abstract:
- Join host Professor Sahar Aziz (https://www.law.rutgers.edu/bio/sa1356) in her conversation with Professor Maryam Jamshidi (https://www.colorado.edu/law/node/125...) about the political and legal implications of Israel and the United States' unprovoked military attacks against Iran on February 28, 2026. As Israeli Benjamin Netanyahu publicly admitted, the Israeli government has been preparing for a war to topple the Iranian regime for over 30 years. (https://www.lemonde.fr/en/internation...) Knowing they do not possess sufficient military capacity to do it alone, Israel unsuccessfully attempted to persuade the United States to start a war of aggression against Iran under the Bush, Obama and Biden administrations. The reasons for restraint by past US administration were often the same. Iran posed no direct threat or conducted an imminent attack toward the US that legally justified an offensive war of aggression. The risk of a global economic downfall and the exorbitant price tag of a major war far outweighed the benefits of removing a hostile government. And perhaps most importantly from a military perspective, the United States had no exit strategy. Indeed, these were the same reasons that led to the Democratic Party winning the White House in 2008 after expensive and endless wars in Iraq and Afghanistan after 2001. Republican politicians campaigned on an America First platform in the 2021 elections by explicitly rejecting wars of choice in the Middle East that cost American lives and treasure. And yet, Republican President Donald Trump violated that promise to his constituents and granted Israel its 30-year dream to start an offensive war on Iran despite no credible evidence of an imminent threat by Iran. The result has been predictably catastrophic for the Middle East and the global economy. The war has engulfed the Gulf states, the Strait of Hormuz is closed to the 20% of global supply of oil and natural gas, energy prices are skyrocketing across the world, Tehran is being bombarded daily by Israel, over 1300 Iranians have been killed thus far, and the war is costing American taxpayers $1 billion per day.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Aggression, and Global Economy
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, North America, and United States of America
7. Beyond the Hype: Assessing Hyperscaler Nuclear Commitments Against U.S. Energy Realities
- Author:
- John Pendleton and Mackenzie Schuessler
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Electricity demand is rising rapidly, along with growing enthusiasm for nuclear power. In addition to climate concerns and the desire for secure energy, these needs are driven in large part by the planned expansion of data centers for artificial intelligence and cloud computing. The United States is home to the world’s largest data center market and the leading global cloud service providers, including Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Meta (Facebook), and Microsoft. These firms—or “hyperscalers”—design, build, and operate massive data center facilities that support skyrocketing AI demands, but require large amounts of firm, scalable, and always-available power. This puts new pressure on electricity grids already facing capacity, reliability, and affordability challenges. As technology companies pursue aggressive AI buildouts, they are seeking innovative ways to meet their energy demands. Nuclear power has thus entered the conversation as one of the few energy sources capable of delivering the kind of firm, high-density electricity that data centers need while simultaneously allowing companies to maintain public climate commitments.1 The entry of hyperscalers into a rapidly evolving nuclear energy market introduces new dynamics to what has been a highly regulated and slow-moving industry. Since 2024, a series of high-profile agreements have been announced between hyperscalers and nuclear utilities, vendors, and reactor designers. These deals signal enthusiasm for the sector, but it is still unclear whether big tech is willing to make big bets on nuclear power. This paper explores how large U.S. technology companies are approaching nuclear power in the context of their energy strategies to meet the escalating demands from AI. The first section describes the approaches hyperscalers are using to secure nuclear energy. To date, their efforts reflect their preference to be energy offtakers (customers) over direct nuclear ownership or project development. The second section then assesses why these approaches have remained cautious, considering factors such as priorities, timing, and costs. Additionally, it considers key entanglement risks that big tech will need to confront including potential reputational exposure, nonproliferation concerns, and management of long-term nuclear waste.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
8. Ecological Statecraft in the Midst of War: Water, Regeneration, and the Future of Gulf Security
- Author:
- Olivia Lazard and Ali Bin Shahid
- Publication Date:
- 05-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The 2026 U.S.-Iran war is radiating through the Gulf’s energy systems, maritime routes, supply chains, food corridors, financial flows, and regional diplomacy—and its effects will be long-lasting. In energy markets, the war is accelerating demand toward more autonomous sources like renewables. On food, the world is bracing for a compound crisis: a convergence of disrupted fertilizer supply chains, inflationary pressures, and El Niño–induced crop failures. These are cascading trends that will demand sustained attention for years to come. But one long-tail effect has already slipped out of view. The war has crossed a dangerous threshold: Infrastructure essential to civilian survival, including desalination facilities, has been directly targeted. Water infrastructure is emerging as a strategic target in kinetic warfare against a background of structural scarcity. This marks a qualitative shift in the Gulf’s security landscape. In a region defined by extreme aridity, collapsing groundwater reserves, and deep structural dependence on manufactured water, desalination infrastructure is not merely a technical utility; it is part of the region’s survival architecture. Millions depend on a relatively concentrated set of energy-intensive coastal plants for drinking water, industry, and urban continuity. The exposure of this infrastructure reveals that ecological fragility and military escalation are no longer parallel crises: They are becoming fused within a single battle space.
- Topic:
- Security, Infrastructure, Ecology, Statecraft, and Regional Security
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
9. Compounded Vulnerability: Spatial Patterns of Energy Burden, Heat Exposure, and Pollution in New York City
- Author:
- Ximena Aristizabal and Paola Jaimes
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
- Abstract:
- Energy insecurity and climate risk increasingly intersect in urban areas, yet they are often treated as separate challenges. This paper examines how household energy affordability stress, extreme heat exposure, and ambient air pollution overlap across urban space, using New York City as a case study. We introduce the concept of compounded vulnerability to describe neighborhoods where high energy burden and high heat exposure coincide, potentially intensifying environmental and health risks. Drawing on tract-level energy burden estimates, satellite-derived surface temperature measures, and summer PM2.5 concentrations, we combine a place-based interpretation of urban infrastructure and historical disinvestment with a tract-level empirical analysis of co-located risks. We document spatial co-location of economic and environmental stressors: neighborhoods facing higher energy burden are, on average, hotter, and areas experiencing joint exposure to heat and energy stress are also situated in environments characterized by elevated summer pollution. These patterns point to a plausible urban mechanism through which climatic extremes interact with energy systems and the built environment, shaping unequal exposure during periods of peak stress.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Pollution, Vulnerability, Energy Security, and Heat
- Political Geography:
- New York, North America, and United States of America
10. Using Minerals and Energy to Rebuild the U.S.-South Africa Relationship
- Author:
- Gracelin Baskaran
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- The United States is quietly losing access to the minerals that underpin its defense systems, semiconductor manufacturing, and reindustrialization agenda—not through geopolitical confrontation, but through commercial neglect. South Africa is the dominant U.S. supplier of platinum group metals, chromium, manganese, and military-grade vanadium, and no allied nation comes close to matching its combination of mineral wealth, processing capacity, and technical expertise. Yet rising energy costs and crumbling infrastructure are pushing South Africa’s processing sector toward closure, and without intervention, that capacity will continue migrating to China by default. As political tensions between Washington and Pretoria have intensified, it is worth remembering what is actually at stake: a supply relationship built over more than a century that would be extraordinarily costly to lose and nearly impossible to replace.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Trade, Economic Security, Semiconductors, Energy, and Critical Minerals
- Political Geography:
- Africa, South Africa, North America, and United States of America
11. Avoiding a Long War - Objectives and Conditions for the US Attack on Iran
- Author:
- Mateusz Piotrowski
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM)
- Abstract:
- The American operation in Iran may be prolonged, lasting several months instead of the planned few weeks. The low public support of Americans for intervention and the economic effects of rising oil prices are unlikely to change the US administration’s stance. Difficulties in completely eliminating the threats posed by Iran may prompt Donald Trump to increase military involvement, including the use of special forces or the launch of a ground invasion.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Military Intervention, Armed Conflict, and Energy
- Political Geography:
- Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
12. When do voters stop caring? Estimating the shape of voters' utility functions
- Author:
- Aleksandra Conevska and Can Mutlu
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
- Abstract:
- In this paper, we address a longstanding puzzle over the functional form that better approximates voter utility from political choices. Though it has become the norm in the literature to represent voter utility with concave loss functions, for decades scholars have underscored this assumption’s potential shortcomings. Yet there exists little to no evidence to support one functional form assumption over another. We fill this gap by first identifying electoral settings where the different functional forms generate divergent predictions about voter behavior. We then assess which functional form better matches observed voter and abstention behavior using Cast Vote Record (CVR) data that captures the anonymized ballots of millions of voters in the 2020 U.S. general election. Our findings indicate that concave loss functions fail to predict voting and abstention behavior, and it is the reverse S-shaped loss functions, such as the Gaussian function, that better match voter behavior.
- Topic:
- Politics, Voting, and Voting Behavior
- Political Geography:
- Global Focus and United States of America
13. As US food aid retreats, can BRICS+ and biotechnology fill the world’s food security gap?
- Author:
- Cullen S. Hendrix
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
- Abstract:
- Cuts to agricultural development assistance and food aid by the United States and other advanced economies are creating a global vacuum just as climate change and conflict drive global hunger up. Many food-insecure developing economies with significant hunger lack the resources to self-finance agricultural research and development (R&D) and have had to depend increasingly on themselves—and one another—to meet rising food needs. Hendrix argues that the BRICS+ economies—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Indonesia—are well positioned to fill the world’s food security gap.
- Topic:
- Agriculture, Markets, Foreign Aid, BRICS, Food Assistance, and Biotechnology
- Political Geography:
- North America, Global Focus, and United States of America
14. Defence innovation and procurement reform: an empirical evaluation of the US Defense Innovation Unit
- Author:
- Ethan Kapstein, Javier Ospital, and Guntram B. Wolff
- Publication Date:
- 05-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- Battlefields are evolving rapidly, with new technologies reshaping military strategy and tactics. Many of the new technologies originate in firms outside the traditional defence sector, rather than with the existing prime contractors. In the United States, the Department of Defense (DoD) created the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) in 2015 to incentivise commercial tech companies to work on national security challenges. How successful has this new unit been in achieving its mission? We provide the first causal evaluation of the DIU’s effects on defence procurement. Using administrative procurement data and a firm-level panel covering 2017-2025, and employing propensity score matching, additional firm-level covariates and a staggered difference-in differences design, we find that the DIU has expanded both the extensive and intensive margins of defence contracting. We find not only a significant increase in the likelihood of receiving a DoD contract because of DIU treatment, but also in the size of the contract. Our findings show that defence innovation organisations can broaden and deepen the defence-supplier base. Governments updating their defence acquisition strategies in response to the lessons from recent conflicts can benefit from reforms that facilitate firm entry into procurement, overcoming the transaction cost and information asymmetry problems typical in defence markets.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Macroeconomics, and Innovation
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
15. Marriage as Insurance: Household Responses to Immigration Policy Uncertainty
- Author:
- Cristian Bonavida
- Publication Date:
- 03-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)
- Abstract:
- This paper examines whether marriage serves as a strategic response to immigration policy uncertainty. We study transitions into marriage among cohabiting binational couples—defined as unions between a U.S. citizen and a noncitizen partner—following the shift in immigration policy expectations during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign and the subsequent tightening of enforcement in 2017. Using ACS data from 2008 to 2019 and a difference-in-differences design, we compare marriage transitions among binational couples to those of homogeneous citizen couples. Immigration policy uncertainty increased marriage rates among binational couples by approximately 1.5–1.8 percentage points, or about 8-10 percent relative to pre-treatment levels. Event-study estimates show no differential pre-trends and indicate that the response began in 2016, prior to the formal reinstatement of Secure Communities. The effect is concentrated among likely unauthorized immigrants and individuals from targeted nationalities. The findings suggest that marriage functioned as a form of legal and economic insurance in response to heightened deportation risk.
- Topic:
- Economics, Marriage, Household, and Immigration Policy
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
16. 'Trade is in our Blood': Momentum Builds in Asia for Expanding Rules-based Economic Cooperation
- Author:
- Jane Mellsop
- Publication Date:
- 01-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- The trade world experienced unprecedented upheaval in 2025, but Asia still sees the rules-based trading system as the strongest foundation for its future. Trade is “in the blood” in Asia, and these countries continue to forge ahead with trade arrangements with multiple partners—so-called plurilateral trade arrangements—to further integrate their economies, provide certainty for businesses, promote innovation, and enhance economic growth. However, it has not been all smooth sailing, particularly at a time when evolving trade policy of the United States is demanding significant attention from all economies. Regional plurilateral agreements, such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) with 12 parties and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with 15 parties, have brought benefits to their members; however, to remain relevant, they need to be updated to keep pace with emerging developments. For the CPTPP, this has not been easy given its broad membership with diverse interests that hampers progress toward consensus on ambitious upgrades. Expanding the membership of these agreements or even instituting novel dialogues with other trading blocs as the CPTPP has started with the EU and ASEAN, not only provides opportunities to access new markets and expand integration but also sends an important signal in support of rules-based trade at this critical time. Asia should not be complacent with the trade rules already in place. The region would benefit from harnessing the current moment when countries are focused on diversifying markets and suppliers to pursue new plurilateral cooperation and agreements in specific sectors, or to address specific trade challenges, such as critical minerals, an economic security framework, or green technology. The first two of these in particular are of interest to the current U.S. administration, though Asian countries would also need to consider how China might view any new arrangements. Importantly, countries are more willing now to consider formats other than legally binding comprehensive agreements to support greater economic integration with like-minded partners, such as agreed principles, guidelines, or concrete areas of cooperation to unlock trade and bring benefits to stakeholders, such as the new Future of Investment and Trade Partnership (FITP). While the current global trading context provides impetus for progressing plurilateral initiatives that deepen economic integration among partners, one challenge is the lack of an obvious leader in the region—country or person—to drive such initiatives forward. A group of like-minded countries, such as Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, and Singapore, could step up and lead the charge in support of increased plurilateral integration and the rules-based system. However, even with the best of intentions, countries will be constrained by their own limited resources for trade negotiations and implementation, while developing countries in particular need capacity building, including from high-quality investments, to make any trade deal successful. This report shares these insights and more from roundtable discussions and interviews with more than 60 experts from both inside and outside government from across Asia and the United States on how like-minded countries can preserve and enhance the rules-based trading system through plurilateral arrangements.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Trade, and Economic Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Asia and United States of America
17. Scam Offensives in Southeast Asia: Comparing Beijing's and Washington's Strategies and Assessing Opportunities for Coordination
- Author:
- Bryanna Entwhistle
- Publication Date:
- 08-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- Disrupting Asia’s cyber scam industry, which is valued at between $88.3 billion and $114.1 billion annually, presents a rare point of mutual interest for the United States and China. Both Chinese and American citizens are both primary targets of complex online fraud schemes run predominantly out of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. To identify where opportunities for cooperation on addressing the issue exist for the United States and China, this paper examines the nature of Beijing's crackdowns on cyber scam operations in Southeast Asia, when Beijing chooses to act, and how. It identifies three core factors driving Chinese action: domestic pressure, reputational damage, and national security concerns. Where these factors converge, as in Myanmar, Beijing has acted swiftly and forcefully. Where reputational pressure collides with countervailing strategic interests, as in Cambodia, Beijing's pressure has been delayed but has grown over time. And where none of the three factors materially apply, as in Laos, Beijing has yet to move against major actors. When Beijing does act, it leverages bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral frameworks to conduct joint operations and intelligence gathering with its Southeast Asian partners. Framed under China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI), these mechanisms have broadened the country’s security relationships across the region—although partner states have not always welcomed Beijing's inroads. As Beijing conducted raids against scam centers in Myanmar, the industry began redirecting its targeting toward the West: American losses to China-linked criminal groups grew to $10 billion per year by 2024. Washington has responded with a cross-departmental campaign of sanctions, indictments, asset seizures, and takedowns of scam-enabling online infrastructure. Still, the U.S. response is hampered by limited operational capacity on the ground in Southeast Asia and the "whack-a-mole" nature of the industry. Concerns about China’s GSI expansion, intelligence sharing sensitivities, host-state political economies, and Beijing’s treatment of trafficked workers are substantial obstacles that stand in the way of U.S.-China cooperation on this issue. Still, bounded cooperation has the potential to serve the interests of both Beijing and Washington. There appears to be recognition of this on the ministerial level: FBI Director Kash Patel has traveled to Beijing twice in the past year to discuss expanding coordination on tackling cyber scams with China, alongside several other forms of transnational crime. In April, the United States, China, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates organized a joint raid on scam centers in Dubai; however, misaligned incentives and strategic distrust have thus far stood in the way of further law enforcement coordination between Beijing and Washington. In support of future law enforcement coordination between China and the United States that takes into account existing obstacles rather than ignoring them, this paper draws on an understanding of Beijing’s cyber scam offensive in Southeast Asia to propose the following recommendations for how Washington could pursue tactical and bounded coordination on the issue: Push for leader-to-leader engagement, drawing on lessons from the fentanyl negotiations; Utilize third countries to mediate and coordinate joint raids and intelligence sharing; Approach Beijing with intelligence-backed asks; Leverage existing channels to facilitate financial intelligence sharing; and Continue using sanctions and indictments to incentivize Beijing to recall key actors.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Law Enforcement, Fraud, Intelligence Sharing, and Scam Centers
- Political Geography:
- China, Cambodia, Southeast Asia, Laos, Myanmar, and United States of America
18. Beyond the Biotech Race — Right-Sizing U.S.-China Competition in a Human-Centered Industry
- Author:
- Jing Qian, Lizzi C. Lee, and Chris Li
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- U.S.-China biotech competition is often framed as a linear, zero-sum race at the technological frontier. A more accurate framework is asymmetric convergence. Biotechnology is not a single chokepoint technology like semiconductors but rather constitutes a multi-layered biomedical ecosystem spanning basic science, translational research, clinical trials, manufacturing, regulatory review, commercialization, data governance, and healthcare delivery. The United States and China are increasingly competing across the same ecosystem, but with different strengths at different layers of the value chain. The United States retains enduring structural advantages, but they require renewal. U.S. leadership remains strongest in foundational science, first-in-class discovery, academic medical centers, venture-backed translational research, deep capital markets, FDA credibility, global standard-setting, and the ability to attract and retain world-class scientific talent. These advantages have long made the United States the orchestrator of frontier biomedical innovation. But they are not self-sustaining. Funding instability, pressure on universities, uncertainty around regulatory capacity, and disruptive and overly restrictive immigration policies could weaken the talent and discovery engine that has historically powered American biotech leadership. China’s biotech rise is no longer simply a story of catch-up or imitation. China has become a systemic peer competitor in several operational domains, including research scale, clinical trial execution, biological manufacturing, asset formation, regional biotech clustering, and global out-licensing. Its strengths are most pronounced where biotechnology functions as an industrial and engineering system: scaling research output, executing trials quickly, mobilizing capital, integrating hospitals and manufacturing, and generating licensable assets at speed. China’s convergence is structural and likely to outlast any fixed policy window. Beijing’s progress is not merely the result of temporary subsidies or isolated breakthroughs. It reflects years of institutional adaptation, talent recruitment, regulatory reform, capital mobilization, data mercantilism, IP capture, and participation in global biomedical networks. Because these capabilities are embedded across multiple layers of the biotech value chain, they are unlikely to be reversed by any single policy tool or short-term action. Biotech should not be treated as exactly analogous to semiconductors. Export controls and “protect” and “restrict” measures may be necessary in specific areas involving sensitive data, dual-use capabilities, supply-chain vulnerabilities, or modalities of national security concern. But broad, undifferentiated restrictions in biotech risk weakening U.S. competitiveness, reducing visibility into global biomedical developments, disrupting supply chains, and slowing innovation in areas where patient outcomes are directly at stake. The United States needs an affirmative, layer-specific strategy. A more effective approach should distinguish among the different layers of the biotech ecosystem: preserve openness in basic science where it underpins U.S. leadership; apply targeted guardrails where national security risks are real; strengthen domestic capacity in biomanufacturing, translational research, and supply-chain resilience; lead in regulatory and data-governance standards; and maintain U.S. influence in global biomedical networks. Competition with China should be used as a catalyst to upgrade the U.S. biotech system. The central U.S. challenge is not only how to restrict China where risks are genuine, but how to compete from a position of renewed strength. This means reinvigorating NIH and NSF funding for basic science, improving translational efficiency, expanding biomanufacturing capacity, supporting clinical trial modernization, strengthening regulatory agility, and preserving America’s ability to attract global talent. Health and medicine remain among the few domains where bounded, de-risked cooperation is still strategically viable. Shared disease burdens, asymmetric capabilities, patient needs, and the humanitarian nature of biomedical innovation create conditions for narrow cooperation that few other sectors can match. Cancer, rare diseases, mental health, chronic illness, aging, pandemic preparedness, antimicrobial resistance, and ethical governance are systemic challenges that do not stop at national borders. A realistic cooperation agenda should be narrow, practical, and subject to clear guardrails. Potential areas include disease-specific clinical trial corridors, rare disease research, oncology pilots, mental health as a shared public health challenge, affordability and access, regulatory learning, and practical training in healthcare delivery and regulatory science. These channels should avoid unrestricted data sharing or sensitive technology transfer and instead focus on privacy protection standards, patient safety, implementation capacity, and measurable health outcomes. The central policy question is not whether the United States should compete with China in biotechnology. It must. The question is how to right-size that competition. A sound strategy should protect national security where risks are real, preserve U.S. scientific and industrial leadership where advantages remain decisive, invest in domestic capacity where vulnerabilities exist, and sustain carefully bounded cooperation where it serves American interests and improves human health.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Public Health, Strategic Competition, Medicine, Biotechnology, and Science and Technology
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
19. An Overview of U.S.-China Life Sciences Competition and Cooperation
- Author:
- Brendan Kelly and Craig Allen
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- After gaining attention in 2025, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, and the broader life sciences sector are moving to the fore of U.S.-China economic and technology competition in 2026. The sector encapsulates all the myriad challenges and opportunities in the U.S.-China bilateral economic relationship, while also serving as a key test case for the Trump administration’s efforts to pursue a more balanced — and transactional — approach with China. Issues involved in the life sciences sector are wide-ranging: serious national security concerns (as biotechnology intersects with advanced AI tools) along with supply chain vulnerabilities, market access barriers for foreign products in China’s domestic market, cross-border data sharing challenges, increasing U.S.-China competition at the leading edge of technology, and growing concerns that the United States could lose its global share in a key sector it has traditionally dominated to Chinese firms benefitting from industrial policies and state support. Yet, despite these tensions, biopharma is one of the few areas in which U.S.-China linkages are growing. A surge of licensing deals over the past few years has cemented cooperation between U.S. pharmaceutical firms and Chinese biotechnology companies that are trialing Chinese-developed compounds in the U.S. market. At the same time, China has made rapid technological advances in the biotech sector, providing both new opportunities and a competitive threat for U.S. firms. Following intensifying U.S.-China competition and decoupling in semiconductors, the risk of a bifurcation of life sciences industry is nonetheless growing. In January 2025, the United States imposed its first export controls largely focused on China’s biotech threat. In December 2025, after two years of congressional deliberation, the BIOSECURE Act was passed into law, imposing phased-in restrictions intended to lessen supply chain reliance of U.S. biopharma firms on Chinese contract development and manufacturing organizations (CDMOs). On April 8, 2025, the Department of Justice announced data regulations that have materially tightened the rules governing the transfer of U.S.-origin clinical trial and genomic data to China. Finally, Members of Congress and advisory groups are also pushing to include the biotech sector in the U.S. outbound investment control regime. As with most U.S.-China economic issues, the commercial tensions also come back to China’s macro and trade imbalances — particularly its heavy focus on production and less on consumption, or in this case, the provision of healthcare to its own citizens. China’s imbalanced approach and discriminatory policies — seeking to expand access to global markets while limiting access for foreign firms in its own market — risk reinforcing decoupling if China does not reciprocate by extending the benefits of more open bilateral trade and investment. Often missing from discussions around biotechnology competition, however, is a focus on the obstacles to fairer competition for U.S. firms and products in the Chinese market. According to the U.S.-China Business Council (USCBC) 2025 Export Report, pharmaceuticals are the fourth largest U.S. export to China, growing rapidly until 2023 but declining since then. U.S. medical equipment exports to China also grew strongly, before stagnating the past few years. Together, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment account for roughly 10% of U.S. exports to China, with further potential if they were not held back by discriminatory measures and market access challenges. Notably, while most trade frictions focus on China’s surging exports, the European Union in 2025 completed a landmark investigation and found broad discrimination against foreign medical devices in China’s domestic market, leading the EU to limit China’s access to the EU’s procurement market in response. For U.S. stakeholders, the focus on supply chain vulnerability and heavy reliance on China is understandable — biotechnology’s dependence on complex global inputs and specialized manufacturing capacity makes reliance on China particularly acute, with recent disruptions in critical minerals supplies from China underscoring this risk. However, in seeking to win the “competition” in biotechnology, too little focus has been placed on finding the right balance for the United States to maximize benefits from commercial and scientific engagement with China in this field, while mitigating excessive supply chain reliance on China. With patient health outcomes — and potential access to future life-saving or life-improving drugs — at stake, finding the right balance in life sciences competition with China is more complex and arguably more pivotal than in other areas of advanced technology rivalry. This calls for a robust discussion in policy circles, publicly and bilaterally, to find the correct balance. Failure to do so risks damaging U.S. interests. At the same time, China similarly risks undermining its own interests — including China’s own access to global markets and technology — it does not allow more reciprocal sharing of the benefits of life sciences cooperation.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, National Security, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, Biotechnology, Economic Security, and Life Sciences
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
20. Russia–North Korea Military Cooperation in Response to China’s Tactical Ambiguity
- Author:
- Sungmin Cho
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- The alignment among China, North Korea, and Russia has emerged as one of the most consequential developments in contemporary international security. Russia and North Korea have significantly deepened their military cooperation, while China has adopted a more ambiguous stance toward these developments. North Korea has deployed at least 12,000 troops to support Russian forces in Ukraine and supplied large quantities of artillery rounds, rockets, and ballistic missiles, including ammunition of various calibers.1 When asked about these developments, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian stated that Russia and North Korea “are two independent sovereign states, and how they develop their bilateral relations is a matter for themselves.”2 Some Western analysts interpret this position as evidence that Beijing is uneasy about Russia and North Korea’s deepening military ties and therefore refrains from openly endorsing closer military cooperation between the two — an indication of potential fissures within the China–North Korea–Russia triangle. This report offers a different interpretation. Rather than viewing China’s ambiguity as evidence of fragmentation, it argues that deepening Russia–North Korea military cooperation stems in part from their own distrust of Beijing in the first place. Available evidence suggests that Pyongyang may have regarded China’s economic support as insufficient, while Moscow likely viewed Beijing’s reluctance to provide direct military assistance — along with its parallel efforts to stabilize relations with the United States and its allies for economic reasons — with unease. From the perspectives of Russia and North Korea, the most reliable strategy for keeping China closely aligned is to first deepen their own bilateral cooperation. Doing so increases Beijing’s concern about potential exclusion from strategic coordination while also intensifying U.S. and allied military cooperation. Together, these dynamics may push China toward closer alignment with Moscow and Pyongyang. This dynamic represents a structural dilemma in China’s strategy. On the one hand, Beijing demonstrates strategic clarity in opposing Western pressure alongside Russia and North Korea. On the other hand, it maintains tactical ambiguity to avoid being drawn directly into the conflicts that Moscow and Pyongyang face with the West.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, International Security, Bilateral Relations, Strategic Ambiguity, and Military Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America
21. Implementing Effective U.S.-China Economic Engagement Channels
- Author:
- Brendan Kelly and Scott Shaw
- Publication Date:
- 05-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- As the state of U.S.-China relations has undergone significant fluctuations over the past decade, so has the structure and frequency of economic engagements between the two countries. The number and scale of such dialogues came under heavy criticism from Republican and Democratic China hawks alike—with one notable critic famously tying the rise of U.S.-China dialogues to the rise of the U.S. trade deficit with China. Some of this criticism misses the mark, however, and underestimates the value of select, well-conceived communication channels. A valid question is whether these dialogues lost the forest for the trees. U.S. officials consistently struggled to move the needle on big trade and investment issues, absent large carrots and sticks, such as WTO accession or significant tariffs. The U.S. government needs to exercise discipline in ensuring that dialogue mechanisms advance U.S. national interests and are not used by China to distract from or delay meaningful progress on core issues. Washington must also be clear-eyed that such dialogues or engagements will likely not “change China” or spur big policy and structural changes. Yet it is equally problematic that from the early stages of the pandemic in 2020 through mid-2023, the governments of the world’s two largest economies, with the world’s most complex trading relationship, had almost no engagement on economic and commercial issues. Just as national security experts emphasize the importance of U.S.-China military-to-military communications to mitigate misunderstandings and security crises, sustained channels for commercial and financial dialogues are critical for managing economic frictions. It is therefore remarkable that for multiple years the two sides lacked any such mechanisms to address commercial, financial and other economic issues. In its last year and a half, the Biden administration broadly addressed these areas through its Economic, Financial and Commercial Issues Working Groups, alongside technical consultations on issues such as export control enforcement, trade secrets, and anti-money laundering. These channels, with select cabinet-level meetings, enabled the U.S. to pursue “competitive actions”—such as export controls, tariffs, and sanctions—while maintaining a largely stable relationship. The Biden administration struggled, however, to make significant progress on the broader obstacles facing U.S. firms and exports in China, even as it was able to resolve certain company-specific issues and defuse some tensions arising from policy misunderstandings. After a sharp deterioration in bilateral economic ties in spring 2025—with tariffs essentially reaching trade embargo levels and export controls shutting down production lines in each economy—the second Trump administration has arrived at a tentative equilibrium with China on trade and technology issues. The Trump administration has an opportunity to strengthen this equilibrium, mitigate volatility, and advance U.S. interests by rebuilding and institutionalizing selective channels on key economic and technology issues. The goal should not be to return to the previous broad dialogue architecture, but rather to establish narrow mechanisms that support U.S. de-risking, reinforce policy discipline, and, with modest expectations, derive economic benefits for the U.S. from the relationship. Cabinet-level relationships with China’s top economic decisionmakers—that also address bureaucratic mismatches and silos in the two systems—are of utmost importance as the leadership dynamics and policy agendas of both governments continue to evolve. Communication mechanisms on macroeconomic, financial sector, and commercial issues have been essential—and as economic and national security issues have moved to the foreground, channels to discuss sanctions, export controls, and investment issues have become necessary as well. The Boards of Trade and Investment proposed by the two governments in recent discussions could serve as an organizing structure for most of these channels, depending on their participants and agenda. This paper reviews the historical evolution of U.S.-China economic dialogues and the key lessons learned—to suggest targeted areas where ongoing communications under these mechanisms can be most important, how these should be structured, and how to make U.S. economic statecraft toward China most effective. We appreciate the insightful inputs and comments on the paper from Craig Allen, Wendy Cutler and Paul Haenle.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Diplomacy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, Macroeconomics, Trade, Donald Trump, and Dialogue
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
22. Seeking Agency in Uncertainty: Asian Middle Powers and the Fragmenting Global Order
- Author:
- Farwa Aamer and Emma Chanlett-Avery
- Publication Date:
- 04-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- The concept of middle powers is not new. What is new, however, is the speed, coordination, and strategic intent with which middle powers, across Asia and the West, are recalibrating their foreign policies. This acceleration reflects growing uncertainty in the global system: the perceived drift and unpredictability of U.S. leadership under the Trump 2.0 administration, intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, and the fragmentation of the post–Cold War order. Countries increasingly find themselves navigating between two systemic pressures: avoiding entrapment in great power rivalries and safeguarding national autonomy, economic resilience, and security interests. In this emerging order, resistant to simple bipolar or multipolar labels, middle powers are neither passive balancers nor quiet bystanders. They are actively constructing a dense network of partnerships, pursuing selective alignments, and diversifying strategic dependencies. Rather than choosing sides, many are hedging to secure national interests: deepening security ties with Washington while sustaining economic engagement with Beijing, expanding mini-lateral frameworks, and strengthening cross-regional linkages that reduce overreliance on any single pole of power. The growing emphasis on economic security, supply chain resilience, technological cooperation, and defense interoperability reflects a broader shift from ideological alignment to pragmatic, interest-driven statecraft. This paper revisits the concept of Asian middle power diplomacy and assesses the forces driving today’s intensified hedging behavior. It examines why urgency around partnerships and alliance diversification has increased, not only among key Asian middle powers themselves but also in their expanding engagement with actors such as the Gulf states, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. Through select country-by-country analysis, the paper evaluates how leading middle powers, in both Asia and beyond, are redefining strategic autonomy, which partnerships warrant close attention, and how these evolving alignments are reshaping the contours of the global order. Finally, it assesses the implications of a more assertive, networked middle power landscape for the United States, and what a strengthened middle power layering means for the future architecture of international politics.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Engagement, International Order, Hedging, and Middle Powers
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
23. Positioning the KMT in the U.S.–China–Taiwan Triangle: Cheng Li-wun’s Early Tenure
- Author:
- Meghan Morris and Sheng-wen Cheng
- Publication Date:
- 04-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- In March 2026, Kuomintang (KMT) chair Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文) accepted an invitation from Chinese President Xi Jinping to visit China from April 7–12—the first such visit by a sitting KMT chair since 2016. The visit presents both challenges and opportunities for Cheng, who is seeking greater dialogue and stability with China. It also comes just weeks before a scheduled major summit between President Trump and Xi in May and introduces new variables for all three leaders. For Xi, the symbolism of him and Cheng possibly meeting face-to-face to “mend fences” could portray an image of cross-Strait unity that could strengthen Xi’s hand in discussions with Trump. For Cheng, a successful China trip could bolster her political standing among the KMT base in Taiwan, but could also alienate opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) voters and swing voters, who may view Cheng as “selling out” Taiwan’s sovereignty in pursuit of easing tensions with mainland China. Finally, for Trump, the visit could complicate Washington’s relations with China. Trump will have to walk an even more delicate tightrope of signaling the United States’ enduring “One China” policy with Xi, while responding to the inevitable message from Xi that cross-Straits are “stabilizing” and that the United States should not intervene in the “internal matters of China.” Given this context, this paper seeks to examine the rise of Cheng Li-wun in Taiwanese politics and implications for her domestic, international, and cross-Strait agenda. We argue that while Cheng’s victory as KMT chair signals symbolic change, it has yet to translate into institutional renewal or political legitimacy. Her early appointments of KMT vice chairs suggest continuity rather than transformation—raising questions about whether the KMT is broadening or narrowing appeal within a younger electoral base. It also contends that Cheng’s rhetoric on China and the United States—calling for deeper alignment and accommodation with Beijing while simultaneously casting doubt on the value of Taiwan’s security ties with Washington—positions Cheng to potentially alter the trajectory of cross-Strait ties if the KMT achieves a majority victory in the 2028 presidential elections.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, and Domestic Politics
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and United States of America
24. Guided Autonomy: America Watching in Xi’s China
- Author:
- Guoguang Wu
- Publication Date:
- 04-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Asia Society
- Abstract:
- U.S.–China relations have undergone significant changes in the past decade, moving from deep interdependence to strategic rivalry, and, meanwhile, China’s policy toward the United States has transformed under Xi Jinping. China’s policymaking mechanism has also evolved, and understanding this shift is critical to understanding the broader U.S.–China relationship. This article examines China’s U.S. policymaking and policy consultation system under Xi Jinping. How does policy consultation on foreign relations work in China? What are the most influential policy research institutions in China's America watch? How do they influence China's U.S. policy?
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Xi Jinping, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
25. From the old world to the new: Why German rearmament matters for Australia
- Author:
- Carl Janz
- Publication Date:
- 07-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
- Abstract:
- When then chancellor of Germany Olaf Scholz delivered the famous Zeitenwende (epochal shift) speech outlining the urgent need for change in defence and security policy as a response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, he presided over a military that reportedly struggled to participate in even basic NATO operations. Today by contrast, Germany is the world’s fourth largest military spender and has committed to military and industrial uplift with zeal. This ASPI Explainer explores the factors driving Germany’s rearmament, its implications for Australia, potential barriers to implementation, and transferable takeaways. It concludes that Germany’s rearmament efforts are set to make the country an increasingly valuable global partner for Australia as the two countries pursue a Status of Forces Agreement. If successfully executed in tandem with its European partners, German rearmament will help establish an increasingly independent European liberal-democratic pole in global politics and will allow the United States to increase its focus on the Indo-Pacific. These developments support Australian interests.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and Rearmament
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Germany, Australia, and United States of America
26. Move Fast and Scale: A Brief Insiders' History of the Replicator Initiative
- Author:
- Kathleen Hicks and Aaron Sherman
- Publication Date:
- 06-2026
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
- Abstract:
- Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks and former Speechwriter to the Deputy Secretary of Defense Aaron Sherman provide an insider account of the Replicator Initiative, tracing its origins, purpose, early implementation, and preliminary outcomes. This initiative to rapidly scale needed military capabilities offers important lessons for reform, from goal-setting and aligning incentives to implementation, feedback, and iteration.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Government, Military Affairs, and Defense Spending
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
27. Untangling the Transatlantic Knot: Germany, France, and the United States
- Author:
- Gesine Weber and Jacob Ross
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- France’s and Germany’s reactions to Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine reveal their significantly different relationships with the United States. Their interpretations regarding the European security architecture are almost diametrically opposed. While Berlin concluded that European security must be constructed transatlantically, Paris saw confirmation of its interpretation that Europeans must be able to address security challenges independently of Washington. Donald Trump’s reelection constitutes a challenge for the two countries because both need to fundamentally rethink their respective relationships with the United States and Europe-US relations more generally. The scope of the US withdrawal from European security remains to be seen, but it will be similarly challenging for Paris and Berlin.
- Topic:
- NATO, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America
28. Factsheet: Elon Musk
- Author:
- Bridge Initiative Team
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
- Abstract:
- Elon Musk is a billionaire entrepreneur and the CEO or top executive of multiple high-profile companies, including X (formerly Twitter), Tesla and SpaceX. He has a documented history of amplifying anti-Muslim tropes, supporting individuals and organizations that promote Islamophobia, and making statements that minimize or dismiss concerns about anti-Muslim racism. His actions and influence have contributed to the normalization of Islamophobic rhetoric in public discourse. In 2024, U.S. President Donald Trump appointed Musk to lead the newly-created Department of Government Efficiency.
- Topic:
- Islamophobia, Far Right, Donald Trump, Elon Musk, Billionaires, and Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE)
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
29. Factsheet: Tom Trento
- Author:
- Bridge Initiative Team
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
- Abstract:
- Tom Trento is an American conservative activist who has a history of making anti-Muslim statements, including promoting a narrative that constructs Islam as a major threat to America. He is the founder and executive director of The United West, described by the Southern Poverty Law Center as an organization “stoking anti-Muslim hate for over a decade.”
- Topic:
- Conservatism, Islamophobia, Activism, Right-Wing Politics, and Tom Trento
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
30. Factsheet: Pete Hegseth
- Author:
- Bridge Initiative Team
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
- Abstract:
- Pete Hegseth is a former Fox News political commentator, author, and former Army National Guard officer who served in Guantanamo Bay, Iraq, and Afghanistan. He has tattoos that are associated with white nationalism and has a history of making Islamophobic statements. Hegseth has also been accused of sexual assault and has had several incidences of alleged sexist behavior. In 2025, Hegseth was confirmed as the next Secretary of Defense in the Trump administration.
- Topic:
- Islamophobia, Far Right, Donald Trump, Military, Pete Hegseth, and White Nationalism
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
31. Factsheet: Randy Fine
- Author:
- Bridge Initiative Team
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
- Abstract:
- Randy Fine is an American Republican politician and currently serves as a Senator for the Florida state government. Before joining politics, he served as a gambling industry executive. Fine has been described as an “unhinged bigot,” “controversial,” “divisive,” and “abrasive.” He has a history of making anti-Muslim, anti-Palestinian, and racist comments, and has threatened two Muslim women members of Congress. In 2024, Fine announced he would be running for the US Congress and was endorsed by President Donald Trump.
- Topic:
- Politics, Islamophobia, Republican Party, and Randy Fine
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
32. Public Debt and the Income Share of the Top 1% in the US, 1960-2019
- Author:
- Aggela Papadopoulou
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- City Political Economy Research Centre (CITYPERC), University of London
- Abstract:
- This study theorizes the relationship between sovereign debt and income inequality and shows that increases in public indebtedness are robustly associated with increases in the income share of the top one percent in the US since the 1960s. First, the paper outlines the mechanisms through which public debt is linked to the top one percent income share, via interest payments and capital gains from bond trading. Subsequently, it scrutinizes the evolution of public debt and the income share of the top one percent in the US, in parallel with the historical development of political and economic institutions. Building on the historical analysis, it demonstrates econometrically that interest payments and total returns on domestic and foreign public debt are positively associated with the income share of the top one percent in the US for the period 1960 to 2019.
- Topic:
- Income Inequality, Public Debt, and Top One Percent
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
33. Black Intergenerational Mobility, Libertarian Capitalism, and Authoritarian Government, 1877–1941: A Case Study
- Author:
- Patrick L. Mason
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
- Abstract:
- There are persistent multigenerational Black-white gaps in occupational attainment. These racial differences in intergenerational mobility are not caused by differences in family values and behavior (Mason, 2007). For three decades, I have gathered evidence on my family’s intergenerational transition from enslavement to present social and economic circumstances. Charles and Susan Rollins were 32 and 29 years-old, respectively, as enslavement ended in 1865. During Reconstruction, they accumulated wealth, established a successful dairy and other farming, helped found a church and religious organizations, helped found multiple civic organizations, served on boards affiliated with the local university and high school, were elected to County and State public office, had savings and bank accounts for the entire family, and were leaders among an extensive social network. Jim Crow in the South and anti-black racism in the north stymied upward mobility for the Rollins family for the three generations after Charles and Susan, despite the fact that their descendants obtained greater education than their ancestors, displayed a willingness to relocate 100s of miles away from their home, possessed a culture of achievement (hard work, future orientation, married couple families, etc.), were blessed with exceptional social capital, and, perhaps, the relative advantage of being mulattoes.
- Topic:
- History, Authoritarianism, Capital, Libertarianism, and Social Mobility
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
34. Fracking or No Fracking? How a Green Transition Can Work for Workers
- Author:
- Robert Pollin and Jeannette Wicks-Lim
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
- Abstract:
- Throughout the 2024 U.S. Presidential campaign, the only climate-related issue to achieve prominence was the question of whether to ban fracking operations in the United States. Donald Trump is a long-time climate denier, and therefore had no qualms in supporting fracking and all other techniques for extracting fossil fuels from the ground. By contrast, Kamala Harris had supported a nationwide ban on fracking during her 2019 presidential campaign. This was due to the severe negative environmental and public health impacts of this natural gas extraction technique and because burning natural gas to produce energy generates CO2 emissions that cause climate change. But Harris opposed a fracking ban in 2024 on the assumption that the ban would impose major costs to the economy of Pennsylvania, which has the second-largest fracking operations among U.S. states, after Texas only. Such negative economic outcomes in Pennsylvania would indeed result if fracking were banned in the U.S. and no large-scale alternative economic activities were introduced into Pennsylvania’s economy. But banning fracking must be understood as one component of a much larger program to advance a viable climate stabilization program, in Pennsylvania, and everywhere else. We find that building a clean energy-dominant infrastructure in Pennsylvania—focused on investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy sources—will generate approximately 160,000 jobs in the state. Meanwhile, phasing down fracking and all other fossil fuel activities by 50 percent between 2026 – 35 will entail job losses in the range of 1,700 per year within the state. We argue that these 1,700 displaced fossil fuel workers should receive just transition policies that include pension, employment and income guarantees, in addition to, as needed, retraining and relocation support. We estimate that such a just transition program for these workers will cost in the range of $240 million per year. This amounts to about 0.02 percent of Pennsylvania’s current GDP. Thus, we show how, between 2026 – 2035, Pennsylvania could phase out 50 percent of all its fossil fuel production activities—including fracking operations—while also providing generous support for workers to transition out of their fossil fuel industry jobs and into activities that both raise public health and environmental standards in the state and contribute toward a viable global climate stabilization project.
- Topic:
- Climate Change, Elections, Green Transition, and Fracking
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
35. Employment in Child Care and Early Education in the U.S. 2000-2021
- Author:
- Aritra Basu and Nancy Folbre
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Political Economy Research Institute (PERI), University of Massachusetts Amherst
- Abstract:
- Accurate assessment of trends in the availability and affordability of childcare services in the U.S. hinges on accurate assessment of a paid labor force that is difficult to precisely measure, because it spans a wide range of informal and formal institutional arrangements. This paper calls attention to these measurement problems and traces significant changes in the composition of child care and early education employment from 2000 to 2021 based on data from the American Community Survey (ACS). It shows that employment in the Child Day Care Services industry has become an increasingly poor measure of the number of those employed in Child Care and Preschool/Kindergarten occupations, due to increased provision in both Private Household Services and Elementary and Secondary Education industries. Comparisons of worker characteristics and median annual earnings across occupations and industries highlight the effects of institutional context, including differences in the composition of demand for paid care services. Consideration of these issues points to the need for specific improvements in labor force survey design.
- Topic:
- Labor Issues, Employment, Survey, and Child Care
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
36. Trump Takes on the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
- Author:
- Michał Wojnarowicz
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Donald Trump’s actions and announcements to date regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are reversing the decisions of previous administrations and strengthening Benjamin Netanyahu’s political position. At the same time, they threaten the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. The deliberately ambiguous statements about the resolution of the crisis seem gauged to increase pressure on regional states and European partners.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Donald Trump, Israeli–Palestinian Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
- Political Geography:
- Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America
37. China Building Up BRICS as Important Foreign Policy Tool
- Author:
- Marcin Przychodniak
- Publication Date:
- 02-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- BRICS is useful for China in its rivalry with the U.S., mainly as a tool to influence developing countries. It is also an important element of strategic cooperation with Russia and a platform for dialogue with India. China does not care about BRICS integration, instead it wants to consolidate the group’s participants to further China’s goals.. The EU’s response to this should include effective support for developing countries and a subjective approach to their demands for global governance.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, European Union, BRICS, Rivalry, and Dialogue
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
38. The U.S. Pursues Increasingly Aggressive Policy towards Latin America
- Author:
- Bartłomiej Znojek
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Donald Trump’s administration is seeking to rebuild U.S. influence in Latin America. It is trying to convince the countries of the region that cooperation with the United States will bring development and increased security to the Americas. For the time being, however, this approach mainly serves U.S. security interests, in particular combating irregular migration, organised crime and drug trafficking, and reducing China’s influence. The current administration’s threats, inconsistent positions, and expansionist drive will deepen the distrust of the U.S. and antagonise important Latin American partners.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Migration, Donald Trump, Strategic Interests, and Drug Trafficking
- Political Geography:
- Latin America and United States of America
39. U.S. Interest in Greenland Reflects the Ongoing Competition in the Arctic
- Author:
- Kinga Dudzińska and Paweł Markiewicz
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- President Donald Trump has repeatedly suggested his intention to attach Greenland to the U.S., a move that has met with opposition from the Greenlandic and Danish governments. The pressure from the U.S. is one manifestation of its aspirations to strengthen its position in the North Atlantic, both because of the strategic importance of the island and the growing international rivalries in the Arctic. The situation will require greater EU and NATO involvement in the High North, as well as consideration of this perspective by countries outside the region, such as Poland.
- Topic:
- NATO, European Union, Donald Trump, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Greenland, Arctic, and United States of America
40. Trump’s assault on foreign aid: implications for international development cooperation
- Author:
- Sebastian Haug, Anna Novoselova, and Stephan Klingebiel
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
- Abstract:
- The United States of America has long been a leading force in international development cooperation, both politically and financially. However, the first weeks of the second Trump administration have called the traditional role of US foreign aid fundamentally into question. From a 90-day funding freeze to the withdrawal from United Nations (UN) bodies and the dismantling of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), measures taken by Trump and his team are not only having palpable repercussions on a wide range of humanitarian and development programmes, but they also point to more far-reaching implications. Against this backdrop, this paper presents the contours and discusses the global consequences of Trump’s assault on US foreign aid, as of late February 2025. We outline the extant role of the United States as a donor in Section 2 and review the changes announced – and/or implemented – by the current US government in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the implications of US funding cuts for bilateral cooperation, while Section 5 focuses on repercussions on multilateral development work. Section 6 outlines three scenarios on how the ongoing changes in the United States might affect the field of international development. We discuss the possible ramifications of (a) a revamped US approach to foreign aid centring on crude national interests, (b) a US retreat that is at least partially offset by other providers and (c) a US retreat without other providers stepping in. Section 7 concludes by discussing the implications for dealing with the second Trump administration. We outline four recommendations that address stakeholders across the – increasingly outdated – donor–recipient divide: (1) refining development cooperation approaches, (2) strengthening the multilateral development system, (3) promoting Southern self-reliance and (4) fostering alliances beyond a Trump-led US government.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Foreign Aid, International Development, Donald Trump, and USAID
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
41. Forecasting Nuclear Escalation Risks: Cloudy With a Chance of Fallout
- Author:
- Jamie Kwong, Anna Bartoux, and James M. Acton
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Forecasting—that is, estimating the probability of specified events’ occurring—can contribute to efforts to better understand and address the challenge of managing escalation.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Forecast, Escalation, and Risk Assessment
- Political Geography:
- Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and United States of America
42. What the White House and Congress Can Do to Prevent Global Mass Atrocities
- Author:
- Federica D'Alessandra
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The Unites States has long recognized that preventing and responding to mass atrocities is both a moral responsibility and in its national security interest. Commitment to atrocity prevention and response has long enjoyed broad bipartisan support, and the U.S. government has long been a global leader on the issue. In 2011, the United States was the first country to establish an interagency body dedicated to atrocity prevention. Ever since, each Republican and Democratic administration—with the support of Congress—has taken additional, important steps toward implementing this objective. In 2019, under President Donald Trump, the United States was the first country to enact federal legislation addressing global mass atrocities. The Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act mandates the White House to report annually to Congress on government-led atrocity prevention efforts. Under the act, the second Trump administration will again be required to report to Congress by mid-2025, raising the question: What is in store for the atrocity prevention agenda under Trump 2.0? This paper reviews the atrocity prevention track record of the first Trump administration and other relevant action taken so far in this second term to parse out what efforts to sustain and uphold U.S. atrocity prevention obligations could look like under Trump’s second White House. This paper highlights how a number of steps the administration has already taken, including but not limited to the recently announced reorganization of the U.S. Department of State and the effective dissolution of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), unless promptly addressed, will raise dire challenges for the readiness and capacity of the State Department and other relevant agencies tasked with operationalizing U.S. commitments to this end. Accordingly, this paper advances a number of actionable recommendations that both the White House and the U.S. Congress should urgently consider to ensure the administration stands ready and capable to fulfill its obligations under the Elie Wiesel Act and other relevant legislation.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, National Security, and Atrocity Prevention
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
43. Geothermal Energy and U.S. Competitive Advantage: Drill, Baby, Drill
- Author:
- Robert W. Sweeney and Noah Gordon
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The United States and the rest of the world sit at the intersection of potentially destabilizing trends. Great power competition, climate change, intensifying geopolitical uncertainty, the economy’s potential deglobalization, and the potential massive increase in energy demands arising from artificial intelligence (AI) are creating challenges for U.S. national energy policy. A foremost concern is the vulnerability of energy supply chains to interference from or control by a hostile power. In this dynamic context, U.S. energy policy has evolved significantly in terms of markets, supplies, regulation, and legislation. The country’s success in using fracking technology and exploiting abundant shale reserves have made it the world’s largest producer of hydrocarbons and a major exporter, especially of natural gas.1 Further, as national and international concerns about climate change have grown, U.S. energy policy has become more aligned with transitioning to renewable sources. So far, the focus of clean energy additions has been on wind, solar, and nuclear power. Beginning in the mid-2000s, the United States issued legislation and policies raising renewable energy to the level of industrial policy. Among those were the Energy Policy Act (2005), the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (2009), the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) (2021), the CHIPS and Science Act (2022), and the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) (2022). However, geothermal energy—which uses the heat of the earth’s crust for power—has been largely left out of U.S. industrial policy. This is despite the facts that utilizing this source of renewable energy requires some of the same technologies that have made the United States the world’s top oil and gas producer and that geothermal has the potential to provide clean, dispatchable power that does not rely on weather conditions. With U.S. clean firm power demand expected to increase by approximately 700–900 gigawatts by 2050,2 the United States needs to dramatically increase capacity while reducing or eliminating net carbon output and insulating its energy supply from dependence on international supply chains. The question for the country now is: how should public and private resources be directed to provide the United States with an energy system optimized for the current national and international environment? This paper argues that recent advances in geothermal power have made it the technology with superior characteristics for future U.S. energy system development. With its comparative advantages, geothermal power merits an urgent, intense, and dedicated reorientation of U.S. industrial policy, legislation, and resources.
- Topic:
- Development, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, and Geothermal Power
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
44. China Decoupling Beyond the United States: Comparing Germany, Japan, and India
- Author:
- Joshua Sullivan and Jon Bateman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- Key U.S. partners are moving toward less technological integration with China. But their specific paths diverge significantly based on domestic circumstances and varied relationships with Beijing.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Science and Technology, Economy, Regional Integration, and Decoupling
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, India, Asia, Germany, and United States of America
45. How to Spend It: European defence for the age of mass precision
- Author:
- Chris Kremidas-Courtney
- Publication Date:
- 03-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- Europe urgently needs to redefine its defence strategy in response to the United States’ growing disengagement from its transatlantic allies. The suspension of US military assistance to Ukraine and calls for increased European self-reliance have forced policymakers to rapidly reassess how to sustain collective security. The European Union’s ReArm EU plan seeks to mobilise €800 billion in national defence spending to meet these challenges, but investments must be made wisely to prepare for future warfare. Modern warfare has entered into an era of mass precision, where forces can achieve the effects of massed firepower through distributed, AI-enabled, and highly accurate weapons systems. Ukraine’s innovative use of drone swarms and precision strikes against Russian forces has demonstrated this shift. China and the US are also leveraging mass precision to reshape the battlefield, making traditional mass-based warfare increasingly obsolete. However, while armoured vehicles, fighter jets, and ships require new protections, they remain essential when integrated into networked, distributed operations. To prepare for this new strategic reality, Europe must: Invest in mass precision and distributed operations – Prioritise drone warfare, deep-strike capabilities, and networked operations. Accelerate investment in the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) programme to develop long-range cruise missiles. Build a European command-and-control (C2) system – Reduce reliance on NATO’s US-centric C2 infrastructure. Strengthen Europe’s intelligence capabilities and decision support – Expand European satellite and cyber capabilities and expand analytical capacities. Strengthen air and missile defence – Accelerate the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) and deploy cost effective countermeasures such as more cost effective laser-based systems. Build a European military logistics system – Ensure the ability to sustain forces and ensure rapid troop and equipment mobility within Europe. Train and exercise European forces at scale – Conduct large-scale joint exercises to build readiness. Buy Ukrainian – Integrate Ukrainian defence firms into EU supply chains. Buy European – Reduce dependence on US arms while leveraging UK, Norwegian, Canadian and Turkish defence industries. Build a European nuclear umbrella – France and the UK should explore extended deterrence options to protect all European allies in case of further US withdrawal. Build a European blue-water navy – Strengthen and expand European naval capabilities to protect vital sea lanes in addition to supporting territorial defence. Winning the next war, not the last one Europe can no longer afford slow, bureaucratic and fragmented defence spending—it must accelerate, integrate and innovate in order to defend itself in the event that the United States is unable or unwilling to do so. We don’t just need bigger budgets—we need a better strategy. The future of warfare is mass precision and distributed operations, enabled by AI, and supported by capabilities that enable decision, cyber and information dominance. If Europe invests wisely, it can be a technologically advanced, resilient and autonomous military power while remaining a robust pillar of NATO’s collective security. The hour of Europe is now.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, European Union, Weapons, Disengagement, and Defense Spending
- Political Geography:
- Europe and United States of America
46. The e-commerce challenge: Is importing low-value consignments going to become more cumbersome in the EU and the US?
- Author:
- Anna Jerzewska
- Publication Date:
- 04-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- In the last few months, terms such as e-commerce and de minimis (threshold below which imported goods are not subject to tariffs) have made headlines both in the EU and in the US. The rapid growth of e-commerce exacerbated problems with this exemption both in the US and in the EU. The first problem is lack of control. Only a percentage of commercial goods are subject to physical border checks, and for e-commerce goods this number is even smaller. Then there is the issue of endangering the level-playing field. De minimis benefits consumers and businesses that rely on it, but harms domestic manufacturers and retail outlets that import in bulk (and thus are subject to full customs and product standards and safety requirements). But can the challenges around the rapid growth of e-commerce be solved by the removal of de minimis? And what would be the consequences of removing the exemption? The paper summarises recent attempts and proposals of removing de minimis in the EU and the US and the challenges faced by both administrations. In both cases, e-commerce is still under discussion and it’s not clear what the final solution will look like. However, there are already noticeable differences in approach.
- Topic:
- European Union, Trade, Imports, and E-Commerce
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, and United States of America
47. The Effects of US-China Cooperation on Fentanyl Markets and Overdose Deaths
- Author:
- Marcus Noland, Julieta Contreras, and Lucas Rengifo-Keller
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
- Abstract:
- Drug overdose is the leading cause of death among Americans aged 15–44, exceeding heart disease, cancer, suicide, vehicular accidents, and COVID-19 in 2023. Most drug deaths are associated with fentanyl. This paper uses data on illicit drug prices to estimate reduced-form price equations of fentanyl, oxycodone, and alprazolam based on supply and demand, including hedonic characteristics. The results are used to estimate the relationship between fentanyl prices and overdoses. They suggest that the Chinese embargo on fentanyl shipments to the United States beginning in May 2019 raised street prices for a limited period, reducing fentanyl overdose deaths in the United States by roughly one-quarter over a three- to five-month period after the announcement.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, Drugs, Opioid Crisis, Cooperation, and Fentanyl
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
48. Radical novelties in critical technologies and spillovers: how do China, the US and the EU fare?
- Author:
- Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- Critical technologies including artificial intelligence, semiconductors and quantum computing are attracting attention because of their indispensable nature and their role in national security strategies. We compare China, the United States and the European Union in these technologies and their subfields. We use large language models (LLMs) to identify which patents in these technologies can be considered most groundbreaking (not patented before) and worth replicating. These are ‘radical novelties.’ We find that the US clearly dominates quantum. Chinese and EU progress is similar. The US does slightly better than China in AI with clear dominance in generative AI, but China stands out in some important subfields, such as aerial vehicle technology. China dominates in a larger number of semiconductor fields but not in the highest value added, which is related to design. In a second step we assess how quickly radical novelties in these three technologies are transferred from one economic area to another and within each economic area. We find that the fastest transmission overall is for AI. The EU is by far the slowest in replicating radical novelties from the US and China, while the US and China tend to replicate European novel patents relatively quickly. Radical novelties are also replicated quickly between China and the US which is surprising given US controls on exports of critical technologies to China. Our findings are concerning for Europe because it does not produce enough critical patents in these technologies and because it is slower in replicating patents from the US and China.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Economy, Trade, and Artificial Intelligence
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
49. Which companies are ahead in frontier innovation on critical technologies? Comparing China, the European Union and the United States
- Author:
- Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Michal Krystyanczuk, and Robin Schindowski
- Publication Date:
- 05-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- Competition in critical technologies is attracting increasing attention not only because of the foundational nature of these technologies for other types of innovation, but also because of their role in the United States national security strategy. In this paper, we look into which entities in China, the European Union and the US innovate at the technology frontier in the three most important critical technologies – artificial intelligence, quantum computing and semiconductors – based on identification of the most radical novel patents in these technologies and their subsectors. Working with these pathbreaking patents, we look into the origin of the companies that file the largest numbers of them. US innovators dominate the innovation frontier for quantum computing and, to a lesser extent, AI, with Chinese innovators doing better in semiconductors. European innovators lag in all, but perform relatively better in quantum computing, in which they rank similarly to Chinese innovators. Furthermore, the innovation ecosystem is quite different across geographies. In the US, tech companies top the rankings of critical novelties and are highly concentrated: as many as three companies are in the top rankings of all of the three critical technologies. Frontier innovators in the field in which the EU competes most equally – quantum – are mostly research centres and not companies. China lies somewhat in between in all three domains.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, Semiconductors, and Quantum Computing
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
50. How can Europe’s nuclear deterrence trilemma be resolved?
- Author:
- Andrea Gilli and Francesco Nicoli
- Publication Date:
- 06-2025
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Bruegel
- Abstract:
- The United States under President Donald Trump has adopted an ambiguous position on European security. Although no immediate risk of abandonment is apparent, European countries are rethinking their defence strategies in case the US declines to support them, or provides only partial support, in a crisis. This discussion is particularly sensitive in relation to nuclear weapons, the ultimate deterrent, for which European countries depend extensively on the United States. We argue that a possible future US withdrawal from European nuclear security will force European countries to face a policy trilemma. If they stick to the existing policy framework of no proliferation and no joint deterrence, they expose themselves to nuclear blackmail, should the US withdraw its external guarantee. If they want to protect themselves from nuclear blackmail, they must choose how to provide nuclear security: either collective nuclear security, which would compromise some national sovereignty, or independent provision by individual countries, leading to nuclear proliferation in Europe. Having established that uncontrolled proliferation is an inferior outcome to some form of joint deterrence, we identify four main alternatives: an extension of the Franco-British nuclear deterrent; an extension complemented by a jointly financed expansion of existing deterrence; the absorption of the French (and perhaps British) nuclear arsenals into a European arsenal; and the construction of a separate European submarine deterrent (with Europe using French or British technology or developing new technology). We also discuss briefly forms of non-nuclear deterrence, which however would likely be a complementary rather than a substitute for a nuclear deterrent. We compare these options using a set of parameters: strategic autonomy and credibility, changes to treaties (including non-proliferation), costs, capabilities and readiness. Our analysis shows that all options have advantages and disadvantages, but some are politically, financially and militarily more feasible.
- Topic:
- Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Industrial Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Macroeconomics, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, and Vulnerability
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, and United States of America