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Begin New Search Political Geography United States of America Content Type Working Paper Publication Year within 1 Year

111. Migration policy preferences and forms of trust in contexts of limited state capacity

Author:
William L. Allen, Matthew D. Bird, Luisa Feline Freier, Isabel Ruiz, and Carlos Vargas-Silva
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:
Why do citizens hold different migration policy preferences? US and European evidence suggests political trust matters by raising support for more open policies, attenuating concerns about costs and strengthening beliefs in governments’ implementation abilities. However, this may not hold in countries with limited state capacity. Instead, we argue interpersonal trust placed in policy beneficiaries matters more as citizens circumvent weaker institutions. We test this using conjoint experiments in Colombia and Peru—low-capacity countries experiencing large inflows of forcibly-displaced Venezuelans—that vary aspects of migration policies. Political trust selectively moderates preferences on migrants’ employment rights and numerical limits, contributing novel evidence of boundary conditions for this form of trust. By contrast, greater interpersonal trust is linked to more open preferences across all tested domains. Our results cast doubt on the importance of political trust for migration preferences in contexts of limited state capacity, instead highlighting its partial substitution by interpersonal trust.
Topic:
Trust, Migration Policy, and State Capacity
Political Geography:
Europe, Colombia, Venezuela, Peru, and United States of America

112. Foreign influence in US politics

Author:
Marco Grotteria, Max Miller, and S. Lakshmi Naaraayanan
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP)
Abstract:
This paper documents that foreign lobbying influences US government spending. We introduce a comprehensive dataset of over 230,000 date-stamped, in-person meetings between agents representing foreign governments and individual US legislators, state governors, and employees of US executive agencies from 2000 to 2018. The data suggest that foreign agents meet disproportionately with individuals important for foreign aid and corporate subsidies, like legislators sitting on powerful congressional committees. Foreign agents also maintain connections with legislators even after they depart powerful committees, providing evidence that meetings do not just reflect short-term quid-pro-quo arrangements. Around meetings, foreign countries receive greater amounts of financial aid. Foreign firms whose governments lobby more often also receive larger corporate subsidies from areas the legislators and governors that they meet with represent. Finally, legislators who meet more often with foreign agents receive both monetary and electoral benefits, while we do not find changes in the political contributions they receive or in their probability of re-election, suggesting that legislators are not punished by their constituents for meeting with representatives of foreign countries.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Lobbying, and Foreign Influence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

113. Spillover effects of the recent US monetary policy shocks on the South African economy: The role of monetary and fiscal policy coordination

Author:
Guangling Liu and Marrium Mustapher
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
This study examines how different policy mix regimes affect the impact of recent US contractionary monetary policy on South Africa’s inflation and business cycles. The study uses a small open economy New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with an integrated fiscal block to analyse these effects. Regime M (active monetary policy) is more effective at containing the spillover effects but leads to higher public debt, requiring larger future fiscal surpluses. The commitment to price stability under Regime M increases real interest rates, raising domestic debt service costs and the debt-to-GDP ratio. Regime F (active fiscal policy), in contrast, stabilizes debt more quickly but at the cost of higher inflation, as it does not use future surpluses to manage public debt. These spillover effects are more amplified under both Regime M and Regime F in the case of a complete exchange rate pass-through and a higher degree of trade openness, with Regime F exhibiting a stronger amplification effect.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Monetary Policy, Inflation, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Africa, South Africa, North America, and United States of America

114. The Political Economy of Conditionality and the New Industrial Policy

Author:
Fabio Bulfone, Timur Ergen, and Erez Maggor
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Conditionality was a central concern in the development literature of the 1990s. With the massive expansion of targeted public support to private firms since the Great Financial Crisis, the question of conditionality is once again at the center of industrial policy debates. Despite the growing interest in the concept, the existing literature does not provide a systematic conceptualization of conditionality in the context of industrial policy, nor does it outline the political factors that facilitate the introduction of conditionality by state actors. This paper addresses this gap by offering a systematic political economy of conditionality. We provide an overview of the literature on conditionality, focusing on different industries, historical periods, and national contexts. In doing so, we make three contributions to the debate on industrial policy. First, we distinguish between two broad instruments of conditionality: performance standards and corporate control devices. Next, we map the coalitional, institutional, ideational, and global contextual factors that facilitate conditionality. Finally, we offer two vignettes of recent industrial policy initiatives in the EU and the US as illustrative cases. We make two arguments. First, the presence of conditionality is not primarily a technical matter of political design, but is shaped by combinations of political economy factors. Second, industrial policy conditionality provides an important theoretical lens for assessing how and where the recent revival of state activism represents a substantive break from the neoliberal order.
Topic:
Development, Industrial Policy, Political Economy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Conditionality
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

115. Firm Size and Society: The Link Between Firm Size, Job Outcomes, and Political Attitudes

Author:
Sinisa Hadziabdic and Sebastian Kohl
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Given the recent reconcentration of the economy in many private industries, the impact of working in firms of different sizes on occupational and political outcomes is of renewed interest. Using micro-level data for the US and Germany, two most dissimilar cases in terms of labor market and political institutions, we show that large firms provide substantially more material and welfare benefits to their workers, while small firms are characterized by the highest job satisfaction and more harmonious relational dynamics. Workers in medium-sized firms appear to be “betwixt and between,” being worst off in many dimensions, thus contradicting utopias of medium-sized-firm capitalism. Within firms of similar size, we also document a significant polarization between employers’ and their employees’ job experiences and political views. Given the number of waking hours spent in the workplace, the firm, hitherto a neglected locus of social sorting and socialization through which the economy shapes society, should figure more prominently in economic sociology research.
Topic:
Economy, Labor Market, Jobs, Political Attitudes, and Job Outcomes
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

116. On U.S.-ASEAN Relations & Trade

Author:
Shay Wester and Kaewkamol Karen Pitakdumrongkit
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
As the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) deepen their economic ties, the stakes for both sides are rising. Comprising 10 Southeast Asian nations, ASEAN stands as the fourth-largest trading partner of the United States, with bilateral trade approaching $500 billion in 2023. The region maintains a $200 billion trade surplus with the United States, mainly from high-tech electronics and manufactured goods. Southeast Asia's economic importance to the United States is substantial and growing. By early 2024, the United States had overtaken China as ASEAN's largest export market, with 15% of ASEAN's exports destined for the United States, up nearly 4% since 2018. The United States is also the largest source of cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) in ASEAN, with total stock reaching nearly $480 billion in 2023 — almost double the combined U.S. investments in China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. The region's potential for future growth is impressive: with nearly 700 million people and a GDP of $3.6 trillion, Southeast Asia is projected to be the world's fastest-growing trade area, driven by its young population and economic diversity. The region’s digital economy alone is expected to reach $1 trillion by 2030. These dynamics position Southeast Asia as not only an economic hub but also as a linchpin in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. Recognizing this, the U.S. and ASEAN governments have advanced their economic cooperation across multiple fronts. Bilateral ties with key Southeast Asian partners have strengthened, including upgraded partnerships with Indonesia and Vietnam, a new dialogue with Singapore on critical technologies, and an infrastructure initiative in the Philippines. At the regional level, ASEAN plays a key role in facilitating dialogue and shaping economic policies among its member states and external partners. Through mechanisms such as the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the organization aligns national priorities with broader regional objectives. In 2022, the U.S.-ASEAN relationship was elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, with President Biden hosting a Special Summit in Washington. The Biden administration has intensified regional cooperation by launching new ministerial dialogues, establishing a U.S.-ASEAN Center in Washington, and increasing investments in areas such as infrastructure, digital economy, and clean energy. However, challenges remain in U.S.-ASEAN engagement. While the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) emerged as a key cooperation platform with seven ASEAN member states, its scope remains limited and progress on trade-related aspects has stalled due to congressional opposition over digital trade, labor, and environmental standards. Concerns about U.S. commitment to the region persist, particularly due to fluctuating policies and strategic competition with China. Many ASEAN nations feel that U.S. initiatives often focus more on countering China than on addressing their economic priorities. As they navigate challenges like economic instability, climate vulnerabilities, and widening socio-economic gaps, ASEAN countries seek more tangible benefits from their engagement with the United States, including improved market access and new investments.
Topic:
Economics, Bilateral Relations, Elections, Trade, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

117. On the Economic Security Agenda

Author:
Jane Mellsop and Mariko Togashi
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Economic security has been hitting the headlines in recent years, with the catchcry that “economic security is national security” underpinning many countries’ view of the world today. While there is no single definition of economic security, the United States and its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific are increasingly concerned about the security and resiliency of their supply chains and access to markets for strategic products, including critical minerals; the disruptions their businesses face from geopolitical, health or climate crises; inappropriate technology transfers; and the risks of economic coercion. The emphasis that each of these countries places on individual economic security issues will necessarily differ due to a range of factors such as their development status, national interests, vulnerabilities, and China policies. In 2023, the Group of Seven (G7) leaders took the first unified step to put the spotlight on economic security as a critical global challenge. Japan shepherded through a new G7 Leaders’ Statement on Economic Resilience and Economic Security at the Hiroshima Summit, highlighting the need to address economic vulnerabilities and counter exploitative practices. By taking this move, the G7 illustrated its leadership in addressing pressing global economic issues, especially as other groups, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), falter in generating collective responses and rules to address new challenges. Representing around a third of the global economy, the G7 can set the tone and the agenda for action on critical issues facing the global economy, although its small number of members is also a limitation when trying to garner broad support for new initiatives.
Topic:
Security, Economics, National Security, G7, and Resilience
Political Geography:
North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

118. On U.S.-China Relations & Climate

Author:
Kate Logan and Li Shuo
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Climate change, and how to confront it, is one of the most politicized issues in the American political system. Regardless of how U.S. politicians talk about climate change, its effects are increasingly dire for Americans and the entire world — including many vulnerable populations in Asia. With the United States and China accounting for around 40% of annual greenhouse gas emissions globally, the speed and scale of their collective emissions reductions will largely determine the future magnitude of economic and human damages. Moreover, how the United States and China implement climate policy and interact will also shape geopolitics, especially for Asian economies that depend on fossil fuels or those rich in minerals and technologies needed for clean energy. The nature of climate change as a common global challenge previously enabled the United States and China to forge a uniquely cooperative relationship on the issue. U.S.-China joint action famously laid the groundwork for the landmark Paris Agreement in 2015, while tempering bilateral tensions. Former President Donald Trump’s subsequent withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, however, irrevocably damaged this cooperation, along with global trust in the United States as a climate leader. And the recent emergence of U.S. economic competitiveness with China as a rare area of bipartisan consensus has further complicated the issue, as U.S. policy responses aiming to limit China’s global dominance in essential clean technologies including solar panels and electric vehicles are seen as counterproductive to the global clean energy transition. Despite this, President Joe Biden and his vice president, Kamala Harris — now the Democratic presidential nominee — have supported climate cooperation as a critical area of U.S.-China convergence. This is the backdrop against which this year’s U.S. election is playing out: two parties that largely align in their view of China as the top U.S. competitor, but who hold starkly polarized views toward climate policy as an economic enabler, in Harris’s and the Democrats’ case, or as a barrier to growth that must be dismantled, as Trump and his supporters contend. The stakes are high — for U.S.-China relations, as well as for the health and safety of our planet.
Topic:
Climate Change, Politics, Bilateral Relations, Carbon Emissions, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

119. On Science & Tech Diplomacy

Author:
Akshay Mathur and Helen Zhang
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
A new era of intergovernmental science and technology cooperation has emerged, driven by the United States and its Asian partners in the Indo-Pacific such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, Singapore, and India. As science and technology take primacy in the modern economy, countries are introducing laws and policies to build new sovereign capabilities, protect sensitive innovations and industries, and govern cross-border cooperation. This essay examines the key trends we have observed in the United States and select Asian countries in the Indo-Pacific, the nature of agreements being inked, and the likely direction of cooperation under the next U.S. administration.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Science and Technology, and Trade
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

120. On U.S.-China Relations & Political Economy

Author:
Lizzi C. Lee and Neil Thomas
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
Communist leaders may not like electoral democracy but there are few events they will pay more attention to this year than the U.S. presidential election on November 5. General Secretary Xi Jinping says U.S.-China ties are “the most important bilateral relationship in the world,” and Chinese officials, scholars, and netizens are anxious to glean insights about Republican Party candidate and former President Donald Trump and Democratic Party candidate and current Vice President Kamala Harris. For Beijing, the stakes are high. The presidencies of first Trump and now Joe Biden saw the United States adopt a posture of “strategic competition” toward China that has significantly impacted the ruling Chinese Communist Party’s external environment and domestic priorities. Trump imposed tariffs on most Chinese imports to the United States, which Biden ramped up in key industries including electric vehicles. Biden introduced extensive export controls aimed at curbing China’s chip industry, which could be expanded to other sectors. Trump and Biden have both elevated U.S. support for Taiwan; strengthened restrictions on inbound and outbound investment with China; and sanctioned hundreds of Chinese government agencies, state-owned enterprises, private firms, and individuals. Biden has further prioritized working with U.S. allies and partners on economic, political, and security policies to blunt China’s influence. Both countries seek “guardrails” against crisis and conflict, but bilateral diplomacy is increasingly fraught and multilateral cooperation on global challenges is increasingly difficult. This essay analyzes the China policies of both candidates, focusing on the diplomatic and economic dimensions of U.S.-China relations, highlighting how a second Trump administration could deliver acute shocks but potential openings while Harris would likely bring continuity with Biden’s approach. It argues that Beijing has no clear preference between the two candidates. Therefore, neither election outcome would fundamentally change China’s international strategy, although the result would produce different tactical responses. It concludes with recommendations for how both Washington and Beijing can safeguard global stability while preserving national sovereignty regardless of who succeeds Biden.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political Economy, Sovereignty, Bilateral Relations, Elections, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America