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Begin New Search Topic Economy Political Geography United States of America Content Type Working Paper Publication Year within 1 Year Publication Year within 10 Years Publication Year within 3 Years

1. South Korea and IPEF: Rationale, Objectives and the Implications for Partners and Neighbors

Author:
Jaewoo Choo
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As a key manufacturer of high-end technology components critical to the sustainability of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, South Korea is essential in any effort to rebuild a resilient global supply chain but also to the promotion of a clean economy. South Korea can thus contribute to two of the pillars of IPEF (Indo-Pacific Economic Framework), specially to pillars II and III (supply-chain resilience and a clean economy). However, as the US executive and legislative branches intensify their hawkish approaches to China, they have not given much consideration to the possible damage they will inflict on the strategic interests of some of their allies. In particular, they have not fully considered Korean factors when legislating on bills such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA). This paper argues that allies such as South Korea and France must make the White House and US legislature aware of the external consequences of their decisions and behavior, and that they must cooperate within the confines of US-led strategic initiatives.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economy, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

2. United States–China semiconductor standoff: A supply chain under stress

Author:
Jeremy Mark and Dexter Tiff Roberts
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In August 2022, the US Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act, a law that approves subsidies and tax breaks to help jump-start the renewed production on American soil of advanced semiconductors.1 Just two months later, the Joe Biden administration issued wide-ranging restrictions on the export to China of chips and chip-making technology to undercut that country’s ability to manufacture the same class of integrated circuits.2 Taken together with a steady stream of Biden administration prohibitions on technology sales to key Chinese companies, the US initiatives represent a profound turn toward competition with China in the high-tech realm.3 They also highlight an effort to restructure the complex, multinational supply chains centered on East Asia that manufacture hundreds of billions of dollars of semiconductors a year. As such, the Biden administration has set in motion a process that could alter the business strategies—and fortunes—of homegrown and foreign-invested semiconductor companies based in China, world-leading chipmakers in Taiwan and South Korea, and suppliers around the world that provide the industry with the machinery and myriad inputs that fuel chip production. The Biden administration insists that its restrictions on sales to China are intended only to limit China’s ability to produce the cutting-edge chips that can feed into the development of weapons and other strategically important technologies—and not to cripple its semiconductor industry. But the current state of play of sanctions and support for US-based semiconductor production, including by Taiwanese and Korean chipmakers, is not the endpoint in this process. Rather, the momentum to constrain Beijing’s semiconductor program is likely to continue in the coming months, at the very least with additional restrictions on Chinese companies and government-linked entities, and unprecedented bureaucratic scrutiny of American venture-capital and equity-financing flows to China. That amounts to more bad news for corporate leaders in Asia, North America, and Europe who have spent the past generation building a globe-spanning semiconductor industry that has faced few barriers to expansion. As US restrictions mount, and sales of certain technologies to China flag, the once-unimaginable process of reorienting semiconductor supply chains will become an ever-present reality. The CHIPS and Science Act already is becoming an important factor in corporate strategy, providing incentives for Taiwanese, Korean, and American companies to make big bets on new factories in places like New York, Ohio, Texas, and Arizona—witness Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company’s (TSMC’s) recent decision to build a second factory in Phoenix.4 This paper explores the potential implications of US semiconductor policy for the global semiconductor supply chains and the competition for primacy in an industry that is constantly changing the face of the global economy and one that has implications for global security in all its dimensions. It begins by examining the policies put in place by the Biden administration, and then discusses the changes taking place across the industry, with a focus on Asia.
Topic:
Economy, Business, Supply Chains, Semiconductors, and Economic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. Building a Coalition - the U.S. Faces Down Competition with China in the Chip Sector

Author:
Damian Wnukowski
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In recent months, the U.S. has intensified its international efforts to limit China’s ability to produce the most advanced chips. The result includes the introduction by Japan and the Netherlands of restrictions on the export of modern machines for chip production. In response, China is trying to attract foreign investment and develop its own potential in this sector. The U.S. actions may significantly slow the pace of China’s technological development and economic growth and limit its potential to further strengthen its military capabilities. This may make it difficult for China to support Russia with dual-use products and render possible offensive actions against Taiwan harder.
Topic:
Economy, Production, Semiconductors, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4. Inequality of Opportunity and Income Redistribution

Author:
Marcel Preuss, Germán Reyes, Jason Somerville, and Joy Wu
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Distributive, Labor and Social Studies (CEDLAS)
Abstract:
We examine how people redistribute income when there is uncertainty about the role luck plays in determining opportunities and outcomes. We elicit redistribution decisions from a U.S.- representative sample who observe worker outcomes and whether luck magnified workers’ effort (“lucky opportunities”) or determined workers’ income directly (“lucky outcomes”). We find that participants redistribute less and are less reactive to changes in the importance of luck in environments with lucky opportunities. Our findings have implications for models that seek to understand and predict redistribution attitudes, and help to explain the gap between lab evidence on support for redistribution and U.S. inequality trends.
Topic:
Inequality, Economy, Redistribution, and Income
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

5. Pandemic-era Inflation Drivers and Global Spillovers

Author:
Julian di Giovanni, Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan, Alvaro Silva, and Muhammad A. Yildirim
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
We estimate a multi-country multi-sector New Keynesian model to quantify the drivers of domestic inflation during 2020–2023 in several countries, including the United States. The model matches observed inflation together with sector-level prices and wages. We further measure the relative importance of different types of shocks on inflation across countries over time. The key mechanism, the international transmission of demand, supply and energy shocks through global linkages helps us to match the behavior of the USD/Euro exchange rate. The quantification exercise yields four key findings. First, negative supply shocks to factors of production, labor and intermediate inputs, initially sparked inflation in 2020–2021. Global supply chains and complementarities in production played an amplification role in this initial phase. Second, positive aggregate demand shocks, due to stimulative policies, widened demand-supply imbalances, amplifying inflation further during 2021–2022. Third, the reallocation of consumption between goods and service sectors, a relative sector-level demand shock, played a role in transmitting these imbalances across countries through the global trade and production network. Fourth, global energy shocks have differential impacts on the US relative to other countries’ inflation rates. Further, complementarities between energy and other inputs to production play a particularly important role in the quantitative impact of these shocks on inflation.
Topic:
Economy, Inflation, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

6. A Growth Perspective on Wyoming

Author:
Thảo-Nguyên Bùi, Tim Freeman, Farah Kaddah, Lucas Lamby, and Yang Li
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
This report sets out to understand if the economy of the State of Wyoming is positioned to grow into the future. To do this, the report begins by investigating the past. To know where the state economy could be headed, and how that direction may be improved, it is critical to understand how the state developed the economic structure and drivers that it has today. Thus, Wyoming’s economic trajectory is explored over the long, medium, and short term. From this investigation, we find that Wyoming faces an overall growth problem, but we also find a high degree of variation in economic engines and growth prospects across the state. The problem that this report identifies is that the composition of economic activities is not positioned to sustain a high quality of life across all parts of the state. “Across all parts of the state” is an essential part of the problem statement for Wyoming. While some local and regional economies in the state are growing and bumping up against identifiable constraints, other local and regional economies are experiencing sustained contractions and will require new sources of growth in order to retain (or expand) population and high quality of life. Since economic dynamics vary significantly across the state, analysis is conducted in as much geographic detail as possible. By combining historical and geographic dimensions of growth, this report aims to inform pathways for sustained and inclusive prosperity across the of Wyoming.
Topic:
Economy, Economic Growth, Telework, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America