Content Type: Working Paper / Political Geography: Ukraine / Publication Year: within 10 Years and within 5 Years

1. Local feminist perspectives as transformation levers for greater gender equality: synthesis study

Author:: Jacqueline Götze, Stephan Klingebiel, and Maryam Khalid
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: The significance of gender equality needs to be spotlighted since women and LGBTQIA* communities are prone to become victims of violence and have limited participation in political and decision-making processes. The approaches of feminist development policies and feminist foreign policies have been criticised for their potential inapplicability to diverse contexts and for perpetuating paternalistic or neo-colonial behaviours. The global rise of right-wing policies has influenced politics, prompting researchers on feminist policies to critically examine their limitations and the ways they have been institutionalised. The present study builds on the expertise, knowledge and experiences of partners from Ghana, India and Ukraine. It introduces local feminist perspectives as levers for transformative change for greater gender equality that can produce context-specific alternative approaches to development processes by addressing prevailing norms and practices, and thereby enhance access to resources and improve the political participation of women, girls and members of the LGBTQIA* communities. This synthesis study identifies common themes, challenges and opportunities across the three case studies prepared by the partner organisations through a combination of deductive and inductive processes. We have developed a matrix of 13 criteria, which can be categorised into five thematic clusters that include: intersectionality, special characteristics of local feminisms and gender (in)equalities, multi-directional flow of norms, challenges and opportunities for gender-transformative change, and future of gender-transformative policies. Key findings reveal persistent barriers faced by local feminist perspectives in influencing policy, decision-making and gender norms due to limited possibilities and restricted opportunities.
Topic:: Feminism, LGBT+, Decision-Making, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:: Ukraine, India, and Ghana

2. Local feminist perspectives as transformation levers for sustainable development in Ukraine in the context of ongoing defence

Author:: Olena Strelnyk, Liudmyla Yuzva, and Tamara Zlobina
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: The research in this discussion paper explores the significant role of feminist perspectives and actions in fostering sustainable gender-transformative changes within Ukraine, particularly during the ongoing defence against Russian aggression. It highlights the ability of feminist movements to catalyse long-term shifts towards gender equality and social inclusion, with a focus on women’s and LGBT+ rights. Despite the challenges of war, feminist activists continue to push for transformative policies that not only address immediate wartime needs, but also lay the foundation for gender-responsive defence, inclusive recovery and post-war reconstruction. This study examines the impact of feminist actions and perspectives on various sectors of Ukrainian society, the barriers they face and the opportunities that remain for strengthening feminist policies during and after the war. The research timeline spans 2014-2024, corresponding to the duration of Russia’s war against Ukraine, with a particular emphasis on the period of the full-scale invasion from 2022 to 2024.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Feminism, LGBT+, Russia-Ukraine War, Sustainable Development, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

3. A battle against time – and against Putin’s Russia

Author:: Erwan Fouéré
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: With Putin’s war against Ukraine about to enter its third year, the EU’s enlargement policy remains at the top of its foreign policy priorities, with the focus being on both Ukraine and Moldova. This is following the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with both countries. But where does this leave the countries of the Western Balkans and their very long journey towards the EU which began over 20 years ago? Will these countries’ hopes for much needed political momentum in their accession prospects be fulfilled during 2024, despite the repeated delays and the EU’s failure to respect its commitments to the region over the past few years? With elections taking place across Europe offering fertile ground for Russia to deploy its arsenal of disinformation tactics, time is not on the EU’s side. To counter Russian attempts to influence developments in the region, as well as to reverse the dangerous trend of backsliding in democratic and rule of law reforms, the EU will need to adopt a more robust, consistent and determined approach towards the Western Balkans. Without any further delay, it needs to set out a much needed geopolitical and security direction for its enlargement policies in the Western Balkans.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Rule of Law, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Balkans

4. Ukraine's European Aspirations

Author:: Myroslav Marynovych
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Ukrainians have always been aware of the fact that they belong to the European cultural sphere. As Serhiy Plokhyi, professor of Ukrainian history at Harvard University, points out, "...times change, ideologies change - liberalism is replaced by national-communism... or the idea of human rights emerges. But Europe remains a constant as an example of that something else that is par excellence necessary for the survival of the Ukrainian national project." Before Ukraine was absorbed by Muscovy in the 17th century, the fact that Ukrainian lands were then part of the Rzeczpospolita (Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) opened up a natural cultural window onto Europe. It was thanks to this lively cultural exchange (albeit not without its problems) that “Ukrainian Baroque” yes amongst other trends, came to be. However, once Ukraine became part of the Russian Empire, new ideas from Western civilisation only reached Ukraine by way of the Russian language, thereby condemning Ukrainian culture to secondary status. Politically, as an independent subject, Ukraine simply disappeared from European consciousness. The emergence of an independent Ukraine in 1991 offered Ukrainians new opportunities to re-establish direct cultural and political contacts with Europe. Immediately, the need to "return to Europe" emerged in Ukrainian public debate. Politically, this had an initial consequence: Ukraine found itself at the end of a fairly long queue of states waiting to join the European Union "club". It was assumed that these states would join as they went along (legislative reforms, economic modernisation, the fight against corruption, etc.). It was not all plain sailing, nor was it without its pitfalls, but the vector of the European vocation (and accession to the European Union) in Ukraine's development was undoubtedly the most powerful, even if it was rivalled by the attachment of eastern Ukrainians to Russia's cultural and political landscape. The impact of Russia's large-scale aggression against Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, primarily affected the pro-Russian part of the country. It is members of this population who now constitute the majority of refugees and displaced persons. It is their vision of the world that has been turned upside down against a backdrop of atrocities and genocidal crimes committed by the Russians. Accession to the European Union and NATO has therefore become the sine qua non of Ukraine's aspirations, as confirmed by several documents of national importance. In addition to historical memory and purely cultural preferences, security priorities are now clearly visible. Ukraine has begun to implement the European Union’s recommendations and to adapt its legal framework to that of Europe. Any campaign against European integration, or simply questioning the need for it, would be perceived by Ukrainian society as a betrayal of national interests. Recently, however, opinions within the European Union have diverged somewhat. Alongside those States that were shocked by the brutality of the Russian aggression and have declared their solidarity with the Ukrainian people and their willingness to accept our country into the Union, there are also States such as Hungary and Slovakia that consider Ukraine's accession to the European Union to be premature, or even wrong. We can be both optimistic and pessimistic. Optimistic, because European leaders and the majority of Member States are increasingly in favour of Ukraine's accession. Pessimistic, because the chances of Ukraine's accession remain slim as long as the European Union retains its current decision-making rules. As war continues, the reactions of Ukrainian society to the reticence of Hungary and Slovakia and to the blocking of the borders by Polish, Slovakian and Romanian farmers have remained discreet. Ukrainians are aware that their country's accession to the European Union would be a long-term solution, and that a certain amount of restraint is therefore advisable. However, since nobody knows the future, in unfavourable circumstances, resentment and therefore rancour might erupt in Ukrainian society. This is why it would be useful to examine this situation not only from the point of view of the formal concordance of conflicting economic and political interests, but also from a broader perspective.
Topic:: European Union, Regional Integration, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

5. The technical limits of the EU. Europe’s defense economy as a driving force for strategic autonomy and technological sovereignty

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 01-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The Working Paper delves into the European Union’s defense sector’s evolution and current challenges, underscoring the urgency for strategic autonomy and technological sovereignty. It provides a historical backdrop of EU defense initiatives, highlighting the significant influence of recent geopolitical shifts, notably the conflict in Ukraine, on the EU’s defense strategies and industrial landscape. The fragmentation of the European defense market, rising equipment costs, and hefty R&D expenses undermining competitiveness and innovation are identified as key challenges. The author focuses on the war in Ukraine as a catalyst for a consolidated defense equipment market and a surge in military expenditures and defense investments among EU nations. He scrutinizes EU’s measures to foster innovation and integration in the defense market while grappling with national protectionism and divergent member state interests. Conclusively, the report advocates for an autonomous European defense capability as crucial for tackling both longstanding and emerging crises and threats. It underscores the imperative of a harmonized defense approach within the EU, highlighting its significance for the region’s stability and security.
Topic:: Defense Policy, European Union, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

6. The Price of War

Author:: Jonathan Federle, André Meier, Steffen Müller, Willi Mutschler, and Moritz Schularick
Publication Date:: 02-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: In an integrated global economy, the economic fallout of war is not confined to the country where the conflict is fought but spills over to other countries. We study the economic effects of large interstate wars using a new data set spanning 150 years of data for more than 60 countries. War on a country’s territory typically leads to an output decline of 30 percent and a 15 percentage point increase in inflation. We find large negative effects also for countries that are geographically close to the war site, irrespective of their participation in the war. Output in neighboring countries falls by more than 10 percent over 5 years, and inflation rises by 5 percentage points on average. Negative spillovers decline with geographic distance and increase in the degree of trade integration with the war site. For very distant countries, output spillovers can turn positive so that wars create winners and losers in the international economy. We rationalize these findings in an international business cycle model, calibrated to capture key features of the data. As the war destroys capital in the war site and productivity falls, trade with nearby economies decreases, generating an endogenous supply-side contraction abroad.
Topic:: International Trade and Finance, War, Business, Geoeconomics, Russia-Ukraine War, Spillovers, and Supply Shocks
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Global Focus

7. Refugees and Return: Resolving Ukraine's Human Capital Crisis

Author:: Markus Ziener and Dariia Mykhailyshyna
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: Ukraine is facing a human capital crisis of enormous proportions. Here, Dariia Mykhailyshyna of the Center for Economic Strategy in Kyiv presents the findings of three waves of surveys among Ukrainian refugees about their intentions to return to Ukraine or remain in their host countries. The report contains some recommendations for encouraging Ukrainians to return. Millions of its citizens fled the country after Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. To share best practices and generate possible solutions, the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), along with its partners—the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), hosted a conference titled “Toward a Skilled Workforce: Rebuilding Ukraine’s Human Capital” in Berlin on April 25–26, 2024. To set the stage, Dariia Mykhailyshyna of the Center for Economic Strategy in Kyiv presented the findings of three waves of surveys among Ukrainian refugees. Those findings, as well as some recommendations, are detailed in this report.
Topic:: Reconstruction, European Union, Refugees, and Human Capital
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

8. Rebuild, Decarbonize, and Integrate: Ukraine, the EU, and the Road to a Net-Zero Energy Sector

Author:: Jacob Kirkegaard
Publication Date:: 06-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:: More than half of Ukraine’s power production capacity has been damaged by Russia since February 2022. Reconstruction is already underway, but to meet EU accession requirements, Ukraine will have to rapidly decarbonize as it rebuilds. As the frontline situation points to a longer war than was projected early on, uncertainties about Ukraine’s long-term economic path and prospects have inevitably increased. At the same time, noticeable political progress has been made given the EU’s agreement to start negotiations for full Ukrainian membership. This step provides the fighting Ukrainian people with a long-term perspective and a destination point as a prosperous, democratic, European market economy. Anchoring Ukraine’s economic future in the EU will have transformative implications for the country’s economy, not least its energy sector. That sector, which is still exposed to Russian military attacks, is now compelled to assimilate into the rapidly decarbonizing EU. More than half of Ukraine’s power production capacity has been damaged by Russia since February 2022 or is situated on territory now controlled by Russia. The Net Zero World Initiative (2023) estimated that 43% of nuclear, 68% of coal-fired, and 33% of combined heat and power generation was lost to the war as of mid-2023. Despite continuing attacks, more than two gigawatts (GW) of electricity production capacity were restored during 2023. Reconstruction of the Ukrainian energy sector is already underway despite the war. With it, the country’s energy transformation has begun. Yet, in March 2024, Russia returned to large- scale saturation missile attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including its large hydropower plants and thermal power stations, inflicting further long-term damage. Putin seeks to exploit the apparent drop in Ukrainian air defense efficiency as Western supplies of air interceptor missiles have grown scarcer. Military risk consequently continues to cloud the outlook for Ukraine’s energy production. It also reduces the interest of foreign and domestic investors in committing resources to the sector. Uncertainty plagues the prospects for Western public support for Ukraine, too. Despite the recent passage of a funding package, future US funding will remain hostage to domestic politics. In Europe, various veto players—led by Hungary—as well as other internal divisions pose an ongoing political challenge to the EU’s financial support for Kyiv. The scarcity of public and private investment funding sources for Ukraine stands in stark contrast to the level of ambition for the energy- sector transition inherent in Ukraine’s EU accession process. One of the major energy- sector challenges facing Ukraine will be the expectation in Brussels that Ukraine will either enter fully into the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) or implement an ETS-aligned national carbon-pricing system of similar ambition. It will not be possible for the Ukrainian economy to be granted a prolonged transition period here, and—for instance—enjoy free carbon-emission credits for affected industries, when these same industries will have been partially or fully phased out in the rest of the EU at the time of Ukraine’s EU accession. While the EU ETS price is currently adjusting to the new post-2022 energy shock demand level (for example, prices have declined so far in 2024 to around €60–65/ton), the ETS auction price forward curve slopes upward. This indicates that carbon market participants continue to believe that EU carbon prices will rise during Ukraine’s EU accession process. Adapting the economy to the EU’s carbon price level will require urgent action on the part of the Ukrainian government as it prepares the long-term National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) that will lay out the country’s energy strategy for the rest of the 2020s. Certainly, Ukraine’s Environmental Protection Minister, Ruslan Strilets, displayed the necessary ambition when he spoke after the UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai in late 2023. He reiterated earlier government statements from 2021 and committed Ukraine to launching a pilot emissions trading system in 2025 with a full launch in 2026. This would enable Ukraine’s entry into the ETS, and thus avoid negative effects of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for Ukrainian exports. This is a timetable that necessitates immediate and sizable climate investments in Ukraine. Ukraine has further committed itself in recent months to a significant scaling up of its already large nuclear power-generation capacity. The Ukrainian government has signed memoranda of understanding aiming at the construction of up to nine new power units using Westinghouse AP1000 technology. Just as the accelerated introduction of carbon pricing in Ukraine will be costly, construction of new nuclear power units, even if located at one of Ukraine’s existing nuclear plant facilities, will require large sums of capital investment upfront. The issue of upfront costs will similarly weigh on the broader issue of reconstruction of Ukraine, as more energy- efficient buildings will only gradually earn back the higher building and materials costs through lower long-term energy consumption. Ukraine must be applauded for aiming to seize the opportunity to rebuild its energy sector and integrate it with the EU as quickly as possible. This follows the recommendations of several expert groups, including GMF’s earlier (2023) report on this issue, which called for rapid Ukrainian adoption of carbon pricing and highlighted the need to phase in EU-level building codes expeditiously. This paper will focus on the implications for both Ukraine and the EU of the Ukrainian government’s recent energy-sector choices. What do these plans require institutionally and financially to succeed, and how will they alter not only the Ukrainian but the entire EU energy sector in the process?
Topic:: Climate Change, European Union, Decarbonization, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Net Zero
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

9. Desinformación y censura en conflictos internacionales

Author:: Vicente Palacio
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:: El fenómeno de la desinformación no se limita al ámbito de las redes sociales; no es patrimonio únicamente de los regímenes autoritarios y populistas; y no afecta únicamente a la limpieza de los procesos electorales. Si ponemos el foco en el análisis de la información en los conflictos internacionales, debemos tener en cuenta que la desinformación es un fenómeno con varias ramificaciones. El punto de partida de este documento de trabajo es la constatación de que la desinformación, la propaganda y la censura en los conflictos armados representan una amenaza vital para nuestras democracias. Ambas atentan contra el derecho de la ciudadanía a obtener una información veraz, que es la base de las democracias liberales. Para España y para la Unión Europea, que están enfrentando dos grandes conflictos en Ucrania y en Oriente Medio, una información veraz y a tiempo debería ser la base de una democracia sana y también de una política exterior que rinda cuentas a los ciudadanos. Este documento tiene un triple objetivo. Primero, realizar un balance crítico de las respuestas legislativas dadas a nivel europeo frente a la desinformación. Segundo, hacer un repaso de los aspectos más relevantes en ambos conflictos de Ucrania y Gaza. Y tercero, lanzar reflexiones y algunas propuestas para poder combatir mejor la desinformación, la propaganda o la censura en la medida de lo posible, siendo conscientes de que en esa vía podremos alcanzar éxitos parciales, aunque significativ
Topic:: Disinformation, Armed Conflict, Censorship, Russia-Ukraine War, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Gaza

10. Dirty Warfare? The Application of International Law to Attacks on Nuclear Power Plants in the Conduct of Hostilities

Author:: Julia Vassileva
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine poses multiple threats to international security, with nuclear safety and nuclear weapons returning to the forefront of global politics. Alongside verbal threats of using tactical nuclear weapons, Russia’s invasion plans have included attacks on nuclear power plants (NPPs), such as the shelling of the Zaporizhzhia complex in Ukraine. These actions raise critical questions about the application of international law to military operations involving NPPs and liability for resulting nuclear damage. This paper examines the scope of international law in such scenarios and concludes with implications from the perspective of strategic studies and NATO nuclear policy.
Topic:: International Law, Weapons of Mass Destruction, International Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

11. Artillery in Present and Future High-Intensity Operations

Author:: Elio Calcagno, Bryan Clark, Sam Cranny-Evans, Alessandro Marrone, Nicolò Murgia, and Eugenio Po
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The Ukraine war has highlighted among NATO allies the importance of planning for protracted, large-scale, and high-intensity conflicts. In this context, artillery capabilities have regained significance, with a clear emphasis on survivability, quality, quantity, range, but also on adequate munition stocks and production capacity. However, successful integration into a wider array of capabilities (including long range precision fires) and advanced Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities are crucial for an effective artillery force. Meanwhile, in the maritime domain, recent events in the Red Sea have shown how naval artillery is gaining a prominent role as a cost-effective solution to defence from drone and swarming threats.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Procurement, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, United Kingdom, Ukraine, France, Italy, and United States of America

12. The War in Ukraine: Reality Check for Emerging Technologies and the Future of Warfare

Author:: Jean-Marc Rickli and Federico Mantellassi
Publication Date:: 04-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:: Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked the beginning of one of the most intense and brutal state-on-state conflicts opposing two modern militaries in recent memory. Despite Russia’s qualitative and quantitative advantages, Ukraine’s armed forces have so far put up strong resistance, foiling Russian plans of a quick victory and turning the conflict into a bloody war of attrition. Due to its scale and the nature of its belligerents, the conflict can provide us with a glimpse into what the future of warfare might look like and help us recentre the burgeoning conversation about the future of warfare in the current reality, especially as it relates to the presence and impact of emerging technologies. The war therefore offers us a way to understand how digital and off-the-shelf technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) impact conflicts of this scale and how relevant they are to current modern warfare. The war can also help us see how new actors become involved in warfare, what new means of influencing nation states are becoming available, and which new tools armed forces can use to affect battlefield outcomes. Importantly, it can help us gauge their importance relative to more traditional aspects of warfare. The analysis is structured in four main parts. This introduction is followed by a short contextualisation to situate the analysis in the wider conversation about emerging technologies and the future of warfare (Part 2). Part 3 provides a short overview of the conflict so far, dividing it into six phases. Part 4 surveys the main elements of the conflict in Ukraine, outlining what emerging technologies have been present and critically assessing their role in the war. Part 5 delves into some implications for the future of warfare that can be understood from the dynamics analysed thus far, especially as they relate to the place of emerging technologies in future conflicts and their role in determining battlefield outcomes. We argue that while some new technologies have come to characterise modern warfare, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict shows that many features of warfighting remain unchanged. Emerging technologies, such as AI and cheaper technological alternatives to traditional armaments, such as drones, are undoubtedly starting to change the battlefield and will play an increasingly larger role in future conflicts. Cyberspace and the globalised digital information space are bringing new actors and new means to exert influence, provide nations’ armed forces with new tools, and make battlefields increasingly globalised and complex. However, the conflict also shows that traditional aspects of warfare will not decrease in importance or be sidelined. Conflicts remain a contest of wills and adaptation, where ammunition supplies, the quantity of traditional armaments such as tanks, and both the number and quality of personnel and the logistical and organisational ability to bring all these elements to bear all remain the most important determinants of success. While technology is playing an increasing role in this equation, it remains unable to determine the outcome of a conflict on its own.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Drones, Artificial Intelligence, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

13. Russia Changes Its Nuclear Doctrine

Author:: Artur Kacprzyk
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The publication of Russia’s new nuclear doctrine is another in its attempts to intimidate NATO states, especially in order to discourage them from supporting Ukraine. Russia is lowering the declared threshold for the use of nuclear weapons and specifying additional situations in which it is to be possible. This does not mean, however, an increased danger of nuclear weapons use in the ongoing conflict. Russia is nonetheless likely to take further steps to heighten the fears of such a scenario among NATO governments and societies. At the same time, the document reflects the weakening of Russia’s conventional forces.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

14. Ukraine's accession negotiations with the European Union: reforms undertaken in ten years and the challenges ahead

Author:: Snizhana Diachenko, Viktoria Melnyk, and Dmytro Naumenko
Publication Date:: 11-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: 10 years ago, European Union representatives were still far from enthusiastic about Ukraine. Indeed, the Association Agreement signed by President Poroshenko in 2014 which came into force three years later[1], although far-reaching, lacked a clear political objective[2]. Russia's massive invasion of Ukraine has considerably accelerated the relaunch of the enlargement policy. Indeed, after Ukraine applied for membership on the fourth day after the Russian invasion, the Union took a positive decision with extraordinary speed and granted Ukraine candidate status in June 2022. On 14 February 2023, the European Council gave the green light to the opening of accession negotiations with Ukraine which started on 25 June 2024. The situation was unprecedented, and the EU seems to have accepted the geopolitical challenges and responded quickly. For Ukraine, approaching the gates of the European Union is a concrete expression of the will of the people who defended the European path during the Revolution of Dignity – otherwise known as EuroMaïdan, in 2014, and which is defending European values on the front line. European integration is proving to be a matter of national security for Ukraine, since from 2019, "the European identity of the Ukrainian people and the irreversibility of Ukraine's European and Euro-Atlantic path" are enshrined in the Constitution of Ukraine, following amendments made on the basis of the "strategic path of the State to acquire full membership of the European Union and NATO". Prior to this, Ukraine's National Security Law of June 2018 had already defined ‘Ukraine's integration into the European political, economic, security and legal space and membership of the European Union’ as one of the State's fundamental national interests. And so, Ukraine has already started working towards its rapprochement with the EU with the implementation of this text. Given its scale and ambition, the lessons learned from Ukraine's implementation of the association agreement can help to effectively organise the accession negotiation process.
Topic:: NATO, Reform, European Union, Russia-Ukraine War, and Enlargement
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

15. European agriculture and Ukrainian agriculture complement each other

Author:: Alan Hervé
Publication Date:: 07-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Agriculture has long been the richest, most diversified and most innovative of Ukraine's economic and social activities. Since Russia launched its aggression against Ukraine in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea, it has also become the most essential for the country and the one that raises the most questions in its relations with the European Union, which it intends to join as soon as possible. Many accuse Ukraine of unfair competition: on wheat, which is seriously disrupting Poland's agrarian economy; on poultry meat, which is said to be a threat to French production; on sugar and, increasingly, on organic products. Beyond the particular circumstances we are currently experiencing, Ukraine could occupy a place of choice within an enlarged Union. Thanks to its high-performance agriculture, it could help to strengthen the Union's role in meeting the food needs of deficit countries, at a time when, without Ukraine, the European Union is losing market share all over the world, particularly to the growing competition from Russia. Ukraine's competitiveness should not be an obstacle to fruitful cooperation, if the accession negotiations agree to include all the key issues of climate change, ecological diversity and the aspiration of a majority of rural people to contribute to solving these problems. This paper outlines the issues at stake and the solutions we need to analyse together in order to take action, and thus to set a new and determined course for a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that has lost its way.
Topic:: Agriculture, Economics, European Union, Innovation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

16. Russian Military Reconstitution: 2030 Pathways and Prospects

Author:: Dara Massicot
Publication Date:: 09-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: As the Kremlin’s antagonism toward Ukraine and the West sharpens, it will be critically important for policymakers and warfighters to anticipate, monitor, and respond to Russia’s military reconstitution progress in the years ahead.
Topic:: Armed Forces, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

17. The End of the Near Abroad

Author:: Thomas de Waal
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Putin’s war on Ukraine marks the end of the near abroad—the idea that Russia enjoys a special status in much of the post-Soviet space. But while Russia’s neighbors are seeking greater independence, they are not necessarily turning West.
Topic:: Democracy, Post-Soviet Space, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

18. Inevitable Fractures: The Ukraine War and the Global System

Author:: Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:: 05-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The divisions in contemporary geopolitics are an inevitable consequence of colliding ideas and interests against the backdrop of American primacy. The United States should accept their reality while advancing its own interests in a competitive strategic environment.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

19. The ‘Grain from Ukraine’ Initiative – A crucial contribution to African food security

Author:: Pavlo Martyshev, Mariia Bogonos, Valentyn Litvinov, and Roksolana Nazarkina
Publication Date:: 12-2024
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: This discussion paper estimates the effect of Ukraine’s ‘Grain from Ukraine’ humanitarian initiative on food security in African and MENA countries targeted by the programme. Ukraine is one of the largest exporters of agricultural produce, accounting for almost half of the world’s sunflower oil exports, 13% of corn exports, and 8% of wheat exports in the 2020/21 marketing year. While Russia’s war against Ukraine negatively affected global food security, it especially impacted African countries, since Ukraine is an essential contributor to local food security there. Of the total number of wheat and sunflower oil imports to Africa in 2021, those from Ukraine accounted for 16% and 23% respectively. Moreover, the growth of undernourishment on the continent is explained by a number of local factors: climate extremes, military conflicts, economic shocks, and disruption of food supply chains. The tight food supply in the region underscores the importance of Ukraine’s presence on the local markets. Our estimates, based on the World Food Programme methodology for calculating the number of people supported by the initiative, show that it has already supported around 16.2 million people in Africa and the Middle East over periods from 1 to 8 months. This is equivalent to feeding around 2 million people for one year. Using the acute food insecurity data from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) for 2023, we calculate that the programme reduced the number of people facing moderate to strong food insecurity (IPC 3-5) by 1.4% in the African and Middle Eastern countries supported in the period from November 2022 to August 2024. Meanwhile, the number of people facing intense food insecurity (IPC 4-5) decreased by about 8% during this period. Overall, the programme has huge potential for development, which should be based on the humanitarian-development nexus that aims for a long-term reduction in hunger. Four main policy options could be considered in this respect: 1. Integrating the development programmes into agricultural production in Africa 2. Pursuing facilitation of agri-food trade with African countries 3. Increasing the supply of processed food products to low-income countries 4. Informing donors of the urgent priorities in maintaining African food security
Topic:: Agriculture, Food Security, Exports, Trade, Russia-Ukraine War, and Wheat
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, and Ukraine

20. The European Union and the war in Ukraine: the liberal power and its limits

Author:: Maxime Lefebvre
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: The European Union has been deeply affected by the war in Ukraine. There was talk of a "paradigm shift" in France, of a "Zeitenwende" ("change of era") in Germany, of an "end to naivety". Across Europe, a surge of sympathy and solidarity for Ukraine and its suffering has gripped public opinion, right down to the blue and yellow colours of the EU and Ukrainian flags being ostensibly displayed by Ursula von der Leyen. The European Union has given massive economic aid to Ukraine (€20 billion already paid out, €20 billion planned for 2023) and has taken in 4 million Ukrainian refugees. At the June European Council, it accepted Ukraine's membership application, as well as that of Moldova, and a prospect of accession for Georgia. By adopting sanctions against Russia that were unprecedented since those taken against Serbia at the beginning of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, it has also demonstrated its capacity for "hard power". In the wake of its common defence policy, it delivered arms to Ukraine for the first time through its €3 billion "peace facility". By almost completely depriving itself of Russian fossil fuels, it is accelerating its energy transition. This shows the enormous change that the war in Ukraine represents for the European project, which is undergoing a new existential crisis after the repeated shocks of the last few years (eurozone crisis, migration crisis, Brexit, Covid-19 pandemic), which again seems to confirm Jean Monnet's prophecy that Europe would be built through crises and would be the sum of the solutions brought to these challenges. By defending its values against Russia, the European Union is asserting itself as a "liberal power". But it remains no less fragile beyond its response.
Topic:: European Union, Geopolitics, Liberalism, Strategic Autonomy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

21. Russia at War and the Islamic World

Author:: Marlène Laruelle
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: While Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a decoupling with the West on a scale not seen since the worst years of the Cold War, Russia has not been isolated from the non-Western world and has even reinvested its diplomatic energy toward the Global South. This paper focuses on Russia’s relationships with the Islamic world and how they have been transformed — or not — by the Ukraine war. It discusses both Russia’s “internal” Islamic realm and how the Middle East has reacted to the strategic tectonic shift unleashed by the war and Western sanctions. It explains that the role and place of Islam in Russia have been reinforced by the war context, as Islamic institutions and Muslims are seen by the Russian regime as among the most loyal constituencies. It concludes that the main Middle Eastern regional powers have been able to consolidate their transactional foreign policies and use the war to assert their autonomy toward Western actors so that Russia’s weakening does not result in the West’s increased influence but in a more multipolar order.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Islam, Multipolarity, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Middle East

22. Integrating Cyber Into Warfighting: Some Early Takeaways From the Ukraine Conflict

Author:: Ariel Levite
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: It is too early to draw definitive conclusions about cyber warfare in the lead-up to and the execution of the Ukraine war. Data are lacking, and the outcome of the conflict remains uncertain. Yet through monitoring and analysis of a single year in the first major war into which cyber has been extensively woven, we do know enough to be able to generate some tentative, high-level, generic propositions on the nature of cyber conflict. These propositions draw on wide-ranging press reporting and extrapolate from several superb pieces recently published by my colleagues Jon Bateman, Nick Beecroft, and Gavin Wilde, as well as Microsoft’s recent report on the cyber dynamics of the conflict.1 However, we must still tread cautiously. Our propositions draw on highly imperfect empirical knowledge of a single historical case that is still unfolding.2 Current and future antagonists are also constantly learning from their own and others’ analyses and enhancing their performance, which can render current assessments obsolete.3 For this and other reasons it is quite possible that some of the cyber dynamics unfolding in and around Ukraine may play out differently later in Ukraine as well as in other, future confrontations. As we have observed over millennia, the balance between offense and defense can shift over time; this dynamic may well play out in cyberspace as well. It is also important to note at the outset that widespread assessments disparaging the utility and expediency of Russian cyber operations in the Ukrainian conflict (and projections regarding future conflicts) are presently limited by far more than a lack of comprehensive and reliable empirical data. We also lack insights into the metrics and criteria that each of the protagonists uses to assess the success and failure of cyber’s overall performance in the conflict, and we have only fragmentary evidence of the role each party expected cyber operations to perform. Moreover, even if we had such information, Ukraine-specific answers might not apply elsewhere because the expectations for cyber and the metrics for assessing its performance may vary not only over time and between protagonists but also from one conflict to another. In this context it is important to underscore that some specific factors that possibly helped diminish the efficacy of Russia’s offensive cyber operations in Ukraine may not apply elsewhere. Three in particular deserve to be noted here: Russia’s unique approach toward cyber warfare; the level of external support that Ukraine received before and during the war from some leading national and multinational cyber powers; and the sophistication and battle-tested experience of Ukraine’s cyber warriors.4 Nevertheless, even if some of the cyber characteristics of the Ukraine conflict ultimately turn out to be sui generis, they are instructive given the novelty of the field and the involvement of major powers in the conflict. Hence, there is considerable value in advancing these propositions to focus attention on certain questions and facets of cyber conflict, facilitating their review and reassessment as more comprehensive and reliable information becomes available and developments on the battlefield evolve. But the reader should consider the interim observations and propositions offered here as hypotheses employed as a heuristic to encourage debate and invite feedback. All the propositions offered below pertain to our core conception of what cyber warfare is about. Some of the propositions we advance are novel; others reaffirm or refine tentative assertions made before the war. Taken together they suggest a more subdued view of the utility and impact of cyber warfare than was generally found in prewar speculations. More importantly, the Ukraine war reveals that nations diverge significantly in the role and aims they assign to offensive cyber operations as well as the institutional setup and operational modalities they use for conducting them. Most glaringly, the U.S. perspective and approach (emulated in whole or in part by several other Western nations) differs deeply from that of Russia, which makes it reasonable to expect similar divergence across similar regimes. We group our propositions under three temporal headings: the prewar period (starting in 2014);5 the war itself (beginning on February 24, 2022); and finally, the postwar period, after kinetic hostilities eventually die down. Obviously, we cannot know when this last phase will begin; nevertheless, analysis of trends that were manifest in the two earlier phases of the conflict provides a tentative basis for predictions as to what might be expected down the road. This broad scope is driven by two considerations. First, it is designed to underscore the considerable relevance of cyber operations across various phases and types of conflicts. And second, it highlights continuity as well as change between cyber action in peacetime, in wartime, and in grey area situations, as well as during the transitions between these states of confrontation.
Topic:: Cybersecurity, Conflict, Non-Traditional Threats, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

23. Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations?

Author:: Ronak Gopaldas
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: With ties forged under Soviet rule, Russia has historically enjoyed warm relations with many African countries, as their economic and ideological ambitions often align and their ties are bolstered by a mutual mistrust of the West. The spread of Africa’s votes on United Nations (UN) resolutions to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, indicates three key themes. Firstly, many African countries are pulled in competing directions by broader global geopolitics—for many, abstaining was the rational choice. Secondly, Russia’s support on the continent may be overstated and is not unconditional. Finally, Russian influence is often limited by the extent to which it can influence the political elite of a country and in some cases co-opt that elite into patronage networks. The split in the way African countries voted to condemn Russia’s actions is an important departure point for an exploration of the changing nature of Africa’s ties to Russia. There have been myriad interpretations of the votes, most of which have focused on the failure of several African countries to denounce the invasion. Few have questioned whether the nonaligned stances of these countries were tacit refusals to be used as supporting actors in public displays of condemnation by the United States and European Union (EU), to distract from the inability to offer meaningful practical or military support. Fewer still have explored whether the nonaligned stances signal weakening Russian influence on a continent it has typically relied on for support. This paper examines political relations between Russia and Africa, delving into the legacy of independence, military support, diplomatic and foreign policy stances, aid, foreign direct investment, and trade. It will also unpack whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a catalyst for what appears to be Russia’s diminishing influence or whether the former Soviet Union’s waning global standing and economic relevance precipitated a loosening of ties. The fluidity of geopolitics has left many African states between a rock and a hard place. What does this mean for Africa, not only in terms of its relationship to Russia but also more broadly on the geopolitical stage? Further, how would Africa be positioned on the global stage should Russia prevail, should the war drag on, or, more interestingly, should Ukraine emerge victorious?
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

24. Rallying Around the Flag: War Challenges and Civic Mobilization in UkraineRallying Around the Flag: War Challenges and Civic Mobilization in Ukraine

Author:: Mykola Riabhuk
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:: Ukraine’s resilience in the first months of Russian aggression came as a great surprise to both its Moscow adversaries and Western partners. Very few experts expected Ukraine to withstand the all-out military assault of the alleged second-best army in the world, and virtually no one believed that it would be able to fight back. An overblown image of Russian strength and military prowess may be one reason for this, but probably more significant was a protracted neglect and depreciation of Ukraine in both Western media and political circles. All of a sudden, it appeared that neither the state—broadly described as weak, corrupt, and dysfunctional—collapsed under the tremendous military assault, nor the society—broadly stereotyped as divided, conflicted, and arguably balancing at the verge of a civil war—broke down for the proverbial two parts. One may presume either that some negative features and tendencies of Ukraine’s development were exaggerated or that some positive tendencies were neglected, undermined, or both. To elucidate the issue, I proceed in three steps. First, I outline briefly the real curses that plagued the Ukrainian state and society after the fall of communism and provide some reasons for international skepticism in regard to the newborn country. Second, I argue that very important and mostly positive (although incoherent and sluggish) changes had occurred in Ukraine in the past 30 years, so that the Russian aggression neither established any new patterns for Ukraine’s development, nor shifted the country into a new direction, but rather accelerated the prior processes and solidified the existing tendencies. Third, I examine the ongoing civic mobilization in Ukraine as a way of accumulating social capital that may play a crucial role in Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction and modernization.
Topic:: Nationalism, Reconciliation, Mobilization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

25. Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine

Author:: Roman Osadchuk and Andy Carvin
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: In the lead-up to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin and its proxies perpetrated information operations to justify military action against Ukraine, mask its operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the war. DOWNLOAD PDF Once the war began in earnest, Russia expanded its strategy with an additional emphasis on undermining Ukraine’s ability to resist in hopes of forcing the country to surrender or enter negotiations on Russia’s terms. This strategic expansion included efforts to maintain control of information and support for the war effort at home, undercut Ukrainian resistance, derail support for Ukrainian resistance among allies and partners, especially in the immediate region, and engage in aggressive information operations internationally to shape public opinion about Russia’s war of aggression, including in Africa and Latin America. Building upon daily monitoring by the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), this report synthesizes Kremlin attempts to undermine Ukraine by targeting local, regional, and global audiences over the course of 2022 since the start of the war on February 24 of that year.
Topic:: Media, News Analysis, Conflict, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

26. The Russian-Ukrainian War: An Opportunity to Strengthen the AfCFTA

Author:: Steve Tametong and Venessa Aboudi
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:: The world had hardly covered from the horrors of the COVID-19 pandemic when it was once again tested on February 24, 2022, by the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine. The consequences of this war are quite significant for humanity. On the economic level, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has highlighted the disadvantages of globalization, understood as a process marked by the interconnection and interdependence of world economies. The inflationary shock and the food crisis resulting from the inoperative nature of import channels for certain basic necessities from Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated the fragility of the economies. With regard to African countries, in particular, the prices of several basic food products (wheat, flour, rice, maize, bread, vegetable oil, etc.) have risen sharply. Indeed, most African countries are almost dependent on the import of agricultural products and seeds from the two belligerent countries. These imports correspond to 35 billion US dollars of imports each year (1). This appears to be an incongruity given the extent of arable land on the African continent. The low production and especially processing capacity increases the dependence of African economies on the import of these basic products. The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict makes it possible to question the economic resilience of African States, that is to say, their “capacity [ to] keep output close to [their] potential despite a shock ” (2). Above all, it offers the opportunity to analyze the economic and commercial potential of the AfCFTA in the process of building the resilience of African economies to external shocks. Indeed, the AfCFTA was officially launched in January 2021 with the main objective of “creating a single market for goods and services facilitated by the movement of people in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent…” (3). This policy note is structured around the idea that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in view of its socio-economic consequences on the African continent, offers an opportunity for African countries to work toward the strengthening of the AfCFTA. So that it appears as a real pole of competitiveness and inter-African trade likely to counter the shocks and uncertainties of the dynamics of world trade. Before analyzing the AfCFTA as a pole of production and export of African products (II), it is necessary to take stock of the socio-economic consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on African economies (I).
Topic:: Security, International Trade and Finance, Military Strategy, Free Trade, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

27. Can Israel mediate an end to the Ukraine war?

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Israel is well positioned to again become a go-between between Russia and Ukraine, an effort that could further elevate its international status
Topic:: Diplomacy, Conflict, Peace, and Mediation
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Israel

28. Examining Changes in Regional Cooperation in Central Europe from a Polish Perspective

Author:: Tomasz Żornaczuk
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Visegrad Group (V4), until recently the most active and multidimensional cooperation platform in Central Europe, does not serve currently to strengthen the voice of the region on the most essential issues concerning its security. This is because Hungary’s stance on Russia’s attack on Ukraine is different than that of its partners. That is why Poland is tightening relations with the other Visegrad countries—Czechia and Slovakia. At the same time, Poland is also intensifying cooperation with the Baltic states, which has its source in joint actions on security and eastern affairs in the years preceding the war.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Visegrad Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Central Europe, Slovakia, and Czechia

29. What is the Significance of Prigozhin's Revolt for Russian Security Policy?

Author:: Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: On the night of 23-24 June, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group private military company, which has been fighting in Ukraine and operating elsewhere, stood up to the Russian Ministry of Defence and began an armed march on Moscow. However, in the end he and his forces did not storm the capital, officially as a result of negotiations led by Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenka. Prigozhin’s actions will worsen the morale of Russian soldiers and mercenaries fighting in Ukraine but will not change Russia’s hostile actions towards NATO countries.
Topic:: NATO, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

30. Using Frozen Russian Assets to Rebuild Ukraine: Possibilities for the EU

Author:: Elzbieta Kaca
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The EU wants to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine, using for this purpose frozen Russian assets, among others. The European Commission proposes to improve the system of confiscation of private assets of sanctioned persons in case of criminal activity and to obtain income from the active management of immobilised Russian public assets. These solutions may yield limited results. To be more effective, the EU would have to reach an international agreement to confiscate the reserves of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
Topic:: Sanctions, Reconstruction, European Union, Assets, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

31. South Africa-Russia Maintain Special Relations

Author:: Jędrzej Czerep
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Although South Africa declares it is neutral regarding the war in Ukraine and offers mediation, it remains a de facto ally of Russia. This is due to the strong sentiment among the ruling elites for the period of cooperation with the USSR, its successor Russia and its activity and influence in this country, and the perception that BRICS will help elevate South Africa’s international importance. If Vladimir Putin visits Johannesburg as scheduled in August, the authorities of the state, which is party to the Rome Statute, will not be willing to fulfil their obligation to arrest him or may even leave the International Criminal Court.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, BRICS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Africa, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and South Africa

32. Refugees from Ukraine Adapting to the European Labour Market

Author:: Jolanta Szymańska
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Due to the length of the war in Ukraine, more and more refugees from this country have decided to take up employment in the EU. Preliminary data indicate that they are integrating into European labour markets faster than refugees from other regions. However, the mismatch between their jobs and qualifications remains a challenge. Despite the refugees’ inclusion, the deteriorating economic situation in Europe may lead to negative perceptions in host countries.
Topic:: Economics, European Union, Refugees, and Labor Market
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

33. China Adapts Policy in Response to Russia's Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:: Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: China perceives the Russian aggression against Ukraine as an expression of resistance to the U.S. and NATO hegemony and an important element of building a new international order that marginalises the West. Based on this, China is strengthening strategic cooperation with Russia, striving to weaken the international position of the U.S., the EU, and their partners, while testing reactions to a possible escalation of Chinese actions towards Taiwan, for example. President Xi Jinping expressed this policy course during his March visit to Russia. At the same time, China is trying to gain support from the countries of the Global South. This approach means a continuation of China’s assertive policy towards the European Union, among others.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

34. Member States Seek to Unmask Russian Espionage in the EU

Author:: Elzbieta Kaca
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russian intelligence services are actively developing their networks of spies in the EU. While Member States are trying to counteract this and are undertaking coordinated action, many of them have limited operational capacities. Their cooperation at the EU level is hampered by differences in threat perceptions and a lack of mutual trust. With the aim of developing common competences, EU diplomacy can inform Member State societies about the growing scale of espionage threats by publishing regular reports on this subject.
Topic:: Intelligence, European Union, Espionage, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

35. Iceland Makes Changes to Foreign Policy after Russia's Aggression against Ukraine

Author:: Veronika Jóźwiak
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Russian aggression against Ukraine forced Iceland to adjust its foreign policy. As a small country without armed forces but covered by security guarantees as a NATO member, it wants to strengthen ties with its allies while resigning from contacts with Russia. Its partnership with the U.S. and the Nordic countries, as well as activity in international organisations and relations with Central European EU Member States, including Poland, have become even more important to the country.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Iceland

36. Putin’s war in Ukraine: How to get out of it?

Author:: Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:: The largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II has entered its 300th day without a clear outcome. “Moscow cannot afford to lose in Ukraine, and it will use every means available to avoid defeat” (Mearsheimer, 2022). I believe that Russia’s hasty withdrawal from northeastern Ukraine and its humiliating defeat in Kherson are by no means signaling the last stretch of the war. As I write these lines, missiles and drones target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, destructing half of Ukraine’s power grid and depriving millions of civilians of electricity, water and heat. So where is this war going?
Topic:: War, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

37. Assessing the importance of new corridors in the South Caucasus in the context of the RussianUkrainian war

Author:: Murad Agayev
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD)
Abstract:: This article analyzes the possibilities of a new corridor in the South Caucasus region in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The research is important because after the 44-day war, fertile conditions for new opportunities have emerged in the South Caucasus region. The RussianUkrainian war and the resulting damage to the transport sector, like other sectors, necessitated the creation and use of alternative routes. The questioning of the security of the Black Sea due to the war and the closing of the European space for Russia created a problem for the countries that used Russia and the Black Sea to reach Europe. These countries are already evaluating alternative opportunities to the corridors. One of these possibilities is the Middle Corridor project, which has seen an increase in the volume of transported cargo since its inception, except during the pandemic period. During the war, the shortest possible transport corridor from China to Europe will be provided after the financial investment in the infrastructure and the integration of the Zangezur Corridor into the Middle Corridor, and work on this process is currently being continued. The North-South Corridor, which has been discussed for a long time however has not gained much popularity, gained even more importance during the war, and the works related to the construction of the infrastructure of the corridor were accelerated.
Topic:: Security, Infrastructure, Transportation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus

38. Prescription for Military Paralysis: Wartime Reactor Meltdowns (Occasional Paper 2305)

Author:: Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:: More than 15 months into the war, Russian attacks against Ukraine’s nuclear plants have yet to release any radiation. As the likelihood of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant reopening quickly declines and Putin’s desire to distract the world from his declining political and military standing increases, some experts fear he may want to induce a radiological release from the plant. In any case, Putin’s military assaults against the Zaporizhzhia plant have already set a worrying precedent. Last December, NPEC held a wargame, the results of which The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists just published, to examine what might happen in a future Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this reinvasion in 2037, Russia targets power reactors in Ukraine, Poland, and Romania. The United States plans to build scores of new reactors in these countries. What if Russian missiles targeted them in a future war? NPEC tapped the expertise of Ukrainians, Romanians, NATO officials, Poles, US security experts, and Hill staff to find out. It hosted five sessions over two weeks and ran a three-move wargame. The game’s play revealed how the uncertainties and dangers of military attacks against nuclear power plants can paralyze decision-making and fundamentally alter the course of wars. The military disruptions these uncertainties introduce may far outstrip the safety issues any reactor radiological release might otherwise present. The game’s play revealed three reasons why.
Topic:: Security, NATO, Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, War Games, Nuclear Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

39. The Ukraine Support Tracker: Which countries help Ukraine and how?

Author:: Christoph Trebesch, Ariana Antezza, Katelyn Bushnell, Andre Frank, and Pascal Frank
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:: This paper presents the Ukraine Support Tracker, which lists and quantifies military, financial and humanitarian aid to Ukraine in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war. Since the third update we track support by 41 countries, specifically the EU member states, other members of the G7, as well as Australia, South Korea, Turkey, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, China, Taiwan, India and Iceland. The database is intended to support a facts-based discussion about support by other countries to Ukraine. Private donations and aid through non-governmental organizations are not included due to a lack of systematic data. To value in-kind support like military equipment or weapons, we rely on government statements as well as own calculations using market prices. We find significant differences in the scale of support across countries, both in absolute terms and as percent of donor country GDP.
Topic:: Economics, War, Foreign Aid, Military Aid, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Germany, and United States of America

40. EU-Ukraine wartime trade: Overcoming difficulties, forging a European path

Author:: Svitlana Taran
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:: During the first year of Russia’s war in Ukraine, EU trade-liberalisation measures and EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes provided Ukraine with alternative export routes and allowed the country to reorient part of its exports to the EU market. However, the insufficient logistics capacity and lack of adequate coordination and cooperation during the operation of Solidarity Lanes led to tensions between Ukraine and its Eastern European neighbours. While a compromise between the European Commission and the Eastern European countries allowed the extension of temporary trade-liberalisation measures for a further year, resolving the immediate crisis, more is needed to ensure their smooth operation. This Discussion Paper provides recommendations on how the EU can further intensify efforts to facilitate Ukraine’s trade flows and prevent sudden trade disruptions and restrictions. These include: Enhance the strategic alignment and connectivity between Ukraine and the EU; Ensure security guarantees and increase the capacity of seaport corridors; Enhance coordination and unity between the Commission, EU member states and Ukraine; Avoid sudden and unjustified Solidarity Lanes' disruptions; Protect critical port and export infrastructure from Russia’s attacks; Facilitate EU-Ukraine trade liberalisation and Ukraine’s integration into the EU Single Market.
Topic:: Security, European Union, Trade Liberalization, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

41. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: One Year On

Author:: LSE Ideas
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This Strategic Update summarises a roundtable discussion held at LSE IDEAS in July 2023. Contributors to the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Stuart Austin, Professor Gordon Barrass, Professor Christopher Coker, Tom McKane, Hugh Sandeman, Susan Scholefield, and Peter Watkins. None of the content of the Strategic Update is attributable to any one individual. One year on from NATO’s Madrid 2022 summit, this Strategic Update address the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept and its implications for the future, especially regarding Russia’s war on Ukraine. The paper addresses the misalignment between preparations for defence and the real state of its armed forces, the UK’s symbolic support for Ukraine versus its capability, the concepts of resilience and deterrence, and finally the future of NATO’s relationship with Russia.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

42. The Energy Crisis Requires a Military Solution that Compels NATO to Spend like Estonia

Author:: Leon Hartwell and Guillemette Guicherd
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: In this LSE IDEAS Strategic Update, the authors focus on the intimate relationship between the Russia-Ukraine war and the energy crisis, both for Ukraine and the rest of Europe. It is argued that although Western sanctions against Russia’s energy sector have been a welcome political statement, they have so far been inadequate. Moreover, in the absence of expanding Ukraine’s defence systems, supplying the country with critical equipment to rebuild its energy sector while it is under constant Russian bombardment has limited impacts. Consequently, the authors argue that to solve the energy crisis, both for Ukraine and the rest of Europe, NATO and its allies need to “spend like Estonia.” Spending like Estonia would, among others, entail ramping up support for Ukraine to 1.1% of each member state’s GDP. Such an approach could help Ukraine to decisively win the war in 2023, and it would help to avert a potential energy crisis during the next winter. 
Topic:: NATO, Crisis Management, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and Estonia

43. Brinkmanship and Nuclear Threat in the Ukraine War

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: Western leaders and Kyiv pledge to “stay the course” despite Russian nuclear threats. But does western brinkmanship in the Ukraine war depend on denying there is a brink? This short article examines “nuclear threat denialism” and its function in war policy. It explores Moscow’s most likely but occluded nuclear option and the unique danger it represents. And the post examines the relevance of the Cuban Missile Crisis to the current conflict.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

44. “Nuclear Blackmail” – Misdirection in the Ukraine War Debate

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: Moscow’s repeated warnings about possible world war and nuclear conflict in response to Western support for Ukraine’s fighting forces have elicited calls in the West to resist “nuclear blackmail.”[1] Some observers go further to claim that moderating Western policy in light of nuclear dangers would actually increase the likelihood of nuclear war, if not now then in the future.[2] Prof Timothy Snyder (Yale University) advances the argument succinctly. He writes: “All of you who are saying that we have to give in to [Russian] nuclear blackmail are making nuclear war more likely. Please stop. When you give in to it, you empower dictators to do it again, encourage worldwide nuclear proliferation, and make nuclear war much, much more likely.”[3] The stratagem of this argument is to turn concern about nuclear war against itself; To see the concern itself as the problem. This is wrong headed. There are a variety of effective and sensible ways to inhibit nuclear weapons proliferation, but categorically daring nuclear threats made by nuclear weapon superpowers fighting wars on their borders is not one of them.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Nuclear Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

45. Catastrophe: The Global Cost of the Ukraine War

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 05-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: The war has been a disaster for Ukraine, but also a calamity for the world. This brief article provides a concise overview of the war’s profound global effects, beginning with the combatants’ cost in lives and treasure. Beyond this it assesses the war’s impact on global trade and economy; energy and food price inflation and their effects on poverty, hunger, and mortality; the redirection of humanitarian and official development assistance; the total sum of aid to the Ukrainian war effort, and the estimated cost of postwar reconstruction and recovery. Also examined is the war’s effect on global defense spending. The article also provides copious citations to support further inquiry.
Topic:: Economy, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

46. Tempting Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use is Misconstrued in Western Policy

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: This article tracks and assesses the evolution of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine crisis, the related interplay between Moscow and Washington, the factors driving Russian thinking on nuclear use, the nuclear options available to Russia, and why US-NATO leaders and hawkish observers dismiss these options as impracticable. We conclude that the probability of Russian nuclear use, although conditionally modest, is rising as Ukraine’s armed forces push forward toward Crimea and the Russian border while also increasing their retaliatory attacks on recognized Russian territory. On its present trajectory, the crisis will soon run a risk of nuclear conflict greater than that experienced during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
Topic:: NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

47. One year of war in Ukraine

Author:: Christian Leffler
Publication Date:: 03-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:: It has been just over one year since Russia began its brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. In that year, the EU has stepped up and provided copious amounts of support to Ukraine – economic and military, as well as providing a safe haven for millions of Ukrainians who have fled the fighting. As the conflict has now entered its second year, this CEPS Explainer dives deep to analyse what has defined the first year and then expands on what the EU needs to concretely do in the second if Ukraine is to have any hope of triumphing over the invaders. This will require vision, courage and boldness from European leaders. The alternative if they fail? A rules-based international order replaced by a ruthless multipolar world defined by competing spheres of influence.
Topic:: European Union, Armed Conflict, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

48. The EU and the Transformed Nuclear Context since the War in Ukraine

Author:: Clara Portela
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022 has entirely transformed the European security landscape, bringing war to the European Union’s doorstep. Importantly, the war features a nuclear dimension that manifests itself in consequential ways, including Moscow’s nuclear sabre-rattling and its denunciation of the last surviving nuclear arms control treaty. This unleashed intriguing reactions, like a surprisingly tough resort to sanctions by the EU, or the shrinking of neutrality on the continent. However, while support for nuclear deterrence has increased in some NATO countries, support for arms control remains strong too. Meanwhile, nuclear disarmament advocates have not shifted their stance as a result of the crisis.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, European Union, Nonproliferation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

49. Reinventing Soft Power: The Strong Impact of China’s Soft Power “Shortcomings” on the Global South

Author:: Tanina Zappone
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: After being introduced into the Chinese academic debate in the 1990s, the notion of soft power has undergone such a process of “Sinicisation” that some scholars now wonder if the original concept has been gradually “reinvented” in China. Given worsening opinions about the PRC in the US and Europe over the last years, many analysts have stressed the weakness of China’s soft power, pointing to its state-centred approach and lack of an attractive set of values to be emulated as the main shortcomings. However, China’s growing influence in the Global South shows that these analyses have misevaluated the real goals and motivations of China’s soft power. The Russia-Ukraine war provides telling examples of the successful dynamics of China’s “defensive” or “negative” version of soft power and suggests it has significant impact in the least industrialised countries.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, and Global South

50. Rebuilding Ukraine: What the International Community Now Needs to Consider

Author:: Jörn Grävingholt and Jörg Faust
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:: Rebuilding Ukraine starts now – even if it is being undertaken against a backdrop of conflict, violence and destruction, with Russia continuing to wage its war of aggression. In granting Ukraine European Union (EU) candidate status, the EU has also made the country’s recovery one of its own priorities. If this reconstruction project is to succeed, then it is necessary to take into account specific contextual conditions, along with experiences from other recovery processes, such as those in the Western Balkans and Iraq. • Functional statehood: Ukraine is better placed in this regard than many other countries, particularly given the functional and widely accepted statehood throughout much of its territory. Reconstruction assistance can kick-start a forward-looking, sustainable green transformation in the economy and society. At the same time, there is a risk that massive external cash flows could feed old networks of corruption and patronage and create new ones. Clear accountability structures are required, along with sanctions for the misuse of funds, if this is to be counteracted. • Agile planning over linear phase model: Rebuilding work is taking place in an atmosphere of great uncertainty. Consequently, planning processes must be flexible in order to adapt to different war scenarios. A linear sequence of recovery phases fails to properly address the situation. This is already visible when it comes to efforts to secure critical infrastructure. Its proper functioning is essential to people’s daily lives and to all forms of reconstruction, yet this infrastructure could become a target for attacks again at any time. • Ukraine as a self-confident partner: As a result of the war’s trajectory, the Ukrainian Government is adopting a self-assured demeanour in its dealings with international donors. While this is essentially a positive thing, it can also give rise to a resistance to reform. The prospect of EU accession creates a common objective to work towards and can also establish coherent criteria for the recovery process, but only as long as accession remains a credible prospect. • Managing reconstruction assistance: Recovery funds have proven an effective means of coordination, though it remains to be seen whether there will be a single fund or several complementary ones. A central Ukraine fund should be (co-)managed on the donor end by the European Commission, as it has at its disposal the strongest reform incentive, namely EU accession. In the meantime, the EU needs to ensure that the Commission and the member states also provide the majority of the funding between them. • Diversity and inclusion: The governance structures of the reconstruction project should be designed to afford participation and a say to pluralist political institutions and civil society voices, and strengthen gender equality. In order to counter brain-drain, it is also imperative that young, mobile population groups (including refugees abroad) feel included. • Social equity: Incorporating social factors into the recovery process will also be essential. Vulnerable groups will require particular support, given the alarming level of impoverishment among the population as a result of the war. • Investment incentives: Essential reconstruction services have to be provided by the private sector. This requires that clear incentives be created, not least by providing investment guarantees. • Developing trauma sensitivity: The rebuilding work is taking place in a context of violence and trauma. This requires that all stakeholders develop a particular sensitivity in dealing with survivors of violence and engaging with a traumatised society.
Topic:: Reconstruction, International Community, Post-Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe and Ukraine

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS