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2. Integrating Cyber Into Warfighting: Some Early Takeaways From the Ukraine Conflict
- Author:
- Ariel Levite
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- It is too early to draw definitive conclusions about cyber warfare in the lead-up to and the execution of the Ukraine war. Data are lacking, and the outcome of the conflict remains uncertain. Yet through monitoring and analysis of a single year in the first major war into which cyber has been extensively woven, we do know enough to be able to generate some tentative, high-level, generic propositions on the nature of cyber conflict. These propositions draw on wide-ranging press reporting and extrapolate from several superb pieces recently published by my colleagues Jon Bateman, Nick Beecroft, and Gavin Wilde, as well as Microsoft’s recent report on the cyber dynamics of the conflict.1 However, we must still tread cautiously. Our propositions draw on highly imperfect empirical knowledge of a single historical case that is still unfolding.2 Current and future antagonists are also constantly learning from their own and others’ analyses and enhancing their performance, which can render current assessments obsolete.3 For this and other reasons it is quite possible that some of the cyber dynamics unfolding in and around Ukraine may play out differently later in Ukraine as well as in other, future confrontations. As we have observed over millennia, the balance between offense and defense can shift over time; this dynamic may well play out in cyberspace as well. It is also important to note at the outset that widespread assessments disparaging the utility and expediency of Russian cyber operations in the Ukrainian conflict (and projections regarding future conflicts) are presently limited by far more than a lack of comprehensive and reliable empirical data. We also lack insights into the metrics and criteria that each of the protagonists uses to assess the success and failure of cyber’s overall performance in the conflict, and we have only fragmentary evidence of the role each party expected cyber operations to perform. Moreover, even if we had such information, Ukraine-specific answers might not apply elsewhere because the expectations for cyber and the metrics for assessing its performance may vary not only over time and between protagonists but also from one conflict to another. In this context it is important to underscore that some specific factors that possibly helped diminish the efficacy of Russia’s offensive cyber operations in Ukraine may not apply elsewhere. Three in particular deserve to be noted here: Russia’s unique approach toward cyber warfare; the level of external support that Ukraine received before and during the war from some leading national and multinational cyber powers; and the sophistication and battle-tested experience of Ukraine’s cyber warriors.4 Nevertheless, even if some of the cyber characteristics of the Ukraine conflict ultimately turn out to be sui generis, they are instructive given the novelty of the field and the involvement of major powers in the conflict. Hence, there is considerable value in advancing these propositions to focus attention on certain questions and facets of cyber conflict, facilitating their review and reassessment as more comprehensive and reliable information becomes available and developments on the battlefield evolve. But the reader should consider the interim observations and propositions offered here as hypotheses employed as a heuristic to encourage debate and invite feedback. All the propositions offered below pertain to our core conception of what cyber warfare is about. Some of the propositions we advance are novel; others reaffirm or refine tentative assertions made before the war. Taken together they suggest a more subdued view of the utility and impact of cyber warfare than was generally found in prewar speculations. More importantly, the Ukraine war reveals that nations diverge significantly in the role and aims they assign to offensive cyber operations as well as the institutional setup and operational modalities they use for conducting them. Most glaringly, the U.S. perspective and approach (emulated in whole or in part by several other Western nations) differs deeply from that of Russia, which makes it reasonable to expect similar divergence across similar regimes. We group our propositions under three temporal headings: the prewar period (starting in 2014);5 the war itself (beginning on February 24, 2022); and finally, the postwar period, after kinetic hostilities eventually die down. Obviously, we cannot know when this last phase will begin; nevertheless, analysis of trends that were manifest in the two earlier phases of the conflict provides a tentative basis for predictions as to what might be expected down the road. This broad scope is driven by two considerations. First, it is designed to underscore the considerable relevance of cyber operations across various phases and types of conflicts. And second, it highlights continuity as well as change between cyber action in peacetime, in wartime, and in grey area situations, as well as during the transitions between these states of confrontation.
- Topic:
- Cybersecurity, Conflict, Non-Traditional Threats, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America
3. Undermining Ukraine: How the Kremlin employs information operations to erode global confidence in Ukraine
- Author:
- Roman Osadchuk and Andy Carvin
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Atlantic Council
- Abstract:
- In the lead-up to Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin and its proxies perpetrated information operations to justify military action against Ukraine, mask its operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the war. DOWNLOAD PDF Once the war began in earnest, Russia expanded its strategy with an additional emphasis on undermining Ukraine’s ability to resist in hopes of forcing the country to surrender or enter negotiations on Russia’s terms. This strategic expansion included efforts to maintain control of information and support for the war effort at home, undercut Ukrainian resistance, derail support for Ukrainian resistance among allies and partners, especially in the immediate region, and engage in aggressive information operations internationally to shape public opinion about Russia’s war of aggression, including in Africa and Latin America. Building upon daily monitoring by the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), this report synthesizes Kremlin attempts to undermine Ukraine by targeting local, regional, and global audiences over the course of 2022 since the start of the war on February 24 of that year.
- Topic:
- Media, News Analysis, Conflict, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
4. Putin’s war in Ukraine: How to get out of it?
- Author:
- Loïc Simonet
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
- Abstract:
- The largest armed conflict in Europe since World War II has entered its 300th day without a clear outcome. “Moscow cannot afford to lose in Ukraine, and it will use every means available to avoid defeat” (Mearsheimer, 2022). I believe that Russia’s hasty withdrawal from northeastern Ukraine and its humiliating defeat in Kherson are by no means signaling the last stretch of the war. As I write these lines, missiles and drones target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, destructing half of Ukraine’s power grid and depriving millions of civilians of electricity, water and heat. So where is this war going?
- Topic:
- War, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
5. From Kosovo to Ukraine: lessons from the humanitarian response to conflict and displacement in Europe
- Author:
- Margie Buchanan-Smith and Peter Wiles
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
- Abstract:
- While there are many differences between the conflicts in Kosovo and Ukraine, the international humanitarian response to both bears many similarities. For example, both crises triggered record levels of funding and most international humanitarian agencies on the receiving end had limited or no presence and experience in the countries affected. Protection is the dominant need amongst affected communities in both crises as well. This paper – written by Margie Buchanan-Smith and Peter Wiles – highlights key lessons from the international humanitarian response to the Kosovo crisis that could have relevance to the response in Ukraine. The lessons are drawn from the three-volume ‘Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds’ and ALNAP’s meta-evaluation of the Kosovo response, from our 2001 Annual Review.
- Topic:
- International Organization, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Humanitarian Response
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Kosovo
6. Israel’s Ukraine policy: ‘Right side of history’ vs national interest
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- History has no right side and it does not evolve according to moral imperatives.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel
7. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
- Topic:
- War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
8. Mobilizing Against Russia? Some Reflections on the Security Deadlock Called Ukraine
- Author:
- Joris Van Bladel
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
- Abstract:
- No event exists beyond the media. This is also the case with the current Russian-Ukraine war. Daily, we are flooded with analyses and opinions about Putin’s military threat in the East. These narratives – mostly polemical and shrill – are both the result of and the catalyst for the crisis. As such, the debate itself – consciously or unconsciously – becomes part of the Western-Russian standoff driven by the strategy of hybrid and decision-centric warfare. This essay deliberately distances itself from the issues of the day and the hyper-polarized debate that currently takes place. Instead, a more detached exercise is made in which the polyphonic nature of the past and the intricacy of history is deliberately sought out. It shows the complexity of the process we have gone through, leading to the current deadlock. As such, we have to face the changes and continuities with which we have been confronted, or as Jeffrey Frank recently wrote in The New Yorker, “If a lot has changed since the end of the Cold War, there’s much that hasn’t.”
- Topic:
- Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
9. The Last Word: Zelensky Wags the Dog, But Slowly
- Author:
- Zachary Jonathan Jacobson
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
- Abstract:
- Too often agency (and blame) for the war in Ukraine has been presumed to lie predominantly with the greater powers. Liberals like Anne Applebaum point to President Vladimir Putin’s autocratic and expansionist mission to restore a greater Russia as the precipitating reagent for the crisis, while realists like John Mearsheimer hold the Americans and Europeans responsible for encouraging Ukraine to challenge Russia by seeking membership in NATO.2 In both cases (and both have a case), what has been underplayed is the agency of Ukraine. Taken for granted have been President Volodymyr Zelensky’s artful strategic manipulations to pull a wide community of actors into the regional conflict. His calls for military assistance have resembled what the political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. termed the “soft powers” of persuasion.
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Ukraine
10. The Long Shadow of the Soviet Union: Demystifying Putin’s Rhetoric Towards Ukraine
- Author:
- Björn Alexander Düben
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- As tensions between Russia and Ukraine reach an almost-tipping point, Björn Alexander Düben analyses the historical and geopolitical rhetoric Putin and his government have deployed against the post-Maidan Ukraine since 2014. Asking, can this be seen as another Russian assertion of dominance in the post-Soviet region, could there be reasons closer to home, or why tensions across the border seem to once again be at a breaking point? From global oil prices to regime consolidation, an analysis into the words of Russia’s elites could unveil what future Europe is steering towards.
- Topic:
- Geopolitics, History, Conflict, Soviet Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
11. What the First Week of Fighting in Ukraine Tells Us About a Potential Insurgency
- Author:
- Alec Worsnop
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- While the Russian advance in Ukraine has been slower than expected, its overwhelming conventional superiority gives it the upper hand. Despite the valiant resistance of many Ukrainians, Russia will probably conquer all or a portion of the country. However, the first week of the conflict has provided some useful information about the prospects for an insurgent campaign in the wake of a Russian occupation.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
12. Policy Paper: Considerations of condemnation and balance of Palestine’s position on the war in Ukraine
- Author:
- Palthink
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
- Abstract:
- In classic wars, we waited for the military result, and then we formed a political response. In new wars, there is not a final resolution; there is only the stronger party imposing its conditions. Additionally, there is also geographical control, regime projection, or behavior modification goals. Russia is seeking to maintain its national security and enhance its regional and international position. It has a deep fear that NATO will expand, bringing weapons to its border with Ukraine. Now that the first shock of the war has receded, the world realizes that the war will not exceed Ukraine’s borders. Russia has given indications that it will limit itself to the minimum that preserves its national security by preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. Global concern about the consequences of war is high. People are wondering if it will continue or stop. Additionally, sanctions have been announced. In this context, developing and poor countries are affected by conflict because they depend on foreign aid. Their positions on the war will determine where they are positioned, and how the political, economic and security consequences will affect them. Trying to show a neutral position would not endear them to the great powers. On the face of it, it may seem to be a war fought on Ukrainian lands only, but it is a world war of influence. The survival of developing nations depends on the strength of the international community and the extent to which it supports these nations in the light of political realism, not because of their strength and resources. Many places cannot survive without traditional international support.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Palestine
13. The EU is Reluctantly Getting Tougher with Putin
- Author:
- Emmanuel Navon
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Europeans surely remember what happens when you let an autocrat get away with grabbing territories hoping that the last bite will be the last one
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
14. The War in Ukraine: More Western Aid and Fear of Escalation
- Author:
- Eldad Shavit and Shimon Stein
- Publication Date:
- 05-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- The United States and other NATO countries have thus far not deviated from their policy regarding the war in Eastern Europe – military and economic assistance, with no boots on the ground. Yet the more the war continues, and while there is a chance of significant escalation, does this policy stand to change?
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Conflict, Escalation, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
15. The Russia-Ukraine War: Where Do We Go from Here?
- Author:
- Zvi Magen and Sophie Kobzantsev
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Two months after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the goal of a short campaign has clearly not been achieved. Russia now seeks to achieve gains while suspending the negotiations with Kyiv – both to improve its position in advance of future negotiations, and to deliver the message to the West that “you cannot stop us.”
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
16. Investigation of Russia's Crimes in Ukraine: A Turning Point for the International Criminal Court?
- Author:
- Ori Beeri and Pnina Sharvit Baruch
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- The Chief Prosecutor at The Hague has already begun to investigate actions taken by Russia in the Ukrainian arena, while accelerating judicial proceedings and bureaucracy. This reflects a change of approach, which includes the prioritization of recent events, as part of an effort to strengthen the status of the Court. How will this affect the investigation of the war in Eastern Europe – and the investigation concerning Israel?
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Conflict, International Crime, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global Focus
17. Walking a Fine Line: Turkey’s Mediation between Russia and Ukraine, and Relations with the West
- Author:
- Remi Daniel and Gallia Lindenstrauss
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Turkey’s reaction to the Russian aggression in Ukraine was among the more moderate responses heard from NATO members. With an eye to the post-war situation, Ankara is trying to walk a tightrope and not overly provoke either side. What lies behind this Turkish policy, and is it viable?
- Topic:
- Security, Diplomacy, Conflict, and Mediation
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine
18. The Ukrainian Civil Front – An Interim Assessment
- Author:
- Meir Elran, Uri Bar-Yosef, and Zvi Magen
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Most of Ukraine’s civilian population demonstrates a high degree of steadfastness during the war, rallying around the flag – and around the president. Nonetheless, the challenge to Ukrainian national resilience remains high, given the huge waves of migration, the losses in the hinterland, and the severe damage to national infrastructure and the local economy – which could have decisive effects on Ukraine’s ability to recover from the war
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
19. The War in Ukraine: The Challenge of Shaping an Endgame
- Author:
- Udi Dekel
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Although nearly three weeks have passed since Putin invaded Ukraine, there is no framework for an endgame on the horizon. While the United States and the West would like to bring Putin to his knees as he sinks deeper in the Ukrainian mud, Washington must recognize that the longer the war continues, the chances increase for escalation to new levels that neither side wants. Therefore, before the situation is completely out of control, there must be a dialogue with Russia that can lead to an end to the war.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
20. Germany and the Ukraine Crisis: End of the Age of Illusions
- Author:
- Shimon Stein
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sent shockwaves through Germany’s political-security approach of the last decades, and recent speeches in the Bundestag reflect the government’s intention to make system-wide changes in security orientation. Germany must also understand how it missed warning signs from Russia over the years, and formulate a clear policy that addresses the emerging worrisome trends
- Topic:
- Security, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, and Germany
21. The Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Legal Aspects
- Author:
- Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Ori Beeri
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Since Russia invaded Ukraine, it has been the object of significant legal pressure. While the various legal measures have no power to stop the bloody war, they deliver a powerful, unequivocal message: any state that flagrantly violates international world and undermines the world order will suffer isolation, condemnation, sanction, and criminal investigations. Israel, which has seemed to lean to sitting on the fence, must join the international efforts against Russia, Otherwise it is liable to find itself on the wrong side of history
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Law, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
22. The Ukraine Crisis: An Interim Analysis
- Author:
- Eldad Shavit, Zvi Magen, and Shimon Stein
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
- Abstract:
- Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began only days ago, it is already clear that with this belligerence Putin has upset the world order that has existed since the Second World War. The Western bloc has already begun to realign and is presenting a unified and forceful stance vis-à-vis Moscow. Israel can no longer avoid taking a clear stand and siding fully with the countries opposing Russia
- Topic:
- Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
23. Ukraine War Distracts US from China, Legitimizes Nuclear Bombs
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is distracting the US from the Chinese threat and erodes the nuclear taboo.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, Rivalry, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America
24. My Country, Right or Wrong: Russian Public Opinion on Ukraine
- Author:
- Denis Volkov and Andrei Kolesnikov
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- When Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine on February 24, Western governments, including the United States, immediately condemned what they described as “Vladimir Putin’s war.”1 Surely, this formulation was no accident. It was aimed, first and foremost, at drawing a distinction between the actions of the Kremlin and the attitudes of ordinary Russians. There was optimism that ordinary Russians would not countenance a war against a neighboring country.2 But hopes of Russian grassroots opposition to the war were swiftly dashed. Indeed, public opinion polls have consistently shown overwhelming support (70 percent or higher) for what Moscow calls its “special military operation” in Ukraine. Contrary to expectations, Putin’s popularity has also seen a boost, similar to what happened in the immediate wake of the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Partly in response to these indicators, figures like Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy have called for a visa ban for all Russian passport holders, with an exception for people whose safety is at risk or who are vulnerable to political persecution.3 According to Zelenskyy, “[T]he most important sanctions are to close the borders—because the Russians are taking away someone else’s land” and Russians should “live in their own world until they change their philosophy.” He added, “The population picked this government and they’re not fighting it, not arguing with it, not shouting at it.” Such sentiments are echoed in calls by some European politicians, such as Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin, for an EU ban on tourist visas. “It’s not right that at the same time as Russia is waging an aggressive, brutal war of aggression in Europe, Russians can live a normal life, travel in Europe, be tourists. It’s not right,” Marin said in mid-August.4 At the same time, a careful reading of popular Russian attitudes toward the war reveals important nuances that all too often are overlooked. First and foremost is the fact that rather than consolidating Russian society, the conflict has exacerbated existing divisions on a diverse array of issues, including support for the regime. Put another way, the impression that Putin now has the full support of the Russian public is simply incorrect. A more careful reading of sociological data, including conversations with focus group participants and quantitative research, presents a far more complex picture of Russian society.
- Topic:
- Public Opinion, Conflict, Vladimir Putin, Society, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
25. Iranian Public Opinion on the War in Ukraine and Nuclear Options
- Author:
- Nancy Gallagher, Ebrahim Mohseni, and Clay Ramsay
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- The current survey is an Update, rather than a comprehensive check on Iranian public attitudes. This interim report covers findings on two unfolding security challenges – Iran’s nuclear program and the war in Ukraine – and their potential interconnections.
- Topic:
- Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Public Opinion, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East
26. Russian Attacks May Prompt Increased Refugee Flows from Ukraine
- Author:
- Maria Piechowska
- Publication Date:
- 12-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Polish Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- Russia is continuing its intensive attacks on critical infrastructure in Ukraine. These are deliberate actions that violate international humanitarian law and are aimed at breaking the morale of Ukrainian society. Power outages mean that many towns and villages are not only without heating but also without water. Further devastation and the difficulty of repairs could trigger a humanitarian catastrophe. Most of the population will try to survive the winter in their current residences or by resettling in smaller towns. Increased refugee movement across borders, especially to Poland, is also possible.
- Topic:
- Refugees, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
27. The OSCE as Sisyphus: Mediation, Peace Operations, Human Rights
- Author:
- Philip Remler
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- Over the past decade, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been returning to its origins as a Cold War–era Conference – a forum where states and blocs, often antagonistic to one another and espousing opposing ideals, can air their frictions and hostilities. The OSCE was created without legal personality and with the liberum veto of the consensus principle. These constraints stunted the growth of executive capabilities and bound the OSCE closely to the will of its participating States. That rendered most mediation efforts ineffective, especially where an OSCE state is both belligerent and mediator in the same conflicts. Peace operations have been more effective – notably the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine – but the same factors have tightly constrained its activity. Though all participating States committed themselves to democratic governance, rule of law and respect for human rights, these ideals failed in much of the former Soviet Union, and autocrats have used the organisation’s lack of legal personality and the consensus principle to hobble the OSCE’s efforts. If the OSCE’s participating States want it to remain an Organization, not a Conference, they must take action to secure its executive autonomy.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, Peacekeeping, Democracy, Conflict, and OSCE
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
28. Lawfare as part of hybrid wars: The experience of Ukraine in conflict with Russian Federation
- Author:
- Zakhar Tropin
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- The main objective of the article is to prove the need for the state to have a centralised legal strategy to ensure the protection of state interests on an international level during a hybrid conflict. Centralisation of control and the planning and implementation of legal actions on an international level are core elements of such a strategy, especially for actions under the jurisdiction of international institutions. This article provides an analysis of treaties and of the practice of adjudication in Ukraine during the conflict with the Russian Federation. The findings of the study show that the legal dimension of hybrid conflict has some sub-levels: legal actions of states in hybrid conflicts taken at interstate level; the level of enterprises controlled by the state; and the private level. The practice of Ukraine shows that the exercising of a multilevel legal encounter during a hybrid war faces a number of problems including the intersection of actions (sometimes even direct conflict), even among authorities involved in the legal protection of state interests; and problems with collecting and analysing the information necessary to protect state interests in the legal dimension; state authorities that are not directly involved in a legal encounter may exercise actions which will complicate the legal position of the state. One of the first steps taken by the state in a hybrid conflict is, therefore, to create special authority or entrust an existing one with the coordination of the functions of lawfare. The next step of such an authority is the strategic “programming” of the opponent’s legal actions with the aim of achieving an advantage in the legal dimension of a hybrid conflict.
- Topic:
- Conflict, Hybrid Warfare, and Lawfare
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
29. Five Years of War in Donbas
- Author:
- Robert E. Hamilton
- Publication Date:
- 10-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- The war in the eastern Ukrainian region known as the Donbas has killed over 13,000 people, displaced millions, and led to the worst rupture in relations between the Russian Federation and the West since the end of the Cold War. The war was caused by inherent cleavages in Ukrainian society, combined with clumsy and self-interested intervention by outside powers. The war’s effects on Ukraine have been profound: the collapse of the post-Soviet Ukrainian political elite; billions of dollars in direct and indirect losses to the Ukrainian economy; a wholesale restructuring of the Ukrainian armed forces; social dislocation and psychological trauma; and unprecedented environmental damage. Despite these sad legacies, there are reasons to be optimistic that a settlement to the conflict is in view. The exhaustion and frustration of people in the separatist-controlled regions, Russia’s changing policy on the war—at least in part a result of rising frustration among the Russian public—and the election of a new Ukrainian government without regional ties or ties to networks of oligarchs all contribute to the possibility of peace. But in order for peace to endure after the war, the Ukrainian state must construct a broad-based, civic national identity, and it must tackle the country’s endemic corruption. The international community must be engaged in both crafting a settlement to the war and helping Ukraine deal with its consequences. External observers may be inclined to point to social division and corruption as the internal causes of the war, and argue that Ukraine has to fix itself before the outside world can intervene to help. And this is true as far as it goes. But it is also true that the outside world contributed to the start of war in Ukraine by making the country the object in a geopolitical tussle between Russia and the West. Any honest accounting of the war’s history must acknowledge this fact. And any fair treatment of Ukraine after the war should seek to compensate it through significant, long-term assistance.
- Topic:
- War, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Separatism
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
30. Dying Light: War and Trade of the Separatist-Controlled Areas of Ukraine
- Author:
- Artem Kochnev
- Publication Date:
- 01-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
- Abstract:
- The paper investigates how war and the war-related government policies affected economic activity of the separatist-controlled areas of Ukraine. The paper applies a quasi-experimental study design to estimate the impact of two events on the separatist-controlled areas: the introduction of the separatist control and the introduction of the second round of the trade ban, which was imposed by the government of Ukraine on the separatist-controlled territories in 2017. Using a difference-in-difference estimation procedure that controls for the yearly and monthly effects, individual fixed effects, and the region-specific time shocks, the study finds that the separatist rule decreased the economic activity by 38% in the Donetsk region and 51% in the Luhansk region according to the preferred specifications. At the same time, the trade ban of the year 2017 against the major industrial enterprises of the separatist-controlled areas decreased luminosity by 20%. The paper argues that the trade disruptions due to the war actions were nested within the negative effect of the separatist rule and accounted for half of it.
- Topic:
- Development, Political Economy, War, Conflict, Macroeconomics, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Ukraine