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2. Israel’s Ukraine policy: ‘Right side of history’ vs national interest
- Author:
- Efraim Inbar
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
- Abstract:
- History has no right side and it does not evolve according to moral imperatives.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Intervention
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel
3. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome
- Author:
- Anthony H. Cordesman
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Abstract:
- It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
- Topic:
- War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
4. The OSCE as Sisyphus: Mediation, Peace Operations, Human Rights
- Author:
- Philip Remler
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- Over the past decade, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been returning to its origins as a Cold War–era Conference – a forum where states and blocs, often antagonistic to one another and espousing opposing ideals, can air their frictions and hostilities. The OSCE was created without legal personality and with the liberum veto of the consensus principle. These constraints stunted the growth of executive capabilities and bound the OSCE closely to the will of its participating States. That rendered most mediation efforts ineffective, especially where an OSCE state is both belligerent and mediator in the same conflicts. Peace operations have been more effective – notably the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine – but the same factors have tightly constrained its activity. Though all participating States committed themselves to democratic governance, rule of law and respect for human rights, these ideals failed in much of the former Soviet Union, and autocrats have used the organisation’s lack of legal personality and the consensus principle to hobble the OSCE’s efforts. If the OSCE’s participating States want it to remain an Organization, not a Conference, they must take action to secure its executive autonomy.
- Topic:
- Human Rights, Peacekeeping, Democracy, Conflict, and OSCE
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
5. Lawfare as part of hybrid wars: The experience of Ukraine in conflict with Russian Federation
- Author:
- Zakhar Tropin
- Publication Date:
- 03-2021
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- The main objective of the article is to prove the need for the state to have a centralised legal strategy to ensure the protection of state interests on an international level during a hybrid conflict. Centralisation of control and the planning and implementation of legal actions on an international level are core elements of such a strategy, especially for actions under the jurisdiction of international institutions. This article provides an analysis of treaties and of the practice of adjudication in Ukraine during the conflict with the Russian Federation. The findings of the study show that the legal dimension of hybrid conflict has some sub-levels: legal actions of states in hybrid conflicts taken at interstate level; the level of enterprises controlled by the state; and the private level. The practice of Ukraine shows that the exercising of a multilevel legal encounter during a hybrid war faces a number of problems including the intersection of actions (sometimes even direct conflict), even among authorities involved in the legal protection of state interests; and problems with collecting and analysing the information necessary to protect state interests in the legal dimension; state authorities that are not directly involved in a legal encounter may exercise actions which will complicate the legal position of the state. One of the first steps taken by the state in a hybrid conflict is, therefore, to create special authority or entrust an existing one with the coordination of the functions of lawfare. The next step of such an authority is the strategic “programming” of the opponent’s legal actions with the aim of achieving an advantage in the legal dimension of a hybrid conflict.
- Topic:
- Conflict, Hybrid Warfare, and Lawfare
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
6. Five Years of War in Donbas
- Author:
- Robert E. Hamilton
- Publication Date:
- 10-2019
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute
- Abstract:
- The war in the eastern Ukrainian region known as the Donbas has killed over 13,000 people, displaced millions, and led to the worst rupture in relations between the Russian Federation and the West since the end of the Cold War. The war was caused by inherent cleavages in Ukrainian society, combined with clumsy and self-interested intervention by outside powers. The war’s effects on Ukraine have been profound: the collapse of the post-Soviet Ukrainian political elite; billions of dollars in direct and indirect losses to the Ukrainian economy; a wholesale restructuring of the Ukrainian armed forces; social dislocation and psychological trauma; and unprecedented environmental damage. Despite these sad legacies, there are reasons to be optimistic that a settlement to the conflict is in view. The exhaustion and frustration of people in the separatist-controlled regions, Russia’s changing policy on the war—at least in part a result of rising frustration among the Russian public—and the election of a new Ukrainian government without regional ties or ties to networks of oligarchs all contribute to the possibility of peace. But in order for peace to endure after the war, the Ukrainian state must construct a broad-based, civic national identity, and it must tackle the country’s endemic corruption. The international community must be engaged in both crafting a settlement to the war and helping Ukraine deal with its consequences. External observers may be inclined to point to social division and corruption as the internal causes of the war, and argue that Ukraine has to fix itself before the outside world can intervene to help. And this is true as far as it goes. But it is also true that the outside world contributed to the start of war in Ukraine by making the country the object in a geopolitical tussle between Russia and the West. Any honest accounting of the war’s history must acknowledge this fact. And any fair treatment of Ukraine after the war should seek to compensate it through significant, long-term assistance.
- Topic:
- War, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Separatism
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
7. Russian Norm Entrepreneurship in Crimea: Serious Contestation or Cheap Talk?
- Author:
- Betcy Jose and Christoph H. Stefes
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- German Institute of Global and Area Studies
- Abstract:
- Western actors have long dominated the political processes and discourses that shape global norms impacting interstate behaviour. Yet, more recently, powerful autocratic regimes such as China and Russia have seemingly challenged democracies, emerging as potential contesters of international norms. What might be the outcome of this contestation? This paper broadly explores this query by investigating Russia’s humanitarian justifications for its Ukrainian incursion. It examines whether Russia’s claim of humanitarian intervention is more than a petty attempt to disguise pure power politics. Is Russia contesting Western understandings of humanitarian interventions in order to reshape our ideas of permissible violations of sovereignty norms to protect vulnerable populations? Using Atlas.ti, we also explore global responses to Russia’s humanitarian claims. Our initial findings indicate that the Ukrainian intervention enabled Russia to contest Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and to champion an alternative version of humanitarian intervention with some limited success.
- Topic:
- Imperialism, Military Strategy, Authoritarianism, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Crimea
8. Ukraine’s Foreign Policy and the Role of the West
- Author:
- Olexiy Haran and Petro Burkovskiy
- Publication Date:
- 03-2017
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Transatlantic Relations
- Abstract:
- This paper is part of CTR's Working Paper Series: "Eastern Voices: Europe's East Faces an Unsettled West." In this chapter, Haran and Burkovskiy begin with a general analysis of mutual perceptions from both sides, then proceed to identify key interests and concerns regarding the war in Donbas, and analyze whether the political aspects of the Minsk agreements can be implemented. They then suggest some recommendations on the way ahead. The authors argue that Putin’s success in attacking Ukraine, which is impossible to achieve without undermining unity among Western powers, could embolden him to exert his power and influence in wider Europe. Moreover, as U.S.-EU ties are likely to undergo some stress after elections on each side of the Atlantic in 2016 and 2017, Russia will to be tempted to take advantage of such turbulence by pressing forward with its goals in Ukraine and pushing the so-called “grey zone” of insecurity westward before a new equilibrium is found within the Euro-Atlantic area.
- Topic:
- International Relations, NATO, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, Grand Strategy, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Crimea, United States of America, and European Union