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1. Afghanistan: Meeting the Real World Challenges of Transition

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
01-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The more one looks at the current situation in Afghanistan today, the more likely it seems that Transition will at best produce a weak and divided state and at worst a state that either continues its civil war or comes under Taliban and extremist control. More than a decade of Western intervention has not produced a strong and viable central government, an economy that can function without massive outside aid, or effective Afghan forces. There is no sign that insurgents are being pushed towards defeat or will lose their sanctuaries in Pakistan. This has made every aspect of Transition is a high-risk effort.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Civil War, Development, Islam, Terrorism, War, Armed Struggle, Counterinsurgency, and Governance
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Taliban

2. Trends in Militancy across South Asia

Author:
Thomas M. Sanderson, Rick "Ozzie" Nelson, Stephanie Sanok Kostro, Zachary I. Fellman, and Rob Wise
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The bulk of international counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and related efforts over the last decade have focused on targeting a select few extremist organizations such as al Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban. Yet looming security transitions, international fiscal strictures, demographic trends, religious and ethnic tensions, popular dissatisfaction, and weak governance are likely having significant and worrying effects on a wide array of militant actors around the world. A narrow focus on those groups perceived to be the most immediate threats has, at times, come at the cost of a broader understanding of militancy and how it may manifest in a given region.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Terrorism, Armed Struggle, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and Taliban

3. India in Afghanistan: A Rising Power or a Hesitant Power?

Author:
Harsh Pant
Publication Date:
04-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
Indian diplomacy faced a major setback at the Afghanistan Conference in London in January 2010, where Indian concerns were summarily ignored. In one stroke, Pakistan rendered New Delhi irrelevant in the evolving security dynamic in Afghanistan. When Indian External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna underscored the folly of making a distinction “between good Taliban and bad Taliban,” he was completely out of sync with the larger mood at the conference. Days before this much-hyped conference, senior U.S. military commanders were suggesting that peace talks with the Taliban may be imminent and that Taliban members might even be invited to join the government in Kabul. The West had made up its mind that it was not a question of if, but when and how to exit from Afghanistan, which seemed to be becoming a quagmire for the leaders in Washington and London.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, War, Power Politics, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Washington, India, Taliban, London, and New Delhi

4. Haqqani Network Financing: The Evolution of an Industry

Author:
Gretchen Peters
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
The purpose of this report is to understand and outline the financial architecture that sustains the Haqqani faction of the Afghan insurgency. The Haqqani network (hereafter “the network” or “the Haqqan is”) is widely recognized as a semi-autonomous component of the Taliban and as the deadliest and most globally focused faction of that latter group. What gets far less attention is the fact that the Haqqan is also appear to be the most sophisticated and diversified from a financial standpoint. This report will illustrate that the Haqqani business portfolio mirrors a mafia operation, and illustrate why an understanding of the illicit business side of the network is critical to enriching our understanding of the group. In addition to raising funds from ideologically like minded donors, an activity the Haqqan is have engaged in since the 1980s, information collected for this report indicates that over the past three decades they have penetrated key business sectors, including import-export, transport, real estate and construction in Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Arab Gulf and beyond. The Haqqan is employ violence and intimidation to extort legal firms and prominent community members, and engage in kidnap for ransom schemes. According to investigators, they protect and engage in the trafficking of narcotics and the precursor chemicals used to process heroin (although to a much lesser degree than other factions of the Afghan Taliban). The Haqqan is also appear to operate their own front companies, many of which appear to be directed at laundering illicit proceeds. The broad range of business activities in which the Haqqan is engage suggests that the pursuit of wealth and power may be just as important to net work leaders as the Islamist and nationalistic ideals for which the Haqqan is claim to fight.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Islam, Terrorism, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Taliban, and Arabia

5. Video-recorded Decapitations: A seemingly perfect terrorist tactic that did not spread

Author:
Martin Harrow
Publication Date:
05-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Video-recorded decapitations have an enormous impact, they are cheap and easy, and they allow the terrorists to exploit the potential of the Internet. With these advantages, the tactic would have been expected to quickly spread across the globe as a favored tactic. Yet, years after its invention in 2002, this has not happened. This paper using evolutionary theory finds that video-recorded decapitations have not caught on for locally specific reasons: in the West because the tactic is less accessible than one might expect; in Iraq because of the unwillingness to be associated with Zarqawi, and in the Afghan context, it has not spread because it is mainly relevant for mobilizing resources from abroad, which is not a priority for the Taliban. These are however situational variables, and just as suicide bombings took years to spread, there may be campaigns of video-recorded decapitations as conditions change.
Topic:
Terrorism, Armed Struggle, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Iraq, Middle East, and Taliban

6. What Comes Next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-Building

Author:
Sarah Phillips
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
News that the failed Christmas Day attack on a U.S. passenger jet was tied to al-Qaeda elements in Yemen prompted questions of whether the fractious Arab state might give rise to a Taliban-style regime. For its part, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has stated its intent to achieve “our great Islamic project: establishing an Islamic Caliphate” but it is vulnerable to the threat that Yemen's tribes may ultimately find its presence a liability.
Topic:
Political Violence, Islam, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Taliban, Yemen, and Arabia

7. When Should We Talk to Terrorists?

Author:
Audrey Kurth Cronin
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
The longer a terrorist group has been in existence, the more likely it is to engage in negotiations. Even so, only about 18 percent of terrorist groups engage in talks on strategic issues at all. When groups do enter talks, the most common pattern is for negotiations to drag on, with the conflict occupying a middle ground between a stable cease-fire and high levels of violence. Negotiations do not necessarily result in a cessation of the violence: about half of the groups that have entered negotiations in recent years have continued to be active in their violence as the talks unfolded, typically at a lower level of intensity or frequency. A wide range of variables can determine the efficacy of negotiations. A crucial element in the success or failure of such talks is the ability of policy makers to devise a plan in advance for what will happen when violence does again occur. Those policymakers who are able to unite with their non state negotiating partners in condemning violence are more likely to sustain talks and make progress. Talks with some global affiliates of al-Qaeda, as well as some smaller factions of the Taliban, may hold promise. Talks should not be seen as a “silver bullet” but rather as a way to manage and channel the violence over the long term, a process that often contributes to the decline of groups or their demise, along with other factors.
Topic:
Terrorism
Political Geography:
Taliban

8. Afghanistan: Searching for Political Agreement

Author:
Gilles Dorronsoro
Publication Date:
04-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The coalition strategy has reached an impasse. None of the efforts attempted since the summer of 2009 has halted the deterioration of the political and security situation. Although a few tactical successes might be possible, the coalition cannot defeat the Taliban or rally local commanders to its side. Moreover, the Karzai government enjoys very limited legitimacy and appears incapable of rebuilding a state that can assume responsibility for its own security in the foreseeable future. The coalition faces the risk of an endless engagement accompanied by an intolerable loss of life and treasure.
Topic:
Government, International Cooperation, Terrorism, Treaties and Agreements, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Asia, and Taliban

9. Fixing Bagram: Strengthening Detention Reforms to Align with U.S. Strategic Priorities

Author:
Sahr MuhammedAlly
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Human Rights First
Abstract:
Eight years after launching Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan—with a mission to kill and capture “high-value” al Qaeda and Taliban members and destroy the safe havens from which al Qaeda planned and directed the 9/11 attacks—the United States government has announced several significant detention reforms in Afghanistan. Human Rights First has closely monitored U.S. detention policies and practices since September 11, 2001. In this paper, we analyze the new detention reforms announced in September 2009 and make recommendations for further improvement in U.S. detention practices in line with U.S. policy interests and legal obligations. We base our recommendations on an analysis of the applicable humanitarian and human rights law and field visits to Afghanistan.
Topic:
Political Violence, Human Rights, Terrorism, War, and Prisons/Penal Systems
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

10. Reconciling With the Taliban?: Toward an Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghanistan

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The run-up to the announcement of President Obama's new "Af-Pak" strategy provoked a flurry of "new solutions" to the conflict. Promoting reconciliation with the Taliban is one idea that has reappeared—even in the administration's own White Paper on U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. While this notion would rightly have been considered ridiculous a few years ago, many in Europe and the United States obviously believe that stabilizing Afghanistan may require just that. In fact, it would be the worst approach at this time—and it is destined to fail so long as key Taliban constituents are convinced that military victory in Afghanistan is inevitable.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Europe, and Taliban

11. Arguing Afghanistan: what the detractors of NATO's mission get wrong

Author:
Patrick Keller
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Over the last few years, Afghanistan has become less stable and less secure. There were more than 2,000 civilian casualties in 2008 - more than in any other year since the Taliban regime was overthrown in 2001, and an increase by 40% in comparison to 2007. Coalition forces suffered 294 casualties in 2008, also the highest number so far. This is the direct consequence of a rise in Taliban and insurgent activity, mostly in eastern and southern Afghanistan.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Asia, and Taliban

12. Securing Pakistan's Tribal Belt

Author:
Daniel Markey
Publication Date:
07-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
Today, few places on earth are as important to U.S. national security as the tribal belt along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan. The region serves as a safe haven for a core group of nationally and internationally networked terrorists, a training and recruiting ground for Afghan Taliban, and, increasingly, a hotbed of indigenous militancy that threatens the stability of Pakistan's own state and society. Should another 9/11-type attack take place in the United States, it will likely have its origins in this region. As long as Pakistan's tribal areas are in turmoil, the mission of building a new, democratic, and stable Afghanistan cannot succeed.
Topic:
Terrorism and War
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Asia, and Taliban

13. Iran and Al-Qaeda in Iraq: What's the Connection?

Author:
Marisa Cochrane Sullivan
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for the Study of War
Abstract:
It is widely speculated in the media that the relationship between the Shi'a government of Iran and the Sunni insurgent group, al-Qaeda in Iraq, is a hostile one, primarily because of the sectarian differences between the two. However, there is clear evidence of Iranian support for another Sunni group, the Taliban in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is worth investigating the potential links between al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Iranian regime, particularly the Iranian Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force (IRGCQF). The dossier below contains articles, press releases, and Defense Department briefings from the last year that consider the nature of this relationship. While it may not present a definitive explanation of the connection between these groups, it does suggest possible links exist between the groups and the sectarian grounds for dismissing the relationship are likely too simplistic. The most relevant passages have been highlighted in yellow.
Topic:
Islam, Terrorism, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and Taliban

14. Crime, Terror and the Central Asia Drug Trade

Author:
Tamara Makarenko
Publication Date:
06-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, St. Andrews University, Scotland
Abstract:
Over the last decade, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has been rising incrementally, culminating in a bumper crop in 1999 that produced approximately 80 percent of the global supply of illicit opium. Despite this predicament, the dynamics of the illicit drugs trade in Afghanistan has received little attention. Most media reports and government statements over-simplify the situation, making it appear as though the Taliban controlled the planting, cultivation, production and trafficking of all opiates. For example, The Times, in an article published in January 2000, reported “The Taliban rulers of Afghanistan have become the world's biggest producers and smugglers of hard drugs, overtaking rings in Colombia and Burma. They are now responsible for 95 per cent of all the heroin entering Britain.” Following the September 11 attacks, this responsibility was shared with Usama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network. British Prime Minister Tony Blair thus stated that the “arms the Taliban are buying today are paid for with the lives of young British people buying their drugs on British streets”, and subsequently added that the Taliban and Usama bin Laden “jointly exploited the drugs trade.” This view has also been propagated in the United States by leading news agencies. CNN, for example, explicitly reported that the Taliban both taxed and trafficked in narcotics, which were directly used to finance their military operations.
Topic:
Crime, Economics, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Britain, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Taliban, Colombia, and Burma