Search

Begin New Search Topic Security Political Geography Russia Content Type Working Paper

1. The Russian-Ukrainian War: An Opportunity to Strengthen the AfCFTA

Author:
Steve Tametong and Venessa Aboudi
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The world had hardly covered from the horrors of the COVID-19 pandemic when it was once again tested on February 24, 2022, by the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine. The consequences of this war are quite significant for humanity. On the economic level, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has highlighted the disadvantages of globalization, understood as a process marked by the interconnection and interdependence of world economies. The inflationary shock and the food crisis resulting from the inoperative nature of import channels for certain basic necessities from Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated the fragility of the economies. With regard to African countries, in particular, the prices of several basic food products (wheat, flour, rice, maize, bread, vegetable oil, etc.) have risen sharply. Indeed, most African countries are almost dependent on the import of agricultural products and seeds from the two belligerent countries. These imports correspond to 35 billion US dollars of imports each year (1). This appears to be an incongruity given the extent of arable land on the African continent. The low production and especially processing capacity increases the dependence of African economies on the import of these basic products. The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict makes it possible to question the economic resilience of African States, that is to say, their “capacity [ to] keep output close to [their] potential despite a shock ” (2). Above all, it offers the opportunity to analyze the economic and commercial potential of the AfCFTA in the process of building the resilience of African economies to external shocks. Indeed, the AfCFTA was officially launched in January 2021 with the main objective of “creating a single market for goods and services facilitated by the movement of people in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent…” (3). This policy note is structured around the idea that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in view of its socio-economic consequences on the African continent, offers an opportunity for African countries to work toward the strengthening of the AfCFTA. So that it appears as a real pole of competitiveness and inter-African trade likely to counter the shocks and uncertainties of the dynamics of world trade. Before analyzing the AfCFTA as a pole of production and export of African products (II), it is necessary to take stock of the socio-economic consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on African economies (I).
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, Military Strategy, Free Trade, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. Fighting Against Internal and External Threats Simultaneously: China’s Police and Satellite Cooperation with Autocratic Countries

Author:
Chisako T. Masuo
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
What direction will the Xi Jinping administration’s foreign policy take over the coming years, and how will that affect the existing international order? The Chinese Communist Party harbours a strong sense of crisis about the internal and external threats colliding to supposedly destabilise its regime, and thus aims to strengthen cooperation with developing countries in order to prevent such danger. The Xi administration is consequently strengthening police and law-enforcement cooperation inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which includes Russia. Besides, China has launched a new initiative of collaborating with Moscow on satellite systems to monitor the entire Earth, in order to accumulate big data on various issues. The current Chinese foreign policy, which pursues a cultivation of deeper relations with autocratic countries by providing them with surveillance technologies, is likely to deepen the global divide with liberal democracies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Order, and Satellite
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

3. No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security

Author:
Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
To the extent that any unified theory of Russian information warfare actually exists, its core tenet might well be that regime security has historically been indivisible from information warfare in Russian strategic thought. Rather than an aggressive or expansionist expression of Moscow’s foreign policy, the Kremlin’s so-called information war should primarily be viewed through a domestic and regime security prism—it’s as much a counterinsurgency as an expeditionary strategy, less an escalation than a projection. Analysts and decisionmakers should therefore avoid reflexively casting the United States and the West as Russia’s primary antagonists in its information war, as doing so risks reinforcing these insecurities and exaggerating Moscow’s degree of power in the information ecosystem.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

4. Examining Changes in Regional Cooperation in Central Europe from a Polish Perspective

Author:
Tomasz Żornaczuk
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Visegrad Group (V4), until recently the most active and multidimensional cooperation platform in Central Europe, does not serve currently to strengthen the voice of the region on the most essential issues concerning its security. This is because Hungary’s stance on Russia’s attack on Ukraine is different than that of its partners. That is why Poland is tightening relations with the other Visegrad countries—Czechia and Slovakia. At the same time, Poland is also intensifying cooperation with the Baltic states, which has its source in joint actions on security and eastern affairs in the years preceding the war.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Visegrad Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Central Europe, Slovakia, and Czechia

5. Evolution, not Revolution: Japan Revises Security Policy

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In December last year, the government of Kishida Fumio adopted three documents adapting Japan’s security policy to the deteriorating international situation. Its security and national defence strategies highlight challenges from China, Russia, and North Korea, as well as an increase in non-military threats. A third document specifies the need for a record increase in defence spending. Japan’s readiness to deepen cooperation with the U.S. and European countries and its criticism in its assessment of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine create the conditions for the further development of Japan’s cooperation with NATO and the Polish-Japanese dialogue on security.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Asia, and North Korea

6. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept. Analysis and implications for Austria

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Adopted at the Madrid Summit in June 2022, the long-overdue NATO’s new Strategic Concept provides a clear set of guidelines for the Atlantic Alliance in a mid-term perspective. The war in Ukraine has provided the Allies with a powerful catalyst to reconsider NATO’s identity, core missions, as well as their vision of Russia and China. NATO’s new deterrence and defence-centric approach has already entailed a major shift in our security architecture, especially on Europe’s eastern flank. Without undermining its historical neutrality, Austria might reinterpret it in light of NATO’s “reset” and use this opportunity to reinvigorate its partnership with the Alliance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Balkans

7. Assessing the importance of new corridors in the South Caucasus in the context of the RussianUkrainian war

Author:
Murad Agayev
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Economic and Social Development (CESD)
Abstract:
This article analyzes the possibilities of a new corridor in the South Caucasus region in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The research is important because after the 44-day war, fertile conditions for new opportunities have emerged in the South Caucasus region. The RussianUkrainian war and the resulting damage to the transport sector, like other sectors, necessitated the creation and use of alternative routes. The questioning of the security of the Black Sea due to the war and the closing of the European space for Russia created a problem for the countries that used Russia and the Black Sea to reach Europe. These countries are already evaluating alternative opportunities to the corridors. One of these possibilities is the Middle Corridor project, which has seen an increase in the volume of transported cargo since its inception, except during the pandemic period. During the war, the shortest possible transport corridor from China to Europe will be provided after the financial investment in the infrastructure and the integration of the Zangezur Corridor into the Middle Corridor, and work on this process is currently being continued. The North-South Corridor, which has been discussed for a long time however has not gained much popularity, gained even more importance during the war, and the works related to the construction of the infrastructure of the corridor were accelerated.
Topic:
Security, Infrastructure, Transportation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus

8. Prescription for Military Paralysis: Wartime Reactor Meltdowns (Occasional Paper 2305)

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
More than 15 months into the war, Russian attacks against Ukraine’s nuclear plants have yet to release any radiation. As the likelihood of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant reopening quickly declines and Putin’s desire to distract the world from his declining political and military standing increases, some experts fear he may want to induce a radiological release from the plant. In any case, Putin’s military assaults against the Zaporizhzhia plant have already set a worrying precedent. Last December, NPEC held a wargame, the results of which The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists just published, to examine what might happen in a future Russian invasion of Ukraine. In this reinvasion in 2037, Russia targets power reactors in Ukraine, Poland, and Romania. The United States plans to build scores of new reactors in these countries. What if Russian missiles targeted them in a future war? NPEC tapped the expertise of Ukrainians, Romanians, NATO officials, Poles, US security experts, and Hill staff to find out. It hosted five sessions over two weeks and ran a three-move wargame. The game’s play revealed how the uncertainties and dangers of military attacks against nuclear power plants can paralyze decision-making and fundamentally alter the course of wars. The military disruptions these uncertainties introduce may far outstrip the safety issues any reactor radiological release might otherwise present. The game’s play revealed three reasons why.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, War Games, Nuclear Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

9. EU-Ukraine wartime trade: Overcoming difficulties, forging a European path

Author:
Svitlana Taran
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
During the first year of Russia’s war in Ukraine, EU trade-liberalisation measures and EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes provided Ukraine with alternative export routes and allowed the country to reorient part of its exports to the EU market. However, the insufficient logistics capacity and lack of adequate coordination and cooperation during the operation of Solidarity Lanes led to tensions between Ukraine and its Eastern European neighbours. While a compromise between the European Commission and the Eastern European countries allowed the extension of temporary trade-liberalisation measures for a further year, resolving the immediate crisis, more is needed to ensure their smooth operation. This Discussion Paper provides recommendations on how the EU can further intensify efforts to facilitate Ukraine’s trade flows and prevent sudden trade disruptions and restrictions. These include: Enhance the strategic alignment and connectivity between Ukraine and the EU; Ensure security guarantees and increase the capacity of seaport corridors; Enhance coordination and unity between the Commission, EU member states and Ukraine; Avoid sudden and unjustified Solidarity Lanes' disruptions; Protect critical port and export infrastructure from Russia’s attacks; Facilitate EU-Ukraine trade liberalisation and Ukraine’s integration into the EU Single Market.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Trade Liberalization, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

10. Charting a Transatlantic Approach to Russia: A Working Paper of the Transatlantic Forum on Russia

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Although the United States and Europe are not directly engaged in the war with Russia in Ukraine, Moscow clearly sees itself as being at war with the West. The United States and Europe, therefore, must be prepared for a period of what is likely to be prolonged confrontation with Russia, with the war for Ukraine at the center of that confrontation. Successfully navigating this period of sustained confrontation requires continued cohesion and coordination between the United States and Europe to ensure they share a common picture of the challenge that Russia poses and the necessary response. Russia’s war in Ukraine has precipitated rapid and major changes in Europe and broader ripple effects that are altering political dynamics much farther afield. Because of the war in Ukraine, Russia itself is changing in still unknowable ways. Russian President Vladimir Putin is taking the country in a more authoritarian direction, Russian society is shifting, and the Russian military’s degradation in Ukraine means that the nature of the Russian threat is evolving. Russia’s war, therefore, requires the allies to re-examine long-held assumptions and understandings about Russia and its intentions and capacity, and it is those updated assessments that should guide the transatlantic partners’ future policy approach toward Moscow. There is no going back to the way things were with Russia prior to its invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Western allies must build on ongoing efforts to constrict and constrain the Kremlin’s ability to sustain aggression in Ukraine and more broadly beyond Russia’s borders. It also will require the development of a long-term and sustainable approach to restoring peace and stability to Europe, increasing resilience to the Kremlin’s tools and tactics, and planting the seeds for a less confrontational relationship with a future Russia. In many ways, such an approach will resemble the containment strategy first set out in the 1940s, a strategy designed to apply steady and forceful counterpressure to a regime whose paranoia and insecurities represented a clear danger to the West, just as the Putin regime does today. Each of the transatlantic allies’ preferred policy approaches will reflect their own proximity to and history with Russia, as well as current political realities within their own borders. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus within the alliance that the unprecedented cohesion and coordination among allies in the wake of Russia’s invasion must hold. To that end, this working paper provides a starting point for the development of a transatlantic approach to Russia. It articulates expectations for relations with Russia that should guide the allies’ approach, outlines the broad objectives that a transatlantic Russia policy should seek to accomplish, and in some cases more specific near-term actions the allies can take. The analysis reflects two years of dialogue that CNAS has conducted through its Transatlantic Forum on Russia (TFR). It brings together and builds on previous work facilitated by the Forum, including policy papers, op-eds, articles, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, “What Comes Next for U.S. Policy Toward Russia,” and other cited publications.1 The paper aims to provide fodder for policymakers and experts on both side of the Atlantic to debate and refine through continued dialogue, including through the future work of the TFR.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Dialogue, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

11. De-colonising the Azerbaijan-Armenian Conflict: Breaking the Knot of Security and Dependence

Author:
Leila Alieva
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The recent military operation in the Nagorno Karabakh area reflects a broader regional transformation. Its essence is in the second attempt (with the first one in Azerbaijan 30 years ago) of changing the security paradigm, this time in Armenia, leading to de-colonisation of relations in the region. The core of this change is liberation from the dependence on Russia’s almost two centuries old patronage, with Nagorno Karabakh conflict evolving as a tool of this dependence. With all the contradictions over the territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and difference in current political systems, the countries seem at last to arrive to the same conclusion of Russia and her control of the Karabakh elite being one of the obstacles to the peaceful relations, reforms and integration in the West. The power balance in the region, affected by such factors as Turkey’s greater involvement, distraction of the West, Russia’s increasing isolation, besides power change in Armenia, has also contributed to the “window of opportunity” for a change of paradigms. The role and influence of the EU and the US in this process, including in deterring potential military developments, will be dependent on the perception of them by the parties as non-partisan brokers, promotion of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan as independent subjects of international relations and consistency in support of democracy.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Mediation, and Interdependence
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

12. Walking a Fine Line: Turkey’s Mediation between Russia and Ukraine, and Relations with the West

Author:
Remi Daniel and Gallia Lindenstrauss
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Turkey’s reaction to the Russian aggression in Ukraine was among the more moderate responses heard from NATO members. With an eye to the post-war situation, Ankara is trying to walk a tightrope and not overly provoke either side. What lies behind this Turkish policy, and is it viable?
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Conflict, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, and Ukraine

13. A Primer on the 2022 National Security Strategy

Author:
Peter Juul and Heba Malik
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
The 2022 National Security Strategy introduces new ideas on navigating strategic competition with China and Russia, investing at home, and a renewed focus on the fight against climate change.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, National Security, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

14. Blowback from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Sarah Cliffe, Leah Zamore, and James Traub
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
While the Ukrainian army and people continue to resist, the costs of Russia's invasion in human terms are mounting. As of March 15, the United Nations (UN) had verified 1,900 civilian casualties, including 726 deaths (fifty of them children), as Russia intensifies its assault on civilian targets, seizes the Zaporizhzhia nuclear site, lays siege to Mariupol which is without food, energy, or water in freezing temperatures, continues to threaten Kyiv, begins a push on Odesa and assaults Kharkiv with heavy and indiscriminate shelling.
Topic:
Security, War Crimes, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

15. The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited

Author:
Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The Russian authorities apply an “algorithm of lies”, the Russian armed forces have become a sealed organization, and tactical information about Russia’s war in Ukraine is fragmented and unreliable. Hence, definite conclusions concerning the Russian soldier cannot be drawn.
Topic:
Security, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

16. Mobilizing Against Russia? Some Reflections on the Security Deadlock Called Ukraine

Author:
Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
No event exists beyond the media. This is also the case with the current Russian-Ukraine war. Daily, we are flooded with analyses and opinions about Putin’s military threat in the East. These narratives – mostly polemical and shrill – are both the result of and the catalyst for the crisis. As such, the debate itself – consciously or unconsciously – becomes part of the Western-Russian standoff driven by the strategy of hybrid and decision-centric warfare. This essay deliberately distances itself from the issues of the day and the hyper-polarized debate that currently takes place. Instead, a more detached exercise is made in which the polyphonic nature of the past and the intricacy of history is deliberately sought out. It shows the complexity of the process we have gone through, leading to the current deadlock. As such, we have to face the changes and continuities with which we have been confronted, or as Jeffrey Frank recently wrote in The New Yorker, “If a lot has changed since the end of the Cold War, there’s much that hasn’t.”
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

17. Turkey’s quest for Strategic Autonomy

Author:
Alexandros Diakopoulos
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Ankara is pursuing a radical revision of the regional status quo by projecting power in neighboring regions with increasing aggression and disregard for international legality. Turkey moved from a security-based to a power-based foreign policy and took advantage of the power vacuum in Eastern Mediterranean to make a bid for regional hegemony by resorting to the use of hard power. The Turkish army developed autonomous expeditionary capabilities, bolstered by a strengthened national defense industry. The lessons learned in Syria clearly informed the series of Turkish foreign policy moves that followed. A revisionist Turkey involved itself in all regional theaters of conflict, fomenting instability in the region while also reaping strategic and economic benefits. These interventions shaped Turkish-Russian competitive cooperation and strategic realignment. Since 2016 the relationship has evolved into something almost symbiotic, with the two countries coordinating their presence on multiple fronts. The two countries are drawn to one another by their shared authoritarian models of governance and similar strategic cultures and operational codes: Both countries are revisionist, aggressive and assertive on their peripheries. Both countries claim to be surrounded, which serves as a pretext for their unilateral actions. Both countries have militarized their foreign policy by conducting hybrid warfare, using surrogate forces and coercing countries that resist.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Authoritarianism, Strategic Autonomy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, and Middle East

18. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: Unity is good, but ambition is better

Author:
Sophie Pornschlegel and Ilke Toygür
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
In view of the volatile geopolitical environment, EU leaders no longer have the luxury of waiting for all 27 member states to find a consensus. In order to lead the way to a Union that is apt for future challenges, the EU should become more ambitious and embrace alternatives, such as differentiated integration, in the coming months and years. Rather than returning to the status quo ante, the EU should use this momentum to progress in five policy fields: economic governance, with a new recovery package and a reform of the fiscal rules; security and defence, with improved EU–NATO cooperation and a stronger ‘European pillar’; energy policy, by quickly steering member states away from dependence on Russian fossil fuels while simultaneously ensuring admissible energy prices for consumers and respecting the climate targets; enlargement and neighbourhood policy, by rethinking its aims and creating options for countries that are unlikely to become EU members in the foreseeable future; and the rule of law, to safeguard the Union’s values ‘at home’. Both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion revealed that the EU institutions and leaders are capable of managing crises swiftly and decisively. This reality certainly increases its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens as well as its allies. The European Union could use this moment of change to increase its ambition for reforms and for moving European integration forward. This should encourage leaders to think about all the options for designing the Union’s future. This is not a time for black and white thinking – Treaty change or nothing –, but rather a time to explore all the shades of grey for securing necessary reforms. If like-minded countries could lead the way, others may also follow. The changing and evolving positions in the EU could help secure more inclusive alliances for moving forward. The political momentum to do so is finally here.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, Rule of Law, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

19. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: Matching Ambition with Reality

Author:
Jonny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in July 2022 on NATO’s 2030 Strategic Concept. Participants in the discussion included: General Sir James Everard, Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Lt Gen Giles Hill, ProfessorChristopher Coker, Dr Luca Tardelli, Marissa Kemp, Tom McKane, and Peter Watkins. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors. The Strategic Concept is the first since 2010 and was redrafted throughout a fundamentally different geopolitical and security context—following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This Update addresses the Concept’s recognition of necessary strategic realignment, with NATO’s widening in both its defence commitments and geographic focus on China, as well as its ambiguity in regards to practical military strategy, deterrence, and endpoint of the war in Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

20. Russian Strategic Interest in Arctic Heats Up as Ice Melts

Author:
Robert Jr. McVey
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In this latest Strategic Update, Col Robert A. McVey Jr addresses why Russia has dramatically changed its Arctic strategy since 2007, committing significant military and fiscal resources to the region. McVey additionally describes the diplomatic, information, legal, and military tools of national power that Russia is craftily employing to pursue, promote, and protect its growing strategic economic interests in the Arctic, finding that the possibility of conflict between great powers remains ever present, regardless of the potential for cooperation or competition. Given that Russia’s Arctic strategy is primarily driven by economic interests, this paper makes five key recommendations for U.S. policymakers and military leaders, focusing on security cooperation programmes with NATO allies and the Arctic states.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Economics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia and Arctic

21. Russian-Turkish Relations and Implications for U.S. Strategy and Operations

Author:
Hanna Notte and Chen Kane
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Russia and Turkey’s complex relationship has significant implications for U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategic interests. The two states cooperate, deconflict, and compete in multiple theatres within Turkey’s extended neighborhood, which straddles United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), and United States European Command (USEUCOM) areas of responsibility (AORs). 1 Their bilateral strategic trade has created mutual dependencies and vulnerabilities across multiple sectors, such as natural gas, nuclear energy, and tourism. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has many implications for the Russia-Turkey relationship. While engaging actively with Russia and stoking fears that its commercial ties with Moscow could serve Russia’s evasion of Western sanctions, Turkey has also provided TB2 Bayraktar drones to Ukraine, invoked the Montreux Convention, and offered itself as a mediator on various operational issues in the Russia-Ukraine war. As a result of these steps, Turkey’s leverage over both Russia and NATO allies has increased since February 2022. From a U.S. perspective, the implications have been mixed as Turkey has translated its increased leverage into foreign policy steps that threaten to undermine U.S. interests and NATO cohesion. Turkey remains of significant importance to the United States in enabling its interests in the three aforementioned AORs, preventing third actors like China and Iran from operating in the “seams,” and generating an enhanced, unified, and credible NATO capability and capacity in response to Russian aggression. It follows that Turkey’s interplay with Russia in its extended neighborhood has far-reaching implications for the United States and NATO. This study aims to shed light on this relationship, its likely trajectory over the coming decade, its implications for U.S. strategic interests, and how the United States and NATO might shape the Russia- Turkey interplay to their advantage.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, North America, and United States of America

22. Can the West Afford to Let the World Go Hungry? Overcoming Challenges to Establishing a Humanitarian Corridor in the Black Sea

Author:
Isak Runarsson
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
While economic interdependencies do not prevent war, witnessed most recently by Russia’s naked war of conquest in Ukraine, the costs of war in a globalised world spread far and wide. Russia has taken the world’s food markets hostage by blockading Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea. The resulting food price increases make a humanitarian crisis in the world’s poorest countries increasingly likely; this, in turn may lead to regime fragility and turmoil in the international system. The question of lifting the blockade by establishing a human corridor into the port of Odessa has recently been much discussed. There are challenges to any such effort, both strategic and operational. Yet a careful analysis reveals that the costs and risks of non-intervention are greater than the risks of intervening. An international naval force, co-led by the EU or its member states and Turkey is the best option for such a mission.
Topic:
Security, Food Security, Hunger, Maritime, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Black Sea

23. The “New Uzbekistan”: Turkey’s New Partner in the Pan-Turkist Organization of Turkic States

Author:
Hay Eytan Cohan Yanaroack
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Tashkent’s increasingly critical approach toward Russia and its deepening role in the Organization of Turkic States has positioned the country as Ankara’s most important bridgehead in Central Asia.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Turkey

24. The differences between Western and non-Western US allies in the Ukraine war

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
For mid-level regional powers, avoiding non-essential friction with a major power like Russia is seen as an imperative, particularly in a situation where consistent support from their US patron is by no means a given.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

25. Japan and the War in Ukraine

Author:
Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Two weeks after the war began, Japan announced that its new National Security Strategy scheduled to be published this year would recategorize Russia from “partner” to “security challenge,” thus placing it alongside China and North Korea.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, and Asia

26. Russia’s threat against the Jewish Agency is a Bargaining Measure

Author:
Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel should prepare for a prolonged crisis. The Russians might want to delay or accelerate the legal process to exploit the elections period. The verdict will not constitute the final word. The government is advised to navigate the crisis behind the scenes: publicity might accelerate escalation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Israel, and North America

27. Ukraine War Distracts US from China, Legitimizes Nuclear Bombs

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is distracting the US from the Chinese threat and erodes the nuclear taboo.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, Rivalry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America

28. Space Traffic Management: Time for Action

Author:
Mir Sadat and Julia Siegel
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Outer space has long been characterized as “contested, congested, and competitive.” More than four thousand eight hundred active satellites currently orbit Earth, representing over forty nations, and nearly twenty-five thousand satellites are projected to join by 2030. Moreover, spacefaring entities are testing the limits of space exploration: Visionary space companies are aiming to launch space tourism programs and send humans to space within the decade, and governments and militaries are increasing activity in cislunar space—the sphere formed by the Earth-Moon radius—to leverage advantageous orbital regions. As humanity expands its frontiers deeper into the galaxy, the threats to US and allied space capabilities will continue to increase. Yet, despite the proliferation of space activity, the ability of international and national bodies to track and regulate space objects—often referred to as space traffic management (STM)—reflects a past era wherein few actors conducted limited operations in space. The current state of STM can be more aptly described as space situational awareness (SSA), or the mere knowledge of objects in orbit. Global actors (including national governments, corporations, and international organizations) track space objects and notify satellite operators when the probability of collision is notable. While collision avoidance maneuvers are standard when there is a one in ten thousand chance of collision, it is ultimately up to the operators to determine whether and when they will move. The limits of this decentralized approach to SSA were illustrated in September 2019 when a European Space Agency satellite veered off path to avoid a Starlink satellite whose operator missed an email notification signaling a high probability of collision.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, National Security, and Space
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

29. The Waning India-Russia Partnership is an Unexpected Effect of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
twitter The Waning India-Russia Partnership is an Unexpected Effect of the War in Ukraine 174 08.11.2022 India has not condemned Russia for its aggression against Ukraine, which stems from historical ideological ties, as well as their strategic and military cooperation. However, the war has led to unfavourable changes from India’s point of view—the weakening of Russia, the collapse of its cooperation with the West, and a growing dependence on China. As a result, Russia is diminishing in importance as a key partner of India, including a supplier of weapons and technology. In the long run, closer cooperation between India and the U.S. and EU countries in the field of security and energy will help to move India away from Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and India

30. Russia or the West – Which Should Jerusalem Choose?

Author:
Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The Israeli government has not publicly expressed a position regarding the gathering of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border. Still, a renewed war between Russia and Ukraine could make it challenging to choose between its commitment to its Western allies and its important relationship with Russia.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

31. What does the Deraa surrender mean for Iran and Russia in Syria?

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
In the southwest, the outside powers of relevance are Iran and Russia. The arrangement in place from July 2018 until now was the product of an uneasy standoff between them.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

32. Countering Zero-Sum Relations in the Middle East: Insights from the Expert Survey

Author:
Flavio Fusco
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Building on emerging debates on the need to develop de-escalation mechanisms for the Middle East, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the Brussels-based Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), with support from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, launched a one-year research and outreach project entitled “Fostering a New Security Architecture in the Middle East”. Connected to the research, an expert survey targeting European, US, Russian, Middle Eastern and Chinese experts and practitioners was conducted on key themes, principles and approaches associated with a potential new security architecture for the region. The results of the survey – first published in an edited book volume jointly published by IAI and FEPS in November 2020 – are analysed below, complete with tables and infographics on key themes associated with the research project and the search for new, inclusive mechanisms for dialogue and de-escalation in the Middle East.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, and United States of America

33. EU Strategic Autonomy in the Shadow of Geopolitical Rivalry: A View from Moscow

Author:
Sergey Utkin
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The EU is determined to maintain the transatlantic bond, while Russia tends to interpret the EU’s strategic autonomy precisely as autonomy from the US. The Western unity effort is significantly strengthened by the poor state of the EU’s relations with Russia. Russia is ready to pay lip service to the idea of a more capable EU, but instead it sees opportunities in areas where bilateral cooperation with member states is possible. The EU-wide consensus is doomed to remain critical vis-à-vis Russia for the foreseeable future. The EU will increasingly focus on gaining autonomy from Russia, primarily in the energy field and in terms of hard security deterrence. The EU-Russia geopolitical tension, centred on the common neighbourhood, is long-term and might cause as yet unseen damage to the relationship if it is not handled carefully.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, European Union, Conflict, Regionalism, Autonomy, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

34. A Strategic Triangle in the Arctic? Implications of China–Russia–United States Power Dynamics for Regional Security

Author:
Ian Anthony and Fei Su
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security paper examines security challenges arising from the Arctic activities of three actors with a substantial ‘footprint’—China, Russia and the United States—and how they might be addressed in existing and new frameworks. Arctic and non-Arctic states want to exploit commercial opportunities created by a changing physical environment. Arctic states agree that climate-related challenges can be addressed through cooperation within existing institutions. However, to ensure that increasing human activity stays within acceptable environmental and human security risk levels, non-Arctic states need to be engaged. The risk of unwanted escalation in military tension in the Arctic due to deteriorating relations among major powers over disputes arising elsewhere has grown to the point where it cannot be ignored. A steady increase in military investments in the Arctic, or Arctic operations, will continue, but there is no ready-made framework to address military security challenges. Issues that occupy a ‘grey zone’ between military and non-military security will have to be addressed as digital and transport infrastructure expand in the Arctic. However, there is little experience in how diverse state and non-state actors can manage cooperation and competition simultaneously.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, and United States of America

35. Strategic Report

Author:
Zaid Eyadat and Moh'd Khair Eiedat
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Abstract:
This is not a historical nor chronological report. It is rather “a working paper”. The purpose of this rather brief report is to reflect on three major issues: first, what are the characteristics of the world we live in? How stable and predictable is it? Are those in power know what are they doing? Or is it the blind leading the blind? Is our sense of uncertainty and thus unpredictability a product of mental crisis related to one in a lifetime pandemic experience? or is it more structural with long historical span? The second question is how dangerous and out of control is the Middle east region? Or is it? The Abraham Accords promise a new dawn for the region? Paradise is just around the corner or the calm preceding the storm? The third question, where does Jordan fit in these wider circles of activities both global and regional? Deliberately we left out of the report any serious considerations of the economic aspect challenge facing Jordan which is both self-evident and widely recognized. Moreover, the emphasis is on the geostrategic aspects of security related to the global level, the regional level and that of Jordan. Let us first look at the world.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan

36. Structural Shifts and Regional Security: A View from Israel

Author:
Ehud Eiran
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Israel is still holding to its traditional security maxim. Based on a perception of a hostile region, Israel’s response includes early warning, deterrence and swift – including pre-emptive – military action, coupled with an alliance with a global power, the US. Israel is adjusting these maxims to a changing reality. Overlapping interests – and perhaps the prospect of an even more open conflict with Iran – led to limited relationships between Israel and some Gulf states. These, however, will be constrained until Israel makes progress on the Palestine issue. Israel aligned with Greece and Cyprus around energy and security, which may lead to conflict with Turkey. Russia’s deployment in Syria placed new constraints on Israeli freedom of action there. The US’s retrenchment from the Middle East is not having a direct effect on Israel, while the Trump administration’s support for Israel’s territorial designs in the West Bank may make it easier for Israel to permanently expand there, thus sowing the seeds for future instability in Israel/Palestine. The EU could try and balance against such developments, but, as seen from Israel, is too divided to have a significant impact. Paper produced in the framework of the FEPS-IAI project “Fostering a New Security Architecture in the Middle East”, April 2020.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Gas, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Greece, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, United States of America, and Mediterranean

37. Perspectives on the future of Idlib

Author:
Kirill Semenov
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The situation in Idlib poses a challenge to the Assad government. Damascus has neither the forces nor the means to resolve the problem. Moreover, any operation conducted against the Syrian moderate opposition and the radical alliance “Hayat Tahrir al-Sham” (HTS) concentrated in this region could be significantly problematic for the government. Turkey seeks to establish a protectorate or security zone in Idlib to accommodate those fleeing regime-held areas and prevent a new refugees flow into Turkey. The gains achieved by the Turkish operation in Idlib by the establishment of the security zone has potentially been lost as a result of the subsequent Russian backed Syrian government offensive, which has created a problem for Turkey with hundreds of thousands heading toward the Turkish border and threatening to exasperate what is already a costly refugee problem for Ankara. In order for Turkey to address issues in Idlib, including IDPs and economic problems, it first needs to deal with the HTS, ideally finding a way to dissolve the group. This could potentially be an area of cooperation for Moscow and Ankara. This may be necessary to prevent a deterioration in the security situation and long-term destabilisation of the area.
Topic:
Security, Refugees, Economy, Political stability, Displacement, Syrian War, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and Transition
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

38. Security Assistance in the Middle East: A Three-Dimensional Chessboard

Author:
Robert Springborg, F.C. "Pink" Williams, and John Zavage
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The United States, Russia, and Iran have chosen markedly different approaches to security assistance in the Middle East, with dramatic implications for statebuilding and stability. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is the world’s testing ground for the effectiveness of security assistance provided by global and regional powers. That security assistance has contributed to the intensity and frequency of proxy wars—such as those under way or recently wound down in Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq—and to the militarization of state and substate actors in the MENA region. Security assistance is at the core of struggles for military, strategic, ideological, and even economic preeminence in the Middle East. Yet despite the broad and growing importance of security assistance for the region and for competition within it between global and regional actors, security assistance has been the subject of relatively little comparative analysis. Efforts to assess relationships between the strategic objectives and operational methods of security assistance providers and their relative impacts on recipients are similarly rare.
Topic:
Security, Geopolitics, Political stability, and State Building
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

39. Finnish foreign policy during EU membership: Unlocking the EU’s security potential

Author:
Matti Pesu, Tuomas Iso-Markku, and Juha Jokela
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
This FIIA Finnish Foreign Policy Paper looks at the evolution of Finnish foreign and security policy during the country’s 25 years as an EU member. The paper aims to trace how – and with what kind of consequences – Finnish foreign and security policy has interacted with EU foreign policy during the membership period. More specifically, the study examines the interlinkage between Finnish and EU foreign policy in relation to three different topics: the policy towards and relations with Russia, security and defence, and Finland’s broadening international agenda. The paper argues that the Finnish policy vis-à-vis the three domains is marked by different patterns of continuity and change. However, the rise of a protective agenda in the Finnish policy towards Russia, Finland’s increased boldness in advancing the EU’s security and defence dimension, and the recent emphasis on the Union’s role as a bulwark against geo-economic threats all indicate that the EU’s role in enhancing Finnish security has become a top priority. Indeed, Finland is currently endeavouring to unlock the EU’s potential as a security community.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, and Scandinavia

40. Russian pipelines and EU energy security: Utilizing the externality elements of the EU’s regulatory framework

Author:
Michalis Mathioulakis
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Russia and the EU have been entangled in the harsh effects of asymmetrical interdependence and the security threats it generates. Russia’s economy is linked directly to the form and volume of trade directed from the EU towards the Russian economy, while the EU economy is linked to the flow of Russian gas and oil directed towards European businesses and households. Growing concerns on EU’s dependency on energy imports led the European Commission to release its Energy Security Strategy (2014), aiming to secure stability and abundancy of energy supply while simultaneously examining the effects of discrepancies from Russian gas imports to the European energy systems. In contrast, Russia’s primary concern is to secure the necessary energy revenues that could enable Moscow to project and exercise its hard power to areas with strategic interest by striving to gain greater leverage within the European energy markets. Russia’s security objectives in relation to its energy export capacity are expressed primarily through materialisation of two major natural gas pipeline systems, namely the Nord Stream 2 and the TurkStream pipelines. This paper by Michalis Mathioulakis, Research Associate of ELIAMEP; Energy Strategy Analyst and Academic Director of the Greek Energy Forum, examines the strive between the two international actors in redetermining their future relations and the role of Russian gas pipelines and the EU’s regulatory framework in shaping the two actors’ common future.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, European Union, and Regulation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

41. Greek-Russian Relations: A Potential to Mend Strained Ties

Author:
George Tzogopoulos
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The relationship between Greece and Russia requires a careful management following the diplomatic crisis of the 2018 summer. The visit of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Athens offers an opportunity for a sincere dialogue between the two countries. Greece and Russia can either agree on their disagreements or search for a new way forward based on realism and common interests. A sincere dialogue should leave illusions aside and concentrate on joint interests.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Greece

42. The Visegrád Four and the Security of NATO’s “Eastern Flank”

Author:
Eoin Micheál McNamara
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of International Relations Prague
Abstract:
Eoin Micheál McNamara in his Policy Paper called The Visegrád Four and the Security of NATO’s “Eastern Flank” expresses the argument that there is considerable scope for the V4 states to improve their contribution to NATO’s collective defence posture. Based on this fact, he argues the different strategic positions of each V4 member within the NATO membership related to Russian influence.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

43. Etched in Stone: Russian Strategic Culture and the Future of Transatlantic Security

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia will remain a formidable adversary for the United States, yet they have a shared interest in avoiding outright war. Time and patience will be needed to rebuild the relationship. Russian strategic culture is a product of several key factors: a long history of wars and adversarial relations with other European powers; an open geographic landscape that puts a premium on strategic depth; and an elite given to embracing a narrative of implacable Western hostility toward Russia. Historically, Europe has been by far the most important geographic theater for Russia, and it remains so to the present day. The national narrative of Vladimir Putin’s Russia emphasizes the legacy of World War II in Europe and the critical role Russia played in the defeat of Germany. Both support the Kremlin’s claim to special rights in the affairs of the continent.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Culture, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

44. Terrorism in Afghanistan: A Joint Threat Assessment

Author:
Teresa Val
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
Terrorism in Afghanistan: A Joint Threat Assessment is intended to serve as an analytical tool for policymakers and an impetus for joint U.S.-Russia action. The report provides an overview of the security situation and peace process in Afghanistan, taking into account U.S. and Russian policies, priorities and interests; surveys the militant terrorist groups in and connected to Afghanistan and explores the security interests of various regional stakeholders vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Challenges relating to border management, arms trafficking and terrorist financing in Afghanistan are also briefly addressed.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, United States, Europe, Middle East, and North America

45. Hard security dynamics in the Baltic Sea region: From turbulence to tense stability

Author:
Matti Pesu
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
This Briefing Paper looks into the fundamentals of the Baltic Sea security landscape in the early 2020s. It argues that three interconnected security dynamics shape the present, ‘post-2014’ security environment in Northeastern Europe. That is to say, Russia’s assertive behaviour in the region and in Europe more broadly, NATO’s reassurance and deterrence measures in the area, and Finland’s and Sweden’s closer integration into the Western defence network all affect hard se- curity dynamics in the Baltic Sea region. These three dynamics underlie the tense regional stability that emerged after a period of alarmism and turbulence in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s ac- tions in Ukraine. Fundamentally, the stability is the product of the interplay between the three dynamics. In other words, NATO’s reassurance and deterrence measures accompanied by Finland’s and Sweden’s in- tegration into the Western security and defence system act as a counterweight to Russia’s actions in the region, creating a balance of power holding Russia’s ambitions in check. Investigating the sources of regional balance is rele- vant for multiple reasons. The region remains a poten- tial hotspot between Russia and the West and, thus, it merits close and continuous attention. Moreover, the word ‘stability’ frequently features in foreign policy parlance in Northern Europe, particularly in Finland and Sweden. Given this rhetorical proclivity, attention needs to be paid to the factors that actually constitute stability and the state of hard security in the Baltic Sea area. The paper consists of three analytical parts. First, it provides a brief historical overview of the twists and turns in the regional security landscape from the early post-Cold War era to today. The second part introduces the three dynamics in detail, followed by an analysis of how they are interconnected. The paper concludes by contemplating how regional stability could best be preserved in the 2020s.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Baltic Sea

46. Russia's Foreign and Security Policy in the Middle East: Entering the 2020s

Author:
Ekaterina Stepanova
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
As Russia has become a major external player in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region due to its military engagement in Syria since 2015, it has acted as a balancer and mediator in several regional controversies and has continued to serve as a security guarantor for the Syrian state. This course has brought Moscow some practical dividends, such as growing economic and military-technical cooperation with select MENA countries, and has spurred its broader international profile. However, entering the 2020s, the risks of more active engagement in the Middle East have also mounted, making Russia’s balancing act more difficult. In three cases where Russia’s involvement has been visible (Syria, Libya and the Israeli-Palestinian problem), evolving developments challenge Moscow’s acquired influence and multi-vector approach, but also create new opportunities for its engagement and mediation. Above all, the 2020 US–Iran crisis catalysed the urgent need for structured regional dialogue, especially across the Persian Gulf. While this requires direct interaction between the region’s main antagonists, the initial impulse to unlock the trans-Gulf impasse might need to come from the outside. A process-oriented blueprint for inclusive multilateral security in the Gulf proposed by Russia in 2019 is a step in the right direction, but to be activated it may need to come as part of some broader international initiative.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Israel, Libya, Palestine, North Africa, and Syria

47. Dealing with Russia: Towards a Coherent Belgian Policy

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer and Laura Vansina
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Belgo-Russian relations are mired in paradox. For several years, the relationship between the Russian Federation on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the other has been characterized by mistrust. As a founding member of these multilateral organisations, Belgium has been a full part of the decision-making process that has formulated a hardening stance towards the Russian Federation. Yet on a bilateral level, Belgium has pragmatically upheld what is left of commercial cooperation and cultural exchanges. In order to deal with this paradox, Belgium should formulate a more coherent approach towards Russia that focuses on upholding the European order and security whilst maintaining dialogue and engaging the Russian Federation. This requires the new Belgian government to engage in a delicate balancing act that can be articulated in the forthcoming National Security Strategy, in the Belgian positions in the EU and NATO, and in the bilateral relationship with Moscow. This Egmont Paper aspires to provide both analytical background and novel ideas which can be used to such a purpose. When analysing Russian foreign policy, it can only be acknowledged that the annex- ation of Crimea in 2014 fundamentally challenged the rules-based international order. Yet to understand Russian behaviour, it is imperative to reach back in time to the late 1990s and early 2000s. Ever since, Russia’s main goal on the international stage has been the re-establishment of its Great Power status. To this end, it has sought to consolidate security buffers in the form of geographical and psychological depth. Most notably, it involved the promotion of the ‘Russian World’ (Russkiy Mir), the conduct of operations in the grey zone between war and peace, and a fair dose of strategic opportunism. Whilst perhaps understandable, this assertive foreign policy has negatively affected Belgian interests in a variety of ways. Belgo-Russian relations constitute a true kaleidoscope ranging from cooperation to conflict. Bilateral trade has largely recovered from the 2014-2015 shock resulting from the sanctions regime – even if the trade balance remains a negative one. Cultural and academic exchanges continue, in line with the little-known 1993 Belgo- Russian Treaty on Understanding and Cooperation. Yet politically, conflict has been on the increase. Russia has been actively challenging and contesting the multilateral framework that Belgium holds dear. In addition, Belgium has become the target of Russian disinformation and other grey zone operations. As it is unlikely that Russia will tone down its assertive foreign policy anytime soon, Belgium would do well to articulate a more coherent approach. This needs to clarify Belgian policy priorities, communicate Belgian positions towards the Russian government, and educate the domestic audience about the evolving relationship with the Russian Federation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Belgium

48. Russia Attempts to Move Closer to Egypt as US Withdraws

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The efforts of Moscow to assert itself as a power in the eastern Mediterranean should sound a cautionary note.
Topic:
Security, Hegemony, Conflict, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

49. Rising Tensions and Security Chaos in Syria’s Deraa Province

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
A four-way contest under way between the Assad regime, Russian interests, Iranian interests, and unreconciled former rebels.
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Regionalism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

50. The Impact of COVID-19 on Russia’s Middle East and Syria Policies

Author:
Leonid Isaev and Andrey Sakharov
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
May 3 rd, Russia’s COVID-19 infection rate resembled that of the United Kingdom. This situation has the potential to significantly impact the country’s financial situation, influencing the country’s foreign policy toward the Middle East. By the beginning of the lock-down period, the most optimistic forecasts for 2020 predicted a fall in the Russian economy by 4-6% of GDP.1 However, after four weeks of confinement, a decline of 6-8% was considered to be the most positive scenario, provided that it is possible to avoid a second wave for the epidemic in the autumn as predicted by the Higher School of Economics forecast. The Russian situation is complicated by the fact that the outbreak of COVID-19 coincided with the dramatic decline in oil and gas prices. The federal budget’s breakeven price for 2020 was set at $42.4 per barrel.3 However, prices by the end of March and the beginning of April went significantly lower. This means that Russia may not be able to match the predicted government spending for 2020. Moreover, its leadership may not be able to spend money as generously to advance projects serving the country’s foreign policy. Moscow, short on revenue, will unlikely take foreign policy and domestic political adventures. Foreign policy projects, primarily those that require significant budgetary expenditures in the Middle East and specifically in Syria, will be frozen. A passive Russian international engagement is expected to dominate until the end of 2020. The exception to this policy will be when a response is unavoidable. Domestic policy is likely to be just as reactive. The baseline will likely be to maintain the current state of affairs and absorb any shocks to stability given the scarcity of financial resources.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

51. The Battle for the Tribes in Northeast Syria

Author:
Nicholas Heras
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Northeast Syria (NES) is fragmented under the control of different powers that are all seeking to gain the support of the local Arab tribes. Those seeking to upset the status quo include the Assad regime and its allies (Russia and Iran), Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies, and ISIS —all seeking disruption with different motivations, yet working side by side. Those seeking to maintain the status quo include the U.S.-led Coalition, the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Often, earning the support and alliance of the tribes is a transactional process whereby the tribes seek direct financial support and community investment, employment opportunities, military support, and autonomy to run their own affairs. Currently, most local tribal groups are calculating that a tenuous U.S.-protected order in northeast Syria provides better security and provisions than the alternatives from the Assad regime and its allies, or by Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies. However, ISIS remains a threat to all the powers involved in northeast Syria, and it is the major spoiler seeking to create the conditions for a return to the old order which was established under ISIS’s territorial Caliphate from 2014-2019.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

52. Russia’s Increasing Stalemate in Southwest Syria

Author:
Alexey L. Khlebnikov
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The town and province of Daraa in southwest Syria is known for being a “cradle of the Syrian revolution”. Six years after the start of the Syrian uprising, it has been included in one of the four de-escalation zones that Russia established in Syria striking deals between different opposition armed groups and Damascus, with the consent of external actors. The southwest de-escalation zone is comprised of three provinces – Daraa, al-Suwaida, and al-Quneitra – whose proximity to Israel has been a crucial factor in Moscow’s strategy in the region. The southwest Syria de-escalation zone has several peculiarities that make it distinct from the other zones, in particular its geography, i.e. its proximity to Israel, which has defined Russia’s very special and nuanced approach to it. At the same time, the Russian approach to dealing with the armed opposition groups within the zone was similar to the groups in other de-escalation zones. So, what makes Russia’s approach different?
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

53. Iran’s Preferred Outcome in Syria: An Open-End or a Formal Agreement?

Author:
Hassan Ahmadian
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Iran’s security concerns drove its involvement in the Syrian crisis back in 2011. With an evolving strategy over the past nine years, Tehran has upgraded its Syria policy in accordance with the ongoing developments on the ground, moving from military training based on the Iranian Basij model, to regionalising this model (as was the case in Iraq with the Popular Mobilization Forces) and encouraging Russian military involvement. In what may be seen as the final stage, Iran is backing its Syrian ally as well as allied militias to balance against other main stakeholders. Iran is attempting to solidify military gains by continuing to back a political process that is properly representative of warring parties and ensures a smooth transition of power, and one whose outcomes will not undermine Iranian geopolitical interests in the country.
Topic:
Security, Development, Military Strategy, Regionalism, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

54. Narratives in the Russian Media of Conflict and Cooperation in the Arctic

Author:
Ekaterina Klimenko, Jan Nilsson, and Miyase Christensen
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The Arctic has been narrated as both a region of cooperation and a region of conflict. This paper presents an analysis of how three Russian newspapers (Rossiyakaya Gazeta, Izvestiya and Novaya Gazeta) reported on the Arctic region between 2007 and 2016. The aim of the analysis is to provide a foundation for a discussion of Russian perceptions of conflict and cooperation in the Arctic in a decade when the desecuritization and peaceful cooperation that began in the late 1980s and early 1990s was challenged by a combination of changes to the physical environment and a shifting geopolitical landscape. The paper also explores how Russia’s narratives of conflict and cooperation fit into narratives about the region that have emerged in the international media. Last, the paper discusses what Russian media narratives can tell us about the priorities and future trends of Russia’s Arctic policy.
Topic:
Security, Media, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Arctic

55. Working paper on the relations between Russia and China

Author:
Jens Bastian
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Working paper by the independent economic analyst Jens Bastian, focusing on relations between China and Russia is published by ELIAMEP. More specifically, in the text entitled “The Embrace Between the Russian Bear and the Panda Bear: An Emerging Sino-Russian Axis” it is argued that: “The depth and momentum of Sino-Russian strategic cooperation is deepening and accelerating. Defense and security, the various bilateral energy arrangements, the synergies resulting from the combination of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), reflect the wider range of joint activities of the two states”.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Eurasia

56. The Embrace Between a Russian Bear and the Panda Bear. An Emerging Sino-Russian Axis

Author:
Jens Bastian
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
During a three-day official visit to Moscow in June 2019 the Chinese President Xi Jinping described Russia’s Vladimir Putin as his “best friend”. While China-US relations are deteriorating over bitter trade disputes, the imposition of tit-for-tat tariffs and intellectual property rights, the Sino-Russian partnership is evolving and deepening in areas such as security and defense, bilateral energy cooperation as well as the Kremlin’s expanding participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Both Beijing and Moscow are building an alliance shaped by shared grievances and based on mutual strategic convenience. Against this background the following report argues that the strategic realignment underway between the Kremlin and Beijing is not one of equal partners. Status matters between the leadership of both countries. Moscow cannot compete with China’s sweeping investment efforts and infrastructure projects in the context of the BRI. What is increasingly emerging in this relationship is a junior role for Moscow and senior status for Beijing. The trade balance is heavily tilted in China’s favor. Chinese banks are key lenders to Russia. The energy cooperation is defined by China being able to command prices from Russia below market rates. Most importantly, China’s BRI is a multi-decade vision, spacing continents and backed up by sheer unlimited financial resources which Russia cannot even contemplate to match. With Russia and China strengthening their cooperation across policy fields, individual countries and sub-regions in continental Europe are faced with new and challenging strategic choices. As Moscow consolidates its economic footprint in Serbia and Montenegro, Beijing expands its presence across Central and Eastern Europe in the context of the 17+1 network. Policy makers are thus faced with daunting options. Some see Beijing as the more promising alternative, while others are tempted to seeking accommodation with both Russia and China.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Trade, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

57. Dangerous Liaisons: Russian Cooperation with Iran in Syria

Author:
Seth G. Jones, Nicholas Harrington, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
As tensions escalate between the United States and Iran in the Middle East, Russia is engaged in covert and overt cooperation with Iran in ways that undermine U.S. national security interests. This analysis of commercial satellite imagery at Tiyas Airbase in Syria indicates the scope and proximity of Russian and Iranian military ties. If Washington wants to contain Tehran and prevent further Iranian expansion, U.S. policymakers will need to increase pressure on Moscow to curb Tehran’s activities in countries like Syria.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Intelligence, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

58. Negotiating Security in Latin America, How Russia Regained a Foothold in the Western Hemisphere

Author:
Taylor Valley
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
What is Russia’s geopolitical game in Latin America? Since the early-2000s, we have witnessed bilateral trade spike by 44 percent, around 40 diplomatic visits by high-ranking Russian officials, and budding military cooperation through joint-naval exercises in Latin American ports. Some explain this growth as Russian efforts to create multipolarity in the western hemisphere and undermine U.S. influence in the region. This narrative of bilateral relations disregards a key element that may be driving Russia’s engagement— the role of Latin American leadership.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Imperialism
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Latin America, North America, and United States of America

59. The Geostrategic Arctic: Hard security in the High North

Author:
Harri Mikkola
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The end of the Cold War meant that the Arctic region lost most of its geostrategic relevance. However, due to growing great power competition, the Arctic is back on the geopolitical map. Hard security dynamics in the region are defined by two key elements: the importance of conventional long-range missiles and nuclear weapons for Russia, and the importance of the North Atlantic sea line of communication for European defence. Russia has revitalized its Cold War-era bastion strategy, which aims to ensure the survival of its strategic ballistic missile submarines. In a crisis scenario, this strategy could pose serious challenges to the Nordic countries as well. Five Arctic states are members of NATO and the Alliance’s collective defence is operational in the Arctic. Even if the Arctic is still not a focus area for NATO, the North Atlantic maritime domain is increasingly back on the agenda. Given the divergent strategic interests and lack of common ground between Russia and other Arctic states on grand strategic issues, the Arctic will not be losing its geostrategic importance anytime soon.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Canada, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland, and Arctic

60. Global Britain's Arctic security policy: Going forward while looking back

Author:
Agne Cepinsktye
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Britain’s Arctic security policy has been shifting from abandoning the region after the Cold War to developing a non-military security approach, to reintroducing the military defence dimension, most notably by the announcement of the UK Defence Arctic Strategy (DAS). These changes are both reactive to regional factors, namely the increasing geostrategic importance of the Arctic and Russia’s military expansion in the North, and reflective of the UK’s redefined post-Brexit identity as Global Britain. The focus on expanding the naval presence in the Arctic is consistent with the Global Britain vision, which underlies the UK’s broader foreign and security policy direction and emphasises the reassertion of naval strength and global maritime influence. While Britain’s ambition to restore the naval power in the Arctic and the North Atlantic is currently constrained by a lack of resources in the defence budget, it indicates an aspiration to strengthen historically rooted naval defence relations with the Arctic states.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, and Arctic

61. US foreign policy tools in the era of disinformation: Deficiencies prevent effective response to malign information operations

Author:
Deborah A. McCarthy
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Russia, China, Iran and ISIS use information operations to undermine the national security objectives of the United States and its allies. However, the US’s international response has been weak. Internal constraints have limited more effective counter-measures. In particular, the lack of a coordinated White House-level strategy, dispersed authorities and little cooperation with private social media companies can be identified as causal factors. Additional steps by the Trump Administration to counter foreign disinformation will aim to protect the 2020 presidential elections rather than to push back on efforts to undermine US leadership abroad.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, ISIS, Social Media, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North America

62. Moscow, the Palestinians, and the Arab Spring that Never Was

Author:
Micky Aharonson
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Russia seeks to be more involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by presenting it as critical to the stability of the whole Middle East. But the legitimacy that it accords to Hamas rules out deeper Russian involvement from Israel’s point of view.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

63. The Fighting Continues in Northern Syria

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The Kurds vow to defend themselves—alone if necessary—against Syria, Turkey and Russia.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

64. The Return of Political Warfare

Author:
Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy outline a U.S. shift from counterterrorism to inter-state competition with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. However, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for much of this competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs of conventional and nuclear war would likely be catastrophic. U.S. strategy is evolving from a post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism against groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State to competition between state adversaries. As the National Defense Strategy notes, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”1 This shift has significant implications for the U.S. military, since it indicates a need to improve U.S. capabilities to fight—and win—possible wars against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea if deterrence fails. Though it is prudent to prepare for conventional—and even nuclear—war, the risks of conflict are likely to be staggering. Numerous war games and analyses of U.S. conflicts with Russia in the Baltics, China in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, and North Korea on the Korean peninsula suggest the possibility of at least tens of thousands of dead and billions of dollars in economic damages. In addition, these conflicts could escalate to nuclear war, which might raise the number of dead to hundreds of thousands or even millions. According to one analysis, for example, a U.S. war with China could reduce China’s gross domestic product (GDP) by between 25 and 35 percent and the United States’ GDP by between 5 and 10 percent. The study also assessed that both countries could suffer substantial military losses to bases, air forces, surface naval forces, and submarines; significant political upheaval at home and abroad; and huge numbers of civilian deaths.2 These costs and risks will likely give Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and even Pyongyang pause, raising several questions. Will these high costs deter the possibility of conventional and nuclear war? If so, what are the implications for the United States as it plans for a rise in inter-state competition? The Cold War offers a useful historical lens. NATO planners prepared for a possible Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The U.S. military, for example, deployed forces to the Fulda Gap, roughly 60 miles outside of Frankfurt, Germany, as one of several possible invasion routes by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. NATO also planned for nuclear war. The United States built up its nuclear arsenal and adopted strategies like mutually assured destruction (MAD). The concept of MAD assumed that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. The threat of such heavy costs deterred conflict, despite some close calls. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the two superpowers nearly went to war after a U.S. U-2 aircraft took pictures of Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. But Washington and Moscow ultimately assessed that direct conflict was too costly. Deterrence held. Instead, the United States and Soviet Union engaged in intense security competition at the unconventional level across Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Both countries backed substate groups and states to expand their power and influence. Under the Reagan Doctrine, for example, the United States provided overt and covert assistance to anticommunist governments and resistance movements to roll back communist supporters. The Soviets did the same and supported states and substate actors across the globe. In addition, the Soviets adopted an aggressive, unconventional approach best captured in the phrase “active measures” or aktivnyye meropriatia. As used by the KGB, active measures included a wide range of activities designed to influence populations across the globe. The KGB established front groups, covertly broadcast radio and other programs, orchestrated disinformation campaigns, and conducted targeted assassinations. The Soviets used active measures as an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy to extend Moscow’s influence and power throughout the world, including in Europe. Unlike the Cold War, the United States confronts multiple state adversaries today—not one. As the National Defense Strategy argues, the United States is situated in “a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory” where “the central challenges to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers.” But based on the likely costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, much of the competition will likely be unconventional—and include what former U.S. State Department diplomat George Kennan referred to as “political warfare.” The term political warfare refers to the employment of military, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and other means—short of conventional war—to achieve national objectives. It can include overt operations like public broadcasting and covert operations like psychological warfare and support to underground resistance groups.3 The United States’ adversaries today are already engaged in political warfare. Russia, for instance, utilizes a range of means to pursue its interests, such as technologically sophisticated offensive cyber programs, covert action, and psychological operations. Moscow has conducted overt operations like the use of RT and Sputnik, as well as semitransparent and covert efforts. It has also become increasingly active in supporting state and substate actors in countries like Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, and Libya to expand its influence in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and even North Africa. Finally, Russia is attempting to exploit European and transatlantic fissures and support populist movements to undermine European Union and NATO cohesion, thwart economic sanctions, justify or obscure Russian actions, and weaken the attraction of Western institutions for countries on Russia’s periphery. Iran is using political warfare tools like propaganda, cyber attacks, and aid to substate proxies to support its security priorities, influence events and foreign perceptions, and counter threats. Tehran is also assisting state and substate actors in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Afghanistan. Iran supports Shia militia groups in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and Houthi rebels in Yemen. In the South China Sea, China is pouring millions of tons of sand and concrete onto reefs, creating artificial islands. It is also conducting a sophisticated propaganda campaign, utilizing economic coercion, and using fleets of fishing vessels to solidify its assertion of territorial and resource rights throughout the Pacific. Finally, Beijing is targeting the U.S. government, its allies, and U.S. companies as part of a cyber-espionage campaign. With political warfare already alive and well with the United States’ state adversaries, there are several implications for U.S. defense strategy. First, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for significant inter-state competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war may be prohibitively high. This should involve thinking through trade-offs regarding force posture, procurement, acquisition, and modernization. A U.S. military that predominantly focuses on preparing for conventional or nuclear war with state competitors—by modernizing the nuclear triad, building more resilient space capabilities, acquiring more effective counter-space systems, equipping U.S. forces with high-technology weapons, and emphasizing professional military education (PME) to fight conventional wars—may undermine U.S. unconventional readiness and capabilities. Second, even organizations that already engage in some types of political warfare—such as U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. intelligence community—will need to continue shifting some of their focus from counterterrorism to political warfare against state adversaries. This might include, for example, providing more aid to the Baltic States to conduct an effective resistance campaign against unconventional action by Moscow. Or it might involve aiding proxies in countries like Syria and Yemen to counter Iranian-backed organizations. It could also include improving the border security capabilities and effectiveness of Ukrainian military and police units against Russian-backed rebels. Third, the United States should invest in resources and capabilities that allow the military and other U.S. government agencies to more effectively engage in political warfare—and to provide agencies with sufficient authorities to conduct political warfare. One example is improving capabilities to conduct aggressive, offensive cyber operations. Other examples might include advanced electronic attack capabilities, psychological warfare units, security force assistance brigades, and precision munitions. Recognizing that other powers routinely conduct political warfare, George Kennan encouraged U.S. leaders to disabuse themselves of the “handicap” of the “concept of a basic difference between peace and war” and to wake up to “the realities of international relations—the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.” Kennan’s advice may be even more relevant today in such a competitive world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

65. Enhanced Deterrence in the North A 21st Century European Engagement Strategy

Author:
Heather A Conley
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Twenty-five years of relative calm and predictability in relations between Russia and the West enabled European governments largely to neglect their military capabilities for territorial defense and dramatically redraw Northern Europe’s multilateral, regional, and bilateral boundaries, stimulating new institutional and cooperative developments and arrangements. These cooperative patterns of behavior occurred amid a benign security environment, a situation that no longer obtains. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, its military incursion into eastern Ukraine, its substantial military modernization efforts, heightened undersea activity in the North Atlantic and Baltic Sea, and its repeated air violations, the region’s security environment has dramatically worsened. The Baltic Sea and North Atlantic region have returned as a geostrategic focal point. It is vital, therefore, that the United States rethink its security approach to the region—what the authors describe as Enhanced Deterrence in the North.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Modernization
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, North Atlantic, Northern Europe, Crimea, and Baltic Sea

66. Russian military police in Syria: function and prospects

Author:
Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The emerging security dynamics and the political settlement in Syria”, Syracuse, Italy, 18-19 October 2018. Since 2015, Syria has been a test-ground for many Russian military innovations. Among them the Russian Military Police (RMP), which quickly became one of the symbols of the Russian involvement in the Syrian crisis. After defeating the militants, the Russian stabilisation and reconciliation strategy included the deployment of forces that could provide security for civilians, negotiators, demining teams and medics. Furthermore, once the ceasefire agreement was reached in 2016, a peacekeeping force was needed to oversee its implementation. Due to domestic and international circumstances, Russia could not deploy combat troops, so the RMP was chosen for its effectiveness and low profile. The RMP provided support to the Reconciliation Centre (RC), secured humanitarian evacuations and monitored de-escalation zones. Despite certain achievements, total success was limited. Due to its size, the RMP was unable to maintain a massive presence in the governmentcontrolled areas to protect the civilian population and shape the security environment. As such, it could not be a substitute for the local and national Syrian forces that were needed to bring peace and stability in the long run.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Syrian War, Police, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

67. Bulgaria and Black Sea Security

Author:
Siemon T. Wezeman and Alexandra Kuimova
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The Black Sea region is experiencing a changing military balance. The six littoral states (Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine) intensified their efforts to build up their military potential after Russia’s takeover of Crimea and the start of the internationalized civil war in eastern Ukraine in 2014. As a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Bulgaria aims to support NATO’s security objectives of increasing military spending, enhancing defence capacities and developing interoperability. Bulgaria contributes to NATO’s military activities in the Black Sea region and regularly hosts and participates in exercises with NATO partners. However, Bulgaria also tries to remain on good terms with Russia by way of bilateral economic and political cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Nuclear Power, Arms Trade, Disarmament, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Bulgaria, and Black Sea

68. The Erosion of Strategic Stability and the Future of Arms Control in Europe

Author:
Corentin Brustlein
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The instruments of cooperative security created during and since the Cold War to foster mutual confidence and reduce the risks of war, inadvertent escalation, and arms races, in and around Europe, have come under increasing strain. The European security architecture has been – and is being – weakened by renewed geopolitical competition, technological and military developments, and states violating or bypassing international law, or walking away from previous commitments. Against this backdrop, it is crucial to reassess the meaning and requirements of crisis and strategic stability in Europe. This report looks at some current and future sources of strategic instability, and focuses in particular on how the Russian way of waging modern conflict could, through the importance given to strategic ambiguity and operational opacity, fuel escalatory dynamics in Europe. It argues that strengthening strategic stability in Europe requires a two-pronged approach, combining a sustained effort to reinforce deterrence and defense in Europe with new confidence- and security-building and arms control measures to reduce reciprocal fears, incentives to escalate rapidly during a crisis, and risks of conventional and nuclear war in Europe.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

69. Strategic deterrence redux: Nuclear weapons and European security

Author:
Leo Michel and Matti Pesu
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
One of the most notable consequences of the end of the Cold War was the diminished role of nuclear weapons in international relations. The world’s primary nuclear weapon powers, the United States and the Russian Federation, made considerable reductions in their nuclear forces. The climax of the process was the New START Treaty signed in 2010. Now, the optimism that characterized the first decades of the post-Cold War era is rapidly evaporating. Geopolitical competition again dominates global and regional security dynamics. Nuclear powers are modernizing their forces and introducing novel systems that may affect strategic stability. At the same time, existing arms control regimes are crumbling. This report takes stock of recent developments in deterrence in general, and nuclear deterrence in particular. Its main ambition is to understand how deterrence has changed in light of certain post-Cold War trends. To this end, the report introduces the basic principles of deterrence. It also explores the nuclear-related policies and capabilities of the four nuclear weapon states most directly involved in European security affairs – Russia, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. Importantly, the report also analyses the implications of the recent trends in strategic deterrence for Northern Europe. This report is part of a research project conducted by the FIIA entitled ‘New Challenges for Strategic Deterrence in the 21st Century’. The project is part of the implementation of the Government Plan for Analysis, Assessment and Research 2018.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, United Kingdom, Europe, France, and North America

70. The Next Arena of Conflict: The Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Iran, Turkey, Russia and other bad actors threaten Western and Israeli security in this strategic zone.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Mediterranean

71. Contrasting Russian Perspectives on Coercion and Restraint in Russia’s Security Relations with the West

Author:
anya Loukianova fink
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This discussion paper analyzes a sample of 2014-2016 Russian-language publications focused on Russia’s security relations with the United States. It characterizes the Russian expert debate at that time as dichotomous in nature, where security policy analysts proposed either coercive or restrained policy approaches in dealing with perceived threats. It assesses similarities and differences of these two perspectives with regard to the nature of Russia’s political-military relationship with the West, as well as past challenges and then-future opportunities in nuclear arms control and strategic stability.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

72. The Last Straw: Responding to Russia’s Anti-Western Aggression

Author:
Mieke Eoyang, Evelyn Farkas, Ben Freeman, and Gary Ashcroft
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
In this paper, we argue that Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election is just one part of a wide-ranging effort by Moscow to undermine confidence in democracy and the rule of law throughout countries in the West. Russia has engaged in this effort because, in both economic and demographic terms, it is a declining power – the only way it can “enhance” its power is by weakening its perceived adversaries. Because Russia’s aim is to erode the health of Western nations, we argue it is time for America and its allies to employ a comprehensive, non-kinetic response to contain Russia.
Topic:
Security, Elections, Cybersecurity, Democracy, Foreign Interference, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

73. Emerging European Security Challenges

Author:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination
Publication Date:
04-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University (LISD) convened a special Liechtenstein Colloquium,“Emerging European Security Challenges,” in Triesenberg, Principality of Liechtenstein, from November 12-15, 2015. The colloquium brought together senior diplomats, academics, policy-makers, experts and representatives of European civil society and NGOs. The colloquium was off-the-record and was financially supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and SIBIL Foundation, Vaduz. The objective of the colloquium was to examine the interactions between and the various effects of three key crises—the Ukraine war, the war in Syria, and the European refugee crisis—for broader regional, EU, and international security. Cluster One considered “Russia, Ukraine, the West, and the future of collective security,” including the role of the Baltic states in security issues, the relationship between Russia and the European Union, and the role of media, information and hybrid warfare. Cluster Two, “The Syrian War and ISIS/Da’esh” focused on several issues related to the ongoing civil war and conflict in the Middle East, including alliances of the Assad government, rebel and other opposition groups, ISIS/Da’esh, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, and, especially, the Kurds. Emphasis was put on the plight of Christians and other religious groups in the region. Cluster Three, “The refugee crisis and the challenge of European collective action,” connected the worst refugee crisis in Europe since World War II to the situation in the MENA region. It focused on refugees and migrants within Europe’s borders and along the Balkan route, the role of Turkey, Greece and Germany, terrorism concerns, and EU actions and emerging differences between member states. The protection of religious minorities and the longer-term question of integration and assimilation of refugees and asylum-seekers offered another focus. This report reflects the substance of these discussions and includes an updated Chair’s Addendum.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, European Union, Refugee Crisis, ISIS, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Syria

74. Europe Today and What's Next

Author:
Hannes Androsch
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
In many places it is forgotten that Europe, especially the EU, is a veritable success story, as this continent has never before experienced a period such as the past seven decades of democracy, peace and prosperity. Faced with the current challenges, especially the refugee crisis, there has been an increasing tendency among European governments to take unilateral action. This approach cannot be successful, however, as European governments attempt to implement policy prescriptions of the past to solve problems of the present. In fact, we need not less but more Europe—but also a reformed Europe: a European Union with one voice for external policy (common foreign, security and defense policy and asylum and migration policy) and the capacity to overcome its internal turmoil (common economic, budget, and tax policies, and a minimum of a transfer union). We also need a European Union that makes the benefits of globalization available to all people. The European Union is currently experiencing one of its worst crises in its history. Old fault lines that have run through the continent for centuries, once considered overcome, have become prominent once again; new challenges have arisen, especially in the wake of globalization, climate change and new technological developments (the Digital Revolution). The world has seemingly become ungovernable. The proclaimed 1989 “end of history” (Fukuyama) is certainly over, and history has a firm grip on Europe. This, at least since the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis in 2007/08, no longer deniable fact is reflected in the still unresolved crisis in Greece (“Grexit”), the associated Euro Crisis, the British referendum on exit from the EU (“Brexit”), and in the renaissance of geopolitics. The annexation of Crimea by Russia undertaken in violation of international law, the war in eastern Ukraine, as well as state disintegration in Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Syria have made it clear that, from the Caucasus to the Balkans and from Pakistan/Afghanistan via the Middle East to North Africa, extends a “Ring of Fire,”—a term used by former Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew to describe the geopolitical challenges of Europe more than twenty years ago. These long concealed —or ignored—distortions are now breaking out again in the form of “wars of succession,” leaving behind territories plagued by unrest, civil wars, and failed states, and resulting in terrorism and refugee waves now reaching the center of Europe. The resulting “crisis mode,” within which the European Union has been operating for several years now, reached its climax with the result of the referendum conducted in June, determining Britain’s exit from the European Union (Brexit). Aside from the medium and long-term economic implications for the country, Brexit was an earthquake with unforeseeable consequences especially on the political level. Scotland is once again discussing its potential separation from the United Kingdom, the fragile peace funded by the EU in Northern Ireland is threatened by collapse, and in a considerable number of other EU countries—mainly France and the Netherlands—populist and nationalist parties are interpreting Brexit as a signal to seek their salvation in national initiatives.
Topic:
Security, Global Recession, European Union, Refugee Crisis, Brexit, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Asia, and Syria

75. Russian Foreign Policy under Dmitry Medvedev’s Presidency (2008-2012)

Author:
Richard Rousseau
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
Following the inauguration of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in May 2008, the Russian political scene was characterized by a new structure: the country was governed by a bicephalous system (which reflected the two-headed eagle of the national flag). Medvedev became President and Vladimir Putin assumed the position of Prime Minister. In this ostensibly tandem structure, the Chief Executive was subordinated to the President as was the case even before Russia first emerged as an independent country in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Such a dual power sharing worked quite well during Medvedev’s term and with no serious fissures that could bring about competing circles of power around each of the heads of state. This was true even though the personalities of the two leaders were very different. Their priorities, however, seemed different, at least formally. During his presidency (2000-2008), Putin made every effort to recover Russia’s super power status and international respect. He did not hesitate to use the privileged position of Russia – main energy supplier to Europe, a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, a continuing influence over the post-Soviet space – to achieve his ambitious goal. For his part, Medvedev preferred to use foreign policy as an instrument to advance the process of economic modernization, while keeping Russian national interests in mind. When compared to Russia’s main partners and competitors, Medvedev was very much aware of the systemic disadvantages his country faced. These disadvantages, according to him, were factors that considerably weakened Russia as a major world power and economic player. The foundation of Putin’s domestic and foreign policy was the concept of “sovereign democracy,” which argues that Russia must follow its own democratization process. There was no need to emulate and copy Western models. In this view, if Russia’s political system had serious flaws, the same could be said of the political systems of Western countries. The West was no longer seen as being in a position to give lessons to Russia. Consequently, Russian foreign policy at the time gradually abandoned or even opposed some of the positions taken by Western countries. Such a tendency began with Putin’s speech at the annual Wehrkunde conference held in Munich in January 2007. Within a year serious tensions arose between Russia and their Western allies, for instance with the August 2008 armed conflict between Georgia and Russia. The origin of this conflict was the longstanding secession attempts by South Ossetia and Abkhazia, two territories recognized as being part of Georgia. Especially glaring were Russia’s disagreements and confrontations with the U.S. over such issues as NATO expansion, European-based missile defense systems and U.S. attempts to expand its influence into what Russia considers its “near abroad”, the post-Soviet space. Under Putin, Russia once again seemed to be a rival of the West, not merely on an ideological basis as during the Cold War, but because of its own strong nationalistic tendencies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, United Nations, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Soviet Union

76. OSCE Principles in Practice: Testing Their Effect on Security Through the Work of Max van der Stoel, First High Commissioner on National Minorities 1993–2001

Author:
Marianna M. Yamamoto
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This monograph tests the OSCE approach to security. The OSCE approach to security encompasses all areas that can cause tensions and conflict between States, and is the result of a sustained effort by almost all of the world’s democracies on how to achieve both security and individual freedom. An important basis of the OSCE security concept is that international security cannot be achieved without the protection and promotion of individual rights and freedoms. The study first extracts from official OSCE documents a set of principles designed to achieve international security, and then uses the work of the first OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Max van der Stoel, to test the effectiveness of the principles in practice. From 1993 to 2001, HCNM Max van der Stoel applied OSCE principles in cases involving minority tensions with a high potential for international conflict, and this experience provided the means to assess the practical effects on security when OSCE principles are implemented. The study examined three cases that involved potential conflict: Ukraine and separatism in Crimea; Estonia and tensions regarding the Russian minority; and Macedonia and tensions regarding the Albanian minority. The study found that in each of the three cases, the implementation of OSCE principles reduced national and international tensions involving minority issues, and increased security. The increase in security was seen within each State, between States, and in the region, and reduced the potential for conflict within and between OSCE States. The results were particularly significant in view of the instability, conflicts, and tensions of the post–Cold War period; the OSCE’s ongoing institutionalization during the period; and the limited resources and tools available to the OSCE and the HCNM. The study identified and articulated twenty OSCE security principles that addressed national and international security. The principles addressed the rights and responsibilities of State sovereignty; a comprehensive, cooperative, and common security approach; the prevention of security threats and the peaceful resolution of issues; the protection and promotion of individual rights and freedoms through democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy; rights and responsibilities pertaining to national minorities; the development and advancement of shared values; and processes and mechanisms. The monograph extended the research on the OSCE principles to express an OSCE security concept. The OSCE security concept is a security framework based on the idea that security depends on the development and implementation of principles guiding three areas: how States deal with each other and resolve problems; the protection and promotion of individual rights within States; and the processes and mechanisms to review and advance values, principles, and commitments. The study showed that the implementation of OSCE principles in Ukraine, Estonia, and Macedonia significantly increased security in those three countries and the OSCE region. The study found that the OSCE principles and the OSCE security concept constitute a significant body of thought and practice regarding security, and respect for the individual. The OSCE principles, the OSCE security concept, and the work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities merit further examination, development, and application to national security policy and practice. The application to national security policy and practice is relevant to all security threats and problems.
Topic:
Security, Cold War, International Cooperation, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Estonia, Macedonia, and Crimea

77. The Future of NATO in the New Security Environment. A Former Newcomer’s View

Author:
Marek Madej and Robert Czulda
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The article ‘The Future of NATO in the New Security Environment. A Former Newcomer’s View’, analyses the role of NATO alliance in the contemporary security environment within the context of its priorities defined by new Strategic Concept 2010, having special attention on potential role of former newcomers and potential new members.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and United States of America

78. The Hour of Truth: The Conflict in Ukraine–Implications for Europe’s Energy Security and the Lessons for the U.S. Army

Author:
Dr. Ariel Cohen and Ivan Benovic
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, a number of gas disputes between Russia and Central and Eastern European countries have unveiled the strategic dependence of Europe on Russian piped gas. The recent Ukrainian crisis demonstrated that Europe has a desperate need to improve the security of its gas supply. The United States is interested in the economic stability and growth of Europe, because the European Union (EU) is its principal and largest economic partner. The United States and the EU enjoy the largest trade and investment relationship in the world, which should not be jeopardized by disruptive, anti-status-quo powers. Europe’s energy independence is not only an economic interest of America, but also a political and security one. Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas undermines European unity and weakens the primary U.S. allies in their relations with Russia. U.S. Armed Forces in Europe and the U.S. Army in particular can and should play an important role in promoting energy security. This involvement includes: increased situational awareness; deployment to the sensitive areas; and enhanced training activities, including with the allies of the U.S. military in Central and Eastern Europe.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Military Affairs, and Gas
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Soviet Union

79. Parsing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises

Author:
Richard Dr. Weitz
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
China and Russia have engaged in an increasing number of joint exercises in recent years. These drills aim to help them deter and, if necessary, defeat potential threats, such as Islamist terrorists trying to destabilize a Central Asian government, while at the same time reassuring their allies that Russia and China would protect them from such challenges. Furthermore, the exercises and other joint Russia-China military activities have a mutual reassurance function, informing Moscow and Beijing about the other’s military potential and building mutual confidence about their friendly intentions toward one another. Finally, the joint exercises try to communicate to third parties, especially the United States, that Russia and China have a genuine security partnership and that it extends to cover Central Asia, a region of high priority concern for Moscow and Beijing, and possibly other areas, such as northeast Asia. Although the Sino-Russian partnership is limited in key respects, the United States should continue to monitor their defense relationship since it has the potential to become a more significant international security development.
Topic:
Security, War, Governance, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia and China

80. A Russian View on Landpower

Author:
Keir Giles and Major General Aleksandr V Rogovoy
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Russia’s seizure of Crimea, and ongoing operations in eastern Ukraine, have refocused attention on the Russian military as a potential cause for concern in Europe. This Letort Paper, by an influential Russian general and military academic, lays out specifically Russian views on the essential nature of strong conventional land forces, and how they may be used. With an expert commentary providing essential context and interpretation, the Paper presents a valuable insight into Russian military thinking, at a potentially critical juncture for European security.
Topic:
Security, War, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Crimea

81. European Defense Trends: Briefing Update

Author:
David J. Berteau, Gregory Sanders, T.J. Cipoletti, Meaghan Doherty, and Abby Fanlo
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The European defense market, though impacted by lethargic economic growth and painful fiscal austerity measures, continues to be a driver in global defense. Five of the fifteen biggest military spenders worldwide in 2013 were European countries, and Europe remains a major market for international arms production and sales. Surges in military spending by Russia, China, and various Middle Eastern countries in recent years has augmented the defense landscape, especially as European countries in aggregate continue to spend less on defense and the United States embarks on a series of deep-striking budget cuts. This report analyzes overall trends in defense spending, troop numbers, collaboration, and the European defense and security industrial base across 37 countries. To remain consistent with previous reports, this briefing utilizes functional NATO categories (Equipment, Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, Infrastructure, and Research and Development) and reports figures in constant 2013 euros unless otherwise noted. Many of the trends identified within the 2012 CSIS European Defense Trends report continued into 2013, namely reductions in topline defense spending, further cuts to R spending, and steadily declining troop numbers. Though total European defense spending decreased from 2001-2013, with an accelerated decline between 2008 and 2010, select countries increased spending2 between 2011 and 2013. Collaboration among European countries has decreased in the R category; however, it has increased in the equipment category – indicating increased investment in collaborative procurement. Defense expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure has decreased across Europe from 2001-2013 with the exceptions of Albania and Estonia. An updated CSIS European Security, Defense, and Space (ESDS) Index is included within this report and exhibits a shift in geographic revenue origin for leading European defense firms away from North America and Europe and towards other major markets between 2008 and 2013. Finally, a brief analysis of Russian defense spending is included in the final section of this report in order to comprehend more fully the size and scope of the European defense market within the global framework. In 2013, Russia replaced the United Kingdom as the third largest global defense spender, devoting 11.2 percent of total government expenditures to defense. This briefing report concludes with summarized observations concerning trends in European defense from 2001 to 2013. CSIS will continue to follow and evaluate themes in European defense, which will appear in subsequent briefings.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Budget
Political Geography:
Russia, China, United Kingdom, America, and Europe

82. Reviving the OSCE: European Security and the Ukraine Crisis

Author:
Stefan Lehne
Publication Date:
09-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
After years at the margins of international diplomacy, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has suddenly regained political relevance because of the Ukraine crisis that began in 2014. The organization turned out to be the most appropriate framework to manage the crisis and prevent further escalation. To continue to play a useful role in resolving this issue and in easing tensions between Russia and the West, the OSCE needs to adjust its way of working and strengthen its toolbox. As the relationship between Russia and the West deteriorated at the end of the 1990s, the OSCE’s role declined. The organization’s arms control regime eroded, its debates on human rights relapsed into ideological confrontation, and its work on promoting economic cooperation never got off the ground. The Ukraine crisis has revived the organization. While political crisis management has been left mainly to a few capitals working with the parties to the conflict, the OSCE’s monitoring mission in Ukraine has become an essential factor of stability. Violence has not stopped, however, and the mission’s work remains hampered by insufficient cooperation from the parties. The OSCE has also assumed an important role in facilitating negotiations on implementing the Minsk agreement, which contains a road map for a political settlement. However, little progress has been made so far. diplo
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Diplomacy, Human Rights, Regional Cooperation, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

83. The Revival of the Silk Roads (Land Connectivity) in Asia

Author:
Pradumna B. Rana and Wai-Mun Chia
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
This paper argues that contrary to popular belief, in the bygone era, there was not one but two Silk Roads in Asia – the Northern and the less well-known South-western Silk Road (SSR). The SSR connected South/Central Asia with southern China and present day Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). After enjoying a rich history of around 1,600 years, the Silk Roads went into disrepair. Now, for various economic, security, and political reasons, land connectivity is once again making a comeback in Asia. These include the (i) ―Go West‖ and the recent ―New Silk Roads‖ policies of China; (ii) ―Look East‖ policies of South Asia; (iii) opening of Myanmar, a node between South Asia and East Asia; and (iv) growing importance of supply-chain trade. The focus has, however, been mainly on reviving the Northern Silk Road with relatively few actions being initiated to revive the SSR. Mirroring the on-going efforts in the Greater Mekong Sub-region and the Central Asian region, this paper proposes four economic corridors for Pan-Asian connectivity that is to connect South/Central Asia with southern China and ASEAN. The paper argues that the revival of land connectivity in Asia is making Maritime Asia of the past, more continental-based. One implication is that regional institutions focusing solely on Maritime Asia, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), may be losing some of their relevance vis-à-vis say the more continental-based China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The other is that the influence of the West in Asia‘s security may be declining relative to that of China, India, and Russia.
Topic:
Security, Globalization, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, China, India, and Asia

84. Too Far, Too Fast: Sochi, Tourism and Conflict in the Caucasus

Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Russia has invested extensive resources and prestige in the Winter Olympics to be held in the Black Sea resort of Sochi, 7-23 February 2014. The tab, an estimated $51 billion, does not include a nationwide security operation to protect the venue against attack by a resilient and ruthless armed jihadi movement. A spate of bombings, including two in December in the southern city of Volgograd, show that North Caucasus Islamist terrorists are determined to strike opportunistically across the country to mar the games and challenge President Vladimir Putin, who has promised a "safe, enjoyable and memorable" Olympic experience. If ripple effects of security for Sochi and the ambitious regional tourism project the games are meant to inaugurate are not to worsen the situation in the war-to rn North Caucasus, local communities must be assured they will benefit from the development plans, not fall victims to rapacious local elites or the abuses allegedly accompanying the Games. Equally important, they will need guaranteed long-term security, not simply oppressive security regimes.
Topic:
Security, Islam, International Affairs, Insurgency, and Governance
Political Geography:
Russia, Caucasus, and Sochi

85. Afghanistan: the view from Russia

Author:
Józef Lang
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Russia's current and foreseeable policy towards Afghanistan is multi-vectored, complex and shows, at times, signs of incoherence. Russia views developments in Afghanistan as a strategic challenge and is expressing growing concern over the country's prospects for stability after the withdrawal of ISAF forces by the end of 2014. Russian decision-makers fear that a security vacuum emerging after the withdrawal could destabilise Central Asia and have a negative impact on Russia itself. At the same time, Moscow is concerned with Western military presence in the region, which it regards as interference in its neighbourhood. At tactical level, Russia also sees the situation in Afghanistan as an opportunity to secure its interests both regionally (consolidating its influence in Central Asia) and more widely (in terms of its relations with NATO).
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, and Central Asia

86. The Challenges to Transition in Afghanistan: 2014-2015

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
04-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Creating political unity and reasons to be loyal to government. Creating a new structure of governance and balance between factions. Effective revenue collection, budget planning and expenditure, and limits to corruption. Fully replacing NATO/ISAF with the ANSF and "layered defense". Creating a new structure of security forces, advisors, and aid funds, to include addressing the presence of US and other nations' personnel. Acting on the Tokyo Conference: Creating effective flow and use of aid, economic reform, and limits to corruption and waste Stabilizing a market economy driven by military spending and moving towards development: Brain drain and capital flight. Coping with weather and other challenges to agricultural structure and with pressures to increase the narco - economy. Dealing with neighbors: Pakistan, I ran, Central Asian nations, India, China, and Russia.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Military Strategy, and Foreign Aid
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, and North America

87. A Sign of Things to Come? Examining four major climate-related disasters, 2010–2013, and their impacts on food security

Author:
Coghlan Christopher, Muzammil Maliha, Ingram John, Vervoort Joost, Otto Friederike, and James Rachel
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
From 2010 to 2013 the world experienced a number of extreme weather events, several of which were notable for their intensity, duration, and impacts on livelihoods and food security. This report focuses on four case studies – a heat wave in Russia, flooding in Pakistan, drought in East Africa, and a typhoon in the Philippines – that represent a range of extreme weather. It analyses the impact of these extreme weather events on food security, by considering when and why threats emerge. This involves characterization of the weather events, examination of the vulnerable groups affected, and analysis of livelihoods and the role of governance and capital.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Environment, and Food
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Africa, Russia, and Philippines

88. Foreign Fighters in Syria

Author:
Richard Barrett
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Soufan Group
Abstract:
Over 12,000 fighters from at least 81 countries have joined the civil war in Syria, and the numbers continue to grow. Around 2,500 are from Western countries, including most members of the European Union, the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. There are also several hundred from Russia. But the great majority are from the Arab World. Most are fighting with rebel groups, and increasingly with the most extreme among them; but many are also fighting with the Government, or with ethnic or faith communities that are trying to protect themselves from both sides. A lot are young, often teenagers, and a fair percentage of those arriving from non-Muslim majority countries are converts to Islam. These and others who share their faith commonly express their motivation as a religious obligation to protect fellow Muslims from attack. This sense of duty is captured by their loose use of the word 'jihad'.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and International Security
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Middle East, Canada, Arabia, Australia, Syria, and New Zealand

89. Five Long-Term Challenges for NATO beyond the Ukraine Crisis

Author:
Karl-Heinz Kamp
Publication Date:
07-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Moscow's aggression against Ukraine has truly been a “game changer” for the Atlantic Alliance. Its implications for NATO's further evolution can hardly be over-estimated and after the likely shoot-down of a Malaysian civil aircraft over Ukrainian territory, controlled by pro-Russian rebels, the situation is even more unpredictable. Even if the catastrophe has put heavy political pressure on President Putin to reduce Russian involvement in Ukraine, Moscow is still not likely to revert the annexation of the Crimean peninsula. As a result, the crisis will dominate the international security debate for a long time to come. Thus, signs of resolve directed at Russia, measures to reassure the NATO members in Eastern Europe and indications of further cooperation with Ukraine will rank very high on the agenda of the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014. With the draw-down of the operation in Afghanistan, some Allies tend to see NATO's future role as primarily to preserve the territorial integrity of its member states. Hence, they argue in favour of a “back to basics” approach with an Alliance concentrated on its defence mission, according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, and International Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Malaysia, Ukraine, Asia, and Moscow

90. NATO Enlargement and Russia: Die-Hard Myths and Real Dilemmas

Author:
Michael Ruhle
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The crisis in Ukraine, which culminated in Russia's annexation of the Crimea, marks a new low in NATO-Russia relations. While this relationship had been deteriorating for quite some time, Moscow's role in the Ukraine crisis revealed a geopolitical agenda that caught many observers by surprise. In the course of just a few weeks Russia clearly emerged as a revisionist power, behaving in a manner reminiscent of the "predatory nation-states from the 19th century" and changing borders by force in order to deny a neighbouring country the choice to determine its own alignments.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and Moscow

91. Cold War Déjà Vu? NATO, Russia and the Ukraine Crisis

Author:
Roger McDermott, Brooke Smith-Windsor, and Heidi Reisinger
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia's behaviour in the Ukrainian crisis has been described by some as giving rise to “the most dangerous situation in East-West relations since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.” For one, NATO's recently retired Supreme Allied Commander has called for immediate action in response. This could include, for example, bringing the NATO Response Force – a sea, air, land, special forces capability – to a higher state of alert, and sailing NATO maritime forces into the Black Sea.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

92. Ukraine's Euromaidan: Questions from the (R)evolution

Author:
Hanna Shelest
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The pictures of Kyiv on fire in early 2014 have attracted attention of the world's media, with Molotov cocktails, barricades and injured journalists making headlines. This is in sharp contrast to the previous two months, when hundreds of thousands of people were coming every Sunday to the main square – Maidan Nezalezhnosti – in peaceful protest.
Topic:
Security, Politics, and Social Movement
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

93. Does Russia Matter? Purely Political Relations Are Not Enough in Operational Times

Author:
Heidi Reisinger
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
On 27 January 2014, the NATO Defense College Research Division hosted its Russia Roundtable, where international experts from various research institutions meet senior practitioners from the International Staff and International Military Staff from NATO HQ.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

94. Russia and the Caspian Sea: Projecting Power or Competing for Influence?

Author:
Tracey German
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
This monograph examines Russia's policy toward the Caspian Sea region as Moscow attempts to counterbalance growing American involvement within what it perceives to be its zone of privileged interest, focusing on the recent expansion of the Caspian Flotilla and the rationale behind it. Moscow has sought to counterbalance the growing involvement of other actors in the region, which has led to rising tension between Russia and its southern neighbors. The primary objectives of the research are to examine Russian perceptions of threat and security in the Caspian region and assess the implications for other actors. This monograph analyzes the drivers of the increasing competition for influence, focusing on developments within the energy sector, and assess the implications of Russia's consolidation of its dominance for security and stability in the region. This issue is important because a clear understanding of Russian strategic thinking and threat perception in the Caspian Sea is vital in order to facilitate effective U.S. policy in the wider Caucasus and Central Asian region.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Russia and Central Asia

95. European Missile Defense and Russia

Author:
Andrew Monaghan and Keir Giles
Publication Date:
07-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
When U.S. President Barack Obama cancelled a scheduled September 2013 summit meeting with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, “lack of progress on issues such as missile defense” was cited as the primary justification. Despite widespread and well founded assumption that the real trigger for the cancellation was the Russian decision to offer temporary asylum to Edward Snowden, the citing of missile defense was indicative. The comment marked one of the periodic plateaus of mutual frustration between the United States and Russia over U.S. attitudes to missile defense capability, stemming from a continued failure to achieve meaningful dialogue over U.S. plans and Russian fears.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

96. Legality in Cyberspace: An Adversary View

Author:
Andrew Monaghan and Keir Giles
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The United States and its allies are in general agreement on the legal status of conflict in cyberspace. Although key principles remain unresolved, such as what precisely constitutes an armed attack or use of force in cyberspace, overall there is a broad legal consensus among Euro-Atlantic nations that existing international law and international commitments are sufficient to regulate cyber conflict.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and North America

97. Options for Canada's Future in Euro-Atlantic Organizations (2013-2030)

Author:
Frédéric Mérand, Nicola Contessi, Jérémie Cornut, and Dominika Kunertova
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Peace and Security Studies
Abstract:
Over the next 20 years, the empowerment of individuals and new information and communication technology will reverberate in the security field with implications such as the growth of cyber-terrorism and the spread of nuclear technology to non-state actors. Power will be diffused among states and from states to informal networks, leading to a less Western-centric globalization. Demographic patterns and a growing demand for resources will have adverse consequences on defence spending and energy security. Among Euro-Atlantic states, there is broad agreement on the nature of future threats: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, regional conflicts, and cyber attacks. Russia is alone in identifying a Europe-specific phenomenon, the expansion of NATO to the East, as one of the main external military threats to its national security. While no major new conflict is predicted to arise in the Euro-Atlantic area, there will be no shortage of crises originating from outside this area, especially in the Middle East and in North Africa, requiring a response from Euro-Atlantic organizations. In the Euro-Atlantic area, it is expected that Russia will reclaim its traditional sphere of influence by intensifying efforts to strengthen regional organizations, sometimes in cooperation with China or smaller states. The Arctic may become one of the new geostrategic hotspots. A relatively cohesive club, NATO remains the most successful military alliance in contemporary history. As an inclusive, regional, and crosscutting organization, the OSCE is less central to key Canadian interests, but it provides a fairly low-cost means to establish a diplomatic foothold and contribute to building a security community in Eurasia. While NATO and the OSCE are expected to remain the pillars of the Euro-Atlantic order, one important question that underlies this report is why Euro-Atlantic-based organizations are necessary to deal with global risks. NATO's civil-military focus is likely to become more central as future multinational interventions place increasing demands on NATO capabilities. Predictions for the OSCE are more difficult to make given its protracted impasse, but the need for confidence building among disagreeing powers remains present. While Canada should not reconsider its membership in these organizations, it should support planned reforms and initiatives that will make them more relevant. Both NATO and the OSCE are moving in the right directions by taking seriously transnational, including cyber-threats. Applying lessons learned, they are likely to continue to improve coordination of civilian and military capabilities to address new risks. Energy security is also likely to move up the agenda of both organizations. To address the shift in global power, and in particular the renewed assurance of Russia, the OSCE must renew its original focus on confidence building, including through multi-track initiatives. Eschewing enlargement for the time being, NATO would be well-advised to nurture its relationship both with Russia and with new partners through political and technical cooperation. In times of austerity, both organizations will have to do more with less. Administrative reforms such as results-based management should be encouraged. At NATO, Smart Defence provides interesting opportunities for Canada to streamline defence procurement and optimize capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Canada, and North Africa

98. Russia Still Matters: Strategic Challenges and Opportunities for the Obama Administration

Author:
John W. Parker and Michael Kofman
Publication Date:
03-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Russia's institution of a ban on American adoptions of Russian orphans, an appalling response by the Duma to U.S. sanctions against officials involved in the Sergei Magnitsky case,1 was a clear indicator that bilateral relations will assume a lower priority in the next 4 years for both capitals. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the measure despite open misgivings by some of his own key aides and against the opposition of most of Russia's civil society. The Russian Internet response was scathing, producing an instant winner for best sick joke of 2012: “An educated American family has decided to adopt a developmentally disabled Duma deputy.”.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Islam, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Middle East

99. Thinking Beyond TAP: Turkey's Role in the Southern Energy Corridor

Author:
Fatih Özgür Yeni
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Energy security is one of the hot topics on the European energy agenda. The EU's Southern Energy Corridor initiative is an attempt to reduce dependence on Russian supplies by tapping into Caspian and Middle-Eastern natural gas resources. Turkey, who aspires to be a regional energy hub, has emerged as the key country in the Southern Corridor. Although the TAP project in its current state satisfies neither Turkey's energy hub ambitions nor the EU's resource diversification efforts, it may serve as the first building block of the Southern Corridor. There are promising developments in the region that can increase volumes and add new routes to the initiative. Private companies have already shown their interest in developing a pipeline infrastructure for possible South-East Mediterranean and Northern Iraq natural gas exports but complex geopolitical issues pose the greatest threat to the way ahead. Thanks to its unique location, Turkey is destined to be one of the key players in the Southern Corridor. The convergence of Turkey's energy hub ambitions and the EU's energy security objectives present mutual gains, but also demand sustained collaboration between the two in light of several technical, legal and political hurdles.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Natural Resources, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, and Middle East

100. After the Drought: The 2012 drought, Russian farmers, and the challenges of adapting to extreme weather events

Author:
Daria Ukhova
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
Extreme weather events are becoming more and more common in Russia. The 2012 summer drought, which came so soon after the devastating drought of 2010, is just one confirmation of this trend. According to the 2012 annual report of the Federal Service for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring (Roshydromet), 2012 saw a record number of extreme weather events. In the period May to June 2012, the number of extreme weather events increased by 65 per cent compared with the same period in 2011, and were roughly on par with the number of events that occurred in the same period in 2010.
Topic:
Security, Agriculture, Climate Change, Energy Policy, and Food
Political Geography:
Russia