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1. Examining Changes in Regional Cooperation in Central Europe from a Polish Perspective

Author:
Tomasz Żornaczuk
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Visegrad Group (V4), until recently the most active and multidimensional cooperation platform in Central Europe, does not serve currently to strengthen the voice of the region on the most essential issues concerning its security. This is because Hungary’s stance on Russia’s attack on Ukraine is different than that of its partners. That is why Poland is tightening relations with the other Visegrad countries—Czechia and Slovakia. At the same time, Poland is also intensifying cooperation with the Baltic states, which has its source in joint actions on security and eastern affairs in the years preceding the war.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, Visegrad Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary, Central Europe, Slovakia, and Czechia

2. South Africa-Russia Maintain Special Relations

Author:
Jędrzej Czerep
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Although South Africa declares it is neutral regarding the war in Ukraine and offers mediation, it remains a de facto ally of Russia. This is due to the strong sentiment among the ruling elites for the period of cooperation with the USSR, its successor Russia and its activity and influence in this country, and the perception that BRICS will help elevate South Africa’s international importance. If Vladimir Putin visits Johannesburg as scheduled in August, the authorities of the state, which is party to the Rome Statute, will not be willing to fulfil their obligation to arrest him or may even leave the International Criminal Court.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, BRICS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and South Africa

3. Lavrov Visits Latin America to Try to Lure It to Russia's Side

Author:
Bartłomiej Znojek
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
On 17-21 April, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba. During his trip, he argued that the goals and interests of Russia and most Latin American countries coincide. He also repeated false Russian narratives, for example, about the reasons for the invasion of Ukraine, portraying Russia as a victim of the policy of the West. While he used his stay in Brazil to legitimise the Russian narratives, in other countries, it was mainly about consolidating Russia’s ties with their authoritarian regimes, including cooperation on evading sanctions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Sanctions, Narrative, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Latin America

4. China Adapts Policy in Response to Russia's Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China perceives the Russian aggression against Ukraine as an expression of resistance to the U.S. and NATO hegemony and an important element of building a new international order that marginalises the West. Based on this, China is strengthening strategic cooperation with Russia, striving to weaken the international position of the U.S., the EU, and their partners, while testing reactions to a possible escalation of Chinese actions towards Taiwan, for example. President Xi Jinping expressed this policy course during his March visit to Russia. At the same time, China is trying to gain support from the countries of the Global South. This approach means a continuation of China’s assertive policy towards the European Union, among others.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

5. Evolution, not Revolution: Japan Revises Security Policy

Author:
Oskar Pietrewicz
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In December last year, the government of Kishida Fumio adopted three documents adapting Japan’s security policy to the deteriorating international situation. Its security and national defence strategies highlight challenges from China, Russia, and North Korea, as well as an increase in non-military threats. A third document specifies the need for a record increase in defence spending. Japan’s readiness to deepen cooperation with the U.S. and European countries and its criticism in its assessment of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine create the conditions for the further development of Japan’s cooperation with NATO and the Polish-Japanese dialogue on security.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Asia, and North Korea

6. Iceland Makes Changes to Foreign Policy after Russia's Aggression against Ukraine

Author:
Veronika Jóźwiak
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Russian aggression against Ukraine forced Iceland to adjust its foreign policy. As a small country without armed forces but covered by security guarantees as a NATO member, it wants to strengthen ties with its allies while resigning from contacts with Russia. Its partnership with the U.S. and the Nordic countries, as well as activity in international organisations and relations with Central European EU Member States, including Poland, have become even more important to the country.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Iceland

7. Deciphering Erdoğan's Regional Paradigm Shifts

Author:
Ofra Bengio
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Turkeyscope, Professor Ofra Bengio analyses the trajectory of Turkish foreign and domestic policies by examining three paradigms in Erdogan's strategy since the early 2000s. In addition, we offer our sincere condolences to the victims of the earthquake last week.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Weapons, Arab Spring, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, and Middle East

8. Who is to suffer? Quantifying the impact of sanctions on German firms

Author:
Holger Görg, Anna Jacobs, and Saskia Meuchelbock
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
In this paper, we use a novel firm level dataset for Germany to investigate the effect of sanctions on export behaviour and performance of German firms. More specifically, we study the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia in 2014 in response to the annexation of Crimea and Russia's countermeasures. We find a substantial negative effect on both the extensive and intensive margin of German exports. While the negative effects are strongest for firms exporting products subject to trade restrictions, we provide further evidence on the indirect effects of sanctions. Analysing the impact on broader measures of firm performance, we document that the cost of sanctions is heterogeneous across firms but overall modest. Our results reveal that the negative impact of the shock was concentrated primarily among a small number of firms that were highly dependent on Russia as an export market and those directly affected by the sanctions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Sanctions, Russia-Ukraine War, and Firm Dynamics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

9. Russia at War and the Islamic World

Author:
Marlène Laruelle
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
While Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine has resulted in a decoupling with the West on a scale not seen since the worst years of the Cold War, Russia has not been isolated from the non-Western world and has even reinvested its diplomatic energy toward the Global South. This paper focuses on Russia’s relationships with the Islamic world and how they have been transformed — or not — by the Ukraine war. It discusses both Russia’s “internal” Islamic realm and how the Middle East has reacted to the strategic tectonic shift unleashed by the war and Western sanctions. It explains that the role and place of Islam in Russia have been reinforced by the war context, as Islamic institutions and Muslims are seen by the Russian regime as among the most loyal constituencies. It concludes that the main Middle Eastern regional powers have been able to consolidate their transactional foreign policies and use the war to assert their autonomy toward Western actors so that Russia’s weakening does not result in the West’s increased influence but in a more multipolar order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Islam, Multipolarity, Regional Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Middle East

10. No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security

Author:
Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
To the extent that any unified theory of Russian information warfare actually exists, its core tenet might well be that regime security has historically been indivisible from information warfare in Russian strategic thought. Rather than an aggressive or expansionist expression of Moscow’s foreign policy, the Kremlin’s so-called information war should primarily be viewed through a domestic and regime security prism—it’s as much a counterinsurgency as an expeditionary strategy, less an escalation than a projection. Analysts and decisionmakers should therefore avoid reflexively casting the United States and the West as Russia’s primary antagonists in its information war, as doing so risks reinforcing these insecurities and exaggerating Moscow’s degree of power in the information ecosystem.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

11. Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations?

Author:
Ronak Gopaldas
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
With ties forged under Soviet rule, Russia has historically enjoyed warm relations with many African countries, as their economic and ideological ambitions often align and their ties are bolstered by a mutual mistrust of the West. The spread of Africa’s votes on United Nations (UN) resolutions to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, indicates three key themes. Firstly, many African countries are pulled in competing directions by broader global geopolitics—for many, abstaining was the rational choice. Secondly, Russia’s support on the continent may be overstated and is not unconditional. Finally, Russian influence is often limited by the extent to which it can influence the political elite of a country and in some cases co-opt that elite into patronage networks. The split in the way African countries voted to condemn Russia’s actions is an important departure point for an exploration of the changing nature of Africa’s ties to Russia. There have been myriad interpretations of the votes, most of which have focused on the failure of several African countries to denounce the invasion. Few have questioned whether the nonaligned stances of these countries were tacit refusals to be used as supporting actors in public displays of condemnation by the United States and European Union (EU), to distract from the inability to offer meaningful practical or military support. Fewer still have explored whether the nonaligned stances signal weakening Russian influence on a continent it has typically relied on for support. This paper examines political relations between Russia and Africa, delving into the legacy of independence, military support, diplomatic and foreign policy stances, aid, foreign direct investment, and trade. It will also unpack whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a catalyst for what appears to be Russia’s diminishing influence or whether the former Soviet Union’s waning global standing and economic relevance precipitated a loosening of ties. The fluidity of geopolitics has left many African states between a rock and a hard place. What does this mean for Africa, not only in terms of its relationship to Russia but also more broadly on the geopolitical stage? Further, how would Africa be positioned on the global stage should Russia prevail, should the war drag on, or, more interestingly, should Ukraine emerge victorious?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

12. Fighting Against Internal and External Threats Simultaneously: China’s Police and Satellite Cooperation with Autocratic Countries

Author:
Chisako T. Masuo
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
What direction will the Xi Jinping administration’s foreign policy take over the coming years, and how will that affect the existing international order? The Chinese Communist Party harbours a strong sense of crisis about the internal and external threats colliding to supposedly destabilise its regime, and thus aims to strengthen cooperation with developing countries in order to prevent such danger. The Xi administration is consequently strengthening police and law-enforcement cooperation inside the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which includes Russia. Besides, China has launched a new initiative of collaborating with Moscow on satellite systems to monitor the entire Earth, in order to accumulate big data on various issues. The current Chinese foreign policy, which pursues a cultivation of deeper relations with autocratic countries by providing them with surveillance technologies, is likely to deepen the global divide with liberal democracies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Order, and Satellite
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

13. Reinventing Soft Power: The Strong Impact of China’s Soft Power “Shortcomings” on the Global South

Author:
Tanina Zappone
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
After being introduced into the Chinese academic debate in the 1990s, the notion of soft power has undergone such a process of “Sinicisation” that some scholars now wonder if the original concept has been gradually “reinvented” in China. Given worsening opinions about the PRC in the US and Europe over the last years, many analysts have stressed the weakness of China’s soft power, pointing to its state-centred approach and lack of an attractive set of values to be emulated as the main shortcomings. However, China’s growing influence in the Global South shows that these analyses have misevaluated the real goals and motivations of China’s soft power. The Russia-Ukraine war provides telling examples of the successful dynamics of China’s “defensive” or “negative” version of soft power and suggests it has significant impact in the least industrialised countries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, and Soft Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, Asia, and Global South

14. Latin America Reacts to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Ariel González Levaggi and Nicolás Albertoni
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
The post-Cold War international order drastically changed after the Russian military intervention in Ukraine. Now Latin America must face an international order marked by competition between great powers, fragmentation, and crisis. Latin American countries' relationships with Russia will bear an additional cost. Although Moscow will lose political, economic, and diplomatic influence, observers should not overlook the Russian push to strengthen its military presence in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Order, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Latin America

15. The Waning India-Russia Partnership is an Unexpected Effect of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Patryk Kugiel
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
twitter The Waning India-Russia Partnership is an Unexpected Effect of the War in Ukraine 174 08.11.2022 India has not condemned Russia for its aggression against Ukraine, which stems from historical ideological ties, as well as their strategic and military cooperation. However, the war has led to unfavourable changes from India’s point of view—the weakening of Russia, the collapse of its cooperation with the West, and a growing dependence on China. As a result, Russia is diminishing in importance as a key partner of India, including a supplier of weapons and technology. In the long run, closer cooperation between India and the U.S. and EU countries in the field of security and energy will help to move India away from Russia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and India

16. Russia Steps up its Campaign for Influence in Africa

Author:
Rina Bassist
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our latest issue of Ifriqiya, Rina Bassist discusses Russian propaganda and paramilitary strategies used to gain influence in recent years in various countries in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Sahel, and Central African Republic

17. Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The two defining features of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy have been an increasingly adversarial relationship with the West and an increasingly close partnership with China. These drivers have been the salient feature of official Russian national security documents for the past three decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security community has viewed Russian strategic thinking as misguided because it failed to see China as the real threat to Russia. This view ignores the Kremlin’s preoccupation with Europe as the most important strategic theater where its interests are at stake, and where they are threatened by the West’s superior capabilities and ambitions. This view also ignores how unimportant—relative to Europe—the Asia-Pacific is for Russia. Russia’s partnership with China is secured, however, by a set of coherent and complementary strategic rationales, which supersede frequent concerns in the Russian strategic community at large about China and its growing capabilities and intentions vis-à-vis Russia. Those concerns appear to have little impact on Russian policy. Notwithstanding those concerns in Russia’s unofficial national security discourse, China’s footprint on its foundational national security and foreign policy documents is invisible—and China, as a source of military threat to Russia, does not appear to be part of the Kremlin’s calculus. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has long been the pacing challenge of Russian military modernization, and the main contingency for which it has been preparing has been future conflict in the European theater. For the Putin regime, there is no alternative to Russia’s “no limits” partnership with China. Moreover, even if Putin were no longer on the scene, a successor regime would have powerful economic, geopolitical, demographic, and military-strategic incentives to maintain this partnership. An adversarial relationship with China would pit Russia against two superior powers in two widely separated geographic theaters. The war in Ukraine has cemented the Russian-Chinese partnership for the foreseeable future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Ukraine

18. Russia and India: A New Chapter

Author:
Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russian-Indian relations are undergoing a major change. Throughout the Cold War, the relationship rested on three pillars: Soviet arms sales to India; shared public-sector-heavy economic philosophy and extensive Soviet aid; and the Soviet Union–India vs. United States–Pakistan–China geopolitical alignment. The fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of India and China, the U.S.-China tensions, the deepening of U.S.-India ties, and the Russian-Chinese partnership intensified by Russia’s break with the West and the war against Ukraine have had a profound effect on Russian-Indian relations. Of the three pillars of the Moscow–New Delhi relationship, only one remains: the arms trade. Russia remains a major supplier of weapons to India, and Russian equipment still makes up a vast portion of Indian Armed Forces’ force structure; but Russia is facing competition in the Indian arms market. India’s desire to diversify its supply of weapons and develop its own defense industry has resulted in declining Russian arms deliveries to India in recent years. Russia’s break with the West because of its war against Ukraine has accelerated its pivot toward China. Against the backdrop of U.S.-China and China-India tensions, Russia’s position as China’s junior partner will make it harder for Russia to preserve partnership with India. Moscow’s leverage versus both New Delhi and Beijing is shrinking as they have greater capabilities of their own than they had previously and have new partners that offer more than Russia. Still, the Russian-Indian partnership will continue. For India, Russia remains an important supplier of weapons and, most recently, oil. India has not joined the West’s sanctions on Russia. By doing so, it has demonstrated its independent foreign policy. For Russia, India is an important market for arms and oil. The Indian-U.S. security relationship is relatively new, whereas India-Russia ties have endured for over two generations. India has no reason to forsake the benefits of this relationship. Nor does Russia. It has been said that Moscow plays a weak hand well, but sustaining strong security ties with both China and India will become more difficult for it. The question is how China will react to Russian arms sales to India, and what Russia will do if pressed by China to curtail them. For reasons of geographic proximity, economic ties, and personal relations between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the odds favor Beijing over New Delhi to have a bigger say in Moscow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, India, and United States of America

19. Networks and Competitive Advantage in a Contested World

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In an increasingly multipolar world and amid challenges from China, Russia, and elsewhere, the United States faces a complex set of foreign policy demands and the real risk of becoming overextended. Networks—of states, businesses, and individuals—offer policymakers a way to prioritize and reduce global commitments while advancing core U.S. interests. Leveraging the right networks in the right ways can extend U.S. influence, support the economic and physical security of Americans, and compete with adversaries at sustainable cost. Today’s policymakers understand the power of networks but need more guidance on how to build and employ them as tools of competition in a contested world rather than a world of open borders and markets. Influence networks—networks primed to spread and amplify U.S. power, enhance U.S. competitiveness, and protect national interests—have three characteristics. They are attraction networks, organized around places and issues where countries and corporations are already interacting, meeting common needs with customized resources. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, is organized around a shared need for infrastructure across the Global South and embeds Chinese influence by tailoring agreements to each partner’s local conditions. The United States has used attraction effectively in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, but most U.S. foreign investment has been centralized and top-down. They are gated networks with clear criteria for entry, access, and exit. Gates capture network power and direct it toward specific goals. The European Union (EU) has used gated economic markets to build significant regulatory power and geopolitical relevance. The United States has tended toward universalism but employs gates in some security networks, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and is turning toward gates in economic networks with friendshoring initiatives in some industries. Finally, they are distributed networks that have robust ties between members throughout the network, allowing influence to flow quickly along more pathways and facilitating collective action. The United States has often relied on less resilient hub-and-spoke networks to retain control. U.S. Indo-Pacific security alliances are hub-and-spoke, while NATO is more distributed, enabling more rapid, coordinated responses and wider spread of U.S. influence. Networks with these characteristics can help policymakers tackle their hardest problems. For example, better use of influence networks can support U.S. efforts to prioritize and fully resource the more significant challenge posed by China by pushing forward changes that advance European security autonomy and by building and mobilizing needed, distributed networks in the Indo-Pacific theater. Influence networks can inform U.S. strategies for building ties to hedging states that offer access to key resources or strategic locations—for example, by focusing on shared local needs of potential partners and U.S. comparative advantages and by creating distributed business or civil society partnerships. Finally, influence networks provide ways to approach the Russia-China relationship that support U.S. security and economic interests, including avoiding the isolation of either. These examples begin to illustrate how influence networks can improve U.S. strategies toward foreign policy challenges by offering policymakers a way to prioritize commitments, capitalize on U.S. strengths, and avoid overextension that harms U.S. interests. Additional exploration and application of these networks will investigate these and other foreign policy challenges in more depth.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Networks, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

20. Adapting to New Realities: Israel’s foreign policy in post-Netanyahu times

Author:
Gabriel Haritos
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Israel had to adapt to the revised objectives of the Biden administration in the Middle East and to update its coordination with Russia on the Syria front. The war in Ukraine has reconfigured Israel’s relations with the US and Russia. Israel’s reluctance to provide arms to Ukraine has allowed Russian-Israeli coordination to continue in Syria. The energy crisis triggered by the Russo-Ukrainian war led the US to revise its stance towards Saudi Arabia. The US-Iran talks ground to a halt in Vienna in the light of the growing ties between Iran and Russia. Israel took advantage of the new state of affairs, encouraging the rapprochement between Washington and Riyadh and countering the possibility of the US reopening its consulate in East Jerusalem. In coordination with the US, Israel has promoted the deepening of the Abraham Accords and drawn India into the new Middle East reality through the new I2U2 mechanism. Thanks to carefully managed communication, the Bennett-Lapid government was able to restore diplomatic relations with Turkey while maintaining close cooperation with Greece and Cyprus. It would seem advisable to put in place additional safeguards to maintain the quality of Athens-Nicosia -Jerusalem relations, similar to those which are expected to accompany the revamped relations between Israel and Turkey.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, Israel, Greece, and United States of America

21. Turkey’s quest for Strategic Autonomy

Author:
Alexandros Diakopoulos
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Ankara is pursuing a radical revision of the regional status quo by projecting power in neighboring regions with increasing aggression and disregard for international legality. Turkey moved from a security-based to a power-based foreign policy and took advantage of the power vacuum in Eastern Mediterranean to make a bid for regional hegemony by resorting to the use of hard power. The Turkish army developed autonomous expeditionary capabilities, bolstered by a strengthened national defense industry. The lessons learned in Syria clearly informed the series of Turkish foreign policy moves that followed. A revisionist Turkey involved itself in all regional theaters of conflict, fomenting instability in the region while also reaping strategic and economic benefits. These interventions shaped Turkish-Russian competitive cooperation and strategic realignment. Since 2016 the relationship has evolved into something almost symbiotic, with the two countries coordinating their presence on multiple fronts. The two countries are drawn to one another by their shared authoritarian models of governance and similar strategic cultures and operational codes: Both countries are revisionist, aggressive and assertive on their peripheries. Both countries claim to be surrounded, which serves as a pretext for their unilateral actions. Both countries have militarized their foreign policy by conducting hybrid warfare, using surrogate forces and coercing countries that resist.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Authoritarianism, Strategic Autonomy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, and Middle East

22. How Its War on Ukraine Killed Russia’s Hydrogen Ambitions

Author:
Aliaksei Patonia
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Hydrogen looks like the fuel that can facilitate global decarbonization because it can be used in diverse applications—such as heat and power generation, transport, and manufacturing—without any carbon emissions. But, while many countries (including in Europe) view renewables-based, zero-carbon hydrogen as the ultimate goal in transitioning to a hydrogen economy, today most hydrogen is produced from natural gas. Thus, it is unlikely that the hydrogen transition will happen without relying on this fossil fuel. Russia is the country with the world’s largest natural gas deposits, and it has been exploring ways to adjust its energy sector to the needs of the emerging global hydrogen one. In 2021, it announced the goal of capturing up to 20 percent of the world’s hydrogen market by 2030. This came after all the major importers of Russia’s energy products had developed their hydrogen strategies, and its key energy companies started to explore new opportunities. Having signed memoranda of understanding with some of the world’s major energy companies to jointly develop Russia’s hydrogen export potential, they focused on Europe as the key destination. Some of Asia’s hydrogen pioneers and most promising future importers, such as Japan and South Korea, were also included among Russia’s potential partners. These steps could have resulted in long-lasting and fruitful collaborations generating large profits for Russia, but its ambitions have been jeopardized by its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This has led to Russia losing key political and economic partners in Europe and also in Asia, which—in combination with being the target the toughest sanctions in its history—is likely to cripple its nascent hydrogen sector. Having planned to convert its natural-gas pipelines to transport hydrogen to future buyers in Europe, Russia is unlikely to be able to use this infrastructure for this purpose anymore. The EU will be an unlikely buyer of Russian hydrogen for the foreseeable future. Turning to Japan and South Korea would not be a success either, since they have joined the sanctions regime against Russia and, like the EU, have been officially labeled as unfriendly by Moscow. This will make the transfer of the technologies critical for the production of low- and zero-carbon hydrogen from the world leaders to a technologically backward Russia very problematic. Europe will also feel long-lasting repercussions of Russia’s war in Ukraine in the energy and hydrogen sectors. With no steady supplies of cheap Russian gas or hydrogen, Europe’s decarbonization efforts and building up its hydrogen industry will be inhibited and require a lot more effort and money. Russia will have to seek alternative markets for its energy commodities and it will seek deals with China, the only country whose energy consumption can rival that of Europe. But, as one of the world’s largest producers of electrolysers and of conventionally manufactured hydrogen, China probably will not need to import Russia’s hydrogen to build up its own hydrogen sector. Possessing critical technologies of its own, it will instead increase imports of Russian primary energy sources (such as natural gas) that it can use for producing hydrogen. The influx of huge volumes of cheap Russian feedstock will speed up China’s transformation from a country with a nascent hydrogen sector into a dominant player on the global hydrogen market. If the EU or the United States—the only two actors comparable to China in economic, technological, and geopolitical strength—do not develop similarly strong hydrogen sectors, Beijing could end up dominating the global energy landscape. To avoid the geopolitical consequences of this and for global balance to be maintained, further cooperation between the EU and the United States will be needed to speed up the creation of strong hydrogen sectors for both.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Business, Trade, Hydrogen, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

23. "Best and Bosom Friends" Putin, Xi and the Challenge to the West

Author:
Michael Cox
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In this latest Strategic Update, LSE IDEAS co-founder Professor Michael Cox highlights China as a significant player in the current tragedy occurring within Ukraine. Prof Cox traces the relationship between the People’s Republic and the USSR, through to the latter’s collapse into the Russian Federation, their formation of a strategic partnership against a unipolar post-Cold War order, and the rise in power of Xi Jinping alongside two international crises caused by Russian aggression in Ukraine. This Update finds that, whilst there are limits to their shared interests, China is politically committed to its Russian partner, and this status-quo leaves us in a more dangerous world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Partnerships, Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

24. Can Chancellor Scholz Save the West? The New German Government and Global Geopolitics

Author:
Maximilian Terhalle
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In the wake of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s departure from the German Chancellorship, her successor, Olaf Scholz, inherits a Germany which has been lacking in strategic vision and an acute foreign policy for a considerable amount of time. Maximilian Terhalle asks, can Chancellor Scholz provide this vision for his country, and imbue NATO and the EU with a coherent and unified foreign policy in the face of threats from China, Russia, and a divided ‘West’?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, Olaf Scholz, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Germany

25. After the Russian “Ruse,” China Looks for New Friends

Author:
Galia Lavi
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it would seem that Beijing and Moscow should be a united front against the West. But in actuality, China has been surprised by the scale of the Russian aggression and is now rethinking its position in the geopolitical arena. How will this affect the Middle East?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

26. Underreporting of Russian Investments Abroad: Are the Sanctions Undermined?

Author:
Haggy Etkes
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
There are indications of underreporting to Western authorities of Russian investments worth about 90 billion dollars, when Russian reports of investments abroad are compared with Western data. If correct, this undermines the effectiveness of the asset freezing that is part of the sanctions imposed by the West following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Sanctions, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

27. Understanding Russia’s perception of international agency in the context of the war against Ukraine

Author:
Andrey Makarychev
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has dominated international politics in 2022 and this looks likely to continue for the foreseeable future. But how did we get to this point in the first place? The core argument presented here is that Russian foreign policy agency – the intention and the ability to act as transgressor and challenger to the liberal international order, defined as the space for norms-based multilateralism – played the key role in the full-fledged restart of the war in Ukraine in February 2022. Taking a critical look at the five pillars of Russian agency, this inaugural CEPS Explainer concludes that the current model of Russia’s international agency is a precarious and vulnerable construct that is unlikely to survive the regime currently sat in the Kremlin.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Multilateralism, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

28. The US–Italy Economic Relations in a Divided World

Author:
Adriana Castagnoli
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In 2021, bilateral trade returned to the sustained pace it had prior to the Covid pandemic. Direct investment also grew – crucially, not just Italian investment in the United States but the other way round too. While Italy’s economic ties with Russia and China remain potential hotspots, Rome has never questioned its Atlantic orientation. Nevertheless, possible austerity policies following sanctions against Russia could spread social discontent that populist parties can exploit for consensus purposes in the 2023 general election, rekindling anti-Americanism rooted in different segments of Italian society.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Policy, Trade, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Italy, and United States of America

29. Ukraine’s Sanctions Against Pro-Russian Oligarch Medvedchuk—All About Oil and Coal

Author:
Alla Hurska
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On February 19, the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (NSDC) imposed sanctions on Ukrainian tycoon and politician Viktor Medvedchuk and his wife, Oksana Marchenko (Pravda.com.ua, February 19). Medvedchuk is a leader and people’s deputy of the pro-Russian party Opposition Platform–For Life, the largest opposition faction in the Ukrainian parliament. Moreover, he is a close acquaintance of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The NSDC sanctions list also includes five Russian nationals and Ukrainian national Nataliya Lavreniuk. The latter is Marchenko’s friend and the common-law spouse of Taras Kozak (already under sanctions), a people’s deputy from the same political party and Medvedchuk’s business partner. Apart from targeting those eight individuals, sanctions were imposed on nineteen associated businesses, including firms that own aircraft and operate direct flights from Kyiv to Moscow as well as a number of joint stock companies registered in Russia, Moldova and Portugal (Pravda.com.ua, February 20). These measures came two weeks after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy ordered the shutdown of several television channels—ZIK, NewsOne and 112—connected to Kozak. The move was described by Zelenskyy as a necessary step to fight Russian propaganda. But according to the Security Service of Ukraine (SSU) and the NSDC, these actions were motivated by more complex issues. Specifically, the three aforementioned TV channels were being financed by limited liability company trading house Don Coal (Rostov, Russia), which receives revenue from smuggling coal out of the Luhansk and Donetsk “people’s republics” (LPR/DPR) (Pravda.com.ua, February 4).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Oil, Sanctions, and Coal
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

30. Countering Zero-Sum Relations in the Middle East: Insights from the Expert Survey

Author:
Flavio Fusco
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Building on emerging debates on the need to develop de-escalation mechanisms for the Middle East, the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) and the Brussels-based Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), with support from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, launched a one-year research and outreach project entitled “Fostering a New Security Architecture in the Middle East”. Connected to the research, an expert survey targeting European, US, Russian, Middle Eastern and Chinese experts and practitioners was conducted on key themes, principles and approaches associated with a potential new security architecture for the region. The results of the survey – first published in an edited book volume jointly published by IAI and FEPS in November 2020 – are analysed below, complete with tables and infographics on key themes associated with the research project and the search for new, inclusive mechanisms for dialogue and de-escalation in the Middle East.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Foreign Policy, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, and United States of America

31. Russia in the Mediterranean: Here to Stay

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s strategy in the Mediterranean is an integral part of its strategy for the wider European theater, which has long been the principal arena of its foreign policy triumphs and setbacks. Europe’s dominant position on Russia’s foreign policy agenda is a product of its strategic culture, which is in turn shaped by geography, historical legacy, and an elite worldview that considers the West a threat to the domestic political order. It is impossible to understand Russia’s current posture in the Mediterranean without viewing it within this larger context and against the backdrop of the country’s centuries-old involvement in the region and retreat from it during the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. Since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, alarms have been sounded about the Kremlin’s ambitions and military capabilities in the Mediterranean. These alarms have been unfounded.; Russian capabilities in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region are modest, and the Kremlin’s ambitions there are constrained by geography and geopolitics, limited resources, a transactional approach to relationships, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) formidable force posture on its southern flank. As much as Russia may aspire to regional domination, it lacks the means to achieve this goal. That said, the Russian military is now a presence to be reckoned with in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has complicated U.S./NATO planning and operations, and Moscow has developed good relationships with important regional powers. Given Russia’s limited means, its re-emergence in the region can be considered a success, but its effects should not be exaggerated. Moscow’s posture in the Mediterranean has been largely designed to protect its gains in Syria and defend against the threat that Russian leaders see from NATO land, air, and naval capabilities to the Russian heartland. The importance of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “bubble” over Syria has at times been exaggerated. The systems that make up the bubble are limited in range and in a conflict with NATO would be vulnerable to countermeasures. Contrary to a widespread perception, Moscow’s ambitions in the Mediterranean are more than a matter of its vague pursuit to regain great power status—they are a product of enduring Russian national security requirements. The principal rationale for Russia’s return to the region has been the prospect of a military confrontation in the European theater and concerns about the vulnerability of its southern flank in a conflict with NATO. While Russia has sought, in fact, to regain its old Cold War footing—and has been skillful and opportunistic in exploiting openings to expand its footprint—it has acted with caution, avoiding undue risks and, most of all, an outright confrontation with the United States. The Kremlin may aspire to dominate the Mediterranean one day, but for now its aim is to deny this option to NATO. Russia is in the Mediterranean to stay, and its push for a greater naval, air, and land presence and increased political influence will continue as long as it remains locked in a tense standoff with NATO in Europe. This warrants heightened vigilance but not, as has often been the case, fears that Russia has replaced the United States/NATO as the key power broker in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Syria, and Mediterranean

32. A Difficult Balancing Act: Russia’s Role in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of its broader strategy for undermining the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) and thus complicating the Western alliance’s ability to operate, plan, and formulate policy. The Kremlin’s interests are geared toward enhancing dependencies on Russian gas and financial flows, cultivating governing elites, and stymieing the ability of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the EU to expand. While Moscow’s efforts in the region after its 2015 intervention in Syria are often described as a means to reassert Russia’s great power status, the Russian leadership more likely sees its actions there as part of a broader standoff with the West that stretches from the Atlantic to the Black Sea and from North Africa to the Arctic. This is certainly the case in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus—three of the most vulnerable countries to Russian influence operations in the region due to a mix of relative geographic proximity to Russia, common cultural and historic legacies, and elites that have looked to Moscow and beyond to balance their countries’ foreign policies or gain leverage with transatlantic partners. While Europe today is generally thought of as more or less “unified,” this region is anything but. Economic turmoil, border and territorial disputes, migration flows, and a growing disenchantment with the EU and the United States have created numerous fissures within and between these three states, transforming them into receptive targets for Russia. They are also highly dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and keen to attract Russian investment and tourists. Russia uses a narrative of shared cultural and religious heritage, along with existing anti-American or Euroskeptic sentiment to cultivate the region’s populations, albeit not always successfully. Yet, its influence operations over the past decade have led to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus being labeled as weak links in NATO or the EU, especially on key issues of concern to Moscow: expansion of Western political and security organizations, EU sanctions, and the promotion of democracy and good governance. However, while the behavior of some of these countries at times has proved troubling to Washington and Brussels, the Kremlin’s engagement there has not led any of them to formally break with their Western partners, although tensions between the latter and Turkey continue to grow. Russia has been skillful and successful in seeking opportunities to engage the region, cultivating rising political, economic, religious, or cultural decisionmakers in all three countries. It now has a clear presence in the Eastern Mediterranean that cannot be ignored. Russia has been able to compartmentalize its differences with Turkey to develop a working, albeit often unhappy, accommodation in Syria and the South Caucasus, even as the two countries operate largely as competitors in Libya and Ukraine. Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system exacerbated frictions with Washington, throwing NATO into an internal crisis and leading to Turkey’s expulsion the F-35 and Patriot missile programs. For Russia, the sale was not only a symbolic win for its arms industry; it succeeded in stoking fissures in the Western alliance and complicating its weapons development programs. Nonetheless, while the Russo-Turkish relationship might appear robust, it is neither deep nor wide, and it is largely dependent on the two countries’ authoritarian leaders. Russia’s engagement with Greece has been less successful. Once described as Moscow’s Trojan horse in Europe,1 Athens pivoted back sharply toward its European and NATO partners after the 2018 exposure of Russian attempts to interfere in Greek politics and to upend its rapprochement with North Macedonia. Despite its promises of financial assistance, Moscow lacks the economic clout to help address Greece’s decade-long financial crisis. President Vladimir Putin’s successful cultivation of his Turkish counterpart also unnerves many Greeks. Greece is a clear case of Russian overreach, but Moscow still has tools—hydrocarbons and cultural links—that it can use in the country should future opportunities arise. Like Greece, Cyprus remains wary of Russia’s enhanced security relationship with Turkey, which has opened the door to greater military cooperation with the United States, France, and other Western allies. Nicosia hoped that Moscow could come to the rescue during its 2012–2013 banking crisis, but the latter lacked the financial clout to do so and was not a viable alternative to a harsh EU bailout. As an offshore financial center, Cyprus is dependent on Russian financial flows, not all of them legal, to help prop up its economy, giving Moscow leverage that has paved the way for limited security cooperation, particularly in the form of naval port calls. Russia has increased its cultural outreach to the country, but much of this is geared toward the growing Russian-speaking expatriate community. In sum, Russia’s capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean are modest, based largely on symbolic diplomacy, energy, financial promises, and the ability to cultivate elites, some of which are quite eager to engage with Moscow for personal or political gain. That approach, however, does not resonate widely beyond the narrow Russia-friendly constituencies in each country. Furthermore, there is not much ballast to these relationships, all of which have proven to be volatile, as the 2015 freeze in Russo-Turkish relations over Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter or the post-2018 plummet in Greek-Russian relations illustrate. But, if Russia’s main goals are to stoke fissures within the West, to shore up vulnerabilities to NATO on its southern flank, and to be seen as a regional player, it has had success, especially considering its limited economic potential and the challenges it faces in balancing the competing interest of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. Russia also wants a seat at the table as a mediator in regional disputes, but that is mainly to preserve its own interests rather than to bring sustainable solutions. Moscow in fact is far more likely to take advantage of those challenges for economic or geopolitical gain than to try to remedy them. To manage Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO and the EU should shift away from trying to combat every instance of Russian activity there, not all of which is malign. Instead, they should work to enhance local resilience and to stabilize countries in the wider Mediterranean such as Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. They should also help Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus address their economic, governance, political, and security challenges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

33. Grand Illusions: The Impact of Misperceptions About Russia on U.S. Policy

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A critical examination of U.S. policy misfires in dealing with Russia and its intentions and capabilities over the past several decades is long overdue. Three factors largely account for this problem. All of them continue to affect contemporary policymakers’ approach to a deeply troubled relationship with Moscow. By unpacking the analytical assumptions that underlie these misconceptions, President Joe Biden’s administration and other important policy players will be better equipped to ensure that U.S. policy going forward is grounded in the most realistic understanding of the challenge that Russia poses and the right kinds of tools that the United States should use to contend with it. The first factor is the lingering euphoria of the post–Cold War period. For many Western observers, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implosion of Russian power demonstrated the permanent superiority of the United States. The perception that Russia’s decline was so deep and irreversible that it would no longer be able to resist Western initiatives made it difficult to accept Moscow’s pushback against Western policies. This was a particular problem when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pursued several rounds of enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s under U.S. leadership. U.S. leaders ignored Russia’s objections and underestimated the lengths to which Russian counterparts were prepared to go to secure the homeland against perceived threats. Second, American policymakers and experts have long paid too little attention to the drivers of Russia’s external behavior. Russian threat perceptions are part of an inheritance heavily shaped by geography and a history of troubled relations with other major European powers. They are compounded by the trauma of the loss of its empire, the lingering ideology of greatness, and a sense of entitlement based on its sacrifice in World War II. President Vladimir Putin stokes all of them for domestic political gain. Third, U.S. policymakers have not fully internalized the lessons of the two biggest crises of the Cold War—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s. In both cases, the Soviet Union went to great lengths to counter what its leaders perceived was a unilateral U.S. threat to the Soviet homeland that could not be tolerated. In 1962 they almost triggered a nuclear war. In 1987, they agreed to eliminate an entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to secure the homeland from U.S. missiles. In both situations, U.S. missiles deployed in Europe would deny the Kremlin the advantage of strategic depth and decision time in a crisis. The lessons of those crises were ignored as anachronisms when NATO embarked on its eastward expansion on the assumption that it would no longer need to worry about, let alone maintain the necessary capabilities for the territorial defense mission. After all, Russia was permanently weakened. When Russia proved otherwise, the alliance was caught by surprise. In another surprise for the United States and its allies, Russian foreign policy has become increasingly assertive, adversarial, and ambitious over the past decade. In the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, Latin America, and parts of Africa, Russia has deployed a diverse tool kit rich in hard, soft, and gray zone power instruments to assert itself as a global power. Russian foreign policy agility and even daring have repeatedly caught the West by surprise and sparked fears of its return as a major threat to Western interests. In reality, Russian gains and tools used to accomplish Moscow’s objectives have not been all that impressive. But Russia has made up for it by capitalizing on mistakes made by the United States and its allies or moving into power vacuums left by them. Still, Russian muscle-flexing and agility in deploying its tool kit, certain to be enriched as new and even more disruptive technologies become available, will remain a top-tier challenge for the president and his senior national security aides. Russia will also remain a serious national security concern for the United States because of its nuclear arsenal and conventional and cyber capabilities—and because of the U.S. commitment to NATO, which is locked in a tense standoff with Russia, in close proximity to its heartland, for the foreseeable future. Getting Russia right—assessing its capabilities and intentions, the long-term drivers of its policy and threat perceptions, as well as its accomplishments—is essential because the alternative of misreading them is a recipe for wasted resources, distorted national priorities, and increased risk of confrontation. In responding to this challenge, it is important to set priorities and differentiate between primary and secondary interests. Europe is the principal theater of the East-West confrontation where Russian actions threaten Western security. Beyond Europe, Russia’s gains have been considerably less than often portrayed and pose a less serious challenge to U.S. interests. The continued tendency to dismiss Russia as a “has been” or declining power whose bark will always be worse than its bite can lead to the United States overextending itself, making unrealistic commitments, and risking a dangerous escalation with the one country that is still its nuclear peer competitor. The push to expand NATO without taking into account the possibility of Russia reemerging as a major military power was an example of such thinking, which is to be avoided in the future. At the same time, the scope and scale of the threat that Russia’s global activism poses to U.S. interests will depend largely on how Washington defines those interests in regions where Russia has expanded its footprint over the past decade. Absent a sober assessment of Russia’s gains and tools for power projection, the United States will position itself to needlessly chase after the specter of Russian expansionism in distant corners of the world where major U.S. interests are not at stake.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Post Cold War, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

34. Less Than a Full Deck: Russia’s Economic Influence in the Mediterranean

Author:
Joanna Pritchett
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, and then subsequently in Libya, marked its return as a major actor in the Mediterranean. Much has been made of Russia’s use of all elements of statecraft, including diplomatic, ideological, military, and economic instruments, to advance its interests in this region, a vital shipping and transit corridor. A closer look at Russia’s economic tool kit in this region, however, suggests concerns about Russian economic capabilities are likely overstated. Russia’s most important economic tools in the Mediterranean are its energy resources, arms exports, and ability to launder money through corrupt networks. These tools have complemented Russia’s diplomatic and military activities, particularly in areas where economic systems and rule of law have been weaker. Where Russia has been successful, it has increased a country’s dependence on Russian money, oil and gas, and/or arms, giving it a say in a country’s policymaking, particularly on matters of importance to Russia, and a way to undermine U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) influence in the region. In particular, Russia’s unique economic tools have helped it manage its otherwise difficult relationship with Turkey, which depends on Russian oil and gas and is a new customer for Russian nuclear power and weapons systems. Turkey is a unique example in the Mediterranean where Russia already had a substantial trade and investment relationship beyond hydrocarbons, and then used these newer, more subversive tools to build its influence. These same tools have allowed Russia to gain more influence in Egypt, Algeria, and to some degree Cyprus over the last decade. These tools have proved of limited utility elsewhere, however, as they have not been backed by the traditional instruments of economic statecraft: trade in non-energy goods and services, foreign direct investment, and development assistance. Russia has trailed the United States and Europe, and in some cases China, in deploying these fundamental economic elements of foreign policy in the Mediterranean region. Based on economic data available, Russia’s bilateral trade with individual Mediterranean countries is low, its investment levels in most Mediterranean countries are insubstantial, and it is not giving large quantities of development assistance to the poorer countries along the Mediterranean’s eastern and southern rims. The lack of these traditional economic ties is surprising, given Russia’s military and diplomatic efforts to increase its influence in the region. Without them, Russia’s economic diplomacy in the region is highly based on symbolism and the relationships lack sustainability over the long term, which undercuts its geopolitical ambitions in the Mediterranean. If Russia’s ambitions in the Mediterranean region are limited to maintaining access, currying favor with key decisionmakers, and remaining a nuisance to NATO, then its current level of economic ties is likely sufficient. If Russia aims to grow its influence and clout with more countries in the region, however, its current economic tool kit does not appear to be large or sophisticated enough to achieve this. Economic statecraft is an important tool in any country’s foreign policy. Trade and investment deals link countries together in vital ways to improve living standards in each country. They also build relationships between people—politicians, business leaders, students, tourists—that promote mutual understanding and respect for each other’s cultures. The United States and the European Union (EU) have generally excelled in building these types of economic ties in the post–World War II era, and economic data show they continue to be the dominant economic powers in the Mediterranean. Continuing this leadership in the economy will likely ensure that Russian influence in the Mediterranean remains a manageable, if persistent, problem for the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Trade, Regional Power, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

35. Reassessing Russian Capabilities in the Levant and North Africa

Author:
Frederic M. Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia may be back in the Middle East, but is it a truly strategic player? The picture is decidedly mixed. After abandoning most of its presence in the Levant and North Africa during the late 1980s, the Kremlin has alarmed Western policymakers in recent years by filling power vacuums and exploiting the missteps of the United States and the European states. Moscow panders to the insecurities and ambitions of local regimes, trying to enrich itself along the way. While Russian activism is part of a broader push for great power status, most of its policies are rooted more in opportunism than grand strategy. Yet Russian influence is formidable in many respects. In war-wracked states like Syria and Libya, Moscow has adroitly deployed military forces and engaged with actors that are off-limits to Westerners, thus positioning itself as a significant power broker. In Egypt and Algeria, it has pursued arms deals that are unencumbered by human rights conditions. Russia’s economic footprint is expanding in fields ranging from infrastructure to tourism to energy, contributing, in some instances, to the region’s cronyism and corruption. At the same time, a closer look at Russian activism reveals that its ability to shape events in the Middle East is far more modest than is commonly assumed. Russia has neither the tools nor the willingness to tackle the region’s deep-seated socioeconomic and governance problems. In Syria, the limits of the Kremlin’s military commitment have been exposed amid clashes with other powerful, outside players and a hardening stalemate on the ground. For now, Moscow is simply not in a position to achieve its desired military or political outcomes absent a significant investment of new resources. Russian economic penetration is driven mainly by short-term objectives and a search for outsized financial rewards that sometimes fail to materialize or to make Moscow an attractive partner. Russian inroads are further limited by regional factors like fractured politics and capricious local actors, who, despite being plied with Russian attention and support, do not behave as docile proxies. In many instances, Middle Eastern rulers exert far more power in shaping the extent of Russian influence than conventional narratives suggest. Successive leaders of Egypt, for instance, have perfected the game of soliciting Russia’s attention to gain leverage over other patrons, namely the United States. For their part, Israeli leaders have worked hard to ensure that Russia does not throw major obstacles in the way of Israel’s ongoing campaign against Iranian military encroachment in Syria—yet they surely take note when Moscow does the bare minimum in raising concerns about the situation in Gaza. The limits of Russian influence are similarly noticeable in the heartbreaking economic crisis in Lebanon, where Moscow is little more than a bystander. With these limitations in mind, Washington should avoid viewing the region through a zero-sum, Cold War lens that sees every development as a net gain or loss for Moscow or minimizes the agency of local actors. In the context of multiple policy challenges across the globe and at home, U.S. decisionmakers need to prioritize the areas of Russian influence that necessitate a response. In so doing, they should avoid playing the arms sales game on Moscow’s terms or letting themselves be instrumentalized by autocratic Middle Eastern rulers who point to Russian overtures to seek leniency and support from Washington. U.S. and European policymakers have ample tools at their disposal that can frustrate or slow the more malign forms of Moscow’s inroads. Yet the net impact of such pushback on Russian resolve should not be overstated. Instead, Washington should focus its energies on its biggest comparative advantage vis-à-vis Moscow in the region: namely, its abundant sources of influence and leverage in the economic and security spheres, its still-potent soft power, and its leadership of multilateral diplomacy and the rules-based global order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and Levant

36. How Syria Changed Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Between August 2016 and the present, Turkey has launched four military operations in northern Syria. Each operation has served specific objectives and was designed to respond to rapidly changing scenarios on the ground. It is possible to identify the key priorities that have informed Turkey’s Syria policy over the years. Boiled down to its core, the Turkish government’s activism in Syria has been driven by domestic politics and has helped Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) preserve power. Domestically, Ankara has used the Syrian conflict as a pretext to suppress the rights of the Kurds living in Turkey and limit their parliamentary representation to secure a landmark constitutional reform in 2017. In the following years, successive military operations in Syria have helped Erdoğan connect with increasingly nationalistic constituencies and drum up support around key electoral dates. Finally, after the failed coup in July 2016, the Turkish government’s Syria policy played a major role in rebuilding the credibility of the Turkish Armed Forces while redrawing the balance between civilian and military power. In foreign policy terms, Turkey’s military operations in Syria have resulted in increasingly tense relations with the United States. Washington’s support for the Syrian Kurds has alienated Ankara to an extent that U.S. policymakers failed to anticipate. The thorniest topic of the day in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relation—Ankara’s decision to deploy the Russian S-400 missile system—is also deeply related to the Syrian crisis. This decision was made in the context of a strategic realignment between Turkey and Russia that has helped both countries pursue their respective objectives in Syria: the survival of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s regime for Moscow and the weakening of the Syrian Kurds for Ankara. Finally, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has also given Turkey new leverage over the EU when it comes to the management of refugee flows. Solving the question of Syrian refugees in Turkey has been a priority of the Turkish government since the early stages of the Syrian civil war—and a main driver of Ankara’s policies toward both Syria and the EU. Overall, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has not only been a source of conflict—or rapprochement—with its traditional partners and neighbors across the region. It has also equipped Turkey with new tools for conducting a more aggressive, nationalistic foreign policy. The strategies Turkey has employed in Syria have boosted the country’s image and international role. These operations have secured a seat for Turkey at the negotiating table with Russia and the United States. Ankara has used these tools, these lessons learned, and its new capabilities to inform its revisionist foreign policy posture. Going forward, and with an eye on the country’s 2023 presidential election, Turkey will continue to use these tools to reinforce its position in the international arena.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Syrian War, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

37. US-Russian Contention in Cyberspace: Are Rules of the Road Necessary or Possible?

Author:
Pavel Sharikov
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
In recent years, as news of U.S.-Russian tensions in the cyber domain has dominated headlines, some strategic thinkers have pointed to the need for a bilateral cyber “rules of the road” agreement. American political scientist Joseph Nye, a former head of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, wrote in 2019 that, even “if traditional arms-control treaties are unworkable” in cyberspace, “it may still be possible to set limits on certain types of civilian targets, and to negotiate rough rules of the road that minimize conflict.” Robert G. Papp, a former director of the CIA’s Center for Cyber Intelligence, has likewise argued that “even a cyber treaty of limited duration with Russia would be a significant step forward.” On the Russian side, President Vladimir Putin himself has called for “a bilateral intergovernmental agreement on preventing incidents in the information space,” comparing it to the Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas. Amid joint Russian-U.S. efforts, the Working Group on the Future of U.S.-Russia Relations recommended several elements of an agreement in 2016, among them that Russia and the U.S. agree “on the types of information that are to be shared in the event of a cyberattack” (akin to responses to a bio-weapons attack) and prohibit both “automatic retaliation in cases of cyberattacks” and “attacks on elements of another nation’s core internet infrastructure.” Most recently, in June 2021, a group of U.S., Russian and European foreign-policy officials and experts called for “cyber nuclear ‘rules of the road.’”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

38. The Russian Diaspora in the Baltic States: The Trojan Horse that never was

Author:
Sarah Coolican
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Thirty years ago this month, the world shook as one of the only two Superpowers unexpectedly collapsed, creating enormous ramifications for the 25 million ethnic Russians who found themselves as non-titular citizens outside the borders of the newly formed Russian Federation. This ‘beached diaspora’ has been left marginalised and treated with fear, by the Baltic States in their nation-building policies and has left many to think of this community as ‘ripe’ for Russian influence. This Strategic Update will analyse Russian soft power policies and the development of ‘Russkii Mir’ as a tool for utilising this diaspora to further its foreign policy. Tools, which have been seemingly unaffected to a community of autonomy seeking citizens.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diaspora, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Baltic States

39. Strategic Report

Author:
Zaid Eyadat and Moh'd Khair Eiedat
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic Studies (CSS)
Abstract:
This is not a historical nor chronological report. It is rather “a working paper”. The purpose of this rather brief report is to reflect on three major issues: first, what are the characteristics of the world we live in? How stable and predictable is it? Are those in power know what are they doing? Or is it the blind leading the blind? Is our sense of uncertainty and thus unpredictability a product of mental crisis related to one in a lifetime pandemic experience? or is it more structural with long historical span? The second question is how dangerous and out of control is the Middle east region? Or is it? The Abraham Accords promise a new dawn for the region? Paradise is just around the corner or the calm preceding the storm? The third question, where does Jordan fit in these wider circles of activities both global and regional? Deliberately we left out of the report any serious considerations of the economic aspect challenge facing Jordan which is both self-evident and widely recognized. Moreover, the emphasis is on the geostrategic aspects of security related to the global level, the regional level and that of Jordan. Let us first look at the world.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Power, Geopolitics, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan

40. Turkish-Russian Relations: A Puzzle that Shakes the Middle East

Author:
Remi Daniel
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In this issue of Turkeyscope, Remi Daniel discusses several contemporary trends in the Russian-Turkish relationship. The dynamics of competition and cooperation between these two states affect the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Central Asia and North Africa in profound ways.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Turkey, Middle East, Eastern Europe, and North Africa

41. Is Serbia Still a Troublemaker in the Balkans?

Author:
Faruk Ajeti
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
As one of the largest countries of the Balkans, Serbia’s troubled past also poses big dilemmas for the future. Its latest political and military cooperation with Russia and China appears to be an effort to build a strategic neutrality with “Serbian characteristics.” But at what cost?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Neutrality, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

42. Structural Shifts and Regional Security: A View from Israel

Author:
Ehud Eiran
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Israel is still holding to its traditional security maxim. Based on a perception of a hostile region, Israel’s response includes early warning, deterrence and swift – including pre-emptive – military action, coupled with an alliance with a global power, the US. Israel is adjusting these maxims to a changing reality. Overlapping interests – and perhaps the prospect of an even more open conflict with Iran – led to limited relationships between Israel and some Gulf states. These, however, will be constrained until Israel makes progress on the Palestine issue. Israel aligned with Greece and Cyprus around energy and security, which may lead to conflict with Turkey. Russia’s deployment in Syria placed new constraints on Israeli freedom of action there. The US’s retrenchment from the Middle East is not having a direct effect on Israel, while the Trump administration’s support for Israel’s territorial designs in the West Bank may make it easier for Israel to permanently expand there, thus sowing the seeds for future instability in Israel/Palestine. The EU could try and balance against such developments, but, as seen from Israel, is too divided to have a significant impact. Paper produced in the framework of the FEPS-IAI project “Fostering a New Security Architecture in the Middle East”, April 2020.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Gas, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Greece, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, United States of America, and Mediterranean

43. Russia at the United Nations: Law, Sovereignty, and Legitimacy

Author:
Philip Remler
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The central task for Russian foreign policy in the era of President Vladimir Putin has been to regain the undisputed recognition that Russia is a world power like the Soviet Union before it, a status to which Russia feels entitled.1 The United Nations (UN) is Russia’s most important venue for putting its global aspirations and achievements on display. Russia’s status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council boosts its claim to be part of a global oligarchy and grants it the power to veto or undermine initiatives that it deems contrary to its interests. The concepts underlying Russia’s use of the UN to promote its aspirations form the subject of this paper. Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, devotes great resources to its missions at the UN, especially New York and Geneva. It traditionally cultivates extensive expertise among its mission members, appointing them to UN postings several times over their careers and leaving them in place for long periods. Russian diplomats are noted for their abilities in drafting highly technical UN documents in English—none more so than Sergey Lavrov, currently Russia’s foreign minister and formerly its permanent representative to the UN from 1994 to 2004.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Power Politics, Law, Geopolitics, and Legitimacy
Political Geography:
Russia and United Nations

44. With Friends Like These: The Kremlin’s Far-Right and Populist Connections in Italy and Austria

Author:
Andrew Weiss
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A blend of new threats and opportunities is causing Moscow to take greater risks and embrace more flamboyant policies in Europe. The Kremlin’s relationships with Italy and Austria shine a spotlight on how Europe’s domestic troubles have opened many doors for Moscow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Populism, and Far Right
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Italy, and Austria

45. Turbulence in arms control: Open Skies Treaty became a victim of the great power competition

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Non-compliance and disputes between Russia and the US resulted in the US exiting the Open Skies Treaty. If Russia withdraws in response, European countries will lose an important source of intelligence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Intelligence, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

46. Greek-Russian Relations: A Potential to Mend Strained Ties

Author:
George Tzogopoulos
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The relationship between Greece and Russia requires a careful management following the diplomatic crisis of the 2018 summer. The visit of Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Athens offers an opportunity for a sincere dialogue between the two countries. Greece and Russia can either agree on their disagreements or search for a new way forward based on realism and common interests. A sincere dialogue should leave illusions aside and concentrate on joint interests.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Greece

47. Exploring India's Strategic Futures

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
he method of major/minor trends developed in this report suggests that the roots of apparently surprising future behavior can be found in a close reading of a target state’s history. Using this method, the report outlines three unlikely but plausible alternative futures of India as a strategic actor. The first scenario envisions India as a Hindu-nationalist revisionist power hostile to Pakistan but accommodating of China; in the second, it is a militarily risk-acceptant state that provokes dangerous crises with China; and in the third scenario, India is a staunch competitor to China that achieves some success through partnerships with other U.S. rivals like Russia and Iran. These scenarios are designed not to predict the future but to sensitize U.S. policymakers to possible strategic disruptions. They also serve to highlight risks and tensions in current policy.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, India, Asia, and North America

48. Defeating Threat Air Defences: the Return of the DEAD

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For the past two decades the US and its allies have faced a very limited surface-to-air threat in wars in which they have engaged. This is now changing as the worsening security environment and the emergence of near-peer rivals once again raises the spectre of a strongly contested air domain. A central element of the renewed challenge is the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. China and Russia have fielded and continue to develop SAM systems across all range categories – and to offer many of these for export – that pose a credible threat to air operations. The US, and to an even greater extent the Europeans, have reduced emphasis and expenditure on what is known as the suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) role. Counter-insurgency rather than counter-integrated air-defence operations have been the priority since the turn of the century. There is now, however, the renewed challenge of being able to carry out air operations in airspace defended by the latest generations of point-, short-, medium- and long-range SAM systems. Low-observable aircraft only offer a partial solution, particularly as the US and its allies will operate mixed fleets of stealthy and non-stealthy combat aircraft at least until around the middle of the century. The latter types of aircraft remain at greater risk from SAM threats than low-observable aircraft, and their operational utility will depend partly on the wider capacity to counter surface-based threat missile systems. SEAD is an asset-intensive capability, particularly in the early days of a conflict, and has traditionally involved dedicated platforms as well as fighter ground-attack aircraft. In SEAD operations in the 1990s, such as Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, up to one-third of strike missions were tasked against ground-based air defences. While the force mix will change as uninhabited systems are increasingly adopted in the inventory, a variety of crewed and uninhabited aircraft and associated weaponry will still be required for the task, and will be required in numbers greater than are available in current inventories if faced by a peer or near-peer threat. Collating what is known as an electronic order of battle against peer and near-peer rivals should once again become a priority, as should the capacity to counter, disable or destroy surface-to-air threat systems.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

49. Russia Strives for an Oil and Gas Resurgence

Author:
Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
As the global economy—animated by the arrival of multiple COVID-19 vaccines—hopes for the first signs of recovery, expectations also rise in Russia for an accompanying surge in demand for oil and natural gas and renewed prominence of energy geopolitics in foreign policy-making. President Vladimir Putin is a firm believer in hydrocarbons as the world’s main energy source and a sceptic of “green agendas,” even if Chinese President Xi Jinping has subscribed to the pledge to curtail emissions (TASS, September 30). Russia’s Energy Strategy 2035, approved in June 2020, sets ambitious goals for expanding oil and gas extraction and defines the shifts in the world markets toward carbon-neutral energy production as a major challenge (Vedomosti, May 19; see EDM, June 2). Mainstream Russian experts dismiss the European Union’s post-crisis recovery plans that include new incentives for developing zero-carbon-emission energy sources; defiantly, they project that Russian energy exports to the European market will continue to expand (Kommersant, December 3).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Oil, Natural Resources, Gas, and Economy
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

50. Russia and Iraq Deepen Energy, Military Ties

Author:
John C. K. Daly
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
As the United States hastens its drawdown of troops in Iraq before the January 20 inauguration of President-elect Joseph Biden, Russia is seeking to fill the developing geopolitical vacuum there. On November 25, following discussions in Moscow with Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, Russia’s top diplomat, Sergei Lavrov, remarked that Russian energy firms have invested billions of dollars in the Iraqi oil industry. “When it comes to energy, the largest Russian companies are working in Iraq together with their partners. These are Lukoil, Rosneft, Gazprom-Neft and Bashneft. All four have invested more than $13 billion in the Iraqi economy,” Lavrov told journalists (Interfax, November 25). He added that Moscow was also prepared to increase arms deliveries to Baghdad, stating, “We are ready to meet any Iraqi needs for Russian-made military products. Our country has traditionally played and continues to play a very important and significant role in ensuring Iraq’s defense capability and equipping its army and security forces, including in the context of continuing terrorist threats” (Mid.ru, November 25).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Iraq, Eurasia, and Middle East