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Begin New Search Topic Budget Political Geography Europe Content Type Working Paper

1. The rising cost of European Union borrowing and what to do about it

Author:
Gregory Claeys and Conor McCaffrey
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Debt issuance by the European Commission on behalf of the European Union has increased massively. Of the approximately €400 billion in outstanding EU debt as of May 2023, 85 percent has arisen from borrowing since 2020. Large-scale borrowing is expected to continue until 2026 to fund the remainder of NextGenerationEU, and concessional loans to support Ukraine. When these programmes were launched, interest rates were at historic lows – even negative for maturities below 10 years. However, interest rates rose sharply in 2022. Beyond the widespread rise in euro-denominated interest rates due to monetary tightening by the European Central Bank in response to the inflation surge, the EU has also faced a widening of the spread between its yields and those of major European issuers, including France and Germany. This widening is driven by a combination of market features, circumstantial factors and institutional features. The EU cannot affect the overall cyclical movement of interest rates and will have to learn to live with it, like sovereigns do. However, the European Commission should continue to try to narrow the spread with major European sovereigns by further developing the relevant market infrastructure and improving its issuance strategy. The Commission will not be able to do this alone. Institutional developments, including progress on the development of new own resources and a long-term substantial presence in the bond market, will be necessary to fully reap the benefits of EU borrowing. A large share of EU borrowing (around €421 billion in total by the end of 2026, in current prices) is intended to finance unprecedented non-repayable support: Recovery and Resilience Fund grants and additional funding for existing EU programmes under the EU budget. The interest costs associated with this part of the debt lie with the EU budget. Our estimates suggest that, because of the high current and expected levels of interest rates, this cost could be twice as high as what was initially estimated at the start of the EU’s 2021-27 budget cycle. As a result, because interest costs for the borrowing of the non-repayable support are accounted for under the EU budget’s ‘expenditure ceiling’, this will exert further pressure on the funding of important EU programmes, which are already affected by inflation. The EU should thus quickly review how interest costs are accounted for in its budget and financial framework.
Topic:
Debt, Budget, European Union, and European Commission
Political Geography:
Europe

2. German Economy Winter 2022: Inching through the energy crisis

Author:
Jens Boysen-Hogrefe, Dominik Groll, Nils Sonnenberg, Nils Jannsen, Stefan Kooths, Vincent Stamer, and Timo Hoffmann
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Wholesale prices for gas and electricity have fallen significantly in recent months - even though they are still at a high level. In addition, the burdens on private households and companies caused by high energy costs are to be cushioned by so-called price brakes. Overall, inflation in 2023 will be much lower at 5.4 percent than we had expected in our autumn forecast (8.7 percent). Although real disposable income and, as a result, private consumption are likely to decrease next year, the decline will be much smaller than had been expected a few months ago. As a result, we now expect a slight increase in GDP of 0.3 percent for 2023 (autumn: -0.7 percent). In 2024, GDP is expected to grow somewhat more strongly again at 1.3 percent (autumn: 1.7 percent). The labour market is robust despite the economic slowdown, partly because companies are still desperately seeking skilled workers. The public fiscal balance is likely to deteriorate significantly in 2023 due to the aid packages in response to the energy crisis and displays a deficit of around 4 percent relative to GDP. With the expiry of the aid packages, the deficit will decrease again in 2024.
Topic:
Economics, Monetary Policy, Budget, Business, Labor Market, Energy Crisis, Emerging Economies, and Advanced Economies
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

3. Multi-annual financial framework and Next Generation EU, Review of an unprecedented, tumultuous European budgetary chapter

Author:
Anne Vitrey and Sébastien Lumet
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Negotiations on the adoption of the multi-annual financial framework 2021-2027 and the "Next Generation EU" recovery fund continue. Although hope of an agreement allowing deployment from 1 January 2021 has not yet been lost, there are still many sticking points. This is illustrated by the strong tensions that have recently emerged between the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, but also between Member States, themselves reluctant to question the precarious balance of the 21 July agreement.
Topic:
Budget, European Union, Finance, and Economic Recovery
Political Geography:
Europe

4. A new look at net balances in the European Union’s next multiannual budget

Author:
Zsolt Darvas
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Whenever the European Union’s budget is discussed, much of the political focus is on net balances – whether countries pay in more than they receive – rather than on the broader overall positive effects of EU spending. The largest net contributor countries have sought to limit their contributions, leading to the build-up of an ad-hoc, complex, opaque and regressive system of revenue corrections.
Topic:
Governance, Budget, European Union, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe

5. The militarization of US foreign policy: Engagement with Europe increasingly about defense

Author:
Deborah A. McCarthy
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The US Department of Defense is playing a predominant role in US foreign policy due to expanded mandates, large budgets and the disparagement of diplomacy by the Trump Administration. Defense relations may be the steadier foundation for transatlantic cooperation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Budget, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and North America

6. Trump’s 2019 Missile Defense Budget: Choosing Capacity over Capability

Author:
Tom Karako and Wes Rumbaugh
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
President Trump’s 2019 budget request includes $12.9 billion for missile defense programs, including $9.9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency and about $3 billion in modernization in the military services, building upon the acceleration initiated in the $323 million FY 2017 Above Threshold Reprogramming and the FY 2018 Budget Amendment of $2.0 billion. The proposed budget continues the recent trend of procurement consuming a greater portion of overall missile defense spending, reflecting a choice for prioritizing near-term capacity over longer-term capability. With the exception of two new Pacific radars and a modest effort for tracking hypersonic threats, the request includes strikingly few changes to the program of record. The submission fails to address past shortfalls for more research and development of new missile defense technologies and capabilities, most significantly with its lack of real movement toward a space-based sensor layer for tracking and discrimination, as opposed to merely missile warning. Pursuit of more advanced capabilities will require substantial programmatic changes in the 2020 budget, or with a budget amendment later this year, if such capabilities are recommended by the forthcoming Missile Defense Review. On February 12, the Department of Defense (DoD) released its budget request for FY 2019, which included a total of $12.9 billion for missile defense-related activities. The proposed topline for the Missile Defense Agency comes in at $9.9 billion, comprising $2.4 billion for procurement, $6.8 billion for research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), $500 million for operations and maintenance (O&M), and $206 million for military construction (MILCON). The $9.9 billion request is a 26 percent increase from the FY 2018 budget request of $7.9 billion. Funding for ballistic missile defense within the services includes about $3 billion, largely for the procurement of Patriot Advanced Capability-3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE) and Standard Missile-6 (SM-6) interceptors. Overall, the budget reflects a near-term focus on capacity of existing programs, even at the expense of capability improvements. In its current form, the request boosts funding for all four families of interceptors. For homeland missile defense, this includes the continued improvements to the capacity and reliability of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system by continuing to deploy an additional 20 interceptors, several testing spares, and a new missile field at Fort Greely, Alaska. The request also deepens the magazines for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Aegis, and Patriot interceptors, continuing a procurement-heavy trend from last year.1 The focus on capacity does not answer the question, however, how missile defense efforts will be adapted to the new reality of great power competition described by the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy.2 One of the few new muscle movements in the entire budget is the addition of two radars in the Pacific for discriminating long-range missile threats to the homeland. The idea of a discrimination radar for Hawaii had been publicly floated over the past two years, and had previously been part of the yet-unpassed appropriations marks from the House and Senate appropriations committees. The Hawaii radar is scheduled for a 2023 deployment, with an additional radar deployed by 2024 at a yet-undisclosed location. The two radars will cost approximately $2.5 billion over the course of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). The inadequacy of the request lies not with the top line, but rather with the capabilities and strategy that the top line fails to prioritize. Although these radars would be useful to close the near-term Pacific midcourse gap against limited ballistic missile threats to the homeland, such funds must be weighed against the opportunity cost for larger improvements in capability provided by a space-based sensor layer that could provide substantially more capable birth-to-death tracking and discrimination on a more global scale and against a wider diversity of threats. The choice for capacity over capability reflects a near-term time horizon, but further delay in more advanced technologies will carry costs at a later time. In sum, the administration’s budget request for FY 2019 prioritizes near-term readiness against limited but growing ballistic missile threats from sources such as North Korea. This choice, however, falls short of connecting missile defense efforts to the reality of renewed great power competition as articulated in the National Defense Strategy. The inadequacy of the request lies not with the top line, but rather with the capabilities and strategy that the top line fails to prioritize. The 2019 request’s modesty of ambition is manifested by low funding for more advanced programs, such as boost-phase intercept, space-based sensors, and volume kill. Should the forthcoming Missile Defense Review address some of these issues and recommend programmatic changes, their implementation may have to wait until the 2020 budget, unless a budget amendment of some kind prioritizes them for the coming fiscal year.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Budget, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Asia, and North America

7. The U.S. Defense Budget in FY2019: Underlying Trends

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The report draws on a wide range of official sources and is designed to provide an overview of official reporting on major trends rather than make an independent analysis. The U.S. provides a vast amount of detail on its annual budget request for military and international affairs spending – much of it in graphic, tabular, and summary form. The material presented here is an attempt to pick the key materials to show where the U.S. is focusing its military spending, how it relates to its strategy, how major force improvements will affect U.S. capabilities, and how the U.S. is dealing with its strategic partners and potential threats. However, the user should be aware that much of the material presented is often uncertain and is not comparable from source to source. There also is no easy or single way to summarize the trends in the U.S. defense budget. The materials that go into just the unclassified portions of the Department of Defense’s annual submission of President’s budget request to Congress, and the subsequent Congressional review of that request, run well over several thousand pages. It is also critical for the reader to understand that only the portion of the report dealing with the National Defense Authorization Act (pages 24-43) represents the final result of Congressional action and the FY2019 budget signed by the President, and not all of the portions of reference action by the key Committees involved were approved in exactly the form shown in the final bill signed by the President. Much of the material is drawn from sources that precede the final Congressional markup because the Department never updates most of the tables and charts in the Department of Defense request until the following year and new budget submission. The material presented also shows that different sources define total defense spending in different ways, and include different expenditures and convert current to constant dollars in different ways. More importantly, most sources report in terms of “Budget Authority” (BA) – the total money the Congress authorizes in a given Fiscal Year that can be spent over a period of years. This is the best estimate of what the Congress is actually approving. However, some sources in terms of “Budget Outlays” (BO) – only the money that can be spent in 12-month period of that U.S. Fiscal Year. (Which begins on 1 October of the year the Congress acts upon, and ends on 30 September of the following year). This is the best way of assessing the impact of spending on how well the budget is balanced, the size of the deficit, and impact on the federal debt. Budget projections for future years present other problems. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides detailed estimates of how the President’s budget request – and the final budgets the Congress authorizes – will impact over time. Many such estimates precede Congressional action on the budget, and it then takes several months for the CBO to estimate the probable future trends in the total federal budget and impact of the final Congressionally approved levels of U.S. defense spending on that total federal budget and the U.S. GDP. This often creates major lags in official estimates of the trends in every aspect of federal spending, the budget deficit, and the national debt. More broadly, the Department of Defense has effectively abandoned any serious effort to create a program budget, and to provide a realistic estimate of the cost of the Future Year Defense Program beyond the fiscal year directly under review. It essentially rolls forward current activities and plans to make estimates of the next four years that are based on the spending levels in the budget year under review. It bases such estimates largely on input categories such as personnel, O&M, RDT&E, and procurement. The Department of Defense does not report expenditures by major mission or command. The Department defines “strategy” largely in terms of broad concepts and goals. It does not tie its “strategy” to net assessments of the balance in terms of threats and strategic partners, to specific force plans, to specific actions and schedules, to specific costs, or to measures of success and effectiveness. Unclassified reporting in “PPB” – or planning, programming, and budgeting– form has become a functional oxymoron. The Congress does hold strategy hearings and directs studies of key strategic issues, but these efforts rarely address any of the practical details of any aspect of the nature and cost of U.S. strategy. Similarly, the outyear estimates of military spending by the Department of Defense, OMB, and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) focus on a “baseline” that assumes the United States does not actually use its military forces in any operational form. The limited estimates provided for future Overseas Contingency Operations are “placeholders” and not actual estimates. This is partly inevitable given the inability to predict the future, but it creates a practical problem in a country whose civil plans call for major future increases in mandatory spending on retirement, medical case, and welfare. This means the official U.S. projections of civil spending rise relative to military spending in ways history indicates will be highly unrealistic.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Budget
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Middle East, and North America

8. European Defense Trends: Briefing Update

Author:
David J. Berteau, Gregory Sanders, T.J. Cipoletti, Meaghan Doherty, and Abby Fanlo
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The European defense market, though impacted by lethargic economic growth and painful fiscal austerity measures, continues to be a driver in global defense. Five of the fifteen biggest military spenders worldwide in 2013 were European countries, and Europe remains a major market for international arms production and sales. Surges in military spending by Russia, China, and various Middle Eastern countries in recent years has augmented the defense landscape, especially as European countries in aggregate continue to spend less on defense and the United States embarks on a series of deep-striking budget cuts. This report analyzes overall trends in defense spending, troop numbers, collaboration, and the European defense and security industrial base across 37 countries. To remain consistent with previous reports, this briefing utilizes functional NATO categories (Equipment, Personnel, Operations and Maintenance, Infrastructure, and Research and Development) and reports figures in constant 2013 euros unless otherwise noted. Many of the trends identified within the 2012 CSIS European Defense Trends report continued into 2013, namely reductions in topline defense spending, further cuts to R spending, and steadily declining troop numbers. Though total European defense spending decreased from 2001-2013, with an accelerated decline between 2008 and 2010, select countries increased spending2 between 2011 and 2013. Collaboration among European countries has decreased in the R category; however, it has increased in the equipment category – indicating increased investment in collaborative procurement. Defense expenditure as a percentage of total government expenditure has decreased across Europe from 2001-2013 with the exceptions of Albania and Estonia. An updated CSIS European Security, Defense, and Space (ESDS) Index is included within this report and exhibits a shift in geographic revenue origin for leading European defense firms away from North America and Europe and towards other major markets between 2008 and 2013. Finally, a brief analysis of Russian defense spending is included in the final section of this report in order to comprehend more fully the size and scope of the European defense market within the global framework. In 2013, Russia replaced the United Kingdom as the third largest global defense spender, devoting 11.2 percent of total government expenditures to defense. This briefing report concludes with summarized observations concerning trends in European defense from 2001 to 2013. CSIS will continue to follow and evaluate themes in European defense, which will appear in subsequent briefings.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Budget
Political Geography:
Russia, China, United Kingdom, America, and Europe

9. The Cyclically Adjusted Budget: History and Exegesis of a Fateful Estimate

Author:
Orsola Costantini
Publication Date:
10-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET)
Abstract:
This paper traces the evolution of the concept of the cyclically adjusted budget from the 1930s to the present. The idea of balancing the budget over the cycle was first conceived in Sweden in the 1930s by the economists of the Stockholm School and was soon reinterpreted and incorporated into the fiscal program of the American political coalition supporting the New Deal, especially by the Committee for Economic Development during and after World War II. In the 1960s, Keynesian economists associated with the Kennedy and Johnson administrations reformulated the notion. Despite their claims at the time, their version differed only in degree from the earlier CED approach, the transformation being largely conditioned by changing political circumstances. In the 1980s, however, the concept changed substantially. Methods for calculating it transformed dramatically, as the notion became a device to limit and direct governments’ fiscal policies in a wide sense, that is, including institutional (or “structural”) reforms. The final section of the paper considers the shifting uses of the notion in the European Growth and Stability Pact.
Topic:
Economics, Budget, Economic Growth, and Fiscal Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

10. Digital Single Market. SMEs and the Juncker Investment Plan for the European Union

Author:
Juan Antonio Pavón Losada
Publication Date:
04-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
A few months ago (25/11/2014), the European Commission disclosed the mechanism for its much-heralded €315 billion investment plan, revealing how a a scarce €21 billion of initial public money is intended to lift fifteen times as much in capital. In March 2015, EU finance ministers agreed upon delivering on the commitment they took at the European Councils in October and December 2014, to wind-off Juncker's flagship investment plan. The idea was to create a new European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), with €5 billion coming from the European Investment Bank and an €8 billion guarantee from existing EU funds designed to secure a further contribution of 16 billion Euro from the institutions. The €8 billion guarantee will come over a three-year period from the Connecting Europe Facility (€3.3 billion); Europe’s research programme Horizon 2020 (€2.7 billion) and socalled “budget margin”, or unused funds, worth €2 billion. On the one hand, the EFSI plans to generate investments into the European economy of about €315 billion, by providing guarantees for higher-risk projects which aim at developing telecommunications and transport infrastructure, energy efficiency projects, research, education and innovation activities to finally generating about 240 billion in long-term investments, showing a timid responsiveness for the claims against austerity over the past years. On the other hand, the alternative purpose of the Fund is to provide financing to SMEs to enhance the viability of new venture capital injections, loan guarantees, securitisations and seed financing designed to offer micro-loans to SMEs, to fund start-ups or offer mid-cap companies venture capital, projected to generate €75 billion for those SMEs and mid-cap firms over the period 2015-2017. In addition, the Commission aims to attract private investors to the Fund. Nevertheless, private investors seem sceptical about investing and assuming greater risks when the returns are not guaranteed. In fact, the basis for most longterm infrastructure or energy efficiency projects will most likely remain public funding -his is especially true of the newer EU member states, where the private sector is not strong enough-. In fact, the EU executive believes that more financing can be provided by individual member states. Two ways are being discussed: Capital contributions, which are not limited to the respective Member State and may entail voting rights and a claim on the fund´s return (if any); and that participation in investment platforms that can be restricted to the Member State itself. As an incentive, this amount will be then discounted from the calculations of their deficits within the European Semester. There is a rising concern between Member States that the new fund will turn into a parallel EU budget -where voting rights could be purchased- not subject to enough democratic control, since this is fund is expected to be managed by Commission and the EIB and. In order to prevent such situation, the Commission has announced that the fund will not consider to make investments on the basis of geographical distribution, but rather based on quality and viability. This may convince member states who fear the introduction of a parallel budget, but it might also raise problems of transparency and for those countries who wish to contribute voluntarily to the EFSI. Several alternatives to the current functioning of the EFSI -that still need to pass the European Parliament filter- has been tabled: e.g. the possibility that the EFSI regulation could establish mandatory national contributions in order to increase the credibility of the ratio 1:15; also, transforming the fund into a permanent financing system with legal personality, so it could access financial markets for funding; and that but not least, turning the EIB's contribution to EFSI into a regularly one rather a one-off, as it has been agreed so far. In any case -often accused of relying on leverage private investment unrealistic projections, lacking ambition, means and clear goals- this Juncker's investment plan goes along with several batteries of measures seeking to facilitate a boost in business activity, removing the obstacles hampering private investment in Europe.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Budget, European Union, and Investment
Political Geography:
Europe and Brussels