Content Type: Working Paper / Political Geography: Europe / Publication Year: within 25 Years and within 5 Years / Topic: Defense Policy

1. What would Europeans want a European defence union to look like?

Author:: Francesco Nicoli, Brian Burgoon, and David Van der Duin
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Bruegel
Abstract:: While the Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a new momentum for EU defence integration, the political feasibility of such integration remains disputed, as it may entail both additional financial costs and a loss of sovereignty. Furthermore, design of defence integration is inherently multidimensional, differing in terms of scope and level, governance and sources of financing, among other dimensions. To determine the extent of public support for European security cooperation, we conducted the first conjoint experiment ever fielded on public support for alternative defence union designs. We carried out a pre-registered, randomised conjoint experiment on a highly representative sample of the French, German, Italian, Dutch and Spanish populations in November 2022. This multidimensional conjoint experiment allows us to determine the causal link between policy features of potential defence pacts, and public support or opposition to such policy. Our results show that policy packages receiving the most support require joint EU-level governance, joint purchases of military equipment through joint procurement, and repurposing of existing national expenditure as the preferred form of financing. All in all, our results show not only that there is considerable cross-border support for defence integration in Western Europe, but also that citizens in different Western European countries have generally aligned preferences regarding the actual design of such policy, indicating that a compromise policy is feasible and publicly supported. Furthermore, our results support ongoing research on the nature of European solidarity at times of crisis, suggesting that European citizens are willing to support the creation of joint institutions and policies to face issues of common concern, and therefore indicating that major crises open important windows of opportunity to re-shape EU-level policies and institutions.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Governance, European Union, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Europe

2. NATO in the North: The emerging division of labour in Northern European security

Author:: Matti Pesu
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Russian war of aggression has rendered Northern Europe an increasingly significant region for Euro-Atlantic security. A stable and secure Northern Europe is a critical precondition for a safe and stable Euro-Atlantic region. The alliance should treat Northern Europe as a strategic whole although the different subareas of Northern Europe have their distinctive security dynamics and concerns. NATO is currently improving its deterrence and defence posture. It is simultaneously shifting its military strategy from a model of deterrence by reinforcement to one of deterrence by denial. NATO’s evolving posture and strategy in Northern Europe should be underpinned by a more explicit division of labour. The regional allies and stakeholders can be divided into four categories in terms of their role in regional security: frontline nations, hubs, security providers and the ultimate security guarantor. The regional frontline nations include the Baltic states, Finland and Poland, which can also play a role as hubs and even security providers along with the United Kingdom and Germany. Denmark, Sweden and Norway are first and foremost hubs. The United States remains the ultimate security guarantor of the area.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, Nordic Nations, Arctic, and Baltic Sea

3. The Greek Defence Sector: Turning the Page?

Author:: Antonis Kamaras
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: From the 1980s to the 2000s, Greece’s defence industry was mismanaged and failed to utilize Greece’s high defence expenditures to become innovative. The impact of Greece’s fiscal crisis and the subsequent expansion of the Turkish threat mean that both economics and geopolitics now favour an invigorated Greek defence sector. The first major weapons procurement programme since the end of Greece’s fiscal crisis has not meaningfully involved the Greek defence sector. Yet the sector’s future prospects have improved, assured by the need for the sector to be financially viable and internationally competitive and by the broader awareness of the defence sector as a building block in national defence. The EU’s growing role in Europe’s collective defence, driven by continent-wide geopolitical developments and industrial imperatives, will also boost the prospects of the Greek defence sector. Mutually reinforcing obstacles still hamper the Greek defence sector’s progress: (a) a polity which privileges distribution over capital investments in its fiscal choices, and (b) an officer corps which lacks the degree of autonomy to co-create novel defence solutions together with the Greek defence sector. Despite these obstacles, the ongoing Turkish threat engenders national insecurity within Greece to such an extent that it can drive the sustainable growth of the Greek defence sector.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Geopolitics, Innovation, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: Europe, Turkey, and Greece

4. Charting a Transatlantic Approach to Russia: A Working Paper of the Transatlantic Forum on Russia

Author:: Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Although the United States and Europe are not directly engaged in the war with Russia in Ukraine, Moscow clearly sees itself as being at war with the West. The United States and Europe, therefore, must be prepared for a period of what is likely to be prolonged confrontation with Russia, with the war for Ukraine at the center of that confrontation. Successfully navigating this period of sustained confrontation requires continued cohesion and coordination between the United States and Europe to ensure they share a common picture of the challenge that Russia poses and the necessary response. Russia’s war in Ukraine has precipitated rapid and major changes in Europe and broader ripple effects that are altering political dynamics much farther afield. Because of the war in Ukraine, Russia itself is changing in still unknowable ways. Russian President Vladimir Putin is taking the country in a more authoritarian direction, Russian society is shifting, and the Russian military’s degradation in Ukraine means that the nature of the Russian threat is evolving. Russia’s war, therefore, requires the allies to re-examine long-held assumptions and understandings about Russia and its intentions and capacity, and it is those updated assessments that should guide the transatlantic partners’ future policy approach toward Moscow. There is no going back to the way things were with Russia prior to its invasion of Ukraine. Instead, Western allies must build on ongoing efforts to constrict and constrain the Kremlin’s ability to sustain aggression in Ukraine and more broadly beyond Russia’s borders. It also will require the development of a long-term and sustainable approach to restoring peace and stability to Europe, increasing resilience to the Kremlin’s tools and tactics, and planting the seeds for a less confrontational relationship with a future Russia. In many ways, such an approach will resemble the containment strategy first set out in the 1940s, a strategy designed to apply steady and forceful counterpressure to a regime whose paranoia and insecurities represented a clear danger to the West, just as the Putin regime does today. Each of the transatlantic allies’ preferred policy approaches will reflect their own proximity to and history with Russia, as well as current political realities within their own borders. Nonetheless, there is broad consensus within the alliance that the unprecedented cohesion and coordination among allies in the wake of Russia’s invasion must hold. To that end, this working paper provides a starting point for the development of a transatlantic approach to Russia. It articulates expectations for relations with Russia that should guide the allies’ approach, outlines the broad objectives that a transatlantic Russia policy should seek to accomplish, and in some cases more specific near-term actions the allies can take. The analysis reflects two years of dialogue that CNAS has conducted through its Transatlantic Forum on Russia (TFR). It brings together and builds on previous work facilitated by the Forum, including policy papers, op-eds, articles, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony, “What Comes Next for U.S. Policy Toward Russia,” and other cited publications.1 The paper aims to provide fodder for policymakers and experts on both side of the Atlantic to debate and refine through continued dialogue, including through the future work of the TFR.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Transatlantic Relations, Dialogue, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

5. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: One Year On

Author:: LSE Ideas
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: This Strategic Update summarises a roundtable discussion held at LSE IDEAS in July 2023. Contributors to the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Stuart Austin, Professor Gordon Barrass, Professor Christopher Coker, Tom McKane, Hugh Sandeman, Susan Scholefield, and Peter Watkins. None of the content of the Strategic Update is attributable to any one individual. One year on from NATO’s Madrid 2022 summit, this Strategic Update address the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept and its implications for the future, especially regarding Russia’s war on Ukraine. The paper addresses the misalignment between preparations for defence and the real state of its armed forces, the UK’s symbolic support for Ukraine versus its capability, the concepts of resilience and deterrence, and finally the future of NATO’s relationship with Russia.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

6. The EU and the Transformed Nuclear Context since the War in Ukraine

Author:: Clara Portela
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces in February 2022 has entirely transformed the European security landscape, bringing war to the European Union’s doorstep. Importantly, the war features a nuclear dimension that manifests itself in consequential ways, including Moscow’s nuclear sabre-rattling and its denunciation of the last surviving nuclear arms control treaty. This unleashed intriguing reactions, like a surprisingly tough resort to sanctions by the EU, or the shrinking of neutrality on the continent. However, while support for nuclear deterrence has increased in some NATO countries, support for arms control remains strong too. Meanwhile, nuclear disarmament advocates have not shifted their stance as a result of the crisis.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, European Union, Nonproliferation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

7. Europe after Putin’s War: EU Foreign and Defence Policy in the new European security architecture

Author:: George Pagoulatos and Spyros Blavoukos
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a game changer for Europe and the global system and a call for the EU to emerge as a coherent security actor. Any EU discussion about an autonomous EU military capacity becomes irrelevant in the face of a systemic global security challenge, such as Russia, which cannot be dealt with through the existing or envisaged EU military instruments. Faced with a security challenge on a global scale, NATO remains the only game in town. The EU ambition of developing its strategic autonomy becomes practically meaningful only within the transatlantic alliance. EU member-states should take advantage of the existing clauses that enable significant steps to be taken towards foreign and security integration. The existing Treaty framework provides legal space for significant advances in the field of foreign and security integration, even though all relevant Treaty Articles contain strong ‘brakes’ which enable member-states to retain control of the process. Enhanced cooperation in EU foreign and security policy remains an important way forward, even though there are significant safety clauses. The ‘mutual defence’ or ‘mutual assistance’ clause (Article 42(7) of TEU) and the ‘solidarity clause’ (Article 222 of TFEU) are the closest things the EU has to security guarantees. Adding teeth to 42(7) should be an EU priority. Supporting EU ‘coalitions of the willing’ (Article 44 of TEU) also provides the opportunity for swifter military action under the EU aegis. The modality of cooperation between such coalitions and the EU rapid deployment capacity, which is also envisaged in the Strategic Compass and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), has still to be worked out. Transition to qualified majority voting (QMV) in EU foreign policy decision-making presents both advantages and disadvantages, both from the standpoint of the EU and of the dissenting member states. The EU cannot become a credible global power if it cannot reach collective decisions on EU foreign and security policy. Moving towards QMV would address structural weaknesses and serve the objective of European sovereignty. However, smaller member-states need a strong and explicit reassurance that they can always use the existing emergency brakes when they consider an issue which is to be decided on by QMV to be a matter of national security. Transition to QMV should be the result of the gradual forging of a common foreign policy understanding on the major security challenges facing the EU. Human rights issues and sanctions are a good place to start when building momentum towards QMV. In the meanwhile, the current reform effort should be focused on investing in the institutional framework of EU foreign and security policy and making good use of existing instruments.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, Vladimir Putin, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe

8. NATO’s Resilience: The first and last line of defence

Author:: Johnny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: Ahead of NATO’s Madrid Summit in June 2022, Hugh Sandeman and Jonny Hall confront the political challenges posed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the alliance’s 2021 Strengthened Resilience Commitment, especially in creating collective standards when resilience remains the responsibility of individual member states. The authors find that resilience is a psychological mindset as well as a material factor, and NATO’s ‘whole-of-society’ approach should be framed within the concept of ‘deterrence by denial’ to potential threats. This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in January 2022 on ‘How can NATO define and develop practical objectives for enhancing the resilience of member states?’ Participants in the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Dr Tomas Ries, Susan Scholefield, Peter Watkins, Professor Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Professor Christopher Coker, and Tom McKane. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

9. What the First Week of Fighting in Ukraine Tells Us About a Potential Insurgency

Author:: Alec Worsnop
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: While the Russian advance in Ukraine has been slower than expected, its overwhelming conventional superiority gives it the upper hand. Despite the valiant resistance of many Ukrainians, Russia will probably conquer all or a portion of the country. However, the first week of the conflict has provided some useful information about the prospects for an insurgent campaign in the wake of a Russian occupation.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

10. The New Wave of Defensive Trade Policy Measures in the European Union: Design, Structure, and Trade Effects

Author:: Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, Vanika Sharma, and Renata Zilli
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:: This study undertakes a comprehensive review of proposed and adopted defensive trade policy instruments in the EU, with the purpose of better understanding their design, functioning, and implications. The study covers eight policy instruments at different stages of development. These are: Anti-Coercion Instrument (ACI), International Procurement Instrument (IPI), Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), Foreign Subsidy Instrument (FSI), Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence (DD), Level Playing Field Provisions in the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (LPF), Enforcement Regulation (ER), and the Deforestation Initiative (DI). It is understandable that the EU seeks both redressive and retaliatory measures in its trade policy. However, these measures would have the total effect of Europe producing more for itself and being less dependent on imports. This is a significant policy shift, because in their totality the defensive trade policies make the EU more inward-looking. This can lead to major negative consequences. An extensive distortion of trade and markets would reduce the gains from trade and prompt a reallocation of European resources. Notably, the EU is a larger supplier of goods and services than it is a buyer, and an inward-looking policy that leads to retaliation from EU’s trading partners can harm its exports and trade surplus. There are also potential strategic consequences that could follow, and their importance has increased considerable as a result of the Russian war against Ukraine. Under these measures, the EU could introduce new trade frictions with friends and allies, and with countries that the EU seeks closer cooperation with to provide for a safer geopolitical environment. For each of these defensive measures, the study takes an extensive look at the objectives of the instruments, their legality, proportionality, and subsidiarity, the working of the instruments and the division of labour between institutions, as well as their enforceability in conjunction with existing multilateral and bilateral rules affecting the EU. It also attempts to capture the impact and potential for retaliation for the EU and its partners as a result of the implementation of the instruments. The study highlights the areas where the instruments lack clarity, particularly in the implementation of the instrument, the division of labour between the EU and EU member states, and the compliance of the instruments with WTO rules and bilateral FTA provisions. The instruments share some general characteristics. Many of the instruments have been created as retaliatory measures against coercion and unfair trade practices by partner countries. Very often, the partner countries most affected by the instruments are also the same. The United States, China, Russia, the UK, and Turkey are likely to be on the receiving end of the instruments due to the significant volumes of trade and economic interdependence with the EU, but also because they either do not follow the same trade rules as the EU, or the EU wants to maintain with them the current level of competitiveness. Most instruments also use restrictions to the EU market as the main policy lever. The objective is not just about creating an equal playing field but also ensuring that the rest of the world follows EU rules. Particularly, the EU aims at regulating non-EU companies directly and unilaterally through EU policies, which increases the risk of retaliation against the EU. At the same time, there are also important areas of departure in the specifics of each instrument, as illustrated by the varying objectives, measures, compatibility with international obligation, affected sectors, and whether the measures apply automatically or at the discretion of the EU.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Political Economy, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: Europe

11. Policy Paper: Considerations of condemnation and balance of Palestine’s position on the war in Ukraine

Author:: Palthink
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:: In classic wars, we waited for the military result, and then we formed a political response. In new wars, there is not a final resolution; there is only the stronger party imposing its conditions. Additionally, there is also geographical control, regime projection, or behavior modification goals. Russia is seeking to maintain its national security and enhance its regional and international position. It has a deep fear that NATO will expand, bringing weapons to its border with Ukraine. Now that the first shock of the war has receded, the world realizes that the war will not exceed Ukraine’s borders. Russia has given indications that it will limit itself to the minimum that preserves its national security by preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. Global concern about the consequences of war is high. People are wondering if it will continue or stop. Additionally, sanctions have been announced. In this context, developing and poor countries are affected by conflict because they depend on foreign aid. Their positions on the war will determine where they are positioned, and how the political, economic and security consequences will affect them. Trying to show a neutral position would not endear them to the great powers. On the face of it, it may seem to be a war fought on Ukrainian lands only, but it is a world war of influence. The survival of developing nations depends on the strength of the international community and the extent to which it supports these nations in the light of political realism, not because of their strength and resources. Many places cannot survive without traditional international support.
Topic:: International Relations, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Palestine

12. The Implications of the Ukraine War for Israel

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: For Israel, this is evidence that its self-reliance doctrine must be nourished with no illusions about foreign support in times of crisis. Moreover, Turkey probably sees NATO more positively since it borders Russia, pushing Ankara toward the West.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

13. Japan and the War in Ukraine

Author:: Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Two weeks after the war began, Japan announced that its new National Security Strategy scheduled to be published this year would recategorize Russia from “partner” to “security challenge,” thus placing it alongside China and North Korea.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Japan, China, Europe, and Asia

14. British Pugwash Note on the Absence of Sole Purpose in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept

Author:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:: In June 2022 NATO members adopted an updated Strategic Concept (the preceding Concept having been adopted in 2010). There was reason to hope that in the updated Concept NATO members would envisage using nuclear weapons only in response to their first use by a nuclear-armed adversary. That reason lay in remarks made by President Biden when he was Barack Obama’s Vice-President. Notably in January 2017 he said: “Given our non-nuclear capacities and the nature of today´s threats, it is hard to envision a plausible scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary or would make sense; deterring, and, if necessary, retaliating against a nuclear attack should be the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal”. The adoption of Sole Purpose would be a useful nuclear risk reduction measure. Leaving open the option of using nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack on NATO entails the risk of nuclear escalation if the attacker is nuclear armed; and nuclear escalation entails the risk of global nuclear annihilation.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

15. Russia’s threat against the Jewish Agency is a Bargaining Measure

Author:: Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Israel should prepare for a prolonged crisis. The Russians might want to delay or accelerate the legal process to exploit the elections period. The verdict will not constitute the final word. The government is advised to navigate the crisis behind the scenes: publicity might accelerate escalation.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Israel, and North America

16. Ukraine War Distracts US from China, Legitimizes Nuclear Bombs

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is distracting the US from the Chinese threat and erodes the nuclear taboo.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, Rivalry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, North America, and United States of America

17. It is in America’s Interest to End the War in Ukraine

Author:: Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:: 12-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Continuing the war harms the West and endangers its battle to attain other critical strategic objectives.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

18. The Ukrainian Civil Front – An Interim Assessment

Author:: Meir Elran, Uri Bar-Yosef, and Zvi Magen
Publication Date:: 04-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Most of Ukraine’s civilian population demonstrates a high degree of steadfastness during the war, rallying around the flag – and around the president. Nonetheless, the challenge to Ukrainian national resilience remains high, given the huge waves of migration, the losses in the hinterland, and the severe damage to national infrastructure and the local economy – which could have decisive effects on Ukraine’s ability to recover from the war
Topic:: Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

19. Intelligence and the War in Ukraine: The Limited Power of Public Disclosure

Author:: Ofek Reimer
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Months before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West began to disclose intelligence material on Putin’s plans – thereby using a policy tool that brings with it both advantages and risks. What did the intelligence disclosures achieve, and what might Israel learn from this experience?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Intelligence, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

20. Is Ukraine Poised to Join NATO and the European Union?

Author:: Oden Eran and Shimon Stein
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:: Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there are more and more voices in the West calling for Kiev’s acceptance into NATO and the European Union. However, this is not the time for rapid measures. Now that Putin has backed himself int a corner, the United States and Europe, in parallel with the harsh sanctions imposed on Russia and the assistance to Ukraine, must leave Moscow a way out
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe, Ukraine, and North America

21. The ‘Magnificent Seven’ of European Defence Integration

Author:: Spyros Blavoukos and Panos Politis-Lamprou
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:: Defence cooperation in the EU is growing, reflecting the European citizens’ view of the EU as a security enhancer. This policy paper takes stock of current developments and analyses the positions of seven EU member-states on defence integration (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, Portugal, and Greece). The ‘Magnificent Seven’ are key players in this process, not least because of their large defence budgets and their engagement in the existing forms of cooperation. We examine the defence budget of the seven countries and their breakdown, as well as their participation in Battlegroups, EU military operations and missions, and PESCO projects. The analysis provides significant insights on the national defence priorities. The seven countries form overlapping clusters, according to their political status and aspirations in the European integration process, their economic condition, their geographical location, and their relations with the US and NATO. All of them are facing significant dilemmas and engage in subtle balancing acts, which explains the slow and arduous path of European defence integration.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:: Europe, Greece, France, Poland, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Portugal

22. Unlocking European Defence. In Search of the Long Overdue Paradigm Shift

Author:: Arnout Molenaar
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The European Union’s range of new EU security and defence initiatives are ground-breaking, but they can only deliver on their potential if member states shift the paradigm towards truly thinking, acting and working together as Europeans, based on a strategic consensus regarding the future of European defence in the changing global context. The new Strategic Compass, to be adopted by the Council in early 2022, provides a framework to develop such a shared vision. It should help to operationalise the EU’s strategic autonomy in concrete terms, in mutual reinforcement and coherence with NATO, while seizing the opportunity to strike a new transatlantic bargain with the Biden Administration. In this context, the Union should agree on concrete steps forward to become a more active security provider abroad, reinforce its resilience and protection at home, enhance its operational readiness for different scenarios, and develop new capabilities through deeper cooperation while stepping up its cooperation with partners.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

23. Opportunities for Danish stabilisation policy to engage with climate- and livelihood-related conflict: New approaches to fragility in the Horn of Africa and Sahel

Author:: Peer Schouten
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: The Horn of Africa and the Sahel are among the most fragile regions in the world: poor, lacking basic infrastructure and state presence across much of their respective territories, and both form hotbeds of conflict and political instability compounded by climate change. This DIIS Working Paper focuses on identifying evolving notions of fragility that could strengthen Danish stabilisation efforts in the Horn and Sahel. It foregrounds notions of fragility that move away from a focus on strong state institutions towards the adaptive capacities of populations in the hinterlands of the Horn and the Sahel to deal with conflict and climate variability. The paper gives an overview of this rapidly evolving field and distils key insights, challenges and future options by exploring the question, how can we support people in the Sahel and Horn to re-establish their responsibility for their respective territories and the management of their natural resources? The paper addresses this question by exploring the implications of recent climate change and livelihoods research on how we approach fragility and, by extension, stabilisation. On the basis of such research, the Working Paper advocates a move away from a sector-based understanding of fragility towards a way of working that is more in line with contextual realities, alongside the ‘comprehensive approach’ to stabilisation that Denmark promotes. The key message is that, programmatically, Danish stabilisation efforts across both regions could benefit from a more explicit focus on supporting the variability that dominant livelihood strategies require and that need to be considered if sustainable security and development outcomes are to be achieved. Failing to do this will only serve to marginalise key communities and may drive them further into the arms of radical groups.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Democratization, Development, Environment, Radicalization, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, and Justice
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Denmark, and Horn of Africa

24. Europe’s Missile Defence and Italy: Capabilities and Cooperation

Author:: Alessandro Marrone and Karolina Muti
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Europe’s missile defence is structurally linked to NATO deterrence and defence architecture, and it has to face both a worsened international security environment and an accelerating, worldwide technological innovation. Russia and China are heavily investing in new hypersonic systems which dramatically decrease the time needed to reach the target by flying mostly within the atmosphere. The US remains a global leader in the development and deployment of missile defence capabilities, including the Aegis systems which represent the cornerstone of NATO integrate air and missile defence covering the Old Continent. European countries are increasingly collaborating within the EU framework on the related capability development, primarily via the TWISTER project under the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSCo). Being exposed to missile threats from Middle East and North Africa and participating to allied nuclear sharing, Italy has a primary interest in upgrading its military capabilities through PeSCo, maintaining them fully integrated within NATO, and involving the national defence industry in cutting-edge procurement programmes.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Science and Technology, and European Union
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, France, Poland, Germany, Italy, North America, and United States of America

25. Cyber Defence in NATO Countries: Comparing Models

Author:: Alessandro Marrone and Ester Sabatino
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In 2016 NATO recognised cyber as a domain comparable to the air, land and sea ones, in consideration of the growing number of cyberattacks and of their negative impact on the cyberspace, as well as on the “real world”. Both NATO and its member states have launched initiatives to better tackle the cyber challenge both operationally and in terms of capability development. Nevertheless, among major NATO’s members a common approach to cyber defence is still missing, thus generating a division among countries that pursue a more active defence – US, UK and France – and those that prefer a more defensive approach – Germany and Spain.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, National Security, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:: United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, Spain, and United States of America

26. The EU’s Defense Ambitions: Understanding the Emergence of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Complex

Author:: Raluca Csernatoni
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Is the European Union (EU) about to rise as a defense technological actor on the world stage? According to conventional wisdom, attempts at greater European integration in security and defense were not likely to amount to much, given that such policy fields have long been considered the reserved domain of the EU member states or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This working paper goes beyond this traditional state-centered approach by looking at past and recent institutional efforts to consolidate European security and cooperation on defense industry and technology. Such efforts have continued despite the disruptions caused by the coronavirus pandemic, owing to the bloc’s willingness to become a stronger security and defense actor on the global stage. The timing of this shift was facilitated by a set of circumstances that triggered a new European defense momentum. Contributing factors include the geopolitical pressures of Brexit, an unreliable transatlantic partner in the United States, concerns within European defense industries regarding dwindling national defense budgets and fierce global technological competition in high technology areas, and the European Commission’s growing supranational role in security and defense. This impetus was also facilitated by the privileged relationship between various EU institutions, European defense industrial actors, transnational interest and lobby groups, and organized expert bodies. In this respect, the defense industry and high-level expert and interest groups have occupied a central position in shaping EU policy processes, funding priorities, and security and defense research programs. Such a rapprochement between EU institutional structures and the European defense industry has allowed for the emergence of a so-called European defense technological and industrial complex (EDTIC). This European defense industrial ecosystem encompasses a wider variety of transnational actors beyond the political, military, and industrial groups typically present in national military-industrial complexes. It presents a dense, multilevel network of EU institutions and agencies; security and industrial stakeholders; national public authorities; and interest and expert groups, all of which both compete and cooperate to shape and set policy agendas. However, this rapprochement is also characterized by the absence of strong democratic control mechanisms and little political and public accountability concerning the surge in and direction of the European defense technological and industrial integration process. These transformations have the potential to make the union a more capable and strategically autonomous global defense technological actor. At the same time, they challenge existing EU democratic governance structures and processes. The EU’s security and defense policies remain tough areas for parliamentary scrutiny and democratic oversight. The EU’s policymaking institutional machinery has been finely tuned to mediate power, keep things as technical and bureaucratic as possible, and to create package deals for certain defense industrial interests and member states’ political agendas. Yet, for real European integration in the field of security and defense, more political and democratic trust is needed across the continent.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe

27. Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation: What history suggests about future scenarios

Author:: Charly Salonius-Pasternak
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden has a history that far predates the most recent ‘reignition’ of 2014, and is now deeper than at any time in the past. In 2020, Sweden and Finland can contribute to each other’s defence in an integrated and planned fashion; but any plans are best viewed as being supplementary to national preparations. While the security interests of Finland and Sweden have overlapped historically, cooperation has often been limited due to a combination of domestic drivers and foreign pressures, as well as the nature of the international security system. Yet these same variables are currently permitting even deeper cooperation. Four future paths of cooperation are identifiable, with the most likely being a continuation of bilateral deepening, with added trilateral cooperation with Norway and the United States.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, Finland, Sweden, and Scandinavia

28. The deepening Finnish-Swedish security and defence relationship: From operative cooperation to ‘strategic interoperability’?

Author:: Matti Pesu and Tuomas Iso-Markku
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation has taken significant steps. Currently, the two countries engage in operative planning, which constitutes a significant part of their new cooperation agenda. Although interoperability between the Finnish and Swedish armed forces is crucial for the bilateral defence relationship, the countries should be ‘interoperable’ at the strategic level as well. Neither Finland’s and Sweden’s strategic cultures nor their decision-making systems or legislation are entirely similar. However, military non-alignment, similar threat perceptions and a shared assessment of their security environment facilitate their cooperation. In view of the future, questions remain about the two countries’ readiness to enter mutual defence commitments. There is also a need to ensure that their basic messages concerning the bilateral defence relationship are aligned. Over the longer term, the idea that one’s neighbour is worth defending should be entrenched in the strategic cultures of both states. This requires active nurturing of the already close relations between their national security communities.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe, Finland, Sweden, and Scandinavia

29. Finnish foreign policy during EU membership: Unlocking the EU’s security potential

Author:: Matti Pesu, Tuomas Iso-Markku, and Juha Jokela
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: This FIIA Finnish Foreign Policy Paper looks at the evolution of Finnish foreign and security policy during the country’s 25 years as an EU member. The paper aims to trace how – and with what kind of consequences – Finnish foreign and security policy has interacted with EU foreign policy during the membership period. More specifically, the study examines the interlinkage between Finnish and EU foreign policy in relation to three different topics: the policy towards and relations with Russia, security and defence, and Finland’s broadening international agenda. The paper argues that the Finnish policy vis-à-vis the three domains is marked by different patterns of continuity and change. However, the rise of a protective agenda in the Finnish policy towards Russia, Finland’s increased boldness in advancing the EU’s security and defence dimension, and the recent emphasis on the Union’s role as a bulwark against geo-economic threats all indicate that the EU’s role in enhancing Finnish security has become a top priority. Indeed, Finland is currently endeavouring to unlock the EU’s potential as a security community.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Finland, and Scandinavia

30. Government reports on Finnish foreign and security policy: Relevant but not without problems

Author:: Henri Vanhanen
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The government reports on foreign and security policy have become a well-established and recognized practice in which the Government of Finland issues a report generally once during the parliamentary term. The reports can be regarded as comprehensive and strategic documents, whose purpose is to signal the strategic directions of Finland’s present and future policy for both domestic and foreign readers. Regardless of the government reports’ institutionalized role in Finnish foreign and security policy practices, they are not without problems. The main issue with the current report process is linked to the quickly changing operational environment. Thus, a more frequent process such as an annual announcement on foreign and security policy to support the government reports should be considered. It is relevant to ask whether the current tradition of producing reports is the most effective way to outline or signal Finland’s overall foreign and security policy. In order to address the issues of the reporting process, alternative methods to support and evaluate Finland’s foreign and security policy should be considered.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, Finland, and Scandinavia

31. Will a European Security Council Bring Strategic Relevance?

Author:: Jo Coelmont
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Europe is looking to be a global player rather than just a global playground. To achieve this, it needs a security council. This is essential for gaining strategic relevance. Europe needs to have recourse not only to international fora but also to a series of instruments of hard and soft power. Swift decision making at the appropriate level is of paramount importance. Such a security council should meet a number of requirements: it must be representative, be able to both achieve unity of vision and undertake action smoothly, and keep going until the desired end-state has been achieved. Several proposals have been made as to the composition of such a body. I will look into the four most discussed options. Are we spoilt for choice?
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

32. Biowar next? Security implications of the coronavirus

Author:: Karsten Friis
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: LSE IDEAS
Abstract:: What are the possible short-, medium- and long-term implications of the coronavirus for global security and defence? In this Strategic Update, Karsten Friis investigates the pandemic's potential consequences for the world, its armed forces, the integration of Europe, US-China relations, as well as the concept and practice of 'war' more broadly. Although much remains uncertain, the disruptions which are beginning to emerge demand a reckoning with a changed world -- and world order.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, War, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, Europe, and United States of America

33. Dealing with Russia: Towards a Coherent Belgian Policy

Author:: Alexander Mattelaer and Laura Vansina
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Belgo-Russian relations are mired in paradox. For several years, the relationship between the Russian Federation on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the other has been characterized by mistrust. As a founding member of these multilateral organisations, Belgium has been a full part of the decision-making process that has formulated a hardening stance towards the Russian Federation. Yet on a bilateral level, Belgium has pragmatically upheld what is left of commercial cooperation and cultural exchanges. In order to deal with this paradox, Belgium should formulate a more coherent approach towards Russia that focuses on upholding the European order and security whilst maintaining dialogue and engaging the Russian Federation. This requires the new Belgian government to engage in a delicate balancing act that can be articulated in the forthcoming National Security Strategy, in the Belgian positions in the EU and NATO, and in the bilateral relationship with Moscow. This Egmont Paper aspires to provide both analytical background and novel ideas which can be used to such a purpose. When analysing Russian foreign policy, it can only be acknowledged that the annex- ation of Crimea in 2014 fundamentally challenged the rules-based international order. Yet to understand Russian behaviour, it is imperative to reach back in time to the late 1990s and early 2000s. Ever since, Russia’s main goal on the international stage has been the re-establishment of its Great Power status. To this end, it has sought to consolidate security buffers in the form of geographical and psychological depth. Most notably, it involved the promotion of the ‘Russian World’ (Russkiy Mir), the conduct of operations in the grey zone between war and peace, and a fair dose of strategic opportunism. Whilst perhaps understandable, this assertive foreign policy has negatively affected Belgian interests in a variety of ways. Belgo-Russian relations constitute a true kaleidoscope ranging from cooperation to conflict. Bilateral trade has largely recovered from the 2014-2015 shock resulting from the sanctions regime – even if the trade balance remains a negative one. Cultural and academic exchanges continue, in line with the little-known 1993 Belgo- Russian Treaty on Understanding and Cooperation. Yet politically, conflict has been on the increase. Russia has been actively challenging and contesting the multilateral framework that Belgium holds dear. In addition, Belgium has become the target of Russian disinformation and other grey zone operations. As it is unlikely that Russia will tone down its assertive foreign policy anytime soon, Belgium would do well to articulate a more coherent approach. This needs to clarify Belgian policy priorities, communicate Belgian positions towards the Russian government, and educate the domestic audience about the evolving relationship with the Russian Federation.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Belgium

34. Belgium Should Not Change Strategy on Her Contribution to NATO's Nuclear Role Sharing

Author:: Didier Audenaert
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: In this policy brief, the author focusses on NATO’s nuclear dimension. He highlights key challenges in the European security environment and explains essential charac- teristics of NATO’s deterrence and collective defence, and its contribution to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. He then briefly describes the contributions of NATO’s nuclear states (and in particular France’s) to collective security and defence. All Allies (except France) participate in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), NATO’s senior body on nuclear matters. NATO’s nuclear role sharing is at the heart of this policy brief: US nuclear weapons carried by European dual-capable aircraft (DCA). The author argues emphatically as to why American nuclear weapons should be kept on European soil and the current DCA countries should maintain the status quo. Tangible recommendations follow on in terms of Belgian’s foreign security policy and defence, many of which are also highly likely to apply to other DCA countries.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, Belgium, and North America

35. China Global Security Tracker, No.6

Author:: Helena Legarda
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: China hits back after NATO calls it a security challenge, dormant Chinese hacking group resumes attacks, and more.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:: United States, China, Europe, North Atlantic, Beijing, Asia, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka

36. European defence policy in an era of renewed great-power competition

Author:: Douglas Barrie, Lucie béraud-Sudreau, Henry Boyd, Nick Childs, Bastain Giegerich, James Hackett, and Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: In 2019, European governments’ combined defence spending, when measured in constant 2015 US dollar terms, surpassed the level reached in 2009, before the financial and economic crisis led to a series of significant defence-spending cuts. However, a different strategic paradigm – one that Europe is struggling to adjust to and which is once more a concern for European governments – has re-appeared in this past decade: great-power competition. Russia attempted to change international borders in Europe through the use of force in 2014 by annexing Crimea and continues to support an armed insurgency in eastern Ukraine. Moscow’s challenge to Euro-Atlantic security exists in multiple dimensions: as both a conventional military and also a hybrid-warfare issue, with Russia working to dislocate existing societal alignments and disrupt political processes in Western states. The poisoning of a former Russian intelligence officer (and of his daughter) in the United Kingdom, attributed by the British government to Russia, underlines further how much the character of conflict has changed. How to manage the challenge Russia poses without simply reverting to Cold War logic remains a worrying problem for governments in NATO and the European Union member states. Meanwhile, European security establishments are beginning to recognise the growing political, economic and military influence of a rising China. Although less of an immediate challenge, China’s growth in these areas has possible profound consequences in the long run. Indeed, in December 2019, NATO declared: ‘We recognise that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.’2 For the United States, China has already become the pacing military threat. The US Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, released in June 2019, opens with the assertion that ‘the Indo-Pacific is the Department of Defense’s priority theater’. In other words, the European theatre is not. European analysts and officials have begun to wonder whether the US might begin to see Europe through an Asian lens, seeking to generate European commitments to the Indo-Pacific region, or at the very least getting Europeans to take on greater responsibility for their own security and thereby freeing up US resources. Although there will be some elements of the US military presence in Europe that are indispensable to US military action in other regions of the world, that might not be enough to sustain Washington’s firm commitment to European security in the future, regardless of who occupies the White House. Significantly, not even the US has the capability to fight two major wars simultaneously any more, meaning binary choices regarding focus are inevitable. As some observers have argued, Europeans need to urgently assess what Washington’s choices in this regard – and their implications for Europe – might look like. Considering both how to deter Russia and what a European contribution to containing China might entail represents a major challenge for Western European nations, which have relegated defence to a secondary position, as almost a discretionary activity. European states partially demobilised in the 1990s and early 2000s, intellectually and in terms of their force structures, in response to the end of the Cold War. For example, according to IISS data, in 1990 West Germany alone was thought to be able to field 215 combat battalions and the UK 94. Today it is a fraction of that. However, security challenges relating to regional instability, crisis management and transnational terrorism – which all dominated the previous two decades – have not disappeared. On the contrary, all these still demand attention and the investment of European resources. While there is a growing recognition among Europe’s analytical community, and some governments, that things cannot simply continue as before in terms of regional security and defence, coherence and resolve among core actors in the Euro-Atlantic sphere have weakened. The US administration has intensified its call for better transatlantic burden sharing, at the same time displaying a cavalier attitude to the collective-defence commitment enshrined in NATO. France’s President Emmanuel Macron has also expressed severe doubts about the viability of NATO’s collective-defence mission. In addition, the British decision to leave the European Union in 2020 implies that the EU has lost one of its most militarily experienced and one of its most capable member states. There is a tendency among many observers and some politicians to argue that European NATO and EU member states need to clarify the political dimension of their defence ambition, via-à-vis greater strategic autonomy, before resolving the problem of how to meet this ambition militarily, at what cost and in what time frame. Indeed, at times, the debate about European strategic autonomy seems to focus more on the degree of independence from the US that its various proponents would like to achieve and less on the military requirement that autonomy is meant to respond to. It is now widely accepted across Europe that Europeans need ‘to do more’ for their own security and defence. Most of the intellectual energy allocated to this aspiration is spent on achieving better coordination – and even a level of integration – among European armed forces. This is useful, but only if it is directed at building capability to provide for the defence of Europe. The existing military capabilities of the European NATO member states fall short when compared to the force requirements generated by the political–military level of ambition as defined by NATO, or for that matter the EU.5 However, this should not be an excuse to lower the level of ambition, nor should the assumption that Europeans are unable to defend themselves be declared an inevitability. Defence output is the result of political, financial and military choices by governments. To think systematically about the challenge of providing capabilities that can meet Europe’s emerging military requirements, The International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hanns Seidel Foundation convened a group of thinkers and practitioners from Germany and the UK. The group took seriously the US assertion that Europe needs to be able to provide for its own defence. If Europeans can achieve this, they will be valuable partners to the US in upholding and strengthening the liberal international order on which Euro-Atlantic prosperity and security depend. Meeting twice in 2019, the group discussed threat assessments, debated European capability gaps and scoped potential approaches to addressing them. The following pages draw on the group’s deliberations but do not represent a consensus position.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Military Spending
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America

37. The Visegrád Four and the Security of NATO’s “Eastern Flank”

Author:: Eoin Micheál McNamara
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Institute of International Relations Prague
Abstract:: Eoin Micheál McNamara in his Policy Paper called The Visegrád Four and the Security of NATO’s “Eastern Flank” expresses the argument that there is considerable scope for the V4 states to improve their contribution to NATO’s collective defence posture. Based on this fact, he argues the different strategic positions of each V4 member within the NATO membership related to Russian influence.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

38. Alliance capabilities at 70: achieving agility for an uncertain future

Author:: Camille Grand and Matthew Gillis
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The credibility of any alliance depends on its ability to deliver deterrence and defence for the safety and secu- rity of its members. Without capability, any alliance is deprived of credibility and exists only on paper. De- spite a rocky history – up to and including the current debate on burden-sharing – capability lies at the heart of NATO’s success. There is good cause to draw opti- mism from the Alliance’s accomplishments throughout its 70 years in providing a framework for developing effective and interoperable capabilities. However, the future promises serious challenges for NATO’s capabilities, driven primarily by new and dis- ruptive technology offering both opportunities and threats in defence applications. Moreover, develop- ments in these areas are, in some cases, being led by potential adversaries, while also simultaneously mov- ing at a pace that requires a constant effort to adapt on the part of the Alliance. On the occasion of NATO’s 70th anniversary, the future outlook requires a serious conversation about NATO’s adaptability to embrace transformation and develop an agile footing to ensure its future relevance.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

39. It’s that time of the decade again: some considerations for NATO’s eighth Strategic Concept

Author:: Jeffrey H. Michaels
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: In the Declaration that emerged from the Decem- ber 2019 London Leaders Meeting, NATO Secre- tary General Jens Stoltenberg was tasked to present Foreign Ministers with “a forward-looking reflection process under his auspices, drawing on relevant exper- tise, to further strengthen NATO’s political dimension including consultation”. This new tasking has been largely attributed to French President Emmanuel Ma- cron’s remark the previous month that the Alliance was suffering from “brain death”. Speaking at a press conference alongside Stoltenberg, Macron elaborated on his comment, complaining the Alliance was overly focused on “cost-sharing or burden-sharing” whereas too little attention was being placed on major policy issues such as “peace in Europe, the post-INF, the re- lationship with Russia, the issue of Turkey, who is the enemy?”3
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Turkey, and North America

40. Turkey’s military policy in Syria: implications for NATO

Author:: Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: In three decades, Ankara’s strategic agenda in Syria has considerably changed. First, back in the late 1990s, Tur- key’s primary goal was to put an end to the Hafez al-As- sad regime’s use of the PKK terrorist organization as a proxy. To address the threat at its source, Ankara resort- ed to a skillfully crafted coercive diplomacy, backed by the Turkish Armed Forces. A determined approach – championed by Turkey’s late president Suleyman Demi- rel – formed the epicenter of this policy: it was coupled with adept use of alliances, in particular the Turkish-Is- raeli strategic partnership. In October 1998, Syria, a trou- blesome state sponsor of terrorism as designated by the US Department of State since 19791, gave in. The Baath regime ceased providing safe haven to Abdullah Oca- lan, the PKK’s founder who claimed thousands of lives in Turkey. The same year, Damascus signed the Adana Agreement with Ankara, vowing to stop supporting ter- rorist groups targeting Turkey. In the following period, from the early 2000s up until the regional unrest in 2011, Turkish policy aimed at reju- venating the historical legacy. During that time, Ankara fostered its socio-cultural and economic integration efforts in Syria – for example, cancelling visas, promoting free trade, and holding joint cabinet meetings. Turkey’s foreign policy was shaped by then Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s thought, popularly formulated in the concept of “Strategic Depth”. Refer- ring to David Laing’s anti-psychiatry school, Davutoglu claimed that the nation was alienated from its roots and embraced a “false self”. To fix the “identity crisis”, Tur- key pursued charm offensives in the Middle East. This ideationally motivated stance even led to speculative neo-Ottomanism debates in Western writings.2 From 2011, when the Arab Spring broke out, there were high hopes as to Turkey’s role model status. In April 2012, before the Turkish Parliament, then For- eign Minister Davutoglu stated that Ankara would lead the change as “the master, pioneer, and servant” of the Middle East.3 Five years later, the Turkish administration dropped these aspirations. At the 2017 Davos meeting, then Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek stated that the Assad regime’s demise was no longer one of his gov- ernment’s considerations.4 In fact, by 2015, Turkey had to deal with real security problems on its doorstep, such as the Russian expedition in Syria, ISIS rockets hammer- ing border towns, the refugee influx, and mushrooming PKK offshoots.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, Turkey, Syria, and North America

41. No time to hedge? Articulating a European pillar within the Alliance

Author:: Jens Ringsmose and Mark Webber
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: NATO has for seven decades seen its share of crisis, argument and division. Still, few would dis- agree that the presidency of Donald Trump has added a new layer of discord and unpredictability to what the late Michael Howard once described as “an unhappy successful marriage”.1 Germany, France, and Denmark have all been brow-beaten by the US President, and even the UK, America’s staunchest ally, has been taken aback by Trump’s behaviour.2 But there is something far worse going on here than a marital argument. By calling into question America’s commitment to Article 5 and even to NATO membership itself Trump has, in effect, threatened a divorce.3 True, Trump’s words are often at odds with American actions. US ma- terial commitment to NATO remains strong, evi- dent in the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), and US participation in exercises such as Trident Juncture and Defender Europe 20. But words still matter, particularly when spoken by a President with a maximalist interpretation of his prerogative powers. Europeans governments may not welcome it, but Trump has raised the possibility of American abandonment. So, the Allies have been forced to consider their options. All European capitals rec- ognize there is no realistic alternative to “Plan A” – a credible American security guarantee – but many are beginning to think of a “Plan B” outside of NATO that supplements the fragile transatlantic link. This sort of reaction to the “Trump shock” is understandable but ill-conceived. Hedging in this way might end up triggering exactly what the Eu- ropeans wish to avoid: the US walking away from its European Allies. There is a risk, in other words, that the hedge will become a wedge. The Europe- an Allies should instead up their game in support of NATO and return to the idea of a European pillar in the Alliance. A stronger and more coher- ent European contribution to defence and securi- ty that straddles both NATO and the EU would demonstrate to a sceptical audience in Washing- ton that NATO-Europe is pulling its weight in the trans-Atlantic Alliance. “Plan A” is still alive, but it could do with a bit of life support.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

42. Defeating Threat Air Defences: the Return of the DEAD

Author:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: For the past two decades the US and its allies have faced a very limited surface-to-air threat in wars in which they have engaged. This is now changing as the worsening security environment and the emergence of near-peer rivals once again raises the spectre of a strongly contested air domain. A central element of the renewed challenge is the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. China and Russia have fielded and continue to develop SAM systems across all range categories – and to offer many of these for export – that pose a credible threat to air operations. The US, and to an even greater extent the Europeans, have reduced emphasis and expenditure on what is known as the suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) role. Counter-insurgency rather than counter-integrated air-defence operations have been the priority since the turn of the century. There is now, however, the renewed challenge of being able to carry out air operations in airspace defended by the latest generations of point-, short-, medium- and long-range SAM systems. Low-observable aircraft only offer a partial solution, particularly as the US and its allies will operate mixed fleets of stealthy and non-stealthy combat aircraft at least until around the middle of the century. The latter types of aircraft remain at greater risk from SAM threats than low-observable aircraft, and their operational utility will depend partly on the wider capacity to counter surface-based threat missile systems. SEAD is an asset-intensive capability, particularly in the early days of a conflict, and has traditionally involved dedicated platforms as well as fighter ground-attack aircraft. In SEAD operations in the 1990s, such as Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, up to one-third of strike missions were tasked against ground-based air defences. While the force mix will change as uninhabited systems are increasingly adopted in the inventory, a variety of crewed and uninhabited aircraft and associated weaponry will still be required for the task, and will be required in numbers greater than are available in current inventories if faced by a peer or near-peer threat. Collating what is known as an electronic order of battle against peer and near-peer rivals should once again become a priority, as should the capacity to counter, disable or destroy surface-to-air threat systems.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

43. China's Rise as a Global Security Actor: Implications for NATO

Author:: Meia Nouwens and Helena Legarda
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: In December 2019, for the first time, NATO leaders recognised China as a new strategic point of focus for the Alliance. This reflects growing concern among NATO members surrounding China’s geopolitical rise and its growing power-projection capabilities, as well as the impact that these may have on the global balance of power. Today, China is not only taking a central role in Indo-Pacific security affairs but is also becoming an increasingly visible security actor in Europe’s periphery. As such, the question of how to deal with an increasingly global China has been an important part of Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s NATO 2030 reflection process. China poses a wide range of challenges to NATO. Beijing sees the Alliance as a United States-centric outfit that may be used by Washington to contain China, and has therefore tried to influence individual NATO members’ decisions in order to weaken the Alliance’s unity. Close ties between China and Russia, especially in the security and military spheres, have also been a source of concern for NATO allies. Besides the Chinese and Russian navies’ joint exercises in the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, there is also the potential for the two sides to further coordinate – or at least align their behaviour – on issues of relevance to the Alliance, including hybrid warfare and cyber espionage, arms-control issues, and their approach to Arctic governance, among others. China’s defence spending and military-modernisation process, along with the growing strength of its defence industry, have led to the proliferation of more advanced military platforms around the world. Beijing is also expanding its stockpile of missiles, some of which have the range to reach NATO countries. China’s military-power-projection capabilities have likewise edged towards Europe as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has expanded its international presence over the last few years. While NATO allies may have agreed that China presents a number of challenges to the Alliance’s security, they have yet to achieve consensus on how to address them. Some of these issues lie beyond NATO’s traditional areas of competence and will require expertise best provided by partners of the Alliance rather than the Alliance itself. NATO allies will need to prioritise how, when, where and with which partners to use their combined resources to deal with them. At the same time, the Alliance acknowledges that China is not its adversary. NATO thus must find areas of common interest where it can continue to cooperate with China, albeit with a more clear-eyed approach than it has done in the past. Addressing the opportunities and problems posed by China as a cohesive alliance will be more important than ever.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:: China, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America

44. Increasing Nuclear Threats through Strategic Missile Defense

Author:: Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:: Growing concerns about third-country nuclear threats led the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty’s constraints on the size and scope of ballistic missile defense arsenals in 2002. Inaccurate and alarmist projections of “rogue state” ICBM threats were critical in winning support for the decision to withdraw from the treaty and to sustain the multi-billion dollar annual price tag for developing, deploying, and expanding strategic missile defenses. But 18 years after Washington abandoned the treaty, North Korea is the only rogue state that could pose a near-term nuclear threat against the American homeland—and U.S. missile defense interceptors and radars have not even delivered high confidence of being able to protect against this threat. Meanwhile, the absence of limits on U.S. strategic missile defenses and prudent, worst-case concerns in Moscow and Beijing about their future expansion are fueling resistance to additional nuclear arms reductions and stability measures. The end result is that the exponential threats posed by Russia and China are getting worse and the chances of a disastrous nuclear arms race are increasing. This analysis argues that the nuclear threat confronting the United States is multilateral, three-dimensional, and interrelated. Unless the United States acknowledges the role of missile defenses in this complicated reality, it will not be able to realize the full benefits that arms control offers.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

45. The European Union's Defense Dimension

Author:: Esa Pulkkinen
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:: A new Occasional Paper from the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University (LISD), "The European Union's Defense Dimension," summarizes Lieutenant General Esa Pulkkinen’s virtual presentation and discussion on May 20, 2020 with Princeton University faculty, students, and alumni, which took place as part of the Liechtenstein Institute’s seminar on Europe and the World and Crisis Diplomacy. The paper provides an overview of the European Union Military Staff’s approach to defense and cooperation, particularly in addressing current security challenges such as, the Covid-19 pandemic, disinformation, and migration. Lt. Gen Pulkkinen details the way in which EUMS hybrid operations, present a great potential for the EU and the European Commission to work in tandem – "if their respective competencies are properly utilized and coordinated." Opinions expressed in this and all LISD Occasional Papers are those of the authors.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

46. Hard security dynamics in the Baltic Sea region: From turbulence to tense stability

Author:: Matti Pesu
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: This Briefing Paper looks into the fundamentals of the Baltic Sea security landscape in the early 2020s. It argues that three interconnected security dynamics shape the present, ‘post-2014’ security environment in Northeastern Europe. That is to say, Russia’s assertive behaviour in the region and in Europe more broadly, NATO’s reassurance and deterrence measures in the area, and Finland’s and Sweden’s closer integration into the Western defence network all affect hard se- curity dynamics in the Baltic Sea region. These three dynamics underlie the tense regional stability that emerged after a period of alarmism and turbulence in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s ac- tions in Ukraine. Fundamentally, the stability is the product of the interplay between the three dynamics. In other words, NATO’s reassurance and deterrence measures accompanied by Finland’s and Sweden’s in- tegration into the Western security and defence system act as a counterweight to Russia’s actions in the region, creating a balance of power holding Russia’s ambitions in check. Investigating the sources of regional balance is rele- vant for multiple reasons. The region remains a poten- tial hotspot between Russia and the West and, thus, it merits close and continuous attention. Moreover, the word ‘stability’ frequently features in foreign policy parlance in Northern Europe, particularly in Finland and Sweden. Given this rhetorical proclivity, attention needs to be paid to the factors that actually constitute stability and the state of hard security in the Baltic Sea area. The paper consists of three analytical parts. First, it provides a brief historical overview of the twists and turns in the regional security landscape from the early post-Cold War era to today. The second part introduces the three dynamics in detail, followed by an analysis of how they are interconnected. The paper concludes by contemplating how regional stability could best be preserved in the 2020s.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Baltic Sea

47. Rebuilding Sweden’s crisis preparedness: Lack of clarity impedes implementation

Author:: Mariette Hagglund
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Changes in the security environment and Sweden’s related policy changes adopted in the early 2000s made large national-level planning and organization unnecessary. This led to a decentralization of Sweden’s crisis preparedness system. Covid-19 is the latest reminder of some of the shortcomings in Sweden’s crisis preparedness. Previous warning signs were the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, and the forest fires in 2014 and 2018. A major effort is currently underway in Sweden to build a streamlined system to respond to the broad scope of vulnerabilities and threats. A functioning crisis preparedness system is not only important in itself, but also as a contribution to Sweden’s total defence efforts. Rebuilding the system, however, will be slow and costly. Sweden’s crisis preparedness system is characterized by a complex authority landscape and discrepancies between sectors and regions. While the Swedish constitution does not allow for exceptions in crises, and ministerial governance is forbidden, the Covid-19 situation may spark a discussion about the need for changes in the legal framework.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Crisis Management, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Europe and Sweden

48. Italy, Atlanticism and the Biden Administration: Greater Convergence to Defuse Ambiguity on China

Author:: Dario Cristiani
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In September 2019, the once anti-establishment Five Star Movement (Movimento Cinque Stelle – M5S) agreed to enter a ruling alliance with the Democratic Party (Partito Democratico – PD).[1] By establishing this “yellow-red” coalition government with what was considered its political nemesis, the M5S managed to preserve its presence in power and avoid early elections. However, its influence gradually weakened, as attested to by poor performances in local elections. The M5S’s declining political fortunes and the changing composition of the government have a significant foreign policy dimension, especially if addressed through the lens of Italy–US relations. The PD is a solidly pro-Atlanticist party in Italy. The M5S, despite its evolution towards greater pragmatism over the years, remains a source of concern, being still perceived as the most pro-China actor within the Italian political landscape.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: China, Europe, Asia, Italy, and United States of America

49. Nuclear Risk Reduction: Looking Back, Moving Forward, and the Role of NATO

Author:: Wilfred Wan
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: In a difficult geopolitical environment marked by increased tensions among nuclear-armed and nuclear-allied states, there has emerged an urgent and widespread call for the implementation of practical measures to reduce the risk of nuclear-weapon use – whether intentional or inadvertent. A concerted effort to take risk reduction forward must address the spectrum of use scenarios by drawing on past activities, building on existing agreements and considering innovative approaches. NATO will have a key role to play, given the nuclear nature of the Alliance and the involvement of its members in strategic and regional competition. Alliance activities past and present can provide insight relevant to the development of multilateral risk-reduction measures. At the same time, in highlighting the dynamism and multi-faceted nature of risk, they underline the scale of the challenge ahead.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Risk, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Russia and Europe

50. NATO’s Current and Future Support for Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation

Author:: Rose Gottemoeller and Steven Hill
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: Times may be tough in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (ADN). But ADN is by no means dead. This is a moment of opportunity, a chance to look to the future and consider what we should be doing differently to improve the international architecture for ADN in the future. NATO is in the process of considering how it can adapt to continue to be relevant in the changing global security environment. The time is therefore ripe for the Alliance to take on an enhanced role in preserving and strengthening more effective ADN. There are a number of areas in which it can support these efforts. These include specific steps to preserve and implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty, modernise the Vienna Document, adapt nuclear arms control regimes and deal with emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs). NATO should position itself as a focal point for innovation in the ADN area, including promoting advances in verification, improving the multinational sharing and use of data, and advancing dialogue related to outer space.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Nonproliferation, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, and United States of America

51. A Long-Term Perspective on NATO and the Multinational Order

Author:: Sinan Ülgen
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:: The evolving external threat environment is impacting the internal political dynamics of NATO nations and is accentuating a series of already existing trends – differences in threat perceptions, burden-sharing difficulties, challenges to respond to sub-threshold threats and the rise of populism – which altogether affect the cohesiveness and potentially the effectiveness of NATO as a political and military alliance. NATO’s operational future over the next decades will be shaped by the ingenuity of the transatlantic leadership in developing new arrangements of institutional cooperation between the Alliance and the burgeoning forms of the “coalition of the willing”. The Alliance should nonetheless remain the main transatlantic political forum, given Brexit as well as the rising need for a common political response to the many challenges ranging from migration to failed states. NATO has been relatively successful in adapting to the changing security environment. Its military capabilities remain unparalleled and unrivalled. The more interesting question is however the political one. Namely how the politics of sustaining this Alliance are being shaped by the underlying dynamics that are transforming the global political, economic and military context. The paper is divided in three chapters.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Politics, Institutions, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, United States of America, and European Union

52. American Sanctions and European Sovereignty

Author:: Jean De Ruyt
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The decision by the United States to withdraw from the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and re-impose sanctions on Iran broke an international understanding, sanctioned by a UN Security Council Resolution. However, European and other non-US companies dealing with Iran must abide by US law in order to avoid its extra- territorial effects on their US operations. Efforts are being made to help the EU keep its “sovereignty” on sanction issues when there is disagreement with the US, but until now these have not accomplished much. Therefore a new Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) was launched at the end of January to ensure the continuation of some trade with Iran. But the only convincing way to allow the EU to increase its autonomy is to boost the role of the Euro in international transactions. Certainly, in today’s unpredictable world, we need more than ever to address the issue of the extraterritorial application of American sanctions – today it is Iran, what if tomorrow it is China?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sovereignty, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
Political Geography:: United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and North America

53. The Aachen Mutual Defence Clause: A Closer Look at the Franco-German Treaty

Author:: Elie Perot
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: On 22 January 2019, Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel signed a new treaty on “Franco-German cooperation and integration” in Aachen. Complementing the 1963 Elysée Treaty which symbolized the reconciliation between Germany and France in the post-war period, the Aachen Treaty aims to further strengthen the ties between the two countries in the domains of economy, culture, administration, environment, diplomacy and defence. Although the Treaty has been criticised for its lack of ambition, a closer reading of its text reveals some hidden gems, including its mutual defence clause. What does this new clause mean for the Franco-German tandem and for collective defence in Europe?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, France, and Germany

54. European Strategic Autonomy: Which Military Level of Ambition?

Author:: Jo Coelmont
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The EU Global Strategy is crystal clear on the EU’s political level of ambition yet remarkably silent on the corresponding military level of ambition. But strategy without capabilities is just a hallucination. Recent developments in the EU make it possible, however, for the Member States to agree on an appropriate and affordable military level of ambition. The aim: to conduct autonomous crisis management operations and to contribute substantially to territorial defence within the NATO framework. We should not forget that the European countries have the primary responsibility for the territorial defence of their own continent.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

55. Europe in a multipolar missile world – Why the EU and NATO should not try to salvage the INF Treaty

Author:: Bruno Hellendorff
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: On 1 February 2019, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that his country had suspended its compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty, and would withdraw from it within six months. The INF Treaty, little known outside of arms control and disarmament circles, was a landmark Cold War agreement between the United States of America and the USSR – the first to ban an entire category of weapons (ground-based medium- and intermediate-range missiles). The US withdrawal, announced in dramatic terms by President Donald Trump in October 2018, followed the claim that Russia had recently developed and fielded a missile with performances forbidden by the INF Treaty. The end of this little-known treaty is not anecdotal. Not only will it further strain the US-Russia relationship and antagonise allies, it will also contribute to the erosion of what is left of the global arms-control architecture and incentivise arms-race behav- iours among great powers. In a world where security is increasingly less a question of multilateral deliberation and rules-based interactions, the end of the INF Treaty is a further signal that missile technologies are again becoming a venue for competition between great powers: only this time, at least three are playing the game (United States, China and Russia) rather than two (United States and USSR). Additionally, missile technology proliferation has turned into a major dimension of contemporary battlefield realities, and missile programmes of countries such as Iran and North Korea continue to pose important diplomatic and non-proliferation challenges. Meanwhile, Europe is, by and large, left watching as its regional security architecture erodes. Welcome to what US National Security Advisor John Bolton recently termed ‘a multipolar missile world’. The EU should not try to salvage the INF Treaty. Its diplomatic capital might be better spent in areas where it could potentially make a difference, rather than in a treaty to which it is not even party. Existing multilateral regimes and agreements with the EU or its Member States as parties are already in dire need of reinforcement in the face of technological progress, a volatile diplomatic environment and self-centred, competitive political narratives. These include, inter alia, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) framework (including its Structured Dialogue), multilateral export control regimes (MECR) like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), transparency and trust-building mechanisms like the Hague Code of Conduct against missile proliferation (HCoC), and nuclear-related frame- works like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or ‘Iran deal’) or the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Process. These, however, may simply fail to meet the challenge of a multipolar missile world. Renewed efforts, both conceptual and in the realm of capabilities, are needed in a NATO framework to reinforce the linkage between deterrence and diplomacy. NATO-EU dialogue and cooperation on defence issues could be further enhanced, and European countries should work more with like-minded partners at both bilat- eral or multilateral levels on the challenges of non-proliferation and disarmament in the twenty-first century. The demise of the INF Treaty should therefore re-energise the debate on European strategic autonomy, help support collective capability building – not least in NATO – and prompt new discussions on stronger multilateral rules on missile development, use and proliferation.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

56. Autonomy and Strategy: What Should Europe Want?

Author:: Jolyon Howorth
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: Europe wants autonomy and it wants a strategy. Semantically, of course, “wants” has a double meaning. First, it means “lacks”. Europe lacks autonomy and it lacks a strategy. The second meaning of wants is “desires”. Here, we have a genuine question. How many EU member states genuinely desire autonomy for the EU? How many are genuinely in favor of a grand strategy – as opposed to the EU’s default practice of just muddling through? And there is also a third meaning behind wants: “needs”. In my view, the EU needs strategic autonomy. But having said that, all I have done is set a point of arrival. How to get there?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Autonomy
Political Geography:: Europe

57. Belgian Special Forces in the Sahel: A Minimal Footprint with Maximal Output?

Author:: Nina Wilen
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: In a shifting geopolitical context, the Belgian Defence has intensified its presence in the Sahel region and developed a new strategic military collaboration with Niger through Operation New Nero. This policy brief critically examines the strategy and identifies three challenges for the future of the operation: Niger’s democratic development, the asymmetry between the Western Partner Nation’s capabilities, and diverging agendas within the Belgian Defence. To counter these challenges, it is suggested that the minimalist approach and the social networks which enable horizontal collaboration among partners are maintained, while new civil-military opportunities are explored. On a broader level, it is recommended that Belgium aligns its political and military agendas to achieve long- term strategies geopolitical regions of importance.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:: Africa, Europe, Belgium, Sahel, and Niger

58. Articulating the Logic of Nuclear-Sharing

Author:: Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements often get bad press. This is remarkable given the fact that they have demonstrably contributed to (a) countering the proliferation of nuclear arsenals in Europe, (b) fostering alliance cohesion by giving non-nuclear weapon states a voice on the nuclear posture of the alliance, and (c) making nuclear deterrence more effective militarily by offering a wider array of force options. When the relative merits of extended nuclear deterrence are unknown, public support thereof is likely to suffer. In order to enrich the debate about NATO’s nuclear policy, this Security Policy Brief articulates the threefold logic of nuclear-sharing.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

59. Alliance Revitalized: NATO for a New Era

Author:: Hans Binnendijk, Daniel S. Hamilton, and Charles L. Barry
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Transatlantic Relations
Abstract:: The NATO Alliance faces simultaneous dangers to its east, to its south, and from a series of security challenges unbounded by geography, at a time when disparate allied responses to a host of challenges are tearing the seams of European unity and American political figures have even questioned the need for NATO. Europe risks turning from an exporter of stability to an importer of instability. The vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace is challenged by a Europe fractured and anxious. The Alliance must be revitalized for the new world rising before us. An overarching Alliance strategy must rely on NATO’s ability to provide a full spectrum of deterrent and defense tools to provide collective defense for all of its members, together with an ability to project stability and resilience beyond its borders using an array of tools for crisis management.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Partnerships, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and North America

60. Keeping the momentum in European defence collaboration: An early assessment of PESCO implementation

Author:: Yvonni-Stefania Efstathiou, Connor Hannigan, and Lucie béraud-Sudreau
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Between March and November 2018, the 25 participating member states launched 34 projects, with the core aim of addressing the EU’s capability shortfalls. In May 2019, a call for a third round of project proposals will be launched. The IISS undertook an early assessment of how PESCO projects are carried out, to assess whether the momentum on the ground has continued since the projects were announced at the political level. A strong pace of implementation would require detailed timelines, deadlines and financial plans, as well as clear links with EU capability requirements. Questionnaires were sent to the projects’ country leads, and were complemented by interviews and secondary-source research. We looked at various dimensions of implementation: timelines, financial commitments, stakeholder involvement and the projects’ relation to strategic autonomy. The results are mixed. While some projects are off to a strong start, there are common challenges for all
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Military Spending
Political Geography:: Europe, Eastern Europe, Brussels, Central Europe, and Western Europe

61. China Global Security Tracker, No.5

Author:: Helena Legarda
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: Presenting China as a 'responsible power' – Beijing releases first major defense white paper in four years
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, and Military Spending
Political Geography:: United States, Japan, China, Europe, Canada, Taiwan, France, and North America

62. Advancing UK maritime aviation in the Queen Elizabeth-class era

Author:: Nick Childs
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:: The United Kingdom is on the cusp of regenerating what is a transformational capability. The first of the UK’s new-generation aircraft carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth, has been at sea on trials for two years, and is working up towards its first operational deployment in 2021. The second ship, HMS Prince of Wales, is scheduled to be accepted into service before the end of the year. The F-35B Lightning II has achieved initial land-based operating capability and the Lightning Force has carried out its first overseas deployment, Lightning Dawn. Maritime aviation in the round has undergone a significant transformation, and there has been a substantial increased focus on collaboration and partnering with industry as well as developing stronger links with critical allies. To underscore the significance of the undertaking, then secretary of state for defence Penny Mordaunt announced on 15 May 2019 that the UK planned to produce a National Aircraft Carrier Policy to lay down a blueprint for how the new carrier era would help deliver the UK’s global objectives. In addition, on 4 June, then prime minister Theresa May announced that the UK would earmark the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers to form part of NATO’s significant new Readiness Initiative. These developments have prompted thought and discussion on the extent to which the carrier programme will enable and actually drive the transformation of UK joint-force capabilities, and are posing questions about the demands such a programme will place on UK defence and industry. This paper considers both the opportunities and challenges that the carrier era presents in a number of key areas
Topic:: Defense Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:: United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and London

63. EU Defense Cooperation: Progress Amid Transatlantic Concerns

Author:: Erik Brattberg and Tomáš Valášek
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: European defense cooperation has made unprecedented strides since 2014 and further progress is expected under the new European Commission. Driving these developments are a combination of internal and external factors. Among them is a more challenging security environment in Europe, the disruptive impact of the Brexit negotiations and the election of U.S. President Donald Trump, demands for deeper European Union (EU) integration in the wake of the 2009 eurozone debt crisis, and defense industrial rationales. As the 2016 European Global Strategy makes clear, the EU’s ambition is to become a more strategically autonomous security player capable of taking more independent action, especially in its own neighborhood. But this will require the decisionmaking structures that can act swiftly and autonomously in crises, the necessary civilian and operational capabilities to carry out these decisions, and the means to produce the necessary capabilities through a competitive high-tech European defense industrial base. The evolving EU defense cooperation goes far beyond crisis management operations. At its core, it has the goal of leveraging EU tools to strengthen European security. In particular, new EU defense initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defense Fund (EDF), though still nascent, are potential game changers in this regard. PESCO operates as a platform for groups of member states to cooperate on defense capability projects. The EDF, as an internal market instrument backed up by European Commission co-funding, has the potential to spur and incentivize collaboration on the development and acquisition of new capabilities between member states. These initiatives lay a framework upon which stronger cooperation can gradually be structured. Nevertheless, these new European defense schemes will have to have the right level of ambition, be successfully implemented, and contribute to strengthening both European and transatlantic security.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe and European Union

64. NATO at 70: enter the technological age

Author:: Tomáš Valášek
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: As NATO celebrates its 70th anniversary, it has re- turned nearly all the way to its original deterrence and defence roots. While it remains in the busi- ness of collective security and crisis management, for the past five years – since Russia’s aggression against Ukraine – Article 5 tasks have come to dominate the agenda of the commanders, plan- ners and policy makers. As for the years ahead, the challenges come in three forms. The first is to finish the transition to common defence. 2019 is not 1949; the nature of the technologies that determine winners and los- ers has changed. And while NATO has adapted admirably in many ways, it has work left to do, par- ticularly in addressing cyber vulnerabilities. The second challenge is also related to technolo- gies, and it is to start preparing for the next gener- ation of partly or fully automated warfare, which will make use of artificial intelligence (AI). The re- search and development is well under way, on the part of the Allies as well as potential adversaries. A lot less thinking is taking place with regard to how defence politics – the way Allies agree on plans and guide operations – will be affected. That is a mistake. The changes which automation will bring to NATO deliberations will be no less dramatic than those which will happen on the battlefield. The third challenge is more immediate and po- litical in nature: it is to keep the Alliance unified inthe face of unprecedented soul-searching on the part of the biggest Ally, the United States. And while by virtue of its size and dominance Wash- ington tends to be self-referential, reactions from the rest of NATO member states do make a dif- ference, both positive and negative. Their track re- cord over the past two years has been mixed.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Ukraine, and North America

65. Why the Baltics matter. Defending NATO’s North-Eastern border

Author:: Sven Sakkov
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, most of Europe went on a “strategic holiday”. The West had won and the future was bright. Even the fact that at its weakest the Russian Federation was still able to create frozen conflicts at its borders did not dent this optimism. Defence spending in Eu- rope was plummeting throughout the 1990s, and all the way to 2014. NATO’s prevailing paradigm changed from being a collective defence organi- sation more to something of a collective security actor, with many main missions and a plethora of partnerships. After the shock of 9/11, the Alliance focused on counter-insurgency operations in Afghanistan. Military capabilities required to fight a modern near-peer adversary atrophied even further. In this context, some Allies did not take their eyes off Russia – primarily Poland and the Baltic States. Yet they were perceived by major Western Allies as nuisances requiring psychological counselling, as countries who had been traumatised by their harsh history and hence had become incapable of embracing this new reality of partnership with Rus- sia. Even the Russian military aggression against Georgia in 2008 did not change that Zeitgeist. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented her “reset” button to the Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov just seven months after Russian tanks rolled into Georgia.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, Eastern Europe, North America, and Northern Europe

66. A Strategic Odyssey: Constancy of Purpose and Strategy-Making in NATO, 1949-2019

Author:: Diego A. Ruiz Palmer
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: In this Research Paper, Diego Ruiz Palmer argues, that in spite of the many crises over seven decades, NATO has been a forum in which Allies were able to stand together, build a common purpose, most notably through a process of strategy- making. What is strategy-making and why is it important? Strategy-making is mainly about building a shared sense of strategic thinking and doing within the Alliance; it is about making the Alliance a cohesive and credible defence actor that draws on a solid and Alliance-wide political and military posture. This is achieved through a process of constant consultation, planning, policy-making, shared threat assessment and buy-in by all member states. Strategy-making is important because it determines the long-term success of the project. This was true in the past, but still holds today, at a time when the Alliance is re-embracing a deterrence and defence agenda. If, as Diego Ruiz Palmer puts it, strategy-making has been the “key ingredient in sustaining a constancy of purpose in often turbulent times”, then it must continue to be so, as external and internal challenges – in the post-Cold War era more than ever – question the relevance of the Alliance. Diego Ruiz Palmer recounts the strategic odyssey in systematic and meticulous detail: from the very first steps of the Alliance’s establishment, to the post-Cold War adaptation, through the doctrinal evolutions of the 1960s, to NATO’s strategic and operational renaissance in the ‘70s and ‘80s. Throughout, Diego draws on a rich mix of NATO’s archives and declassified documents, secondary sources, and his own expertise of the institution’s life. The result is inspiring, and will no doubt become a reference document on NATO’s nature and ability to navigate through turbulent strategic waters. One may simply hope that the fate of the Alliance does not resemble that of the Odyssey’s hero.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

67. The necessary adaptation of NATO’s military instrument of power

Author:: Jan Broeks
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Since 2014, the Euro-Atlantic security environment has become less stable and predictable as a result of a series of actions taken by Russia: Russia’s illegal and illegitimate annexation of Crimea and ongoing destabilization of eastern Ukraine; Russia’s military posture and provocative military activities, such as the deployment of modern dual-capable missiles in Kaliningrad, repeated violations of NATO Allied air- space, and the continued military build-up in Crimea; its significant investments in the modernization of its strategic forces; its irresponsible and aggressive nu- clear rhetoric; its large-scale, no-notice snap exercises; and the growing number of its exercises with a nucle- ar dimension. In parallel, growing instability in our southern re- gion, from the Middle East to North Africa, as well as transnational and multi-dimensional threats, are chal- lenging our security. These factors can all have long- term consequences for peace and security in the Eu- ro-Atlantic region and stability across the globe. Yet it is mainly Russian military actions that have brought deterrence and collective defence back to the fore- front of NATO’s agenda.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Ukraine, and North America

68. Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic Managing Hard Power in a “Low Tension” Environment

Author:: Mathieu Boulegue
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Russia’s military posture in the Arctic is informed by the changing geopolitical environment, and can no longer be considered in isolation from the country’s growing tensions with the West. In this sense, the period of “Arctic exceptionalism” – in which, by convention, the region has been treated as a zone of depoliticized cooperation – is coming to an end. Certainly, the Russian Arctic is not exceptional for Moscow in military-operational terms. Russia’s leadership has accorded the same threat perception to the Arctic as it has to other theatres of operation. It seeks consistent control over foreign military activity in the Russian Arctic, and ensured access for Russian armed forces, particularly the Northern Fleet. Russia’s military build-up in the Russian Arctic and the Kremlin’s intentions are, at least for now, defensive in nature. Russia’s military build-up in the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) primarily aims to ensure perimeter defence of the Kola Peninsula for the survivability of second-strike nuclear assets. Russia’s “Bastion” defence concept consists of the projection of multi-layered sea denial and interdiction capabilities. Another Russian priority is to ensure the Northern Fleet’s access to, and passage along, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. This has hitherto been achieved through military infrastructure along the NSR. However, due to the receding ice, Moscow will seek to enforce “border control” over a larger portion of its Arctic area in the future. The revamping of dual-use border control infrastructure and facilities is deemed a priority for safeguarding Russia’s vision of national security in the AZRF. Since the mid-2010s, Russia has deployed substantive force and capabilities along its northern border in the AZRF. Parts of the armed forces, such as the Arctic Brigade, are now Arctic-capable and have developed concepts of operations tailored to that environment. The Northern Fleet has been repurposed with the Arctic environment in mind, and has been provided with Arctic-specific military technology and training. Russia acts as a status quo power and a reluctant rule-follower in the Arctic, partly because international law there plays in its favour, and partly because it is in Russia’s interest to do so. Despite growing tension, cooperation between Russia and other Arctic nations is likely to endure.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and Arctic

69. NATO and EU training missions in Iraq – an opportunity to enhance cooperation

Author:: Niels Schafranek
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: For the past fifteen years, NATO-European Union (EU) cooperation has been expanding with mixed results. Fundamentally, the two organizations are different: NATO, as an intergovernmental military alliance, focuses on collective defence, crisis man- agement and cooperative security. The EU, on the other hand, is a political and economic union that has developed a security agenda under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, there are also overlapping security activities such as the so-called “Petersberg tasks”, involving the EU in peacekeeping, and potentially even tasks of combat for EU forces in crisis management.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

70. Fighting “Men in Jeans” in the grey zone between peace and war

Author:: Peter Braun
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Since 2014, all NATO Summit Declarations have pointed to terrorism and hybrid warfare as the main and most immediate threats to the security of the North Atlantic Alliance and its members.1 Surprisingly, the two threats are largely addressed separately – the fact that ter- rorism happens to be an important element of hybrid warfare is not mentioned at all. This pa- per seeks to examine whether NATO’s current concepts of counter-terrorism (CT) are ade- quate for countering potential terrorist threats in a hybrid environment. To do so, the paper be- gins by examining how terrorism could be used in a hybrid scenario. Thereafter, the particular challenges that these threats pose to collective defence, according to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, are addressed. Finally, this paper considers the extent to which key elements of NATO’s counter-terrorism strategy fit the spe- cific challenges posed by terrorism as a possible component of hybrid warfare.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Terrorism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

71. From hybrid warfare to “cybrid” campaigns: the new normal?

Author:: Antonio Missiroli
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The speed and intensity at which the strategic land- scape has evolved over the past two decades requires constantly updating our analytical and operational tools, capturing change as it occurs, anticipating it whenever possible, and also framing it in terms that facilitate adaptation and cooperation. The recent de- bates over “hybrid” are an excellent case in point.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

72. What NATO contribution to the security architecture of the Indo-Pacific?

Author:: Jean-loup Samaan
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: On 3rd April, 2019 in Washington, DC, US Vice Pres- ident Mike Pence addressed an audience of Western current and former statesmen gathered to celebrate the 70th anniversary of NATO. After taking stock of the Alliance’s accomplishments over the previous decades, Pence ventured on the emerging challenges and touched on an unexpected subject, the Indo-Pa- cific region: “By working together, we can maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific where independent na- tions boldly pursue their own interests”.1 Although the Indo-Pacific has by now become a central feature of policy discussions in the US, it has been relatively absent from talks within NATO circles, as the issue is perceived as a matter lying outside the organization’s mandate. But security de- velopments in this region do matter for its member countries. Moreover, there are ways the organization could play a significant role in the Indo-Pacific with- out compromising its pre-existing priorities. Against that backdrop, this Policy Brief aims to contribute to the emerging discussion on NATO’s engagement in the Indo-Pacific by first providing an appraisal of the policy implications of the US strategy towards the region, and then identifying realistic expectations for a NATO engagement in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and Indo-Pacific

73. The enhanced Forward Presence: innovating NATO’s deployment model for collective defence

Author:: Christian Leuprecht
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) is not merely a deterrence mechanism that relies on NA- TO’s reputation to guard the northeastern flank, but an innovative deployment model in response to the spectrum of emerging threats that confront the Alliance and its members. On the one hand, the eFP enables select mem- ber states to support others, harnessing the econ- omies and economics of an alliance with the legit- imacy of a NATO mandate under circumstances where not all member states want to, or are able to, opt in; or when timelines are tighter than a full- fledged NATO mission could meet. On the other hand, the eFP’s potential for crisis management and security cooperation to address the spectrum of traditional and emerging threats identified in the Wales, Warsaw, and Brussels Summit commu- niqués is considerable: collective defence aside, the current eFP is already showing promise in areas such as building societal resilience and improved security cooperation among member states that are deploying and exercising together – but, in the case of the Baltic states, for instance, without a permanent US headquarters or operational pres- ence. This study starts with a summary of the ratio- nale that informs the eFP and situates it as a quint- essential manifestation of NATO’s new mission set beyond the 2014 Wales Summit. The eFP is be- spoke for the highly dynamic and complex threat environment that is challenging NATO resources on multiple fronts, both in- and out-of-area. The Brief explicates the political and deterrence pur- poses of NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence in northeastern Europe. It also considers eFP’s strategic effects, conceptual limits, and the extent to which this new deployment model might lend itself to confronting a myriad of security risks – conventional and unconventional – that member states face in the 21st century. The final sections rationalize the prospects and value of applying the eFP framework for other conceivable in-area op- erations: the benefits that accrue from rotational forces, and in circumstances when there is NATO consensus but absent willingness by all members to make an actual contribution and commitment; all of which embodies the premium put on the shift in deterrence from political reputation to mil- itary preparedness.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

74. NATO at 70: what defence policy and planning priorities?

Author:: Patrick Turner
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: NATO at 70 shows no sign of slowing down. Indeed, the last few years have been marked by a growth in the challenges to which we must respond, and a high tem- po of decisions and adaptation. NATO’s ability to adapt to the changing security environment has always been a core strength – but this ability has been and will continue to be put to the test. In the last five years, since Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and intervention in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, NATO has been going back to basics. Its core purpose of defending Allies has come back to the fore. But not to the exclusion of other tasks and priorities such as: NA- TO’s operations and missions, for example in Afghani- stan, Kosovo and Iraq; our broader contributions to the international fight against terrorism; or our work to build partner capacity. This Policy Brieffocuses on NATO’s efforts to strength- en its defence posture. The NATO shorthand for our efforts to improve our collective defence is deterrence, defence and dialogue (the “three Ds”). These are un- derpinned by responsiveness, readiness and reinforce- ment (the “three Rs”), as well as strengthened national resilience to attack. More investment and commitment by non-US Allies in line with the Defence Investment Pledge agreed at the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, the shorthand for which is cash, capabilities and contri- butions (the “three Cs”), provides the crucial enablers for the three Ds and the three Rs.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, Ukraine, and North America

75. Calibrating the scope of NATO’s mandate

Author:: Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Anniversaries are opportunities to look back at what has been achieved and to look forward to what ought to be changed and, possibly, improved. Having reached a mature age, an anniversary can also be an occasion to ponder deeper questions of self-identity, purpose and ambition. In 2019 NATO turned 70, and if, overall, it can be proud of what it has achieved for the security of its citizens since 1949, there are also challenges that con- strain its full success as a security actor. More specifically, since 2014, the combination of the Alliance’s two main missions of “deterrence and defence” and “projecting stability”, furthermore in a context of transatlantic tur- bulence and deep tension among member states, has raised a number of questions about NATO’s capacity to remain united and fit for purpose. While the security environment is increasingly com- plex, with constantly evolving threats, and adversaries challenging established state actors and the way they fight, how should NATO further adapt to remain rel- evant? While conflicts are increasingly “hybrid”, should NATO embrace the largest portfolio possible to match the various layers of hybridity, or should it stay focused on what it does best – delivering hard power? Proba- bly both: staying focused might be an option in an ide- al world, but in fact, broadening the scope of NATO’s mandate will be difficult to resist.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

76. Imitation, innovation, disruption: challenges to NATO's superiority in military technology

Author:: Andrea Gilli and Mauro Gilli
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: Analysts, academics and observers are worried that NATO countries may lose their industrial leadership in defence production. Globalization and advances in communications are widely believed to enable enemies and adversaries alike to copy NATO countries’ state- of-the-art weapon systems, and possibly even surpass them by developing next-generation weapon systems. Moreover, so-called disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence, quantum computing and additive manufac- turing are believed to offer cheaper and less technologi- cally demanding options to countries that do not possess the decades’ old defence industrial base of NATO coun- tries. These countries could then use such new technolo- gies for weakening NATO force structure. These concerns are real and deserve close scrutiny. However, adversaries and competitors still face signif- icant challenges which are more insidious than those NATO countries are facing. Because of the complexity of modern technology, imitation, innovation and disruption in armaments production have become increas- ingly demanding over the past decades – especially for naval and aerial platforms intended to operate in com- petitive environments. For NATO this implies more tar- geted defence investments and exploitation of industrial specialisation across the Alliance, as well as experimen- tation and innovation with new technologies to favour their future integration into the NATO force structure.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, Globalization, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:: Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

77. Achilles’ Heel: Adding Resilience to NATO’s Fragile Missile Shield

Author:: Ian Williams
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:: Tensions with Iran are once again increasing. The slow implosion of the nuclear accord, Iran’s harassment of cargo ships, and the downing of a U.S. unmanned aircraft have made plain the risk of conflict between Iran and the United States. The dispute should also draw attention to the questionable preparedness of the United States and its allies to fight a war with Iran on short notice and deal with that war’s blowback across the Middle East and Europe. Regional missile defense architectures are an important part of that preparedness. Iran has the largest and most diverse supply of ballistic missiles in the Middle East region, and Tehran has shown an ability and willingness to use them in combat operations.1 Iran is also learning to employ other kinds of aerial threats, such as long-range cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In a conflict with Iran, U.S. and allied forces would likely face a wide spectrum of air and missile threats. The biggest U.S. investment in Iran-centric missile defenses has been the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). EPAA is a phased buildup of U.S. missile defense assets in and around Europe to deter and, if necessary, limit damage from an Iranian missile attack on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Yet the EPAA architecture is heavily dependent on the nominal, unencumbered performance of a single radar deployed relatively close to Iran. This produces a single point of failure susceptible to malfunction or operator error. It also presents an Achilles’ heel that a determined or imaginative adversary could exploit. Iran certainly fits both descriptors. In 1958, strategist Albert Wohlstetter wrote that U.S. confidence in its nuclear second-strike ability was achieved only by “ignoring the full range of sensible enemy plans.”2 This same critical judgment should be applied to confidence in the EPAA as currently configured. Inasmuch as a sensible adversary such as Iran relies upon its missile forces to achieve its defense goals, it should be credited with the foresight to target single points of failure that would preclude the effective application of that missile force. Fortunately, there are practical steps that NATO and the United States can take to further adapt EPAA for greater resiliency. Upgrades to existing radars, the integration of allied radars into the missile defense mission, and the addition of air and space-based sensors would do much to improve EPAA’s capability and survivability, improving U.S. and NATO preparedness for an unexpected Middle East conflict.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: Europe, Iran, North Atlantic, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

78. What’s in the CARDs?

Author:: Ronald Van Reybroeck
Publication Date:: 02-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:: The Foreign Affairs Council on 19 November 2018 agreed to launch the CARD (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence) as a standing activity aimed at offering a better overview at EU level of defence spending, national investment and defence research efforts. Ministers of Defence tasked the European Defence Agency (EDA) to launch the first full CARD cycle in autumn 2019. How did we get here and, more importantly, what does the CARD have in store?
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Military Spending
Political Geography:: Europe

79. Proposed Frontex reform and its impact: Border politics and the external security nexus in the EU

Author:: Teemu Tammikko
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The EU Commission has proposed that the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, known as Frontex, should have a standing corps of 10,000 operational staff, who could be deployed anywhere in the world to willing host countries. Frontex would emphasize its focus on migration management and returns, and expands its tasks to countering terrorism.The reform would increase Frontex’s operational capabilities, but decrease the role of the member states by centralizing decision-making within the Commission. A partial overlap with the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) instruments, especially with civilian crisis management, could have an impact on the external action of the EU. Since the member states have diverging views on how to improve border security and the role that the Council should have in the decision-making, it is likely that the proposal will face some changes before it can be accepted by the Council and the European Parliament. To this end, the planned timeframe seems unrealistic.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, European Union, European Parliament, and Centralization
Political Geography:: Europe

80. Towards an EU security community? Public opinion and the EU’s role as a security actor

Author:: Matti Pesu and Tuomas Iso-Markku
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The EU’s ability to contribute to the security of its citizens forms a key part of a new emerging narrative for the Union. Finland is one of the advocates of increased EU activity in security and defence, frequently referring to the EU as a security community. Existing data on public opinion suggest that citizens’ views provide building blocks for more potent EU action in security and defence matters and support for the idea of the EU security community. EU citizens broadly share concerns related to terrorism and migration. The fear of armed conflict is low, however. In general, EU citizens are disposed towards collective action by the EU in questions of foreign, security and defence policy. Support for the CFSP and CSDP has remained high and strikingly stable. Moreover, there seems to be a nascent sense of solidarity and unity among Europeans, which may facilitate the EU’s agency in these areas. However, the EU should survey public attitudes on security-related questions in a more detailed fashion in order to gain a better grasp of the prevailing sentiments among EU citizens.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:: Europe

81. Democratic deterrence: How to dissuade hybrid interference

Author:: Mikael Wigell
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: For all the rhetorical rage surrounding ‘hybrid warfare’, Western democracy is being threatened more acutely by hybrid interference. Using liberal democratic values and infrastructure for cover, authoritarian actors use a panoply of covert, non-military means to subtly drive wedges between democratic societies and undermine their internal cohesion. This paper outlines the strategic logic of hybrid interference and shows how it puts Western democratic governability in jeopardy. It argues that deterrence policies need to be revamped in the face of this new challenge and suggests a new strategic concept – democratic deterrence – as a framework for dissuading hybrid interference. The concept of democratic deterrence shows how liberal democratic values need not be security vulnerabilities, as often presented in the current debate, but how they can be turned into strengths and tools for a credible deterrence response against hybrid aggressors, all the while making our Western democracies more robust and resilient.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Democracy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe and North America

82. Global Britain's Arctic security policy: Going forward while looking back

Author:: Agne Cepinsktye
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Britain’s Arctic security policy has been shifting from abandoning the region after the Cold War to developing a non-military security approach, to reintroducing the military defence dimension, most notably by the announcement of the UK Defence Arctic Strategy (DAS). These changes are both reactive to regional factors, namely the increasing geostrategic importance of the Arctic and Russia’s military expansion in the North, and reflective of the UK’s redefined post-Brexit identity as Global Britain. The focus on expanding the naval presence in the Arctic is consistent with the Global Britain vision, which underlies the UK’s broader foreign and security policy direction and emphasises the reassertion of naval strength and global maritime influence. While Britain’s ambition to restore the naval power in the Arctic and the North Atlantic is currently constrained by a lack of resources in the defence budget, it indicates an aspiration to strengthen historically rooted naval defence relations with the Arctic states.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:: Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, and Arctic

83. The basis for strong US-European relations endures: Continuity in institutions and interests

Author:: Christopher Kojm
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: President Donald Trump’s words and actions are disrupting US-European relations. Yet the structural basis for strong transatlantic ties endures. Key institutions and forces involved in the making of US foreign policy exhibit more continuity than change with respect to transatlantic relations. Congress strongly supports NATO. It agrees with the President on the need for greater burden-sharing, yet opposes the President’s harsh and gratuitous attacks on the Alliance. Executive Branch Departments, especially the Department of Defence, have longstanding institutional ties with European counterparts. High-level meetings, defence cooperation agreements, military exercises, and relationship-building continue without interruption. The US business community strongly opposes tariffs, and has been able to blunt the Administration’s further imposition of tariffs on European partners. Public opinion still strongly supports transatlantic defence and trade relations, even as partisan differences grow.
Topic:: Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Tariffs, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: United States, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

84. The militarization of US foreign policy: Engagement with Europe increasingly about defense

Author:: Deborah A. McCarthy
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The US Department of Defense is playing a predominant role in US foreign policy due to expanded mandates, large budgets and the disparagement of diplomacy by the Trump Administration. Defense relations may be the steadier foundation for transatlantic cooperation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Budget, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: United States, Europe, and North America

85. Venezuela: A Test Case for Russia and the US

Author:: Micky Aharonson
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: Venezuela has become flash point between Russia and the US. The way in which America responds to Russian conduct in its backyard will influence Russia’s international conduct in the future.
Topic:: Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Hegemony, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, South America, Venezuela, North America, and United States of America

86. The Fighting Continues in Northern Syria

Author:: Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Working Paper
Institution:: Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:: The Kurds vow to defend themselves—alone if necessary—against Syria, Turkey and Russia.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

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