Search

Begin New Search Topic Military Strategy Political Geography Europe Content Type Working Paper Publication Year within 10 Years Publication Year within 5 Years

1. The Russian-Ukrainian War: An Opportunity to Strengthen the AfCFTA

Author:
Steve Tametong and Venessa Aboudi
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The world had hardly covered from the horrors of the COVID-19 pandemic when it was once again tested on February 24, 2022, by the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine. The consequences of this war are quite significant for humanity. On the economic level, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has highlighted the disadvantages of globalization, understood as a process marked by the interconnection and interdependence of world economies. The inflationary shock and the food crisis resulting from the inoperative nature of import channels for certain basic necessities from Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated the fragility of the economies. With regard to African countries, in particular, the prices of several basic food products (wheat, flour, rice, maize, bread, vegetable oil, etc.) have risen sharply. Indeed, most African countries are almost dependent on the import of agricultural products and seeds from the two belligerent countries. These imports correspond to 35 billion US dollars of imports each year (1). This appears to be an incongruity given the extent of arable land on the African continent. The low production and especially processing capacity increases the dependence of African economies on the import of these basic products. The outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict makes it possible to question the economic resilience of African States, that is to say, their “capacity [ to] keep output close to [their] potential despite a shock ” (2). Above all, it offers the opportunity to analyze the economic and commercial potential of the AfCFTA in the process of building the resilience of African economies to external shocks. Indeed, the AfCFTA was officially launched in January 2021 with the main objective of “creating a single market for goods and services facilitated by the movement of people in order to deepen the economic integration of the African continent…” (3). This policy note is structured around the idea that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in view of its socio-economic consequences on the African continent, offers an opportunity for African countries to work toward the strengthening of the AfCFTA. So that it appears as a real pole of competitiveness and inter-African trade likely to counter the shocks and uncertainties of the dynamics of world trade. Before analyzing the AfCFTA as a pole of production and export of African products (II), it is necessary to take stock of the socio-economic consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war on African economies (I).
Topic:
Security, International Trade and Finance, Military Strategy, Free Trade, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. Mine Action as a Confidence- and Security-building Measure in the OSCE Region

Author:
Claudia Ditel
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Mine action has the potential to incentivise confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), because it could contribute to development and reconciliation through the creation of communities of practice among individuals from civil society and at the grassroots level as part of post-conflict reconstruction. Although many Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) participating States are contaminated by mines, mine action as a CSBM has scarcely been included in peace negotiations, because it is thought that it might hinder the peace process. Yet mine action, if “depoliticised”, could be implemented independently of peace negotiations through the creation of spaces for cooperation in demining projects of common interest to rival communities. The OSCE is well placed to propose these strategies, especially in Eastern Ukraine, Georgia, and Nagorno-Karabakh, which are not only affected by protracted conflicts with limited engagement of the population in the peace process but are also highly contaminated by mines.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Violence, and Landmines
Political Geography:
Europe

3. Commitment to Control Weaponised Artificial Intelligence: A Step Forward for the OSCE and European Security

Author:
Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The global debate on weaponised artificial intelligence (AI) often focuses on futuristic “killer robots”, which risks overlooking the fact that these technologies are already part of the security landscape. Diminishing human control over the use of force and the differences in states’ discourse pose a considerable risk for European security and stability. The impact of AI is not inevitable, and states should address this issue through political means, such as a political declaration with a commitment to ensuring human control over the use of force. With its inclusive membership, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) can and should become the platform through which its participating States can take a step forward in the global debate on weaponised AI.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Artificial Intelligence, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Europe

4. The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited

Author:
Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The Russian authorities apply an “algorithm of lies”, the Russian armed forces have become a sealed organization, and tactical information about Russia’s war in Ukraine is fragmented and unreliable. Hence, definite conclusions concerning the Russian soldier cannot be drawn.
Topic:
Security, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

5. Mobilizing Against Russia? Some Reflections on the Security Deadlock Called Ukraine

Author:
Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
No event exists beyond the media. This is also the case with the current Russian-Ukraine war. Daily, we are flooded with analyses and opinions about Putin’s military threat in the East. These narratives – mostly polemical and shrill – are both the result of and the catalyst for the crisis. As such, the debate itself – consciously or unconsciously – becomes part of the Western-Russian standoff driven by the strategy of hybrid and decision-centric warfare. This essay deliberately distances itself from the issues of the day and the hyper-polarized debate that currently takes place. Instead, a more detached exercise is made in which the polyphonic nature of the past and the intricacy of history is deliberately sought out. It shows the complexity of the process we have gone through, leading to the current deadlock. As such, we have to face the changes and continuities with which we have been confronted, or as Jeffrey Frank recently wrote in The New Yorker, “If a lot has changed since the end of the Cold War, there’s much that hasn’t.”
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

6. The Last Word: Zelensky Wags the Dog, But Slowly

Author:
Zachary Jonathan Jacobson
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
Abstract:
Too often agency (and blame) for the war in Ukraine has been presumed to lie predominantly with the greater powers. Liberals like Anne Applebaum point to President Vladimir Putin’s autocratic and expansionist mission to restore a greater Russia as the precipitating reagent for the crisis, while realists like John Mearsheimer hold the Americans and Europeans responsible for encouraging Ukraine to challenge Russia by seeking membership in NATO.2 In both cases (and both have a case), what has been underplayed is the agency of Ukraine. Taken for granted have been President Volodymyr Zelensky’s artful strategic manipulations to pull a wide community of actors into the regional conflict. His calls for military assistance have resembled what the political scientist Joseph Nye Jr. termed the “soft powers” of persuasion.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

7. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: Matching Ambition with Reality

Author:
Jonny Hall and Hugh Sandeman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This Strategic Update is based on a discussion hosted by LSE IDEAS in July 2022 on NATO’s 2030 Strategic Concept. Participants in the discussion included: General Sir James Everard, Gordon Barrass, General Sir Richard Barrons, Lt Gen Giles Hill, ProfessorChristopher Coker, Dr Luca Tardelli, Marissa Kemp, Tom McKane, and Peter Watkins. This Strategic Update reflects points made during the discussion, but no participant is in any way committed to its specific content, and the views expressed here are attributable solely to the authors. The Strategic Concept is the first since 2010 and was redrafted throughout a fundamentally different geopolitical and security context—following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This Update addresses the Concept’s recognition of necessary strategic realignment, with NATO’s widening in both its defence commitments and geographic focus on China, as well as its ambiguity in regards to practical military strategy, deterrence, and endpoint of the war in Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

8. What the First Week of Fighting in Ukraine Tells Us About a Potential Insurgency

Author:
Alec Worsnop
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
While the Russian advance in Ukraine has been slower than expected, its overwhelming conventional superiority gives it the upper hand. Despite the valiant resistance of many Ukrainians, Russia will probably conquer all or a portion of the country. However, the first week of the conflict has provided some useful information about the prospects for an insurgent campaign in the wake of a Russian occupation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

9. Policy Paper: Considerations of condemnation and balance of Palestine’s position on the war in Ukraine

Author:
Palthink
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In classic wars, we waited for the military result, and then we formed a political response. In new wars, there is not a final resolution; there is only the stronger party imposing its conditions. Additionally, there is also geographical control, regime projection, or behavior modification goals. Russia is seeking to maintain its national security and enhance its regional and international position. It has a deep fear that NATO will expand, bringing weapons to its border with Ukraine. Now that the first shock of the war has receded, the world realizes that the war will not exceed Ukraine’s borders. Russia has given indications that it will limit itself to the minimum that preserves its national security by preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. Global concern about the consequences of war is high. People are wondering if it will continue or stop. Additionally, sanctions have been announced. In this context, developing and poor countries are affected by conflict because they depend on foreign aid. Their positions on the war will determine where they are positioned, and how the political, economic and security consequences will affect them. Trying to show a neutral position would not endear them to the great powers. On the face of it, it may seem to be a war fought on Ukrainian lands only, but it is a world war of influence. The survival of developing nations depends on the strength of the international community and the extent to which it supports these nations in the light of political realism, not because of their strength and resources. Many places cannot survive without traditional international support.
Topic:
International Relations, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Palestine

10. Everything Counts: Building a Control Regime for Nonstrategic Nuclear Warheads in Europe

Author:
Miles A. Pomper, William Alberque, Marshall L. Brown Jr., William M. Moon, and Nikolai Sokov
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Biden administration insisted in arms control talks with Russia that a follow-on agreement to the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) should cover all nuclear weapons and that such an agreement should focus on the nuclear warheads themselves. This would represent a significant change from previous agreements, which focused on delivery vehicles, such as missiles. The United States has been particularly interested in potential limits on nonstrategic nuclear warheads (NSNW). Such weapons have never been subject to an arms control agreement. Because Russia possesses an advantage in the number of such weapons, the US Senate has insisted that negotiators include them in a future agreement, making their inclusion necessary if such an accord is to win Senate approval and ultimately be ratified by Washington. In the wake of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine conflict, such demands can only be expected to grow if and when US and Russian negotiators return to the negotiating table.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

11. The Implications of the Ukraine War for Israel

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
For Israel, this is evidence that its self-reliance doctrine must be nourished with no illusions about foreign support in times of crisis. Moreover, Turkey probably sees NATO more positively since it borders Russia, pushing Ankara toward the West.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

12. The “New Uzbekistan”: Turkey’s New Partner in the Pan-Turkist Organization of Turkic States

Author:
Hay Eytan Cohan Yanaroack
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Tashkent’s increasingly critical approach toward Russia and its deepening role in the Organization of Turkic States has positioned the country as Ankara’s most important bridgehead in Central Asia.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and Turkey

13. Japan and the War in Ukraine

Author:
Eyal Ben-Ari
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Two weeks after the war began, Japan announced that its new National Security Strategy scheduled to be published this year would recategorize Russia from “partner” to “security challenge,” thus placing it alongside China and North Korea.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, and Asia

14. British Pugwash Note on the Absence of Sole Purpose in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
In June 2022 NATO members adopted an updated Strategic Concept (the preceding Concept having been adopted in 2010). There was reason to hope that in the updated Concept NATO members would envisage using nuclear weapons only in response to their first use by a nuclear-armed adversary. That reason lay in remarks made by President Biden when he was Barack Obama’s Vice-President. Notably in January 2017 he said: “Given our non-nuclear capacities and the nature of today´s threats, it is hard to envision a plausible scenario in which the first use of nuclear weapons by the United States would be necessary or would make sense; deterring, and, if necessary, retaliating against a nuclear attack should be the sole purpose of the US nuclear arsenal”. The adoption of Sole Purpose would be a useful nuclear risk reduction measure. Leaving open the option of using nuclear weapons in response to a non-nuclear attack on NATO entails the risk of nuclear escalation if the attacker is nuclear armed; and nuclear escalation entails the risk of global nuclear annihilation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

15. Russia’s threat against the Jewish Agency is a Bargaining Measure

Author:
Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel should prepare for a prolonged crisis. The Russians might want to delay or accelerate the legal process to exploit the elections period. The verdict will not constitute the final word. The government is advised to navigate the crisis behind the scenes: publicity might accelerate escalation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Israel, and North America

16. It is in America’s Interest to End the War in Ukraine

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Continuing the war harms the West and endangers its battle to attain other critical strategic objectives.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

17. War or Peace? Turkish Moves in Syria

Author:
Gallia Lindenstrauss and Carmit Valensi
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Recent increased attacks on Kurdish targets in northern Syria by Turkey and the Syrian rebel groups its supports raise the question whether Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan intends to carry out his threat of May 2022 to begin another major ground operation against the Kurds. On the other hand, conciliatory statements regarding the Assad regime have been sounded recently in Turkey, and there has been discussion of the possibility of normalizing relations between the two countries after over a decade of hostility and competition. These two processes appear to be contradictory, given that the Syrian regime opposes existing Turkish control of Syrian territories, and does not wish to see this control broadened. On the other hand, this may be a calculated Turkish move that aims to show the Turkish public a concerted multi-faceted effort to confront both the Kurdish underground and the issue of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Discussion of events in northern Syria and the web of Syrian and Turkish interests can be used to assess the question, which trend will prevail in Turkish-Syrian relations: normalization or escalation?
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Homeland Security, Peace, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

18. The War in Ukraine: More Western Aid and Fear of Escalation

Author:
Eldad Shavit and Shimon Stein
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The United States and other NATO countries have thus far not deviated from their policy regarding the war in Eastern Europe – military and economic assistance, with no boots on the ground. Yet the more the war continues, and while there is a chance of significant escalation, does this policy stand to change?
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Escalation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

19. The Russia-Ukraine War: Where Do We Go from Here?

Author:
Zvi Magen and Sophie Kobzantsev
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Two months after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the goal of a short campaign has clearly not been achieved. Russia now seeks to achieve gains while suspending the negotiations with Kyiv – both to improve its position in advance of future negotiations, and to deliver the message to the West that “you cannot stop us.”
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

20. Investigation of Russia's Crimes in Ukraine: A Turning Point for the International Criminal Court?

Author:
Ori Beeri and Pnina Sharvit Baruch
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The Chief Prosecutor at The Hague has already begun to investigate actions taken by Russia in the Ukrainian arena, while accelerating judicial proceedings and bureaucracy. This reflects a change of approach, which includes the prioritization of recent events, as part of an effort to strengthen the status of the Court. How will this affect the investigation of the war in Eastern Europe – and the investigation concerning Israel?
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, International Crime, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Global Focus

21. The Ukrainian Civil Front – An Interim Assessment

Author:
Meir Elran, Uri Bar-Yosef, and Zvi Magen
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Most of Ukraine’s civilian population demonstrates a high degree of steadfastness during the war, rallying around the flag – and around the president. Nonetheless, the challenge to Ukrainian national resilience remains high, given the huge waves of migration, the losses in the hinterland, and the severe damage to national infrastructure and the local economy – which could have decisive effects on Ukraine’s ability to recover from the war
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

22. After the Russian “Ruse,” China Looks for New Friends

Author:
Galia Lavi
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
With the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it would seem that Beijing and Moscow should be a united front against the West. But in actuality, China has been surprised by the scale of the Russian aggression and is now rethinking its position in the geopolitical arena. How will this affect the Middle East?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

23. Intelligence and the War in Ukraine: The Limited Power of Public Disclosure

Author:
Ofek Reimer
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Months before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West began to disclose intelligence material on Putin’s plans – thereby using a policy tool that brings with it both advantages and risks. What did the intelligence disclosures achieve, and what might Israel learn from this experience?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Intelligence, Military Strategy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

24. Will Russia Use Nuclear Weapons in Ukraine?

Author:
Helit Barel
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
One month into the war in Ukraine, the nuclear threat remains. Will Russia’s President decide to use nuclear weapons on the battlefield, and thereby shatter the 77 years of nuclear deterrence? From a rational perspective, there is little likelihood of this occurring, but thus far Putin has not succeeded in realizing his goals in the Ukrainian theater – and Russia has a large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

25. The War in Ukraine: The Challenge of Shaping an Endgame

Author:
Udi Dekel
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Although nearly three weeks have passed since Putin invaded Ukraine, there is no framework for an endgame on the horizon. While the United States and the West would like to bring Putin to his knees as he sinks deeper in the Ukrainian mud, Washington must recognize that the longer the war continues, the chances increase for escalation to new levels that neither side wants. Therefore, before the situation is completely out of control, there must be a dialogue with Russia that can lead to an end to the war.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

26. Putin’s Dilemma

Author:
Ofer Shelah
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
After more than two weeks of war in Ukraine, initial conclusions can already be drawn. Chief among these is the realization that force application in complicated conditions can confront a decision maker with a serious dilemma, in which precisely a military achievement may destroy any possibility of scoring a political achievement
Topic:
Military Strategy, Leadership, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

27. The Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Legal Aspects

Author:
Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Ori Beeri
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Since Russia invaded Ukraine, it has been the object of significant legal pressure. While the various legal measures have no power to stop the bloody war, they deliver a powerful, unequivocal message: any state that flagrantly violates international world and undermines the world order will suffer isolation, condemnation, sanction, and criminal investigations. Israel, which has seemed to lean to sitting on the fence, must join the international efforts against Russia, Otherwise it is liable to find itself on the wrong side of history
Topic:
Military Strategy, Law, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

28. The Ukraine Crisis: An Interim Analysis

Author:
Eldad Shavit, Zvi Magen, and Shimon Stein
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
Although Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began only days ago, it is already clear that with this belligerence Putin has upset the world order that has existed since the Second World War. The Western bloc has already begun to realign and is presenting a unified and forceful stance vis-à-vis Moscow. Israel can no longer avoid taking a clear stand and siding fully with the countries opposing Russia
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

29. Russia-Ukraine: Dangerous Stalemate

Author:
European Institute of Peace
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Institute of Peace (EIP)
Abstract:
Seven years have passed this month since the Package of Measures for implementation of the Minsk agreements called for an “immediate and comprehensive ceasefire in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine and its strict implementation…”. Despite endorsement by the UN Security Council Resolution 2202 (February 2015), little or no progress was made in implementing the Minsk agreements, with continued conflict and violations of the ceasefire reported by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) on an almost daily basis. Almost 14.000 Ukrainians lost their lives, thousands more were injured, and millions displaced. With no effective ceasefire in place, this is not a “frozen conflict,” and violent escalation may happen by intent, misunderstanding or miscalculation. Today an even more dangerous stalemate has emerged. Deep international concerns have been raised about the reported Russian military build-up along the country’s borders with Ukraine. Further raising the stakes, broader security issues have re-surfaced with Moscow demanding inter alia guarantees from the US and NATO to refrain from any further enlargement of the alliance, including the accession of Ukraine and other states. Despite intensive and on-going international consultations at all levels, there are no signs yet of de-escalation of the crisis. This report has been prepared in consultation with a group of Ukrainian and Russian experts who have been conducting quiet discussions during the past two years on the Minsk peace process and, more broadly, relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. These talks are held under the auspices of the European Institute of Peace.[1] Out of deep concern with present developments, it was decided to share more widely the broad consensus among the participants about the urgent need for a sustainable and durable ceasefire as a prerequisite for implementing the Minsk agreements. In a recent encouraging development, the advisers to the Normandy Four (N4) heads of state and government have supported in a joint statement after their meeting in Paris “unconditional observance of the ceasefire of 22 July 2020 regardless of differences on other issues of the implementation of the Minsk agreements.”[2] Reportedly, a follow-up meeting in Berlin on 10 February 2022 yielded no tangible results yet. Even if the Minsk peace process has come to a ground halt at present, it should be realized that the same political and security issues will have to be addressed in any renewed peace efforts in whatever format to restore peace in east Ukraine. This report highlights that any attempt to overcome the current political stalemate needs to be supported by concrete steps to establish a sustainable ceasefire at the ground-level of the conflict. The report analyses the major reasons for why a sustainable ceasefire was not implemented thus far, and offers a ceasefire management tool referred to as a “Coordination and Verification Mechanism” (CVM).
Topic:
Military Strategy, Violence, Peace, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

30. Radioactive Consequences of a War in Ukraine

Author:
Rico Chandra
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
A war in Ukraine could lead to thousands of radioactive sources getting lost, or worse, getting stolen and repurposed for political destabilization. So what is a radioactive “source”? It is a material that is specifically manufactured for the purpose of emitting radiation. For example, some forms of cancer are treated using radiotherapy whereby intense gamma radiation, emitted from a pencil-sized lump of radioactive metal, is directed at the tumor. This lump of highly radioactive metal is a radioactive “source”.
Topic:
Health, Military Strategy, Radiological Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

31. Present Danger: Nuclear Power Plants in War

Author:
Henry Sokolski
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
After Russia’s unprecedented seizure of Ukraine’s nuclear plant at Zaporizhzhya, the United States needs to adjust its military planning and policies to cope with hostile military forces’ targeting, seizure, and garrisoning of armed forces at large operating nuclear plants and clarify its policies regarding possible US targeting of such plants. This article is the first to analyze these concerns. It compares Russia’s assaults with previous strikes against research reactors and nonoperating nuclear plants in the Middle East and clarifies what new military measures and policies will be needed to cope with military operations against large, operating nuclear plants. US Army and Pentagon officials, as well as military and civilian staff, will discover ways to mitigate and reduce future military harm to civilians in war zones and understand the operational implications of military assaults on and seizures of civilian nuclear facilities.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

32. Arresting Nuclear Adventurism: China, Article VI, and the NPT

Author:
Henry Sokolski and Andrea Beck
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Given the current crisis in Ukraine, it’s tempting to consider focusing on Chinese compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to be an academic indulgence. Giving into this inclination, however, would be a mistake. As dangerous as Russia currently is, China will be more threatening in the long run. As we are learning with Russia’s violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, enforcing binding understandings is critical lest violators run roughshod over law and good order. This is true with Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. It is no less so with China’s nuclear weapons buildup and its repeated refusal to join in good faith negotiations to limit its nuclear weapons activities, which is required by Article VI of the NPT. This buildup and refusal clearly flies in the face of China’s legal NPT obligations. The question is what might bring Beijing back into compliance. To get the answers, NPEC held a battery of workshops last fall, followed by a week-long diplomatic simulation. The game participants included U.S., Japanese, and Australian former and current officials and staff as well as outside experts. The group concluded that Beijing is unlikely to comply willingly with the NPT anytime soon, but that U.S. and international security would still be best served by spotlighting Beijing’s nuclear adventurism and suggesting diplomatic off-ramps to arrest its nuclear buildup.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Peace, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

33. The EU is Reluctantly Getting Tougher with Putin

Author:
Emmanuel Navon
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Europeans surely remember what happens when you let an autocrat get away with grabbing territories hoping that the last bite will be the last one
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

34. Understanding the Russia-Iran-Israel Triangle

Author:
Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
As Tehran invests efforts to improve relations with Russia, Israel will have to maintain a dialogue with Moscow to safeguard its military and diplomatic freedom of action.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

35. The Ukraine War: Preparing for the Longer-Term Outcome

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
It is far too early to predict the ultimate outcome of the Ukraine War, but it is all too clear that no peace settlement or ceasefire is likely to eliminate a long period of military tension between the U.S. – including NATO and its allies – and anything approaching President Putin’s future version of Russia, nor will any resolution of the current conflict negate the risk of new forms of war. It is equally clear that the U.S. and NATO need to act as quickly as possible to prepare for an intense period of military competition and must create a more secure deterrent and improve their capability to defend against Russia. In practice, NATO will need to make up for years of underfunding by each member country and for the cuts in force levels, readiness, and modernization that years of a U.S.-driven focus on burden-sharing – rather than funding NATO’s real military priorities – did little or nothing to address. NATO will need to find new ways to counter the massive problems in interoperability and differences in comparative warfighting that still exist between NATO’s 30 nations. This will need to be accomplished at a time when emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) are constantly changing the nature of deterrence and warfighting, when Russia is actively pursuing nuclear modernization rather than arms control, and when NATO’s more advanced forces are struggling to create new approaches to joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) – and all while doing so at a time when most member countries have limited capabilities to support their existing force structure. At best, developing and sustaining any coherent effort to deal with these issues will take at least five years to implement. It then will require constant updating on an annual basis as new types of technology, tactics, and command and control continue to reshape military needs and force plans. This, in turn, requires sustained political and popular support in the face of inflation and civil needs during a time when the momentum for military change created by the current fighting in Ukraine may have faded. In some ways, the only thing harder than crisis management is the lack of crisis management.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

36. Iranian Public Opinion on the War in Ukraine and Nuclear Options

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Ebrahim Mohseni, and Clay Ramsay
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The current survey is an Update, rather than a comprehensive check on Iranian public attitudes. This interim report covers findings on two unfolding security challenges – Iran’s nuclear program and the war in Ukraine – and their potential interconnections.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Public Opinion, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Ukraine, and Middle East

37. US-Russian Contention in Cyberspace: Are Rules of the Road Necessary or Possible?

Author:
Pavel Sharikov
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
In recent years, as news of U.S.-Russian tensions in the cyber domain has dominated headlines, some strategic thinkers have pointed to the need for a bilateral cyber “rules of the road” agreement. American political scientist Joseph Nye, a former head of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, wrote in 2019 that, even “if traditional arms-control treaties are unworkable” in cyberspace, “it may still be possible to set limits on certain types of civilian targets, and to negotiate rough rules of the road that minimize conflict.” Robert G. Papp, a former director of the CIA’s Center for Cyber Intelligence, has likewise argued that “even a cyber treaty of limited duration with Russia would be a significant step forward.” On the Russian side, President Vladimir Putin himself has called for “a bilateral intergovernmental agreement on preventing incidents in the information space,” comparing it to the Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas. Amid joint Russian-U.S. efforts, the Working Group on the Future of U.S.-Russia Relations recommended several elements of an agreement in 2016, among them that Russia and the U.S. agree “on the types of information that are to be shared in the event of a cyberattack” (akin to responses to a bio-weapons attack) and prohibit both “automatic retaliation in cases of cyberattacks” and “attacks on elements of another nation’s core internet infrastructure.” Most recently, in June 2021, a group of U.S., Russian and European foreign-policy officials and experts called for “cyber nuclear ‘rules of the road.’”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

38. Belarus’s Weaponization of Migration Should Make Us Reevaluate the Extent of Crimes Against Humanity and Human Rights

Author:
Peter Pinto
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
Facing temperatures below freezing and bitter winter conditions, thousands of Middle Eastern and African migrants currently remain trapped between the tumultuous borders of Belarus and its EU neighbors. Many humanitarian groups have warned of imminent danger to the migrants if this humanitarian crisis, which has seen nearly 30,000 migrants attempt to illegally cross the Polish border since August, is not quickly resolved. Despite genuine reasons for their journey, the migrants have become unsuspecting pawns in an ever-growing political chess game between Belarus and its EU neighbors. More specifically, Belarus and its President Aleksander Lukashenko are being accused of facilitating and weaponizing such migration in an attempt to punish their geopolitical rivals in the EU. The accusations are relatively well-founded considering the litany of different immigration policies adopted by Belarusian authorities in recent months, including granting visas to migrants upon arrival and escorting migrants to the Polish border. Furthermore, many view this targeted influx of migrants as political retaliation for EU sanctions against Belarus for election fraud and repression of civil rights. Perhaps in hopes of destabilizing his enemies or deterring future sanctions, President Lukashenko is using migrants and their pursuit for safety as weapons in his geopolitical war against the West. Despite his already lackluster record in humanitarian governance, this blatant indifference for migrant safety represents an escalation in his disregard for human rights. If we are to deter other authoritarian leaders from employing such inhumane tactics in the future, then we must recognize the weaponization of migration streams as a crime against humanity and a violation of human rights.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Crimes Against Humanity, Humanitarian Crisis, and Migrants
Political Geography:
Europe and Belarus

39. Montenegro after the General Elections: A New Chapter in Transition or Preservation of Status Quo?

Author:
Krševan Antun Dujmović
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
The general elections held in Montenegro on 30 August 2020 has once again drawn the attention of the Western Balkans to the smallest, measured by population, among seven nations that emerged after the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This attention is due to a number of factors. Back in May of 2018 Montenegro has opened the last of the thirty-three chapters in the negotiation process with the European Union, making it a harbinger among Western Balkans nations on the path to Euro-Atlantic integrations, especially as the country had joined the North Atlantic Alliance in June 2017. Other countries in the region linger behind Montenegro – Albania and North Macedonia, both NATO members, are still waiting for the opening of the negotiations with the EU. Serbia has no intention to join NATO, and in spite of EU negotiations and ambitions, sees itself in balance between the West on one side, and Russia and China on the other. Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina are far from NATO membership and have merely the status of potential candidates for EU membership. This is why all eyes of the region and of the advocates of continuation of EU enragement policy are on Montenegro. The second factor are strong historical ties of this country on the Adriatic coast with its northern neighbor Serbia. Serbian minority makes up to one third of Montenegro’s population, and the Serbian Orthodox Church (SPC- Srpska Pravoslavna Crkva) plays a vital role in Montenegrin society, as this country does not have its own autocephalous Church recognized by other Orthodox Churches in Eastern Christendom. This gives Serbia and the SPC a significant clout within borders of its southern neighbor. The third factor is the involvement of global players in this country. The United Sates has advocated strongly to include Montenegro in NATO in order to stretch the line of NATO’s southern flank in the Northern Mediterranean from the Iberian Peninsula to the west to Greece and Turkey in the east. On the other hand, Montenegro’s authorities accused Russia of meddling in the general elections held in October 2016 when the alleged coup d’état occurred on the election day. Many feared a similar scenario on the eve of 30 August 2020 election, fathoming the outbreak of riots and violence that could ignite the powder keg in the Balkans. Although none of these happened, Montenegro is not ceasing to be the subject of the geopolitical chessboard. Considering these factors, the attention of neighbors to the events in this Balkan country is understandable. The unfolding situation after the elections in which the government of Montenegro is backed by a very thin majority in the Parliament (Skupština Crne Gore) and with no clear vision nor strategy for further political and economic development of the country, is only fueling the wariness of its neighbors and of Brussels about Montenegro as a success story.
Topic:
NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Elections, European Union, and Transition
Political Geography:
Europe, Balkans, and Montenegro

40. Russia or the West – Which Should Jerusalem Choose?

Author:
Daniel Rakov
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The Israeli government has not publicly expressed a position regarding the gathering of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border. Still, a renewed war between Russia and Ukraine could make it challenging to choose between its commitment to its Western allies and its important relationship with Russia.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and Israel

41. What does the Deraa surrender mean for Iran and Russia in Syria?

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
In the southwest, the outside powers of relevance are Iran and Russia. The arrangement in place from July 2018 until now was the product of an uneasy standoff between them.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

42. The Unpredictable Course of Naval Innovation – The Guns of HMS Thunderer

Author:
Ben Lombardi
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In January 1879, a muzzle-loading gun aboard HMS Thunderer, one of the Royal Navy’s most powerful warships, exploded. A parliamentary investigation determined that the accident occurred because of human error brought about by a highly innovative, but complicated, loading mechanism. Given earlier unsatisfactory experience with early breech-loading guns, contemporary naval engagements and expectations of the future nature of conflict at sea, retention of muzzle-loaders seemed a reasonable course of action. Vast sums were, therefore, spent in ensuring that Britain’s navy had the biggest and most powerful of that type of ordnance. But the explosion and other advances in gun design meant that muzzle-loaders were a dead end, and the incident on Thunderer became the impetus for the Royal Navy to adopt breech-loaders. This incident shines light upon the thinking within the Royal Navy at the time regarding advanced guns. But it also underscores the uncertainty and unpredictability that is inevitably attached to rapid innovation by a large military institution such as the Royal Navy was in the late-19th century. This story is highly relevant to force development considerations today because in any era of continuous technological change, mistakes are inevitable and their expectation should be accommodated within planning.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
Britain and Europe

43. NATO 2030- The Military Dimension

Author:
Heinrich Brauss and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO must “stay strong militarily, be more united politically, and take a broader approach 1 globally”. When launching the reflection pro- cess on NATO’s future role, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg set these three priorities to frame his vision of NATO 2030. At their meeting in London in December 2019, NA- TO’s political leaders mandated a “forward-looking re- flection process” on how NATO should further adapt to ensure it was able to successfully cope with a world of competing great powers due to the rise of China and Russia’s persistently aggressive posture, together with instability along NATO’s southern periphery, new trans- national risks emerging from pandemics, climate change and disruptive technologies. Establishing a unified stra- tegic vision is vital for upholding the Alliance’s cohesion, credibility and effectiveness. Looking forward, what does this mean for NATO’s military dimension?
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

44. “The Montreux Petition” and Creeping Islamization of the Turkish Military

Author:
Hay Ertan Cohen Yanarocak
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
A storm over a petition by retired naval officers once again has revealed longstanding tensions between the civilian Turkish government and the Turkish military, and Erdogan’s plans for advancing pro-regime Islamists in the military.
Topic:
Security, Religion, Military Strategy, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Asia

45. Time to Update Israeli Policy Toward Syria

Author:
Aiman Mansour
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel should (silently) support a more flexible US policy towards the Syrian regime and the Russian presence in Syria, including the easing of sanctions on Syria, in order to decrease Assad’s dependence on Iranian support and to heighten the conflicts of interest between Moscow and Tehran.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Israel, Syria, North America, and United States of America

46. Biden’s Eastern Mediterranean Agenda

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Establishing coherent US policy regarding brewing conflict in the eastern Mediterranean should be a Biden administration priority. By restraining Erdogan’s ambitions, the US can add to stability and rebuild bridges with key European players and traditional US allies. The governments of Israel and Greece, in consultation with Egypt, should work together to advance this perspective in Washington.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Leadership, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Greece, North America, United States of America, and Mediterranean

47. Erdogan using deniable private militias to destabilize the Middle East

Author:
Hay Ertan Cohen Yanarocak and Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Erdoğan has created a private military and paramilitary system. He deploys this apparatus for domestic and foreign operations without official oversight.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Leadership, Private Sector, and Public-Private Partnership
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey

48. Can Russia live with an ongoing conflict in Syria? Mapping out Trends Among Russian Foreign Policy Elites

Author:
Andrey Baklanov and Leonid Isaev
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
September 30, 2020 marked five years since the start of the Russian Aerospace Forces operation in Syria. This was the first military operation Moscow launched far from its own borders since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Today Russia is not only militarily involved but is deeply invested in the conflict as it seeks to shape the course of the negotiation process and the post-conflict socio-political development of Syria. Russia’s grand strategy in Syria continues to evolve as it assesses its actions and goals in the light of current realities. In this paper we look at how the Russian academic community and diplomatic circles see the outlook of the Syrian negotiation process. We conducted in-depth interviews with representatives of these groups in order to understand their perspective on the Geneva process, the prospects of the Astana format, and the impacts on Russia of an ongoing conflict scenario in Syria.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

49. Reconciliation Initiatives in Daraa: A Testimony for Histor

Author:
Haytham Manna
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The southern city of Daraa was the birthplace of the peaceful Syrian uprising that started in March 2012. This genuine Syrian movement was met with accusations of conspiracy and vandalism by the Government of Syria (GoS), whose aggressive responses provoked similar reactions from local population. The Houranian people (Daraa city residents), who are known for their peacefulness and sensitivity towards strangers, detested the militarization of the uprising, and they resisted the increasing presence of foreign armed elements (Hezbollah, Nusra Front, ISIS). The feeling of loss of their identity and space to outsiders was acute. The reconciliation with the GoS came about through negotiations with the Russians in mid-2018. Houran people took it as an opportunity to avoid a costly military confrontation with the GoS, restore peacefulness, and expel the foreign militias. This author was part of the negotiations and involved in deliberations at many junctures, and this testimony was prepared in consultation with the principal members of the reconciliation negotiations with the Russians and the GoS.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

50. Understanding Russia’s Endgame in Syria: A View from the United States

Author:
Mona Yacoubian
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Inherently unstable, Russia’s “spheres of influence” endgame strategy will result in a fractured and volatile Syria. Neither Russia nor Turkey appears likely to withdraw from Syria in the near term. Iran will remain an important player, albeit without holding a territorial sphere of influence. Balancing against Moscow, Tehran will exploit opportunities where possible, deepening its influence through informal and covert efforts. In this endgame, Russia’s prickly partnership with Turkey in Syria likely will endure. As a Russian analyst noted, “Turkey and Russia need each other strategically.” While Moscow may acknowledge that Turkey’s presence in Syria is a long-term problem, Russia’s “spheres of influence” endgame strategy nonetheless accommodates the reality of a lasting Turkish presence.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Rivalry, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

51. US-Russia interactions in Syria and the future of the conflict in 2021

Author:
Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The future for Syria in 2021 looks bleak from the Russian perspective. Though the conflict entered a low-intensity phase of armed confrontations that characterised 2020 will likely continue in 2021. The temporary negotiated solution for north-western Syria reached in March 2020 is likely to hold but there exists a high probability of renewed fighting between the SAA and various Islamist groups. There will also be bickering between Russia, Turkey, Syria, and Iran due to their different visions for Idlib’s future. Tensions will likely also continue to grow in northern and north-eastern Syria, where US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces sporadically clash with pro-Turkish groups. Occasional US-Russian encounters on the ground are also highly likely in the region. Additionally, confrontations between Israel and Iran/Hezbollah forces stationed in Syria will likely continue and might escalate.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

52. Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation: What history suggests about future scenarios

Author:
Charly Salonius-Pasternak
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Defence cooperation between Finland and Sweden has a history that far predates the most recent ‘reignition’ of 2014, and is now deeper than at any time in the past. In 2020, Sweden and Finland can contribute to each other’s defence in an integrated and planned fashion; but any plans are best viewed as being supplementary to national preparations. While the security interests of Finland and Sweden have overlapped historically, cooperation has often been limited due to a combination of domestic drivers and foreign pressures, as well as the nature of the international security system. Yet these same variables are currently permitting even deeper cooperation. Four future paths of cooperation are identifiable, with the most likely being a continuation of bilateral deepening, with added trilateral cooperation with Norway and the United States.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, Sweden, and Scandinavia

53. The deepening Finnish-Swedish security and defence relationship: From operative cooperation to ‘strategic interoperability’?

Author:
Matti Pesu and Tuomas Iso-Markku
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Finnish-Swedish defence cooperation has taken significant steps. Currently, the two countries engage in operative planning, which constitutes a significant part of their new cooperation agenda. Although interoperability between the Finnish and Swedish armed forces is crucial for the bilateral defence relationship, the countries should be ‘interoperable’ at the strategic level as well. Neither Finland’s and Sweden’s strategic cultures nor their decision-making systems or legislation are entirely similar. However, military non-alignment, similar threat perceptions and a shared assessment of their security environment facilitate their cooperation. In view of the future, questions remain about the two countries’ readiness to enter mutual defence commitments. There is also a need to ensure that their basic messages concerning the bilateral defence relationship are aligned. Over the longer term, the idea that one’s neighbour is worth defending should be entrenched in the strategic cultures of both states. This requires active nurturing of the already close relations between their national security communities.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, Sweden, and Scandinavia

54. Finnish foreign policy during EU membership: Unlocking the EU’s security potential

Author:
Matti Pesu, Tuomas Iso-Markku, and Juha Jokela
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
This FIIA Finnish Foreign Policy Paper looks at the evolution of Finnish foreign and security policy during the country’s 25 years as an EU member. The paper aims to trace how – and with what kind of consequences – Finnish foreign and security policy has interacted with EU foreign policy during the membership period. More specifically, the study examines the interlinkage between Finnish and EU foreign policy in relation to three different topics: the policy towards and relations with Russia, security and defence, and Finland’s broadening international agenda. The paper argues that the Finnish policy vis-à-vis the three domains is marked by different patterns of continuity and change. However, the rise of a protective agenda in the Finnish policy towards Russia, Finland’s increased boldness in advancing the EU’s security and defence dimension, and the recent emphasis on the Union’s role as a bulwark against geo-economic threats all indicate that the EU’s role in enhancing Finnish security has become a top priority. Indeed, Finland is currently endeavouring to unlock the EU’s potential as a security community.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, and Scandinavia

55. Government reports on Finnish foreign and security policy: Relevant but not without problems

Author:
Henri Vanhanen
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The government reports on foreign and security policy have become a well-established and recognized practice in which the Government of Finland issues a report generally once during the parliamentary term. The reports can be regarded as comprehensive and strategic documents, whose purpose is to signal the strategic directions of Finland’s present and future policy for both domestic and foreign readers. Regardless of the government reports’ institutionalized role in Finnish foreign and security policy practices, they are not without problems. The main issue with the current report process is linked to the quickly changing operational environment. Thus, a more frequent process such as an annual announcement on foreign and security policy to support the government reports should be considered. It is relevant to ask whether the current tradition of producing reports is the most effective way to outline or signal Finland’s overall foreign and security policy. In order to address the issues of the reporting process, alternative methods to support and evaluate Finland’s foreign and security policy should be considered.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, and Scandinavia

56. Will a European Security Council Bring Strategic Relevance?

Author:
Jo Coelmont
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Europe is looking to be a global player rather than just a global playground. To achieve this, it needs a security council. This is essential for gaining strategic relevance. Europe needs to have recourse not only to international fora but also to a series of instruments of hard and soft power. Swift decision making at the appropriate level is of paramount importance. Such a security council should meet a number of requirements: it must be representative, be able to both achieve unity of vision and undertake action smoothly, and keep going until the desired end-state has been achieved. Several proposals have been made as to the composition of such a body. I will look into the four most discussed options. Are we spoilt for choice?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

57. Dealing with Russia: Towards a Coherent Belgian Policy

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer and Laura Vansina
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Belgo-Russian relations are mired in paradox. For several years, the relationship between the Russian Federation on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the other has been characterized by mistrust. As a founding member of these multilateral organisations, Belgium has been a full part of the decision-making process that has formulated a hardening stance towards the Russian Federation. Yet on a bilateral level, Belgium has pragmatically upheld what is left of commercial cooperation and cultural exchanges. In order to deal with this paradox, Belgium should formulate a more coherent approach towards Russia that focuses on upholding the European order and security whilst maintaining dialogue and engaging the Russian Federation. This requires the new Belgian government to engage in a delicate balancing act that can be articulated in the forthcoming National Security Strategy, in the Belgian positions in the EU and NATO, and in the bilateral relationship with Moscow. This Egmont Paper aspires to provide both analytical background and novel ideas which can be used to such a purpose. When analysing Russian foreign policy, it can only be acknowledged that the annex- ation of Crimea in 2014 fundamentally challenged the rules-based international order. Yet to understand Russian behaviour, it is imperative to reach back in time to the late 1990s and early 2000s. Ever since, Russia’s main goal on the international stage has been the re-establishment of its Great Power status. To this end, it has sought to consolidate security buffers in the form of geographical and psychological depth. Most notably, it involved the promotion of the ‘Russian World’ (Russkiy Mir), the conduct of operations in the grey zone between war and peace, and a fair dose of strategic opportunism. Whilst perhaps understandable, this assertive foreign policy has negatively affected Belgian interests in a variety of ways. Belgo-Russian relations constitute a true kaleidoscope ranging from cooperation to conflict. Bilateral trade has largely recovered from the 2014-2015 shock resulting from the sanctions regime – even if the trade balance remains a negative one. Cultural and academic exchanges continue, in line with the little-known 1993 Belgo- Russian Treaty on Understanding and Cooperation. Yet politically, conflict has been on the increase. Russia has been actively challenging and contesting the multilateral framework that Belgium holds dear. In addition, Belgium has become the target of Russian disinformation and other grey zone operations. As it is unlikely that Russia will tone down its assertive foreign policy anytime soon, Belgium would do well to articulate a more coherent approach. This needs to clarify Belgian policy priorities, communicate Belgian positions towards the Russian government, and educate the domestic audience about the evolving relationship with the Russian Federation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Belgium

58. Belgium Should Not Change Strategy on Her Contribution to NATO's Nuclear Role Sharing

Author:
Didier Audenaert
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
In this policy brief, the author focusses on NATO’s nuclear dimension. He highlights key challenges in the European security environment and explains essential charac- teristics of NATO’s deterrence and collective defence, and its contribution to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. He then briefly describes the contributions of NATO’s nuclear states (and in particular France’s) to collective security and defence. All Allies (except France) participate in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), NATO’s senior body on nuclear matters. NATO’s nuclear role sharing is at the heart of this policy brief: US nuclear weapons carried by European dual-capable aircraft (DCA). The author argues emphatically as to why American nuclear weapons should be kept on European soil and the current DCA countries should maintain the status quo. Tangible recommendations follow on in terms of Belgian’s foreign security policy and defence, many of which are also highly likely to apply to other DCA countries.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, Belgium, and North America

59. Turkey’s military policy in Syria: implications for NATO

Author:
Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In three decades, Ankara’s strategic agenda in Syria has considerably changed. First, back in the late 1990s, Tur- key’s primary goal was to put an end to the Hafez al-As- sad regime’s use of the PKK terrorist organization as a proxy. To address the threat at its source, Ankara resort- ed to a skillfully crafted coercive diplomacy, backed by the Turkish Armed Forces. A determined approach – championed by Turkey’s late president Suleyman Demi- rel – formed the epicenter of this policy: it was coupled with adept use of alliances, in particular the Turkish-Is- raeli strategic partnership. In October 1998, Syria, a trou- blesome state sponsor of terrorism as designated by the US Department of State since 19791, gave in. The Baath regime ceased providing safe haven to Abdullah Oca- lan, the PKK’s founder who claimed thousands of lives in Turkey. The same year, Damascus signed the Adana Agreement with Ankara, vowing to stop supporting ter- rorist groups targeting Turkey. In the following period, from the early 2000s up until the regional unrest in 2011, Turkish policy aimed at reju- venating the historical legacy. During that time, Ankara fostered its socio-cultural and economic integration efforts in Syria – for example, cancelling visas, promoting free trade, and holding joint cabinet meetings. Turkey’s foreign policy was shaped by then Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s thought, popularly formulated in the concept of “Strategic Depth”. Refer- ring to David Laing’s anti-psychiatry school, Davutoglu claimed that the nation was alienated from its roots and embraced a “false self”. To fix the “identity crisis”, Tur- key pursued charm offensives in the Middle East. This ideationally motivated stance even led to speculative neo-Ottomanism debates in Western writings.2 From 2011, when the Arab Spring broke out, there were high hopes as to Turkey’s role model status. In April 2012, before the Turkish Parliament, then For- eign Minister Davutoglu stated that Ankara would lead the change as “the master, pioneer, and servant” of the Middle East.3 Five years later, the Turkish administration dropped these aspirations. At the 2017 Davos meeting, then Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek stated that the Assad regime’s demise was no longer one of his gov- ernment’s considerations.4 In fact, by 2015, Turkey had to deal with real security problems on its doorstep, such as the Russian expedition in Syria, ISIS rockets hammer- ing border towns, the refugee influx, and mushrooming PKK offshoots.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, Turkey, Syria, and North America

60. Projecting Stability to the South: NATO’s other challenge

Author:
Chloe Berger
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In the spring of 2020, the Atlantic Alliance’s “large pe- riphery” to the South, which extends from the Sahel to the Asian borders of the Arabian Gulf, remains in a state of dangerous instability. The health and con- tainment measures taken by the authorities against the COVID-19 crisis have put popular claims to rest. The case of Lebanon shows, however, that the urgency of the pandemic has not made the demands of the pop- ulation disappear. Beyond managing the health crisis, there is no doubt that the future of the region’s lead- erships1 will largely depend on their ability to miti- gate both the socio-economic consequences of the COVID-19 crisis, as well as the political ones. In this “broader MENA” region, whose confines and internal cohesion are unstable, the challenges are ever more complex. Despite the relative consensus between NATO and its Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Is- tanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) partners on the deep-rooted causes of the structural instability, the po- tential solutions are much debated. NATO’s “Project- ing Stability” concept raises as many questions with the partners, as it does within the Alliance, since a desired end-state has yet to be defined. While all efforts con- tributing to an increase in stability are a priori welcome, the Alliance and its partners must agree on the conditions of stability in order to identify and implement effective means suited to the local context.
Topic:
NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, North America, and Gulf Nations

61. Recalibrating NATO Nuclear Policy

Author:
Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The continuing role of nuclear weapons for NATO security was the focus of a Workshop for early- to mid-career nuclear strategists convened at the NATO Defense College in July 2019, and organized and run by Andrea Gilli. The articles in this volume, which were drafted by several of the speakers at the event, highlight a number of the most critical challenges to NATO’s nuclear deterrence policy and propose recommendations for further NATO action. Carrie Lee provides detailed analysis on the development of hypersonic missile systems by great powers, assesses their unique characteristics and reviews the potential implications of these systems on strategic stability and deterrence. Jacek Durkalec dives deep into Russia’s nuclear strategy and doctrine and proposes some additional steps that NATO can take to be more effective in deterring Russia. Katarzyna Kubiak examines the security challenges posed by the end of the INF Treaty and assesses a range of nuclear response options that NATO could consider. Finally, Harrison Menke reviews Russia’s integration of conventional and nuclear forces in its defence strategy and argues that NATO should take steps to better align its own conventional and nuclear forces and operations in order to enhance deterrence.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Collective Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

62. US Nonproliferation Cooperation with Russia and China

Author:
Robert Einhorn
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The United States has at times worked cooperatively with Russia and China to promote shared nonproliferation objectives. But with no end in sight to the current precipitous decline in Washington’s bilateral relations with Moscow and Beijing, constructive engagement on today’s nonproliferation challenges has become increasingly problematic. Unless the United States and its two great power competitors can find a way to carve out areas of cooperation in otherwise highly adversarial relationships, the remarkably positive record of international efforts to prevent additional countries from acquiring weapons will be difficult to sustain. From sometimes partners to frequent foes, this Occasional Paper examines the history of US cooperation with Russia and China on key issues including Iran, North Korea, Syria, international nonproliferation mechanisms, and nuclear security. It also outlines the obstacles to future nonproliferation cooperation, as well as the growing proliferation threats that require such cooperation. Most importantly, it identifies several possible areas where the United States can hope to find common ground with both countries. With relationships with Russia and China reaching new lows and unlikely to improve for the foreseeable future, finding a way to for the United States to work cooperatively with both countries will not be easy. Bridges to constructive engagement have been burned and will be difficult to rebuild. However, the author points out that constituencies for cooperation remain in all three countries, including in government bureaucracies. “As hard as it may be to find common ground in otherwise highly adversarial relationships, it is imperative that the US administration in office after January 2021 make every effort to do so. Cooperation with America’s two great power rivals will not always guarantee success, but the absence of such cooperation will surely increase the risk of failure.”
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, United States of America, and North America

63. Defeating Threat Air Defences: the Return of the DEAD

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For the past two decades the US and its allies have faced a very limited surface-to-air threat in wars in which they have engaged. This is now changing as the worsening security environment and the emergence of near-peer rivals once again raises the spectre of a strongly contested air domain. A central element of the renewed challenge is the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. China and Russia have fielded and continue to develop SAM systems across all range categories – and to offer many of these for export – that pose a credible threat to air operations. The US, and to an even greater extent the Europeans, have reduced emphasis and expenditure on what is known as the suppression of enemy air defence (SEAD) role. Counter-insurgency rather than counter-integrated air-defence operations have been the priority since the turn of the century. There is now, however, the renewed challenge of being able to carry out air operations in airspace defended by the latest generations of point-, short-, medium- and long-range SAM systems. Low-observable aircraft only offer a partial solution, particularly as the US and its allies will operate mixed fleets of stealthy and non-stealthy combat aircraft at least until around the middle of the century. The latter types of aircraft remain at greater risk from SAM threats than low-observable aircraft, and their operational utility will depend partly on the wider capacity to counter surface-based threat missile systems. SEAD is an asset-intensive capability, particularly in the early days of a conflict, and has traditionally involved dedicated platforms as well as fighter ground-attack aircraft. In SEAD operations in the 1990s, such as Operation Allied Force during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, up to one-third of strike missions were tasked against ground-based air defences. While the force mix will change as uninhabited systems are increasingly adopted in the inventory, a variety of crewed and uninhabited aircraft and associated weaponry will still be required for the task, and will be required in numbers greater than are available in current inventories if faced by a peer or near-peer threat. Collating what is known as an electronic order of battle against peer and near-peer rivals should once again become a priority, as should the capacity to counter, disable or destroy surface-to-air threat systems.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

64. Promoting and Projecting Stability: Challenges and Perspectives

Author:
Amanda Lapo, Bastain Giegerich, and James Hackett
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The ambition to promote stability and foster peace in an increasingly volatile security environment is an established element of EU and NATO policy. There is a risk that the coronavirus pandemic will increase the demand for stabilisation measures while at the same time complicating their supply. This paper focuses on the role that military and security actors can play in supporting stabilisation efforts. The ambition to promote stability and foster peace in an increasingly volatile security environment is an established element of European Union and NATO policy. This ambition is also reflected in many of their member states’ national-level policy and strategy documents. The direction and implementation of these policies are influenced by a range of motivations including security worries, humanitarian concerns and historical ties. Stability is a challenging endeavour at the best of times, and there is a risk that the coronavirus pandemic will increase the demand for it while at the same time complicating its supply.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Political stability, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

65. Increasing Nuclear Threats through Strategic Missile Defense

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Growing concerns about third-country nuclear threats led the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty’s constraints on the size and scope of ballistic missile defense arsenals in 2002. Inaccurate and alarmist projections of “rogue state” ICBM threats were critical in winning support for the decision to withdraw from the treaty and to sustain the multi-billion dollar annual price tag for developing, deploying, and expanding strategic missile defenses. But 18 years after Washington abandoned the treaty, North Korea is the only rogue state that could pose a near-term nuclear threat against the American homeland—and U.S. missile defense interceptors and radars have not even delivered high confidence of being able to protect against this threat. Meanwhile, the absence of limits on U.S. strategic missile defenses and prudent, worst-case concerns in Moscow and Beijing about their future expansion are fueling resistance to additional nuclear arms reductions and stability measures. The end result is that the exponential threats posed by Russia and China are getting worse and the chances of a disastrous nuclear arms race are increasing. This analysis argues that the nuclear threat confronting the United States is multilateral, three-dimensional, and interrelated. Unless the United States acknowledges the role of missile defenses in this complicated reality, it will not be able to realize the full benefits that arms control offers.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

66. The European Union's Defense Dimension

Author:
Esa Pulkkinen
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
A new Occasional Paper from the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination at Princeton University (LISD), "The European Union's Defense Dimension," summarizes Lieutenant General Esa Pulkkinen’s virtual presentation and discussion on May 20, 2020 with Princeton University faculty, students, and alumni, which took place as part of the Liechtenstein Institute’s seminar on Europe and the World and Crisis Diplomacy. The paper provides an overview of the European Union Military Staff’s approach to defense and cooperation, particularly in addressing current security challenges such as, the Covid-19 pandemic, disinformation, and migration. Lt. Gen Pulkkinen details the way in which EUMS hybrid operations, present a great potential for the EU and the European Commission to work in tandem – "if their respective competencies are properly utilized and coordinated." Opinions expressed in this and all LISD Occasional Papers are those of the authors.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

67. Terrorism in Afghanistan: A Joint Threat Assessment

Author:
Teresa Val
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
Terrorism in Afghanistan: A Joint Threat Assessment is intended to serve as an analytical tool for policymakers and an impetus for joint U.S.-Russia action. The report provides an overview of the security situation and peace process in Afghanistan, taking into account U.S. and Russian policies, priorities and interests; surveys the militant terrorist groups in and connected to Afghanistan and explores the security interests of various regional stakeholders vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Challenges relating to border management, arms trafficking and terrorist financing in Afghanistan are also briefly addressed.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, and Peace
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, United States, Europe, Middle East, and North America

68. Hard security dynamics in the Baltic Sea region: From turbulence to tense stability

Author:
Matti Pesu
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
This Briefing Paper looks into the fundamentals of the Baltic Sea security landscape in the early 2020s. It argues that three interconnected security dynamics shape the present, ‘post-2014’ security environment in Northeastern Europe. That is to say, Russia’s assertive behaviour in the region and in Europe more broadly, NATO’s reassurance and deterrence measures in the area, and Finland’s and Sweden’s closer integration into the Western defence network all affect hard se- curity dynamics in the Baltic Sea region. These three dynamics underlie the tense regional stability that emerged after a period of alarmism and turbulence in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s ac- tions in Ukraine. Fundamentally, the stability is the product of the interplay between the three dynamics. In other words, NATO’s reassurance and deterrence measures accompanied by Finland’s and Sweden’s in- tegration into the Western security and defence system act as a counterweight to Russia’s actions in the region, creating a balance of power holding Russia’s ambitions in check. Investigating the sources of regional balance is rele- vant for multiple reasons. The region remains a poten- tial hotspot between Russia and the West and, thus, it merits close and continuous attention. Moreover, the word ‘stability’ frequently features in foreign policy parlance in Northern Europe, particularly in Finland and Sweden. Given this rhetorical proclivity, attention needs to be paid to the factors that actually constitute stability and the state of hard security in the Baltic Sea area. The paper consists of three analytical parts. First, it provides a brief historical overview of the twists and turns in the regional security landscape from the early post-Cold War era to today. The second part introduces the three dynamics in detail, followed by an analysis of how they are interconnected. The paper concludes by contemplating how regional stability could best be preserved in the 2020s.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Baltic Sea

69. Turkey’s Salafists, ISIS, and the Revolving Doors of Turkish Prisons

Author:
Hay Ertan Cohen Yanarocak
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Turkey wants to have it both ways: To act against the Salafists, while using them as dispensable mercenaries against the Kurds.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Counter-terrorism, ISIS, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey

70. An EU response to Turkey’s increased aggressiveness

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Turkey’s ambitious and expansionist leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has capitalized on the end of the Cold War and on US isolationist tendencies in enhancing Turkey’s international standing.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Asia

71. Israel, Greece, and the Turkish Challenge: Acute Testing Lies Ahead

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel is unable to get directly involved in eastern Mediterranean hostilities, should they erupt. But it can and should cooperate closely with Greece in intelligence matters and arms acquisition and coordinate political action with Greece in Washington. The US stance largely will determine the practical scope of Erdogan’s ambitions.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Greece

72. The Tensions between Assad and Iran Present an Opportunity in Syria

Author:
Eran Lerman, Aiman Mansour, and Micky Aharonson
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel and the US may have an opportunity to incentivize Assad and Putin to cooperate in constraining Iran’s presence in Syria.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, Israel, Syria, North America, and United States of America

73. Is Yemen Turkey’s Next Stop after Libya?

Author:
Hay Ertan Cohen Yanarocak
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Ankara’s military interventions in Iraq, Syria and Libya as well as its growing presence in the eastern Mediterranean constitutes a radical change in Turkish foreign policy. Its recent success in Libya demonstrates Ankara’s regional heft. Turkey’s next intervention is probably in Yemen.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Influence, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Turkey, Libya, and Yemen

74. Erdogan’s Arc of Destabilization

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
From northwest Iraq to Tripoli on Libya’s African coast, Turkey is flexing its muscles – without the slightest nod to the supposedly ‘pro-Western’ and ‘pro-NATO’ orientation that Turkey’s Western apologists like to recall.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Conflict, Regionalism, Strategic Stability, and Destabilization
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

75. The Outlawing of Hezbollah in Germany

Author:
Omer Dostri
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Germany’s decision is an important step in the international effort against Hezbollah. It will hamper the criminal network and terrorist activities of Hezbollah in Europe and even in Lebanon. Hezbollah should be outlawed across Europe.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

76. Idlib, the next phase of the Turkish-Syrian conflict

Author:
Jonathan Spyer
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Russia’s desire to woo Turkey from the West likely to prevent all-out war.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

77. The Struggle for the Eastern Mediterranean: Israel’s Role following the Berlin Summit on Libya

Author:
Eran Lerman
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Everything short of a military confrontation needs to be done, though, to deter Erdogan from establishing a barrier diagonally across the Mediterranean, barring Cyprus, Egypt and Israel from connecting their gas infrastructure to Greece and hence to Europe.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Natural Resources, Infrastructure, Gas, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Greece, and Mediterranean

78. Putin’s surprise visit to Syria

Author:
Micky Aharonson and Aiman Mansour
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Meeting with Assad sent clear messages to the countries of the region.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

79. The Battle for the Tribes in Northeast Syria

Author:
Nicholas Heras
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Northeast Syria (NES) is fragmented under the control of different powers that are all seeking to gain the support of the local Arab tribes. Those seeking to upset the status quo include the Assad regime and its allies (Russia and Iran), Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies, and ISIS —all seeking disruption with different motivations, yet working side by side. Those seeking to maintain the status quo include the U.S.-led Coalition, the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Often, earning the support and alliance of the tribes is a transactional process whereby the tribes seek direct financial support and community investment, employment opportunities, military support, and autonomy to run their own affairs. Currently, most local tribal groups are calculating that a tenuous U.S.-protected order in northeast Syria provides better security and provisions than the alternatives from the Assad regime and its allies, or by Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies. However, ISIS remains a threat to all the powers involved in northeast Syria, and it is the major spoiler seeking to create the conditions for a return to the old order which was established under ISIS’s territorial Caliphate from 2014-2019.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

80. Russia and Issues of HTS and Tanzim Hurras ad-Din

Author:
Anton Mardasov
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Moderate Syrian opposition includes some natives from Russia’s North Caucasus, although they are a minority. Caucasian and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) natives were, in large part, members of the Islamic State (IS) or in some way linked to the forces formally led by Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN) and later by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). Those who went to Syria and Iraq to fight can be roughly divided into two generations. The first one includes Caucasus Emirate members who responded to the call of Salafi sheikhs from Arab-Islamic centres. Natives of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, and Turkmenistan (migrant workers, for the most part) were mainly recruited for jihad in Russia or within various diasporas across Europe.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Alliance, Conflict, and Opposition
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

81. Security, Stability, and Counter-Terrorism in Idlib: A Turkish Perspective

Author:
Serhat Erkmen
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In Idlib, armed groups can be categorized under three conglomerates: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army (SNA), and radicals led by Hurras al-Deen (HaD). Among these three anti-government groups, HTS is the strongest one. Though the SNA’s Idlib branch has more manpower than other groups, HTS has superiority in terms of discipline, organisation and weaponry.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Governance, Counter-terrorism, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

82. Russia’s Increasing Stalemate in Southwest Syria

Author:
Alexey L. Khlebnikov
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The town and province of Daraa in southwest Syria is known for being a “cradle of the Syrian revolution”. Six years after the start of the Syrian uprising, it has been included in one of the four de-escalation zones that Russia established in Syria striking deals between different opposition armed groups and Damascus, with the consent of external actors. The southwest de-escalation zone is comprised of three provinces – Daraa, al-Suwaida, and al-Quneitra – whose proximity to Israel has been a crucial factor in Moscow’s strategy in the region. The southwest Syria de-escalation zone has several peculiarities that make it distinct from the other zones, in particular its geography, i.e. its proximity to Israel, which has defined Russia’s very special and nuanced approach to it. At the same time, the Russian approach to dealing with the armed opposition groups within the zone was similar to the groups in other de-escalation zones. So, what makes Russia’s approach different?
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

83. The Eighth Brigade: Striving for Supremacy in Southern Syria

Author:
Abdullah Al-Jabassini
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In June 2018, the Syrian regime forces backed by Russia launched a military offensive that aimed at terminating rebel rule and restoring control over southern Syria. By August 2018, Daraa’s rebel organisations were pushed to surrender under a “patchwork” strategy, including Russian-led negotiations between regime and opposition figures, and the Syrian regime’s use of armed force. The two fundamentally divergent approaches have demarcated three main zones in which the regime’s authority and thus the roles former rebels come to play in the post-rebellion period vary significantly. In eastern Daraa, Russia established the Eighth Brigade, a sub-division of the Fifth Corps, and entrusted Ahmad al-Oda, a former rebel leader, with its command. By incorporating former rebels in the Eighth Brigade’s ranks, Russia, in fact, intended to establish a local armed actor characterised by a wide margin of manoeuvre to handle local security affairs and inflict acceptable and monitored small-scale violence to limit the regime’s authority and to keep Iranian influence at bay, thereby limiting status quo violations. For more than two years, the Eighth Brigade has limited the regime’s authority, served as a bulwark against Iranian expansion, intervened to defuse tensions, and mediated to prevent wide-scale regime-led military offensives against several localities, all of which are Russia’s top priorities to maintain the status quo in the south. Nevertheless, the Eighth Brigade has been mired in struggles to overcome and mitigate top four interrelated challenges. First, the absence of official recognition by the Syrian Ministry of Defence. Second, the ambitions of Iran and its proxies in southern Syria. Third, the intermittent cyclical patterns of retaliations with local armed groups in neighbouring province of Sweida. Fourth, the ongoing rivalries among former rebel leaders.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Governance, Local, Peace, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

84. Turkish Strategic Alternatives for the North East of Syria

Author:
Murat Yeşiltaş
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Turkey’s Syrian policy has been under significant transformation since the Syrian uprising erupted in the Spring of 2011. In the early stage of the crisis, Turkey’s main objective was to peacefully support the democratic transition in Syria. However, with heightened competition between regional and international actors over the Syrian crisis and intensifying militarisation of the uprising, Turkey had to adopt a security-oriented strategy to prevent potential spill-over effects of the civil war into its borders. In the post-2016 security and strategic landscape, Turkey has been following a two-dimensional military strategy. On the one hand, while Turkey has been trying to minimize the terrorist threat in northeast Syria (NES), on the other hand it has been calibrating its military strategy in NES by supporting the Syrian National Army (SNA) and the Syrian Interim Government to establish a sustainable local order. This paper aims to make sense of Turkey’s strategic alternatives in northeast Syria by presenting four different scenarios.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Governance, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

85. Iran’s Preferred Outcome in Syria: An Open-End or a Formal Agreement?

Author:
Hassan Ahmadian
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Iran’s security concerns drove its involvement in the Syrian crisis back in 2011. With an evolving strategy over the past nine years, Tehran has upgraded its Syria policy in accordance with the ongoing developments on the ground, moving from military training based on the Iranian Basij model, to regionalising this model (as was the case in Iraq with the Popular Mobilization Forces) and encouraging Russian military involvement. In what may be seen as the final stage, Iran is backing its Syrian ally as well as allied militias to balance against other main stakeholders. Iran is attempting to solidify military gains by continuing to back a political process that is properly representative of warring parties and ensures a smooth transition of power, and one whose outcomes will not undermine Iranian geopolitical interests in the country.
Topic:
Security, Development, Military Strategy, Regionalism, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

86. Seventy years of NATO: Is the Alliance still needed?

Author:
Krševan Antun Dujmović
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
This year the North Atlantic Treaty Origination (NATO) marks seventieth anniversary of its creation. Back in 1949, the founding nations gathered around the United States as the leader of Western liberal democracies, establishing NATO as a military and political alliance that was to serve as a barrier against the Soviet Union, ‘’’’ serve as a counterbalance to NATO and the era of the Cold War gained full sway, with clearly established division in Europe between the capitalist West and communist East, and with only a handful of European countries opting for neutrality. Thus, a bipolar system of world order was established, with defined territories and its export of communism throughout the continent. Just six years later, Moscow assembled the Warsaw Pact together with other Eastern European communist countries, excluding Yugoslavia. The Warsaw Pact was to and frontiers of the two global adversaries, and the Cold War pertained until the collapse of the USSR in 1991. From 1991 onwards, fifteen new independent states emerged from the disintegrated Soviet Union, with the newly founded Russian Federation as its legal successor and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Subsequently the Warsaw Pact had collapsed, and Eastern European countries used a transition period that was to bring them closer to the West, ultimately to NATO and the European Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union was the single most important event in history after the World War II and the world entered into a new era. Back in early nineties, it seemed that Russia and the West have buried the tomahawk of war for an indefinite time, and many political theorists and politicians, in both NATO member states and in Russia, have stated that without its archrival NATO no longer had raison d’etre.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

87. Volodymyr Zelensky’s Sweeping Victories: Is Ukraine’s Turn Toward the West Definite?

Author:
Krševan Antun Dujmović
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
For more than half a decade Ukraine has been one of epicenters on the map of geopolitical crises in the world and consequently drawn a lot of international attention worldwide. Ever since it gained its independence form the crumbling Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine was a of the country also changed. Ukraine has been dominated by Russia as the Russian Empire penetrated deep toward the Black Sea in the 17th century, and the position of inferiority towards Moscow was also the case in the USSR. The first upheaval dubbed the Orange Revolution sort of buffer zone between the West and East, between the United States and European allies on the one hand, and the Russian Federation on the other. With the change of political elites and their political preferences, the orientation in 2004, brought to power Viktor Yushchenko, who tried to conduct reforms and bring Ukraine closer to the West, but the effect of his Presidency were ephemeral. President Viktor Yanukovych turned Ukraine’s sight towards Russia again, but also kept the process of EU association alive before suddenly deciding not to sign the Association Agreement with the EU just days before the planned signing ceremony on 29th November 2013. This Yanukovych’s abrupt turn from EU in favor of stronger ties with Russia triggered the wave of massive public demonstrations which later become known as the Euromaidan and subsequently the Ukrainian revolution in February 2014. The Euromaidan Revolution toppled Yanukovych and the new pro-Western government was formed. Russia soon reacted to the change of tide in Ukraine by annexing the Crimean peninsula in March and soon the armed conflict between the pro- Western government in Kiev and Russia backed rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts broke out. Ever since the spring of 2014, Ukraine has been engulfed in a brutal conflict in the east of the country that is hampering its efforts to reform and get closer to the EU. Nonetheless, Ukrainian leadership is under the new President Volodymir Zelensky is striving to forge stronger links with the West and the EU.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Crimea

88. American Sanctions and European Sovereignty

Author:
Jean De Ruyt
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The decision by the United States to withdraw from the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and re-impose sanctions on Iran broke an international understanding, sanctioned by a UN Security Council Resolution. However, European and other non-US companies dealing with Iran must abide by US law in order to avoid its extra- territorial effects on their US operations. Efforts are being made to help the EU keep its “sovereignty” on sanction issues when there is disagreement with the US, but until now these have not accomplished much. Therefore a new Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) was launched at the end of January to ensure the continuation of some trade with Iran. But the only convincing way to allow the EU to increase its autonomy is to boost the role of the Euro in international transactions. Certainly, in today’s unpredictable world, we need more than ever to address the issue of the extraterritorial application of American sanctions – today it is Iran, what if tomorrow it is China?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sovereignty, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and North America

89. European Strategic Autonomy: Which Military Level of Ambition?

Author:
Jo Coelmont
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The EU Global Strategy is crystal clear on the EU’s political level of ambition yet remarkably silent on the corresponding military level of ambition. But strategy without capabilities is just a hallucination. Recent developments in the EU make it possible, however, for the Member States to agree on an appropriate and affordable military level of ambition. The aim: to conduct autonomous crisis management operations and to contribute substantially to territorial defence within the NATO framework. We should not forget that the European countries have the primary responsibility for the territorial defence of their own continent.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

90. Europe in a multipolar missile world – Why the EU and NATO should not try to salvage the INF Treaty

Author:
Bruno Hellendorff
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
On 1 February 2019, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that his country had suspended its compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty, and would withdraw from it within six months. The INF Treaty, little known outside of arms control and disarmament circles, was a landmark Cold War agreement between the United States of America and the USSR – the first to ban an entire category of weapons (ground-based medium- and intermediate-range missiles). The US withdrawal, announced in dramatic terms by President Donald Trump in October 2018, followed the claim that Russia had recently developed and fielded a missile with performances forbidden by the INF Treaty. The end of this little-known treaty is not anecdotal. Not only will it further strain the US-Russia relationship and antagonise allies, it will also contribute to the erosion of what is left of the global arms-control architecture and incentivise arms-race behav- iours among great powers. In a world where security is increasingly less a question of multilateral deliberation and rules-based interactions, the end of the INF Treaty is a further signal that missile technologies are again becoming a venue for competition between great powers: only this time, at least three are playing the game (United States, China and Russia) rather than two (United States and USSR). Additionally, missile technology proliferation has turned into a major dimension of contemporary battlefield realities, and missile programmes of countries such as Iran and North Korea continue to pose important diplomatic and non-proliferation challenges. Meanwhile, Europe is, by and large, left watching as its regional security architecture erodes. Welcome to what US National Security Advisor John Bolton recently termed ‘a multipolar missile world’. The EU should not try to salvage the INF Treaty. Its diplomatic capital might be better spent in areas where it could potentially make a difference, rather than in a treaty to which it is not even party. Existing multilateral regimes and agreements with the EU or its Member States as parties are already in dire need of reinforcement in the face of technological progress, a volatile diplomatic environment and self-centred, competitive political narratives. These include, inter alia, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) framework (including its Structured Dialogue), multilateral export control regimes (MECR) like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), transparency and trust-building mechanisms like the Hague Code of Conduct against missile proliferation (HCoC), and nuclear-related frame- works like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or ‘Iran deal’) or the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Process. These, however, may simply fail to meet the challenge of a multipolar missile world. Renewed efforts, both conceptual and in the realm of capabilities, are needed in a NATO framework to reinforce the linkage between deterrence and diplomacy. NATO-EU dialogue and cooperation on defence issues could be further enhanced, and European countries should work more with like-minded partners at both bilat- eral or multilateral levels on the challenges of non-proliferation and disarmament in the twenty-first century. The demise of the INF Treaty should therefore re-energise the debate on European strategic autonomy, help support collective capability building – not least in NATO – and prompt new discussions on stronger multilateral rules on missile development, use and proliferation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

91. Autonomy and Strategy: What Should Europe Want?

Author:
Jolyon Howorth
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Europe wants autonomy and it wants a strategy. Semantically, of course, “wants” has a double meaning. First, it means “lacks”. Europe lacks autonomy and it lacks a strategy. The second meaning of wants is “desires”. Here, we have a genuine question. How many EU member states genuinely desire autonomy for the EU? How many are genuinely in favor of a grand strategy – as opposed to the EU’s default practice of just muddling through? And there is also a third meaning behind wants: “needs”. In my view, the EU needs strategic autonomy. But having said that, all I have done is set a point of arrival. How to get there?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe

92. Belgian Special Forces in the Sahel: A Minimal Footprint with Maximal Output?

Author:
Nina Wilen
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
In a shifting geopolitical context, the Belgian Defence has intensified its presence in the Sahel region and developed a new strategic military collaboration with Niger through Operation New Nero. This policy brief critically examines the strategy and identifies three challenges for the future of the operation: Niger’s democratic development, the asymmetry between the Western Partner Nation’s capabilities, and diverging agendas within the Belgian Defence. To counter these challenges, it is suggested that the minimalist approach and the social networks which enable horizontal collaboration among partners are maintained, while new civil-military opportunities are explored. On a broader level, it is recommended that Belgium aligns its political and military agendas to achieve long- term strategies geopolitical regions of importance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Belgium, Sahel, and Niger

93. The End of the INF-Treaty: Context and Consequences

Author:
Didier Audenaert
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
On 2 August both the US and the Russian Federation will no longer be restrained by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1987). Early this century it gradually became clear that Russia wanted to step out of the Treaty, by which it felt itself to be solely restrained. European nations should now take up a greater share of the burden of missile defence, which should get a broader mission than it has today. The debate on EU strategic autonomy can be an instrument in this endeavour. Because of the worsening security environment NATO’s non- strategic nuclear capability becomes even more important. European NATO allies and EU member states may very soon be confronted with difficult and fundamental choices for a future without the INF Treaty, which need to be communicated and explained to their national population.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and INF Treaty
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

94. Articulating the Logic of Nuclear-Sharing

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements often get bad press. This is remarkable given the fact that they have demonstrably contributed to (a) countering the proliferation of nuclear arsenals in Europe, (b) fostering alliance cohesion by giving non-nuclear weapon states a voice on the nuclear posture of the alliance, and (c) making nuclear deterrence more effective militarily by offering a wider array of force options. When the relative merits of extended nuclear deterrence are unknown, public support thereof is likely to suffer. In order to enrich the debate about NATO’s nuclear policy, this Security Policy Brief articulates the threefold logic of nuclear-sharing.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

95. China Global Security Tracker

Author:
Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Europe has become a major target of China’s push to acquire advanced key technologies. These technologies support the development of dual-use products with civilian as well as military applications, a development that is in line with China’s efforts towards civil-military integration. The EU has been slow to wake up to this trend. Despite recent efforts, including those to set up a tighter investment screening mechanism, it still lacks strong coordinated regulations to protect its research and technologies. Even more importantly, the author of our newest China Global Security Tracker, MERICS researcher Helena Legarda, warns that Europe lacks a clear policy or strategy to keep up with China’s ambitions in this area. Joint European initiatives providing strategic guidance and adequate funding for innovation in dual-use technologies will be needed to not only preserve but to advance the EU’s scientific and engineering expertise. The China Global Security Tracker is a bi-annual publication as part of the China Security Project in cooperation between Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). This issue also features the Trump administration’s tightened export controls in response to China’s civil-military integration efforts, and it tracks other security developments in China in the second half of 2018, from the launch of a number of new defense systems to an increase in China’s military diplomacy activities around the world.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Beijing, and Asia

96. Defending Europe: scenario-based capability requirements for NATO’s European members

Author:
Ben Barry, Douglas Barrie, Lucie béraud-Sudreau, Henry Boyd, Nick Childs, and Bastain Giegerich
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The study applies scenario analysis – with scenarios set in the early 2020s – to generate force requirements, and assesses the ability of NATO’s European member states to meet these requirements based on data from the IISS Military Balance Plus online database. The cost of closing the identified capability shortfalls through equipment acquisition has been estimated. The objective of the study is to enable informed policy dialogue both in Europe and in a transatlantic setting. The study explicitly does not intend to predict future conflicts nor the intentions of any of the actors involved. Neither does it wish to prescribe a certain path of action to be pursued by European NATO governments. The first scenario examined deals with the protection of the global sea lines of communication (SLOCs). In this scenario, the United States has withdrawn from NATO and has also abandoned its role of providing global maritime presence and protection, not just for its own national interest but also as an international public good. It thus falls to European countries to achieve and sustain a stable maritime-security environment in European waters and beyond, to enable the free flow of international maritime trade, and to protect global maritime infrastructure. The IISS assesses that European NATO members would have to invest between US$94 billion and US$110bn to fill the capability gaps generated by this scenario. The second scenario deals with the defence of European NATO territory against a state-level military attack. In this scenario, tensions between Russia and NATO members Lithuania and Poland escalate into war after the US has left NATO. This war results in the Russian occupation of Lithuania and some Polish territory seized by Russia. Invoking Article V, the European members of NATO direct the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to plan Operation Eastern Shield to reassure Estonia, Latvia and Poland, and other front-line NATO member states, by deterring further Russian aggression. European NATO also prepares and assembles forces for Operation Eastern Storm, a military operation to restore Polish and Lithuanian government control over their territories.
Topic:
NATO, Military Strategy, Maritime, and Free Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

97. Keeping the momentum in European defence collaboration: An early assessment of PESCO implementation

Author:
Yvonni-Stefania Efstathiou, Connor Hannigan, and Lucie béraud-Sudreau
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Between March and November 2018, the 25 participating member states launched 34 projects, with the core aim of addressing the EU’s capability shortfalls. In May 2019, a call for a third round of project proposals will be launched. The IISS undertook an early assessment of how PESCO projects are carried out, to assess whether the momentum on the ground has continued since the projects were announced at the political level. A strong pace of implementation would require detailed timelines, deadlines and financial plans, as well as clear links with EU capability requirements. Questionnaires were sent to the projects’ country leads, and were complemented by interviews and secondary-source research. We looked at various dimensions of implementation: timelines, financial commitments, stakeholder involvement and the projects’ relation to strategic autonomy. The results are mixed. While some projects are off to a strong start, there are common challenges for all
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Brussels, Central Europe, and Western Europe

98. Advancing UK maritime aviation in the Queen Elizabeth-class era

Author:
Nick Childs
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The United Kingdom is on the cusp of regenerating what is a transformational capability. The first of the UK’s new-generation aircraft carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth, has been at sea on trials for two years, and is working up towards its first operational deployment in 2021. The second ship, HMS Prince of Wales, is scheduled to be accepted into service before the end of the year. The F-35B Lightning II has achieved initial land-based operating capability and the Lightning Force has carried out its first overseas deployment, Lightning Dawn. Maritime aviation in the round has undergone a significant transformation, and there has been a substantial increased focus on collaboration and partnering with industry as well as developing stronger links with critical allies. To underscore the significance of the undertaking, then secretary of state for defence Penny Mordaunt announced on 15 May 2019 that the UK planned to produce a National Aircraft Carrier Policy to lay down a blueprint for how the new carrier era would help deliver the UK’s global objectives. In addition, on 4 June, then prime minister Theresa May announced that the UK would earmark the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers to form part of NATO’s significant new Readiness Initiative. These developments have prompted thought and discussion on the extent to which the carrier programme will enable and actually drive the transformation of UK joint-force capabilities, and are posing questions about the demands such a programme will place on UK defence and industry. This paper considers both the opportunities and challenges that the carrier era presents in a number of key areas
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, National Security, Military Strategy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
United States, United Kingdom, Europe, and London

99. European security in crisis: what to expect if the US withdraws from NATO

Author:
Lianna Fix, Bastain Giegerich, and Theresa Kirch
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Recent developments in transatlantic relations have reignited the debate about the need for Europeans to assume greater responsibility for their own security. Yet, efforts by European leaders to substantiate the general commitment to 'take their fate into their own hands' are so far lacking sufficient progress. Against this backdrop, the Körber Policy Game brought together a high-level group of senior experts and government officials from France, Germany, Poland, the UK and the US to address a fictional scenario that involves a US withdrawal from NATO, followed by multiple crises in Europe. How will Europeans organise their security and defence if the US withdraws from NATO? To what extent will future European security be based on mutual solidarity, ad-hoc coalitions or a bilateralisation of relations with the US? Which interests would the respective European governments regard as vital and non-negotiable? What role would the US play in European security after the withdrawal? The Körber Policy Game is based on the idea of projecting current foreign and security policy trends into a future scenario – seeking to develop a deeper understanding of the interests and priorities of different actors as well as possible policy options. The starting point is a short to medium-term scenario. Participants are part of country teams and assume the role of advisers to their respective governments.
Topic:
NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and Brussels

100. A Russian View of the U.S. INF Withdrawal

Author:
Victor Esin
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The stabilizing role of the INF Treaty is still relevant. Its importance has even increased against the background of the sharp deterioration of relations between Russia and the West in recent years due to the well-known events in Ukraine, aggravated by mutual sanctions and NATO’s military build-up near Russian borders. Preserving the INF Treaty, which has now become the subject of controversy and mutual non-compliance accusations between Russia and the United States, is therefore doubly important.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe