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1. From Kosovo to Ukraine: lessons from the humanitarian response to conflict and displacement in Europe

Author:
Margie Buchanan-Smith and Peter Wiles
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:
While there are many differences between the conflicts in Kosovo and Ukraine, the international humanitarian response to both bears many similarities. For example, both crises triggered record levels of funding and most international humanitarian agencies on the receiving end had limited or no presence and experience in the countries affected. Protection is the dominant need amongst affected communities in both crises as well. This paper – written by Margie Buchanan-Smith and Peter Wiles – highlights key lessons from the international humanitarian response to the Kosovo crisis that could have relevance to the response in Ukraine. The lessons are drawn from the three-volume ‘Independent Evaluation of Expenditure of DEC Kosovo Appeal Funds’ and ALNAP’s meta-evaluation of the Kosovo response, from our 2001 Annual Review.
Topic:
International Organization, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Humanitarian Response
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Kosovo

2. Russia’s Iskander Missiles Fail in Karabakh but Cause Crisis in Armenia

Author:
Pavel Felgenhauer
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The Second Karabakh War, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, began on September 27, 2020, and ended on November 9, 2020, with a Russian-brokered and guaranteed agreement. The conflict claimed the lives of thousands of Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers. But after 44 days of fierce fighting, it concluded with Yerevan soundly defeated: Armenia lost territory occupied during the First Karabakh War in 1992–1994 as well as over 30 percent of prewar Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast—a region of Soviet Azerbaijan majority populated by ethnic Armenians. Today, the rump self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR or “Artsakh”)—still controlled by Armenians and not recognized by anyone—is fully surrounded by Azerbaijani troops and territory. The rump Karabakh “republic’s” perimeter is guarded by some 2,000 Russian “peacekeepers” who also control the so-called Lachin corridor, the only highway left open from Armenia proper to Karabakh through the city of Lachin. The future of the rump NKR and its Armenian population is unclear. Baku refuses to discuss any special administrative status for the territory, insisting Armenians born in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast or their descendants must disarm and apply for Azerbaijani citizenships to stay as a minority inside Azerbaijan. In turn, the NKR leadership has declared Russian an official language alongside Armenian to avoid use of Azerbaijani Turkish (Izvestia, February 17). Officials in Stepanakert (Khankendi in Azerbaijani) apparently hope this may tempt Moscow to keep its peacekeepers in Karabakh permanently and maybe eventually agree to annex the NKR outright.
Topic:
Weapons, Conflict, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Nagorno-Karabakh

3. Lawfare as part of hybrid wars: The experience of Ukraine in conflict with Russian Federation

Author:
Zakhar Tropin
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The main objective of the article is to prove the need for the state to have a centralised legal strategy to ensure the protection of state interests on an international level during a hybrid conflict. Centralisation of control and the planning and implementation of legal actions on an international level are core elements of such a strategy, especially for actions under the jurisdiction of international institutions. This article provides an analysis of treaties and of the practice of adjudication in Ukraine during the conflict with the Russian Federation. The findings of the study show that the legal dimension of hybrid conflict has some sub-levels: legal actions of states in hybrid conflicts taken at interstate level; the level of enterprises controlled by the state; and the private level. The practice of Ukraine shows that the exercising of a multilevel legal encounter during a hybrid war faces a number of problems including the intersection of actions (sometimes even direct conflict), even among authorities involved in the legal protection of state interests; and problems with collecting and analysing the information necessary to protect state interests in the legal dimension; state authorities that are not directly involved in a legal encounter may exercise actions which will complicate the legal position of the state. One of the first steps taken by the state in a hybrid conflict is, therefore, to create special authority or entrust an existing one with the coordination of the functions of lawfare. The next step of such an authority is the strategic “programming” of the opponent’s legal actions with the aim of achieving an advantage in the legal dimension of a hybrid conflict.
Topic:
Conflict, Hybrid Warfare, and Lawfare
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

4. The OSCE as Sisyphus: Mediation, Peace Operations, Human Rights

Author:
Philip Remler
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
Over the past decade, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been returning to its origins as a Cold War–era Conference – a forum where states and blocs, often antagonistic to one another and espousing opposing ideals, can air their frictions and hostilities. The OSCE was created without legal personality and with the liberum veto of the consensus principle. These constraints stunted the growth of executive capabilities and bound the OSCE closely to the will of its participating States. That rendered most mediation efforts ineffective, especially where an OSCE state is both belligerent and mediator in the same conflicts. Peace operations have been more effective – notably the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine – but the same factors have tightly constrained its activity. Though all participating States committed themselves to democratic governance, rule of law and respect for human rights, these ideals failed in much of the former Soviet Union, and autocrats have used the organisation’s lack of legal personality and the consensus principle to hobble the OSCE’s efforts. If the OSCE’s participating States want it to remain an Organization, not a Conference, they must take action to secure its executive autonomy.
Topic:
Human Rights, Peacekeeping, Democracy, Conflict, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

5. Baku’s Success in Using Turkish Drones Raises Question: Could Ukraine Use Them Against Russia in Crimea?

Author:
Paul A. Goble
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
The Azerbaijani military’s use of Bayraktar TB2 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), purchased from Turkey, played such a prominent role in Baku’s victory over Armenian forces during the Second Karabakh War (September 27–November 9, 2020) that defense analysts around the world are now focusing on how their countries may utilize similar unmanned systems and how they could respond if such drones are used against them (Regnum, accessed December 16; Ecfr.eu., November 24; see EDM, November 9). Notably, Azerbaijan employed its Bayraktars to identify and attack Armenian forces as well as to provide a real-time picture of the battlefield that was useful for both strategic planning and propaganda (see EDM, October 15). Now, Vadim Nozdrya, who heads the Ukrainian arms trade state committee Ukrspetseksport, has announced that Kyiv is prepared to purchase from Turkey 48 of these battle-tested UAVs (Milliyet), December 4). That news is undoubtedly prompting analysts in Moscow to consider how Ukraine could eventually use such drones to threaten Russian control of occupied Crimea or Donbas and what Moscow needs to do in response.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Weapons, Drones, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Turkey, Eastern Europe, Azerbaijan, Crimea, and Mediterranean

6. Five Years of War in Donbas

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The war in the eastern Ukrainian region known as the Donbas has killed over 13,000 people, displaced millions, and led to the worst rupture in relations between the Russian Federation and the West since the end of the Cold War. The war was caused by inherent cleavages in Ukrainian society, combined with clumsy and self-interested intervention by outside powers. The war’s effects on Ukraine have been profound: the collapse of the post-Soviet Ukrainian political elite; billions of dollars in direct and indirect losses to the Ukrainian economy; a wholesale restructuring of the Ukrainian armed forces; social dislocation and psychological trauma; and unprecedented environmental damage. Despite these sad legacies, there are reasons to be optimistic that a settlement to the conflict is in view. The exhaustion and frustration of people in the separatist-controlled regions, Russia’s changing policy on the war—at least in part a result of rising frustration among the Russian public—and the election of a new Ukrainian government without regional ties or ties to networks of oligarchs all contribute to the possibility of peace. But in order for peace to endure after the war, the Ukrainian state must construct a broad-based, civic national identity, and it must tackle the country’s endemic corruption. The international community must be engaged in both crafting a settlement to the war and helping Ukraine deal with its consequences. External observers may be inclined to point to social division and corruption as the internal causes of the war, and argue that Ukraine has to fix itself before the outside world can intervene to help. And this is true as far as it goes. But it is also true that the outside world contributed to the start of war in Ukraine by making the country the object in a geopolitical tussle between Russia and the West. Any honest accounting of the war’s history must acknowledge this fact. And any fair treatment of Ukraine after the war should seek to compensate it through significant, long-term assistance.
Topic:
War, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Separatism
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe