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1. India's G20 Presidency: Opportunity to Resume Engagement in the Arctic

Author:
Anurag Bisen
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The Arctic lies at the intersection of several issues with global consequences such as climate change, increased accessibility to and availability of resources, and global strategic contestation that have made the region increasingly relevant to the world. Temperatures in the Arctic continue to rise at four times the global annual average, driving many of the changes under way there, most prominently sea-level rise and the thawing of permafrost, which impact both local ecosystems and the global climate system. International scientific cooperation and data monitoring and sharing are crucial to understanding the impact of climate change, counteracting its negative effects, and enhancing living conditions and economic activity. Apart from a few limited pockets of cooperation that still exist, cooperation between Russia and the West with regard to the Arctic has largely been put on hold since the start of the conflict in Ukraine. The current absence of research and data sharing among scientists is threatening to jeopardise scientists’ understanding of the warming trends in the Arctic, exacerbating the environmental emergency the region in particular is facing. One of the few channels that still exists for constructive dialogue on a range of Arctic-related issues is the GCSP’s “‘High North Talks”’, through which discreet exchanges on various important issues continue. Among other things, the G20 agenda includes climate change, sustainable development and the environment, all of which are under threat due to the cessation of Artic-related scientific engagement. The G20 also represents a rare platform where engagement between Russia and the West has not yet ceased. The suspension of dialogue and scientific exchange vis-à-vis the Arctic is driven by a deep distrust that needs to be overcome by an interlocutor that is acceptable to all stakeholders. India's theme for its G20 presidency resonates strongly with the Arctic and its impact on the world. The resumption of Arctic-related scientific exchange is an easy deliverable with global benefits that India, which has the necessary legitimacy, credibility and relevance, should use its G20 presidency to strive for.
Topic:
Climate Change, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Science and Technology, G20, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
India, Asia, and Arctic

2. China’s Provinces as Global Actors: Evidence from China-Africa Relations

Author:
Charlotte Lenz
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
With the launch in the early 2000s of China’s ‘Going Global’ Strategy, Chinese provinces became one group of actors participating in China’s South-South relations. In this Strategic Update, Charlotte Lenz investigates the role of Chinese provinces as foreign policy actors and explains their internationalisation strategies, challenging the prevalent perception of China as a unitary actor on the world stage. Drawing on evidence from Africa-China relations, the report identifies two strategies employed by Chinese provinces in pursuit of their foreign policy interests: (1) Formal and informal “twinning” as a collaborative model between central and local actors, wherein central actors design policies and provincial governments execute projects; (2) and “clustering” according to a sectoral logic of investment and diplomacy in which a certain Chinese province engages a certain foreign country. Despite ongoing bureaucratic centralisation under Xi Jinping, provinces continue to pursue their own internationalisation strategies to help meet local economic and employment targets. Understanding their agency, interests and limitations is thus key to deriving a better understanding of China’s evolving global presence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and Internationalization
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

3. Centrality and Community: ASEAN in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

Author:
Soo Yeon Kim
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This paper examines the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) role in the formation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement. The RCEP project proceeded as trade governance has shifted from the multilateral trade regime under the World Trade Organization to free trade agreements and where the geopolitics of Asia has cast a shadow on the progress of regional integration efforts. The analysis in this paper focuses on ASEAN centrality, both as a concept and practice, in influencing the launch and progress of RCEP. Conceptually, ASEAN centrality is about the capacity of the 10-member group to help launch negotiations for the RCEP agreement and to shape its provisions for governing trade. In practice, the RCEP agreement consolidates and significantly unravels the numerous overlapping trade agreements between ASEAN, 38 in all between individual ASEAN members and its five RCEP partners, Australia, China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand. The paper also examines the relationship between the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and RCEP. RCEP provides for further tariff liberalisation between ASEAN members and its five RCEP partners and thus expands the zone of preferential treatment for goods exported from ASEAN and other RCEP members. RCEP also consolidates rules of origin requirements under one agreement, providing for diagonal cumulation and common rules of cumulation for agreement partners. The RCEP provisions can greatly facilitate production and trade along regional supply chains, thus accelerating the progress of the AEC as a single market and production base. Moving forwards, RCEP and ASEAN’s place in it, is likely to be shaped by challenges and opportunities from the Comprehensive and Progressive Transpacific Partnership and the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) initiative. The ASEAN members with overlapping membership in the IPEF and RCEP will be pivotal in determining areas of cooperation. Regional integration will thus continue to be shaped by ASEAN centrality, and its progress will shape the ASEAN community.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia and ASEAN

4. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Economic Backgrounds of ASEAN and Its Dialogue Partners

Author:
Keita Oikawa, Fusanori Iwasaki, and Shujiro Urata
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
We overview the economic backgrounds of the countries participating in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations and two Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Dialogue Partners – the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) – to understand their economic relationships before the signing of the RCEP and their economic interests in the RCEP. We discover that the 16 countries participating in RCEP negotiations vary in terms of economic size, income level, growth pattern, share of trade in the economy, and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. Additionally, both lower- and higher-income ASEAN Member States (AMS) have received a large amount of FDI, in contrast to Japan and the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea), which have seen more FDI outflows from their countries than inflows. In terms of bilateral FDI inflows and outflows, as a centre for regional FDI, Singapore attracts FDI from developed countries (including the US and the EU) and reinvests it in India and other AMS. As an FDI hub, Singapore promotes liberalised regional markets to attract advanced country investors. By examining bilateral trade relationships, we find that as the centre of manufacturing in the world, ASEAN and China have participated in international production networks that also include Japan and Korea since 2000. Japan and Korea have maintained competitiveness in intermediate goods in the region’s production networks, while China notably exports final products to the US and the EU. Amongst the 16 countries participating in RCEP negotiations, India has not had a significant presence in the production networks. Indeed, India has expanded its bilateral trade deficit with China, which probably caused India to withdraw from RCEP negotiations to protect its manufacturing industry. Simulation results of the impacts of the RCEP, using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model (Global Trade Analysis Project model), show that the countries participating in RCEP negotiations – particularly the less developed AMS – would gain greatly from lowering services trade costs and investment liberalisation. India would also gain significantly from the RCEP. In contrast, countries not participating in RCEP negotiations (the US and the EU) would experience small negative impacts of the RCEP through trade diversion effects.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia and ASEAN

5. How Preferential are RCEP Tariffs?

Author:
Kazunobu Hayakawa
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This study discusses the extent to which the tariffs provided in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) are preferential. RCEP does not necessarily adopt a common concession rule in tariffs, and the speed and depth of tariff reduction/elimination also differ by country. We show that RCEP tariffs become the best choice in trading some specific products with some specific countries in some specific years. Furthermore, there are some specific cases where the use of RCEP tariffs becomes beneficial even if RCEP tariffs are not lower. Therefore, we demonstrate that RCEP tariffs are beneficial in specific types of supply chains. In short, this study aims to enhance our comprehensive understanding of how preferential RCEP tariffs are compared with other types of available tariffs.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Tariffs, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia and ASEAN

6. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and Europe: Impact and Implications

Author:
Haans Gunther Hilpert
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
In the first 2 decades of the millennium, European Union (EU) trade policy underwent historic changes, amongst them an explicit pivot to Asia. Along with continued firm support of the rules-based World Trade Organization (WTO)-centred multilateral trading system, important new directions in the EU’s trade policy included a turn to competitive bilateralism, a strong focus on values, an ambition to protect and to promote European trade standards as well as the politicisation of trade policy. Asia’s outwards looking economic growth, the increasing trade interdependence in Asia as well as the various bilateral and multilateral trade agreements in the region, notably amongst them the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), attracted the EU’s attention, and have helped cause and drive these changes. There was no particular Asian influence on the EU’s own regionalisation, however. Meanwhile, trade and investment relations between Europe and Asia have intensified greatly over this period. But the EU has been slow and late to formulate a comprehensive strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. In spite of some notable successes, the EU’s trade policy remains fragmented with differentiated approaches for each trading partner. Opinions on the RCEP’s relevance and importance for Europe are divided. RCEP sceptics point to the overall shallow nature of the agreement. RCEP optimists emphasise the future potential of trade and investment integration within the newly established RCEP economic area and warn of the discriminatory effects for Europe’s economy and businesses. So, Europe’s business will have to invest in the new RCEP free trade zone to overcome trade diversion risks and to benefit from the RCEP market integration. More worrying from Europe’s perspective is RCEP’s potentially negative policy impacts: a relative loss in the EU’s trading power, the risk of Europe being sidelined in the make-up of future trade rules, and RCEP’s future impact on rules based multilateralism and the WTO. The EU has various trade policy options with regard to the Indo-Pacific trade area and RCEP in particular. The most promising options include the conclusion of free trade agreements with as many RCEP member countries as possible, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as a group (as a region-to-region agreement), with other trading partners (from the Indo-Pacific or from other world regions), or with the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Transpacific Partnership area.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Regional Cooperation, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia and ASEAN

7. The Story of RCEP: History, Negotiations, Structure, and Future Directions

Author:
Aladdin D. Rillo, Anna Maria Rosario D. Robeniol, and Salvador Buban
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This paper is about the story of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), including the history, dynamics of negotiations, and structure of this multilateral framework. Issues related to ASEAN centrality, sensitivities of negotiations, and other challenges are also highlighted and analysed. Nearly a decade in the making, RCEP represents a significant achievement for the region. As an ASEAN-led process, RCEP supports not only the region’s market integration but as well as ASEAN’s economic relations with the rest of the world, particularly with the 5 RCEP FTA Partners. Beyond the impact of RCEP in supporting the multilateral trading system, it is also intended to address the current challenges in the region, including the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. Thus, the narrative of RCEP provides a comprehensive overview of, and considers the potential implications for, trade in the region; for economic integration, and for the future of trade policy.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economics, Regional Cooperation, Regionalism, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia and ASEAN

8. Comparison of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Other Free Trade Agreements (FTAs)

Author:
Innwon Park
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This study evaluates the desirability of RCEP by comparing it with other mega-lateral FTAs. Evaluating the member-specific scale effects of the FTAs, we find that RCEP will generate significantly larger gains compared with the CPTPP. Evaluation of the provision-specific depth effects of RCEP suggests the possibility of positive gains but these gains may not be significant compared with those derived from the CPTPP. The existing CGE model analyses reveal that RCEP will generate greater gains than the CPTPP. RCEP will be more desirable for China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea and the estimated gains for ASEAN will notably increase as the model explicitly specifies the diagonal ROO cumulation scheme. Considering the sequence of implementing FTAs, we find that the CPTPP will generate greater gains for dual members, but the marginal gains enjoyed by RCEP members will not be substantial.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, Free Trade, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia and ASEAN

9. Australia’s Interests in East Asia’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

Author:
Shiro Armstrong
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement was seen as important for Australia economically and politically from its inception. RCEP economies account for roughly two-thirds of Australia’s total trade and being part of an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-led initiative that progressed broader East Asian economic integration was consistent with the structure of Australia’s trade interests and with Australia’s support for the multilateral trading system. Australia has a track record of pursuing regional cooperation that supports multilateral trade and for supporting regional integration that is outward oriented. RCEP became more important economically, politically, and strategically throughout its negotiations. It furthered East Asian economic integration that avoided fragmentation but also to entrench the ASEAN Economic Community project. Concluding RCEP took on greater importance and urgency as a ballast against the rising protectionism globally in the latter half of 2010. The ASEAN–Australia–New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) included an economic cooperation agenda focused on capacity building that was seen as a success for its members and shaped Australia’s approach and support towards economic cooperation being a pillar of RCEP. Negotiations for RCEP were chaired and led by Indonesia and ASEAN. Australia played a proactive role in pushing for high standards – credible market access commitments and new rules – in negotiations. Australia was one of the RCEP member countries that was also negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in parallel. The interest in the TPP was to keep the United States productively engaged in the region and to further rule-making and liberalisation amongst the TPP members. Having overlapping membership between the TPP and RCEP would mean that there was less chance of significant divergence or inconsistencies between them, although the approach differed. The deterioration of Australia’s economic and political relationship with China makes the RCEP framework potentially more important for facilitating the rebuilding of trust and confidence.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Regional Cooperation, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, Australia, and ASEAN

10. Heyday of Asian Regionalism? The Implications of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership for the United States

Author:
Mireya Solís
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This paper analyses the implications of the entry into force of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) for the United States (US). Traditionally, trade policy has been central to the United States’ aim to position itself as a Pacific power and architect of the evolving regional economic architecture. Over the years, however, US trade strategy has evolved in distinct ways: from an emphasis on bilateral trade negotiations and open regionalism (in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] forum) to the pursuit of a high-standard transregional trade agreement (in the Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP]); and more recently under the Trump administration the pursuit of unilateralism and the resort to tariffs as a form of leverage vis-à-vis competitors (China) and partners (allies in Europe and Asia) alike. When the RCEP negotiations launched, there was little concern in US policymaking circles that the emerging trade grouping in Asia could be disadvantageous for the US given that the TPP project was an effective vehicle to advance the US vision for quality economic integration and to cement its position in the dynamic Asian region. However, the US withdrawal from the TPP and the successful conclusion of the RCEP talks (even with the absence of India) have changed that calculus. This paper identifies three main implications of RCEP for the United States at this juncture: growing marginalisation from intra-Asian trade, diminished rulemaking capabilities as alternative standards disseminate widely in the region, and lessened diplomatic clout as the United States struggles to incorporate trade liberalisation into its Asia policy. A fourth possible consequence – a renewed interest in joining the Comprehensive and Progressive for Trans-Pacific Partnership – has not materialised. Instead, the Biden administration is developing an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework that will not include market access negotiations but will focus instead on issues such as supply chain resilience, infrastructure, and the digital economy. The ability of the United States to offer a compelling plan of economic engagement with the region is in question, raising the spectre of marginalisation whilst Asian regionalism makes strides.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Regionalism, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Asia, North America, United States of America, and ASEAN

11. South Korea's Public Diplomacy during the COVID-19 Pandemic: Seeking Status as an Authority in Global Governance

Author:
Kadir Ayhan
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic caught almost all countries unprepared. Some countries, including South Korea (hereafter Korea), managed to deal with the pandemic relatively more successfully than others and had a proactive global posture from early on, including providing aid, and public diplomacy campaigns. In this paper, I explore Korea’s COVID-19-related public diplomacy activities and its aims. I analyze Korea’s COVID-19 humanitarian aid trends, its policy documents, and the tweets related to the pandemic posted by the country’s official public diplomacy account. I find that the pandemic catalyzed what Korea had already been aiming to do, which is improve its global status to be among top authorities across various issue-areas. Due to the nature of the pandemic, Korea’s public diplomacy has been themed around international cooperation and solidarity. I suggest that Korea should hold onto its international cooperation emphasis on public diplomacy, to form the basis for its status-seeking as an authority in global governance in the post-pandemic era.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Domestic Policy, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Global Focus

12. Biden, Israel, and China: Making a Difficult Threesome Work

Author:
Steven R. David
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
It is wrong to expect Israel, a middle-level economy, to decouple from China when far wealthier countries (including the United States) show no signs of following suit. Israeli companies should not be subject to restrictions not placed on companies elsewhere, including the United States itself.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. Normalization between Turkey and Israel: Will it Last?

Author:
Gallia Lindenstrauss and Remi Daniel
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The decision by Turkey and Israel to normalize their relations stems from several processes that brought the Turkish side to push for normalization and the Israeli side to respond affirmatively. Yet alongside the serious motivations of the two sides to continue this process, there are issues that could become obstacles. Among them are the developments between Israel and the Palestinians, Turkey-US relations, the dynamics of Turkey's integration in processes related to the Abraham Accords, and the nature of future Israeli plans regarding gas exports. Nonetheless, coping with challenges related to these issues will be easier with senior diplomatic representation present in both countries.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Normalization, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, and Asia

14. China below the Radar: Israel-US Strategic Dialogue on Technology

Author:
Assaf Orion and Shira Efron
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for National Security Studies (INSS)
Abstract:
The statements issued by President Biden during his visit to the Middle East include little mention of China. However, close reading reveals that between the lines, China is quite present in the agreements reached by the President and Israel and Saudi Arabia. The dialogue on technology cooperation announced by Jerusalem and Washington, which is related directly to the Great Power competition, signals a new stage in partnership between the countries: Israel alongside the United States, even if not against China
Topic:
Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North America, and United States of America

15. Arresting Nuclear Adventurism: China, Article VI, and the NPT

Author:
Henry Sokolski and Andrea Beck
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Given the current crisis in Ukraine, it’s tempting to consider focusing on Chinese compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to be an academic indulgence. Giving into this inclination, however, would be a mistake. As dangerous as Russia currently is, China will be more threatening in the long run. As we are learning with Russia’s violation of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, enforcing binding understandings is critical lest violators run roughshod over law and good order. This is true with Russia’s behavior in Ukraine. It is no less so with China’s nuclear weapons buildup and its repeated refusal to join in good faith negotiations to limit its nuclear weapons activities, which is required by Article VI of the NPT. This buildup and refusal clearly flies in the face of China’s legal NPT obligations. The question is what might bring Beijing back into compliance. To get the answers, NPEC held a battery of workshops last fall, followed by a week-long diplomatic simulation. The game participants included U.S., Japanese, and Australian former and current officials and staff as well as outside experts. The group concluded that Beijing is unlikely to comply willingly with the NPT anytime soon, but that U.S. and international security would still be best served by spotlighting Beijing’s nuclear adventurism and suggesting diplomatic off-ramps to arrest its nuclear buildup.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Peace, and Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

16. PRC Foreign and Military Policy, 1977-81: Shades of Mao, the Imprint of Deng

Author:
Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
China Studies Centre, The University of Sydney
Abstract:
This Working Paper is a draft chapter for a book on the poorly understood CCP elite politics of the early post-Mao period, tentatively entitled Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, and the Dismantling of Maoism. Conventional wisdom pictures the period up to the December 1978 Third Plenum as a struggle between Hua and Deng, reflecting neo-Maoist v. reformist tendencies, and won by Deng at the plenum. In fact, there was broad consensus between them, Hua was more proactive in key areas, and there is no evidence of anything approaching a power struggle. This paper, however, deals with an area where elements of accepted views of Deng hold up. In essence, Deng held both the foreign policy and particularly PLA portfolios, notably where they concerned the crucial relationships with the US, Soviet Union, Japan, and Vietnam. In external relations Deng was broadly regarded to have performed brilliantly, while Hua was thought a mere cypher. Overall, Hua was clearly secondary in external relations, but he took the bold step of initiating relations with revisionist Yugoslavia, made the most telling proposal in the high-level negotiations with the US, and deeply impressed dominant European leaders Margaret Thatcher and Helmut Schmidt. Deng’s foreign policy outlook was deeply influenced by Mao, he could push Mao’s “horizontal line” concept to counterproductive extremes, almost losing the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, and rather than brilliantly negotiating US normalization, the Chinese side was slow to grasp the outcome that was always there. Most significant, and revealing of the underlying dynamic of CCP politics, was the war against Vietnam. This was truly Deng’s war, opposed by not only Hua, but also by a broad array of senior civilian and PLA officials, including surviving marshals. This was essentially the first time since his return to work in 1977, in contrast to persuading his colleagues through intense effort, that Deng simply asserted his authority. Neither here or elsewhere, was argument decisive as it had generally been under Hua’s leadership to that point. What was decisive was Deng’s enormous prestige as the most outstanding of the surviving “old revolutionaries” who achieved the success of 1949. It was the same factor that allowed Deng’s quiet coup against Hua at the turn of 1979-80, with no significant resistance from Hua or anyone else, and with no explanation being made in any official forum until well after the fact.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Politics, Governance, Leadership, and Normalization
Political Geography:
China and Asia

17. Could Biden construct a new world order through détente with Russia?

Author:
Efraim Inbar
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Such a scenario would give the US a leg up against China’s totalitarianism and expansionist aims, and bridge the age-old schism with Russia
Topic:
Diplomacy, Hegemony, Rivalry, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. Inside China’s Techno-Security State

Author:
Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has significantly elevated the importance of national security and technological innovation in the country’s overall priorities. He has invested considerable time, effort, and political capital to establish an expansive techno-security state based upon his strategic and ideological vision. This brief examines the five major methods Xi’s administration has undertaken to develop its techno-security state: developing a national security state, innovation-driven development, military strengthening, military-civilian fusion, and economic securitization.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Industrial Policy, International Security, Innovation, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

19. US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue: Responding to Increased Chinese Aggressiveness

Author:
Jeffrey Ordaniel
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Taiwan is already under attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) politically, economically, psychologically, and militarily—the latter through more aggressive Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gray zone military operations short of actual direct conflict. This multidimensional threat requires a multidimensional response in ways that complement and enhance military deterrence. PRC behavior represents a global problem that demands a global response. PRC pressure on Taiwan has increased considerably over the past year, even before Beijing used the visit by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi as an excuse to further ramp up pressure. The August 2022 PLA military exercise around Taiwan appears aimed at further creating a “new normal” that could reduce warning times should Beijing invade. However, such PRC actions are not “normal.” They are unilateral, destabilizing, and, in some instances, illegal changes to the status quo. Such Chinese pressure tactics, combined with the “wake up call” provided by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, have sensitized the citizens and governments of Taiwan, the United States, and the international community to the growing possibility—if not probability—of a PRC invasion and have increased public perceptions about the need and willingness to defend Taiwan democracy. The PRC’s nuclear build-up is also a great cause of concern. This concern is driven not by the threat of nuclear war (given US nuclear superiority) but by the possibility of nuclear blackmail aimed at discouraging Washington from getting involved in a Taiwan confrontation. Taiwanese are concerned about crisis escalation (especially to the nuclear level) but worry more about the PRC deterring the United States. The United States, working closely with allies and other like-minded states, should be more proactive and less reactive in responding to increased PRC aggressive behavior. With the US Department of Defense (DoD) in the lead, the US Government needs to better assess Chinese strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis Taiwan with an eye toward countering strengths and exploiting weaknesses, while also examining ways to broaden the challenge along multiple fronts in cooperation with various allies and partners. Think tanks can and should supplement this analysis. While continued strong support for Ukraine is important to demonstrate Western resolve and prevent more Russian territorial gains, the PRC remains the “pacing threat” and thus should remain the focus of US national security policy and defense procurement strategy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Deterrence, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

20. Tracking Chinese Aid through China Customs: Darlings and Orphans after the COVID-19 Outbreak

Author:
Andreas Fuchs, Lennart Kaplan, Krisztina Kis-Katos, Sebastian Schmidt, Felix Turbanisch, and Feicheng Wang
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, China's mask and vaccine diplomacy have been widely discussed, but the debate relies on a few stylized data points. This article introduces a systematic way to measure China's foreign aid in almost real-time through official customs records of exported aid goods. Our results show significant shifts in China's aid after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. First, medical aid skyrocketed after the outbreak. It was initially dominated by face masks and other protective equipment and later by vaccines. This came at the expense of non-medical aid, which was 16.3 percent below its pre-pandemic level. Second, China's aid became global, clearly extending beyond the Global South. Third, in the aftermath of the initial outbreak in March 2020, China's aid became less responsive to both recipient need and political friendship, which can be mainly attributed to the rise of aid through non-government sources. However, in the vaccine diplomacy period of 2021, economic needs and political factors have regained their original importance.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Public Health, Vaccine, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

21. Mind the Gap: Priorities for Transatlantic China Policy

Author:
Wolfgang Ischinger and Joseph S. Nye Jr.
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
Working together with partners such as Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and many others with whom areas of agreement can be identified will be crucial to achieving success.9 In the case of Russia, a constructive dialogue on China is clearly not a near-term prospect. But given Russia’s strategic interests it is a conversation to which the West should revert once conditions permit. The rise of a domestically authoritarian and globally assertive China renders transatlantic cooperation more relevant than at any time in recent history. Transatlantic partners need to be ready for long-term strategic competition. They must also seize opportunities for cooperation with China, starting with issues such as climate change, global health, and food security. By working together from a position of strength, they will improve the chances of arriving at more productive relationships with China.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and North America

22. Twitter and Digital Diplomacy: China and COVID-19

Author:
Chris Alden and Kenddrick Chan
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This Strategic Update explores how official Chinese foreign policy entities have used Twitter as a public diplomacy platform during the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the nature of their Twitter activity, and what this means for Chinese Twitter Diplomacy in the future.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Social Media, COVID-19, Twitter, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

23. Righting a Wrong: Taiwan, the United Nations, and United States Policy

Author:
Michael Mazza and Gary J. Schmitt
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project 2049 Institute
Abstract:
Fifty years ago, on October 25, 1970, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, which expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek” from the United Nations (UN) and gave the Republic of China’s seat to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For several years now, the UN has misread the resolution as meaning that Taiwan is a province of the PRC. Neither the resolution nor the UN Charter empowers the UN Secretary-General to make this determination. Quite to the contrary, as Michael Mazza and Gary Schmitt demonstrate in this report marking the 50th anniversary of Resolution 2758, Taiwan’s participation in the UN system would be in accord with international law and the interests of a globalized world. Absent greater flexibility from Beijing regarding Taiwan’s engagement with the UN, the authors argue, the United States should launch a full court press to achieve Taiwan’s formal membership.
Topic:
Diplomacy, United Nations, History, and International System
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

24. China’s biased role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Author:
Tuvia Gering
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Beijing’s anti-Israel statements and actions during the recent Gaza operation undermined Israeli trust in China.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, and Asia

25. China’s Improvised Mask Diplomacy in Chile

Author:
Urdinez. Francisco
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
During the pandemic, Chinese medical and equipment supplies to Chile have come mostly from a diverse cast of Chinese players with local experience in Chile. They adapted to Chile’s unique system of emergency and disaster management. China has become a global power, but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices. With a generous multiyear grant from the Ford Foundation, Carnegie has launched an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through a mix of research and strategic convening, this project explores these complex dynamics, including the ways Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are mostly ignored by Western policymakers in particular. Ultimately, the project aims to significantly broaden understanding and debate about China’s role in the world and to generate innovative policy ideas. These could enable local players to better channel Chinese energies to support their societies and economies; provide lessons for Western engagement around the world, especially in developing countries; help China’s own policy community learn from the diversity of Chinese experience; and potentially reduce frictions.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Disaster Relief, Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South America, and Chile

26. Limits of Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Lessons from the THAAD Dispute for South Korea's Foreign Policy

Author:
Maximilian Ernst
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This paper examines South Korea’s foreign policy towards China before, during, and after the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense dispute to investigate the limits of South Korea’s public diplomacy and soft power. South Korea’s official public diplomacy has the objective to “gain global support for Korea’s policies,” following Joseph Nye’s narrow definition of soft power. South Korea furthermore ranks high in the most relevant soft power indices. Based on the case of Chinese economic retaliation against South Korea in response to THAAD deployment, this paper argues that public diplomacy and soft power only work in the absence of traditional security contentions, but fail in the presence of such security contentions. The THAAD case also demonstrates the utility of traditional diplomacy, based on high-level summits and negotiations, to solve the very disputes that South Korea’s latent public diplomacy and soft power were unable to alleviate.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Weapons
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, and Korea

27. Advancing South Korea-Southeast Asia Security Ties: Between Opportunities and Challenges

Author:
Prashanth Parameswaran
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s New Southern Policy (NSP)—the most recent effort by Seoul to boost relations with Southeast Asian countries and India and diversify its relationships beyond four major powers: China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. Yet, at the same time, less of a focus has been placed on how to advance the security aspect of the NSP despite some of the inroads that have been made, as well as the underlying convergences of concerns and interests between South Korea and the countries of Southeast Asia. This paper addresses this gap by providing insights into South Korea’s security ties with Southeast Asia, based on a close analysis of South Korean and Southeast Asian accounts as well as conversations with officials and scholars on both sides. It makes three arguments. First, while South Korea’s efforts to advance security ties with Southeast Asian states as well as with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a bloc may have been met with mixed results so far, the inroads made still deserve attention and are rooted in several domestic, regional, and global drivers. Second, though these security ties create opportunities for Seoul’s relations with ASEAN countries, they also pose challenges that should not be ignored. Third and finally, advancing security relations between South Korea and Southeast Asian countries will require actions not just on the part of Seoul or ASEAN nations, but also other actors.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and Southeast Asia

28. ASEAN Matters for America/America Matters for ASEAN

Author:
East-West Center
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
This project maps the trade, investment, employment, business, diplomacy, security, education, tourism, and people-to-people connections between the United States and the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at the national, state, and local levels. Part of the Asia Matters for America initiative, this publication, the one-page connections summaries for states, and the AsiaMattersforAmerica.org website are resources for understanding the robust and dynamic US-ASEAN relationship.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Agriculture, Diplomacy, Health, and Infrastructure
Political Geography:
Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

29. Don’t Interfere, Integrate: China Proposes (Yet Another) Middle East Peace Initiative

Author:
Tuvia Gering
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Israel should work with China so that its initiative doesn’t interfere with the Abraham Accords, and should seek to capitalize on common denominators between Beijing and Washington.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, Asia, North America, and United States of America

30. Israel, help India fight COVID-19

Author:
Oshrit Birvadker
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
The world is watching India’s coronavirus catastrophe, and it could use any lifeline at this point. Israel could now help this Asiatic power overcome one of the most serious crises in its history.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Middle East, India, Israel, and Asia

31. South Korea Beyond Northeast Asia: How Seoul Is Deepening Ties With India and ASEAN

Author:
Kathryn Botto
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Under South Korean President Moon Jae-in and his administration, Seoul has undertaken its first unified diplomatic initiative aimed at advancing ties with India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This initiative is known as the New Southern Policy (NSP). Though Moon’s efforts toward securing inter-Korean peace have received the most publicity, the NSP has arguably sustained more momentum than any of the administration’s other flagship foreign policy initiatives. Looking beyond South Korea’s relationships in Northeast Asia, it is also important to assess the NSP’s progress toward its goal to “elevate [South] Korea’s relations with ASEAN member states and India in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres, among others, to the same level [South] Korea maintains with the four major powers (the United States, China, Japan and Russia).”1 The NSP is an extension of South Korea’s need to diversify its economic and strategic relationships amid the uncertainty posed by competition between its closest ally, the United States, and largest trading partner, China. By elevating ties with India and Southeast Asia, particularly in the economic realm, Seoul hopes to insulate itself from the risks posed by trade and strategic friction between the two great powers. Moreover, it hopes to advance its middle power diplomacy and improve ties with India and Southeast Asia commensurate with their growing economic and strategic importance. Though India and ASEAN countries have strong ties to South Korea and share many of the same values and interests, they have not featured as prominently in Seoul’s diplomacy as major powers around the peninsula in the past. While it has clear logic behind it, the NSP’s implementation and outcomes so far are mixed. Of the policy’s three pillars—prosperity (economic cooperation), people (sociocultural cooperation), and peace (political and strategic cooperation)—the prosperity pillar has received the most emphasis. Under this pillar, South Korea has initiated new negotiations for free trade agreements and launched an official development assistance (ODA) strategy aimed at six NSP partner countries. However, cooperation with India has often lagged while cooperation with Vietnam has outpaced attention to most other ASEAN member states. The peace pillar, by contrast, has been relatively underdeveloped and focused mainly on nontraditional security issues while avoiding sensitive strategic issues confronting the region. This pillar showcases how South Korea’s concerns about Chinese influence both motivate and constrain the policy—though Seoul wants to diversify its economic portfolio and strategic partnerships to mitigate its reliance on China, it also must tread carefully to avoid retaliation from Beijing. Even so, while ASEAN, India, and South Korea share common interests on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, stability in the Taiwan Strait, and denuclearization by North Korea, South Korea’s main security concerns revolve around Northeast Asia, while those of India and ASEAN do not. Seoul’s hierarchy of priorities in the security realm will continue to differ from that of its NSP partners, posing another obstacle to security cooperation. That said, the policy has made progress in strengthening South Korea’s diplomatic infrastructure and institutional apparatus to devote more attention to NSP partner countries, even in just four short years and after being disrupted by a global pandemic. Considering this short period, many of NSP’s projects will take time to show results. Even so, the broad and far-reaching policy has sometimes struggled to define its goals or unify its wide range of elements under a clear strategy. It would benefit from a more well-branded approach to India and Southeast Asia that highlights core projects under each pillar.2 To that end, the Moon administration should strive to evaluate the outcomes of the NSP in its final year in office. Although it is typically difficult to maintain continuity in foreign policy due to South Korean presidents’ limit to one five-year term, the geopolitical and economic imperatives driving the NSP will remain under a new administration in 2022. Given the staying power of these drivers and the continuously growing importance of India and Southeast Asia, South Korea’s next president will have every reason to keep emphasizing these regional partnerships as well.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Integration, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
India, Asia, and South Korea

32. How China Learned to Harness Israel’s Media and Booming Tech Scene

Author:
Roie Yellinek
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Israel and China established full diplomatic relations only in 1992, making Israel almost the last Middle Eastern country to do so. Starting in the early 2000s, ties between the two countries began to blossom, mostly because the Chinese government started to view Israel as a global technology hub and began seeking to capitalize on Israel’s innovation capabilities to help meet its own developmental needs and strategic challenges. In addition, as China’s rivalry with Israel’s leading ally, the United States, has heated up, Beijing’s interest in Israel also has gotten stronger. In light of Israel’s status as a major technology hub and a leading U.S. ally, China has sought to deepen its influence in Israel through media engagement and other forms of outreach. As Chinese actors have pursued technological innovation and greater political influence in Israel, they have employed three basic approaches to court favor in and through Israeli media circles: direct messaging to the Israeli public in local Hebrew-language newspapers, the use of Chinese outlets (especially the Hebrew department of China Radio International) targeted at Israeli audiences, and efforts to leverage prominent public figures friendly toward China to amplify favorable messages delivered on these local Israeli and Chinese platforms. China’s messaging strategy in Israel has evolved in three stages. Early on, this strategy mainly included recycled talking points from the Chinese Communist Party that do not always translate well overseas. Between 2015 and 2018, this messaging from Chinese actors started to become more direct and tailored for the Israeli people. Since 2018, Chinese engagement has expanded to include a much wider variety of Israeli media outlets, which has meant even more direct access to ordinary Israelis. This strategy and other elements of China’s diplomatic outreach to Israel seem to be having an impact. According to 2019 polling from the Pew Research Center, Israeli respondents view China more positively than those in any other Western-oriented countries that took part in this survey did. These results are an outgrowth of China’s desire to build influence vis-à-vis Israeli society, especially in terms of Israelis’ views on China. Chinese government officials and other actors see this campaign toward the Israeli people as part of a broader and more important strategic campaign, as Beijing competes with Washington for worldwide influence. Israel has a clear national interest in carefully examining how and why Beijing deploys such strategic messaging and how Chinese actors have leveraged local conditions, language habits, and consumer preferences to advance their objectives. The new Israeli government under Prime Minister Naftali Bennett must act prudently and keep these Chinese messaging activities in mind as it balances and advances Israel’s foreign policy interests, seeking to underscore that it does not see China as an enemy but that cooperation with Beijing needs to be pursued in the right way.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, and Media
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Israel, and Asia

33. The “Indo-Pacific” Concept: Geographical Adjustments and their Implications

Author:
Wada Haruko
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The United States, Australia, Japan, India, France, the United Kingdom, Indonesia and ASEAN have adopted the term “Indo-Pacific” as a policy symbol of regional engagement. However, less attention has been given to the change in the geographical definition of the “Indo-Pacific”. This study examines how these countries have adjusted the geographical scope of “Indo-Pacific” to understand how they conceptualise the region. It finds that the inherent core area of the “Indo-Pacific” is from India to the Southeast Asian countries and the seas from the eastern Indian Ocean to the South China Sea, and that the “Indo-Pacific” has converged eastwards and diverged westwards through the geographical adjustment process. It also found that some of the geographical definitions have an additional function of conveying diplomatic messages. These findings will help us understand how the concept of “Indo- Pacific” as conceptualised by various countries develops.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, United Kingdom, Asia, France, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

34. Indo-Japan Dialogue in the 20th Century and Cultural Heritage in the New World Order

Author:
Rekha Yadav and Anisha Deswal
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
India International Centre (IIC)
Abstract:
The paper presentations on the second day of the conference on ‘Rethinking Cultural Heritage’ continued the trend of research-based studies, as evident on the first day of the meeting.1 Professor Amiya P. Sen began with a note of apology, stating that after reflection, he had changed the title of his presentation to ‘Japan and India as Ontology: Negotiating Modernity, Culture and Cosmopolitanism in Colonial Bengal’. The paper was divided into two parts. The first part of the paper focused on the broad introduction of the structure and arguments which he developed about 19th century Bengal, as the site where the first crop of a Westerneducated Hindu intelligentsia, creatively and actively engaged in a two-way, quite contrary, intellectual enterprise. While it produced some of the greatest supporters of Western modernity, it also created its sharpest critics. The second part of the paper examined changing Indian perceptions of Japan over a period of time, through the writings of two prominent intellectual figures of Bengal, that is Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902), and the poet, Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941).
Topic:
Diplomacy, History, Bilateral Relations, Culture, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Japan, South Asia, India, and Asia

35. Domestic and International (Dis)Order: A Strategic Response

Author:
Aspen Strategy Group
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
The Aspen Strategy Group recently released Domestic and International (Dis)Order: A Strategic Response bringing together preeminent experts to explore race, democracy, and political divisions on the American home front; the future of U.S.-China relations; the global economy; and U.S. foreign policy priorities for 2021. Contributors include: Madeleine K. Albright, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, Zoë Baird, Robert D. Blackwill, Nicholas Burns, Kurt M. Campbell, Diana Farrell, Peter Feaver, Michael J. Green, Naima Green-Riley, Jane Harman, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Wolfgang Ischinger, Aditi Kumar, Anja Manuel, David McCormick, John McLaughlin, Shivshankar Menon, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., David H. Petraeus, Tom Pritzker, Condoleezza Rice, Senator Tim Scott, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Torrey Taussig, and Philip Zelikow.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, International Cooperation, Race, Military Strategy, Democracy, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

36. China Global Security Tracker, No.6

Author:
Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
China hits back after NATO calls it a security challenge, dormant Chinese hacking group resumes attacks, and more.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, North Atlantic, Beijing, Asia, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka

37. North Korea’s Nuclear Program: The Early Days, 1984–2002

Author:
Torrey Froscher
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
The North Korean nuclear program has been a major intelligence and policy challenge for more than 30 years. Former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry described the problem as “perhaps the most unsuccessful exercise of diplomacy in our country’s history.”1 Donald Gregg, who was CIA station chief in Seoul as well as US ambassador to South Korea, called North Korea the “longest running intelligence failure in the history of American espionage.”2 To be fair, Gregg was referring specifically to a lack of success in recruiting human sources—not necessarily errors in specific or overall assessments. Nonetheless, his comment underscores the difficulty of figuring out what North Korea is up to. In 2005, the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which was convened to investigate the failed 2002 national intelligence estimate on Iraqi WMD capabilities, indicated that we know “disturbingly little about the weapons programs and even less about the intentions of many of our most dangerous adversaries,”3 presumably including North Korea. Today we know a lot more about North Korea’s nuclear program— but mostly it is what they want us to know. Pyongyang has conducted six nuclear tests. We know that North Korea has nuclear weapons, a significant fissile material production capacity, and an ambitious nuclear and missile development effort. These programs are completely unconstrained. The United States has tried many approaches to deal with the problem over the years, and intelligence has played a key role in support. Are there lessons to be learned from this experience? Obviously, it’s a very big question and I will sketch out just a few thoughts, mostly from an intelligence perspective: What we knew and when and how we thought about the problem. North Korea was one of many issues I worked on as an analyst and manager in CIA until my retirement in 2006. The views that follow are my own, of course, and the specific information is drawn from the extensive public literature on the issue, as well as declassified intelligence documents.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Intelligence, Nuclear Weapons, and History
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and United States of America

38. US Nonproliferation Cooperation with Russia and China

Author:
Robert Einhorn
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The United States has at times worked cooperatively with Russia and China to promote shared nonproliferation objectives. But with no end in sight to the current precipitous decline in Washington’s bilateral relations with Moscow and Beijing, constructive engagement on today’s nonproliferation challenges has become increasingly problematic. Unless the United States and its two great power competitors can find a way to carve out areas of cooperation in otherwise highly adversarial relationships, the remarkably positive record of international efforts to prevent additional countries from acquiring weapons will be difficult to sustain. From sometimes partners to frequent foes, this Occasional Paper examines the history of US cooperation with Russia and China on key issues including Iran, North Korea, Syria, international nonproliferation mechanisms, and nuclear security. It also outlines the obstacles to future nonproliferation cooperation, as well as the growing proliferation threats that require such cooperation. Most importantly, it identifies several possible areas where the United States can hope to find common ground with both countries. With relationships with Russia and China reaching new lows and unlikely to improve for the foreseeable future, finding a way to for the United States to work cooperatively with both countries will not be easy. Bridges to constructive engagement have been burned and will be difficult to rebuild. However, the author points out that constituencies for cooperation remain in all three countries, including in government bureaucracies. “As hard as it may be to find common ground in otherwise highly adversarial relationships, it is imperative that the US administration in office after January 2021 make every effort to do so. Cooperation with America’s two great power rivals will not always guarantee success, but the absence of such cooperation will surely increase the risk of failure.”
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, United States of America, and North America

39. The PLA’s Mask Diplomacy

Author:
Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Much has been written about China’s “mask diplomacy” during the Covid-19 pandemic. As the epicenter of the pandemic shifted from China to the rest of the world, China’s government sent planeloads of masks and medical supplies to hard-hit countries around the world. Beijing’s “mask diplomacy” sought to bolster China’s image as a responsible global power and was widely perceived as part of Beijing’s attempt to control the narrative around the pandemic and distract from its initial cover-up. But while all the attention focused on the Chinese government’s actions, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was carrying out its own, much quieter version of mask diplomacy. According to MERICS data, in the three months between March 13 and June 19, the PLA sent military planes full of medical material to 46 countries. The material, which mostly consisted of masks and personal protective equipment (PPE), was invariably donated to the recipient countries’ armed forces or defense ministries. The PLA also set up video conferences with foreign militaries to share its experiences of fighting the Covid-19 outbreak and strengthen military-to-military relations. At first glance, the Chinese government’s mask diplomacy campaign and the PLA’s look remarkably similar. However, a number of differences suggest there were different goals and strategies at play.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Public Policy, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

40. China's Rise as a Global Security Actor: Implications for NATO

Author:
Meia Nouwens and Helena Legarda
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In December 2019, for the first time, NATO leaders recognised China as a new strategic point of focus for the Alliance. This reflects growing concern among NATO members surrounding China’s geopolitical rise and its growing power-projection capabilities, as well as the impact that these may have on the global balance of power. Today, China is not only taking a central role in Indo-Pacific security affairs but is also becoming an increasingly visible security actor in Europe’s periphery. As such, the question of how to deal with an increasingly global China has been an important part of Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s NATO 2030 reflection process. China poses a wide range of challenges to NATO. Beijing sees the Alliance as a United States-centric outfit that may be used by Washington to contain China, and has therefore tried to influence individual NATO members’ decisions in order to weaken the Alliance’s unity. Close ties between China and Russia, especially in the security and military spheres, have also been a source of concern for NATO allies. Besides the Chinese and Russian navies’ joint exercises in the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, there is also the potential for the two sides to further coordinate – or at least align their behaviour – on issues of relevance to the Alliance, including hybrid warfare and cyber espionage, arms-control issues, and their approach to Arctic governance, among others. China’s defence spending and military-modernisation process, along with the growing strength of its defence industry, have led to the proliferation of more advanced military platforms around the world. Beijing is also expanding its stockpile of missiles, some of which have the range to reach NATO countries. China’s military-power-projection capabilities have likewise edged towards Europe as the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has expanded its international presence over the last few years. While NATO allies may have agreed that China presents a number of challenges to the Alliance’s security, they have yet to achieve consensus on how to address them. Some of these issues lie beyond NATO’s traditional areas of competence and will require expertise best provided by partners of the Alliance rather than the Alliance itself. NATO allies will need to prioritise how, when, where and with which partners to use their combined resources to deal with them. At the same time, the Alliance acknowledges that China is not its adversary. NATO thus must find areas of common interest where it can continue to cooperate with China, albeit with a more clear-eyed approach than it has done in the past. Addressing the opportunities and problems posed by China as a cohesive alliance will be more important than ever.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
China, Europe, North Atlantic, Asia, and North America

41. Turkey's Foreign Policy in the Age of Uncertainty

Author:
Hidajet Biscevic
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
From the early period of post-Cold War world order in the last decade of 20th century, through challenges and changes over the two decades of 21st century, Turkey’s foreign policy has been characterized by the need and ability to adapt to the changing, and ever deteriorating global conditions. Changes in the structure and nature of international order and the way Turkish foreign policy evolved are directly related. During the initial period of undisputed unipolar order, Turkey shaped its foreign policy in a way to align its national goals with the main Western partners and alliances. But, as the international system gradually moved from unipolarity to the current “unfinished new system”, characterized by renewed competition and confrontation among a rising number of actors, Turkey started to pursue multi-dimensional and multi- directional foreign policy strategy and practice. In sum, it could be argued that there were “two phases” of Turkish foreign policy approach: of Erdogan's period in 2002.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Asia

42. The End of the Second Karabakh War: Has a Lasting Peace Come to the South Caucasus?

Author:
Krševan Antun Dujmović
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
In a year in which the whole world seemed to have frozen its conflicts, uniting its efforts to curb the COVID-19 pandemic, a war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding regions in Azerbaijan. This was a full-scale armed conflict involving two nations in the South Caucasus, but unlike the first Karabakh war that lasted for more than six years, this war lasted only six weeks. Mainly due to modern warfare and deployment of new sophisticated technology, namely unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by Azerbaijan, a long war of attrition was avoided. Thus, the second war caused a significantly lower destruction of properties and cultural sites in this region of rich history on the crossroads between Asia and Europe, the Caspian and the Black Sea. The short duration of this war also insured that no big players neighboring Armenia and Azerbaijan get directly involved on either of the two warring sides, which could have had incomprehensible consequences for the international community. This is because the countries neighboring the conflict area are substantively different comparatively to what they were in the first half of the nineties when the first Karabakh war took place. Firstly, to the north, Russia was then a country facing disintegration and social implosion, with its military in disarray, unable to quell a rebellion in its small republic of Chechnya in the North Caucasus. Today, Russia is the second military force in the world, spreading its political and military clout far beyond its borders. Secondly, to the west, Turkey has become a major political power in the region, assertive and ambitious, the size of its military is second only to that of the US in NATO. Thirdly, to the south, Iran which was by late eighties a country weary of conflicts after a long war with Iraq, is today a regional power wielding it leverage in most of the Middle East. Considering this, the second war in Karabakh had a potential of erupting to a wider regional conflict, and considering the players involved, even into a global conflict. However, while Europe was introducing a second wave of lockdowns in order to grind to a halt the coronavirus, and while the US was embroiled in the presidential election campaign, shattered by an unprecedented economic slump and civil unrest, the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan erupted without much attention of the international community. When the conflict finally started to gain the interest of the world, it rapidly ended, leaving the international community once again perplexed. Has the ceasefire agreement signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan on November 9 brought a lasting peace to the South Caucasus, or is the truce just temporary, freezing the conflict for yet another round of hostilities?
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Peace, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and South Caucasus

43. China's Pandemic Diplomacy

Author:
Denny Roy
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic threatened to damage China’s international reputation just as the Chinese government under Xi Jinping was peaking in its promotion of China as a model political system and superior international citizen. Beijing launched a massive diplomatic effort aimed at both foreign governments and foreign societies. The goal was to overcome initial negative publicity and to recast China as an efficient and heroic country in the eyes of international public opinion. The crisis created an opening for China to make gains in its international leadership credentials as the world saw the superpower United States falter. Ultimately, however, Chinese pandemic diplomacy contributed to a net decrease in China’s global prestige, largely because domestic political imperatives motivated behavior that generated international disapproval and distrust for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government. This paper summarizes the content of Chinese pandemic diplomacy through the key period of January through May 20201, identifies specific strengths and weaknesses of China’s effort, and briefly assesses its global impact.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

44. Pyongyang's Foreign Relations: Amidst a Diplomatic Standstill, Will Old Friendships Fade Away?

Author:
Daniel Wertz
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
North Korea’s tumultuous path over the past few years from nuclear standoff to summit diplomacy put a spotlight on Pyongyang’s bilateral relations across the Indo-Pacific. The February 2017 assassination of Kim Jong Un’s exiled half-brother at the Kuala Lumpur airport dramatized the malign aspects of North Korea’s overseas presence, and presaged Southeast Asia’s role as an important front in the incipient U.S.-led maximum pressure campaign against Pyongyang. As maximum pressure transitioned to engagement with North Korea, U.S.-DPRK summits in Singapore and Vietnam raised hopes that North Korea could follow the examples of these host nations, and move forward on a more hopeful path toward economic development and reconciliation with old adversaries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, and Pyongyang

45. Implications of the Proposed China-Iran deal for India

Author:
Sruthi V.S.
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
The ambitious $400 billion deal between China and Iran has garnered worldwide attention. The 18-page draft proposal says that China will facilitate the infusion of about $280 billion to Iran. This major economic and security partnership between China and Iran has raised India’s concerns against the backdrop of its ongoing border conflict with China. According to the New York Times report, the proposed China-Iran deal talks about expanding China’s presence in Iran’s “banking, telecommunications, ports, railways and dozens of other projects”, and in return China will receive a steady supply of oil from Iran for the next 25 years at a discounted price. There are more than 100 projects listed in the draft that will see Chinese investments; these include building Free Trade Zones and several very significant ports. The Chinese will also help Iran build infrastructure for 5G networks and come up with an internet filter like the Great Firewall in China. The stronghold of China in Iran could also result in undermining US policy in the Middle East.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Iran, Middle East, India, and Asia

46. Prospects for India-Taiwan Relations

Author:
Niranjan Jose
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on International Policy (CIP)
Abstract:
This year’s border stand-off in the Galwan Valley between China and India following China’s encroachment into Indian territory, is a reminder of India’s perennial problems with Beijing. The latest violation is an example of the staunch stance China has adopted against India. Neither nation is interested in a full-fledged confrontation. In this scenario, New Delhi has no option but to engage with Beijing to resolve the dispute through dialogue; however discussion and confidence-building initiatives by itself will not lead India towards problem-solving. China’s confrontational approach towards India and the border disagreement set the right background as to why it could not be a better opportunity for India to meaningfully engage with Taiwan. India and Taiwan both are Asian democracies pursuing an effective resolution of dynamic social and ethnic problems, and both face aggressive Chinese security policies aimed at establishing regional hegemony. From a strategic security perspective, both India and Taiwan are deeply concerned about the rising assertiveness of Beijing in the region. The China element can become a tool for moving closer to the strategic communities in New Delhi and Taipei. India and Taiwan have a variety of mutual concerns, ranging from controlling China’s growth to a political and economic partnership. For Taiwan, China’s current trade war with the US has made several Taiwanese firms keen to reduce their vulnerability on China. Indian government initiatives such as Smart Cities, Make in India, Digital India, and Start-up India were launched to increase India’s viability for foreign investors, making it an attractive destination for Taiwanese corporations.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, India, Taiwan, and Asia

47. 11th U.S.-China High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue

Author:
Joshua Cavanaugh
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EastWest Institute
Abstract:
A select delegation of leaders from the U.S. Democratic and Republican Parties and the global business community traveled to Beijing, China to meet with senior officials from the Communist Party of China (CPC) on November 18-21, 2019. The discussions were part of the 11th U.S.-China High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue organized by the EastWest Institute (EWI) in partnership with the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (IDCPC). Launched in 2010, the U.S.-China High-Level Political Party Leaders Dialogue seeks to build understanding and trust between political elites from the U.S. and China through candid exchanges of views on topics ranging from local governance to foreign policy concerns. The dialogue process consistently involves sitting officers from the CPC and the U.S. Democratic and Republican National Committees. In the 11th iteration of the dialogue, the CPC delegation was led by Song Tao, minister of IDCPC. Gary Locke, former secretary of the United States Department of Commerce, former governor for the state of Washington and former United States Ambassador of China; and Alphonso Jackson, former secretary of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development; lead the U.S. Democratic and Republican delegations, respectively. Throughout the dialogue, members of both delegations spoke freely on relevant topics including foriegn policy trends, trade disputes and emerging areas of economic cooperation. EWI facilitated a series of meetings for the U.S. delegation, which included a productive meeting with Wang Qishan, vice president of the People’s Republic of China at the Great Hall of the People. The delegates also met with Yang Jiechi, director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs; Dai Bingguo, former state councilor of the People’s Republic of China; and Lu Kang, director of the Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The U.S. delegates visited the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and met with their president, Jin Liqun, as well as the Schwarzman College at Tsinghua University to engage prominent scholars on the future of the U.S.-China relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Trade and Finance, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
United States, China, Asia, and North America

48. Dealing with China: Lessons Learned from Three Case Studies

Author:
Christopher W. Bishop
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The idea for this paper began after several conversations with Canadian friends and colleagues about the cases of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor. On December 10, 2018, Chinese officials detained the two Canadian citizens for “endangering state security”, 10 days after Canadian authorities arrested Meng Wanzhou, Huawei’s chief financial officer, on an extradition warrant from the United States, where she was wanted for bank fraud. Despite Chinese statements denying any connection between the two Michaels and Meng, some Canadians have argued the only way to gain their release is for Canada to release Meng – a classic “prisoner exchange”. Others, however, have argued just as forcefully that trading Meng for the two Canadians would only give legitimacy to China’s “hostage diplomacy”. One friend asked me if China had ever done anything like this before. How had those cases been resolved, and what would China do this time? Those were good questions. As a U.S. Foreign Service officer who has spent much of my career working on China – including at the U.S. embassy in Beijing from 2015-2018, where I analyzed the Communist Party leadership and China’s state security apparatus – I had some insight into Chinese foreign policy. I also had a personal connection to one of the cases. I knew Michael Kovrig – he had been one of my counterparts at the Canadian embassy in Beijing – and I had great respect for his work as a diplomat, and later as a senior advisor at the International Crisis Group. Moreover, because I was now on leave from the U.S. Department of State to serve as a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellow in Canada, I had time to look for some answers. And so I began trying to identify and analyze similar cases from the recent past. This paper is the result. It represents my own views, and although the Department of State has allowed me to publish it in my personal capacity, it does not necessarily reflect the views of the Department or the U.S. government.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Affairs, Prisons/Penal Systems, and Finance
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Asia, North America, and United States of America

49. Shifts in Global Sanctions Policy, and What They Mean for the Future

Author:
Richard Nephew
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
The last four years have borne witness to a range of new sanctions, policies, and approaches around the world. Some of these were predicted in November 2016, as Donald Trump took to sanctions far more than his predecessors, using them to tackle virtually every foreign policy problem he encountered. In fact, Trump’s use of sanctions transcended their typical usage in both form and content, as he employed tariffs and other more traditional “trade” tools to try to manage a bevy of nontrade problems. The long-term effects of this decision have yet to be felt or properly understood. It may be that Trump was ahead of the curve in seeing the fracturing of the global liberal economic order and employed the US economy for strategic advantage while it was still ahead. It may also be that Trump undermined the US position in the global economy through his policies, if not actually hastened the demise of this system of managing global economics. Time and the evolution of policy in other global power centers will eventually tell. The shifting approach to sanctions policy by a variety of other states is a manifestation of the potential effects of Trump’s policy choices in using US economic power. From the EU to Russia to China, other countries have changed long-standing policy approaches as they relate to sanctions, either to respond to or perhaps to take advantage of the new paths forged by the United States. The actions that they have taken are not “unprecedented” per se, as each of these countries or organizations has—at times—embraced policies that are consistent with some of these current actions. But, in aggregate, they describe an overall shift in how the world treats sanctions and trade policy, particularly that as practiced by the United States.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

50. How the US and China Could Renew Cooperation on Climate Change

Author:
Aimee Barnes, Fan Dai, and Angela Luh
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Averting global climate catastrophe depends in large part on progress by the world’s two greatest powers and emitters: the United States and China. However, relations between these two countries—particularly on climate action—have deteriorated over the past four years. With a new presidential administration set to enter the White House in January 2021, there is an opportunity for the US and China to build trust and cooperation on climate change in a way that supports a cooperative and dynamic bilateral relationship more broadly. This commentary takes a close look at the Biden-Harris presidential platform with respect to climate action and China, and assesses China’s domestic and international climate efforts, particularly with respect to the status of its 14th Five-Year Plan. Importantly, what emerges from this examination is a starting point for China and the US to improve their relationship through climate action and collaboration. China’s announcement that it would seek to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 is an important step towards such cooperation.[1] The most promising potential areas for US-China cooperation fall into three broad categories: renewing a shared commitment to global climate governance under the Paris Agreement; building trust to enable renewed bilateral cooperation, such as on technology innovation and investments; and supporting subnational leaders' progress in both countries through platforms where they can productively convene. Recognizing that a climate-safe future is bound up in our mutuality, these two world powers can promote a new era of climate action and resiliency.
Topic:
Climate Change, Diplomacy, Energy Policy, Environment, and International Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America