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2. Preparing for One War and Getting Another?
- Author:
- Antulio J. Echevarria II
- Publication Date:
- 09-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- Current trends in defense thinking show signs of being influenced by the notion that preparing for one form of war has brought about another. We find evidence of this notion in a number of official speeches, the 2008 National Defense Strategy, and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report. It is captured in the almost routine claim that America's superiority in conventional warfare is so great that it is driving our adversaries toward irregular methods. All of these examples share the basic assumption that we are now fighting (and will likely continue to fight) conflicts for which we have not prepared—precisely because we have not prepared for them. Thus, the modern complement—a preparation paradox—to the old Latin adage “If you want peace, prepare for war,” might well be “If you want one kind of war, prepare for another.”
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, Terrorism, War, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- United States and America
3. Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot
- Author:
- Eric T. Olson
- Publication Date:
- 10-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- If the U.S. Army's current experience in ongoing overseas operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan are any indication, reconstruction has become an integral part of the American way of war. And judging from the disappointing results of reconstruction efforts in these operations, measured mostly in terms of the effect that such efforts have had on the course of these wars, there is much lacking in the Army's understanding of reconstruction itself and the role that it will likely play in all future operations, especially in counterinsurgencies (COIN).
- Topic:
- Conflict Resolution, Arms Control and Proliferation, Terrorism, War, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- Afghanistan and United States
4. An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army's Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations
- Author:
- Suzanne C. Nielsen
- Publication Date:
- 09-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- During the 2 decades preceding the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the U.S. Army went through tremendous reform and rejuvenation. It recovered from the Vietnam War, transitioned to an all-volunteer personnel model, and refocused on a potential future war against a very capable adversary in Europe. The Army's transformation was evident to external observers: from being seen as an organization in distress in the early 1970s, by 1991 the Army became an organization whose professionalism was the source of admiration. Drawing on the relevant literature, the author seeks to explain this important case of military change.
- Topic:
- Arms Control and Proliferation, War, and Counterinsurgency
- Political Geography:
- United States, Europe, and Vietnam
5. U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap
- Author:
- Dennis E Keller
- Publication Date:
- 08-2010
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
- Abstract:
- Establishing an effective local police force is one of the most critical elements of successful counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations, but it is a task for which the U.S. Government is the least prepared and capable. The establishment of an effective police force is critical to security sector reform, justice sector reform, and the successful transition to the host nation's security forces. But the United States lacks the institutional capacity to provide an immediate and coordinated civilian police training and advisory effort, particularly in a failed or fragile state. Because hesitation in addressing such problems causes delays in forming and training new police forces, and, even worse, emboldens corrupt and abusive locals who enable insurgents, terrorist groups, and organized criminal networks, the U.S. military must be prepared to support stability operations at regional level and below by assessing, advising, and even training police units until such time as civilian police trainers and mentors arrive on the ground.
- Topic:
- Crime, Counterinsurgency, and Law Enforcement
- Political Geography:
- United States