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Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Content Type Working Paper Publishing Institution The Geneva Centre for Security Policy Publication Year within 5 Years Publication Year within 10 Years

1. Blockchain Technology: An Innovative Policy Tool for Enhancing Conventional Arms Control and Verification

Author:
Nicolo Miotto
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Blockchain represents an unprecedented opportunity for enhancing conventional arms control (CAC) and verification. Based on the principles of transparency, verifiability, and predictability, this state-of-the-art technology could build confidence and facilitate the implementation of arms control mechanisms. Blockchain-based so-called “smart contracts” have advantageous practical implications for CAC. They could improve the verification of countries’ compliance with their CAC obligations by enhancing monitoring procedures and could strengthen arms export controls by improving treaty signatories’ ability to monitor weapons and ammunition supply chains. Reinforcing the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) framework for conventional ammunition control with a permissioned blockchain would provide greater confidentiality and improve monitoring and data verifiability, thus strengthening the OSCE’s CAC regimes.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Blockchain
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Regulating and Limiting the Proliferation of Armed Drones: Norms and Challenges

Author:
Cholpon Orozobekova and Marc Finaud
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
As a consequence of the attractiveness of the use of drones – for obvious reasons of cost and pilot safety – the international market in armed drones is booming, creating risks of widespread proliferation, especially to non-state actors or states known for their lack of respect for the laws of warfare.This paper analyses these proliferation risks and formulates recommendations on how to mitigate them. Starting in the late 20th century, the growth of guided-missile technologyled the international community to draw up political and legal rules in order to control the export of such sensitive equipment – subsequently including UAVs – to countries where the risk of uncontrolled and/or illicit proliferation and use is the highest. The first such attempt was the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which was established in 1987 to harmonise policies for the export of missiles and related technology and has been gradually extended to cover UAVs. The second regime was a voluntary transparency measure, the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA), established in 1991, to which UN member states are encouraged to report their exports and imports of conventional arms, including UAVs. The third was the Wassenaar Arrangement, launched in 1996 as a multilateral export control regime for conventional and dual-use goods and technologies, to which UAVs were added. The most recent initiative is the ATT, which entered into force in 2014 and regulates transfers of conventional arms, including certain categories of UAVs. As we will see in section 2, however, these regimes are far from being universal and all have limitations that make it difficult to impose constraints on UAV exports.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Drones
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Prohibitions and Export Assessment: Tracking Implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty

Author:
Tobias Vestner
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
This Geneva Paper shows that ATT states parties generally implement the ATT’s prohibitions set forth in Article 6 through national laws and policies. This paper also demonstrates that exporting states implement the ATT’s obligations regarding export assessment contained in Article 7 in many different ways. While the spectrum of how exporting states parties consider an arms exports’ potential effect on peace and security is very broad, their national frameworks contain similar or nearly identical export criteria on assessing the risk of arms being used for serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Few states parties have national export criteria regarding terrorism, transnational organized crime and gender-based violence. States also consider national criteria other than those specified in Article 7 before authorizing arms exports, including positive consequences of arms exports. Finally, states parties’ national frameworks mostly do not define clear thresholds for denying arms exports. Given this divergence in states party implementation, in addition to a remaining lack of clarity on how states apply the ATT provisions in practice, this paper recommends reinforcing dialogue on ATT implementation. This could lead to better understanding and implementation guidance that strengthens the emergence of common standards and improves the quality of national export assessments. To increase states parties’ knowledge on risks to be avoided, institutionalizing cooperation with human rights bodies and establishing an ATT internal information exchange mechanism is also recommended.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, United Nations, and Arms Trade
Political Geography:
United Nations and Global Focus