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1. The Concept of “Forward Defence”: How Has the Syrian Crisis Shaped the Evolution of Iran’s Military Strategy?

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Over the past decade, Iranian officials have repeatedly referred to “forward defence” or “offensive defence” as the foundation of Iran’s military strategy. While the concept implies the inclusion of offensive aspects into Iran’s military strategy, which used to have an overwhelmingly defensive nature, it is also increasingly used to justify Iran’s military presence beyond its borders. This paper begins with a historical overview of the evolution of Iran’s military strategy, especially since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, showing how the concept of “deterrence” has become the cornerstone of its strategic military planning. It also discusses the crucial concept of “strategic depth”. Understanding these basic concepts is essential to be able to analyse the forward defence strategy, its main elements, and the domestic, regional, and international factors contributing to its formation. The paper also explores how the Syrian crisis has affected Iran’s military strategy in both conceptual and instrumental terms, leading to the formation and consolidation of the forward defence. Conceptually, Iran has justified its direct military presence far from its borders as necessary for confronting threats at their source before they reach Iranian territory. From an instrumental point of view, Iran’s involvement in the Syrian crisis has led to the development of Iran’s regional network of non-state allies and proxies, while adding a new layer to Iran’s deterrence vis-à-vis Israel. The main argument is that forward defence is not a new military doctrine but an evolved and updated form of “deterrence”. The paper also identifies Iran’s ballistic missile and drone programmes, its support for non-state actors across the region, and its focus on developing cyberwar capabilities as the main elements of its forward defence strategy, rooted in its perception that it is located in an increasingly insecure regional environment. Finally, the paper suggests that, for the United States to reach an agreement with Iran on these missile and regional issues, Washington and its regional allies must make reciprocal concessions to alleviate Iran’s sense of threat to its security and survival. In this case, Iran might be ready to make concessions on its allied and proxy militias in Yemen and Syria, although the more complex security and political situations in Iraq and Lebanon leave Tehran with comparably less leverage. While Iran is not expected to agree on considerably limiting its missile programme, an agreement on the range of its ballistic missiles could be achievable.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Missile Defense, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

2. US-Russia interactions in Syria and the future of the conflict in 2021

Author:
Nikolay Surkov
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The future for Syria in 2021 looks bleak from the Russian perspective. Though the conflict entered a low-intensity phase of armed confrontations that characterised 2020 will likely continue in 2021. The temporary negotiated solution for north-western Syria reached in March 2020 is likely to hold but there exists a high probability of renewed fighting between the SAA and various Islamist groups. There will also be bickering between Russia, Turkey, Syria, and Iran due to their different visions for Idlib’s future. Tensions will likely also continue to grow in northern and north-eastern Syria, where US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces sporadically clash with pro-Turkish groups. Occasional US-Russian encounters on the ground are also highly likely in the region. Additionally, confrontations between Israel and Iran/Hezbollah forces stationed in Syria will likely continue and might escalate.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

3. Post-Election Iran and Syria: Continuity or Change?

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
On June 18, conservative cleric Ebrahim Raisi won Iran’s presidential election to succeed moderate President Hassan Rouhani. For many, his victory came amid public dissatisfaction with the dire economic and political situation, along with widespread disqualification of reformist and moderate candidates, which significantly reduced voter turnout. Traditionally, lower turnout in Iranian elections means the victory of conservative or so-called ‘hardline’ figures and so Raisi’s victory was in many ways following a theme. However, even though the election and its outcome indicate a significant shift in Iran’s domestic politics toward more authoritarianism, its impacts on foreign policy, including Iran’s strategy in Syria, will be less tangible. Over the past several years, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has almost completely dominated Iran’s regional policy. At the same time, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei openly seeks to limit the role of the president in foreign policy. Consequently, this means that Iran’s policy in Syria in the post-election period will be more about continuity than about change.
Topic:
Governance, Elections, Leadership, and Transition
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria

4. The Battle for the Tribes in Northeast Syria

Author:
Nicholas Heras
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Northeast Syria (NES) is fragmented under the control of different powers that are all seeking to gain the support of the local Arab tribes. Those seeking to upset the status quo include the Assad regime and its allies (Russia and Iran), Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies, and ISIS —all seeking disruption with different motivations, yet working side by side. Those seeking to maintain the status quo include the U.S.-led Coalition, the Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Often, earning the support and alliance of the tribes is a transactional process whereby the tribes seek direct financial support and community investment, employment opportunities, military support, and autonomy to run their own affairs. Currently, most local tribal groups are calculating that a tenuous U.S.-protected order in northeast Syria provides better security and provisions than the alternatives from the Assad regime and its allies, or by Turkey and its Syrian rebel proxies. However, ISIS remains a threat to all the powers involved in northeast Syria, and it is the major spoiler seeking to create the conditions for a return to the old order which was established under ISIS’s territorial Caliphate from 2014-2019.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Syria, North America, and United States of America

5. Syria in the US and Israeli debate on Iran

Author:
Shira Efron
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
With presidential elections in the United States underway in November 2020[1], the only possible scenarios for Washington in the Middle East are either continuation and solidification, or a change in its Iran policy, each with different potential impacts on the geopolitical conflict between the United States, Israel, and allied Arab countries on one side and Iran and its regional Axis-of-Resistance on the other. Analysing current convergences and divergences between the United States and Israel on Syria and Iran is important to anticipate potential changes in both countries’ positions following the US election, as such changes may impact the effectiveness and even the prospect of the continuation of the United States’ so-called ‘Maximum Pressure’ campaign. The policies of the two countries on Syria and Iran became varyingly intertwined as Iran entrenched itself deeply in Syria. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Israel and the United States differ in their approaches to tackling Syria. This contribution attempts to assess the US campaign against Iran, the cost it is likely to have inflicted upon it in Syria, and the outlook of an agreement with Iran. Although we are considering US policy on Iran, the analysis here also includes the Israeli perspective. Private conversations with Israeli current and former officials have provided important insights into how Israeli officials see US policy in Syria and vis-à-vis Iran, and can add a unique contribution to the dialogue. In this analysis, we sought to address several issues. First, whether there are any incentives for Iran to concede to US demands or reach a meaningful bargain, and whether under a Biden or Trump administration a new Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) could be renegotiated to include Iranian expansion in the region. We also examined the form and incentives structure that could entice Iran to offer a constructive contribution to the stability of Syria and the region. In addition, we assessed to what extent the Maximum Pressure campaign affects Iran, and whether targeting Syria with sanctions would incentivise both the Syrian government and the Syrian locals (who are working with Iran as fighters) to break with Iran. Finally, assuming that Iran is in Syria to protect its own interests, we question whether more threats to Tehran would lead to reduced presence in Syria.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Governance, Elections, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, Syria, North America, and United States of America

6. Iran’s Preferred Outcome in Syria: An Open-End or a Formal Agreement?

Author:
Hassan Ahmadian
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Iran’s security concerns drove its involvement in the Syrian crisis back in 2011. With an evolving strategy over the past nine years, Tehran has upgraded its Syria policy in accordance with the ongoing developments on the ground, moving from military training based on the Iranian Basij model, to regionalising this model (as was the case in Iraq with the Popular Mobilization Forces) and encouraging Russian military involvement. In what may be seen as the final stage, Iran is backing its Syrian ally as well as allied militias to balance against other main stakeholders. Iran is attempting to solidify military gains by continuing to back a political process that is properly representative of warring parties and ensures a smooth transition of power, and one whose outcomes will not undermine Iranian geopolitical interests in the country.
Topic:
Security, Development, Military Strategy, Regionalism, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Syria

7. Russian and Iranian Economic Interests In Syria (Pre-2010 and intra-war period)

Author:
Hamidreza Azizi and Leonid Issaev
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Discussion paper for the workshop on: “The Politics and Modalities of Reconstruction in Syria”, Geneva, Switzerland, 7-8 February 2019. There has historically been low levels of trade and investment from both Russia and Iran with Syria, with trade in military items being a notable exception. While the trade relationship between Syria and its two main allies predates the conflict, levels of trade had been remarkably low before the crisis, in contrast to mainstream perceptions. Yet, these figures cannot be confirmed due to unavailability of a comprehensive record of the Syrian bilateral relationship with Iran and Russia. Internationally imposed sanctions have discouraged Russian and Iranian companies from doing business with Syria. Lacking any other resources, the only way that Syrian could repay debts to its allies would be to grant exclusive access to energy and natural resources. This however would reduce the public revenue needed to rebuild state institutions, and also encourage foreign rivalry over economic opportunities. As Syria lacks any coordination mechanism for post-war economic reconstruction, Russia and Iran have set their eyes on the energy sector, where Russia has the upper hand. Yet, cooperation is also possible in other sectors, such as Syria’s rail sector. In order to understand the Russian and Iranian economic relationship with Syria, two factors should be considered. First is the informal relationship between Syria and its two allies, which has taken the form of unofficial agreements and trade. These would be important when sanctions are lifted. The second factor is military exports to Syria, expected to be large, given the scale of war and Syrian reliance on Russia and Iran. Due to lack of official data, this paper will not consider both issues.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, Conflict, Syrian War, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, and Syria