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Begin New Search Topic Nuclear Power Political Geography Global Focus Content Type Working Paper Publishing Institution James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

1. he Other Fissile Material: Strengthening National and International Plutonium Management Approaches

Author:
John Carlson, Leonard Spector, and Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
CNS Occasional Paper #42 discusses issues relating to separated, or unirradiated, plutonium in civilian nuclear programs, that is, plutonium that has been chemically separated from spent nuclear reactor fuel by reprocessing but has not been reintroduced into a nuclear reactor after separation and subjected to further irradiation. Efforts to limit the spread of reprocessing in the civilian sector crystalized in the mid-1970s. Two developments triggered the intensified attention to this issue: (1) India’s 1974 test of a nuclear explosive device, which used as its core plutonium produced in an ostensibly peaceful nuclear-research program, and (2) attempts on the part of several states that had not renounced nuclear weapons to obtain reprocessing plants for their civil nuclear power programs. In the intervening forty-four years, in those states that proceeded with civilian reprocessing programs, stocks of separated civilian plutonium have continued to grow in the aggregate. Taken together today, they are substantially greater than worldwide military plutonium stocks. Multiple approaches to limiting the separation of civil plutonium have been implemented, and still others have been given serious study, but stocks have increased regardless, while options for working down these stocks appear to be diminishing. Meanwhile, concern has deepened over the possible theft or diversion of this material, which could bring weapon-sufficient quantities of plutonium into the hands of violent extremists. International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards are valuable, but they do not fully address the risks of breakout from nonproliferation or disarmament commitments. Safeguards are intended to provide timely warning of diversion, so as to provide an opportunity for intervention. However, even if diversion of plutonium is detected immediately, the plutonium could be weaponized too quickly for effective preventive measures. Nor are safeguards designed to address nuclear-material security issues. Accordingly, there is a need for institutional and technical measures to mitigate risks from separated plutonium. This report recommends steps to address the risks posed by existing reprocessing programs and stocks as well as ways to discourage potential new programs.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Governance, Nuclear Power, and Mining
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Understanding Nuclear Weapon Risks: Non-State Actors and Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Elena Sokova
Publication Date:
04-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
CNS Deputy Director Elena K. Sokova discusses risks of nuclear weapons and materials falling into wrong hands and provides an assessment of international efforts to deny terrorists and non-state actors access to these weapons and materials in her chapter in the new UNIDIR study Understanding Nuclear Risks.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Terrorism, Non State Actors, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3. Open-Source Monitoring of Uranium Mining and Milling for Nuclear Nonproliferation Applications

Author:
Jeffrey Lewis, Melissa Hanham, Joshua Pollack, Catherine Dill, and Raymond Wang
Publication Date:
12-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Uranium mines and mills offer an important focus for the analysis of fissile-material production. It is possible to combine traditional research techniques with new tools and technologies to estimate the production of yellowcake uranium. Such estimates can, in turn, be used to roughly estimate the throughput of a country’s nuclear fuel cycle. In some cases, this may help researchers to determine whether undeclared fuel cycle facilities exist and to estimate their capacity. This CNS Occasional Paper is the first in a series of papers funded by the MacArthur Foundation. It deals primarily with how researchers can use open-source information to monitor uranium mining and milling in the service of arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation goals. Additional monographs will provide regional cases studies in North Korea, China, India, and Pakistan to demonstrate what these methods can reveal—and what they cannot. The final monographs look at the emerging, and potentially revolutionary, role of remote sensing for this application and gives policy recommendations.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Nuclear Power, Nonproliferation, Mining, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Improving the Security of All Nuclear Materials

Author:
Mark Fitzpatrick, Elena Sokova, Miles A. Pomper, Laura Rockwood, Ferenc Dalnkoki-Veress, and Matthew Cottee
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
About four-fifths of the weapons-usable nuclear materials in the world are in non-civilian programmes. This means not only as the explosive core in active or reserve nuclear weapons, but also as fuel in naval and military research reactors, highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium at production sites, in storage, or declared excess to military uses, but not yet transferred to other programmes or eliminated. Yet coordinated global efforts to enhance the security of nuclear materials have been almost exclusively concentrated on the estimated 17% of such nuclear materials in the civilian sector. Ideally, all HEU and plutonium of the same grade should have at least the same level of adequate security regardless of the possessor or purpose, since the materials pose the same threat. In practice, however, the security of materials can vary depending on whether they are used in the civilian or military sectors. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (CPPNMNF – as the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was renamed after the 2005 amendment came into force in May 2016), as well as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) security guidelines such as INFCIRC/225/Rev.5, describe how civilian materials should be secured. No such explicit guidelines exist on how to secure materials outside of the civilian sector. Nor is there comprehensive public knowledge about the state of security of such materials in all countries with nuclear weapons programmes. It has often been asserted that nuclear materials in non-civilian use are well protected because they are under military control. However, the number of troubling security breaches involving nuclear material in military use, as well as some examples involving civilian nuclear facilities, belies this casual assumption, underscoring why the world should not simply accept the unsubstantiated ‘solemn word’ of authorities that security is as tight as needed. The list of incidents includes insider threats, peaceful incursions for demonstration purposes, theft, armed attack, and, most recently, over-flights by drones and computer hacking. Our report includes a number of examples of incidents at civilian facilities as well because they demonstrate areas of vulnerability that may also apply to the noncivilian sector. The record offers a compelling case for why security must be enhanced for all nuclear material.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Global Focus