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Begin New Search Topic Military Strategy Political Geography Europe Content Type Working Paper Publishing Institution EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations Publication Year within 10 Years

1. The Russian Soldiers’ Question Revisited

Author:
Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The Russian authorities apply an “algorithm of lies”, the Russian armed forces have become a sealed organization, and tactical information about Russia’s war in Ukraine is fragmented and unreliable. Hence, definite conclusions concerning the Russian soldier cannot be drawn.
Topic:
Security, War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

2. Mobilizing Against Russia? Some Reflections on the Security Deadlock Called Ukraine

Author:
Joris Van Bladel
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
No event exists beyond the media. This is also the case with the current Russian-Ukraine war. Daily, we are flooded with analyses and opinions about Putin’s military threat in the East. These narratives – mostly polemical and shrill – are both the result of and the catalyst for the crisis. As such, the debate itself – consciously or unconsciously – becomes part of the Western-Russian standoff driven by the strategy of hybrid and decision-centric warfare. This essay deliberately distances itself from the issues of the day and the hyper-polarized debate that currently takes place. Instead, a more detached exercise is made in which the polyphonic nature of the past and the intricacy of history is deliberately sought out. It shows the complexity of the process we have gone through, leading to the current deadlock. As such, we have to face the changes and continuities with which we have been confronted, or as Jeffrey Frank recently wrote in The New Yorker, “If a lot has changed since the end of the Cold War, there’s much that hasn’t.”
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. Will a European Security Council Bring Strategic Relevance?

Author:
Jo Coelmont
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Europe is looking to be a global player rather than just a global playground. To achieve this, it needs a security council. This is essential for gaining strategic relevance. Europe needs to have recourse not only to international fora but also to a series of instruments of hard and soft power. Swift decision making at the appropriate level is of paramount importance. Such a security council should meet a number of requirements: it must be representative, be able to both achieve unity of vision and undertake action smoothly, and keep going until the desired end-state has been achieved. Several proposals have been made as to the composition of such a body. I will look into the four most discussed options. Are we spoilt for choice?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

4. Dealing with Russia: Towards a Coherent Belgian Policy

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer and Laura Vansina
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Belgo-Russian relations are mired in paradox. For several years, the relationship between the Russian Federation on the one hand and the EU and NATO on the other has been characterized by mistrust. As a founding member of these multilateral organisations, Belgium has been a full part of the decision-making process that has formulated a hardening stance towards the Russian Federation. Yet on a bilateral level, Belgium has pragmatically upheld what is left of commercial cooperation and cultural exchanges. In order to deal with this paradox, Belgium should formulate a more coherent approach towards Russia that focuses on upholding the European order and security whilst maintaining dialogue and engaging the Russian Federation. This requires the new Belgian government to engage in a delicate balancing act that can be articulated in the forthcoming National Security Strategy, in the Belgian positions in the EU and NATO, and in the bilateral relationship with Moscow. This Egmont Paper aspires to provide both analytical background and novel ideas which can be used to such a purpose. When analysing Russian foreign policy, it can only be acknowledged that the annex- ation of Crimea in 2014 fundamentally challenged the rules-based international order. Yet to understand Russian behaviour, it is imperative to reach back in time to the late 1990s and early 2000s. Ever since, Russia’s main goal on the international stage has been the re-establishment of its Great Power status. To this end, it has sought to consolidate security buffers in the form of geographical and psychological depth. Most notably, it involved the promotion of the ‘Russian World’ (Russkiy Mir), the conduct of operations in the grey zone between war and peace, and a fair dose of strategic opportunism. Whilst perhaps understandable, this assertive foreign policy has negatively affected Belgian interests in a variety of ways. Belgo-Russian relations constitute a true kaleidoscope ranging from cooperation to conflict. Bilateral trade has largely recovered from the 2014-2015 shock resulting from the sanctions regime – even if the trade balance remains a negative one. Cultural and academic exchanges continue, in line with the little-known 1993 Belgo- Russian Treaty on Understanding and Cooperation. Yet politically, conflict has been on the increase. Russia has been actively challenging and contesting the multilateral framework that Belgium holds dear. In addition, Belgium has become the target of Russian disinformation and other grey zone operations. As it is unlikely that Russia will tone down its assertive foreign policy anytime soon, Belgium would do well to articulate a more coherent approach. This needs to clarify Belgian policy priorities, communicate Belgian positions towards the Russian government, and educate the domestic audience about the evolving relationship with the Russian Federation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Belgium

5. Belgium Should Not Change Strategy on Her Contribution to NATO's Nuclear Role Sharing

Author:
Didier Audenaert
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
In this policy brief, the author focusses on NATO’s nuclear dimension. He highlights key challenges in the European security environment and explains essential charac- teristics of NATO’s deterrence and collective defence, and its contribution to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. He then briefly describes the contributions of NATO’s nuclear states (and in particular France’s) to collective security and defence. All Allies (except France) participate in the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG), NATO’s senior body on nuclear matters. NATO’s nuclear role sharing is at the heart of this policy brief: US nuclear weapons carried by European dual-capable aircraft (DCA). The author argues emphatically as to why American nuclear weapons should be kept on European soil and the current DCA countries should maintain the status quo. Tangible recommendations follow on in terms of Belgian’s foreign security policy and defence, many of which are also highly likely to apply to other DCA countries.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, Belgium, and North America

6. American Sanctions and European Sovereignty

Author:
Jean De Ruyt
Publication Date:
02-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The decision by the United States to withdraw from the “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action” and re-impose sanctions on Iran broke an international understanding, sanctioned by a UN Security Council Resolution. However, European and other non-US companies dealing with Iran must abide by US law in order to avoid its extra- territorial effects on their US operations. Efforts are being made to help the EU keep its “sovereignty” on sanction issues when there is disagreement with the US, but until now these have not accomplished much. Therefore a new Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) was launched at the end of January to ensure the continuation of some trade with Iran. But the only convincing way to allow the EU to increase its autonomy is to boost the role of the Euro in international transactions. Certainly, in today’s unpredictable world, we need more than ever to address the issue of the extraterritorial application of American sanctions – today it is Iran, what if tomorrow it is China?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Sovereignty, Military Strategy, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and North America

7. European Strategic Autonomy: Which Military Level of Ambition?

Author:
Jo Coelmont
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The EU Global Strategy is crystal clear on the EU’s political level of ambition yet remarkably silent on the corresponding military level of ambition. But strategy without capabilities is just a hallucination. Recent developments in the EU make it possible, however, for the Member States to agree on an appropriate and affordable military level of ambition. The aim: to conduct autonomous crisis management operations and to contribute substantially to territorial defence within the NATO framework. We should not forget that the European countries have the primary responsibility for the territorial defence of their own continent.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

8. Europe in a multipolar missile world – Why the EU and NATO should not try to salvage the INF Treaty

Author:
Bruno Hellendorff
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
On 1 February 2019, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that his country had suspended its compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, or INF Treaty, and would withdraw from it within six months. The INF Treaty, little known outside of arms control and disarmament circles, was a landmark Cold War agreement between the United States of America and the USSR – the first to ban an entire category of weapons (ground-based medium- and intermediate-range missiles). The US withdrawal, announced in dramatic terms by President Donald Trump in October 2018, followed the claim that Russia had recently developed and fielded a missile with performances forbidden by the INF Treaty. The end of this little-known treaty is not anecdotal. Not only will it further strain the US-Russia relationship and antagonise allies, it will also contribute to the erosion of what is left of the global arms-control architecture and incentivise arms-race behav- iours among great powers. In a world where security is increasingly less a question of multilateral deliberation and rules-based interactions, the end of the INF Treaty is a further signal that missile technologies are again becoming a venue for competition between great powers: only this time, at least three are playing the game (United States, China and Russia) rather than two (United States and USSR). Additionally, missile technology proliferation has turned into a major dimension of contemporary battlefield realities, and missile programmes of countries such as Iran and North Korea continue to pose important diplomatic and non-proliferation challenges. Meanwhile, Europe is, by and large, left watching as its regional security architecture erodes. Welcome to what US National Security Advisor John Bolton recently termed ‘a multipolar missile world’. The EU should not try to salvage the INF Treaty. Its diplomatic capital might be better spent in areas where it could potentially make a difference, rather than in a treaty to which it is not even party. Existing multilateral regimes and agreements with the EU or its Member States as parties are already in dire need of reinforcement in the face of technological progress, a volatile diplomatic environment and self-centred, competitive political narratives. These include, inter alia, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) framework (including its Structured Dialogue), multilateral export control regimes (MECR) like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), transparency and trust-building mechanisms like the Hague Code of Conduct against missile proliferation (HCoC), and nuclear-related frame- works like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or ‘Iran deal’) or the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Process. These, however, may simply fail to meet the challenge of a multipolar missile world. Renewed efforts, both conceptual and in the realm of capabilities, are needed in a NATO framework to reinforce the linkage between deterrence and diplomacy. NATO-EU dialogue and cooperation on defence issues could be further enhanced, and European countries should work more with like-minded partners at both bilat- eral or multilateral levels on the challenges of non-proliferation and disarmament in the twenty-first century. The demise of the INF Treaty should therefore re-energise the debate on European strategic autonomy, help support collective capability building – not least in NATO – and prompt new discussions on stronger multilateral rules on missile development, use and proliferation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

9. Autonomy and Strategy: What Should Europe Want?

Author:
Jolyon Howorth
Publication Date:
04-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Europe wants autonomy and it wants a strategy. Semantically, of course, “wants” has a double meaning. First, it means “lacks”. Europe lacks autonomy and it lacks a strategy. The second meaning of wants is “desires”. Here, we have a genuine question. How many EU member states genuinely desire autonomy for the EU? How many are genuinely in favor of a grand strategy – as opposed to the EU’s default practice of just muddling through? And there is also a third meaning behind wants: “needs”. In my view, the EU needs strategic autonomy. But having said that, all I have done is set a point of arrival. How to get there?
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe

10. Belgian Special Forces in the Sahel: A Minimal Footprint with Maximal Output?

Author:
Nina Wilen
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
In a shifting geopolitical context, the Belgian Defence has intensified its presence in the Sahel region and developed a new strategic military collaboration with Niger through Operation New Nero. This policy brief critically examines the strategy and identifies three challenges for the future of the operation: Niger’s democratic development, the asymmetry between the Western Partner Nation’s capabilities, and diverging agendas within the Belgian Defence. To counter these challenges, it is suggested that the minimalist approach and the social networks which enable horizontal collaboration among partners are maintained, while new civil-military opportunities are explored. On a broader level, it is recommended that Belgium aligns its political and military agendas to achieve long- term strategies geopolitical regions of importance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Belgium, Sahel, and Niger

11. The End of the INF-Treaty: Context and Consequences

Author:
Didier Audenaert
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
On 2 August both the US and the Russian Federation will no longer be restrained by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (1987). Early this century it gradually became clear that Russia wanted to step out of the Treaty, by which it felt itself to be solely restrained. European nations should now take up a greater share of the burden of missile defence, which should get a broader mission than it has today. The debate on EU strategic autonomy can be an instrument in this endeavour. Because of the worsening security environment NATO’s non- strategic nuclear capability becomes even more important. European NATO allies and EU member states may very soon be confronted with difficult and fundamental choices for a future without the INF Treaty, which need to be communicated and explained to their national population.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, European Union, and INF Treaty
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

12. Articulating the Logic of Nuclear-Sharing

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements often get bad press. This is remarkable given the fact that they have demonstrably contributed to (a) countering the proliferation of nuclear arsenals in Europe, (b) fostering alliance cohesion by giving non-nuclear weapon states a voice on the nuclear posture of the alliance, and (c) making nuclear deterrence more effective militarily by offering a wider array of force options. When the relative merits of extended nuclear deterrence are unknown, public support thereof is likely to suffer. In order to enrich the debate about NATO’s nuclear policy, this Security Policy Brief articulates the threefold logic of nuclear-sharing.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

13. 919-2019: How to Make Peace Last? European Strategy and the Future of the World Order

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The commemorations of the Great War have come to and end. 2019 will see the centenary of the peace treaties that concluded the war, starting with Versailles, and of the founding of the League of Nations, the predecessor of the United Nations. These failed to establish a stable rules-based world order, but they deserve to be commemorated nonetheless, as well as analysed, for we might learn something from them. This policy brief offers four insights from the Interbellum to help us avoid a collapse of the world order today: (1) A world order that is created for the express purpose of keeping one of the great powers outside the system, is bound to fail. (2) If breaking the rules carries no consequences, the world order will be hollowed out and, eventually, collapse. (3) A great power who refuses to invest in the world order, cannot expect the others to do so. (4) No state voluntarily submits to another: a world order that is only imposed and not accepted, will not last long.
Topic:
International Cooperation, International Organization, United Nations, Military Strategy, Peace, and League of Nations
Political Geography:
Europe

14. The Resurgence of Bilateral Diplomacy in Europe

Author:
Alexander Mattelaer
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
As the conduct of international relations is changing in tone, bilateral diplomacy is back in vogue. This trend does not leave the European continent unaffected: intergovernmental bargaining is on the rise. Many EU member state capitals make good use of their diplomatic network across the continent to better understand what other member states aspire to achieve, and to promote their own voice within the European system. This Egmont Paper seeks to shed conceptual clarity on the resurgence of bilateral diplomacy in Europe. Firstly, it argues that in the absence of multilateral successes, bilateral approaches constitute the fall-back position for structuring the international system. Secondly, it explains in what ways bilateral networks add political depth to intra-European relationships. Thirdly, it addresses the question whether the revival of bilateralism in Europe inevitably undermines supranational institutions. It concludes one must appreciates the conspicuous complementarity between the two approaches: bilateralism and multilateralism may well alternate in prominence, but can also reinforce one another. By way of postscript, it considers the implications this analysis entails for Belgium’s diplomatic posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

15. Fighting for Europe. European Strategic Autonomy and the Use of Force

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Strategic autonomy: yes! But to do what exactly? To protect ourselves, or to protect others, outside Europe, as well? To protect ourselves by defeating the enemy on his own ground, in Europe’s neighbourhood or further afield? Or only by making sure he doesn’t breach the walls of Europe? To protect us from all enemies, or only from some? Who is the “enemy” anyway? The June 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS) for the first time explicitly mentions strategic autonomy as an objective for the Union, and that raises a lot of questions. Sven Biscop argues that the EU’s priorities should be: (1) In the short term, to further strengthen its strategic autonomy in protecting our domestic security, and to achieve full strategic autonomy in crisis response, across the whole spectrum of operations, in our broad neighbourhood. (2) In the medium term, to achieve a significant degree of autonomy in securing Europe’s “connectivity” with the world, in space, air space and cyberspace and on the seas. (3) In the long term, to achieve a significant degree of autonomy for the European Allies and partners of NATO (who, pace Cyprus, happen to constitute the EU), to deter and defend against threats against our territory, in case the attention of our main non-EU allies is pulled away by contingencies outside the North Atlantic area.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Autonomy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

16. European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
At their 1998 Saint-Malo Summit, the UK and France initiated the creation of a military arm for the European Union, now known as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Ever since, EU member states have consistently claimed that more cooperation between their armed forces is the only way to significantly increase military capability. Successive projects have been proposed, yet none has ever really been implemented.Sceptics can therefore be forgiven for eyeing the EU’s latest initiative, known as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), with some suspicion – not least because the EU has already tried and failed to activate PESCO, in 2010 after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

17. Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy: What does it mean for the European Union?

Author:
Nanae Baldauff
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Not so long ago Japan seemed to be left out on the diplomatic stage, notably when it decided not to join China’s newly established Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) in 2015. But while no one can deny China’s impressive global outreach under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Japan has not been sitting idly by. Quite the contrary, Japan is playing a leading role in shaping the concept of free and open Indo-Pacific region, and has positioned itself as an important political actor that upholds the rule of law under its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (FOIP). As China becomes more and more assertive economically and militarily, strengthening ties with Japan becomes all the more important for the European Union (EU). As a strategic partner of Japan, the EU more than ever needs to work with Japan in upholding the liberal international order.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Investment
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Asia, and Indo-Pacific